Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CONFLICTS OF LAW
I.
JURISDICTION
1. TYPES OF JURISDICTION
G.R. No. L-18164 January 23, 1967
WILLIAM F. GEMPERLE vs. HELEN SCHENKER and
PAUL SCHENKER
1.
WHAT LAW GOVERNS; APPROVAL OF
PROJECT OF PARTITION. Article 10 of the old Civil
Code (Article 16, new Civil Code) provides that the validity of
testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national
law of the person whose succession is in question. In case at
bar, the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada. Since the
laws of said state allow the testator to dispose of all his
property according to his will, his testamentary dispositions
depriving his wife and children of what should be their
legitimes under the laws of the Philippines, should be
respected and the project of partition made in accordance with
his testamentary dispositions should be approved.
1.
JURISDICTION OVER A NON-RESIDENT
DEFENDANT; SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON AN
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT; EFFECT. Where a non-resident
alien had constituted his wife as his attorney-in-fact had
authorized her to sue, and the latter in fact had sued on his
behalf, and as a result thereof a suit was brought against him
and a service of summons addressed to him on the latter case
was served personally on his wife, his attorney-in-fact; the
court had acquired jurisdiction over his person, he having
empowered her to sue, so that she was also in effect
empowered to represent him in suits filed against him.
2.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW IF
INTRODUCED IN EVIDENCE. The pertinent law of the
state of the testator may be taken judicial notice of without
proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the
project of partition where it appears that said law was admitted
by the court as exhibit during the probate of the will; that the
same was introduced as evidence of a motion of one of the
appellants for withdrawal of a certain sum of money; and that
the other appellants do not dispute the said law.
2.
CROSS-COMPLAINT. I. S. P. in her crosscomplaint brought suit against E. A. P. and the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of
the Supreme Court of the State of New York and asked the
court below to render judgment enforcing that New York
judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of
action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and
which falls within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, to adjudicate, settle and determine.
2.
ZEDAKIAH NOTES
Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither
.are they "doing business in the Philippines." Likewise, the
main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of
the Philippines.
ZEDAKIAH NOTES
II.
3.
WILL OF AMERICAN CITIZEN. The intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will of a citizen of one of the
American States, proved under Section 636 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, is governed by the laws of the State of which
he is a citizen.
4.
CITIZENSHIP; AMERICANS RESIDENT IN
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. When a person who is a citizen of
the United States and therefore also a citizen of the State in
which he was born or naturalized becomes a resident of the
Philippine Islands, he cannot acquire a new citizenship here;
and he must be assumed to retain his State citizenship along
with his status as a citizen of the United States.
5.
JUDICIAL NOTICE. The courts of the Philippine
Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of
the various States of the American Union, although they may
take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress.
2.
2.
MARRIAGE; DOCTRINE OF "PROCESSUAL
PRESUMPTION" APPLIED IN PHILIPPINE LAW.
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to
the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is
valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad,
Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code)
ZEDAKIAH NOTES
Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office
accompanying the copy of the public document. No such
certificate could be found in the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is
objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence.
According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is
involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a
duly authenticated copy of the statute.
III.
AL.
vs.
POEA
In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not the
rights of the workers as provided by the Labor Code, but the
provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain,
which ipso facto amended the worker's contracts of
employment. Respondents consciously failed to conform to
these provisions which specifically provide for the increase of
the worker's rate. It was only after June 30, 1983, four months
after the brown builders brought a suit against B & R in
Bahrain for this same claim, when respondent AIBC's
contracts have undergone amendments in Bahrain for the new
hires/renewals.
ZEDAKIAH NOTES
not agree with the POEA Administrator that this three-year
prescriptive period applies only to money claims specifically
recoverable under the Philippine Labor Code. Article 291
gives no such indication. Likewise, We can not consider
complainants' cause/s of action to have accrued from a
violation of their employment contracts. There was no
violation; the claims arise from the benefits of the law of the
country where they worked.
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have
prescribed under the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that
there is in force in the Philippines a "borrowing law," which is
Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where such
kind of law exists, it takes precedence over the common-law
conflicts rule.
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on
prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the
governing law.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
"A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be
actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the
expiry of the contract".
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied
in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so
forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even
if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of
Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a
law.
ZEDAKIAH NOTES
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed
only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures as to
which were inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or
contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48
cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the
application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forum's public policy. To enforce the oneyear prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as
regards the claims in question would contravene the public
policy on the protection to labor.
4.
RULE OF RESORTING TO THE LAW OF THE
DOMICILE IN DETERMINING MATTERS WITH
FOREIGN ELEMENT INVOLVED. The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of
matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the
person of the owner.
5.
COURT OF DOMICILE BOUND TO APPLY ITS
OWN LAW AS DIRECTED IN THE CONFLICT OF LAW
RULE OF DECEDENT'S STATE; APPLICATION OF THE
RENVOI DOCTRINE. The conflict of law rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, refers back the case, when
a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of
domicile can not and should refer the case back to California,
as such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination, because the case will then be tossed back and
forth between the two states. If the question has to be decided,
the Philippine court must apply its own law as the Philippines
was the domicile of the decedent, as directed in the conflict of
law rule of the state of the decedent, California, and especially
because the internal law of California provides no legitime for
natural children, while the Philippine law (Articles 887 (4) and
894, Civil Code of the Philippines) makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
vs.
HELEN
1.
PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL
LAW;
DETERMINATION OF CITIZENSHIP; U.S. CITIZENSHIP
NOT LOST BY STAY IN PHILIPPINES BEFORE
INDEPENDENCE. The citizenship that the deceased
acquired in California when he resided there from 1904 to
1913 was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter
was a territory of the United States until 1946, and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951
he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never intended to abandon his California citizenship
by acquiring another.
6.
PHILIPPINE LAW TO BE APPLIED IN CASE AT
BAR. As the domicile of the deceased, who was a citizen
of California, was the Philippines, the validity of the
provisions of his will depriving his acknowledge natural child
of the latter's legacy, should be governed by the Philippine
law, pursuant to Article 946 of the Civil Code of California,
not by the law of California.
2.
VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS;
MEANING OF "NATIONAL LAW" IN ARTICLE 16, CIVIL
CODE; CONFLICT OF LAW RULES IN CALIFORNIA TO
BE APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply
to any general American law, because there is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the union having its own private law
applicable to its citizen only and in force only within the state.
It can therefore refer to no other than the private law of the
state of which the decedent was a citizen. In the case at bar,
the State of California, prescribes two sets of laws for its
ZEDAKIAH NOTES
even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that
the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern,
the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless,
if Texas has a conflict of law rule adopting the situs theory
(lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.
3
Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in
their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article
17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c)
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed.
PERSONAL LAW
1. NATIONAL LAW
ZEDAKIAH NOTES
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
"en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine bill had effected
in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
2.
DOMICILE
7.
DOMICILE; A MINOR FOLLOWS THE
DOMICILE OF HIS PARENTS; CASE AT BENCH. A
minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once
acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in
spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban,
Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This
domicile was not established only when her father brought his
family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's
averments.
2.
RESIDENCE, CONSTRUED. Residence, in its
ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a
person in a given area, community or country.
8.
REQUISITES TO EFFECT CHANGE OF
DOMICILE. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts
which correspond with the purpose.
3.
DIFFERENTIATED FROM RESIDENCE. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is
that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose
for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may
seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health.
If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to
have different residences in various places. However, a person
can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice.
9.
CASE AT BENCH. In the absence of clear and
positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing
concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence
requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at
bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly
lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this
court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment
requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with
one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
4.
RESIDENCE USED SYNONYMOUSLY WITH
DOMICILE. For political purposes the concepts of
residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact
that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile.
5.
ABSENCE FROM PERMANENT RESIDENCE
WITHOUT INTENTION TO ABANDON IT DOES NOT
RESULT IN LOSS OR CHANGE OF DOMICILE. So
settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in
these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that
10.
MARRIAGE, NOT A CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
DOMICILE. In this connection, it cannot be correctly
argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation
ZEDAKIAH NOTES
of law as a result of her marriage to the, late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1954. For there is a clearly established
distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence." The presumption that the wife automatically gains
the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage
cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in
Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one
area where the two concepts are well delineated. A survey of
jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of
domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon
marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female
spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of
the husband's choice of residence upon marriage. Article 110
is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code
of 1889: La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde
quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo,
podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el
marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia"
in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the
husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article
clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to
a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover,
this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase
"cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same
provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his
residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the
family to another home or place of actual residence. The
article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile
which is a fixed, fairly-permanent concept when it plainly
connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to
another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem
fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the
concept of actual residence. Very significantly, Article 110 of
the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109
which obliges the husband and wife to live together. The duty
to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife
are physically together. This takes into account the situations
where the couple has many residences (as in the case of
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one
of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in
order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to
conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to
"residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for
professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various)
residences.
11.
TERM RESIDENCE REFERS TO "ACTUAL
RESIDENCE." The term residence may mean one thing in
civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in
political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil
Code is concerned affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife the term residence should only be
interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessatium.
Applying case law to the present case, it can be said that the
respondent effectively abandoned her residency in the
Philippines by her acquisition of the status of a permanent
U.S. resident. Nonetheless, we find that the respondent
reacquired her residency in the Philippines even before the
holding of the May 2001 elections. The records show that she
surrendered her green card to the Immigration and
ZEDAKIAH NOTES
Naturalization Service of the American Embassy way back in
1998. By such act, her intention to abandon her U.S. residency
could not have been made clearer. Moreover, when she
decided to relocate to the Philippines for good in 1993, she
continued living here and only went to the U.S.A. on periodic
visits to her children who were residing there. Moreover, she
was elected Mayor in the 1998 elections and served as such
for the duration of her term. We find such acts sufficient to
establish that the respondent intended to stay in the Philippines
indefinitely and, ultimately, that she has once again made the
Philippines her permanent residence.
10