City As a System Analytical Framework: A

Structured Analytical Approach to

Understanding and Acting in Urban
Environments
By Mark Lomedico and Elizabeth M. Bartels
Journal Article | Aug 4 2015 - 2:47pm

City As a System Analytical Framework: A Structured Analytical Approach to Understanding and

Acting in Urban Environments
Mark Lomedico and Elizabeth M. Bartels
Introduction
On-going research on mega-cities highlights aspects of large, unplanned cities that make them an
operational challenge. This work has a clear perspective on the potential threats posed by cities, and
makes the case that current doctrine is ill prepared to manage these problems. However, these research
efforts have focused on the conceptual challenges of cities rather than practical approaches to analyzing
and operating in urban environments. In response, Caerus Associates has created an analytical framework
to enable military analysts and planners to develop a systems perspective of the urban operational
environment. The framework is designed to enable the continuous updating of analysis and premised on
the idea of iteration in the face of a changing environment. This article discusses the characteristics of
urban environments, suggests opportunities, as well as challenges, resulting from urban complexity, and
describes the frameworks approach to understanding and acting in urban settings.
Background
Caerus Associates developed an analytical framework for assessing urban environments to support current
military planning and analysis processes. The purpose of the project was to develop a nuanced way of
understanding hyper-connected cities, highlighting interactions between the physical and social domains.
Building on ideas developed by Caerus founder David Kilcullen in his book Out of the Mountains, the
teams work drew on current social science research, best practices curated through interviews with
military and intelligence organizations, and team members own operational experience. Caerus
rigorously tested the framework using workshops, case studies, and wargames over the course of 15
months. These engagements with general purpose and special operations forces, the intelligence
community, and academia ensured that the framework was useful to, and usable by operational staffs
during analysis and planning.
The Urban Environments Challenges
Rapid and unplanned urbanization continues to concentrate the global population in cities. A growing

consensus of military thinkers argue that as cities struggle to plan for and manage this growth, threats to
US interests will require US military engagement.[i] In some cases, these threats will take the form of nonstate actors empowered by gaps in host-nation capacity. In others, normal urban functions will be
overcome by natural disasters or popular unrest. As a result, the US military will be called to conduct
decisive action (offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities[ii]) in cities.[iii] Many of
these missions will not be adversary-centric, requiring analysis of the environment be given the same level
of emphasis traditionally given to the adversary.
In order to be successful in cities, military analysts and planners will require tools to understand urban
environments. The City As a System Analytical Framework describes the urban environment and
recommends a systems approach to analysis. Cities are complex, adaptive systems due to their
connectedness; their unique terrain; and the diversity of territorial controllers (each explained in more
detail below). These qualities lead to a high density of interaction between the population, infrastructure,
and the physical terrain, which overwhelms traditional reductive analysis. Systems approaches to analysis
seek to understand these interactions and how they contribute to broad patterns of behavior over space and
time.
The framework is not unique in advocating a systems approach to understanding the connected, complex
nature of urban environments. Many academic and military thinkers have argued that adopting a systems
approach is crucial to understanding urban environments. For example, urban operations subject matter
expert Russell Glenn wrote: Urban areas are by nature systems, which are themselves parts of even larger
systems.[iv] More recent writings within the military have also taken this approach. The Chief of Staff
of the Armys Strategic Studies Group stated: "...Simply understanding the behavior of individual parts of
a complex system is insufficient. One must develop an appreciation for the whole of the system to
comprehend the behavior of its sub-components."[v] Other Army thinkers have agreed, arguing:
Megacities can be best described as systems of systems, comparable to a living organism. They are
dynamic environments that change not only block by block, but day to day. While this is not a new idea,
the magnitude of the challenge to gain situational understanding is significantly greater due to the
complexity, density, and scale of the physical and human terrain.[vi]
Connected and Data Rich
Cities are saturated with information due to their internal and external connectedness. The constant
interaction between people and between people and physical terrain creates a large amount of information,
which is collected by ubiquitous sensors throughout the urban environment. This rich data offers big data
analytical opportunities, but it can also be overwhelming for analysts, risking the loss of critical signals in
the noise of the city. For example, those seeking concealment in urban environments must work carefully
to remain unobserved, but for those who are able to blend into the daily patterns of urban life, detection
can be extremely difficult. Data is also difficult to interpret, and changes rapidly over time. Residents cope
with size, density, and complexity by developing personalized understandings of the city, which can cause
conflicting interpretations and observations of how elements of the urban environment work and their
importance. Cities also change due to both outside stimuli and due to interactions between elements of the
city over time.
As a result of urban connectedness, methods for gathering necessary information about cities differ from
methods used in traditional environments. Analysts need to be prepared to leverage open source
information and local perspectives. However, they must also be prepared to synthesize multiple,
conflicting perspectives and dynamic information. Better intelligence collection requirements, and
structured but flexible approaches to store and share date will be critical to sense making in these
environments. Additionally, traditional analytical methods that silo information do not enable analysts to

observe relationships that exist in the environment. This presents a problemone that the framework
seeks to remedyas the urban environment is hyper-connected and thus yields many cross-cutting
relationships.
Unique Terrain
As a result of the growing size of cities and connectivity, cities no longer terminate at their administrative
edges. Expanding populations settle in outlying neighborhoods, slowly connecting cities to neighboring
urban centers to form uninterrupted areas of settlement. Resulting urban agglomerationssuch as the
northeast corridor of the US with its string of urban settlements from Washington DC to Bostonfunction
as an integrated whole, even when outdated political divisions remain. Infrastructure, such as utility
systems and transit networks, also extend past administrative boundaries. Social networks connect the city
to people outside of the city, whether 5 miles outside or 5,000. These networks can influence certain
sectors of a citys population through information sharing, messaging, and an influx of money. As a result,
areas of operation determined by political boundaries fail to encompass the true extent of the cities social
and physical reach, removing potential threats and vectors of influence from the analysis.
Edgelessness requires a fundamental change in approach to urban operations. Existing joint concepts
stress the importance of isolating cities before undertaking urban operations.[vii] Caerus findings,
however, conclude that it is very difficult to cordon and lay siege to a medium or large city. Urban
agglomerations do not terminate in permissible areas, making it difficult to emplace walls and checkpoints
needed to isolate the city. Systematic clearing of city blocks requires battalions of forces that are rarely
available, leaving openings for enemies to reinfiltrate cleared areas. Even when resources are available,
cordoning a city and cutting off the flow of goods and people can cause long-term damage to the health of
the city, risking strategic defeat despite tactical victories. Instead, US forces can achieve micro-isolation
by denying the problem system of certain critical flows and nodes that may be accessible to friendly
forces. Alternatively, friendly forces may be able to work within the existing system, by strengthening
some aspects of the problem system allowing cities to continue to function while removing potential
threats. In some cases, these approaches can be achieved from outside of the city as urban connectedness
enables US forces to influence systems from afar.
Diversity of Controllers
Cities are rarely controlled by a single coherent actor. Most cities have social, political, economic, and
infrastructure hubs located in multiple places throughout the city. These hubs are often controlled by
different actors who influence the population by permitting or denying access to areas, people, goods, and
services. While the state attempts to create rules to make these centers legible and accessible to state rule,
[viii] often cities are too overwhelming to be completely managed by one actor. To compensate, the state
will devolve control to sub-state actors or non-governmental entities. In some cases, this is done in a very
controlled, official way, by granting authority over specific aspects of the city to approved entities, like
religious organizations and businesses. For example, states sometimes grant authority to churches to
manage behavior of their congregations. However, in other cases devolution occurs because the state lacks
the capacity, allowing unauthorized actors to gain control over an area.
As a result, analysts of, and operators in cities must be prepared to navigate interactions with a range of
powerful actors. Understanding the relationships between different actors, and how friendly and adversary
forces are connected as part of systems, is critical to effective operations. Furthermore, it is critical to
understand how territorial logics of the physical environment empower and constrain actors behavior.
The natural and man-made physical terrain shapes the behavior of adversary forces, friendly agencies, and
the population. Territorial logic refers to the strategies and behaviors of systems and actors resulting from

the limits of terrain.

City Size
Caerus findings indicate that population size is not a proxy for connectivity, unique terrain, or the
diversity of actors in the city. The difficulty of managing urban problems is not meaningfully reduced by
operating in a smaller city, if that city is still hyper-connected, edgeless, and exhibiting fractured control.
Size also rarely predicts whether a city is relevant to US national security interests, or permissible to US
actors on the ground.
Many stakeholders in the urban operations community of interest place an emphasis on megacitiescities
of 10 million or more peopleand their size, rapid growth, and scale. However, Caerus research shows
that megacities are not growing as quickly as are medium sized cities. In fact, the fastest growing cities are
cities with 500,000 to 1 million people in Asia and Africa.[ix] Furthermore, there are many more medium
sized cities than there are megacities. In 2014, there were 952 cities with populations between 500,000
and 5 million, 43 cities with populations between 5 and 10 million, and only 28 megacities, with
populations 10 million or more.[x] Caerus is not alone in reaching this finding.[xi] The complex, adaptive
nature of cities is present in small and large cities as well as megacities. The quantity of middleweight
cities might mean that the US military is more likely to operate in these medium sized cities than in
megacities. A similar argument is made in The Case Against Megacities by Michael Evans in
Parameters.[xii]
City As a System Analytical Framework
In light of these urban challenges, Caerus built a framework to enhance existing doctrinal planning and
analysis techniques. The framework is a method for developing a holistic perspective of the urban
environment and its problem systems in order to better aid US military course of action development and
course of action analysis. The framework also motivates data collection and organization practices to
address critical gaps, as well as long term collection to support baselining.
Design Principles
The framework encourages analysts to take a broad view of the urban operational environment by
combining adversary-, population-, and terrain-centric approaches that are common to various military
planning processes. The complexity of the urban environment makes it impossible to isolate these aspects
of the environment from one another. Terrain and infrastructure shape the behavior of not only friendly
and adversary forces, but also contribute to the behavior of the population. Adversary action affects both
the behavior of the population and the physical terrain of the city. In order to account for these
relationships, the framework encourages the consideration of friendly and adversary actors as part of the
environment, rather than as an isolated element of analysis.
Relatedly, the framework elevates the importance of the environment (to include physical and man-made
terrain, infrastructure, and the population) to the same level of emphasis given to the adversary.
Traditional intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) focuses heavily on the
adversary, their tactics, techniques, and procedures, and their most likely courses of action (COAs). The
framework posits that other aspects of the environmentlike infrastructure and the
populationcontribute to urban problems as much as, and perhaps more than, the adversary. Giving the
environment this level of emphasis and importance ensures analysts and planners are considering how the
system of systems across the physical and social domains impact the operational environment, a key
component of IPOE step 2.

Process
The framework is a three-step process: define the urban operational environment, frame and map urban
problem systems, and develop and analyze urban COAs.
Step I: Define the Urban Operational Environment guides analysts to develop an understanding of the
current and historical operational environment. The frameworks techniques offer lines of questions for
staffs to work though in order to gain an initial understanding of the urban environment. The framework
provides an ontology for urban environments that highlights 13 Significant Characteristics (illustrated in
Figure 1 below), and commonly occurring types for each.

Figure 1 Significant Characteristics of the Urban Operational Environment.

These characteristics and the research that goes into defining them helps analysts and planners understand
the connections between elements of the Urban Triad[xiii]the population, infrastructure, and physical
environment of the city. In contrast to traditional approaches like the operational variables (PMESII[xiv]),
the framework does not encourage a reductive method but helps tease out the important systems that exist
within an urban environment. The Urban Triad also supports cataloging and storing data to encourage
collection over time and coordination between units. Figure 2 illustrates this approach with some notional
(though frequently relevant) elements of the environment. It is important to note that the framework does
not use the Urban Triad as a mandatory matrix to populate as part of a deep dive. It is merely a method to
catalog research.
Taken together, the techniques provided in Step 1 of the framework generate a picture of the current and
historical state of the environment. It improves on current practice by guiding analysts to collect and
analyze information that highlights the relationships between elements of the environment. This approach
integrates adversary-, terrain-, and population centric perspective to create a more holistic picture.

Figure 2 Example of the Urban Triad.

Step II: Frame and Map Urban Problem Systems directs analysts and planners to develop problem
statements and understand the elements and interactions of the environment that contribute to the problem.
The frameworks structured process for defining the urban operational environment in Step I enables
comparison of the current state of the environment to the desired future state defined by commanders
guidance in order to identify problems. The framework then guides the analyst to identify elements of
problem systems in systems terms. The framework identifies flows and nodes as the elements of problem
systems. Flows are the tangibles and intangibles, whether in constant or periodic motion, that serve as a
systems inputs and outputs and enable system capability. Nodes are the shipping, storage, and receiving
locations of various flows. The framework offers a structured approach, called FASCOPE,[xv] to identify
and document elements of the system and their key considerations.
After determining the problem system and identifying its elements, the framework directs analysts and
planners to analyze the problem system as a whole by conceptually diagramming and geospatially
mapping it. Depicting how these elements of the environment interact can help provide an explanation
why and how systems behave and reveal the associated territorial logics. Conceptual and geospatial
mapping is crucial to developing a sense of systematic behavior and territorial logics as they can be used
for process and flow pathway tracing. Simply inputting information about a system into an Excel
spreadsheet or a PowerPoint deck will not reveal these logics. It is important to reiterate that problem
systems can include the adversary, friendly forces, the population, infrastructure networks, and elements
of the physical terrain.
Step III: Develop and Analyze Urban Courses of Action provides the analysis needed to determine how
best to affect the environment through the identification of Environmental Centers of Gravity (E-COGs).
Based on the maps of the problem system developed in Step II, analysts and planners can begin to identify
E-COGs. E-COGs are the nodes and/or flowsof which there can be one or manythat are most critical
to a problem system. As a result, affecting these components can have a sizeable impact on the broader
system.
E-COGs expand traditional adversary-centric center of gravity analysis to be used for examining urban
problem systems in order to identify the elements on which the system critically depends. The concept
also picks up on themes from newer applications of systems thinking to military analysis and planning
such as the 2003 Institute for Defense Analyses ideas of nodal capture and nodal isolation, as mentioned
in the Kevin M. Felix and Frederick D. Wong article, The Case For Megacities, in Parameters.[xvi]
However, the E-COG concept introduces the possibility of isolating important nodes (and flows) outside
the scope of the adversary. Furthermore, the E-COG concept seeks to stress that not all E-COGs must be

destroyed, degraded, neutralized, or isolated. Some E-COGsfor example a potable water infrastructure
networkmust be buttressed, protected, or improved.
After identifying the E-COGs of problem systems, analysts and planners can begin developing tentative
COAs to degrade or buttress E-COGs, and understanding how the COAs might impact the broader
environment. Analysts and planners can assess COAs for their acceptability and feasibility, by returning to
their conceptual diagram and thinking through how the proposed COAs might affect the elements of the
problem system. This visualization and accompanying narrative can serve as a way to promote discussion
amongst the staff and also as a briefing tool to the commander. Planners should also brainstorm how the
COAs can affect systems that are related to the problem system. Because consequences of military action
do not unfold neatly and linearly, the staff and commander must return to their definition of the urban
operational environment (Step I) and re-assess how the COAs will impact the significant characteristics of
the urban operational environment. The commander and staff must identify whether the COAs actions on
the E-COGs will contribute to achieving the desired future state.
Conclusion
The community of interest concerned with future urban operations generally agrees on the types of
challenges the urban environment poses. While there are slight disagreements with regard to city size as a
driver for force and concept development, there is a growing effort to devote time and resources to study
the problem. With this in mind, Caerus sought to ground and operationalize these concepts in the creation
of the framework. By developing a process for establishing a systems perspective of the city and its
problem systems, Caerus believes it addressed a gap in urban operations doctrine guiding analysis and
planning.
For more information about the framework, its components, and its development process, contact Caerus
Associates regarding the City As a System Analytical Framework at info@caerusassociates.com or (703)
649-5300.
End Notes

[i] David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla, 2013.
[ii] The term decisive action replaces the term full spectrum operations as the concept of continuous,
simultaneous offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities. Defense support of civil
authorities replaces civil support as a task under decisive action. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 30 Unified Land Operations, 2012, v.
[iii] US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1 "The U.S. Army Operating Concept,"
2014, 12.
[iv] Russell W. Glenn, "Managing Complexity During Military Urban Operations: Visualizing the
Elephant," RAND, 2004, x.
[v] Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future, Chief of
Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, 2014, 10.
[vi] Kevin M. Felix and Frederick D. Wong, "The Case For Megacities," Parameters, Spring 2015, Vol.
45 No. 1, 24.

[vii] William G. Adamson, Megacities and the US Army, Parameters, Spring 2015, Vol. 45 No. 1, 5152.
[viii] For more on this, see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the
Human Condition Have Failed, Yale University Press, 1998.
[ix] "World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision," United Nations, 2014, 2.
[x] "World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision," United Nations, 2014, 13.
[xi] See Diane E. Davis, Insecure and Secure Cities: Towards a Reclassification of World Cities in a
Global Era, MIT International Review, Spring 2008, p 30-41.; Christopher Paul et. al Identifying Urban
Flashpoints: A Delphi-Derived Model for Scoring Cities Vulnerability to Large-Scale Unrest, Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 31:981-1000, 2008.; and Brett G. Sylvia, Megacities: Geopolitical Dominator or
Distractor? USAWC Strategy Paper, 2014.
[xii] Michael Evans, The Case Against Megacities, Parameters, Spring 2015, Vol. 45 No. 1, 36.
[xiii] Joint Publication 3-06 Joint Urban Operations, 2013, I-2.
[xiv] Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure. Joint Publication 2-01.3 Joint
Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 2009, I-1.
[xv] Flows, Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events.
[xvi] Kevin M. Felix and Frederick D. Wong, "The Case For Megacities," Parameters, Spring 2015, Vol.
45 No. 1, 29.

About the Authors

Mark Lomedico
Mark Lomedico is an associate at Caerus Associates working on assessing and
understanding cities. Prior to joining Caerus, Mark was an intelligence officer with
the U.S. Army. His assignments included: signals intelligence platoon leader,
military intelligence company executive officer (forward deployed to RC-East,
Afghanistan), and assistant battalion intelligence officer, most recently with 4th
Brigade Combat Team (Currahee), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Before
serving in the Army, Mark attended Middlebury Colleges Summer Arabic
Language Program and American University in Cairos Arabic Language Institute.
He holds a BA in Political Science from the University of Vermont.

Elizabeth M. Bartels
Elizabeth Ellie Bartels is a senior associate at Caerus Associates, leading efforts to
develop and test concepts and tools to better understand urban operational
environments. Prior to joining Caerus, Ellie led teams in designing educational and
analytical strategic wargames at the National Defense University. She holds an SM
in Comparative Political Science from MIT and an AB in Political Science and Near
Eastern Languages and Civilization from the University of Chicago. You can follow
her on Twitter here: https://twitter.com/elliebartels.

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