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3d 587
Francesco Graziano appeals from an order of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York (I. Leo Glasser, Judge ) denying his
motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. FACTS
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On May 11, 1993, Graziano was indicted for (1) conspiring to murder Louis
DiBono for the purpose of gaining entrance to or enhancing his position in the
Gambino Organized Crime Family, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(5), and
(2) the October 2, 1990, murder of DiBono, in violation of 1959(a)(1). On
June 15, 1994, Graziano entered into a plea agreement and a sentencing bargain
by which he agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy count. He also agreed that
pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C)1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, he
would be sentenced to a ten-year term of incarceration. The agreement provided
that the appropriate fine and term of supervised release would be left to the
discretion of the district court.
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The plea allocution was also conducted on June 15, 1994. After determining
that Graziano had reviewed the agreement with his attorney, the court asked
Graziano about the factual basis for his plea, and Graziano admitted that he had
entered into an agreement to murder DiBono in order to maintain his position in
the Gambino Crime Family. The court accepted Graziano's guilty plea,
reserving decision on whether to impose the sentence agreed upon by the
parties in the plea agreement.
Graziano brought no direct appeal from his conviction or his sentence, but on
April 10, 1995, filed this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, pro se and in
forma pauperis. Graziano raised several issues before the district court,
including (1) that his guilty plea was induced by misrepresentations and
erroneous advice from his counsel regarding the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range for the conspiracy charge to which he pled; (2) that his threeyear term of supervised release was not authorized by 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(5);
and (3) that the fine imposed by the district court exceeded the statutory
maximum under 1959(a)(5). In a Memorandum and Order dated September 1,
1995, the district court dismissed Graziano's motion as meritless and
procedurally barred due to his failure to bring a direct appeal. Significantly, the
district court found that (1) the "plea agreement conferred a significant benefit
upon Graziano in that ... he was ... permitted to plead guilty to a lesser offense
than the one for which he was indicted[,] which would have required a sentence
of life imprisonment upon conviction"; (2) Graziano's term of supervised
release was expressly authorized by 18 U.S.C. 3583(a); and (3) the maximum
fine of $250,000 was explicitly authorized by 18 U.S.C. 3571(b)(3).
Graziano filed his notice of appeal pro se on September 21, 1995, and the
district court denied his motion for reconsideration on October 25, 1995.
Subsequently, Graziano retained counsel who filed a supplemental
memorandum of law and argued on his behalf.
II. DISCUSSION
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On appeal, Graziano raises eight issues--several for the first time. He contends
that (1) the court erred in imposing the $250,000 fine without a proper inquiry
into his ability to pay, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3572(a); (2) the $250,000 fine
was not authorized by the statute defining the offense, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(5);
(3) the fine imposed exceeded the Sentencing Guidelines range in effect at the
time he committed the crime; (4) his guilty plea should be vacated due to
ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) his sentence to a three-year term of
supervised release was not authorized by 1959(a)(5); (6) his guilty plea
should be vacated because his indictment was defective; (7) 18 U.S.C. 1959
is unconstitutional; and (8) the court erred in failing to grant him an evidentiary
hearing on his 2255 motion.
We begin with Graziano's three challenges to the $250,000 fine imposed by the
district court. Insofar as Graziano was proceeding pro se before the district
court, we interpret those pleadings liberally and construe his challenge to the
statutory authority for the $250,000 fine before the district court as
encompassing the two other challenges to the fine that have been "refined" with
the assistance of appellate counsel. See Billy-Eko v. United States, 8 F.3d 111,
117 (2d Cir.1993). We find them all to be without merit. First, Graziano's claim
that the district court did not consider the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
3572(a)2 is belied by the record. The experienced and able district judge
explicitly noted that he had "considered the financial implications [of imposing
a fine]." This is sufficient under United States v. Sellers, 42 F.3d 116, 120 (2d
Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 93, 133 L.Ed.2d 49 (1995),
where we held that explicit findings regarding a defendant's ability to pay a fine
are not required under 3572(a): "All that is required is that the district court
'consider,' among other things, the defendant's ability to pay." Second, we find
that the district court properly held that the $250,000 fine was authorized under
18 U.S.C. 3571(b)(3), which provides that an individual convicted of any
felony may be fined up to $250,000.
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We find that the circumstances in the instant case do not amount to a "complete
miscarriage of justice." Graziano was explicitly informed that he faced a
$250,000 fine, and so informed, he voluntarily entered a plea of guilty. Any
challenge that Graziano had regarding alleged violations of the Sentencing
Guidelines should have been raised on direct appeal. Accordingly, his claim is
procedurally barred.
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III. CONCLUSION
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Affirmed.
(2) the burden that the fine will impose upon the defendant [and] any person
who is financially dependent on the defendant ...;
(3) any pecuniary loss inflicted upon others as a result of the offense;
(4) whether restitution is ordered or made and the amount of such restitution;
(5) the need to deprive the defendant of illegally obtained gains from the
offense;
(6) the expected costs to the government of any imprisonment, supervised
release, or probation component of the sentence;
(7) whether the defendant can pass on to consumers or other persons the
expense of the fine; and
(8) if the defendant is an organization, the size of the organization, and measure
taken by the organization to discipline any officer, director, employee, or agent
of the organization responsible for the offense....