TERRY P I N K A R D

Georgetown University

SOCIAL

PHILOSOPHY

AND

SOCIAL

CATEGORIES

Although categorial philosophy has been a dominant feature of metaphysics

and epistemology since Aristotle, there have been few attempts since those
by Hegel and Marx at the construction of social categories. By 'social category'
is meant not just humdrum emprical classifications (of which threre are
plenty) but those concepts which form the basic structure for social theory.
The one exception to this is Sartre's Critique de la Raison Dialectique. The
book has been largely overlooked in this regard, doubtlessly due in part to
its ponderous style but also in part because of an unfamiliarity on the part
of readers with the program of constructing social categories. Another item
which has been overlooked is Heidegger's remaining influence on Sartre's
later thought. In this paper, using Sartrean and Heideggerian notions, I
would like to develop two things, both what a social category is and what
kinds there might be. This could be done in one of two ways. One way
would be, of course, a massive point by point study and comparison of
Heidegger and Sartre on these themes. While this may be satisfactory for
seminars and dissertations, it is hardly satisfactory for a paper. So instead
I have opted for an independent exposition of the basic principles and
concepts involved. What I shall attempt to show is that (roughly) if one
pushes some of Heidegger's key notions in the direction which Sartre
took, a rigorous and intelligible construction of social categories can be
given. The result will have ramifications for social science, since insofar
as such a construction can be done, one will have developed the categorial
framework for social science. The strategy for this will be to develop first
the basic principles for the construction of such categories, then using those
principles to sketch out what those categories would be. The goal of this
paper is thus indirectly a defense of the relevance of hermeneutical categorial
philosophy for social science.
I

The key concept here is one which appears to be a more purely 'ontological'
or even 'epistemological' notion than those commonly employed in social
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TERRY PINKARD
philosophy, viz., that of the world. Heidegger's rejection of the classical
doctrines of the world forms the matrix in which the further development
of his (and Sartre's) thought may fruitfully be seen. To be clear on this, we
must then first examine what the classical view is which is to be rejected.
We can designate this classical model as the realist and the idealist conceptions of the world. 1 The realist notion of the world (what Husserl called
the 'naive' or 'natural attitude') is that of an underlying 'stuff' to which
our descriptions must correspond, i.e., that which makes our beliefs t r u e
when they are indeed true. Whereas the realist notion of the world answers
closely to commonsense ideas on the subject, from the problems it raises it
quite naturally leads to its counterpart, the idealist picture of the world. If
the world is something totally and radically independent of our descriptions
of it, and it is that which makes a true description true, then it follows that
it is always possible that perhaps our descriptions do not match up with t h i s
world. That is, one must admit as a possibility that the world (ansich, so to
speak) could turn out to be entirely different than what we have thought
it to be. From this simple realist idea, the move to Kantian idealism, to a
bifurcation of the world in-itself and the world for-us (i.e., the world as
we describe it) is easily made. Such a move is further buttressed by the
consideration that it would be in principle impossible, given realist suppositions, ever to know if our descriptions actually matched up with the
world. Our only access to the world is our own experience (or descriptions)
of it, but how could we, so to speak, leap outside our experience to compare
the world ansich with the world as experienced ? Since we obviously cannot,
the realist notion of the world entails this bifurcation.
The idealist notion of the world (that the world is simply the set of our
beliefs about it or the set of 'world experiences' we have) follows from
this. The realist notion of the world quickly evaporates into a 'I know not
what,' an indeterminate 'stuff' somehow underlying the set of descriptions
oe experiences we have; it becomes, that is, a purely vacuous notion, in
which case the logical move is to drop altogether the notion of the independent world and stick with only our experiences of it. This is a line o,f
reasoning common to most varieties of phenomenalism, where objects (and
consequently the world) are defined in terms of unities of (both actual and
possible) experience. The idealist notion, however, quickly leads back to the
realist notion. To define an object, say, a chair, as a collection of actual
and possible experiences, one must specify what a possible experience is.
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SOCIAL P H I L O S O P H Y AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

A possible experience, however, is something akin to a possible stub of the
toe; it is the kind of thing one would have, were one to do certain kinds
of things. A possible experience of, e.g., the chair is precisely the kind of
experience which one would have if one were to move, for example, one's
head from here to there. Thus, an analysis of the notion of possible experience shows it to be essentially connected with at least one object in
the world, viz., one's own body. The upshot is that whereas the realist notion
of the world is vacuous, the idealist notion is contradictory : it defines
physical objects as unities of actual and possible experiences but defines
possible experiences in terms of another physical object, viz., one's own body.
The idealist notion thus~fails on grounds of self-contradiction, while the
realist notion fails on grounds of vacuity. Where two rival views are so
closely linked, yet also so deeply involved in internal difficulties, what is
often required is a more careful description or redescription of the initial
concepts. Two intertwined concepts are crucial for such a redescription, that
of passibility and that of organization.
The argument against the idealist notion of the world hinges on the notion
of possible experience. It would be impossible to understand the world
without the modal notion of possibility. The understanding of something as
possible involves essentially the understanding of certain contrary-to-fact conditionals (e.g., 'were p the case, then q would be the case'). This would
be inescapable even if one were to identify the world with nature, for nature
is best conceived as a system governed by laws, and natural laws are inconceivable without the notion of cotlnterfactuals (i.e., propositions in which
the notion of possibility essentially occurs). Otherwise (to use the condusion of well-known arguments), we could not distinguish between accidental and nomic regularities, i.e., between A's contingently always being B
and A's necessarily being B (where 'necessarily' is used in the sense of
natural necessity). An understanding of the world, therefore, presupposes
an understanding of possibility. Since, for obvious reasons, counterfactual
situations do not exist, possibility is something we bring to the actual world.
Our understanding of the world implies therefore our organization of it,
and one of the central categories of such organization is that of possibility.
It is important that one speaks here of the organization of the world and not,
e.g., of our 'constitution' of it. We live in a world (are Being-in-the-World,
to use Heidegger's phrase), we do not in the idealist sense make it up. But
in order to understand that world, we must organize it. The question then
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TERRY PINKARD

is : what are the principles for the organization of the world ? Organization
implies elements which are organized; thus we must also ask : what are the
elements of such organization ? Keeping in mind that the key category for
such organization will be the notion o.f possibility, as a proposal we can
distinguish three such elements : (1) things (2) ourselves (3) other people.
In each case, the question will be the same : what is the organization which
allows for our understanding of these elements in terms of possibility ?

II. THE UNDERSTANDING

OF T H I N G S

One can understand a thing in terms o.f its possibilities in two ways : (1) as
a natural thing, an object of nature; (2) as an implement, a piece of equipment. To understand something as a part of nature is to locate it within the
law-like system which is, roughly speaking, the 'natural order.' But to locate
it within such a scheme is to locate it with respect to natural laws, which is
to conceive of it not merely in terms of its 'behavior' here and now, nor
even 'there and then' but its possible behavior (i.e., behavior in counterfactual situations). Laws involve an element of necessity in them; they
involve, that is, reference not only to the kinds of factual relations in which
the objects have entered or what factual patterns of behavior they have
displayed, but also what kinds of relations and behavior they would exhibit
in different situations.
Admittedly, the involvement of the modal notion of possibility in natural
laws is, despite its wide acceptance, not a non-controversial one. Nevertheless,
for reasons of space, we shall not pursue this issue further. Instead, we shall
examine the one more relevant for our undertaking, viz., the understandi,,g
of things qua implements.
To understand a thing as an implement is to understand it in terms of its
instrumentality, its possible use. Obviously instruments can take many different uses, some uses being only mediate for other further uses. Thus, a
nail is understood, e.g., as the kind of thing which would hold boards
together, boards held together bring things which would constitute a house,
and so on. From this seemingly trivial consideration, two things follow.
First, implements obtain their intelligibility only in relation to human wants
and needs. One uses an implement 'in order to' achieve something else.
One uses an implement, that is, in order to X - - t o which the question may
arise : why does one want X ? The answer, in turn, may either be : in order
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SOCIAL P H t L O S O P H Y AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

to Z; or it may be simply : because I want X. One might, for example, ask
why someone wanted a house, to which the answer might be : to stay out of
the rain. That itself could be questioned, however, until ultimately any
further questions would be beside the point. One comes to the point when
a statement of wants and needs is sufficient. Thus, when one is pushed to
saying that one wants to stay out of the rain in order to remain healthy, and
one is asked 'why be healthy,' one comes (at least close) to a terminal point
in the line of questions. Some human wants, such as a healthy life, of wellbeing, are simply taken for granted. The important point here is not which
human wants and desires are so taken but the more 'formal' point that the
network of 'in order to' relations which organize the things of the world
into implements imply a 'for the sake of which' set of human needs and
wants. =
The second point to be noted is that where things are understood as implements one is prima fade involved in a teleological explanation of human
behavior. One is, i.e., explaining the behavior of a person by reference to
certain goals which the person has. Now, to explain the behavior of a person
by reference to goals is not necessarily to give any grounds for predicting
that person's (physical) behavior. To say a person acted because of a goal
is to make statements of the form : A did B in order to C. But, of course,
A might also do D or E in order to C. The person engages in the behavior
which he or she believes appropriate to the achieving of C. To explain
behavior in terms of goals is then to make essential reference to a person's
beliefs, viz., those beliefs about which behavior would be appropriate to the
achieving of the desired goal. Thus, the explanation of behavior actually
takes this form : A did B because A believed that in circumstances Z one
must do B in order to C. ~
These two points may themselves seem trivial, but they lead to an understanding of a fundamental way of organizing the world. The world becomes
on this basis a system of what we might call a system of 'cross-referencing'
(roughly, what Heidegger means by a Verweistcngszusammenhang and Sartre
a champ pratique)% or a system in which things 'refer' to one another
(hammers to nails to boards, etc.) and in which the principle of such
cross-referencing is human needs and desires. Besides the cross-referencing
of things, one also has thereby a cross-referencing of behavior. It becomes
intelligible why behavior can take on an organizational structure of its own.
Behavior becomes organized into the appropriate behavior for achieving
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TERRY PINKARD
certain goals, and this organization of behavior enters into that system of
cross-referencing by which we understand implements. Appropriate behavior
becomes linked with certain implements.?

III. THE UNDERSTANDING

OF O T H E R S

If we understand instruments in terms of possible use (the principle of

such understanding being a knowledge of human needs and wants), how
then do we understand both ourselves and others, especially with regard
to this notion of possibility ? To understand ourselves in terms of our
possibilities is to understand what we can do, feel and can become. If the
principle of understanding, the raison d'Stre of implements is human wants
and needs, then an understanding of those is requisite for an understanding
of implements. One facet of understanding ourselves is therefore understanding what our needs and wants are. The objects of desire fall into three
distinct classes : (1) those which we desire solely for their consequences
(e.g., needing a hammer in order to drive in nails; (2) those which we
desire for their own sake (e.g., well-being); (3) those which we desire
both for their own sake and for their consequences (e.g., health, which is
both desirable on its own and a means to other enjoyments). As important,
though, as the understanding of our wants and needs is the understanding
of what one can become, of the kind of, e.g., character one can achieve. That
is, we understand ourselves through our life-plan (what Sartre and Heidegger call the project), our own possibilities of what we could become. To
understand this is largely a kind of skill, one which rests on a large background knowledge (an 'outer horizon') of one's own capabilities along with
the social and cultural situation.
Whereas the form of the understanding of implements is: 'if one
wants X, one must do Y in circumstances Z,' the form of the understanding
of Ourselves and others is slightly different. T o see how it is different, it is
important to note that in a significant way, it is also similar. One may for
example have certain wants and understand oneself therefore in instrumental
form : if I want X (e.g., to be a good pianist), then I must Y (practice a
good deal) in circumstances Z (the circumstances in this case including facets
of one's character and ability). The difference in form concerns the nature
of this possibility, which is linked with the notion of freedom. Freedom
involves not only an understanding of possibilities but a choosing between
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SOCIAL P H I L O S O P H Y AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

them. Thus, whereas implements are always understood in instrumental
terms, i.e., as means to ends, the understanding of ourselves involves those
ultimate ends which provide the background for the understanding of implements. One may understand one's character even in instrumental terms,
i.e., by understanding one's capacities as instrumentalities to be ordered in
a certain fashion, but it is oneself that does the shaping ana ordering of
those capacities. The 'can be' of an individual is categorially different than
the 'can be' of an implement in that the former is linked with the concepts of
freedom and, most importantly, self-knowledge, whereas the latter are not. 6
The understanding of implements has its intelligibility thus anchored in
various kinds of self-knowledge: the largely taken for granted knowiedge
of human wants and needs and the more specific understanding of one's
own wants and needs.
The understanding of others is a slightly more complicated case. In understanding others, we impute possibilities to them, of what they would do in
certain circumstances and what they 'can' become. Others are understood
thereby (roughly speaking) in terms of their possible behavior--or, if one
prefers, in terms of a form of life which we impute to them. (The notion
of a social role is unintelligible without this.) We understand ourselves
through our own possibilities (our life-plan and capacities) and others
through possibilities which we impute to them. But likewise, we understand
ourselves also in terms of the possibilities which others impute to us, and they
may understand themselves in terms of the possibilities which we impute to
them. This kind of multisided awareness forms the coCe of the principle of
reciprocity.7 It includes both the awareness and beliefs we hold about our
own possibilities, others' possibilities and the reciprocai imputation of possibilities. Reciprocity also involves therefore an understanding of the 'can be'
which is different than the 'can be' of implements. But between the understanding of others and the understanding of oneself there is no logical
difference. Both involve (minimally) the kind of general self-knowledge
which issues in a know-how concerning human wants, needs and capacities
in general. The difference in the two cases is only in that in one's own case
as opposed to that of others one has 'more evidence' or, perhaps, the evidence
is closer to hand than in the latter.
Thus, the world becomes further organized and cross-referenced with the
addition of this kind of understanding. Not only is the world one of natural
objects obeying causal laws, implements 'referring' to one another and to the
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TERR!Y P I N K A R D
system of human wants and needs but is also a 'shared' world of others with
our own life-plans and others mapped out onto it. More importantly, each
articulation of this shared world requires an essential reference to human
awareness. The world as a system of cross-references involves awarenesses
and beliefs about instrumentalities, thus of causal laws, our own capacities
and (insofar as we admit others) the possibilities of others' behavior. The
world then is organized according to certain human interests in order to be
understood.. It is a system of rdations which, once made, puts constraints
and limits on our organization of it.
These considerations yield several principles for the construction of social
categories. We may call these categorial principles, for (1) they are (if valid)
normative for thought about human plurality, and (2) they function as
principles for the construction and interpretation of further social categories.
In speaking of social categories, one must take care so as not to avoid crucial
misunderstandings. Although the status of these principles is thus categorial,
it should be clear that they hardly deserve to b.e called a priori. However, with
the collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction brought about by Quine's
early attack and (in a different fashion) by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological notion of 'ambiguity,' one should not be compelled to think that
such a priori principles are to be found. For this reason, they might be better
called hermeneutical prindples, i.e., principles for the interpretation of the
human world. They are principles not for the constitution of the world (in
the idealist sense) but for the human organizatio,n of the world, or, if one
prefers, the crafting of the elements of the 'world' into a humanly intelligible
world.

IV. SOCIAL CATEGORIES

The crucial question nevertheless remains open : can one say anything interesting about specifically social categories on the basis of these principles ?
Defenders of hermeneutical theory in the social sciences have on the whole
tended to answer this question in the negative. One gets the impression that
those who would deny such a possibility for hermeneutical theory harbor a
suspicion that such an undertaking would undermine the basic ideas o f
hermeneutical theory. That it does not will be an issue to which I shall return
near the end of this paper.
Social categories would express, so it seems, forms of reciprocity. Another
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SOCIAL P H I L O S O P H Y A2qD SOCIAL CATEGORIES

way of putting it would be to say that they express certain unities of human
plurality. Obviously, several possibilities are logically open : the pluralities
in question may consist of members who are not aware of their being a
member of that plurality; or it may consist of some of the members being
aware, or it may consist of all of the members being aware. Furthermore, the
characterization of categories as social categories might be prejudicing the
answer, for there is a categorial distinction to be made between the realm
of the social and the realm of the political. The social life of people is an
outgrowth of the purely personal (the 'private') lives of individuals; more
specifically, it is the outgrowth of the individual organism's need to survive.
Sociality then is the contingent connection between people for the purpose
of satisfying organic needs. To take a simplified example : X grows food,
and Y needs food but does not grow it; Y builds homes, and X needs a
home but does not build them; therefore, insofar as X and Y both provide
'services' to each other, they are socially bound. But the relation is contingent; X needs Y only insofar as Y provides X with a home. There exists
no essential reference to Y in X's needs; if X could obtain a home without
Y (say, if X learned the magic words which caused homes to spring up),
then the social bond with Y would be shattered. 'Society' denotes then that
organization of individuals for the satisfaction of each one's personal needs;
in society there are no essential relation with others. The political order,
however, includes an essential reference to others. The political order is that
relationship among persons who together discourse for the purpose of setting
both social and political goals. The political order has for its object the
general welfare (hence, politics is, as Aristotle and Hegel argued, bound up
with ethics). The descriptions of the political order thereby make essential
reference to not only one person but to many. One might express it so :
whereas the description of the social order only makes essential reference to
individual states of mind of one individual, the political order makes essential reference to states of mind of at least two individuals. The relation to
the other is essential, not contingent. To say the same thing differently:
descriptions of the social order can be paraphrased as a conjunction of
statements of the form, "I will (want, need, etc.) X," descriptions of the
political order can be paraphrased as statements of the form, "We will
(want, need, etc.) X." Likewise, one can see how social categories imply
political categories, for the political order is necessary for maintaining and
even establishing the social order?
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TERRY PINKARD
More as an illustration than a final answer, I would now like to show
how two of Sartre's basic conceptions fulfill the requirements of being fundamental kinds of social categories, i.e., fundamental kinds of human
plurality. W e may designate these as (roughly) external and internal
groupings, what Sartre subsumes under the technical titles of serial#ies and
groups. External groupings are those which make no essential reference to
any belief or awareness which the members of the groupings have about
one another. Internal groupings are those in which an essential reference is
made to beliefs about or awarenesses of each other on the part of members
of the group. Internal groupings may be further distinguished, as we shall
see, by certain internal groupings involving essential reference to certain
goals which the members share in common.
A seriality is that kind of social formation in which the members of the
formation are (indirectly) related to one another by being (directly) related
to some object in common. To take an example : the class of all viewers of
a television program (i.e., that 'class' which the television ratings describe)
are 'united' only by virtue of their relation to some object, viz., the program.
The various specific intentions of the members of the seriality are irrelevant
to the grouping's being constituted. That the members might share a set
of goals would be an accidental, not an essential feature of a seriality. To
understand oneself or another as a member of a series is thus to understand
oneself or the other person, so to speak, only 'numerically', in his or her
abstract status simply as a member of an external grouping. This is always
an 'external understanding' in the sense that one does not understand the
other people or oneself in terms of the kinds of possibilities intrinsic to
them or oneself. One understands the other only qua status, not qua possibility. 9 Whether or not any of the members of the series are even aware
at all of the other members as being members of the series is acddental and
not essential to the series.
Internal groupings what Sartre calls groups--present a different case.
One can differentiate here 'strong' and 'weak' internal groupings. A
'weak' internal grouping is simply one in which the members of a group
share a common goal or set of goals. A 'strong' internal grouping would
be one in which the members both (a) have a set of common goals (b) are
aware that each shares this set of common goals (c) it is no conflict that
each may attain the goal. To use a visual metaphor, one can think of a
group in the technical Sartrean sense as a series which has 'imploded' in on
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SOCIAL P H I L O S O P H Y AiND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

itself. Whereas the unity of a series comes from something external to the
series (the uniting object), the unity of a group comes from something
internal to it, viz., the reciprocal awareness of its members. The logic of
the group takes the form of a kind of practical reasoning o,f which the background premises are : (1) freedom is the ability to make something of oneself, i.c., to determine one's status, (2) this (w 1) is intelligible only as
choosing and acting on one's own possibilities, (3) assume that there is
something which each member of the group perceives as a hindrance or a
threat to his or her freedom, (4) each believes that the other is similarly
threatened and that the other perceives him or her as similarly threatened,
(5) each believes that the hindrance o.r threat can be overcome only by
common action, (6) it follows that each believes that the preservation of
their own particular freedom is possible only in this common action. Given
( 1 ) - - ( 6 ) , the following piece of practical reasoning issues: (a) each
wants X (the preservation of his or her freedom), (b) each believes that Y
is necessary for X (Y = concerted action), (c) therefore, each does Y.
The result, as is always the result of a piece of practical reasoning, is an
action by the reasoners. If the members of the group each go through this
practical reasoning, the result is the formation of a 'strong' internal grouping,
what Sartre calls the Groupe-en-Fusion (or what might just be called a
practical community).
Sartre generates an understanding of how the Group-en-Fusion can develop into things like institutions by sketching along these lines further
forms of practical reasoning. After the threat is eliminated the group can
either disintegrate or maintain itself. If it is to maintain itself without
there being a perceived threat, it must find some other means of selfpreservation. Each member must, that is, take some kind of pledge (be
it tacit or explicit) not to leave the group. If such a pledge is taken, then
the Group alters its form. Formerly, it was a means to an end (the preservation of freedom); now it becomes an end in itself (i.e., insofar as the
preservation of the group has become an end in itself and not merely a
means to preserve freedom). The pledge, however, is not enough. Insofar as
each member believes that he or she must maintain the group, it is plausible
(given certain beliefs about human psychology) to think that each will
believe that he or she must subordinate themselves to the preservation of the
group. The possibilities (projects and life plans) of each member would
therefore become circumscribed by the group and the function which the
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TERRY P I N K A R D
individual plays in the group. The notion of a social role is intdligible on
this view as the result of acceptances by individuals of their functions in a
group, and the imputations by others of expectations as to their possible
behavior. A social structure is thereby created which reproduces itself.
If this construction of social categories is accurate, then it has a consequence of importance for hermeneutics, viz., that awareness, particularly
the various kinds of redprocal awareness which have been mentioned, is a
key concept in social science. Social categories are constituted by these networks of awareness. The term, "category," is therefore well taken : just as
there are categories of 'theoretical' reasoning, there are also categories of
'practical' reasoning. But since reciprocity of awareness is central, social
science must include a hermeneutical component. This is so, first, for the
commonplace reason that awareness is indicated by the cultural matrix in
which people find themselves. Second, the reciprocity of awareness introduces a fundamental hermeneutical component into social science, since
a multiplicity of social circumstances rest on complex, 'I believe that you
believe that I believe that you believe...' situations; hence, articulation of beliefs becomes necessary. Between beliefs and actions, moreover, there exists
an in principle hiatus. To explain actions is often to explain them in terms
of certain beliefs which the agents have; but it always remains possible that
actions which may appear to stem from certain beliefs actually have their
basis in other beliefs--the ubiquitous fact of duplicity is witness to this.
Social situations are therefore largely structured by beliefs which agents have
about one another. The matrix of all this is of course, the common world
which agents share and which is the result of an organization which the
agents bring to it; without an organization of the world, people could not
find their way around nor live in the immensely complex social structures
which they do.
The philosophical question is the categorial one: whether or not this
organization of the world has any categorial constraints on it. Even though
the skeptic's answer is always negative, it has been argued here that there
are indeed such constraints to such organization. We began this paper by
noting that the categorial structure of the world is a commonplace feature
of both ontology and epistemology and have extended such considerations
to the kinds of restraints found in the social organization of the world. The
upshot is thus that perhaps the links between ontology, epistemology, social
and political philosophy--in short, between practical and theoretical
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SOCIAL P H I L O S O P H Y AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

reason--are stronger than they have been thought to have been, and the key
to understanding these links lies in a further development of categorial
philosophy.

NOTES
1 T h i s w a y of t r e a t i n g the classical v i e w is adapted f r o m Richard Rorty's, " T h e World
Well L o s t , " Journal of Philosophy, 69, (x972), pp. 649-665.
2 Cf. Heidegger. Sein und Zeit (Tfibingen : M a x N i e m e y e r Verlag, i929) x972, w ~5-x8.
,3 T h i s w a y of f o r m u l a t i n g the issue is, it should be noted, i n d i f f e r e n t to the issue of whether
or not teleological explanations are ultimately reducible to causal ones.
4 Cf. Heidegger. Ibid, w XT; el. Sartre. Critique de la Raison dialectique (Paris : Gallimard,
~96o). pp. x38-:[4a.
5 O n the notion of "appropriate" b e h a v i o r and w h y this cannot be explained in purely
behaviorist terms, cf. Charles Taylor. The Explanation of Behavior ( L o n d o n : Routledge and
K e g a n Paul, x964). Cf. also G.H. yon W r i g h t . Explanation and Understanding (New Y o r k :
Cornell U n i v e r s i t y Press, :z97z). Taylor claims it is because teleological laws are irreducible to
purely behavioral "laws; yon W r i g h t a r g u e s that such a reduction would deny the logical
v a l i d i t y of practical inferences (as he reconstructs them).
r O n this point cf. Stuart H a m p s h i r e , Freedom of the Individual (New York : H a r p e r and Row,
z965). PP. x~-33. Cf. also A n t h o n y Kenny. " D y n a m i c M o d a l i t i e s " in J. M a n n i n e n and R.
T u o m e l a (eds.). Essays on Explanation and Understanding ( D o r d r e c h t : D. ReideI, ~976).
pp. zog-a~z.
7 H e i d e g g e r ' s notion of das Man m a y be seen a case of i m p u t e d reciprocity. The term is, of
course, Sartre's. Cf. Sartre, op. cir., pp. :~82-~99.
s T h i s corresponds r o u g h l y to the m o v e in H e g e l ' s Philosophy of Right f r o m the ' a t o m i s m ' of
civil society to the organized plurality of the state.
A different w a y of p u t t i n g this would be p e r h a p s to say that one ~ n d e r s t a n d s the other's
possibility as "static," i.e., purely as a continuation of their status.

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