Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 52
The single question presented by this appeal is whether Rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., prohibits a government agency,
authorized by statute to examine the financial records of persons subject to
regulation by it, from inspecting these records when they are being held under
a federal grand jury subpoena duces tecum. We agree with the district court that
such inspection does not constitute a 'disclosure of matters occurring before the
grand jury' proscribed by Rule 6(e) and we therefore affirm the order granting
leave to inspect the records.
Rule 6(e)2 embodies a long established policy of the federal courts to maintain
the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 1958, 356 U.S. 677, 681, 78 S.Ct. 983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077. Though the
reasons for the policy are many, see United States v. Rose, 3 Cir., 1954, 215
F.2d 617, 628-629, the Rule is intended only to protect against disclosure of
what is said or what takes place in the grand jury room. Documents as well as
oral testimony of course may come within its proscription against disclosure.
See, e.g., In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 7 Cir., 1956, 239 F.2d 263.
However, it is not the purpose of the Rule to foreclose from all future
revelation to proper authorities the same information or documents which were
presented to the grand jury. Thus, when testimony or data is sought for its own
sake-- for its intrinsic value in the furtherance of a lawful investigation-- rather
than to learn what took place before the grand jury, it is not a valid defense to
disclosure that the same information was revealed to a grand jury or that the
same documents had been, or were presently being, examined by a grand jury.
In the Matter of Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency of
the United States Senate, D.C.N.D.Ill.1956, 19 F.R.D. 410; State v. Kemp,
1928, 124 Conn. 639, 1 A.2d 761.
In the present case the inspection sought by the ICC will in no way impinge
upon the secrecy of the grand jury's deliberations. The representatives of the
ICC do not seek to learn what use the grand jury has made of appellant's
records. They wish only to inspect and copy the records, which happen to be in
the control of the grand jury, for their own lawfully authorized investigation.
No question of the 'disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury' is
therefore involved and Rule 6(e) does not prohibit the examination.
Permitting the ICC to inspect the records of appellant does not impair the
appellant's right as owner of documents held under grand jury subpoena to
object to their disclosure to third parties if he believes the disclosure to be
unlawful. Documents produced pursuant to a grand jury subpoena remain the
property of the person producing them, see Application of Bendix Aviation
Corp., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1945, 58 F.Supp. 953; Matter of Randall, 1903, 87
App.Div. 245, 84 N.Y.S. 294, and their inspection by persons other than the
grand jury and the prosecuting attorneys is therefore dependant upon the
consent of the owner or upon a court order. In the event the owner is unwilling
to give his consent, the legal right of the third party to inspect the documents
may be tested in the proceeding to obtain leave from the court for the
examination, just as happened in this case. See In the Matter of Hearings
Before the Committee on Banking and Currency of the United States Senate,
supra. The court is required in each case to determine whether independent
legal authority for the inspection exists, as well as deciding whether the
examination sought would be in violation of Rule 6(e). Here there can be no
doubt of the authority of the ICC under 320(d) of the Motor Carrier Act to
inspect appellant's records, and, as discussed above, the inspection will not
impinge upon the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings.
Order affirmed.
defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of
secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule.'