Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015 - JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION),
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is
ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case.
The strength of the Prosecutions case, albeit a good measure of the accuseds
propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial. 1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to
assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 2014 2 and August 8, 20143 issued by
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has
been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For
Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
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Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in
the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively
filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others,
that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The
motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its
Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enriles motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that
Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of
the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. 9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at
the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and
his Motion to Fix Bail,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the
Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he
should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established
that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with
plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion
perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must
further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying
Enriles Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the
Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong
against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then
will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
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To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused
Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even
commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to
fix his bail.
xxxx
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is
charged with plunder, the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him
is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua. He anchors this claim on Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70)
years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. Accordingly, it may be said that the
crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus
bailable.
The argument has no merit.
xxxx
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken
into consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition
of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense
charged. x x x
xxxx
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he
is not a flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by
the Court.
Admittedly, the accuseds age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are
among the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail.
However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail
without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not
strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enriles Motion to Fix Bail
dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
14
SO ORDERED.
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to
deny Enriles motion for reconsideration filed vis--vis the July 14, 2014
resolution.15
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Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari, namely:
Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of
right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon
concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.x x x x
The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever
he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile
is entitled to bail as a matter of right.x x x x
The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of
Enriles guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter
of right.x x x x
At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk. 16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as
matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly
and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded
from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that
Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the
presence of two mitigating circumstances his age and his voluntary surrender;
that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the
crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking
into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his
social standing.
In its Comment,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enriles right to bail is

discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is
mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong

evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the
imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
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Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
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1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed
innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of
due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, 19
and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the
accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes.21 The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but
it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. 22 Thus,
bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in
his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societys interest in
assuring the accuseds presence at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 24 of the Rules of
Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may
be punished with death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest,
or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of
his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless
he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. 26 Once it has
been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be
recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court
are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try
capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong. 28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial
court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma,30 such discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of
the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty. It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a
matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing
with notice to the Prosecution.31 The indispensability of the hearing with notice has
been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz.:32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in
People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be
granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without
any hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution
for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The
court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three
policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court
possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima
facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who
probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each
individual accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits the
issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness
of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally
entitled as the accused to due process.
xxxx
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence
and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the
nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused,
the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at
the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not
the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is
highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte
determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the
court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of
guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court
does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that
ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate
on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. 33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge
is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor
of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
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Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
3.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two
mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he
was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense,
and that he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enriles averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose
Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that
As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed
upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating
circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or absence of mitigating
circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The
relevant clause in Section 13 is charged with an offense punishable by. It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing
and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in
the accuseds favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles averment on
the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite
the crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua,37 simply
because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made
by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by
the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The
Court is further mindful of the Philippines responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
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community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk
of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do
not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar
personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during
the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. 40 With his solid
reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service,
and historys judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling
justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not
recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was
found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering
from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug
therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following:

a.
b.
c.
Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with

carotid and vertebral artery disease; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
Ankle
Brachial
Index
suggestive
of
arterial
calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by

Holter monitoring; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome;
(Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a.
b.
Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of

the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0,
3.1, 3.2)
S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens.
(Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
Alpha thalassemia;
Gait/balance disorder;
Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged
prostate on recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively,
could pose significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled
hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including
recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal
cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary
calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a
future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of
ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive
heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in
patients with asthma or COPD.43
.
a.
b
c.
d.
e.
f.
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced age and ill
health required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General
Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-incharge (OIC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the
limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
xxxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator
Enrile at the Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of
Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
xxxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile,
you happy or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the
accused vis a vis the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if
the condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things,
Your Honor.45
xxxx
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his
continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger
his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not
serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court
has already held in Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case,
the illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a
circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which
should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence
the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail;47 x x x
xxxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect
that the petitioner is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of
pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis, and that in said
institute they have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when
the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail; taking into consideration
that the petitioners previous petition for bail was denied by the Peoples Court on
the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active
tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the Peoples Court in sending the petitioner
to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual
condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering
from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail;
and considering further that the said Peoples Court has adopted and applied the
well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases,
among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino
(case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released on bail on the ground
that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be
injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently
hold that the Peoples Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
release the petitioner on bail.48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable
him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.
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On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a
meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the
objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the
trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail whose existence is
either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice
that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without
awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by
protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at
the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as
well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective
of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As
such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enriles Motion To
Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of
certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to excess, or lack of jurisdiction. 50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.51
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ of
certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and
August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00
in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan
Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
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Sereno, C. J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.Velasco, Jr., J., Leonardo-De

Castro, Brion, Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.Carpio, J., I join the Dissent
of J. Leonen. Peralta, J., for humanitarian reasons.Del Castillo, J., I concur
in the result based on humanitarian grounds.Villarama, Jr., J., on official
leave.Reyes, J., on sick leave.Perlas-Bernabe, J., I joint the dissent of J.
Leonen.Leonen, J., I dissent, see separate opinion.Jardeleza, J., no part,
prior OSG action.
Endnotes:
See Ariana Lindermayer, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations of
the State Constitutional Right to Bail, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 78, Issue 1
(2009), pp. 307-309.
1
Rollo, pp. 79-88; penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang, and

concurred in by Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires and Associate Justice Alex L.
Quiroz.
2
Id. at 89-102.
Id. at 107-108.
Id. at 103-157.
Id. at 163-192.
Id. at 193-221.
Id. at 222-241.
Id. at 241.
10
Id. at 242-243.
11
Id. at 244-247.
12
Id. at 249-256.
13
Id. at 13.
14
Id. at 84-88.
15
Id. at 89-102.
16
Id. at 16-19.
17
Id. at 526-542.
18
Section 14, (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571,

September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623 where the Court said that the constitutional
right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt; see also Shima
Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, Ohio State Law Journal, Vol.
72 (2011), p. 728.
19
20
Baradaran, supra note 19, at 736.
21
Id. at 731.
Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 564, 572.
22
Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619,
628.
23
24
As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December 1, 2000.
25
Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, supra note 19, at 693.
26
27
Id.
28
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.All persons in custody shall be

admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
29
Section 5, Paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
30
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995, 241 SCRA 84, 88.
Gacal v. Infante, A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845 (Formerly A.M. No. I.P.I. No. 03-1831RTJ), October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 535, 536.
31
32
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778, 789-790.
Cortes v. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997, 279 SCRA 1, 11.
33
34
Id. at 18.
Rollo, pp. 252-253.
35
36
Id. at 260.
Worthy to mention at this juncture is that the Court En Banc, in People v. Genosa
(G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 537), a criminal prosecution for
parricide in which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death under Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code, appreciated the concurrence of two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance as a privileged mitigating
circumstance, and consequently lowered the penalty imposed on the accused to
reclusion temporal in its medium period.
37
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No.
153675, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 470, 482 (bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis).
38
Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 17, G.R. No.157977, February 27,
2006, 483 SCRA 290, 298.
39
Rollo, pp. 559, 571-576.
40
41
Id. at 339-340 (TSN of July 14, 2014).
42
Id. at 373-374 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).
43
Id. at 334-335, 374-375.
44
Id. at 244-247.
45
Id. at 485-488 (TSN of September 4, 2014).
77 Phil. 461 (October 2, 1946), in which the pending criminal case against the
petitioner was for treason.
46
47
Id. at 462.
48
Id. at 465-466.
Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 466, where the
Court observed:
49
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a
consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but also
evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. There would then be a
need for a complete trial, after which the judge would be just about ready to render
a decision in the case. As perceptively observed by the Solicitor General, such
procedure would defeat the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending trial.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006,
484 SCRA 119, 127; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., G.R. No. L-40867,
July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 489, 494.
50
Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, G.R. No. 156822, October 18, 2004,
440 SCRA 467, 478; Duero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002,
373 SCRA 11, 17.
51
DISSENTING OPINION
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion

perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. - Const., art. III, sec. 13
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.
The Red Lily, Chapter 7 (1894) by Anatole France, French novelist (1844-1924)
LEONEN, J.:
I dissent.
This Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. The action of the Sandiganbayan
in denying the Motion to Fix Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of right in cases
where the crime charged is plunder and the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua.
Neither was there grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan when it failed to
release accused on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons. His release for
medical and humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his prayer in his Motion to
Fix Bail1 filed before the Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his prayer for the
grant of bail in this Petition on his medical condition.
The grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a special accommodation for
petitioner. It is based on a ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the
pleadings filed before this court. The Sandiganbayan should not be faulted for not
shedding their neutrality and impartiality. It is not the duty of an impartial court to
find what it deems a better argument for the accused at the expense of the
prosecution and the people they represent.
The allegation that petitioner suffers from medical conditions that require very
special treatment is a question of fact. We cannot take judicial notice of the truth
contained in a certification coming from one doctor. This doctor has to be presented
as an expert witness who will be subjected to both direct and cross-examination so
that he can properly manifest to the court the physical basis for his inferences as
well as the nature of the medical condition of petitioner. Rebutting evidence that
may be presented by the prosecution should also be considered. All this would be
proper before the Sandiganbayan. Again, none of this was considered by the
Sandiganbayan because petitioner insisted that he was entitled to bail as a matter
of right on grounds other than his medical condition.
Furthermore, the majoritys opinionother than the invocation of a general human
rights principledoes not provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on
humanitarian grounds. Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently
provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the
Constitution.
This case leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism of granting a privilege ad
hoc: only for one personpetitioner in this case.
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will
predictably be deluged with motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian
considerations. The lower courts will have to decide, without guidance, whether bail
should be granted because of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded
diseases. They will have to decide whether this is applicable only to Senators and
former Presidents charged with plunder and not to those accused of drug
trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, serious illegal detention, and other crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. They will have to decide
whether this is applicable only to those who are in special detention facilities and
not to the aging or sick detainees in overcrowded detention facilities all over this
country.
Our trial courts and the Sandiganbayan will decide on the basis of personal
discretion causing petitions for certiorari to be filed before this court. This will usher
in an era of truly selective justice not based on clear legal provisions, but one that
is unpredictable, partial, and solely grounded on the presence or absence of human
compassion on the day that justices of this court deliberate and vote.
Not only is this contrary to the Rule of Law, it also undermines the legitimacy and
the stability of our entire judicial system.
I
On June 5, 2014, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) was charged with the crime of
plunder punishable under Republic Act No. 7080. 2 Section 2 of this law provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the
crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death[.]
(Emphasis supplied)
On June 10, 2014, Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion before the Sandiganbayan,
praying that he be allowed to post bail if the Sandiganbayan should find probable
cause against him.3 On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied the Omnibus
Motion on the ground of prematurity since no warrant of arrest had been issued at
that time. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered Enriles arrest. 4
On the same day the warrant of arrest was issued and served, Enrile proceeded to
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group of the Philippine National Police in
Camp Crame, Quezon City.5
On July 7, 2014, Enrile filed a Motion to Fix Bail, arguing that his alleged age and
voluntary surrender were mitigating and extenuating circumstances that would
lower the imposable penalty to reclusion temporal.6 He also argued that his alleged
age and physical condition indicated that he was not a flight risk. 7 His prayer
states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court allow Enrile to post
bail, and forthwith set the amount of bail pending determination that (a) evidence
of guilt is strong; (b) uncontroverted mitigating circumstances of at least 70 years
old and voluntary surrender will not lower the imposable penalty to reclusion
temporal; and (c) Enrile is a flight risk [sic].8
The Office of the Ombudsman filed its Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail 9 dated
July 9, 2014. Enrile filed a Reply10 dated July 11, 2014.
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Pending the resolution of his Motion to Fix Bail, Enrile filed a Motion for Detention
at the PNP General Hospital11 dated July 4, 2014, arguing that his advanced age
and frail medical condition12 merit hospital arrest in the Philippine National Police
General Hospital under such conditions that may be prescribed by the
Sandiganbayan.13 He also prayed that in the event of a medical emergency that
cannot be addressed by the Philippine National Police General Hospital, he may be
allowed to access an outside medical facility.14 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court temporarily place him
under hospital confinement at the PNP General Hospital at Camp Crame, Quezon
City, with continuing authority given to the hospital head or administrator to
exercise his professional medical judgment or discretion to allow Enrile's immediate
access of, or temporary visit to, another medical facility outside of Camp Crame, in
case of emergency or necessity, secured with appropriate guards, but after
completion of the appropriate medical treatment or procedure, he be returned
forthwith to the PNP General Hospital.15
After the prosecutions submission of its Opposition to the Motion for Detention at
the PNP General Hospital, the Sandiganbayan held a hearing on July 9, 2014 to
resolve this Motion.
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On July 9, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order allowing Enrile to remain at

the Philippine National Police General Hospital for medical examination until further
orders of the court.16
This Order regarding his detention at the Philippine National Police General Hospital
is not the subject of this Petition for Certiorari. Enrile did not ask that this
Order be declared invalid or null and void.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued the Resolution 17 denying Enriles
Motion to Fix Bail for being premature,18 stating that:
[I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court
shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against
accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the
Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused
Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even
commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to
fix his bail.19
Enrile filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 reiterating that there were mitigating and
extenuating circumstances that would modify the imposable penalty and that his
frail health proved that he was not a flight risk.21 The Sandiganbayan, however,
denied the Motion on August 8, 2014.22 Hence, this Petition for Certiorari was filed.
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II
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
Motion to Fix Bail for prematurity. It was following entrenched and canonical
procedures for bail based upon the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
A trial courtin this case, the Sandiganbayanacquires jurisdiction over the person
of the accused through his or her arrest.23 The consequent detention is to ensure
that the accused will appear when required by the Rules and by order of the court
trying the offense.24 The provisions on bail provide a balance between the accuseds
right to be presumed innocent on one hand and the due process rights of the state
to be able to effect the accuseds prosecution on the other hand. That balance is
not exclusively judicially determined. The Constitution frames judicial discretion.
Thus, Article III, Section 13 states:
Article III
Bill of Rights
....
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The doctrine on bail is so canonical that it is clearly provided in our Rules of Court.
The grant of bail is ordinarily understood as two different concepts: (1) bail as a
matter of right and (2) bail as a matter of discretion. Thus, Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 114 provide:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted
upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from nonbailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by
the appellate court.
Then in Section 7 of Rule 114:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)
The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail when it is a
matter of right. On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an
accused is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but fundamentally to determine
whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
The mandatory character of a bail hearing was first addressed in the 1945 case of
Herras Teehankee v. Rovira25 where this court ordered the Peoples Court to
conduct a bail hearing despite the accused being charged with a capital offense. 26
This court reasoned that the hearing is for the purpose of enabling the Peoples
Court to exercise its sound discretion as to whether or not under the Constitution
and laws in force[,] petitioner is entitled to provisional release under bail.27
A year later, this court clarified its orders to the Peoples Court and gave the
following instructions:
(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the
petition for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper
exercise of its discretion, grant the release after the approval of the bail which it
should fix for the purpose;
(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutors attitude is
not justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the states
evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;
(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular
question on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the
success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not
compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the
Solicitor General, who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with
the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be
ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce
provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant
or detainee.28
The ruling in Herras Teehankee was applied in Ocampo v. Bernabe:29
We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, that all persons shall
before conviction be bailable except when the charge is a capital offense and the
evidence of guilt is strong. The general rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether
charged or not yet charged, are, before their conviction, entitled to provisional
release on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a capital offense and
the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of the application for bail,
the burden of showing that the case falls within the exception is on the
prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7. The determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong is, as stated in the Herras Teehankee case, a matter
of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot properly
be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a
proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents
are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails
to object thereto.30 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Herras Teehankee was also applied in Feliciano v. Pasicolan, etc., et al.31 and
Siazon v. Hon. Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, etc., et al.32
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We have disciplined numerous judges who violated this courts instructions on the
application of the constitutional provisions regarding bail.
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo33 outlines these administrative cases promulgated from
1981 to 1996.34 Unfortunately, there were still administrative complaints filed
against judges for failing to hold a hearing for bail even after the promulgation of
Basco.
In Cortes v. Judge Catral,35 this court ordered Judge Catral to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 for granting bail to the accused charged with capital offenses. 36 This
court could only lament on the deluge of these administrative cases, stating:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with
a number of administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all,
there is no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a
matter of fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been
including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars conducted for judges. Be
that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial
judges are enjoined to study them well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly,
judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith,
but this defense is much too frequently cited even if not applicable. A number of
cases on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to
discharge their duties assiduously. For a judge is called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that
he be conversant with basic legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice
can only be engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench
cannot justly be charged with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 37
The guidelines in Cortes fell on deaf ears as administrative cases continued to be
filed against judges who failed to hold hearings in applications for bail.
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In Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas,38 the accused was charged with murder.39 Judge
Bugtas initially denied the accuseds petition for bail but granted his motion for
reconsideration and set his bail without a hearing.40 As a result, Judge Bugtas was
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.0041 for being grossly ignorant of the rules and
procedures in granting or denying bail[.]42
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores,43 the erring judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P10,000.00 for granting bail to the accused charged with rape without a hearing. 44
In Chief State Prosecutor Zuo v. Judge Cabebe,45 Judge Cabebe was fined
P20,000.00 for granting bail, without the requisite hearing, to the accused charged
with possession of illegal drugs.46
A bail hearing is mandatory even if the accused has not filed an application for bail
or the prosecutor already recommends an amount for bail.
In Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante:47
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a
hearing should still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial
hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge
ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of
the crime. The Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its
evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.
....
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down by
the Supreme Court regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and indispensable.
He ought to have remembered, then, that it was only through such hearing that he
could be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for the Prosecution
was weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing with the hearing manifested a gross
ignorance of the law and the rules.48
In the present charge of plunder, petitioner now insists that this court justify that
bail be granted without any hearing before the Sandiganbayan on whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. During the hearing on petitioners Motion to Fix Bail, the
prosecution argued that any grant of bail should be based only on their failure to
establish the strength of the evidence against him.49 The prosecution had no
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opportunity to present rebuttal evidence based on the prematurity of the Motion.

Building on consistent precedent, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioners
Motion to Fix Bail for being premature. The denial is neither capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary [nor] despotic50 as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. It was in
accord with the clear provisions of the Constitution, jurisprudence, and longstanding rules of procedure.
Thus, this could not have been the basis for declaring that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioners Motion to Fix Bail.
III
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
release petitioner on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not
ask that bail be granted because of his medical condition or for humanitarian
reasons. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution as respondent developed their
arguments on this point at the Sandiganbayan or in this court to establish the legal
and factual basis for this special kind of bail in this case.
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioners grant of bail.
In his Petition before this court, petitioner argued that:
Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right.
Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2)
circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii)
when evidence of guilt is strong.
It is the duty and burden of the prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that
Enrile falls within the exception and exclusion from the right; and not the burden of
Enrile to show entitlement to his right.
The prosecution failed to establish that Enriles case falls within the exception;
hence, denial of his right to bail by the Sandiganbayan was in grave abuse of
discretion.
The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would
be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail
as a matter of right.
The Sandiganbayan ignored the fact that the penalty prescribed by the Anti-Plunder
Law itself for the crime of plunder is not only reclusion perpetua but also the
penalty next lower in degree (or reclusion temporal) by consider(ing) the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code.
Further proceedings to receive evidence of mitigating circumstances is a needless
formality.
The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enriles
guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Notwithstanding that the prosecution did not assert, hence failed to raise in issue,
in its Opposition to Enriles motion for bail, that evidence of guilt is strong, in the
light of the prosecutions continuing muteness to the defenses repeated challenge
for the prosecution to produce any single piece of paper showing that Enrile
received even a single peso of kickback, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless insisted
that Enrile must first initiate, and formally apply for, the formal proceedings (bail
hearing) before the prosecution may be called upon to discharge its duty of
proving evidence of guilt is strong.
At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.
The exception to, or exclusion from, the right (shall be bailable) does not become
a prohibition (shall not be bailable). Indeed, the exception to a mandatory right
(shall) is a permissive right (may).
A liberal interpretation is consistent with the rights to presumptive innocence and
non-deprivation of liberty without due process, and the theory behind the exception
to right-to-bail.
Hence, if the theory is clearly shown not to exist as to Enrile (i.e., Enrile is
demonstrated not being a flight risk), then bail may be granted to him.
Enrile is definitely not a flight risk, being of old age, frail physical and medical
condition, and having voluntarily surrendered.
Circumstances of official and social standing shows that Enrile is not a flight risk.
Other circumstances negating Enriles disposition to become a fugitive from justice
are also present.
The following illustrative cases decided by the Supreme Court show that at this
stage of the proceeding, Enrile is entitled to bail a matter of right. 51
The prayer in his Petition reads:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Enrile respectfully prays that the Honorable Court:
ACT En Banc on the Petition for Certiorari;
EXPEDITE the certiorari proceedings;

SET the Petition for Certiorari for oral arguments; and
after due proceedings, ANNUL, REVERSE, and SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayans
Resolution dated July 14, 2014, and the Resolution dated August 8, 2014, and
forthwith GRANT BAIL in favor of Enrile.
Petitioner Enrile prays for such other and further relief as may be just and
equitable.52
IV
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This case entailed long, arduous, and spirited discussion among the justices of this
court in and out of formal deliberations. As provided by our rules and tradition, the
discussion was triggered by the submission of the member in charge of a draft
early this year. The draft mainly adopted the legal arguments of the Petition which
was centered on this court taking judicial notice of evidence to establish two
generic mitigating circumstances that would lower the penalty to be imposed even
before trial or a hearing for the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong happened before the Sandiganbayan. Associate Justice Estela PerlasBernabe and this member submitted their reflections on this issue. Refutations and
arguments were vigorously exchanged in writing.
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member adopted the common
position that there was no grave abuse of discretion and, therefore, the Petition
should be dismissed. At most, the Motion to Fix Bail could be treated by the
Sandiganbayan as a petition or application for bail as in all cases where the
statutorily imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, death, or life imprisonment.
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member differed only in the
treatment of mitigating circumstances and the interpretation of Bravo, Jr., etc. v.
Hon. Borja, et al.53
When this case was called again for deliberation during the En Banc session on
August 11, 2015, the member in charge (now the ponente) proposed the idea of
dropping all discussion on the legal points pertaining to whether bail was a matter
of right and focusing the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds. The member in
charge committed to circulate a draft for the consideration of all justices. This
member expressed that he was open to listen to all arguments.
The revised draft that centered on granting bail on the basis of the medical
condition of petitioner was circulated on August 14, 2015. After considered
reflection, this member responded with a letter addressed to all the justices, which
stated:
In my view, there are several new issues occasioned by the revisions in the
proposed ponencia that need to be threshed out thoroughly so that the
Sandiganbayan can be guided if and when an accused charged with offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua should be released on bail for humanitarian
reasons.
Among these are as follows:

First: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it applied the text of the Constitution, the rules of court, and
the present canonical interpretations of these legal texts?
Second: Are we taking judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the certification
of a certain Dr. Gonzalez? Or are we suspending our rules on evidence, that is,
doing away with cross examination and not appreciating rebutting evidence that
may be or have been presented by the prosecution?
Third: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in appreciating the
facts relating to the medical condition of the accused? Or, are we substituting our
judgment for theirs?
Fourth: What happens to the standing order of the Sandiganbayan which authorizes
the accused to be brought to any hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms
which cannot be treated by the PNP hospital subject only to reportorial
requirements to the court? Are we also declaring that the Sandiganbayans
decisions in relation to their supervision of the detention of the accused were
tainted with grave abuse of discretion?
Fifth: What, if any, is the legal basis for humanitarian releases on bail? Or, if we are
able to hurdle the factual issues and find that there is actually a medical necessity,
should his detention rather be modified? Do we have clear judicial precedents for
hospital or house arrests for everyone?
Sixth: Without conceding, if the accused is released on bail so that his medical
condition can be attended to, should he be returned to detention when he becomes
well? If he reports for work, does this not nullify the very basis of the ponencia?
Seventh: What is the basis for P500,000.00 as bail? We have established rules on
what to consider when setting the amount of bail. In relation to the accused and his
circumstances, what is our basis for setting this amount? What evidence have we
considered? Should this Court rather than the Sandiganbayan exercise this
discretion?
Eighth: What are our specific bases for saying that the medical condition of the
accused entitles him to treatment different from all those who are now under
detention and undergoing trial for plunder? Is it simply his advanced age? What
qualifies for advanced age? Is it the medical conditions that come with advanced
age? Would this apply to all those who have similar conditions and are also
undergoing trial for plunder? Is he suffering from a unique debilitating disease
which cannot be accommodated by the best care provided by our detention
facilities or hospital or house arrest? Are there sufficient evidence and rules to
support our conclusion?
Ninth: Are there more specific and binding international law provisions, other than
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which specifically compel the release of
an accused in his condition? Or, are we now reading the general tenor of the
declaration of human rights to apply specifically to the condition of this accused?
What entitles the accused in this case to a liberal application of very general
statements on human rights?54
The points in my letter were raised during the deliberations of August 18, 2015.
The member in charge, however, did not agree to wait for a more extensive written
reflection on the points raised. Insisting on a vote, he thus declared that he
was abandoning the August 14, 2015 circulated draft centering on release
on bail on humanitarian grounds for his earlier version premised on the
idea that bail was a matter of right based on judicial notice and the
judicial declaration of the existence of two mitigating circumstances.
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This was the version voted upon at about 11:00 a.m. of August 18, 2015. The only
amendment to the majority opinion accepted by the member in charge was the
increase of the proposed amount of bail to P1,000,000.00.
The vote was 8 to 4 with Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who was the member
in charge, emerging as the ponente. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe,
and this member dissented.
During the oral arguments on the Torre de Manila case or at about 3:00 p.m., the
ponente passed around a final copy of the majority opinion which was not
the version voted upon during the mornings deliberation. Rather, the copy
offered for signature was substantially the August 14, 2015 circulated version
granting bail on humanitarian grounds.
The current ponencia now does away with petitioners entire argument, stating
that:
Yet, we do not now determine the question of whether or not Enriles averment on
the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite
the crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua, simply
because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made
by the trial court.55 (Citation omitted)
Ordinarily, the drafts of the dissents would have been available to all members of
the court at the time that the case was voted upon. But because the final version
for signing was not the version voted upon, this member had to substantially revise
his dissent. Since the issue of mitigating circumstances and bail as a matter of right
was no longer the basis of the ponencia, Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe
decided to graciously offer her points for the drafting of a single Dissenting Opinion
and to abandon her filing of a Separate Opinion and joining this member.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the submission of a
dissenting opinion. Thus, in Rule 13, section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC:
SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring opinion. - A Member who disagrees with
the majority opinion, its conclusions, and the disposition of the case may submit to
the Chief Justice or Division Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting forth the
reason or reasons for such dissent. A Member who agrees with the result of the
case, but based on different reason or reasons may submit a separate opinion; a
concurrence in the result should state the reason for the qualified concurrence. A
Member who agrees with the main opinion, but opts to express other reasons for
concurrence may submit a concurring opinion. The dissenting, separate, or
concurring opinion must be submitted within one week from the date the writer of
the majority opinion presents the decision for the signature of the Members.
(Emphasis supplied)
But this member endeavored to complete his draft incorporating the ideas and
suggestions of other dissenting justices within two days from the circulation of the
majority opinion.
In the meantime, media, through various means, got wind of the vote and started
to speculate on the contents of the majority opinion. This may have created
expectations on the part of petitioners friends, family, and counsel. The Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, while admitting that the Decision had as yet not
been promulgated and served, made announcements as to their readiness to
receive the cash bond and process the release of the accused even if August 19,
2015 happened to be a holiday in Quezon City, which was the seat of their court.
This is the context of the apparent delay in the announcements regarding the vote
and the date of promulgation of this judgment.
V
Despite brushing aside all of petitioners arguments, the majority, instead of
denying the Petition for Certiorari, grants it on some other ground that was not
even argued nor prayed for by petitioner.
In essence, the majority now insists on granting bail merely on the basis of the
certification in a Manifestation and Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr. Jose
C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that petitioner is suffering from numerous
debilitating conditions.56 This certification was submitted as an annex to a
Manifestation57 before this court regarding the remoteness of the possibility of flight
of the accused not for the purposes of asking for bail due to such ailments.
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial
notice of a doctors certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on
evidence by doing away with cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales
findings on petitioners health in a hearing whose main purpose is to determine
whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.
Under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

In State Prosecutors v. Muro:58
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to
be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety.59
Petitioners medical ailments are not matters that are of public knowledge or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration. His illness is not a matter of general
notoriety.
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Assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the
prosecution is now deprived of a fair opportunity to present any evidence that may
rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other medical documents presented by
petitioner in this Court. Due process requires that we remand this matter for a bail
hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales findings and to ensure that that is still the condition
that prevails at present.
That we make factual determinations ourselves to grant provisional liberty to one
who is obviously politically privileged without the benefit of the presentation of
evidence by both the prosecution and the accused, without the prosecution being
granted the opportunity to cross-examine the evidence, and without consideration
of any rebutting evidence that may have been presented should a hearing be held,
casts serious doubt on our neutrality and objectivity.
The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, longstanding, and canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This is to be examined when a hearing is
granted as a mandatory manner after a petition for bail is filed by the accused. The
medical condition of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and heard.
VI
Assuming without conceding that petitioner suffers from illnesses that require
immediate medical attention, this court has not established clear guidelines for
such releases. The closest that the majority opinion reaches for a standard is:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his
continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger
his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not
serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during trial. 60 (Emphasis in the
original)
To see the logical fallacy of the argument we break it down to its premises:
Premise: There are those whose continued incarceration is clearly shown to be

injurious to their health OR whose lives are endangered due to incarceration.
Premise: Petitioner is suffering from some ailments.
Therefore: Petitioner should be released.
There are various ways to see the fallacy of the argument.
It is true that it is the duty of courts to ensure that detention prisoners are
humanely treated. Under A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC, 61 judges of lower courts are
mandated to conduct monthly jail visitations in order to [e]nsure the promotion
and protection of the dignity and well being62 of detention prisoners. Detention
prisoners may also be released to a medical facility on humanitarian grounds if
their continuous confinement during the pendency of their case would be injurious
to their health or endanger their life.63
In many instances, alternative detentionwhether temporary or permanentis
granted upon a clear showing before the trial court or the Sandiganbayan that the
physical condition of the accused, as proven through evidence presented in open
court, is absolutely requiring medical attention that could not be accommodated
within the current custodial arrangements. Care should, however, be taken that
such alternative custodial arrangements do not take place more than the time
necessary to address the medical condition of the accused. Likewise, the

Sandiganbayan should ensure that alternative custodial arrangements are not
borne by the state and, therefore, should be sensitive to the possibility that these
alternatives are not seen as a privilege given to the wealthy or powerful detainees.
On July 9, 201464 and July 15, 2014,65 the Sandiganbayan already issued
Resolutions allowing accused to remain at the Philippine National Police General
Hospital and continue medical examinations until further orders from the court,
subject to reportorial requirements and at accuseds personal expense. In
particular, the Resolution dated July 9, 2014 states:
Pending receipt of [Dr. Jose C. Gonzaless report], the Court will hold in abeyance
action on accused Enriles motion for detention at the PNP General Hospital.
However, he is allowed to remain thereat until further orders from this Court. The
Director or Administrator of PNP General Hospital is GRANTED AUTHORITY to
allow accused Enrile to access another medical facility outside Camp Crame only
(1) in case of emergency or necessity, and (2) the medical procedure required to
be administered on accused Enrile is not available at, or cannot be provided for by
the physicians of, the PNP General Hospital, ALL AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE
OF ACCUSED ENRILE. After completion of the medical treatment or procedure
outside Camp Crame, accused Enrile shall be returned forthwith to the PNP General
Hospital. The said director or administrator is DIRECTED to submit a report
to the Court on such visit/s of accused Enrile to another medical facility on
the day following the said visit/s.66 (Emphasis in the original)
The Resolution dated July 15, 2014 states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, and/or any his duly
authorized representative/s from the Philippine General Hospital, is DIRECTED to
continue with the medical examination of accused Juan Ponce Enrile and to submit
a report and recommendation to the Court within thirty (30) days from receipt
hereof. The necessary medical examination/s and/or procedure/s as determined the
said doctor/s shall be undertaken at PGH or any government hospital, which the
medical team may deem to have the appropriate, suitable and/or modern
equipment or medical apparatus and competent personnel to undertake the
procedure/s, ALL AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED JUAN PONCE
ENRILE. Pending the completion of the aforesaid medical examination/s and/or
procedure/s and submission of the required report and recommendation, accused
Juan Ponce Enrile is allowed to remain at the Philippine National Police General
Hospital subject to conditions earlier imposed by the Court in its Resolution dated
July 9, 2014.
SO ORDERED.67
These are standing orders of the Sandiganbayan that authorize accused to be
brought to any hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms that cannot be treated
at the Philippine National Police General Hospital subject only to reportorial
requirements to the court. In granting bail to petitioner, we are, in effect, declaring
that the Sandiganbayans decisions in relation to its supervision of the accuseds
detention were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
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However, these orders were not the subject of this Petition for Certiorari.
To the Sandiganbayan, based upon the facts as presented to it, accused does not
seem to be suffering from a unique debilitating disease whose treatment cannot be
provided for by our detention facilities and temporary hospital arrest in accordance
with their order. How the majority arrived at a conclusion different from the
Sandiganbayan has not been thoroughly explained. Neither did this issue
become the subject of intense discussion by the parties through their
pleadings.
It is unclear whether this privilege would apply to all those who have similar
conditions and are also undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear whether
petitioners incarceration aggravates his medical conditions or if his medical
conditions are simply conditions which come with advanced age.
The majority has not set specific bases for finding that the medical condition of
petitioner entitles him to treatment different from all those who are now under
detention and undergoing trial for plunder. There is no showing as to how grave his
conditions are in relation to the facilities that are made available to him. There is
also no showing as to whether any of his medical ailments is actually aggravating in
spite of the best care available. If his health is deteriorating, there is no showing
that it is his detention that is the most significant factor or cause for such
deterioration.
Usually, when there is a medical emergency that would make detention in the
hospital necessary, courts do not grant bail. They merely modify the conditions for
the accuseds detention. There is now no clarity as to when special bail based on
medical conditions and modified arrest should be imposed.
Finally, there is no guidance as to whether this special bail based on medical
condition is applicable only to those of advanced age and whether that advanced
age is beyond 90 or 91 years old. There is no guidance as to whether this is
applicable only to cases involving plunder. There is no guidance in the majoritys
opinion as to whether this is only applicable to the medical conditions or stature or
titles of petitioner.
The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard for the
special grant of bail on the ground of medical conditions.
Bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald:68
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical
care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It
may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are
seriously sick. There may also be an existing proposition for the selective
decarceration of older prisoners based on findings that recidivism rates decrease
as age increases.69
VII
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Neither is there clarity in the majority opinion as to the conditions for this special
kind of bail. Thus, the majority asserts:
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable
him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.70
Before the ink used to write and print the majority opinion and this dissent has
dried, friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that he
would report immediately for work. This strongly indicates that the majoritys
inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating illnesses may have been
too speculative or premature.
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Significantly, there is no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then

can be cancelled motu propio or upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether
that motion to cancel bail should be filed before the Sandiganbayan or before this
court.
The crime charged in petitioners case is one where the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. The Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be
granted after granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove that evidence of
guilt is strong. The special grant of bail, due to medical conditions, is unique,
extraordinary, and exceptional. To allow petitioner to go about his other duties
would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of the provisions of the Constitution and our
rules.
In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of provisional liberty on the
basis of humanitarian considerations extends even after the medical emergency
has passed. Again, a case of a decision especially tailored for petitioner.
VIII
There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of P1,000,000.00 as the amount
for bail. The original proposal of the member in charge was P100,000.00. This was
increased to P500,000.00 in its revised proposal circulated on August 14, 2015.
Then, upon the request of one member who voted with the majority, it was then
increased to P1,000,000.00.
The rules guide courts on what to consider when setting the amount of bail. 71 The
majority opinion is sparse on the evidence it considers for setting this particular
amount. Again, the more prudent course of action would have been for the
Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its discretion in setting the amount of
bail.
IX
There are no specific and binding international law provisions that compel this court
to release petitioner given his medical condition. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion, is a general declaration 72 to
uphold the value and dignity of every person.73 It does not prohibit the arrest of any
accused based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of any person
accused of crimes. It only implies that any arrest or detention must be carried out
in a dignified and humane manner.
The majority opinion cites Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
v. Hon. Olalia, Jr.74 as basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian reasons.75
However, Government of Hong Kong does not apply to this case because the issue
was on whether bail could apply to extradition cases. This court stated that because
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose principles are now embodied
in the Constitution, bail applies to all instances where an accused is detained
pending trial, including administrative proceedings such as extradition. This court,
however, does not state that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights mandates
that bail must be granted in instances where the accused is of advanced age and
frail health.
Petitioners remedies under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that
safeguard his fundamental right to liberty are qualified by the Constitution. Article
III, Section 13 of the Constitution clearly states that bail is available to all persons
before conviction except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong[.] Even Article 29(2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the same document used by the majority opinion,
provides that:
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.
In any case, even this court in Government of Hong Kong was wary to grant bail
without evidence presented that the accused was not a flight risk. For this reason,
it remanded the case to the trial court76 instead of applying the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and categorically stating that based on
these principles alone, the accused was entitled to bail.
It is true that the Constitution is replete with provisions on both the respect for
human dignity and the protection of human rights. These rights are applicable to
those who, during the dark days of Martial Law, were illegally detained, tortured,
and even involuntarily disappeared. There is, of course, no reason for these rights
and the invocation of human dignity not to be applicable to Senators of our
Republic.
However, the mere invocation of the broadest concept of human rights is not
shibboleth. It should not be cause for us to be nonchalant about the existence of
other constitutional and statutory provisions and the norms in our Rules of Court.
The mere invocation of human rights does not mean that the Rule of Law is
suspended. It is not a shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or result that we want.
Rather, human rights are best entrenched with the Rule of Law. Suspending the
applicability of clear legal provisions upon the invocation of human rights compels
this court to do a more conscious and rigorous analysis of how these provisions
violate specific binding human rights norms.
The majority opinion fails in this respect.
Liberty is indeed a cherished value. It is an intrinsic part of our humanity to fight
for it and ensure that it allows all of us to lead the kind of lives that we will consider
meaningful. This applies to petitioner as accused. Yet it also applies with equal
force to all the individuals in our communities and in this society.
Our collective liberty, the kind that ensures our individual and collective meaningful
existence, is put at risk if justice is wanting. Special privileges may be granted only
under clear, transparent, and reasoned circumstances. Otherwise, we accept that
there are just some among us who are elite. Otherwise, we concede that there are
those among us who are powerful and networked enough to enjoy privileges not
shared by all.
This dissent rages against such a premise. It is filled with discomfort with the
consequences of the majoritys position. It cannot accept any form of impunity.
X.
Plunder is not the only crime statutorily punished with the imposable penalty of
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Under the Revised Penal Code, the
following crimes, among others, carry this as maximum penalty:
(1) Parricide;77
(2) Murder;78
(3) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention;79
(4) Robbery with homicide;80
(5) Robbery with rape;81
(6) Robbery with serious physical injuries;82
(7) Attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide;83
(8) Rape;84
(9) Rape of children under 12 years old;85
(10) Sexual assault;86 and
(11) Incestuous rape.87
Under special laws, the following crimes, among others, carry the maximum
penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua:
(1) Carnapping with homicide or rape;88
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(2) Sale of illegal drugs regardless of quantity and purity; 89

(3) Illegal possession of 10 grams or more of heroin, 10 grams or more of cocaine,
50 grams or more of shabu, 500 grams or more of marijuana, or 10 grams or more
of ecstasy;90
(4) Illegal possession of 10 grams to less than 50 grams of shabu; 91
(5) Illegal possession of 5 grams to less than 10 grams of heroin, cocaine, shabu,
or ecstasy;92
(6) Child prostitution;93
(7) Child trafficking;94
(8) Forcing a street child or any child to beg or to use begging as a means of
living;95
(9) Forcing a street child or any child to be a conduit in drug trafficking or
pushing;96
(10) Forcing a street child or any child to commit any illegal activities; 97 and
(11) Murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries of
a child under 12 years old.98
If we are to take judicial notice of anything, then it should be that there are those
accused of murder, trafficking, sale of dangerous drugs, incestuous rape, rape of
minors, multiple counts of rape, or even serious illegal detention who languish in
overcrowded detention facilities all over our country. We know this because the
members of this court encounter them through cases appealed on a daily basis.
Many of them suffer from diseases that they may have contracted because of the
conditions of their jails. But they and their families cannot afford hospitals better
than what government can provide them. After all, they remain in jail because they
may not have the resources to launch a full-scale legal offensive marked with the
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creativity of well-networked defense counsel. After all, they may have committed
acts driven by the twin evils of greed or lust on one hand and poverty on the other
hand.
For them, there are no special privileges. The application of the law to them is
often brute, banal, and canonical. Theirs is textbook equal treatment by courts.
Our precedents show that when there are far less powerful, less fortunate, poorer
accused, this court has had no difficulty denying a motion to fix bail or motion to
set bail where the crime charged carries the imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua. With less powerful accused, we have had no difficulty reading the plain
meaning of Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution. With those who are less
fortunate in life, there are no exceptions.
Petitioner in this case is unbelievably more fortunate.
There is a right, just, and legal way to do things for the right, just, and legal result.
In my view, it is not right, just, and legal to grant bail, even for P1,000,000.00,
without clearly articulating why the Sandiganbayans actions were arbitrary,
capricious, and whimsical.
In truth, the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law and with sufficient
compassion. It did not gravely abuse its discretion. Thus, this Petition should be
dismissed.
XI
Those that read a decision which does not fully respond to the legal issues outlined
in this dissent may be tempted to conclude that the decision is the result of obvious
political accommodation rather than a judicious consideration of the facts and the
law. This case may benefit one powerful public official at the cost of weakening our
legal institutions. If it is pro hac vice, then it amounts to selective justice. If it is
meant to apply in a blanket manner for all other detainees, then it will weaken the
administration of justice because the judicial standards are not clear.
Without further clarity, our signal to the various divisions of the Sandiganbayan
hearing these complex and politically laden plunder cases can be misinterpreted.
Rather than apply the Rule of Law without fear or favor, the sitting justices will
become more sensitive to the demands of those who have political influence. After
all, in their minds, even if they do what is expected of them, this court may still
declare that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.
The granting of bail is a judicial function circumscribed within the bounds of the
Constitution. Our duty is to ensure the realization of the Rule of Law even in
difficult cases. This case does not really present any kind of legal complexity if we
blind ourselves as to who is involved. It is complex only because it is political.
The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any determination of whether
the evidence of guilt is strong violates the clear and unambiguous text of the
Constitution. It may be that, as citizens, we have our own opinions on or
predilections for how the balance of fundamental rights, liberties, and obligations
should be. It may be that, as citizens, such opinions are founded on our wealth of
knowledge and experience.
But, as members of this court, our duty is to enforce the exact textual formulation
of the fundamental document written and ratified by the sovereign. This fealty to
the text of the Constitution will provide us with a stable anchor despite the
potential political controversies that swirl over the legal questions that we need to
decide. It is also this fealty to the text of the Constitution that gives this court the
legitimacy as the final bastion and the ultimate sentinel of the Rule of Law.
As the apex of the judiciary, the very sentinels of the Rule of Law, the court from
whom all other courtslike the Sandiganbayanshould find inspiration and
courage, we should apply the law squarely and without fear or favor. We should
have collectively carried the burden of doing justice properly and denied this
Petition.
Indeed, mercy and compassion temper justice. However, mercy and compassion
should never replace justice. There is injustice when we, as the court of last resort,
conveniently rid ourselves of the burden of enforcing the Rule of Law by neglecting
to do the kind of rigorous, deliberate, and conscious analysis of the issues raised by
the parties. There is injustice when we justify the result we want with ambiguous
and unclear standards.
Compassion as an excuse for injustice not only fails us as justices of this court. It
also fails us in our own humanity.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. The Motion to Fix Bail should be
treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition for bail under Rule 114, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court.
Endnotes:
Petition for Certiorari, Annex I.
An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, as amended by Rep. Act No.
7659 (1993).
2
Ponencia, p. 2.
Id.
Id.
Petition for Certiorari, Annex I, pp. 45.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 67.
Petition for Certiorari, Annex J.
10
Petition for Certiorari, Annex K.
11
Petition for Certiorari, Annex H.
12
Id. at 2.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 3.
16
Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.
17
Petition for Certiorari, Annex A.
18
Id. at 6 and 10.
19
Id. at 6.
20
Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.
21
Id. at 35.
22
Petition for Certiorari, Annex B, p. 14.
See Fiscal Gimenez v. Judge Nazareno, 243 Phil. 274, 278 (1988) [Per J.
Gancayco, En Banc].
23
See REV. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 114, sec. 3.
24
25
75 Phil. 634 (1945) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
26
Id. at 644.
27
Id.
Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 774 (1946) [Per J. Hilado,
En Banc].
28
29
77 Phil. 55 (1946) [Per C.J. Moran, En Banc].
30
Id. at 58.
31
112 Phil. 781, 782783 (1961) [Per J. Natividad, En Banc].
32
149 Phil. 241, 247 (1971) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].
33
336 Phil. 214 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
Id. at 221227, citing People v. Mayor Sola, et al., 191 Phil. 21 (1981) [Per C.J.
Fernando, En Banc], People v. Hon. San Diego, etc., et al., 135 Phil. 514 (1968)
[Per J. Capistrano, En Banc], People v. Judge Dacudao, 252 Phil. 507 (1989) [Per J.
Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division], People v. Calo, Jr., 264 Phil. 1007 (1990) [Per J.
Bidin, En Banc], Libarios v. Dabalos, A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991, 199
SCRA 48 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], People v. Nano, G.R. No. 94639, January 13,
1992, 205 SCRA 155 [Per J. Bidin, Third Division], Pico v. Combong, Jr., A.M. No.
RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992, 215 SCRA 421 [Per Curiam, En Banc], De Guia v.
Maglalang, A.M. No. RTJ-89-306, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 153 [Per Curiam, En
Banc], Borinaga v. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA
206, 216 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Aurillo, Jr. v. Francisco, A.M. No. RTJ-931097, August 12, 1994, 235 SCRA 283 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], Estoya v.
Abraham-Singson, A.M. No. RTJ-91-758, September 26, 1994, 237 SCRA 1 [Per
Curiam, En Banc], Aguirre v. Belmonte, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994,
237 SCRA 778 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Lardizabal v. Reyes, A.M No. MTJ-94897, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA 640 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], Guillermo v.
Judge Reyes, Jr., etc., 310 Phil. 176 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division],
Santos v. Judge Ofilada, 315 Phil. 11 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Sule v.
Biteng, 313 Phil. 398 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc], and Buzon, Jr. v. Judge
Velasco, 323 Phil. 724 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
34
35
344 Phil. 415 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
36
Id. at 430431.
Id., citing Basco v. Judge Rapatalo, 336 Phil. 214, 237 (1997) [Per J. Romero,
Second Division].
37
38
448 Phil. 45 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
39
Id. at 48.
40
Id. at 4950.
41
Id. at 5657.
42
Id. at 56.
43
389 Phil. 372 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
44
Id. at 375 and 388.
45
486 Phil. 605 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].
46
Id. at 611 and 618.
47
674 Phil. 324 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
Id. at 340341, citing Directo v. Judge Bautista, 400 Phil. 1, 5 (2000) [Per J.
Melo, Third Division] and Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores, 389 Phil. 372, 381 (2000)
[Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
48
49
Petition for Certiorari, Annex A, p. 2.
People v. Sandiganbayan, 490 Phil. 105, 116 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second
50
Division], citing People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431
SCRA 610, 616 [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Rodson Philippines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480 [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Matugas v. Commission on Elections, 465 Phil. 299,
313 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 467 Phil. 541, 553 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], and
Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil.
660, 667 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
51
Petition for Certiorari, pp. 912.
52
Id. at 64.
53
219 Phil. 432 (1985) [Per J. Plana, First Division].
54
J. Leonen, Letter to Colleagues dated August 18, 2015.
55
Ponencia, p. 10.
The enumeration of diseases on page 12 of the ponencia is based on the

certification of Dr. Gonzales. There was a hearing but for the purpose of
determining whether hospital arrest can continue. The hearing was not for the
purpose of determining whether bail should be granted on the basis of his medical
condition.
56
Rollo, p. 373.
57
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, September 19, 1994, 236 SCRA 505 [Per Curiam, En
Banc].
58
Id. at 521522, citing 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 17, 48, King v. Gallun, et al.,
109 U.S. 99, 27 L. ed. 870, and 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Secs. 67, 823.
59
60
Ponencia, p. 14.
Re: Guidelines on the Jail Visitation and Inspection. New guidelines are stated in
OCA Circular No. 107-2013.
61
62
A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC (2008), sec. 1(3).
De la Rama v. Peoples Court, 77 Phil. 461, 465 (1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].
63
64
Petition for Certiorari, Annex O.
65
Petition for Certiorari, Annex P.
66
Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.
67
Petition for Certiorari, Annex P, pp. 23.
68
536 Phil. 413 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].
Id. at 428, citing Release of Accused by Judge Muro in Non-Bailable Offense, 419
Phil. 567, 581 (2001) [Per Curiam, En Banc], People v. Judge Gako, Jr., 401 Phil.
514, 541 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division], Ernesto Pineda, THE
REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 193 (2003) which in turn cited De la
Rama v. Peoples Court, 77 Phil. 461, 465 (1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc], Archers
case, 6 Gratt 705, Ex parte Smith, 2 Okla. Crim. Rep. 24, 99 Pfc. 893, and Max
Rothman, Burton Dunlop, and Pamela Entzel, ELDERS, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 233234 (2000).
69
70
Ponencia, p. 15.
See REV. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 114, sec. 9, which states:
71
SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. The judge who issued the warrant or granted
the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not
limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 545 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc], this court stated: Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend
it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted
the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State.
72
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 1 states that [a]ll human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and rights.
73
74
550 Phil. 63, 72 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
75
Ponencia, pp. 1011.
See Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr.,
550 Phil. 63, 77 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]. The dispositive
portion reads: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to
the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the
basis of clear and convincing evidence. If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct
the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
76
77
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 246.
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 248, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 6, and
Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), sec. 1.
78
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 267, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 8, and
Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), sec. 1.
79
80
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 294(1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 9.
81
82
83
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 297.
84
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A(1)(d), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997),
sec. 2.
85
86
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A(2), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.
87
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-B(1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.
88
Rep. Act No. 6539 (1972), sec. 14, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993),
sec. 20 and Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), sec. 1.

89
Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 5.
90
Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11, 1st par. (3)(4)(5)(7)(8).
91
Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11, 2nd par. (1).
92
Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11, 2nd par. (2).
93
Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 5.
94
Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 7.
95
Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10(e)(1)
96
Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10(e)(2).
97
Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10(e)(3).
98
Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10
ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: DIGEST AND COMMENTS

G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin
Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective
of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded
in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported
involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail,
which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for
Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary
surrender.
Senator Enrile
(Source: wikifilipinas.org)
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail

which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that:
(a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and
voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal,
thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age
and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed
resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless
the crime charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua where the
evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner
would be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt
is strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight
risk.
HELD:
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of
innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than
what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution
and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal

offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established
that the evidence of guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is
not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the
court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted
upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from nonbailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by
the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue
on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail
subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by
the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life

imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to judicial discretion.
In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: [S]uch discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not
he should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice
is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should
primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs.
Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court
to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
2. YES.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to
the international community arising from its commitment to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC
emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure
the appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced
age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically
and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan

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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan

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G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015 - JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v.

SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

In its Comment,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enriles right to bail is

mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong

Ruling of the Court

(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following:

Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by

Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

Sereno, C. J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.Velasco, Jr., J., Leonardo-De

Rollo, pp. 79-88; penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang, and

Section 14, (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571,

Baradaran, supra note 19, at 736.

As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December 1, 2000.

Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.All persons in custody shall be

Section 5, Paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995, 241 SCRA 84, 88.

Rollo, pp. 252-253.

Rollo, pp. 559, 571-576.

Id. at 339-340 (TSN of July 14, 2014).

Id. at 373-374 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).

Id. at 334-335, 374-375.

Id. at 485-488 (TSN of September 4, 2014).

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion

On July 9, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order allowing Enrile to remain at

opportunity to present rebuttal evidence based on the prematurity of the Motion.

EXPEDITE the certiorari proceedings;

Among these are as follows:

demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Premise: There are those whose continued incarceration is clearly shown to be

necessary to address the medical condition of the accused. Likewise, the

Significantly, there is no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then

(2) Sale of illegal drugs regardless of quantity and purity; 89

Petition for Certiorari, Annex I, pp. 45.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex J.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex K.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex H.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex A.

Id. at 6 and 10.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex B, p. 14.

See REV. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 114, sec. 3.

75 Phil. 634 (1945) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].

77 Phil. 55 (1946) [Per C.J. Moran, En Banc].

112 Phil. 781, 782783 (1961) [Per J. Natividad, En Banc].

149 Phil. 241, 247 (1971) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].

336 Phil. 214 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].

344 Phil. 415 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].

448 Phil. 45 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

389 Phil. 372 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

Id. at 375 and 388.

486 Phil. 605 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].

Id. at 611 and 618.

674 Phil. 324 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

Petition for Certiorari, Annex A, p. 2.

Petition for Certiorari, pp. 912.

219 Phil. 432 (1985) [Per J. Plana, First Division].

J. Leonen, Letter to Colleagues dated August 18, 2015.