Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No.

101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the
Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they
are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a
distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court
to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not
agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said
right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many
other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of
E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for
the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the
country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in

Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that
the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough
to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom
of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the
exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is
SET ASIDE.

# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few
years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have
therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to
refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of
the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the
field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in
the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There
is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage
into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slashand-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the
use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss
of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the

1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely
wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which
give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency
charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each
of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does
not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored

in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at
here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology"
and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it
is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and
executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded
in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of
the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek
to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality
of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful
acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the
forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

G.R. No.s 171947-48, December 18, 2008

Concerned Citizens vs MMDA
Facts:
January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC Imus,
Cavite against several government agencies for the clean-up, rehabilitation and protection of the
Manila Bay/ The complaint alleged that the water quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the
allowable standards set by law (esp. PD 1152, Philippine environment Code).
DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples collected from the beaches
around Manila Bay is beyond the safe level for bathing standard of the DENR. MWSS testified
also about MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the bay. Philippine Ports Authority presented
as evidence its Memorandum Circulars on the study on ship-generated waste treatment and
disposal as its Linis Dagat project.
RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.
The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning of the
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Raising the concerns of lack of
funds appropriated for cleaning, and asserting that the cleaning of the bay is not a ministerial act
which can be compelled by mandamus.
CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies to do tasks outside of
their usual basic functions.
Issue:
(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents.
(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not ministerial act of petitioners
that can be compelled by mandamus.

Held:
(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus.
Petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are
to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of
the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law
or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus.
The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in
the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up
a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated;
discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially
according to their judgment or conscience.
(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned
shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the
prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain,
remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do
so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up
operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons
and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution
incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific
pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned government
agencies, when appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the
prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water
is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
Note:
- The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. Ministerial duty is one
that requires neither official discretion nor judgment.

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:

The Resolution contains the proposed directives of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee to the
concerned agencies1 and local government units (LGUs) for the implementation of the 18
December 2008 Decision of the Court in this case.
Among the directives stated in the Resolution is for the affected agencies to submit to the Court
their plans of action and status reports, thus:
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency in
the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the
updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy (OPMBCS);2
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures
intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial
establishments, and private homes;3
The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas in Metro
Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater treatment facilities. Within
the same period, the concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their plans and projects
for the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the
completion period for said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2020;4
The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30,
2011 the list of cities and towns in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan that do not
have sewerage and sanitation facilities. LWUA is further ordered to submit on or before
September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and
sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for said works
which shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020;5
The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR), shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report on areas in Manila Bay
where marine life has to be restored or improved and the assistance it has extended to the
LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the
fisheries and aquatic resources in Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the
marine life in said areas. Within the same period, it shall submit its five-year plan to restore
and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the
aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the completion period for said undertakings;6
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the list of violators
it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is further ordered to include in its
report the names, make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall
submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to
implement its compliance with paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA
Decision and the completion dates of such measures;7
The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before June 30,
2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake
to apprehend the violators of RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other
pertinent laws, ordinances and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to
ensure the successful prosecution of violators;8
The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its fiveyear plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to apprehend
the violators of Presidential Decree (PD) 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA
9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009and other pertinent laws and regulations to
prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators;9
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the Court on or
before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila
who own and occupy houses, structures, constructions and other encroachments
established or built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the PasigMarikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-

Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros as of December

31, 2010. On or before the same date, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal of
said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid houses, structures,
constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for said activities
which shall be fully implemented not later than December 31, 2015;10
[T]he DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit its plan for the removal of said
informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and
encroachments, as well as the completion dates for such activities which shall be
implemented not later than December 31, 2012;11
[T]he DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said companies have proper
disposal facilities and the completion dates of compliance;12
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure
compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to the integration of the
aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which shall be fully implemented by
June 30, 2012;13 (Emphasis supplied)
What is the purpose of requiring these agencies to submit to the Court their plans of action and
status reports? Are these plans to be approved or disapproved by the Court? The Court does
not have the competence or even the jurisdiction to evaluate these plans which involves
technical matters14 best left to the expertise of the concerned agencies.
The Resolution also requires that the concerned agencies shall "submit [to the Court] their
quarterly reports electronically x x x."15 Thus, the directive for the concerned agencies to
submit to the Court their quarterly reports is a continuing obligation which extends even beyond
the year 2011.16
The Court is now arrogating unto itself two constitutional powers exclusively vested in the
President. First, the Constitution provides that "executive power shall be vested in the
President."17 This means that neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature can exercise executive
power for executive power is the exclusive domain of the President. Second, the Constitution
provides that the President shall "have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices."18 Neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature can exercise control or even
supervision over executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
Clearly, the Resolution constitutes an intrusion of the Judiciary into the exclusive domain of the
Executive. In the guise of implementing the 18 December 2008 Decision through the
Resolution, the Court is in effect supervising and directing the different government agencies
and LGUs concerned.
In Noblejas v. Teehankee,19 it was held that the Court cannot be required to exercise
administrative functions such as supervision over executive officials. The issue in that case was
whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme
Court, in view of the conferment upon him by law (Republic Act No. 1151) of the rank and
privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. The Court, answering in the negative, stated:
To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of
investigating and disciplining all these officials whose functions are plainly executive and the
consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power
to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the
Constitution expressly place under the President's supervision and control.
xxx
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature
had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of
Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to
be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of
privilege would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of
separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of

supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the
control of the Chief Executive over such officials.20 (Boldfacing supplied)
Likewise, in this case, the directives in the Resolution are administrative in nature and
circumvent the constitutional provision which prohibits Supreme Court members from
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides:
SEC. 12. The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not
be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Thus, in the case of In Re: Designation of Judge Manzano as Member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice,21 the Court invalidated the designation of a judge as member
of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which was tasked to receive complaints
and to make recommendations for the speedy disposition of cases of detainees. The Court held
that the committee performs administrative functions22 which are prohibited under Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
As early as the 1932 case of Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co.,23 this Court has
already emphasized that the Supreme Court should only exercise judicial power and should not
assume any duty which does not pertain to the administering of judicial functions. In that case, a
petition was filed requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to fix the terms and the compensation to be paid to Manila Electric Company for the
use of right of way. The Court held that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, whose decision of a majority shall be final, to
act on the petition of Manila Electric Company. The Court explained:
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or as members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not
to fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would
presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction
would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the
proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually
coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its
members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions performed by the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as
administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of duties which the
members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The
present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme
Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of
arbitrators, which is not a court at all.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in
our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme
Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power
or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administering of judicial functions.24
Furthermore, the Resolution orders some LGU officials to inspect the establishments and
houses along major river banks and to "take appropriate action to ensure compliance by
non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes with said law,
rules and regulations requiring the construction or installment of wastewater treatment
facilities or hygienic septic tanks."25 The LGU officials are also directed to "submit to the

DILG on or before December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports which shall contain
the names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-complying factories,
commercial establishments and private homes."26 Furthermore, the Resolution mandates that
on or before 30 June 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila should
"consider providing land for the wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water Inc.) within their
respective jurisdictions."27 The Court is in effect ordering these LGU officials how to do
their job and even gives a deadline for their compliance. Again, this is a usurpation of the
power of the President to supervise LGUs under the Constitution and existing laws.
Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "The President of the Philippines
shall exercise general supervision over local governments x x x."28 Under the Local
Government Code of 1991,29 the President exercises general supervision over LGUs, thus:
SECTION 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. (a) Consistent with the
basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local
government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized
cities and independent component cities; through the province with respect to component cities
and municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect to barangays. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Resolution constitutes judicial overreach by usurping and performing executive
functions. The Court must refrain from overstepping its boundaries by taking over the functions
of an equal branch of the government the Executive. The Court should abstain from exercising
any function which is not strictly judicial in character and is not clearly conferred on it by the
Constitution.30 Indeed, as stated by Justice J.B.L. Reyes inNoblejas v. Teehankee,31 "the
Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and can not be required to
exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected
with the administration of judicial functions."32
The directives in the Resolution constitute a judicial encroachment of an executive function
which clearly violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic
republican government. The principle of separation of powers between the Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial branches of government is part of the basic structure of the Philippine
Constitution. Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines;33 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines;34 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established.35
Since the Supreme Court is only granted judicial power, it should not attempt to assume or be
compelled to perform non-judicial functions.36 Judicial power is defined under Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution as that which "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The
Resolution contains directives which are outside the ambit of the Court's judicial functions.
The principle of separation of powers is explained by the Court in the leading case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission:37
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent
of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to

secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
department in its exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.38
Even the ponente is passionate about according respect to the system of separation of powers
between the three equal branches of the government. In his dissenting opinion in the 2008 case
of Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain (GRP),39 Justice Velasco emphatically stated:
Separation of Powers to be Guarded
Over and above the foregoing considerations, however, is the matter of separation of powers
which would likely be disturbed should the Court meander into alien territory of the executive
and dictate how the final shape of the peace agreement with the MILF should look like. The
system of separation of powers contemplates the division of the functions of
government into its three (3) branches: the legislative which is empowered to make laws;
the executive which is required to carry out the law; and the judiciary which is charged
with interpreting the law. Consequent to actual delineation of power, each branch of
government is entitled to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Being one
such branch, the judiciary, as Justice Laurel asserted in Planas v. Gil, "will neither direct
nor restrain executive [or legislative action]." Expressed in another perspective, the
system of separated powers is designed to restrain one branch from inappropriate
interference in the business, or intruding upon the central prerogatives, of another
branch; it is a blend of courtesy and caution, "a self-executing safeguard against the
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other." x x x
Under our constitutional set up, there cannot be any serious dispute that the maintenance of the
peace, insuring domestic tranquility and the suppression of violence are the domain and
responsibility of the executive. Now then, if it be important to restrict the great departments
of government to the exercise of their appointed powers, it follows, as a logical corollary,
equally important, that one branch should be left completely independent of the others,
independent not in the sense that the three shall not cooperate in the common end of
carrying into effect the purposes of the constitution, but in the sense that the acts of
each shall never be controlled by or subjected to the influence of either of the
branches.40 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, adherence to the principle of separation of powers which is enshrined in our
Constitution is essential to prevent tyranny by prohibiting the concentration of the sovereign
powers of state in one body.41 Considering that executive power is exclusively vested in the
President of the Philippines, the Judiciary should neither undermine such exercise of executive
power by the President nor arrogate executive power unto itself. The Judiciary must confine
itself to the exercise of judicial functions and not encroach upon the functions of the other
branches of the government.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote against the approval of the Resolution.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG), ), Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS), Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), Department of Agriculture (DA),
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Philippine National Police (PNP), Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), Department of Health (DOH), Department of Education
(DepEd), and Department of Budget and Management (DBM).

Resolution, p. 4.
Resolution, p. 6.
4
Resolution, p. 6.
5
Resolution, p. 6-7.
6
Resolution, p. 7.
7
Resolution, p. 7.
8
Resolution, p. 8.
9
Resolution, p. 8.
10
Resolution, pp. 8.
11
Resolution, p. 10.
12
Resolution, p. 11.
13
Resolution, p. 11.
14
For instance, the Resolution orders the PPA to "include in its report the activities of the
concessionaire that collects and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other shipgenerated wastes, which shall state the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced
by it since August 2003 up to the present date, the dates the ships docked at PPA ports,
the number of days the ship was at sea with the corresponding number of passengers
and crew per trip, the volume of solid, liquid and ship-generated wastes collected from
said ships, the treatment undertaken and the disposal site for said wastes;" Resolution,
pp. 7-8.
15
Resolution, p.11.
16
For example, the Resolution directs that "[i]n its quarterly report for the last quarter
of 2010 andthereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for violations of the
penal provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws on pollution for the said period;
Resolution, p. 10. (Emphasis supplied.)
17
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1.
18
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17.
19
131 Phil. 931 (1968).
20
Id. at. 934-935.
21
248 Phil. 487 (1988).
22
Administrative functions are "those which involve the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon
the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence." Id. at 491.
23
57 Phil 600 (1932).
24
Id. at 604-605.
25
Resolution, p. 5.
26
Resolution, p. 6.
27
Resolution, p. 6.
28
Emphasis supplied.
29
Republic Act No. 7160.
30
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., supra note 23.
31
Supra note 19.
32
Id. at 936, citing Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil. 600, 605
(1932).
33
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 1.
34
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1.
35
Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
36
J. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary
828 (1996).
37
63 Phil. 139 (1936).
3

38

Id. at 156-157.
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 & 183962, 14 October 2008, 568 SCRA
402.
40
Dissenting Opinion, id. at 669-670. (Citations omitted)
41
S. Carlota, The Three Most Important Features of the Philippine Legal System that
Others Should Understand, in IALS Conference Learning from Each Other: Enriching the
Law School Curriculum in an Interrelated World 177
<www.ialsnet.org/meeting/enriching/carlota.pdf> (visited 5 November 2010).
39

DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
"The judicial whistle needs to be blown for a purpose and with caution. It needs to be
remembered that the Court cannot run the government. The Court has the duty of implementing
constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights but they cannot push back the limits of the
Constitution to accommodate the challenged violation."1
These are the words of Justice Anand of the Supreme Court of India, from which court the idea
of a continuing mandatory injunction for environmental cases was drawn by the Philippine
Supreme Court. These words express alarm that the Indian judiciary has already taken on the
role of running the government in environmental cases. A similar situation would result in the
Philippines were the majority Resolution to be adopted. Despite having the best of intentions to
ensure compliance by petitioners with their corresponding statutory mandates in an urgent
manner, this Court has unfortunately encroached upon prerogatives solely to be exercised by
the President and by Congress.
On 18 December 2008, the Court promulgated its decision in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, denying the petition of the government agencies, defendants
in Civil Case No. 1851-99. It held that the Court of Appeals, subject to some modifications, was
correct in affirming the 13 September 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
No. 1851-99. It ordered "the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B
sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to
make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation."
The Court further issued each of the aforementioned agencies specific orders to comply with
their statutory mandate.2 Pursuant to the judgment above, the Court established its own Manila
Bay Advisory Committee. Upon the recommendations of the said Committee, the present
Resolution was issued. It encompasses several of the specific instructions laid out by the court
in the original case, but also goes further by requiring reports and updates from the said
government agencies, and setting deadlines for the submission thereof.
I find these directives in the Majority Resolution patently irreconcilable with basic constitutional
doctrines and with the legislative mechanisms already in place, such as the Administrative Code
and the Local Government Code, which explicitly grant control and supervision over these
agencies to the President alone, and to no one else. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent
from the Majority Resolution.
In issuing these directives, the Court has encroached upon the exclusive authority of the
Executive Department and violated the doctrine of Separation of Powers
The Resolution assigned the Department of Natural Resources as the primary agency for
environment protection and required the implementation of its Operational Plan for the Manila
Bay Coastal Strategy. It ordered the DENR to submit the updated operational plan directly to the
Court; to summarize data on the quality of Manila Bay waters; and to "submit the names and
addresses of persons and companiesthat generate toxic or hazardous waste on or before
September 30, 2011."

The Department of the Interior and Local Government is directed to "order the Mayors of all
cities in Metro Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan;
and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in said provinces to inspect all factories, commercial
establishments and private homes along the banks of the major river systems" to determine if
they have wastewater treatment facilities, on or before 30 June 2011. The LGUs are given a
deadline of 30 September 2011 to finish the inspection. In cooperation with the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), these local governments are required to submit their plan
for the removal of informal settlers and encroachments which are in violation of Republic Act No.
7279. The said demolition must take place not later than 31 December 2012.
The Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) is required to submit its plans for
the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in areas where needed, the completion period
for which shall not go beyond the year 2020. On or before 30 June 2011, the MWSS is further
required to have its two concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage
fees. The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) is ordered to submit on or before 30
September 2011 its plan to install and operate sewerage and sanitation facilities in the towns
and cities where needed, which must be fully implemented by 31 December 2020.
The Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Aquatic Fisheries and Resources are ordered
to submit on or before 30 June 2011 a list of areas where marine life in Manila Bay has
improved, and the assistance extended to different Local Government Units in this regard. The
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is ordered to report the names, make, and capacity of each ship
that would dock in PPA ports; the days they docked and the days they were at sea; the activities
of the concessionaire that would collect solid and liquid ship-generated waste, the volume,
treatment and disposal sites for such wastes; and the violators that PPA has apprehended.
The Department of Health (DOH) is required to submit the names and addresses of septic and
sludge companies that have no treatment facilities. The said agency must also require
companies to procure a "license to operate" issued by the DOH. The Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila must submit a
report on the "amount of garbage collected per districtvis--vis the average amount of
garbage disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites." MMDA must also submit a plan for the
removal of informal settlers and encroachments along NCR Rivers which violate R.A. No. 7279.
Clearly, the Court has no authority to issue these directives. They fall squarely under the domain
of the executive branch of the state. The issuance of specific instructions to subordinate
agencies in the implementation of policy mandates in all laws, not just those that protect the
environment, is an exercise of the power of supervision and control the sole province of the
Office of the President.
Both the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of the
Philippines, state:
Exercise of Executive Power. - The Executive power shall be vested in the President.3
Power of Control.- The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.4
In Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. Executive Secretary,5 this Court has already asserted that
the enforcement of all laws is the sole domain of the Executive. The Court pronounced that the
express constitutional grant of authority to the Executive is broad and encompassing, such that
it justifies reorganization measures6 initiated by the President. The Court said:
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The
executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees
of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This

means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control,
the President also has the duty of supervising and enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
To herein petitioner agencies impleaded below, this Court has given very specific instructions to
report the progress and status of their operations directly to the latter. The Court also required
the agencies to apprise it of any noncompliance with the standards set forth by different laws as
to environment protection. This move is tantamount to making these agencies accountable to
the Court instead of the President. The very occupation streamlined especially for the technical
and practical expertise of the Executive Branch is being usurped without regard for the
delineations of power in the Constitution. In fact, the issuance of the Resolution itself is in direct
contravention of the Presidents exclusive power to issue administrative orders, as shown thus:
Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental
operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders.7
The Courts discussion in Ople v. Torres8 pertaining to the extent and breadth of administrative
power bestowed upon the President is apt:
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific

aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
The implementation of the policy laid out by the legislature in the Philippine Clean Water Act of
2004, the Toxic and Hazardous Waste Act or Republic Act 6969, the Environment Code, and
other laws geared towards environment protection is under the competence of the President.
Achieved thereby is a uniform standard of administrative efficiency. And since it is through
administrative orders promulgated by the President that specific operational aspects for these
policies are laid out, the Resolution of this Court overlaps with the Presidents administrative
power. No matter how urgent and laudatory the cause of environment protection has become, it
cannot but yield to the higher mandate of separation of powers and the mechanisms laid out by
the people through the Constitution.
One of the directives is that which requires local governments to conduct inspection of homes
and establishments along the riverbanks, and to submit a plan for the removal of certain
informal settlers. Not content with arrogating unto itself the powers of "control" and "supervision"
granted by the Administrative Code to the President over said petitioner administrative
agencies, the Court is also violating the latters general supervisory authority over local
governments:
Sec. 18. General Supervision Over Local Governments. - The President shall exercise general
supervision over local governments.9
Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units.(a) Consistent with the basic
policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local
government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.10
The powers expressly vested in any branch of the Government shall not be exercised by, nor
delegated to, any other branch of the Government, except to the extent authorized by the
Constitution.11

As has often been repeated by this Court, the doctrine of separation of powers is the very
wellspring from which the Court draws its legitimacy. Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno has
traced its origin and rationale as inhering in the republican system of government:
The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration of legislative, executive, and
judicial powers to a single branch of government by deftly allocating their exercise to the three
branches of government...
In his famed treatise, The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu authoritatively analyzed the nature
of executive, legislative and judicial powers and with a formidable foresight counselled that any
combination of these powers would create a system with an inherent tendency towards
tyrannical actions
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and the
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed
to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive
power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the
nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing
the public resolutions, and that of trying the causes of individuals. 12
Nor is there merit in the contention that these directives will speed up the rehabilitation of Manila
Bay better than if said rehabilitation were left to the appropriate agencies. Expediency is never a
reason to abandon legitimacy. "The Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of
dispatch and the immediate functioning of government. It is the long-term staying power of
government that is enhanced by the mutual accommodation required by the separation of
powers."13
Mandamus does not lie to compel a discretionary act.
In G.R. Nos. 171947-48, the Court explicitly admitted that "[w]hile the implementation of the
MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or
the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus."14 In denying the appeal of petitioners and affirming the Decision of
the RTC, the Court of Appeals stressed that the trial courts Decision did not require petitioners
to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.15
In its revised Resolution, the Court is now setting deadlines for the implementation of policy
formulations which require decision-making by the agencies. It has confused an order enjoining
a duty, with an order outliningspecific technical rules on how to perform such a duty. Assuming
without conceding that mandamus were availing under Rule 65, the Court can only require a
particular action, but it cannot provide for the means to accomplish such action. It is at this point
where the demarcation of the general act of "cleaning up the Manila Bay" has become blurred,
so much so that the Court now engages in the slippery slope of overseeing technical details.
In Sps. Abaga v. Sps. Panes16 the Court said:
From the foregoing Rule, there are two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue: (1)
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station;
or (2) when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the other is entitled. The "duty" mentioned in
the first situation is a ministerial duty, not a discretionary duty, requiring the exercise of
judgmentIn short, for mandamus to lie, the duty sought to be compelled to be performed must
be a ministerial duty, not a discretionary duty, and the petitioner must show that he has a welldefined, clear and certain right.
Discretion, on the other hand, is a faculty conferred upon a court or official by which he may
decide the question either way and still be right.17
The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms defined in the law
itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving

discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act
one way or the other. This is the end of any participation by the Court, if it is authorized to
participate at all.
In setting a deadline for the accomplishment of these directives, not only has the Court provided
the means of accomplishing the task required, it has actually gone beyond the standards set by
the law. There is nothing in the Environment Code, the Administrative Code, or the Constitution
which grants this authority to the judiciary. It is already settled that, "If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide when and how the duty shall be
performed, such duty is not ministerial."18
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,19 the Court ruled that,
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform
a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of
discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment
in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court.
The Constitution does not authorize the courts to "monitor" the execution of their decisions.
It is an oft-repeated rule that the Court has no power to issue advisory opinions, much less
"directives" requiring progress reports from the parties respecting the execution of its decisions.
The requirements of "actual case or controversy" and "justiciability" have long been established
in order to limit the exercise of judicial review. While its dedication to the implementation of the
fallo in G.R. 171947-48 is admirable, the Courts power cannot spill over to actual encroachment
upon both the "control" and police powers of the State under the guise of a "continuing
mandamus."
In G.R. 171947-48, the Court said: "Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing
mandamus, the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in
view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference."
Needless to say, the "continuing mandamus" in this case runs counter to principles of "actual
case or controversy" and other requisites for judicial review. In fact, the Supreme Court is in
danger of acting as a "super-administrator"20 the scenario presently unfolding in India where
the supposed remedy originated. There the remedy was first used in Vineet Narain and Others
v. Union of India,21 a public interest case for corruption filed against high-level officials. Since
then, the remedy has been applied to environmental cases as an oversight and control power
by which the Supreme Court of India has created committees (i.e. the Environment Pollution
Authority and the Central Empowered Committee in forest cases) and allowed these
committees to act as the policing agencies.22 But the most significant judicial intervention in this
regard was the series of orders promulgated by the Court in T.N. Godavarman v. Union of
India.23
Although the Writ Petition filed by Godavarman was an attempt to seek directions from the
Court regarding curbing the illegal felling of trees, the Supreme Court went further to make
policy determinations in an attempt to improve the countrys forests. The Court Order
suspending felling of trees that did not adhere to state government working plans resulted in
effectively freezing the countrys timber industry. The Supreme Court completely banned tree
felling in certain north-eastern states to any part of the country. The courts role was even more
pronounced in its later directions. While maintaining the ban on felling of trees in the seven
northeast states, the court directed the state governments to gather, process, sell, and
otherwise manage the already felled timber in the manner its specified the Supreme Court
became the supervisor of all forest issues, ranging from controlling, pricing and transport of
timber to management of forest revenue, as well as implementation of its orders.24
Thus, while it was originally intended to assert public rights in the face of government inaction
and neglect, the remedy is now facing serious criticism as it has spiraled out of control.25 In fact,

even Justice J. S. Verma, who penned the majority opinion in Vineet Narain in which continuing
mandamus first made its appearance, subsequently pronounced that "judicial activism should
be neither judicial ad hocism nor judicial tyranny."26Justice B.N. Srikrishna observed that judges
now seem to want to engage themselves with boundless enthusiasm in complex socioeconomic issues raising myriads of facts and ideological issues that cannot be managed by
"judicially manageable standards."27 Even Former Chief Justice A. S. Anand, a known defender
of judicial activism, has warned against the tendency towards "judicial adventurism," reiterating
the principle that "the role of the judge is that of a referee. I can blow my judicial whistle when
the ball goes out of play; but when the game restarts I must neither take part in it nor tell the
players how to play."28
Unless our own Supreme Court learns to curb its excesses and apply to this case the standards
for judicial review it has developed over the years and applied to co-equal branches, the
scenario in India could very well play out in the Philippines. The Court must try to maintain a
healthy balance between the departments, precisely as the Constitution mandates, by
delineating its "deft strokes and bold lines,"29 ever so conscious of the requirements of actual
case and controversy. While, admittedly, there are certain flaws in the operation and
implementation of the laws, the judiciary cannot take the initiative to compensate for such
perceived inaction.
The Court stated in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance:30
Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the
long run only result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are
called upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to what may appear to be the
opinion of the day
Hence, "over nothing but cases and controversies can courts exercise jurisdiction, and it is to
make the exercise of that jurisdiction effective that they are allowed to pass upon constitutional
questions."31 Admirable though the sentiments of the Court may be, it must act within
jurisdictional limits. These limits are founded upon the traditional requirement of a cause of
action: "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another."32 In constitutional
cases, for every writ or remedy, there must be a clear pronouncement of the corresponding right
which has been infringed. Only then can there surface that "clear concreteness provided when a
question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary
argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and
demanding interests."33
Unfortunately, the Court fails to distinguish between a pronouncement on violation of rights on
one hand, and non-performance of duties vis--vis operational instructions, on the other.
Moreover, it also dabbles in an interpretation of constitutional rights in a manner that is
dangerously pre-emptive of legally available remedies.
The "continuing mandamus" palpably overlaps with the power of congressional oversight.
Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution states:
The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or
upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before
and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the
state or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.
This provision pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Macalintal v. Comelec34 discussed
the scope of congressional oversight in full. Oversight refers to the power of the legislative
department to check, monitor and ensure that the laws it has enacted are enforced:

The power of Congress does not end with the finished task of legislation. Concomitant
with its principal power to legislate is the auxiliary power to ensure that the laws it enacts
are faithfully executed. As well stressed by one scholar, the legislature "fixes the main lines of
substantive policy and is entitled to see that administrative policy is in harmony with it; it
establishes the volume and purpose of public expenditures and ensures their legality and
propriety; it must be satisfied that internal administrative controls are operating to secure
economy and efficiency; and it informs itself of the conditions of administration of remedial
measure.

Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor

bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are
properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive
usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest.

Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies
perform their functions within the authority delegated to them.
Macalintal v. Comelec further discusses that legislative supervision under the oversight power
connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of Congress regarding executive
operations in a given administrative area. Because the power to legislate includes the power to
ensure that the laws are enforced, this monitoring power has been granted by the Constitution
to the legislature. In cases of executive non-implementation of statutes, the courts cannot justify
the use of "continuing mandamus," as it would by its very definition overlap with the monitoring
power under congressional oversight. The Resolution does not only encroach upon the general
supervisory function of the Executive, it also diminished and arrogated unto itself the power of
congressional oversight.
Conclusion
This Court cannot nobly defend the environmental rights of generations of Filipinos enshrined in
the Constitution while in the same breath eroding the foundations of that very instrument from
which it draws its power. While the remedy of "continuing mandamus" has evolved out of a Third
World jurisdiction similar to ours, we cannot overstep the boundaries laid down by the rule of
law. Otherwise, this Court would rush recklessly beyond the delimitations precisely put in place
to safeguard excesses of power. The tribunal, considered by many citizens as the last guardian
of fundamental rights, would then resemble nothing more than an idol with feet of clay: strong in
appearance, but weak in foundation.
The Court becomes a conscience by acting to remind us of limitation on power, even judicial
power, and the interrelation of good purposes with good means. Morality is not an end
dissociated from means. There is a morality of morality, which respects the limitation of office
and the fallibility of the human mindself-limitation is the first mark of the master. That, too is
part of the role of the conscience.35
The majority Resolution would, at the same time, cast the light of scrutiny more harshly on
judicial action in which the Courts timely exercise of its powers is called for as in the cases of
prisoners languishing in jail whose cases await speedy resolution by this Court. There would
then be nothing to stop the executive and the legislative departments from considering as fair
game the judiciarys own accountability in its clearly delineated department.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
Footnotes

Justice Dr. A.S. Anand, Supreme Court of India,"Judicial Review Judicial Activism
Need for Caution," in Soli Sorabjees Law and Justice: An Anthology, Universal Law
Publishing Company, (2003), at 377. Also in Justice A.S. Anand, Millenium Law Lecture
Series, Thursday, October 21, 1999, Kochi, Kerala, available at
http://airwebworld.com/articles/index.php. (visited 17 November 2010)
2
"In particular: (1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of
the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating
the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and
implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the
Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the
Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the
successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated
completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987
and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the
Presidents power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in
establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine
Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river
systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the
Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the MeycauayanMarilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite)
River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually
discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine
whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as
prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be
found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and
homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent
industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these
rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or
imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install,
operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in
Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in
coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain
sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment,
and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga,
and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to
improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist
the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and
Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic
resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group,
in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall

apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations
designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt
such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes
and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked
at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects
for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination
with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall
dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments
established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the
Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting
waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor
of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more
particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination
with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other
concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other
applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other
rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the
Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary
landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of
this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with
the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like
undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the
appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of
RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on
pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275,
within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic
and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of
fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the
companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set
up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental
sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA
9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste
management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula
of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them,
their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and
maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire
Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating
to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila
Bay, in line with the countrys development objective to attain economic growth in

a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine
waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA,
DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and
PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this
Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities
undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED."

Carino v. Insular Government

212 U.S. 449 (1909)
Annotate this Case
U.S. Supreme Court
Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)
Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands
No. 72
Argued January 13, 1909
Decided February 23, 1909
212 U.S. 449
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Syllabus
Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to this Court.
The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases, and the former is proper to bring up a
judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming a judgment of the Court of
Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of land.

Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the
Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one who
actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of 1902,
which applies to the whole archipelago.
While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically it is a
question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it will
insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and how far it will
recognize actual facts.
Page 212 U. S. 450
The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the
inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that
property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually owned
land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies
prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and
against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of
a subsequently enacted registration act.
Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine
Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land in the Province of
Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the continued
possession thereof.
7 Phil. 132 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 212 U. S. 455
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration for the registration of certain
land. The application was granted by the court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was taken to the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet on behalf of the government of the
Philippines, and also on behalf of the United States, those governments having taken
possession of the property for public and military purposes. The Court of First Instance found
the facts and dismissed the application upon grounds of law. This judgment was affirmed by the
supreme court, 7 Phil. 132, and the case then was brought here by writ of error.
The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the
Province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the Treaty of
Page 212 U. S. 456
Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the
land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the
holding of cattle, according to the custom of the country, some of the fences, it seems, having
been of much earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing
cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as owners by the
Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot
custom. No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in
1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in
force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps, information that lands in Benguet
could not be conceded until those to be occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been designated -a purpose that has been carried out by the Philippine government and the United States. In
1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands
were registered to him, that process, however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.
Before we deal with the merits, we must dispose of a technical point. The government has spent
some energy in maintaining that this case should have been brought up by appeal, and not by
writ of error. We are of opinion, however, that the mode adopted was right. The proceeding for
registration is likened to bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in principle. It is a
proceeding in rem under a statute of the type of the Torrens Act, such as was discussed in Tyler
v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71. It is nearer to law than to equity, and is an assertion of
legal title; but we think it unnecessary to put it into either pigeon hole. A writ of error is the
general method of bringing cases to this Court, an appeal the exception, confined to equity in
the main. There is no reason for not applying the general rule to this case. Ormsby v. Webb, 134

U. S. 47, 134 U. S. 65; Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478; Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of
Columbia, 195 U. S. 322.
Page 212 U. S. 457
Another preliminary matter may as well be disposed of here. It is suggested that, even if the
applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No.
926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation. But that act
deals with the acquisition of new titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the perfecting
of titles begun under the Spanish law. The applicant's claim is that he now owns the land, and is
entitled to registration under the Philippine Commission's Act No. 496, of 1902, which
established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction "throughout the Philippine Archipelago," 2,
and authorized in general terms applications to be made by persons claiming to own the legal
estate in fee simple, as the applicant does. He is entitled to registration if his claim of ownership
can be maintained.
We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below -- namely, whether the
plaintiff owns the land. The position of the government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed,
asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit
private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the Crown, and that, if there
was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to make the title good;
that the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public
land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights
that the Philippine government is bound to respect.
If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct that the Crown
of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at the date of the Treaty of Paris, to which the United
States succeeded, it is not to be assumed without argument that the plaintiff's case is at an end.
It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands
were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward
people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those
Page 212 U. S. 458
in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true also that, in legal theory, sovereignty is
absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted,
absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the

United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is
a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual
facts, are matters for it to decide.
The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor General, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of
the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have
granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by
the Spanish laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may
have been the technical position of Spain, it does not follow that, in the view of the United
States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized
his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an
important part of the island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards
would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United
States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the
dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy the land. It is obvious that, however
stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would
deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private
gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the property and rights
acquired there by the
Page 212 U. S. 459
United States are to be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof." It is reasonable
to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was
unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same
statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the
Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that
"no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."

 5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from 12, it is hard to believe that the
United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the
inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it
proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association -- one of
the profoundest factors in human thought -- regarded as their own.
It is true that, by 14, the government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules and
prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands where some, but not all, Spanish conditions
had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than sixteen hectares of public
lands actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section
perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation was of land admitted to be
public land, and had not continued for such a length of time and under such circumstances as to
give rise to the understanding that the occupants were owners at that date. We hesitate to
suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper title a trespasser, and
to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. It is true again that there is excepted from the
provision that we have quoted as to the administration of the property and rights acquired by the
United States such land and property as shall be designated by the President for military or
other reservations,
Page 212 U. S. 460
as this land since has been. But there still remains the question what property and rights the
United States asserted itself to have acquired.
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further than the necessities
of decision demand, every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like
the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly, in a case like this, if there is doubt or
ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. Whether
justice to the natives and the import of the organic act ought not to carry us beyond a subtle
examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the attitude of Spanish law, humane
though it was, it is unnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way, it was assumed that the wild tribes of
the Philippines were to be dealt with as the power and inclination of the conqueror might dictate,

Congress has not yet sanctioned the same course as the proper one "for the benefit of the
inhabitants thereof."
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that
it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older
decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that
the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other
words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into
trespassers, or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, Title 12, Law 14 of the
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3
Phil. 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition
of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true
that it
Page 212 U. S. 461
begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King
or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to
exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3 Phil. 546:
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they
shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription."
It may be that this means possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the principle is
admitted. As prescription, even against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain, we
see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard
to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual
theoretic assertion that, for private ownership, there must have been a grant by competent
authority; but instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all legal effects, those who have
been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years,
uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that, when this decree went into
effect, the applicant's father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. But, it is

said, the object of this law was to require the adjustment or registration proceedings that it
described, and in that way to require everyone to get a document of title or lose his land. That
purpose may have been entertained, but it does not appear clearly to have been applicable to
all. The regulations purport to have been made "for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals." (We follow the translation in the government's brief.) It does not
appear that this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied. In Article 6, it is provided that
"interested parties not included within the two preceding
Page 212 U. S. 462
articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty years] may legalize their
possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership of the said lands, by means of adjustment
proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner."
This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those declared already to be owners by lapse of
time. Article 8 provides for the case of parties not asking an adjustment of the lands of which
they are unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one year, and threatens that the treasury
"will reassert the ownership of the state over the lands," and will sell at auction such part as it
does not reserve. The applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such
proceedings against him or his father ever was made. Finally, it should be noted that the natural
construction of the decree is confirmed by the report of the council of state. That report puts
forward as a reason for the regulations that, in view of the condition of almost all property in the
Philippines, it is important to fix its status by general rules on the principle that the lapse of a
fixed period legalizes completely all possession, recommends in two articles twenty and thirty
years, as adopted in the decree, and then suggests that interested parties not included in those
articles may legalize their possession and acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain price.
It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who may prove"
possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger,
if he had read every word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of
the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.

Page 212 U. S. 463

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. The royal decree of February 13, 1894,
declaring forfeited titles that were capable of adjustment under the decree of 1880, for which
adjustment had not been sought, should not be construed as a confiscation, but as the
withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant never was disturbed. This same
decree is quoted by the Court of Land Registration for another recognition of the common law
prescription of thirty years as still running against alienable Crown land.
It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not
without difficulties for courts of a different legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that
account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress
establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole
case, we are of opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he
seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he
lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
Judgment reversed.
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5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
108

Article II, Section 16, Constitution.

The Rationale and Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases issued
by the Supreme Court [hereafter Annotation], p. 133.
109

110

Annotation, p. 78.

111

Annotation, p. 78-79.

112

Annotation, p. 139.

113

Rollo (G.R. 207282), pp. 2-50.

114

See Rule 43, Rules of Court.

115

See Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas, 453 Phil. 479, 494 (2003).

It should be noted that the Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan were promulgated with due
regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction.
(Annotation, p. 100).
116

Boracay Foundation v. The Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26,2012, 674 SCRA
555, 604.
117

118

Annotation, p. 140.

119

CA rollo, Volume I, pp. 41-47.

120

Referred to as the Casio Group in this case.

121

Rollo (G.R. No. 207257), pp. 241-245.

122

Rollo (G.R. No. 207276), Volume I, p. 474.

123

CA rollo, Volume XVI, pp. 5856-5857.

124

TSN, December 12, 2012, pp. 179-186.

RA 8749 entitled "An Act Providing for a Comprehensive Air Pollution Control Policy and
for Other Purposes"; also known as "The Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
125

126

Refers to ground level concentrations.

127

Rollo (G.R. No. 207276), Volume I, p. 475.

128

TSN, December 5, 2012, pp. 162-164, 169.

129

CA rollo, Volume XV, pp. 5763-5765.

130

CA rollo, Volume XVI, p. 5857.

131

Rollo (G.R. No. 207282), pp. 342-343.

132

TSN, December 12, 2012, pp. 171-174.

133

CA Rollo, Volume XVI, p. 5859.

134

TSN, December 12, 2012, pp. 141-148.

135

Section 3(l), DAO 2003-30.

136

Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 263 Phil. 1068, 1077 (1990).

137

The appellate court noted, thus:

However, while the CFB technology appears to be a better choice compared with the
traditional technology for operating power plants, it cannot be declared, at this point
in time, that the CFB technology to be used by RP Energy in its Power Plant project
will not cause any environmental damage or harm. Sarkki, who is one of the
members of the team that developed the CFB technology and an employee of Foster
Wheeler (manufacturer of the CFB boilers) testified that: it depends on the kind of
coal and the technology to be used in burning the coal; semirara coal is known to
have very high fouling characteristics and it was not in the interest of RP Energy to
utilize said coal; and high fouling means ash is melting in low temperature and
collected on its surfaces and making it impossible to continue the operation of a
boiler; RP Energy has not yet ordered any CFB boiler from Foster Wheeler, and
manufacturing has not started because there is no finalized contract; and RP Energy
is still finalizing its coal contract. Wong testified that he was not shown any coal
supply agreement. Ouano testified that, per report, there are no coal and equipment
supply agreements yet and that he recommended to RP Energy the Indonesian coal
because it has much lower volatile matter and it is better than semirara coal.
Mercado also testified that she did not see any coal supply agreement with a
supplier. Evangelista testified that RP Energy already selected Foster Wheeler as the
supplier for the Power Plant project's boiler but there is no purchase agreement yet
in connection with the equipment to be used. Thus, since RP Energy has, as yet, no
equipment purchase agreement in connection with its proposed CFB Coal-Fired
Power Plant project nor a coal supply agreement that comply with the
recommendations of the various engineers on CFB technology, there is no scientific
certainty of its environmental effect. [Rollo (G.R. No. 207257), pp. 245-246]

138

CA rollo, Volume I, pp. 127-129.

139

Id. at 131-132.

140

SEC. 6. Failure to settle.- If there is no full settlement, the judge shall:

xxxx
(l) Determine the necessity of engaging the services of a qualified expert as a friend
of the court (amicus curiae); x x x

141

SEC. 12. Discovery Measures. A party may file a verified motion for the following reliefs:

(a) Ocular Inspection; order The motion must show that an ocular inspection order
is necessary to establish the magnitude of the violation or the threat as to prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It shall
state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits
of witnesses having personal knowledge of the violation or threatened violation of
environmental law.
After hearing, the court may order any person in possession or control of a
designated land or other property to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon. The order
shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date,
time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions
to protect the constitutional rights of all parties.
(b) Production or inspection of documents or things;order The motion must show
that a production order is necessary to establish the magnitude of the violation or the
threat as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
After hearing, the court may order any person in possession, custody or control of
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain
evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection,
copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The production order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the
production and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection or
production and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of
all parties.
142

Annotation, p. 80.

143

Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan.

144

Rollo (G.R. 207282), pp. 21-22.

145

CA rollo, Volume III, p. 847.

146

Id.

TSN, October 29, 2012, p. 82; see also issues for the Casio Group in preliminary
conference.
147

In its Resolution dated July 23, 2013, the Court required the adverse parties to comment
within ten days from notice on the separate Petitions for Review on Certiorariin G.R. Nos.
207257, 207276, 207282 and 207366. Then in its Resolution dated April 1, 2014, the Court
resolved to, among others, dispense with the filing of the comment of respondents Casio, et
al. (Casio Group) in G.R. No. 207276. Additionally, the Court, among others, noted in its
Resolution dated June 10, 2014, SBMAs Manifestation and Motion to Resolve dated May
21, 2014 praying, among others, that respondents Casio, et al. (Casio Group) be deemed
148

to have waived their right to file their comment with respect to the Petition for Review on
Certiorari dated July 15, 2013 in G.R. No. 207366.
As earlier noted, the groundsraised by the Casio Group in its Petition for Writ of
Kalikasanwere limited to whether: (1) the power plant project would cause grave
environmental damage; (2) it would adversely affect the health of the residents of the
municipalities of Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo; (3) the ECC
was issued and the LDA entered into without the prior approval of the sanggunians
concerned as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code (LGC); (4)
the LDA was entered into without securing a prior certification from the NCIP as required
under Section 59 of the IPRA Law; (5) Section 8.3 of DAO 2003-30 which allows
amendments of ECCs is ultra viresbecause the DENR has no authority to decide on
requests for amendments of previously issued ECCs in the absence of a new EIS; and (6)
due to the nullity of Section 8.3 of DAO 2003-30, all amendments to RP Energys ECC are
null and void.
149

150

As narrated earlier, the issues set during the preliminary conference were limited to:
I. ISSUES
A. Petitioners (Casio Group)
1. Whether x x x the DENR Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC x x
x) in favor of RP Energy for a 2x150 MW Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant
Project (Power Plant, x x x) and its amendment to 1x300 MW Power Plant,
and the Lease and Development Agreement between SBMA and RP Energy
complied with the Certification Precondition as required under Section 59 of
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA
Law, x x x);
2. Whether x x x RP Energy can proceed with the construction and operation
of the 1x300 MW Power Plant without prior consultation with and approval of
the concerned local government units (LGUs, x x x), pursuant to Sections 26
and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code;
3. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30
(DAO No. 2003-30, x x x) providing for the amendment of an ECC is null
and void for being ultra vires; and
4. Whether x x x the amendment of RP Energys ECC under Section 8.3 of
DAO No. 2003-30 is null and void.
B. Respondent RP Energy
1. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 can be collaterally
attacked;
1.1 Whether x x x the same is valid until annulled;
2. Whether x x x petitioners exhausted their administrative remedies with
respect to the amended ECC for the 1x300 MW Power Plant;

2.1 Whether x x x the instant Petition is proper;

3. Whether x x x RP Energy complied with all the procedures/requirements
for the issuance of the DENR ECC and its amendment;
3.1 Whether x x x a Certificate of Non-Overlap from the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples is applicable in the instant case;
4. Whether x x x the LGUs approval under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code is necessary for the issuance of the DENR ECC and its
amendments, and what constitutes LGU approval;
5. Whether x x x there is a threatened or actual violation of environmental
laws to justify the Petition;
5.1 Whether x x x the approved 1x300 MW Power Plant complied
with the accepted legal standards on thermal pollution of coastal
waters, air pollution, water pollution, and acid deposits on aquatic and
terrestrial ecosystems; and
6. Whether x x x the instant Petition should be dismissed for failure to comply
with the requirements of proper verification and certification of non-forum
shopping with respect to some petitioners.
C. Respondent DENR Secretary Paje
1. Whether x x x the issuance of the DENR ECC and its amendment in favor
of RP Energy requires compliance with Section 59 of the IPRA Law, as well
as Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code;
2. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 can be collaterally attacked
in this proceeding; and
3. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 is valid.
Concededly, the issue as to "whether x x x RP Energy complied with all the
procedures/requirements for the issuance of the DENR ECC and its amendment" is
broad enough to include the issue of the lack of signature. That this was, however,
contemplated by the parties or the appellate court is negated by the context in which
the issue arose, as will be discussed in what follows.
151

TSN, December 12, 2012, pp. 63-67.

152

See CIVIL CODE, Art. 745 and 749.

153

Revised Procedural Manual for DAO 2003-30 (Revised Manual), p. 15.

154

Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System.

155

Administrative Order.

156

Underline supplied for this sentence.

157

Revised Manual, p. 9 and Glossary, letter h; Section 3(d), Article I, DAO 2003-30.

158

TSN, December 12, 2012, pp. 65-67.

159

CA rollo, Volume XVII, pp. 7010-7011.

160

Section 3 of PD 1151 provides:

SECTION 3. Right to a Healthy Environment. In furtherance of these goals and
policies, the Government recognizes the right of the people to a healthful
environment. It shall be the duty and responsibility of each individual to contribute to
the preservation and enhancement of the Philippine environment.

161

Section 4, PD 1151.

162

Section 1, Article I, DAO 2003-30.

163

Section 3(h), Article I,DAO 2003-30.

Under Section 3(a), Article I of DAO 2003-30, a CNC is "a certification issued by the EMB
certifying that, based on the submitted project description, the project isnot covered by the
EIS System and is not required to secure an ECC."
164

As distinguished from single projects, co-located projects/undertakings are defined under

Section 3(b), Article I of DAO 2003-30 as "projects, or series of similar projects or a project
subdivided to several phases and/or stages by the same proponent, located in contiguous
areas."
165

Section 3(k), Article I of DAO 2003-30 defines an EIS as a "document, prepared and
submitted by the project proponent and/or EIA Consultant that serves as an application for
an ECC. It is a comprehensive study of the significant impacts of a project on the
environment. It includes an Environmental Management Plan/ Program that the proponent
will fund and implement to protect the environment."
166

Section 3(s), Article I of DAO 2003-30 defines an IEE as a "document similar to an EIS, but
with reduced details and depth of assessment and discussion."
167

Section 3(t), Article I of DAO 2003-30 defines an IEE Checklist Report as a "simplified
checklist version of an IEE Report, prescribed by the DENR, to be filled up by a proponent to
identify and assess a project's environmental impacts and the mitigation/enhancement
measures to address such impacts."
168

Section 3(p), Article I of DAO 2003-30 defines an EPRMP as a "documentation of the

actual cumulative environmental impacts and effectiveness of current measures for single
projects that are already operating but without ECCs, i.e., Category A-3. For Category B-3
projects, a checklist form of the EPRMP would suffice."
169

Section 3(x), Article I of DAO 2003-30 defines a PD as a "document, which may also be a
chapter in an EIS, that describes the nature, configuration, use of raw materials and natural
170

resources, production system, waste or pollution generation and control and the activities of
a proposed project. It includes a description of the use of human resources as well as activity
timelines, during the pre-construction, construction, operation and abandonment phases. It is
to be used for reviewing co-located and single projects under Category C, as well as for
Category D projects."
171

Section 3(p), Article I, DAO 2003-30.

172

Section 1.0, paragraph 8 (b), Revised Manual.

173

Glossary, letter (t), Revised Manual.

Parenthetically, we must mention that the validity of the rules providing for amendments to
the ECC was challenged by the Casio Group on the ground that it is ultra viresbefore the
appellate court. [It] argued that the laws governing the ECC do not expressly permit the
amendment of an ECC. However, the appellate court correctly ruled that the validity of the
rules cannot be collaterally attacked. Besides, the power of the DENR to issue rules on
amendments of an ECC is sanctioned under the doctrine of necessary implication.
Considering that the greater power to deny or grant an ECC is vested by law in the President
or his authorized representative, the DENR, there is no obstacle to the exercise of the lesser
or implied power to amend the ECC for justifiable reasons. This issue was nolonger raised
before this Court and, thus, we no longer tackle the same here.
174

175

Footnotes omitted.

176

Underline supplied.

177

Underline supplied.

178

Footnotes omitted.

179

Rollo (G.R. No. 207257), pp. 150-151. (DENRs Petition, pp. 29-30)

180

Underline supplied.

181

Underline supplied.

182

Underline supplied.

183

Emphasis supplied.

To illustrate the flexibility of the EIA documents used in the EIA process, we can look at the
EPRMP itself.
184

The contents of an EPRMP, under Section 5.2.5, Article II of DAO 2003-30, are as
follows:
5.2.5. x x x
The EPRMP shall contain the following:

a. Project Description;
b. Baseline conditions for critical environmental parameters;
c. Documentation of the environmental performance based on the
current/past environmental management measures implemented;
d. Detailed comparative description of the proposed project expansion and/or
process modification with corresponding material and energy balances in the
case of process industries[;] and
e. EMP based on an environmental management system framework and
standard set by EMB.
As previously demonstrated, the EPRMP is not justused for ECPs, which are
operating but without an ECC or operating with a previous ECC but planning for
expansion or re-start, but for major amendments to a non-implemented project with a
previous ECC, such as the subject project. Section 5.2.5(c), however, requires that
an EPRMP should contain "[d]ocumentation of the environmental performance based
on the current/past environmental management measures implemented." This would
be inapplicable to a nonimplemented project. Thus, the project proponent merely
notes in the EPRMP that there are no current/past environmental management
measures implemented because the project is not yet implemented. As can be seen,
the use of the EPRMP is flexible enough to accommodate such different project
types, whether implemented or not, for as long as the necessary information is
obtained in order to assess the environmental impact of the proposed changes to the
original project design/description.
185

Emphasis supplied.

186

CA rollo, Volume IV, pp. 1129-1132.

Excerpts from Section 4 of the EPRMP ("Baseline Environmental Conditions for
Critical Environmental Parameters, Impact Assessment and Mitigation") are
reproduced below:
187

4.1 The Land

4.1.1 Existing Condition
The proposed route of the transmission line will traverse grasslands with sloping
terrain, ranging from 3-50% slopes as shown in Figure 30 and Figure 31. x x x
4.1.2 Impacts
Construction of the transmission line components will include minimal civil and
electrical works. Tower structures will be pre-assembled in a workshop and
transported to designated locations for erection and linkage. Excavation and clearing
activities will be minimal and short-term, whilst generated spoils will be low/negligible
in terms of volume.

xxxx
4.1.3 Mitigation
Generated spoils will be used as backfill material for aesthetic rehabilitation and
stabilisation, if necessary. Slope stabilisation, and inspection and testing of the
transmission line components will be conducted prior to project turnover for quality
assurance and structural integrity. Proper handling and transport of the tower
structures, aswell as safe practice for electrical works will be disseminated and
complied with across all personnel and involved contractors.
An integrated foundation system consisting of combined footings will be employed in
order to ensure adequate footing embedment and tower stabilization. Soil
stabilisation and slope protection measures will be implemented to significantly
reduce erosion potential of mountain soil.
Tower installation and related activities will only commence upon finalisation of
agreement between the proponent and concerned stakeholders (i.e.,regulatory
agencies). Disputes and discussions over lease agreement and right-of-way
permitting works will be placed through due legal process of the SBMA.
xxxx
4.2 The Water
xxxx
4.2.1 Existing Condition
The Subic Bay is rich in marine biodiversity including coral reef areas, seagrass
patches, fisheries and coastal resources. x x x
4.2.2 Impacts
The additional RPE project facilities, except for the transmission line, will have
impacts on water quality and ecology for both freshwater and marine components, as
these will be located along the coastline or involve the use of freshwater resources.
The construction phase entails earth-moving activities, both inland and offshore. The
initial concern upon implementation of the project is the degradation of the reef area
within the proposed RPE project site, resulting from high sediment influx either via
soil erosion, surface run-off or re-suspension.
xxxx
4.2.3 Mitigation
The following mitigating measures may be applied in order to minimize the potential
impacts of the proposed project on marine resources. Whilst these measures will aid
in minimizing the perceived impacts, mortalities of coastal resources may still occur
as individuals of different coral and seagrass species have different levels of

environmental sensitivity. Likewise, mortalities may also be influenced by a variety of

factors unrelated to the proposed project such as water temperature fluctuations due
to climatic phenomenon.
Placing mooring buoys within the area encompassed by offshore
construction work would allow construction barges to dock onto them during
the construction of the coal pier and other offshore project facilities. The
mooring buoys will negate the need to use chain anchors to prevent these
vessels from drifting towards the reef or seagrass areas.
During the driving of the pier piles, the use of silt curtains to minimise
suspended sediments from reaching the coral community will aid the chance
of survival of many coral colonies. The coral community in the area is
dominated by massive growth forms which are more resilient to
sedimentation compared to branching colonies. Whilst this is true, these
massive forms still have a maximum tolerance threshold, hence the use of
mitigating measures is imperative. Sediment curtains will greatly improve the
chances of survival of these corals during the construction phase by
constraining the movement of liberated silt.
The operators of construction equipment, as well ascontractors, will need to
be informed of the location of the fragile coral community and seagrass bed
in the area, so that they will work in a manner that will minimise the effects on
these areas. This condition can be included in their contracts.
Alignment and/or integration of mitigations withthe Subic Coastal
Resources Management Plan.
Overall, the primary impact that needs to be mitigated is sedimentation
resulting from heavy equipment manoeuvring to construct the coal pier and
other structures and from increased traffic in the project area due to vehicles
working inland and construction barges working offshore.
xxxx
4.3 The Air
Baseline conditions for this module as reported in the EIS (GHD, 2008) are
appropriate and sufficient to describe site conditions for the additional RPE
components. A brief summary to highlight the key impacts and mitigation for this
module are presented below.
4.3.1 Existing Condition
The air shed of the proposed project site falls under the category of Type I climate,
which is characterized by two pronounced seasons, generally dry season from
December to May, and wet season from June to November.
4.3.2 Impacts

Dust and noise generation resulting from earthmoving activities (i.e., excavation,
scraping and leveling methods) is of significant concern. Concentration of suspended
particulates in the atmosphere is likely to increase for the duration of the construction
phase. Similarly, high noise levels within the immediate impact area will be
experienced.
4.3.3 Mitigation
The proponent will implement control measures addressed at reducing noise levels
and dust concentrations. Regular wetting of construction grounds, as well as putting
up perimeter wall around major construction areas will limit the re-suspension of
dust. Installation of noise barriers (i.e., vegetation buffer, noise wall) around the
construction area and noise reduction technology for vehicles and equipment (i.e.,
mufflers) will significantly reduce the impacts of construction noise to nearby
communities. In addition, construction activities contributing to high-noise levels will
be scheduled during daytime. x x x (CA rollo, Volume IV, pp. 1193-1194, 1200-1201,
1204)
188

Section 3(x), Article I, DAO 2003-30.

189

Section 1.0, paragraph 8 (a) and (b), Revised Manual.

190

Glossary, letter aa, Revised Manual.

191

Rollo (G.R. No. 207257), pp. 151-152. (DENRs Petition pp. 30-31)

192

Underline supplied.

193

Supra note 191.

194

Underline supplied.

195

Underline supplied.

196

Rollo (G.R. No. 207282) p. 9. (Casio Group Petition, p. 8)

197

CA rollo, Volume V, pp. 1444-1448.

198

The PDR states, in part:

RPE now proposes to construct a single high-efficiency 300-MW (net) circulatingfluidized-bed coal-fired generating unit for Phase 1 of the project, instead of two lessefficient 150-MW units, the environmental impacts of which are unchanged from the
original proposal. (CA rollo, Volume V, p. 1441)

199

Rollo (G.R. No. 207257), p. 68.

200

Section 3(h), Article I, DAO 2003-30.

Rules and Regulations implementing Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as "The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997."
201

202

Cruz v. Sec. of Environment & Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 1012 (2000).

203

RA 8371, Section 2 (b).

204

<http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/license> (visited 27 November 2014).

205

<http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/permit> (visited 27 November 2014).

206

Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction

207

Article 1643 of the Civil Code provides:

ARTICLE 1643. In the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to give to
another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which
may be definite or indefinite. However, no lease for more than ninety-nine years shall
be valid.

This is the clear import of the definition of "ancestral domains" in Section 3(a) of the IPRA
Law, viz:
208

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
a) Ancestral Domains Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since
time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and
private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic,
social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for
their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
209

The following are the relevant constitutional provisions:

Article II, Section 22: The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.
Article XII, Section 5: The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and
cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
ARTICLE XIV, Section 17: The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights
of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions,
and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and
policies.
ARTICLE XIII, Section 6: The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or
utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under
lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights
of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural
estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
Article XVI, Section 12: The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the
President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the
members of which shall come from such communities.
Article VI, Section 5(2): The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.
210

RP Energys EIS dated September 2008 stated, in part:

4.4.1.1.4 Indigenous People
The Aetas are acknowledged to be one of the earliest settlers in the municipality.
Historically, as lowlanders came to Subic, Aetas were displaced and wereforced to
flee to the hinterlands. While a number of Aetas have managed to be integrated
within the mainstream of development activities in the municipality, many have
remained deprived of public services such as health, social welfare and basic
education. Aeta families are scattered in some barangays in Subic, such as:
Batiawan and Naugsol. There are no Aeta communities identified within the vicinity of
the project areas." (CA rollo, Volume III, p. 857)

This is the clear implication of the clause "except when interrupted by war, force majeure
or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any
other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations" in
the definition of "ancestral domain," in the IPRA Law viz:
211

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean:

a) Ancestral Domains Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally

belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since
time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and
private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic,
social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for
their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
212

Article 5 of the Civil Code provides:

ARTICLE 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws
shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

The Certificate of Non-Overlap with Control No. RIII-CNO-12-10-0011 issued on 31

October 2012 stated:
213

"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that based on the findings of the FBI Team in its report dated
October 8, 2012 and submitted by Ms. Candida P. Cabinta, Provincial Officer, the
applied site/s for Certification Precondition situated at Subic Bay Freeport Zone
(SBFZ) Sitio Naglatore, Brgy. Cawag, Subic, Zambales covering an aggregate area
of Thirty Eight (38.00) hectares more or less, does not affect/overlap with any
ancestral domain.
THIS CERTIFICATIONis issued to SBMA-REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY
CORPORATION with office address at Unit 304 The Venue, Rizal Highway, Subic
Bay Industrial Park, Phase I, Subic Bay Freeport Zone 2222 in connection with the
application for 600 MW Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal Fired Power Plant
before the Ecology Center, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. x x x x (CA rollo,
Volume XVI, p. 6495)
SECTION 59. Certification Precondition. All departments and other governmental
agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing, or granting any
concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement, without
prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral
domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a fieldbased investigation is conducted
by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall
be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of ICCs/IPs
concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency or governmentowned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production
sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the
ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that
has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process. (Emphasis supplied)
214

The DENR, in assessing ECC applications, requires project proponents to conduct public
participation/consultation. Section 5.3, Article II of DAO 2003-30 on public
hearing/consultation requirements provides, in part:
215

Proponents should initiate public consultations early in order to ensure that

environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into consideration in the
EIA study and the formulation of the management plan. All public consultations and
public hearings conducted during the EIA process are to be documented. x x x
In any event, there appears to be no good reason why the subject project should not
comply with the prior consultations requirement under Section 26, in relation to Section 27,
of the LGC. There would be no conflict with RA 7227 because prior consultations do not
impair the power of the SBMA to approve or disapprove a project within the SSEZ, i.e. the
results of the public consultations do not bind or compel the SBMA to either approve or
disapprove the project or program. Seediscussion, infra.
216

217

Article X, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:

The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

218

Alvarez v. Picop, 538 Phil 348, 402-403 (2006).

219

Lina, Jr. v. Pao, 416 Phil. 438, 449-450 (2001).

220

Supra notes 15, 26, and 27.

221

RA 7227, Section 12(a).

222

518 Phil 103 (2006).

223

Id. at124-125.

224

Subic Bay Freeport; also referred to as the SSEZ.

Section 11 of the "Rules and Regulations Implementing the Provisions Relative to the
Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Under
Republic Act No. 7227, Otherwise Known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992."
225

226

III RECORDS, SENATE 8TH CONGRESS, 59TH SESSION, 613 (January 29, 1992).

227

CA rollo, Volume XVII, p. 6893. (Motion for Reconsideration of SBMA)

228

TSN, October 29, 2012, pp. 47, 50-51.

229

G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792 (1993).

Note that in Item #8 of the "DECISION CHART FOR DETERMINATION OF

REQUIREMENTS FOR PROJECT MODIFICATION," a new EIS canbe required for the
amendment covered therein:
230

8 Conversion to new
New
. project type (e.g.
ECC /
Considered new application but with lesser data
bunkerfired plant to
EIS
gas-fired)
requirements since most facilities are established;
environmental performance in the past will serve as baseline;
However, for operating projects, there may be need to request
for Relief from ECC Commitment prior to applying for new
project type to ensure no balance of environmental
accountabilities from the current project

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait v.

Secretary Angelo Reyes
Year:
2015
Country:
Phillippines
Region:
Pacific
Topics:
Access to Justice
Coastal and Marine
Oil and Gas
Procedural Issues
Summary:
The Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines ruled that a service contract for oil exploration,
development, and production issued by the government of the Philippines in the protected area of
the Taon Strait was unconstitutional.
Case Note:

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, G.R.
No. 180771 (April 21, 2015)
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX to
conduct oil exploration in the Taon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one
exploration well. The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Taon
Strait by two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The
second petition was filed by a non-governmental organization representing the interests of fisherfolk,
along with individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil exploration
activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In
2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and oil
exploration activities ceased. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of review.
In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the important procedural point of whether the case
was moot because the service contract had been terminated. The Court declared that mootness is
not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Id., p. 12.
Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations and paramount public interest in the case, not to
mention the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the Court found it necessary to
reach the merits of the case even though the particular service contract had been terminated. Id.
BH
Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court narrowed them down to
two: 1) whether marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing to pursue the case;
and 2) whether the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution or other domestic laws. Id.,
p. 11.
As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond natural and juridical
persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence moves towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases. Id., p. 15.
Instead, the Court explained, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has
been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit
to enforce our environmental laws. Id., p. 16-17.
The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction,
the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the 1987
Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the
president and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the

Energy Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was
unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.
In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation of natural resources in
protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected area, the exploration must be
performed in accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted that
JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any EIA was performed; therefore its activity was
unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and
utilization of energy resources can only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine
Congress. Because Congress had not specifically authorized the activity in Taon Strait, the Court
declared that no energy exploration should be permitted in that area. Id., p. 34.