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ARTICLE X

any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.

Local Government
General Provisions

SECTION 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral


representation as may be prescribed by law.

SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the


Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided.

SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,


merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

SECTION 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

SECTION 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component
cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to
their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the
metropolitan authority that will hereby be created shall be limited to basic services
requiring coordination.

SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays
shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.

SECTION 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component
cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be
deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
SECTION 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or
coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to
them in accordance with law.

SECTION 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.

SECTION 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or
other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of
departments and other government offices, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative
decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the
economic and social growth and development of the units in the region.

SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law,
in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.

Autonomous Region

SECTION 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the


proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their
respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the
inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
SECTION 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for

SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
SECTION 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

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SECTION 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this
Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National
Government.
SECTION 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region
with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government
for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both
of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The
organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and
property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

SECTION 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and
security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
TITLE III
SHARES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS IN THE PROCEEDS OF
NATIONAL TAXES
CHAPTER I
Allotment of Internal Revenue
Section 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. - Local government units shall
have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the
third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);

SECTION 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within
eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts
for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide
for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(b) On the second year, thirty-five percent (35%); and


(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).
Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable
public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation
with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the
"liga", to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local
government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%)
of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding
the current fiscal year: Provided, further, That in the first year of the effectivity of
this Code, the local government units shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%)
internal revenue allotment which shall include the cost of devolved functions for
essential public services, be entitled to receive the amount equivalent to the cost of
devolved personal services.
Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. - The share of local government
units in the internal revenue allotment shall be collected in the following manner:

(7) Educational policies;


(a) Provinces - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(b) Cities - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.

(c) Municipalities - Thirty-four percent (34%); and

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(d) Barangays - Twenty percent (20%)
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be
determined on the basis of the following formula:
(a) Population - Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%); and
(c) Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)
Provided, further, That the share of each barangay with a population of not less than
one hundred (100) inhabitants shall not be less than Eighty thousand (P80,000.00)
per annum chargeable against the twenty percent (20%) share of the barangay from
the internal revenue allotment, and the balance to be allocated on the basis of the
following formula:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code:
(1) Population - Forty percent (40%); and
(2) Equal sharing - Sixty percent (60%)
(b) On the second year:

the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose.
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share of
local government units under existing laws.
Section 287. Local Development Projects. - Each local government unit shall
appropriate in its annual budget no less than twenty percent (20%) of its annual
internal revenue allotment for development projects. Copies of the development
plans of local government units shall be furnished the Department of Interior and
Local Government.
Section 288. Rules and Regulations. - The Secretary of Finance, in consultation with
the Secretary of Budget and Management, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations for a simplified disbursement scheme designed for the speedy and
effective enforcement of the provisions of this Chapter.
CHAPTER II
Share of Local Government Units in the National Wealth
Section 289. Share in the Proceeds from the Development and Utilization of the
National Wealth. - Local government units shall have an equitable share in the
proceeds derived from the utilization and development of the national wealth within
their respective areas, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of
direct benefits.

(1) Population - Fifty percent (50%); and


(2) Equal sharing - Fifty percent (50%)
(c) On the third year and thereafter:
(1) Population - Sixty percent (60%); and

Section 290. Amount of Share of Local Government Units. - Local government units
shall, in addition to the internal revenue allotment, have a share of forty percent
(40%) of the gross collection derived by the national government from the preceding
fiscal year from mining taxes, royalties, forestry and fishery charges, and such other
taxes, fees, or charges, including related surcharges, interests, or fines, and from its
share in any co-production, joint venture or production sharing agreement in the
utilization and development of the national wealth within their territorial
jurisdiction.

(2) Equal sharing - Forty percent (40%).


Provided, finally, That the financial requirements of barangays created by local
government units after the effectivity of this Code shall be the responsibility of the
local government unit concerned.
Section 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need
of any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after

Section 291. Share of the Local Governments from any Government Agency or
Owned or Controlled Corporation. - Local government units shall have a share
based on the preceding fiscal year from the proceeds derived by any government
agency or government-owned or controlled corporation engaged in the utilization
and development of the national wealth based on the following formula whichever
will produce a higher share for the local government unit:
(a) One percent (1%) of the gross sales or receipts of the preceding
calendar year; or

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(b) Forty percent (40%) of the mining taxes, royalties, forestry and fishery
charges and such other taxes, fees or charges, including related surcharges,
interests, or fines the government agency or government owned or
controlled corporation would have paid if it were not otherwise exempt.
Section 292. Allocation of Shares. - The share in the preceding Section shall be
distributed in the following manner:

Section 294. Development and Livelihood Projects. - The proceeds from the share of
local government units pursuant to this chapter shall be appropriated by their
respective sanggunian to finance local government and livelihood projects:
Provided, however, That at least eighty percent (80%) of the proceeds derived from
the development and utilization of hydrothermal. geothermal, and other sources of
energy shall be applied solely to lower the cost of electricity in the local government
unit where such a source of energy is located.

(a) Where the natural resources are located in the province:


(1) Province - Twenty percent (20%);
JUDGE DADOLE VS COA
(2) Component City/Municipality - Forty-five percent (45%);
and
(3) Barangay - Thirty-five percent (35%)
Provided, however, That where the natural resources are located in two (2)
or more provinces, or in two (2) or more component cities or
municipalities or in two (2) or more barangays, their respective shares
shall be computed on the basis of:
(1) Population - Seventy percent (70%); and
(2) Land area - Thirty percent (30%)
(b) Where the natural resources are located in a highly urbanized or
independent component city:
(1) City - Sixty-five percent (65%); and
(2) Barangay - Thirty-five percent (35%)
Provided, however, That where the natural resources are located in such
two (2) or more cities, the allocation of shares shall be based on the
formula on population and land area as specified in paragraph (a) of this
Section.
Section 293. Remittance of the Share of Local Government Units. - The share of
local government units from the utilization and development of national wealth shall
be remitted in accordance with Section 286 of this Code: Provided, however, That in
the case of any government agency or government-owned or controlled corporation
engaged in the utilization and development of the national wealth, such share shall
be directly remitted to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer
concerned within five (5) days after the end of each quarter.

G.R. No. 125350 December 3 2002


FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor
issued notices of disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount
(maximum of P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and municipalities,
respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional monthly allowances of the
judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the
amount they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory
powers of the President.
RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the
exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and
the power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The
President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of
the President. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he
will see to it that the local governments or their officials were performing their
duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they
can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or
reversed. They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as
their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President
can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the
latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory
powers over LGUs

PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE
G.R. NO. 132988 (JULY 19, 2000)

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FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1
of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from
implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal
revenue allotments.
HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal
autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way
of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are
consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by
the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A
directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The
AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the
country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal
matters, provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector
deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of
the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local
leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department
of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4)
any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which
orders the withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA clearly contravenes the
Constitution and the law.

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO


FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed
Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved
by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight
Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the
portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the
DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the
subsequent release of the corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations
Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each

corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed
conditions for the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively
encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the State shall ensure the local
autonomy of local governments. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy,
theConstitution confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general
supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v.
Limdistinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing
of an act the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the
act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are
followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to
modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the
LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the
just share shall beautomatically released to the LGUs. Since the release
is automatic, the LGUs arent required to perform any act to receive the just
share it shall be released to them without need of further action. To subject its
distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as
sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD
Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is
if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40%
of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in
this case.
The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of
1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the
IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate
law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a

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general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a
separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation,
whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose
or a separate fiscal unit any provision therein which is intended to amend another
law is considered an inappropriate provision. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of
LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit
the Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly
infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of
autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and
liberty upon which these provisions are based.

ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND


DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS. ZAMORA

Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to Congress
a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session,
submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed
an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, AN ACT APPROPRIATING
FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE,
TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES also known as General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It provides under the heading
ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS that the IRA for local
government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading UNPROGRAMMED FUND, it is
provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the
P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the IRA, which amount
shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President
to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by
certain committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund,
it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of
Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of
the condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials
filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then


Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor MagtolisBriones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of
provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS)
referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED
FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by
unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by
placing the same under Unprogrammed funds. Although the effectivity of the Year
2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues
raised in the present case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue
that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the
IRAs when it made its release contingent on whether revenue collections could meet
the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the
release automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically
releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA.
HELD:
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law,
in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the
release of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue
targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release
automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above constitutional provision is
addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not
prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the
executive branch of the government from unilaterally withholding the IRA, but
not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. In
the words of respondents, This essentially means that the President or any member
of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute,
withhold the release of the IRA.
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just
share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to
pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that
the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties,
provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution
amendable by statute a proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers
intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional
instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been
worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local
governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and not the release
thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution
to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory

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automatic release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas:
if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than
40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what
should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections
for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis
depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter
of the current fiscal year.
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was
motivated by the laudable intent to lower the budget deficit in line with prudent
fiscal management. The pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed:
[T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within
the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be
carried out by legal methods.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1
and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set
apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the
UNPROGRAMMED FUND.

2.

Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule


under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

3.

Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING


[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can
be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which
show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization
of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the
second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,


G.R. NO. 196271, OCTOBER 18, 2011
I.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections,


should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election
based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao


(ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act
that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September
2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26,
2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the
ARMM elections]?

YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates
the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2.

NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-onseparate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate
can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject
to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills
immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the
effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of


printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when
the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI,
Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i]
the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local

PUBCORP 2 ATTY PASCASIO


elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both
the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.
3.

YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in
the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the
[incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2)
hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when
those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the
President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in
the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by
completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly
within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
3.2.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in


nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President,
Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided
by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress
may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details
in the execution of that power.

1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of
the incumbent ARMM officials

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the


scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for
regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of
its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can
act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court
is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our
power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of
Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot
extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to
appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective
term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it
cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term
and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into
the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever
way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the
past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available
option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident.

2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its


own, has no authority to order special elections.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration
date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is
what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall
prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3.

3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the
interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure
RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as
the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

PUBCORP 2 ATTY PASCASIO


At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and
the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:

the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective
ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the
officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA
No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim
measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should
be read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim
measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President
can appoint. These are:

GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR. and the Province of


Camarines Sur v. Hon. Jesse M. Robredo, in his capacity as Secretary of DILG
December 10, 2014 | Reyes, J. | Honest Public Service and Full Public Disclosure

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public


ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank
of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint
pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to
appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution
requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an
express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment
of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153
were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative
character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend
what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge
for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of

Digester: Lingat, Anna Mickaella N.

SUMMARY: Villafuerte filed a petition assailing the three memorandum circulars


issued by Robredo. The circulars pertain to full disclosure of local budget and
finances and other guidelines regarding budget. Villafuerte argues that the circulars
violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy of the LGU. The Court ruled that
the circulars merely reiterated what was already provided in the law and that the
order on public disclosure is consistent with the policy of promoting good
governance through transparency, accountability and participation.
DOCTRINE: The Constitution is now replete with numerous provisions directing
the adoption of measures to uphold transparency and accountability in government,
with a view of protecting the nation from repeating its atrocious past. It commands
the strict adherence to full disclosure of information on all matters relating to official
transactions and those involving public interest.

FACTS:

On February 21, 2011, Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by


the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition for
certiorari, seeking to nullify the three issuances of Robredo for being
unconstitutional and having been issued with grave abuse of discretion:
o MC No. 2010-83 entitled Full Disclosure of Local Budget and
Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings, which aims to promote good
governance through enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs.

Legal and Administrative Authority: Section 352 of LGC of 1991


requires the posting within 30 days from end of each fiscal year in at

PUBCORP 2 ATTY PASCASIO

o
o

least 3 publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the LGU a


summary of all revenues collected and funds including the
appropriations and disbursements of such funds during the preceding
fiscal year. RA No 984 (Government Procurement Reform Act) calles
for the posting of the Invitation to Bid, Notice of Award, Notice to
Proceed and Approved Contract in the procuring entitys premises, in
newspapers of general circulation, the Philippine Govt Electronic
Procurement System and the website of procuring entity.

Responsibility of Local Chief Executive: All Provincial Governors,


City Mayors, and Municipal Myors, are directed to faithfully comply
with the abovecited provisions of laws, and existing national policy,
by posting in conspicuous places within public buildings in the
locality, or in print media of community or general circulation, and in
their websites1
MC No 2010-138 reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be
utilized for desirable social, economic, and environmental outcomes
essential to the attainment of the constitutional objective of life for all. 2
MC No 2011-08 directing for the strict adherence to Section 90 of RA No
10147 of the General Appropriations Act of 2011.

RULING: Petition denied.

Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of


local and fiscal autonomy enshired in the Constitution and the LGC? NO

1 CY 2010 Annual Budget, Quarterly Statement of Cash Flows, CY


2009 Statement of Receipts and Expenditures, CY 2010 Trust
Fund (PDAF) Utilization, CY 2010 Special Education Fund
Utilization, CY 2010 20% Component of the IRA Utilization, CY
2010 Gender and Development Fund Utilization, CY 2010
Statement of Debt Service, CY 2010 Annual Procurement Plan or
Procurement List, Items to Bid, Bid Results on Civil Works, and
Goods and Services, Abstract of Bids as Calculated

Administrative expenses such as cash gifts, bonuses, food


allowance, medical assistance, uniforms, supplies, meetings,
communication, water and light, petroleum products, and the
like;Salaries, wages or overtime pay;

2.

Travelling expenses, whether domestic or foreign;

3.

Registration or participation fees in training, seminars,


conferences or conventions;

4.

Construction, repair or refinishing of administrative offices;

5.

Purchase of administrative office furniture, fixtures,


equipment or appliances; and Purchase, maintenance or
repair of motor vehicles or motorcycles, except ambulances.

Legal and Administrative Authority: Section 90 stipulates that the


amount appropriated for the LGUs share in the IRA shall be used in
accordance with Sections 17(g) and 287 of RA No 7160. The annual
budgets of LGUs shall be prepared in accordance with the forms,
procedures, and schedules prescribed by the Department of Budget
and Management and those jointly issued with the Commission on
Audit.
Sanctions: Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions - An elective
local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office
on: (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross
negligence, or dereliction of duty

Petitioners: assailed issuances interfere with the local and fiscal autonomy of
LGUs embodied in the Constitution and the LGC.
o MC 2010-138 transgressed these constitutionally-protected liberties when
it restricted the meaning of development and enumerated activities
which the local government must finance from the 20% development fund
component of the IRA and provided sanctions for local authorities who
shall use the said component of the fund for the excluded purposes stated
therein.
o Robredo cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the local
legislative council in enacting its annual budget and specifying the
development projects that the 20% component of its IRA should fund.
Court: Petitioners arguments are untenable.
o The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the
autonomy of LGUs (Article X of Constitution)
o It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution that enhancing local
autonomy that the LGC was enacted.3

3 Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the


policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of
the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby
local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization
shall proceed from the national government to the local
government units.

PUBCORP 2 ATTY PASCASIO


Local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization.

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or


decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments more
responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the pursuit of national development and social progress. (Limbona v
Mangelin)

To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution


confines the power of the President over LGUs to mere supervision.
The President exercises general supervision over them, but only to
ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He has
no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own. (Section 4, Article X of Constitution)
o It is petitioners contention that Robredo went beyond the confined of his
supervisory powers, as alter ego of the President, when he issued MC No
2010-138. They argue that the mandatory nature of the circular, with the
threat of imposition of sanctions for non-compliance, evinces a clear desire
to exercise control over LGUs. However, the Court perceives otherwise.
o A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an
existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to
faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize
the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. The assailed circular
was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of
the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for
development projects but was diverted to expenses more properly
categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the LGC.
o The issuance of MC No. 2010-138 was brought about by the report of the
COA that the development fund was not being utilized accordingly. To curb
the alleged misuse of the development fund, the respondent deemed it
proper to remind LGUs of the nature and purpose of the provision for the
IRA through MC No. 2010-138.
o The enumeration in the circular was not meant to restrict the discretion of
the LGUs in the utilization of their funds. It was incorporated in the assailed
circular in order to guide them in the proper disposition of the IRA and
avert further misuse of the fund by citing current practices which seemed to
be incompatible with the purpose of the fund. LGUs remain at liberty to
map out their development plans based on their own discretion and utilize
their IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction that 20% thereof be
expended for development projects.
The local autonomy granted LGU does not completely severe them from the
national government or turn them into impenetrable states. Thus,
notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are
still under the supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for
malfeasance or violations of existing laws.
Answering petitioners claim that the requirement to post other documents in
the issuances went beyond the provisions in LGC and RA No 9184: It is well to
remember that fiscal autonomy does not leave LGUs with unbridled discretion
o

in the disbursement of public funds. They remain accountable to their


constituency.
The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08, are
but implementation of this avowed policy of the State to make public officials
accountable to the people. They are amalgamations of existing laws, rules and
regulation designed to give teeth to the constitutional mandate of transparency
and accountability.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his
own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust.
By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have
the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to
serve. (ABAKADA GURO Party List v Purisima)
The Constitution strongly summoned the State to adopt and implement a
policy of full disclosure of all transactions involving public interest and
provide the people with the right to access public information. Section 352
of the LGC and RA No 9184 are responses to this call for transparency and
both laws establish a system of transparency in procurement process in
government agencies.
The publication of budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans and procurement
plans of LGUs required in the assailed issuances could not have infringed on
the local fiscal autonomy of LGUs.
o The issuances do not interfere with the discretion of the LGUs in the
specification of their priority projects and the allocation of their budgets.
The posting requirements are mere transparency measures.
o Section 352 of the LGC that is being invoked by the petitioners does not
exclude the requirement for the posting of the additional documents stated
in MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08. The additional requirement for the
posting of budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans, and procurement
plans are well-within the contemplation of Section 352 of the LGC
considering they are documents necessary for an accurate presentation of a
summary of appropriations and disbursements that an LGU is required to
publish.
o The supervisory powers of the President are broad enough to embrace the
power to require the publication of certain documents as a mechanism of
transparency. The President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the
economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible
for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated
social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country.
(Pimentel v Aguirre)
The Constitution, which was drafted after long years of dictatorship and
abuse of power, is now replete with numerous provisions directing the
adoption of measures to uphold transparency and accountability in
government, with a view of protecting the nation from repeating its
atrocious past. It commands the strict adherence to full disclosure of
information on all matters relating to official transactions and those
involving public interest. (Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III)
The assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the policy of promoting good
governance through transparency, accountability and participation. The action
of the respondent is certainly within the constitutional bounds of his power as
alter ego of the President.

PUBCORP 2 ATTY PASCASIO

The power to govern is a delegated authority from the people who hailed the
public official to office through the democratic process of election. He must not
frown upon accountability checks which aim to show how well he is
performing his delegated power. For, it is through these mechanisms of
transparency and accountability that he is able to prove to his constituency that

he is worthy of the continued privilege. <3

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