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ARTICLE X
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Local Government
General Provisions
SECTION 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
SECTION 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component
cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to
their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the
metropolitan authority that will hereby be created shall be limited to basic services
requiring coordination.
SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays
shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.
SECTION 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component
cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be
deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
SECTION 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or
coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to
them in accordance with law.
SECTION 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.
SECTION 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or
other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of
departments and other government offices, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative
decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the
economic and social growth and development of the units in the region.
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law,
in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Autonomous Region
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
SECTION 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
SECTION 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and
security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
TITLE III
SHARES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS IN THE PROCEEDS OF
NATIONAL TAXES
CHAPTER I
Allotment of Internal Revenue
Section 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. - Local government units shall
have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the
third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);
SECTION 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within
eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts
for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide
for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose.
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share of
local government units under existing laws.
Section 287. Local Development Projects. - Each local government unit shall
appropriate in its annual budget no less than twenty percent (20%) of its annual
internal revenue allotment for development projects. Copies of the development
plans of local government units shall be furnished the Department of Interior and
Local Government.
Section 288. Rules and Regulations. - The Secretary of Finance, in consultation with
the Secretary of Budget and Management, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations for a simplified disbursement scheme designed for the speedy and
effective enforcement of the provisions of this Chapter.
CHAPTER II
Share of Local Government Units in the National Wealth
Section 289. Share in the Proceeds from the Development and Utilization of the
National Wealth. - Local government units shall have an equitable share in the
proceeds derived from the utilization and development of the national wealth within
their respective areas, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of
direct benefits.
Section 290. Amount of Share of Local Government Units. - Local government units
shall, in addition to the internal revenue allotment, have a share of forty percent
(40%) of the gross collection derived by the national government from the preceding
fiscal year from mining taxes, royalties, forestry and fishery charges, and such other
taxes, fees, or charges, including related surcharges, interests, or fines, and from its
share in any co-production, joint venture or production sharing agreement in the
utilization and development of the national wealth within their territorial
jurisdiction.
Section 291. Share of the Local Governments from any Government Agency or
Owned or Controlled Corporation. - Local government units shall have a share
based on the preceding fiscal year from the proceeds derived by any government
agency or government-owned or controlled corporation engaged in the utilization
and development of the national wealth based on the following formula whichever
will produce a higher share for the local government unit:
(a) One percent (1%) of the gross sales or receipts of the preceding
calendar year; or
Section 294. Development and Livelihood Projects. - The proceeds from the share of
local government units pursuant to this chapter shall be appropriated by their
respective sanggunian to finance local government and livelihood projects:
Provided, however, That at least eighty percent (80%) of the proceeds derived from
the development and utilization of hydrothermal. geothermal, and other sources of
energy shall be applied solely to lower the cost of electricity in the local government
unit where such a source of energy is located.
PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE
G.R. NO. 132988 (JULY 19, 2000)
corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed
conditions for the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively
encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the State shall ensure the local
autonomy of local governments. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy,
theConstitution confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general
supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v.
Limdistinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing
of an act the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the
act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are
followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to
modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the
LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the
just share shall beautomatically released to the LGUs. Since the release
is automatic, the LGUs arent required to perform any act to receive the just
share it shall be released to them without need of further action. To subject its
distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as
sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD
Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is
if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40%
of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in
this case.
The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of
1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the
IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate
law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a
Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to Congress
a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session,
submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed
an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, AN ACT APPROPRIATING
FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE,
TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES also known as General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It provides under the heading
ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS that the IRA for local
government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading UNPROGRAMMED FUND, it is
provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the
P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the IRA, which amount
shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President
to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by
certain committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund,
it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of
Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of
the condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials
filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
2.
3.
Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can
be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which
show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization
of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the
second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1.
THE FACTS
Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the
ARMM elections]?
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates
the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2.
NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-onseparate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate
can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject
to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills
immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the
effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:
YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in
the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the
[incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2)
hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when
those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the
President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in
the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by
completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly
within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
3.2.
1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of
the incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can
act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court
is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our
power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of
Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot
extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to
appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective
term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it
cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term
and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into
the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever
way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the
past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available
option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration
date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is
what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall
prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3.
3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the
interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure
RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as
the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective
ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the
officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA
No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim
measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should
be read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim
measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President
can appoint. These are:
FACTS:
o
o
2.
3.
4.
5.
Petitioners: assailed issuances interfere with the local and fiscal autonomy of
LGUs embodied in the Constitution and the LGC.
o MC 2010-138 transgressed these constitutionally-protected liberties when
it restricted the meaning of development and enumerated activities
which the local government must finance from the 20% development fund
component of the IRA and provided sanctions for local authorities who
shall use the said component of the fund for the excluded purposes stated
therein.
o Robredo cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the local
legislative council in enacting its annual budget and specifying the
development projects that the 20% component of its IRA should fund.
Court: Petitioners arguments are untenable.
o The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the
autonomy of LGUs (Article X of Constitution)
o It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution that enhancing local
autonomy that the LGC was enacted.3
The power to govern is a delegated authority from the people who hailed the
public official to office through the democratic process of election. He must not
frown upon accountability checks which aim to show how well he is
performing his delegated power. For, it is through these mechanisms of
transparency and accountability that he is able to prove to his constituency that