Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 770
In early October 1975, Millow was summoned before a federal grand jury
investigating possible violations of laws prohibiting the operation of illegal
gambling businesses and the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. 371,
1955. After several delays at Millow's request he moved to quash his subpoena
on the grounds that his testimony was unnecessary to a conviction and that he
should be granted a hearing to determine whether the grand jury had employed
the product of illegal wiretaps as the basis of his interrogation. At a hearing on
October 28, 1975, the government produced the orders issued by Westchester
County Court Judge Rubin that authorized interception of Millow's telephone
lines by members of the Westchester County District Attorney's Office for a
sixty-day period in 1974.2 After a review of the order and the affidavits and
applications on which it was based, Judge Pierce found them facially sufficient
and denied Millow's motion to quash.
3
Millow then appeared before the grand jury on October 29, 1975, but invoked
his right against self-incrimination and refused to answer questions. Millow was
then granted immunity under 18 U.S.C. 6002. Nevertheless, Millow
continued his refusal to testify on the ground that he was appealing the denial
of his motion to quash.3
On November 14, 1975, a panel of this court denied Millow's motion for bail
pending appeal of his contempt citation but expedited the appeal which we
heard on December 2, 1975.4 At that time we indicated our affirmance of the
order of confinement and we issue this opinion to supplement that judgment.
Cf., United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129 (10th Cir. 1975).
We hold that it was sufficient for the government to show that there was a valid
court order authorizing a wiretap in answer to Millow's charges of illegally
obtained evidence. Judge Pierce was clearly correct in rejecting Millow's claim
that the government's statement was proof that it had violated the order, as it is
clear that the statement showed nothing of the sort.
Millow's original request for a hearing on the existence of any wiretap was
based on his attorney's knowledge that some electronic surveillance had been
used in the investigation of other persons involved in the same activities that
led to the examination of Millow and on the mere suspicion that some of the
wiretaps might have been placed on Millow's telephone lines without an
appropriate court order.5 The government respondent to this demand by
presenting to Judge Pierce the court orders issued by Westchester County Court
Judge Rubin and the affidavits submitted at the time that order was requested.
After a review of this material, Judge Pierce found that there had been a
sufficient basis for authorizing the wiretap.
8
Here, the government has introduced a court order sufficient under Persico to
avert further litigation by a subpoenaed witness on the legality of the
surveillance. While not asserting that this order is invalid, Millow does contend,
however, that the government has conceded the patent illegality necessary
under Persico to justify his refusal to testify. We disagree.
10
11also want to advise you, Mr. Millow, that you are a target of this investigation and
'I
that my questions here today were based upon electronic surveillance, physical
surveillance of your movements in the past two years by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and local law enforcement officials, witnesses before this Grand Jury,
and statements which you have made to myself, Mr. Emory, and Special Agent
Douglas Wilhelmi.'
12
It is clear from this statement, as later clarified by the Special Attorney at the
October 31 contempt hearing,7 that the 'two years' period concerns only
physical surveillance and not electronic surveillance. Millow's continued
reliance upon the above statement to demonstrate patent illegality under Persico
is without merit.
13
Millow next seeks to have the contempt order vacated because his assertion
that electronic surveillance exceeded the terms of the court order has not been
refuted by affidavits from the government. Millow invokes 18 U.S.C. 3504
which provides that 'upon a claim by a party aggrieved' that evidence in a grand
jury or other judicial or administrative proceeding is inadmissible because it is
the fruit of an illegal act such as wiretapping, the opponent of the claim 'shall
affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged unlawful act.' We hold that where,
as here, assertions of misconduct are so obviously frivolous and lack even a
colorable basis there is no 'claim' sufficient to trigger the government's
obligation within the meaning of 3504.
14
15
violation of the Fifth Amendment, United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 n.3,
86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966); and it may rely upon hearsay or
otherwise incompetent evidence where the nature of the evidence is revealed to
the grand jurors, Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100
L.Ed. 397 (1956); United States v. Marquez, 462 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1972). Nor
will the court conduct a hearing to determine the source of the evidence on
which the grand jury interrogation is based, Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S.
339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958).
16
17
18
Other courts have found that the nature of the government's investigation and
denial of misconduct under 3504 depends upon the specificity of the charges
made by the grand jury witness. See United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101
(5th Cir. 1975); United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 992, 95 S.Ct. 1428, 43 L.Ed.2d 673 (1975). While our finding that
there was no 'claim' at all in this case makes it unnecessary to consider the
application of a 'fluid standard' to the resolution of such situations, we note that
these cases indicate that not every accusation of misconduct by the prosecution
requires a detailed response by government agencies to determine their
participation in any wrongdoing. See also In re Mintzer, 511 F.2d 471 (1st Cir.
1974).
20
Finally, Millow requests that if we find against him on the merits, we grant bail
pending an application for certiorari to the Supreme Court. A person confined
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1826(a) may have bail set pending appeal only if it
appears that the appeal is not frivolous or taken for delay, 28 U.S.C. 1826(b).
At oral argument the government submitted the affidavits requested by
Millow.8 Thus, even if we are wrong in our conclusion that responsive
affidavits from the government were unnecessary because there was no claim
made by Millow, the fact that the government has now submitted affidavits
which comply fully with its obligation even under the strictest reading of
3504 makes frivolous any petition which Millow could file. See In re
Buscaglia, 518 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1975). The request for bail is denied.
21
The order of the district court is affirmed. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
The denial of the motion to quash was unappealable. See United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690--91, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974)
This reasoning has been accepted by the Fifth Circuit, In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 522 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1975), and by the Ninth Circuit, Droback v.
United States, 509 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964, 95
S.Ct. 1952, 44 L.Ed.2d 450 (1975). But see In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803 (1st
Cir. 1974)
At the October 31 contempt hearing, the Special Attorney quoted the statement
in dispute to the court and then stated:
I think Mr. Millow misunderstood what I was advising him. I merely advised
him that his physical movements had been under surveillance, not that his
phone had been tapped as apparently he told his defense attorney for two years.
That is not the case, your Honor. I am familiar with all aspects of this
investigation, your Honor. There is no electronic surveillance that has been
placed on either a premises controlled by Mr. Millow or a telephone which is
registered to Mr. Millow or which Mr. Millow used other than the ones that
have been placed before your Honor. That is the only electronic surveillance
that I am aware of in this case, and since I am the attorney who is going to be
propounding these questions, your Honor, before the grand jury, I believe that
that's dispositive.
8