Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 58
7 Media L. Rep. 2562
Franklin K. Breselor, Asst. Atty. Gen. of State of New York, Albany, N.Y.
(Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of State of New York, William J. Kogan,
Asst. Sol. Gen. of State of New York, Albany, N.Y., of Counsel), for
petitioner.
Lisa B. Margolis, Counsel, F.C.C., Washington, D.C. (Stephen A. Sharp,
Gen. Counsel, F.C.C., Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate Gen. Counsel,
F.C.C., John E. Ingle, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, F.C.C., William F.
Baxter, Asst. Atty. Gen. of U.S., Barry M. Grossman, Atty. U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for respondents.
Gardner F. Gillespie, Washington, D.C. (Hogan & Hartson, Jay E. Ricks,
Paul C. Skelly, Washington, D.C., and Barry P. Simon, New York City, of
counsel), for intervenor Teleprompter Corp.
N. Frank Wiggins, Washington, D.C. (Cohn & Marks, Washington, D.C.),
for intervenor WWHT Corp.
Before FEINBERG, Chief Judge, FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge, and
PIERCE, Circuit Judge.*
Since the inception of the American television era, various ideas, technologies,
and services have been developed to enhance the reception of locally-broadcast
video signals and to substantially broaden the programming alternatives
available to viewers. This case raises the issue of whether the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") lawfully preempted New York State's
regulation of one of those services.
Background
2
Among the several options available to some television viewers in New York
State are programs delivered by master antenna television ("MATV") systems,
by community antenna television ("CATV") systems, and by Multipoint
Distribution Service ("MDS").
Atop the Empire State Building in New York City is station WQQ-79, which
Atop the Empire State Building in New York City is station WQQ-79, which
operates under a license granted to Microband Corporation of America
("Microband") by the FCC. It transmits MDS signals to receivers within a 35
mile radius, including points in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.
Among WQQ-79's customers, for which it transmits programming, is Home
Box Office, Inc. ("HBO"), a company which supplies entertainment programs
to the viewing public for a fee. WQQ-79 transmits HBO's programming to
some 233 MATV and CATV reception points serving an estimated 110,950
subscribers. Like any other customer of a MDS station, HBO provides the
programming and specifies the receive points and time of transmission. HBO,
however, does not itself market the programming. Instead, it engages the
services of middlement, such as Orth-O-Vision, Inc. ("Orth-O-Vision"), to
market its services to apartment dwellers. In order to reach an apartment
resident, WQQ-79 typically sends the video material provided by HBO to a
rooftop antenna connected to the necessary downconverter and decoder. The
signal is then delivered to the customer's home television set through the wires
of a MATV system.
In 1972, the New York State legislature created the New York State
Commission on Cable Television ("State Commission") and gave it regulatory
jurisdiction over all "cable television systems." N.Y. Executive Law, Art. 28.
By statute, a "cable television system"2 does not include a "master antenna
television system."3 In two orders entitled Clarification of Policy in Docket No.
90085 dated October 22, 1976 ("Clarification") and Further Clarification and
Modification of Policy dated April 4, 1977 ("Further Clarification"), the State
Commission ruled that the statutory definition of a MATV system did not
encompass any MATV system which provides pay programming or which
allows the reception of programming which could not be received from locally
viewable off-the-air broadcast signals. Thus, a MATV system which delivered
down converted and decoded MDS signals was not considered a "master
antenna television system" under the statute and would be regulated as a "cable
television system." Importantly, such a system could not operate without first
obtaining a franchise from the local municipality pursuant to N.Y. Executive
Law 819.4
By its "Petition for Expedited Relief" filed on March 11, 1977, Orth-O-Vision,
a marketer of HBO's pay television service in the Borough of Queens, New
York, requested the FCC to preclude the State Commission from regulating or
prohibiting the reception of pay programming sold by Orth-O-Vision which
was transmitted from WQQ-79 to MATV systems in multi-unit dwellings in
Queens. On March 21, 1977, the FCC placed the petition on public notice5 and
solicited comments from interested parties.6 In a decision released on
September 22, 1978, the FCC, treating Orth-O-Vision's petition as a petition for
a declaratory ruling, ruled that the State Commission's policies enunciated in its
Clarification and Further Clarification were void as preempted "to the extent
that their effect will be to prohibit the receipt of federally-authorized MDS
transmissions of HBO's programming." In re Orth-O-Vision, Inc., 69 F.C.C.2d
657, 671 (1978) ("First Order"). In subsequently denying the State
Commission's petition for reconsideration, the FCC made clear that its prior
ruling was not limited to HBO programming, but applied to any MDS
transmissions which were impeded by state regulation of MATV systems. In re
Orth-O-Vision, Inc., 82 F.C.C.2d 178, 179, 185 (1980) ("Second Order").7
9
In the petition for review now before us, 8 the State Commission contends that
the FCC incorrectly found that the State's regulation of MATV systems, as
applied, impeded service in the MDS; that even if it did impede MDS service,
the State's regulation only affected intrastate MDS transmissions, over which
the FCC has no jurisdiction; and, finally, that the FCC's rulings were
impermissibly vague.9 For the reasons stated below, the State Commission's
petition for review is denied.
Discussion
10
Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2, a federal law
preempts state law when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed.
581 (1941); see Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick &
Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1130, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981);
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142, 83 S.Ct.
1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Even in an area where Congress has not
completely foreclosed state regulation, "a state statute is void to the extent that
it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute." Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151, 158, 98 S.Ct. 988, 994, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309-10, 51 L.Ed.2d 604
(1977). The federal preemptive authority may be "explicitly stated in the
(federal) statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."
Id. at 525, 97 S.Ct. at 1309. In determining whether it conflicts with the federal
law, the Court must look to the effect, rather than the purpose of the state law.
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1712, 29 L.Ed.2d 233
(1971). In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has instructed courts "to consider
the relationship between state and federal laws as they are interpreted and
applied, not merely as they are written." Jones, 430 U.S. at 526, 97 S.Ct. at
1310.
11
Pursuant to the foregoing guidelines, we will examine the effect of the State
Commission's regulation, the FCC's regulatory authority, and finally, the
conflict between the two regulatory schemes. Initially, however, we note that
the scope of our review of the FCC's declaratory orders is prescribed by 5
U.S.C. 706(2)(A)-(D). 10 Under those provisions, the Court must set aside
"agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" or action which
fails to meet constitutional, jurisdictional, or procedural requirements. See
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14, 91 S.Ct.
814, 822, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1970). Under the "arbitrary or capricious" standard
of review-a "narrow" standard, id. at 416, 91 S.Ct. at 823-the Court may only
invalidate agency action that is "not based on a consideration of relevant
factors" and not rational. FCC v. National Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 803, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 2116, 56 L.Ed.2d 697 (1978);
Citizens to Protect Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. at 823.
Although our review must be "searching and careful," we are not empowered to
substitute our judgment for that of the agency. National Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 803, 98 S.Ct. at 2116, quoting, Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. at 823; see Malrite T.V. of New
York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1149 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. pet. filed, 50 U.S.L.W.
3177 (Sept. 14, 1981).
13
The State Commission contends that MATV systems are not integral or
After noting the integral connection between MATV systems and the receipt of
programming transmitted via MDS, the FCC found that the object of the State
Commission's action was to permit municipalities, by denial of franchises, to
terminate MDS programming transmitted to multi-unit dwellings, and thereby
curtail MDS as a competitor of conventional cable television systems. 69
F.C.C.2d at 662, 666. Notably, the FCC concluded that the practical effect of
the State's regulation of MATV systems was to interfere with, burden, and limit
service provided by MDS. 69 F.C.C.2d at 668-69; 82 F.C.C.2d at 182-84.
15
The State Commission claims that the FCC erred in finding that it sought to
encourage the denial of municipal franchises to MATV systems attached to
MDS receiving equipment, and the State Commission asserts that it has no
policy of discouraging the grant of franchises to such MATV systems. We
initially note that the State Commission's contention is largely irrelevant since
we must consider the effect rather than the purpose of the state regulation. In
any event, its argument is belied by its admission in the Clarification, at 8-9,
upon which the FCC relied, that "(w)e anticipate that most (MATV) systems
will choose to reduce services to gain the matv system exception and we
encourage them to do so." (Emphasis supplied).
16
As to effects, the FCC found that the State Commission's policy had already
had an actual impact upon MDS service. On November 17, 1977, New York
City denied Orth-O-Vision's application for a cable television franchise. As a
result, HBO refused to supply Orth-O-Vision with pay programming for new
customers. 69 F.C.C.2d at 662. In its Second Order, the FCC stated that the
mere issuance of the State Commission's Clarification and Further Clarification
has had a "chilling effect" upon MDS development in New York City. 82
F.C.C.2d at 184. Based upon the foregoing findings, the FCC reasonably
concluded that the State's regulations of MATV systems had an adverse effect
on MDS development by allowing and causing a reduction in MDS reception
points.
17
Equally supportable and lawful is the FCC's conclusion that the State's
In 1934 Congress enacted the Communications Act (the "Act") and created the
FCC for the purpose of regulating "communication by wire and radio so as to
make available ... to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service...." 47
U.S.C. 151. Under 47 U.S.C. 152(a), Congress directed the FCC to regulate
all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio.11 See United States
v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 172-73, 88 S.Ct. at 2002-03 (1968).
Moreover, the FCC is empowered to "perform any and all acts, make such rules
and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as
may be necessary in the execution of its functions." 47 U.S.C. 154(i).
Congress gave the FCC broad authority, so as to "maintain, through appropriate
administrative control, (the federal government's) grip on the dynamic aspects
of radio transmission." FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. at 696, 99 S.Ct.
at 1441, quoting, FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138, 60
S.Ct. 437, 439, 84 L.Ed. 656 (1940).
19
As to more specific powers of the FCC, Title II of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 201 et
19
As to more specific powers of the FCC, Title II of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 201 et
seq., concerns the regulation of common carriers engaged in interstate
communications by wire or radio, and Title III of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 301 et
seq., governs the FCC's authority over radio communication. Congress has
instructed the FCC to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in
the public interest," 47 U.S.C. 303(g), see National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1010, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943),
and to maintain federal control "over all the channels of interstate and foreign
radio transmission." 47 U.S.C. 301. To carry out its mandate, Congress
empowered the FCC to "(m)ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such
restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this chapter ..." 47 U.S.C. 303(r).
20
Since MDS operators are communications common carriers, they must adhere
to the requirements of Title II. See 47 C.F.R. 21.900 et seq. In addition,
operators are subject to the licensing requirement of Title III because MDS
uses radio signals. Contrary to the State Commission's contention, 47 U.S.C.
152(b) does not bar the FCC's assertion of authority over WQQ-79's MDS
transmissions or any other MDS transmissions. Section 152(b) states that the
FCC has no jurisdiction to regulate intrastate communication service by wire or
radio. As previously discussed, WQQ-79's service and MDS in general is
interstate service; thus, 152(b) is inapplicable.12
23
Vagueness
24
The State Commission's final argument is that the FCC orders are void for
vagueness. This argument, founded on the State Commission's recitation of
several issues which it contends remain unclear after the FCC's action,16 was
raised in its petition for reconsideration before the FCC. In denying that
petition, the FCC rejected the same vagueness arguments raised here and stated
"we believe (our First Order) is sufficiently clear in informing (the State
Commission) that the establishment of any policy or rule, by definition or any
other device, that has the effect of limiting or adversely affecting interstate
MDS service is preempted." 82 F.C.C.2d at 185. An agency's adjudicative
order, based upon adequately articulated factual and legal premises,17 is not
impermissibly vague simply because borderline hypotheticals could be
envisioned which may not be explicitly covered by the order. See Lafayette
Radio Electronics Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 278, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1965);
cf. Erie-Lackawanna Railroad Co. v. United States, 279 F.Supp. 316, 351
(S.D.N.Y.1967) (three judge court) (Friendly, J.) (administrative agency need
not deal with every possibility no matter how unlikely), modified and
remanded, Penn-Central Merger and N & W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 88
S.Ct. 602, 19 L.Ed.2d 723 (1968). Given the fact that the FCC adequately
stated the factual and legal underpinnings of its orders and clarified its First
Order upon reconsideration, the State Commission's challenge on vagueness
grounds is without merit.
Conclusion
25
When this appeal was heard, Judge Pierce was a District Judge for the Southern
When this appeal was heard, Judge Pierce was a District Judge for the Southern
District of New York, sitting by designation. He was inducted as a judge of this
court on November 30, 1981
Copies of the public notice were presumably available at the FCC's general
information office. See 47 C.F.R. 0.443. By post-argument letter filed with
the Court on November 3, 1981, counsel for the FCC indicated that no
announcement of the filing of the petition was published in the Federal Register
Neither FCC Order purported to preempt all state regulation of MATV systems.
Indeed, the Second Order explicitly stated that not all state regulation of MATV
systems would be inconsistent with federal policies. 82 F.C.C.2d at 184 n.10
At oral argument the State Commission raised an argument that it had not
mentioned in its brief but had urged in its petition for reconsideration filed with
the FCC, namely, that the FCC should have proceeded by way of formal
rulemaking rather than by way of a declaratory ruling. The choice between
rulemaking and adjudication rests within the informed discretion of the
administrative agency. N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95,
94 S.Ct. 1757, 1769-72, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974); Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v.
Kelly, 573 F.2d 765, 768 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904, 99 S.Ct. 1991,
60 L.Ed.2d 372 (1978); see 5 U.S.C. 554(e). The FCC's choice of a
declaratory ruling in this case, after notice and an opportunity for comments by
interested parties, was not an abuse of discretion
10
11
12
13
MDS is presently limited to two channels. The FCC, however, has proposed
rules that might expand the number of channels available to MDS to ten. Notice
of Inquiry, Proposed Rulemaking and Order, General Docket No. 80-112, 45
Fed.Reg. 29323 (May 2, 1980)
14
15
The State Commission's contention that the effect of its regulation of Orth-OVision on interstate commerce will be minimal is irrelevant, since the FCC is
properly concerned with the overall effect of the State's regulation
16
The State Commission goes so far as to suggest that the FCC's orders could be
read to preempt state franchising of conventional cable television systems. This
result cannot be gleaned from even a strained reading of the FCC's orders and,
in any event, the FCC has specifically disavowed such a policy. Brief for
Respondents, at n.51
17
The sole case relied upon by the State Commission, Public Media Center v.
FCC, 587 F.2d 1322, 1331-32 (D.C.Cir.1978), merely restates the well-settled
proposition that an administrative agency must articulate the reasons for a
particular decision to make possible meaningful review of that decision. See
N.L.R.B. v. Columbia University, 541 F.2d 922, 930 (2d Cir. 1976). Here, the
FCC's reasoning was sufficiently stated to enable meaningful review by this
Court