Professional Documents
Culture Documents
3d 195
The complaint was dismissed on February 10, 2005 and a final judgment was
entered on March 8, 2005. On February 15, the Goodspeeds filed a timelyyet
by their own admission "skeletal"Rule 59(e) motion. The motion provided no
ground for altering or amending the district court's order dismissing the
complaint. Instead, the Goodspeeds' counsel sought, for personal reasons, an
extension of time to April 8, 2005 to support the motion. Specifically, counsel
requested additional time to "perform a proper review" of the district court's
February 10, 2005 Order "before deciding whether to bring certain issues to the
Court's attention." The district court received the supplemented motion on April
7 and denied it on June 27, 2005. The Goodspeeds filed a notice of appeal on
July 20, 2005.2
Moreover, under Rule 6(b), courts may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rule 59(e). Permitting the Goodspeeds to supplant their timely yet
insufficient "placeholder" Rule 59(e) motion from February 15 with their
subsequent augmented filing on April 7 would afford them an easy way to
circumvent Rule 6(b)'s prohibition on granting an enlargement of time for filing
motions under Rule 59(e). See Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818, 820 (7th
Cir.1977) (per curiam).
Two consequences flow from this conclusion. First, because the Goodspeeds'
notice of appeal entered on July 20, 2005 is only timely with respect to the
district court's denial of their motion for reconsideration entered on June 27,
Second, because the Goodspeeds' Rule 59(e) motion was improperly filed and
was not supplemented until after the ten-day time limit for filing Rule 59
motions, we construe their Rule 59(e) motion as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief
from judgment. See United States v. Clark, 984 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.1993);
Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir.1991). A final judgment on the
district court's Rule 12(b)(6) ruling was entered on March 8, 2005. The
Goodspeeds filed their "fleshed out" Rule 59(e) motion on April 7, 2005 just
within the thirty-day time limit to file a notice of appeal. Therefore, we
conclude that the Goodspeeds' improperly filed Rule 59(e) motion for
reconsideration should be construed as a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1). See
In re 310 Assocs., 346 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam). 3
CONCLUSION
9
For the reasons stated above, we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the
district court's dismissal of the complaint because Plaintiffs-Appellants' skeletal
or placeholder Rule 59(e) motion did not toll the thirty-day time limit for filing
a notice of appeal.
Notes:
*
The Honorable William H. Pauley, United States District Court Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation
On October 20, 2005, a motions panel found that "this Court has jurisdiction to
consider the March 8, 2005 judgment because appellant's February 15, 2005
Rule 59(e) motion triggered the tolling provision of Rule 4(a)(4)(A) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure." However, the fact that a prior motions
panel in this case denied Defendants-Appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal
on jurisdictional grounds does not prevent us, the merits panel, from revisiting
this issueSee Rezzonico v. H & R Block, Inc., 182 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir.1999).
A separate summary order filed today addresses the merits of the denial of this
motion