Evidence - Case Digests

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U.
Bautista |1
G.R. No. 140079. March 31, 2005.

AUGUSTO R. SAMALIO, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Augusto R. Samalio, former Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation was convicted of the crime of Robbery by the
Sandiganbayan for extorting money from Ms. Weng Sai Qin, Chinese, in exchange for
her passport. An administrative case was also filed against him for Violation of CSMC
No. 46, Rule 2, Section 1, for dishonesty, oppression, misconduct, disgraceful and
immoral conduct, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties,
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) Acting
Commissioner, the Secretary of Justice, and the Civil Service Commission, on appeal,
found Samalio guilty of the charges and ordered his dismissal. The Court of Appeals
also dismissed Samalio's Petition for Review and Motion for Reconsideration. Samalio
claims that he was denied due process because no witness or evidence was presented
against him and no hearing was conducted on his case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise
known as the "rule on former testimony should be applied
HELD: Yes. There was ample evidence which satisfied the burden of proof required in
administrative proceedings substantial evidence or that quantum of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion to support
the decision of the CSC.
The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying Section 47, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the "rule on former testimony,"
in deciding petitioners administrative case. The provisions of the Rules of Court may be
applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of administrative bodies exercising quasijudicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of the
administrative agency concerned.
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a)
the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that
in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by
the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case and (e) the
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.
In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in the administrative
proceedings before the BID because she left the country on February 6, 1993, or even
before the administrative complaint against petitioner was instituted. Petitioner does not
deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin was given in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case
No. 18679, a case which sprang from the information filed pursuant to Resolution No. 093-0224 dated February 4, 1993 of the City Prosecutors Office of Pasay City, the very
same resolution used by Commissioner Respicio as basis for filing the administrative
complaint. Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal
Case No. 18679 was the same issue in the administrative case, that is, whether
petitioner extorted money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also had the opportunity to
face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to defend and vindicate his
cause before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application of
the rule on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47, Rule 130, were satisfied.
Thus, the CSC and the Secretary of Justice committed no error when they applied it and
took cognizance of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal
Case No. 18679 where petitioner was convicted.
Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |2
G.R. No. 12724. March 27, 2000.

ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner, 66 years old, filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino
citizen. He was born in China but has stayed in the Philippines since he was nine years
old. Petitioner testified and presented three witnesses. The prosecutor was impressed
so he did not present any evidence or witness against the petitioner. Thus, the petition
was granted. However, the Office of the Solicitor General appealed claiming that he
failed to state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA
ONG,"; that he failed to disclose in his petition that he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa
St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo."; that he failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines because he lived-in with his
wife for several years and had four children out of wedlock; and that he failed to file an
income tax return because his income is low. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases,
the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and
brought up for the first time on appeal. The petitioner contended that documents not
presented and formally offered as evidence are mere scraps of paper devoid of any
evidentiary value under Rule 132 34 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court should consider evidence which has not been formally
offered
HELD: Yes. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which provides
that These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient.
The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or
suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the
case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time
on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action
considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on
res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from
later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally
offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object
against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural
due process. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the
admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite
party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in
the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 153660. June 10, 2003.

PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA,
ARMAN QUELING, ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA,
EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON MANALASTAS, petitioners,
vs.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent.
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint against Coca-Cola for illegal dismissal.
Clarificatory hearings were held for the complaints. The respondent moved for the
dismissal of the complaints there being no employer-employee relationship. The Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC, on appeal, ordered the reinstatement of the complainants.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise. The CA noted that affidavits of
complainants Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome,
Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas should not have been given
probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo crossexamination. The petitioners contend that the Rules of Court should not be strictly
applied in this case because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure. The respondent
commented that their affidavits should be stricken off the records for being self-serving,
hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not an affidavit not testified to in a trial has evidentiary value
HELD: Yes. The argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not
presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are
not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where
decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.
It was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined
by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale
and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to
make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of
law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of
Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. Under the Rules of the Commission, the
Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or
hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided
based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.
The Court ordered the respondent to reinstate the petitioners to their former
positions as regular employees, and to pay them their full back wages, with the
exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages are yet to be computed upon proof
of his dismissal.
G.R. No. 123546. July 2, 1998.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOERAL GALLENO, accused-appellant.
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court of Roxas City convicted Galleno for the crime of
statutory rape. The five-year old victim, Evelyn, sustained a laceration in her vagina
which resulted in profuse bleeding due to her tender age. Galleno denied the
accusation. He claimed that his left ring finger with long fingernail was accidentally
inserted into the vagina of the child while they were playing, and that he applied the sap
from the leaves of a madre de cacao tree on her vagina to stop the bleeding. The case
was elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review. Galleno claimed that the
testimonies of the three expert witnesses, medical doctors who examined Evelyn, failed
to conclusively and sufficiently establish the cause of the laceration of Evelyn's vagina.
ISSUE: Whether or not the opinion of a witness is admissible
HELD: As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give
opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions
upon the facts proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in
many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either
because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature
of the subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the
court in reaching a judgment.
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of
the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the
victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, especially
the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of
the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise
of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various
possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean that the trial court's inference
is wrong.
The Supreme Court, in People vs. Fulgencio Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, (held that)
evidence, to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but it must be credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by the impact of
events and testimony colored by the unconscious workings of the mind. No better test
has yet been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity to
the knowledge and common experience of mankind.
Sec. 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "(e)vidence must have such
a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence." This
simply means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic and human
experience. There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided by law.
However, the determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at
the discretion of the court, which must be exercised according to the teachings of logic
and everyday experience.
The proverb "the wicked fleeth even when no man pursueth, but the innocent are
as bold as a lion" was correctly adopted by the trial court in drawing its conclusions. The
loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly work against the credibility of accusedappellant's story on which his defense is based.
Besides, the trial court's conclusions find support in the testimony of accusedappellant's own witness, Dr. Lourdes Laada (who was earlier presented during the trial
as a prosecution witness), who testified that a laceration is caused by a blunt instrument
and that a fingernail is not a blunt but a sharp instrument.
The conviction of accused-appellant is affirmed.
G.R. No. 158203. March 31, 2005.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG, appellants.
FACTS: Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang were convicted of two counts of
murder. The victims Alicia Catipay and Santiago Catipay were killed with the use of
bolos. The prosecution presented Magno Gomez as its lone eyewitness who testified
that after he and the spouses left the store where they drank, Calumpang and Omatang
followed them and killed the spouses. However, the defense presented witnesses who
testified that the appellants did not follow the victims after they left the store and that
Santiago and Magno were arguing when they left.
ISSUE: Whether or not discrepancies between the affidavit of a witness and his
testimonial declarations cast doubt on the veracity of his testimony
HELD: Yes. After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that the trial court
overlooked pertinent pieces of evidence favorable to the accused and disregarded
several significant facts and circumstances that cast doubt on the veracity of the
testimony of the prosecutions lone eyewitness, Magno Gomez, justifying a departure
from the settled rule that factual findings of the trial court bind this Court.
While Magno claimed to have witnessed the gruesome killings, the records show
that serious discrepancies attended Magnos testimony in court and his sworn
statement, executed during the preliminary examination.
Generally, an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is considered almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate or lacking in details and is deemed inferior to the
testimony given in open court. Jurisprudence, however, forewarns that when serious
and inexplicable discrepancies exist between a previously executed sworn statement of
a witness and his testimonial declarations, with respect to a persons participation in a
serious imputation such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the
witness account.
Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itselfsuch as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.
Appellants' defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated
only by their relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them
to be at the place of the incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily
prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift the burden of proof in criminal
cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution
overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and
credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains.
There being no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as
the perpetrators of the crime, appellants presumed innocence stands.
The appellants were acquitted on reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 152807. August 12, 2003.

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE S.
SABANPAN, DANILO S. SABANPAN and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO
SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ
and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ
GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR., petitioners,
vs.
ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO,
REMEDIOS COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO, BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and
ISABELITA H. COMORPOSA, respondents.
FACTS: In 1965, Adolfo Saez, out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, allowed
Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of his father, Marcos Saez, without any rent.
Thus, Francisco's nipa hut was carried to a portion of Marcos' land. Francisco's heirs
succeeded in his posession for free and occupied the premises through petitioners'
tolerance. In 1998, petitioners made a formal demand to the respondents to vacate the
premises. The respondents refused and claimed that they have acquired just and valid
ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription and
that the Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession
over the land in question, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title. Thus, petitioners
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against them. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. Petitioners filed a petition
for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admissibility of evidence is similar with its probative value
HELD: No. Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the
admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this
evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on
summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted
evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the
rules of evidence.
While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses'
respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto
render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of
proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.
The testimony of petitioners' witnesses alone cannot prevail over respondents'
continued and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for a considerable length of
time.
G.R. No. 142856-57. August 25, 2003.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO NEGOSA alias "JOVIN," Appellant.
FACTS: The appellant is the live-in partner of the victim's mother, Cenilda. Gretchen, 12
years old, claimed that she was sexually abused by the appellant on two separate
occassions. Gretchen did not inform her mother about the incidents because of fear but
she told some of her female friends about these events. She also kept a record on her
notebook which her Auntie, Josilyn, discovered and read. Josilyn informed her parents
and siblings, except Cenilda, about Gretchens revelation. They took Gretchen to the
doctor for physical examination on September 14, 1998, and filed two criminal
complaints for rape. The appellant interposed the defense of alibi. Cenilda testified for
the appellant and claimed that he admitted that he only attempted to rape Gretchen.
The court found the appellant guilty of rape and of acts of lasciviousness.
ISSUE: Whether or not the late entries on Gretchens diary affects her credibility and the
probative weight of her testimony
HELD: No. The fact that Gretchen started making entries in her "diary" only on
September 2, 1998, more than a year after the first rape incident occurred (June 28,
1997), does not lessen the probative weight of the said entries.
It bears stressing that Gretchen was only in Grade V, barely eleven years old
when the appellant raped her on June 28, 1997. At such a tender age, still
inexperienced in the vagaries of life, she could not be expected to act and react like an
adult. Being subjected to a vicious sexual assault was an emotional and psychological
experience on the part of the young victim. In People v. Aquino, this Court held that "the
range of emotions shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by calculus. It is
thus unrealistic to expect information from rape victims."
The trial court disbelieved Gretchens testimony that on September 4, 1998, the
appellant managed to insert a small portion of his penis through the side of his short
pants and the side of the victims loose short pants and convicted the appellant only of
acts of lasciviousness. This, however, does not impair Gretchens credibility and the
probative weight of her testimony that she was raped by the appellant on June 28,
1997. In People vs. Lucena, we ruled that the testimony of a witness may be partly
believed or disbelieved, depending on the corroborative evidence and intent on the part
of the witness to pervert the truth. The principle FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN
OMNIBUS is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction.
The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus deals only with the weight of
evidence and is not a positive rule of law; the rule is not an inflexible one of universal
application. Modern trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility when the testimony of
a witness may be partly believed and partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative
evidence presented at the trial. Thus, where the challenged testimony is sufficiently
corroborated in its material points, or where the mistakes arise from innocent lapses
and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the rule may be relaxed. It is a rule
that is neither absolute nor mandatory and binding upon the court, which may accept or
reject portions of the witness testimony based on its inherent credibility or on the
corroborative evidence in the case.
There is no evidence that Gretchen intended to pervert the truth as to the extent
of the sexual abuse done to her on September 4, 1998. Neither can it be claimed that
she prevaricated when she testified that the appellant raped her on June 28, 1997.
The appellant is found guilty of statutory rape.
G.R. No. 14440. February 24, 2004.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FERDINAND MATITO y TORRES, a.k.a. "FREDDIE," appellant.
FACTS: Filomena Raymundo heard gunshot wounds so she rushed to her husbands
direction. She saw that he was bleeding. Mariano told her that Freddie shot him. Matito
interposed defenses of denial and alibi, but the Trial Court found him guilty based on
Filomena's testimony and other pieces of circumstantial evidence, such as the presence
of nitrate powder on the cast taken from the right hand of appellant; the bitter quarrel
that ensued between him and the victim after the latter had cut off the formers water
supply; the denial by appellant of the request of his neighbors (including the victim) to
widen the right of way along the premises of his house; and hours before the victim was
killed, the threatening remarks of appellant to the formers daughter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the witness as a dying declaration should be
given credence
HELD: Yes. A dying declaration, also known as a statement in articulo mortis, may be
received in evidence under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which we
quote: "SEC. 37. Dying Declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under a
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death
is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of
such death."
To be admissible, the following requisites should be met: (a) the declaration must
concern the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) at
the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) he or she is competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a
case in which the declarants death is the subject of the inquiry.
In addition, the fact that he was still able to enter the house after being shot three
times, as well as the significant lapse of time before he died in the hospital, showed that
he had ample time to communicate to his wife the assailants identity. That there was no
way the victim could have told his wife before he died that it was appellant who had shot
him cannot be accorded absolute credence and faith, as such testimony was given by
Dr. Aves who was not a speech therapist or a neurologist.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact
in issue through an inference which the fact finder draws from the evidence established.
Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a
felon free." It is not a weaker form of evidence vis--vis direct evidence. Cases have
recognized that in its effect upon the courts, the former may surpass the latter in weight
and probative force. To warrant a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The totality of
the evidence must constitute an unbroken chain showing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
On the strength of the circumstantial evidence proven in the current case, we
hold that the court a quo did not err in convicting appellant of the crime charged. The
combination of the circumstances comprising such evidence forms an unbroken chain
that points to appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.
Alibi and denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving, undeserving of any weight in law. Alibi is an inherently weak
defense, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. Appellant must prove that he
was not only at some other place when the crime was committed, but that it was
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time the crime was perpetrated. This
he failed to do.
The appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
G.R. No. 152954. March 10, 2004.

vs.
PAULINO SEVILLENO y VILLANUEVA, a.k.a. "Tamayo Sevilleno", appellant.
FACTS: The appellant was charged with rape with homicide. The victim was Virginia
Bakia, nine years old. The appellant pleaded guilty and was found guilty as charged. On
automatic review, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court and set aside
its decision as the appellant was not properly apprised of his fundamental right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation leveled against him. The appellant then
pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented witness who testified that appellant and
Virginia passed by together but only the appellant emerged from the sugarcane fields
with scratches on his face and neck. The examining physician also testified and
concluded that Virginia must have been raped and strangled to death. Appellant
interposed the defense of denial and alibi, but no other witness was presented for the
defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of the accused is valid and binding
HELD: Yes. The rule is that once the prosecution has shown compliance with the
constitutional requirements on custodial investigations, a confession is presumed
voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of destroying this presumption. The
confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a
result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency. Appellant failed
to show that his confession in this case was given under any of the above
circumstances.
Significantly, appellants conviction was not based solely on his extra-judicial
confession but on other pieces of evidence established by the prosecution to the
satisfaction of the court. To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the
mind as to the criminal liability of the appellant. Jurisprudence requires that the
circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one
fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the
author of the crime. These, the prosecution were able to establish.
While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to
circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a
condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in
the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial
evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under
conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under
all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in
secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.
On the other hand, an alibi, to be believed, must receive credible corroboration
from disinterested witnesses. Appellant failed to present his employer or any co-worker
to corroborate his alibi or a logbook that would prove his presence at his workplace at
the time of the commission of the crime. Neither was there any evidence to show that it
was impossible for the appellant to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
In the end, the rule is settled that where the culpability or innocence of the
accused hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies,
the findings of trial courts are given the highest degree of respect. Hence, their findings
on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts, unless some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted. We find no circumstance of weight or substance that was overlooked by
the trial court.
The appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide.
E u g e n i c e I v y G w y n n U . B a u t i s t a | 10
G.R. Nos. 139751-52. January 26, 2004.

vs.
NOEL DARILAY, appellant.
FACTS: Marilyn and Ailyn Arganda were on their way home from a store after buying
tinapa when appellant emerged and struck Ailyn twice at the back with a piece of wood.
The appellant also struck Marilyn. When Ailyn regained consciousness, she looked for
her sister and the appellant. Ailyn told their mother what happened. Their father looked
for Marilyn and the appellant while their uncle reported the incident to the police. They
found torn pieces of clothing and a slipper bearing the Marilyn's name. The appellant
pointed where Marilyn was. Marilyns body was in a grassy area near bushes and trees
along the river. She was lying face down, her legs spread apart and was completely
naked. There was blood on her nose, her mouth, and her vagina. The appellant was
arrested. The appellant was charged of attempted murder and with rape with homicide.
The appellant denied the charges and claimed that Hercules Bon and Jose Delfino
raped and killed Marilyn and he did nothing to prevent them. The Trial Court found him
guilty as charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not circumstantial evidence may prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt
HELD: Yes. The testimony of children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and
truthful than that of older persons, so that once established that they have fully
understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony should be given full
credence.
We agree with the appellant that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence
to prove that he raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the said crime.
However, direct evidence is not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the
crime charged; it may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances
from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and
common experience. What was once a rule of ancient practicability is now entombed in
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial
evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as
anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur: "x x x if (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt."
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a
compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the
proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one
conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence
to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial
evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of
evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.
We are convinced that the appellant raped Marilyn about 15 meters from where
he had earlier waylaid Ailyn. He then carried Marilyn across the river where he killed her
to prevent her from revealing to the authorities that she was raped. The appellant hid
her body under the bushes and trees to thus prevent police authorities from discovering
that he killed Marilyn. Irrefragably, Marilyn was killed by reason of the rape. The killing
of a child, barely 9 years old, is murder. Nonetheless, the appellant is guilty of rape with
homicide because the latter crime is used in its generic sense.
The appellant is found guilty of rape with homicide and of attempted murder.
G.R. No. L-3544. March 27, 1907.

CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
EDWIN CASE, Respondent-Appellant.
FACTS: Edwin Case claims a right of way through a passage along the side of Carmen
Ayala de Roxas' property. The appellant claims that the right of way exists by
prescription, and not founded on any written instrument but on immemorial use alone.
The appellant anchors his claim on the law stating that discontinuous servitudes have
no fixed periods, but must be proved by usage or a term so long that men cannot
remember its commencement (Tanto tiempo de que non se pueden accordar los omes,
quanto ha que lo commencaron a usar). However, the supreme court of Spain held that
the court should consider the testimony and number of witnesses over 60 years of age
who were acquainted with the servitude during their lives and who also had heard it
spoken of in the same way by their elders. The appellant failed to comply with the
second requirement. Thus, appellant filed an appeal from the Court of Land
Registration.
ISSUE: Whether or not a right or prescription may be proved by the memory of living
witnesses alone
HELD: No. There is not vested right in a mere rule of evidence. The law establishes a
disputable presumption "that a person is the owner of property from exercising acts of
ownership over it or from common reputation of his ownership." The use of the passage
proved in this case cannot be held to constitute acts of ownership for the reason that it
is quite consistent with a mere license to pass, informal in its origin and revocable in its
nature. It seems, however, that under the clause quoted, common reputation of
ownership of the right of way was open to proof and on this theory of the case such
testimony, if available, should have been offered.
In order to establish a right or prescription something more is required than the
memory of living witnesses.
A right of way claimed to have been established by use prior to the Civil Code,
without written evidence, cannot be proved by the memory of living witnesses alone.
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
MIGUELA C. DAILO, Respondents.
FACTS: Respondent spouses Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. bought a
house and lot but the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Marcelino's name. In
a Special Power of Attorney(SPA), he authorized Lilibeth Gesmundo to obtain a loan
from petitioner secured by the property. The loan was foreclosed, and the petitioner
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure. A Certificate of Sale was issued in petitioner's favor
and the property was not redeemed so the petitioner consolidated the ownership.
Miguela claims that she was not aware of mortgage and that the property is conjugal.
She filed complaint for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit
of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against petitioner. Petitioner claimed that the property was the
exclusive property of Marcelino. The Trial Court, by preponderance of evidence, found
that the property was conjugal in nature and ordered the reconveyance of the property
to the spouses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented is sufficient to declare the property as
the exclusive property of Marcelino
HELD: No. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and
her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal
partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code
and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict,
the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when
the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge
and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision
of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent
of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be
void.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . ."
Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the
benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to
compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot
be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted
to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the
other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases
thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in
order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.
G.R. No. 144773. May 16, 2005.

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
LAURENCIO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER
HEIRS OF EMILIANO AYING, PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN
BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF SIMEON AYING, AND WENCESLAO
SUMALINOG, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF
ROBERTA AYING, respondents.
FACTS: A cadastral decree over Lot No. 4399 in Lapu-Lapu City was issued in favor of
the Aying siblings, but the certificate of title was lost during the war. All the heirs of the
siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of petitioner who filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title which
was granted. The Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the Aying
siblings. Claiming to be the rightful owner, the petitioners notified the occupants to
vacate the property. The respondents filed a complaint for cancellation of the ExtraJudicial Partition with Absolute Sale, recovery of ownership, injunction and damages
and alleged that their ascendants are the registered owners of the property. The Trial
Court concluded that the document is valid since the respondents failed to provide
evidence that it was a totally simulated or fictitious contract and that the action had
prescribed. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the action had not yet prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the burden of proof to prove the date from
which the prescriptive period began to run
HELD: Yes. In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of when the heirs of Emiliano
Aying and Simeon Aying discovered the existence of the document of sale, it must be
determined which party had the burden of proof to establish such fact.
The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an
action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the
basis for the relief he seeks to obtain. Moreover, one alleging a fact that is denied has
the burden of proving it and unless the party asserting the affirmative of an issue
sustains the burden of proof of that issue by a preponderance of the evidence, his
cause will not succeed. Thus, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to all
affirmative defenses which he sets up in answer to the plaintiffs claim or cause of
action; he being the party who asserts the truth of the matter he has alleged, the burden
is upon him to establish the facts on which that matter is predicated and if he fails to do
so, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor.
In the case at bar, it was petitioner, which set up in its Answer the affirmative
defense of prescription. It was, therefore, incumbent upon petitioner to prove the date
from which the prescriptive period began to run. Evidence as to the date when the tenyear prescriptive period began exists only as to the heirs of Roberta Aying, as
Wenceslao Sumalinog admitted that they learned of the existence of the document of
sale in the year 1967. As to the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, there is no
clear evidence of the date when they discovered the document conveying the subject
land to petitioner. Petitioner miserably failed to adduce proof of when the heirs of
Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying were notified of the subject document. Hence, with
regard to said heirs, the Court may consider the admission in the amended complaint
that they learned of the conveyance of the disputed land only in 1991 when petitioner
sent notices to vacate to the occupants of the subject land, as the date from which the
ten-year prescriptive period should be reckoned.
The amended complaint of the heirs of Roberta Aying is dismissed on the ground
of prescription. However, the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, having
instituted the action for reconveyance within the prescriptive period, are hereby declared
as the lawful owners of a 2/8 portion of the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. RO-2856.
G.R. No. L-45137. September 23, 1985.

FE J. BAUTISTA and MILAGROS J. CORPUS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO, District Judge, Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch I and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with estafa for refusal to return pieces of jewelries or
deliver the proceeds thereof to complainant Dr. Leticia C. Yap. Yap claimed that the
petitioners received jewelries on consignment. However, petitioners claimed that they
acquired the jewelries by virtue of purchase and sale. The prosecution presented Yap
as its only witness. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case by way of demurrer
to the evidence. Petitioners believed that the prosecution failed to prove their guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Court denied their Motion to Dismiss because
the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa against said accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not burden of proof shifts to defense upon finding of a prima facie
case
HELD: No. A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to
counter-balance the general presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not
encountered and controlled by evidence tending to contradict it, and render it
improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it, and the establishment of a prima
facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence which may in the opinion
of the jury be such as to rebut and control it.
When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as
in the case at bar, the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains
throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposedthe prosecution. It is the
burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of
the case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is met
by evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts
back.
A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor
by evidence of greater weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of
plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient. As a result, plaintiff will
have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that at the trial the weight of
evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate against
plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot prevail.
In the case at bar, the order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, required them
to present their evidence. They refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference
of their guilt. The inevitable result was that the burden of evidence shifted on them to
prove their innocence, or at least, raises a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.
The petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. 115625. January 23, 1998.

ESMUNDO B. RIVERA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMY ROBLES, PEREGRINO MIRAMBEL and MERLINA
MIRAMBEL, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner filed an ejectment case againts private respondents claiming that
they built their houses on his property. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner. On appel, the RTC reversed the MTC decision. Unlike the evidence
presented by the plaintiff, the evidence presented by the defendants show that they
have been the caretaker of the said public land since 1969. The CA dismissed the
petition for failure of the petitioner to prove a cause of action. Thus, petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner proved his cause of action by a preponderance of
evidence
HELD: No. A party who has the burden of proof in a civil case must establish his cause
of action by a preponderance of evidence. When the evidence of the parties is in
equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance of evidence lies, the
party with the burden of proof fails and the petition/complaint must thus be denied.
Basic is the rule in civil cases that "the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence." By "preponderance of evidence is
meant simply evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is
offered in opposition to it." In the present ejectment case, petitioner (as plaintiff) has the
burden of proving that the houses of private respondents were located within his titled
land. To justify a judgment in his favor, petitioner must therefore establish a
preponderance of evidence on this essential fact.
The extant records of this case support the finding of the Court of Appeals that
the aggregate of evidence submitted by both parties was insufficient to determine with
certainty whether the private respondents' houses were inside the petitioner's entitled
property.
Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which
side the evidence preponderates[,] the party having the burden of proof fails upon that
issue." Therefore, as "neither party was able to make out a case, neither side could
establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no
better off than before they proceeded to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the
courts can only leave them as they are. In such cases, courts have no choice but to
dismiss the complaints/petitions."
In any event, we are here called upon essentially to review the public
respondent's assessment of the weight of the evidence presented by both parties. This
factual question, however, may not be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. This rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, but petitioner
failed to prove that this case falls under one of them. If for this reason alone, the petition
should be denied.
The petition is denied.
G.R. No. 151827. April 29, 2005.

JOSEFINA BENARES, Petitioners,
vs.
JAIME PANCHO, RODOLFO PANCHO, JR., JOSELITO MEDALLA, PAQUITO
MAGALLANES, ALICIA MAGALLANED, VIOLETA VILLACAMPA, MARITESS
PANCHO, ROGELIO PANCHO and ARNOLFO PANCHO, Respondents.
FACTS: Respondents claimed that they were illegally dismissed as sugar farm workers
in Hda. Maasin II, a sugar cane plantation located in Murcia, Negros Occidental with an
area of 12-24 has. planted, owned and managed by Josefina Benares. Respondents
argued that they were illegally terminated without being paid termination benefits by
Benares in retaliation to what they have done in reporting to the Department of Labor
and Employment their working conditions viz-a-viz (sic) wages and other mandatory
benefits. The NLRC ruled in favor of the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC's decision is supported by substantial evidence
HELD: Yes. The probative value of petitioners evidence, however, has been passed
upon by the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. Although the labor arbiter
dismissed respondents complaint because their "position paper is completely devoid of
any discussion about their alleged dismissal, much less of the probative facts thereof,"
the ground for the dismissal of the complaint implies a finding that respondents are
regular employees.
The Court of Appeals, in fact, found no such grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC. Accordingly, it dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed with
modification the findings of the NLRC. It is well to note at this point that in quasi-judicial
proceedings, the quantum of evidence required to support the findings of the NLRC is
only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Verily, the NLRCs decision, affirmed as it was by the Court of Appeals, appears
to have been arrived at after due consideration of the evidence presented by both
parties.
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601. August 11, 2005.

MERCEDES G. DUDUACO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kabacan,
North Cotabato, Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent brought her vehicle to Toyota Service Center for repairs and
replacement of damaged parts. She was told to pay the deductible franchise before her
vehicle will be released and to sign the Release of Claim with Subrogation. She paid
under protest upon presentation of a demand letter, but she refused to sign form, so she
left without her car. Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct, abuse of
judicial office and/or gross ignorance of the law. Respondent denied that she threw her
weight around and abused her judicial authority. Yez, Saragoza (Service Department
Manager) together with complainant and Joe Linaza (Linaza) from FEB Mitsui Marine
Insurance, Co., came to see respondent in her sala to apologize. Thus, the Investigating
Justice of the Court of Appeals recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit, insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. The OCA opined that
complainants insistence on pursuing her unsubstantiated charges despite lack of
personal knowledge wasted the time and resources not only of respondent but also of
the Investigating Justice and this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in
their complaints lies with the complainants
HELD: Yes. In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Administrative proceedings
against judges are by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the
rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support the
administrative charges should thus be more substantial and they must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty and corruption. On the other hand, misconduct is any unlawful conduct on
the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of
parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper
or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.
This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring
members of the bench. At the same time, however, the Court should not hesitate to
shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the
orderly administration of justice. This Court could not be the instrument that would
destroy the reputation of any member of the bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere
speculation.
The administrative complaint is dismissed and complainant is fined.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876. December 11, 1995.

STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, respondent.
FACTS: Judge Manuel T. Muro dismissed motu propio 11 criminal cases by reason of
mere newspaper reports which are characterized as "hearsay evidence, twice removed"
and therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether
objected to or not, and without waiting for the defense to file a motion to quash nor at
least affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter. He was
charged with gross ignorance of law and was ordered dismissed from service. He filed a
Moion for Reconsideration and claimed that his action was not motivated by bad faith or
by any corrupt and insidious intent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge may motu proprio dismiss a case due to hearsay
evidence
HELD: No. Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a
speedy trial, it should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial.
Careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more important
than a race to end the trial. A genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful
consideration before ruling on important questions, and a zealous regard for the just
administration of law are some of the qualities of a good trial judge, which are more
important than a reputation for hasty disposal of cases.
In every litigation, . . ., the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to
everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to
indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of
yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or
prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of
reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own
sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that
he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with
patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a
minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is
essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should
avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not merely
a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary
does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There
are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits
include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural
rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at
pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty
or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to
yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise
a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the social life."
G.R. No. 79094. June 22, 1988.

MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
FACTS: The Petitioner was convicted of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 on the
basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense
during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. At trial, only the prosecution presented
its evidence. The petitioner submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of
Facts.
ISSUE: Whether or not stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial not signed by the
petitioner nor by his counsel is admissible in evidence
HELD: No. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that no agreement or
admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence
against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel.
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those
in the affirmative are merely directory. The use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its
mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which
may be enforced. And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and
remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused.
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the
accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation
of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his
memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule
118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the
prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the
Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the
elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the
accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of the
admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice
require that evidence be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a
judgment has been entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will
sometimes be set aside or reopened.
This case is ordered reopened and remanded to the appropriate Branch of the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.
G.R. No. 117728. June 26, 1996.

SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES EDUARDO and FELISA TOLOSA, BINAN
MOTOR SALES CORPORATION, and EDUARDO GARCIA, respondents.
FACTS: Tolosa spouses purchased an Isuzu passenger-type jeepney from Amante
Motor Works payable in 24 monthly installments. The spouses executed a promissory
note and chattel mortgage over the vehicle in favor of Amante Motor Works.
Servicewide later acquired the rights and interests over said note and mortgage. The
spouses failed to pay thus, Servicewide demanded the return of the vehicle or the
payment of the balance. Petitioner filed a complaint for replevin and/or sum of money
with damages against respondents. The spouses claimed that they purchased one
jeepney unit from Binan Motor Sales Corporation (Binan Motors), not Amante Motor
Works, but the spouses bought another unit from Garcia, General Manager of Binan
Motors, who prepared and executed a "Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage"
where it appears that Tolosa sold and transferred to him the said jeepney. Garcia was in
possession of the jeepney as he made the initial payment and would pay the monthly
amortizations. The sheriff seized the subject vehicle from the possession of one
Lourdes Bartina, who filed a Third-Party Claim. Servicewide presented its legal
accounts analyst, Ms. Nannette Navea, who testified on the outstanding obligation of
the Tolosas and Garcia. It also presented several documents consisting of the
promissory note, deed of chattel mortgage, the deed of assignment of the Tolosas'
credit by Filinvest Finance and Leasing Corporation, and the notice and demand letter
to the Tolosas. Servicewide then submitted the case for decision. The spouses failed to
appear at trial thus they were declared in default. Judgment was rendered against their
favor. Defendant Eduardo Garcia moved for reconsideration and clarification of the
decision on the ground that he was not one of the defendants in the principal case. He
claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was never
served nor did he receive summons on the amended complaint naming him as an
additional defendant. However, since Garcia filed several pleadings as a third-party
defendant in the trial court, he was deemed to have submitted himself to its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence on record to hold Garcia, together
with the Tolosa spouses, solidarily liable to petitioner for the return of the subject motor
vehicle or payment of its equivalent value in money
HELD: No. The documentary evidence of Bartina merely shows that the jeepney subject
of the complaint was indeed sold to her by Binan Motors represented by Juliet Garcia,
Eduardo Garcia's daughter. There is nothing to show that Eduardo Garcia sold to
Bartina the vehicle that he previously sold to the Tolosas.
On the whole, petitioner's evidence consists of the promissory note, the deed of
chattel mortgage and the deed of assignment and the notice and demand letter. The
promissory note in favor of Amante Motor Works was signed by the Tolosa spouses.
This same promissory note provides that any payment thereon shall be made "to the
order of Filinvest Finance and Leasing Corporation." Both spouses also signed as
mortgagors the deed of chattel mortgage of the said jeepney in favor of Amante Motor
Works. Amante Motor Works assigned in the same deed all its rights over the chattel
mortgage to Filinvest Finance and Leasing Corporation. Filinvest Finance and Leasing
Corporation likewise assigned its rights and interest over the promissory note and deed
of chattel mortgage to Filinvest Credit Corporation which in turn assigned it to petitioner.
The Tolosa spouses defaulted on the obligation and refused to pay the installments due
despite notice to them. By no stretch of logic can they prove Garcia's solidary liability.
Petition is denied.
G.R. No. L-19101. February 29, 1964.

EMILIANO DALANDAN and MARIA DALANDAN, assisted by her husband JULIAN
SILVERIO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
VICTORIA JULIO, ELEUTERIO SANTOS, and FRANCISCA ECHIPARI as natural
guardian ad litem of the minors Dolores, Ponciano, Lorenzo and Nolasco, all
surnamed SANTOS, defendants-appellees.
FACTS: The records show that on September 24, 1932, Clemente Dalandan, for and in
consideration of the sum of P4,000.00, executed a contract of sale of 50 salt beds
(banigan) located at Sitio Lakura, Las Pias, Rizal, in favor of Victorina Dalandan, with
right to repurchase the same within 10 years from the date of the execution of the
contract, by paying back and returning to the latter the purchase price of P4,000.00,
with all the expenses incident to the preparation of said contract and, upon failure of
Clemente Dalandan to exercise said right of repurchase within said period, title thereto
shall pass to and become vested, absolutely and without reservation, to Victorina
Dalandan, her heirs, and assigns. On May 14, 1940, however, or prior to the expiration
of the period of repurchase agreed upon, the parties executed another contract to waive
the 10-year period for redemption or repurchase. Clemente Dalandan was grantedthe
right to make the repurchase at any time, without any limitation as to the period of
redemption or repurchase, whatsoever. In 1960, plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest
offered to pay the amount but the defendant refused to accept the amount. Plaintiffs
consigned the amount in court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss claiming that
complaint states no cause of action and that they are the absolute owner of the
property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint due on the
ground that it states no cause of action
HELD: Yes. As the trial court correctly pointed out, "such allegation of 'equitable
mortgage' in the complaint is a mere conclusion of plaintiffs (appellants) and not a
material allegation, so that the same cannot be deemed admitted by defendants
(appellees) who file the motion to dismiss". As a rule, the complaint should contain
allegation of ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
Neither is it proper to allege in a pleading inferences of fact from facts not stated,
or incorrect inferences from facts stated, for they are not the ultimate facts required by
law to be pleaded. Legal conclusions need not be pleaded, because so far as they are
correct they are useless, and when erroneous, worse than useless.
The allegation of nullity of a judgment in a complaint, being a conclusion and not
a material allegation, is not deemed admitted by the party who files a motion to dismiss.
Before 1950, the principle obtained here, that a combination of several such
circumstance (stated in Article 1607 new Civil Code) might justify the courts in
concluding that the parties intended the written document of pacto de retro to be a mere
security for the payment of a debt. One was not enough. So that Article 1602 (providing
one only of such circumstances as enough to give rise to the presumption) in effect
enunciates a new rule of law. As such, we do not think it could affect contract like this
entered into before 1950.
The fact that the vendee a retro was given the right to enjoy the usufruct of the
land during the period of redemption, far from being a factor favoring an equitable
mortgage, is an argument in favor of appellee's theory (that the contract was a sale a
retro), for usufruct is an element of ownership which is involved in a contract of sale.
G.R. No. 112573. February 9, 1995.

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents.
FACTS: Defendant failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant
on behalf of the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued defendant in Tokyo and obtained a favorable
ruling. Attempt to serve the writ of summons were unsuccessful because the person
believed to be authorized to receive court processes was in Manila. Summons were
served through diplomatic channels upon the defendant's head office in Manila. Having
failed to appear at hearing, defendant subsequently received a copy of the judgment.
Defendant did not appeal, but the plaintiff was unable to execute the judgment in Japan.
Plaintiff filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence.
The court dismissed the case and granted the motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of processual presumption may be applied
HELD: Yes. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of
the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.
Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction
and has regularly performed its official duty.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the
service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of
the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was
rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on
SHARP. As to what this law is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial
notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or
by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to
present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it,
the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of
validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered
by the Japanese court must stand.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the
presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be
invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the
Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines.
In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four
duly registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the
light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and,
as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to
have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process.
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court
was valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
G.R. No. L-26053. February 21, 1967.

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERARDO GARCIA CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO
NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA SIMEON DILIMAN,
AQUILINO BARRIOS LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA
LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS, ISABELO OBAOB ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE
BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS, ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA,
MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO
BERIO SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA,
BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG,
JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA EMIGDIO EGIPTO,
defendants-appellants.
FACTS: Defendant built their houses on the land owned by the plaintiff without the
latter's consent. Upon knowledge of the occupancy, the defendants were given permits
or lease contract and were charged rentals. The Elementary School nearby needed to
expand. The defendants were ordered to vacate the premises within 30 days from
notice. The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. Defendant insisted that they have
already acquired legal status as tenants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge should take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566
HELD: Yes. Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not
profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken
because he was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason
being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial
notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. And, Ordinance 4566
itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set
aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos
Elementary School.
Moreover, defendants entered the land, built houses of second-class materials
thereon without the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected
without city permits. These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all,
defendants are squatters.
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city
officials will elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry and
official permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept of proper official norm of conduct.
Because, such permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does
not promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is
an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to
obtain in this country where there is an orderly form of government.
The houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises clearly
hinder and impair the use of that property for school purposes. The courts may well take
judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary grades has
been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants must
have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of constructing the school building
annex is paramount.
G.R. No. L-18247. August 31, 1963.

FLORENTINO GALLEGO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS: Gallego and his companions held a meeting of the Jehova's Witnesses in front
of the public market of Lambunao. Iloilo. The chief of police asked for their permit but
Gallego was unable to produce one. Despite being ordered to stop the meeting, Gallego
continued the meeting and challenged the police. Gallego was arrested and the court
found him guilty of slight disobedience. The court held that there was an existing
municipal ordinance at the time (Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957) providing for a
previous permit for the holding on religious meeting in public places. Gallego challenged
the existence of the ordinance. He claimed that Court of Appeals should not have taken
judicial notice of Ordinance No. 2, series of 1957 of Lambunao, Iloilo, when the trial
court itself allegedly did not take cognizance of the ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance
HELD: Yes. There is nothing in the law that prohibits a court, like the Court of Appeals,
from taking cognizance of a municipal ordinance. On the contrary, Section 5 of Rule 123
of the Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial notice of matters which are capable
of unquestionable demonstration. This is exactly what the Court of Appeals did in this
case in holding that "contrary to appellant's (petitioner's) contention, there was an
existing municipal ordinance at the time (Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957) providing for
a previous permit for the holding of religious meeting in public places."
We held that courts of first instance should take judicial notice of municipal
ordinances within their respective jurisdictions. It must be in compliance with this ruling
that the trial court took notice of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957 of the Municipality of
Lambunao.
The ordinance in this case is reasonable regulation of the use of public streets.
There is no claim that it gives the authorities arbitrary power to grant or deny permit; in
fact there is no claim that petitioner was arbitrarily denied a permit.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
G.R. No. 119288. August 18, 1997.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA GACOT, respondents.
FACTS: In 1971, Josefa Gacot filed a petition to claim ownership over Lot No. 5367.
Josefa claimed that she been in actual possession of the property for more than 30
years since she bought the property and had declared Lot No. 5367 for taxation
purposes. In 1990, the trial court rendered judgment adjudicating Lot No. 5367 to Josefa
Gacot. On appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General was able to verify that Lot 5367
was earlier declared to be the property of the Republic in a decision rendered by Judge
Lorenzo Garlitos on 20 October 1950.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court should take judicial notice of its own acts and records
HELD: Yes. Section 1, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of
facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own
records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the
same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice will
be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the
same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another
case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of
court personnel.
The remand of the case would likewise seem to be unavoidable. The area of Lot
No. 5367 claimed and awarded to the late Josefa Gacot had not been specified in the
records. Indeed, on the basis of the Certification of the Forest Management Services of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Lot No. 5367, per Land
Classification (LC) No. 1246 of 15 January 1936, would appear to contain an area of
394,043 square meters, 300,000 square meters of which were classified as Alienable
and Disposable land and 94,043 square meters as Timberland, which under
Proclamation No. 2152, dated 29 December 1981, had been included to form part of the
Mangrove Swamp Forest Reserve, closed for entry, exploitation and settlement.
The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 85423. May 6, 1991.

JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.
FACTS: In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership over a parcel of residential land
consisting of about 440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan was
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose
Tabuena. Judgment was rendered against Tabuena and he was required to vacate the
disputed lot. Tabuena appealed complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the
trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been
marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not evidence not formally offered should be admitted

(2) Whether or not the court should take judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in
a case it had previously heard
HELD: (1) No. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean
it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that
Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was
only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They were not by such marking
formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, "At the trial
on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will
advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event,
such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary
value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of
facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the
trial.
Even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the
adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that
these requirements have been satisfied in the case before us.
(2) No. As a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending
before the same judge.
The exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the
knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties,"
the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are
actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case
then pending." These conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the
petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being
considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it,
the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving
him no opportunity to counteract.
The petition is granted and the appealed decision is reversed.
G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001.

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE
VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner insists that he is the victim of prejudicial publicity and he assails the
decision for adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to reach
the conclusion that he has resigned. Thus, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Courts Decision
of March 2, 2001.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Angara Diary is admissible
HELD: Yes. The use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule, and not
violative of the rules on res inter alios acta, authentication of private writings and best
evidence.
Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that
these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. The Angara Diary contains
direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party. It is,
however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, nonbinding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An
adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person
when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated
or implied by the other person. In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started
to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and
commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President
Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation.
Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave
the country. Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken as
an admission by him.
The Angara Diary is not violative of the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is
expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, and an exemption is provided
in Section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. Under
our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the
principal (petitioner).
The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of
mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements
of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign.
They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long
been a quiet area of our law on evidence and petitioners attempt to foment a belated
tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.
The Court did not violate the rules on authentication of private writings and best
evidence. A party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered instrument may
not object that it was not properly identified before it was admitted in evidence.
Petitioner had been given an opportunity to inspect the Angara Diary but did not object
to its admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise his objections in an Omnibus
Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered
partly on the basis thereof.
A.M. No. P-03-1708. February 16, 2005.

ATTY. JOSE R. ORTIZ, JR., Clerk of Court VI, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon
City, complainant,
vs.
LARRY DE GUZMAN, Branch Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 31,
Quezon City, respondent.
FACTS: Complainant requested a formal investigation on Respondent branch clerk of
court Larry de Guzman for allegedly issuing falsified receipts, unauthorized provisional
receipts, orders to jail officers to release accused, and other documents from Branch
31, MeTC of Quezon City. Initial investigations revealed that respondent demanded and
received cash bond deposits in violation of standing regulations of this Court. The Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) suspended the respondent. The OCA also noted the
arrest of respondent in an entrapment operation conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation. Together with another court employee, he was caught extorting P5,000
from a winning party litigant for the implementation of a certain court decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence adduced warrant respondents dismissal
HELD: Yes. From the evidence adduced in this administrative matter, the Investigating
Judge is persuaded that complainant has preponderantly established his charge against
the herein respondent. The evidence is overwhelming that respondent issued fake and
provisional receipts of cash bonds for the provisional liberty of several accused. Despite
all opportunities accorded to respondent to appear and present his countervailing
evidence, he failed to do so. Hence, respondents silence may be considered as an
implied admission of guilt.
By issuing fake and provisional receipts covering the [accused] cash bonds and
the proceeds thereof converted to respondents own benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the accused who posted said cash bonds, (he) blatantly degraded the
judiciary and diminished the respect and regard of the people to the court and its
personnel. Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, morality
and honesty.
The respondents refusal to face the charges against him head-on is contrary to
the principle in criminal law that the first impulse of an innocent man, when accused of
wrongdoing, is to express his innocence at the first opportune time. For his silence and
inaction can easily be misinterpreted as a defiance to the directives issued, or worse, an
admission of guilt.
First, in demanding and receiving cash bond deposits without authority,
respondent, as branch clerk of court, committed grave misconduct.
Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92 dated March 1, 1992 enumerates the
guidelines to be followed in making deposits or withdrawals of all collections from
bailbonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary collections. The said circular is addressed
to executive judges and clerks of court. It goes without saying, that fiduciary collections
ought to be the responsibility of the clerk of court,not the branch clerk of court. This is to
ensure that all the money received in trust are duly accounted for.
Second, apart from the unauthorized collection of cash bond deposits,
respondent issued fake receipts and unauthorized provisional receipts. Such can only
be classified as dishonesty.
Third, issuing orders of release to jail officers was clearly not part of his duties.
The issuance of a release order is a judicial function, not an administrative one. He had
no power to order the commitment or the release on bail of persons charged with penal
offenses. In so doing, he arrogated to himself the authority to exercise judicial discretion
and overstepped the boundaries of his function.
Respondent is found guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and is dismissed
from service.
G.R. No. L-7973. April 27, 1959.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CENON SERRANO alias PIPING, ET AL., defendants.
DOMINGO CADIANG, SANTIAGO YUMUL and FILEMON CENZON, defendantsappellants.
FACTS: On 17 December 1951, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Benjamin Tolentino,
Melchor Esguerra, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio
Reyes were charged with illegal detention with murder for the death of Pablo Navarro in
an information filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga. On 12 February 1952, upon
motion of the assistant provincial fiscal, the Court ordered the discharge of Anastacio
Reyes from the information to testify as witness for the prosecution. Eulogio Serrano
was charged with the same crime in criminal case No. 1819 but has not yet been
apprehended. Cenon Serrano alias Piping charged with the same crime was also at
large but later on arrested and brought to trial with his co-defendants in both criminal
cases for the death of Pablo Navarro (case No. 1262) and for the death of Simplicio
Manguerra (case No. 1263). The evidence for the prosecution heard against his codefendants before his arrest and arraignment was again presented to afford him the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses. The defendants were
convicted. Only Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon have
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator given on the stand at the trial may
be admissible in evidence against his co-conspirator
HELD: Yes. In order that the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence
against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the
admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be
bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy.
The rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only to
extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial,
where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the
testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion,
"coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be received with great caution
and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent.
The trial court did not err in convicting the appellants.
G.R. No. 123542. June 26, 2001.

vs.
ROGELIO BULOS, accused-appellant.
FACTS: Bulos and the offended party, Nancy P. Cordero, work for spouses Fariolan.
Nancy was the cook and general househelper while Bulos worked as a truck helper.
Both stayed in the house of the Fariolans. While Nancy was in her room, Bulos entered,
threatened her with a hunting knife and had carnal knowledge of her. When Bulos left
her room, she was bleeding. The day after the incident, Nancy left the house and told
her mother about the incident. Medical examination was conducted on Nancy. The
defense presented Mario Fariolan, their employer to establish that Bulos was not at the
house on the day the incident occured because he was on vacation at Conrado Perido's
house in South Cotabato. Merson, Nancy's brother testified that Bulos only left the
Faroilan's house a day after the rape incident and that Bulos offered marriage to Nancy
with the encourangement of the Faroilan spouses but Nancy refused. Two sur-rebuttal
witnesses testified that Nancy left the house long before the rape incident. Citing
decided cases that the sole testimony of the rape victim, even if uncorroborated but
delivered in a clear, straightforward, sincere, and convincing manner, is sufficient to
convict, the trial court meted out a judgment of conviction
ISSUE: Whether or not the lone testimony of the rape victim, corroborated by the
medical certificate, is competent to establish guilt
HELD: Yes. It is doctrinally settled that the lone testimony of the rape victim herself is
competent to establish guilt, where the same is found to be credible, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. This is because from the
nature of the offense, the only evidence that can oftentimes be offered to establish the
guilt of the accused is the complainant's testimony. The Court also considers that
ordinarily, no woman would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and
testify to the details of her ordeal were it not but a response to the compelling need to
seek and obtain justice. There is nothing in this case to indicate that Nancy Cordero, an
18-year old cook and house helper, would have any motive to falsely implicate the
accused, in the process admitting to the stain to her modesty and honor, and losing her
humble means of employment; the logical conclusion is that her testimony is worthy of
full faith and credence.
Furthermore, Nancy's statements are corroborated by the medical certificate,
which confirmed the presence of healed vaginal lacerations. When testimony of rape is
supported by physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient foundation for
concluding that there was carnal knowledge. Lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are
the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.
The Court also takes into consideration the flight of accused-appellant the day
after the rape, and his offer of marriage to the victim after the incident had been
reported to the authorities. As a rule in rape cases, an offer of marriage to the offended
party is an admission of guilt.
G.R. No. 136975. March 31, 2005.

COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
HANTEX TRADING CO., INC., respondent.
FACTS: Vicente Amoto, Acting Chief of Counter-Intelligence Division of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), received confidential information that the
1987 importations of the respondent were understated in its accounting records. Audit
was conducted. Respondent was ordered to pay deficiency income and sales taxes for
the year 1987. On appeal, the CA ruled that the assessments were unlawful because
they were based on hearsay evidence. The copies of the import entries relied upon in
computing the deficiency tax were not duly authenticated nor verified under oath, and
the public officer charged with the custody of the import entries was never presented in
court to lend credence to the alleged loss of the originals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the photocopies of import entries are admissible as secondary
evidence under the best evidence obtainable rule
HELD: No. The best evidence obtainable may consist of hearsay evidence, such as the
testimony of third parties or accounts or other records of other taxpayers similarly
circumstanced as the taxpayer subject of the investigation, hence, inadmissible in a
regular proceeding in the regular courts. Moreover, the general rule is that
administrative agencies such as the BIR are not bound by the technical rules of
evidence. It can accept documents which cannot be admitted in a judicial proceeding
where the Rules of Court are strictly observed. It can choose to give weight or disregard
such evidence, depending on its trustworthiness.
However, the best evidence obtainable under Section 16 of the 1977 NIRC, as
amended, does not include mere photocopies of records/documents. The petitioner, in
making a preliminary and final tax deficiency assessment against a taxpayer, cannot
anchor the said assessment on mere machine copies of records/documents. Mere
photocopies of the Consumption Entries have no probative weight if offered as proof of
the contents thereof. The reason for this is that such copies are mere scraps of paper
and are of no probative value as basis for any deficiency income or business taxes
against a taxpayer. Indeed, in United States v. Davey, the U.S. Court of Appeals (2nd
Circuit) ruled that where the accuracy of a taxpayers return is being checked, the
government is entitled to use the original records rather than be forced to accept
purported copies which present the risk of error or tampering.
The original copies of the Consumption Entries were of prime importance to the
BIR. This is so because such entries are under oath and are presumed to be true and
correct under penalty of falsification or perjury. Admissions in the said entries of the
importers documents are admissions against interest and presumptively correct.
In fine, then, the petitioner acted arbitrarily and capriciously in relying on and
giving weight to the machine copies of the Consumption Entries in fixing the tax
deficiency assessments against the respondent.
As a general rule, tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and
made in good faith. All presumptions are in favor of the correctness of a tax
assessment. It is to be presumed, however, that such assessment was based on
sufficient evidence. However, the prima facie correctness of a tax assessment does not
apply upon proof that an assessment is utterly without foundation, meaning it is arbitrary
and capricious.
The case is remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals for further proceedings, to
enable the petitioner to adduce in evidence certified true copies or duplicate original
copies of the Consumption Entries for the respondents 1987 importations, if there be
any.
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY,
respondents.
FACTS: Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. Filipina claimed that the decision of
the RTC in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation,
and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her
husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. Filipina
also alleged that his psychological incapacity existed from the time of the celebration of
their marriage and became manifest thereafter. The Court denied her petition because
the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological
incapacity. On appeal by certiorari, Filipina claimed that the marriage is void ab initio
because there was no valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. Filipina
claimed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance
of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous. Their
marriage was celebrated before the issuance of the marriage license.
ISSUE: Whether or not photocopies may be admitted in evidence by the trial court
HELD: Yes. We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only
photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah
Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of
the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial
court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due execution.
Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she
affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15,
1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the
adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient
proof of the facts contained therein.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for
annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the
marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion
that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these
critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court. The date
of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is
contained in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked
as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. The date of celebration of their marriage at Our
Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by
petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private
respondent's answer admitting it. This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open
court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both
their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes " B"
and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial
court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. These
pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the
marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license.
The marriage between Fiipina and Fernando is declared void ab initio for lack of
marriage license at the time of celebration.
G.R. No. 117384. October 21, 1998.

HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by EDRONEL DELA CRUZ,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PACIFICO MARQUEZ, FILOMENO and GREGORIO, both
surnamed MADRID, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance with damages against private
respondents involving a parcel of land. Petitioners claimed that their predecessors-ininterest bought the property in 1959 from the private respondents, Madrid brothers. In
1986, private respondents obtained a Torrens Title over the land. Meanwhile, Pacifico
Marquez claimed to have bought the property from the Madrids in 1976. During the
trial, petitioners offered, as Exhibit A, a photo copy of the purported original carbon copy
of the deed of sale in an effort to prove the transaction. They claimed that the original
deed of sale was lost. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition and ruled that
Exhibit A was inadmissible in evidence. The Court of Appeals, although affirming the
RTC's decision, ruled that Exhibit A was admissible in evidence for failure of the private
respondents to object when it was offered during the trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not a secondary evidence may be admitted in evidence and become
a primary evidence
HELD: Yes. It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be
presented, all duplicates and/or counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse for
the non-production of the original document itself can be regarded as established until
all its parts are unavailable.
Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit A was presented private
respondents failed, not only to object, but even to cross-examine the notary public, Atty.
Tabangay, regarding its execution. Forthwith, upon private respondents failure to object
to Exhibit A when it was presented, the same becomes primary evidence. To be sure,
even if Exhibit A is admitted in evidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that its
probative value must still meet the various tests by which its reliability is to be
determined. Its tendency to convince and persuade must be considered for admissibility
of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
As earlier stated, Exhibit A was merely a photocopy lifted from the carbon copy of
the alleged deed of sale. A cursory glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned
by any of the parties and undated as to when it was executed. Worse, when Atty.
Tabangay typed Exhibit A, the contents were based on an alleged carbon original which
petitioners predecessor-in-interest presented to him, without bothering to check his own
files to verify the correctness of the contents of the document he was copying. In other
words, Atty. Tabangays failure to determine the accuracy of the carbon copy requested
by the petitioners predecessor-in-interest renders Exhibit A unreliable.
The petitioners are declared as the legal owners of the subject land.
G.R. No. L-28498. July 14, 1986.

SALVADOR DE LA RAMA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
RAFAEL LEDESMA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS: De la Rama, one of the stockholders of Inocentes de la Rama Inc., sold to
Ledesma his 140 shares in the corporation by endorsing his certificates of stock in favor
of the latter with an alleged understanding that De la Rama reserved to himself his
proportionate equity in the war damage benefits due on his 140 shares which Ledesma
promised to deliver to him upon payment by the Foreign Claim Settlement Commission
of the United States. Upon presentation of the endorsed shares of stock, new
certificates of stock were issued in the name of Ledesma. When Ledesma received the
dividends pertaining to his total shareholding including the 140 shares he had
purchased from De la Rama, the latter demanded the return and delivery to him of his
corresponding share. Ledesma refused. Thus, De la Rama filed a money claim against
Ledesma. Ledesma claimed that the indorsement by De la Rama of the Stock
Certificate in question without qualification or condition constituted the sole and
exclusive contract between the parties and to allow De la Rama to prove any alleged
simultaneous oral agreement would run counter to the Parol Evidence Rule and the
Statute of Frauds. De la Rama averred that the instant case is exempted from the Parol
Evidence Rule since the writing fails to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties, and this fact is pleaded. The lower court ruled against De la Rama.
ISSUE: Whether or not De la Rama is allowed to present parol evidence to prove his
alleged reservation to the war damage benefits in question
HELD: No. It is a well-accepted principle of law that evidence of a prior or
contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid instrument.
While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing,
unless there has been fraud or mistake. (Yu Tek & Co. v. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384.)
Indeed, the exceptions to the rule do not apply in the instant case, there being no
intrinsic ambiguity or fraud, mistake, or failure to express the true agreement of the
parties. If indeed the alleged reservation had been intended, businessmen like the
parties would have placed in writing such an important reservation. In the case at bar,
nowhere in the complaint were the exceptions to the rule alleged or put in issue.
The alleged reservation not being admissible under the Parol Evidence Rule, We
do not find it necessary to discuss the applicability or non-applicability to the present
case of the Statute of Frauds.
G.R. No. L-11346. March 21, 1918.

ESPIRIDIONA CANUTO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN MARIANO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: The plaintiff executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land to the defendant
reserving the right to repurchase it after one year. The plaintiff failed to redeem the land
on the set date. However, plaintiff claimed that before the expiration of the redemption
period, the plaintiff and the defendant made an oral agreement to extend the period.
However, when the plaintiff tried to repurchase the land, the defendant refused to carry
out the oral agreement and to execute a deed of resale.
ISSUE: Whether or not the introduction of oral evidence violates the Parol Evidence
Rule
HELD: No. The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary,
or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by
parol of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the
time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may
have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the
contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing; for the parol evidence does not in
any way deny that the original agreement of the parties was that which the writing
purports to express, but merely goes to show that the parties have exercised their right
to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract.
It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written contract the
parol one was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable it
may be proved and enforced.
The defendant having extended the time within which the plaintiff could
repurchase the land on condition that she would find the money and make repurchase
within the extended period, it is clear that he cannot be permitted to repudiate his
promise, it appearing that the plaintiff stood ready to make the payment within the
extended period, and was only prevented from doing so by the conduct of the defendant
himself.
G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300. August 6, 1986.

VICTORIA LECHUGAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA LOZA, SALVADOR LOZA, ISIDRO LOZA,
CARMELITA LOZA, DAVID LOZA, AMPARO LOZA, ERLINDA LOZA and
ALEJANDRA LOZA, respondents.
FACTS: Plaintiff filed two complaints against the defendant for forcible entry and for
recovery and possession of Lot A. The trial court dismissed the complaints. Plaintiff
appealed and claimed that she bought the land from Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale duly registerd in Office of the Register of Deeds.
Defendants claimed that the lot which the plaintiff owned is different from the lot subject
of the complaints. Leoncia Lasangue, plaintiff's vendor, testified for the defendants.
Leoncia testified that she sold to the plaintiff the land situated in the south side of the
land in litigation. Based on Lasangue's testimony, the appellate court upheld the trial
court's decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Leoncia Lasangue's testimony violates the
Parol Evidence Rule
HELD: No. The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by
either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit
is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base
a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby.
The rule therefore applies, that as between parties to a written agreement, or
their privies, parol evidence cannot be received to contradict or vary its terms. Strangers
to a contract are, of course, not bound by it, and the rule excluding extrinsic evidence in
the construction of writings is inapplicable in such cases; and it is relaxed where either
one of the parties between whom the question arises is a stranger to the written
agreement, and does not claim under or through one who is party to it. In such case the
rule is binding upon neither. ...
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not
applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and
third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria
Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and the private
respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was
shown that what she really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot
No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her
first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which
petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale
described the disputed lot instead.
From the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion but that Lasangue did not
intend to sell as she could not have sold, a piece of land already sold by her father to
the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents.
The fact that vendor Lasangue did not bring an action for the reformation of
Exhibit "A" is of no moment. The undisputed fact is that the respondents have timely
questioned the validity of the instrument and have proven that, indeed Exhibit "A" does
not reflect the true intention of the vendor.
The Court did not nullify the deed of sale. Instead, it upheld the ownership of Lot
No. 5522 to the petitioner.
G.R. No. L-568. July 16, 1947.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JUAN FRANCISCO, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS: Francisco was convicted of the crime of parricide. Sergeant of police Pimentel
testified that the accused confessed to him that he stabbed his wife, his child and
himself because he was already tired or disgusted with his life "on account of the
accusation of his father-in-law" against him that he should rather die than live in shame
for having dishonored the family of his wife. The prosecution, in recommending the
imposition of the capital penalty upon the accused, relied mainly on: the affidavit, Exhibit
C (translation, Exhibit C-1), which is virtual confession of the accused; Exhibit D, which
is the record made by the justice of the peace of Mansalay of the arraignment of the
defendant upon which the latter entered a plea of guilty; and the rebuttal testimony of
Emilia Taladtad, wife of the Appellant. The defense impugned the admissibility of the
testimony of appellant's wife, invoking the provision of section 26, (d) of Rule 123
prohibiting the wife and the husband from testifying for or against each other.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rule of marital incompetency may be waived
HELD: Yes. The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a husband
nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other have been stated thus: First,
identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the
law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even
at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because
its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth, because,
where a want of domestic tranquillity exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other.
However, as all other general rules; this one has its own exceptions, both in civil
actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one
against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons
which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For
instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquillity which may be disturbed, the reason
based upon such harmony and tranquillity fails. In such a case identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law
aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave
a void in the unhappy home.
At any rate, in the instant case the wife did not testify in the direct evidence for
the prosecution but under circumstances presently to be stated. It will be noted that the
wife only testified against her husband after the latter, testifying in his own defense,
imputed upon her the killing of their little son. Hence, in giving such testimony, the
husband must, in all fairness, be held to have intended all its aforesaid natural
necessary consequences. By his said act, the husband himself exercising the very right
which he would deny his wife upon the ground of their marital relations must be taken
to have waived all objection to the latters testimony upon rebuttal, even considering that
such objection would have been available at the outset.
G.R. No. L-39012. January 31, 1975.

AVELINO ORDOO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANGEL DAQUIGAN, presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of La
Union, Branch I and CONRADO V. POSADAS, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
La Union and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: Avelino Ordoo was charged with having raped his daughter, Leonora.
Catalina Balanon Ordoo, his wife, stated in her sworn statement that Avelino also
raped their other daughter, Rosa, but they kept silent because Avelino Ordoo
threatened to kill them if they reported the crime to the police. At trial, the defense
objected to the presentation of Catalina as a prosecution witness on the ground of
marital disqualification. Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoo had not consented
expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying against him. The trial court overruled the
objection and ruled against Avelino.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marital disqualification rule applies in the case
HELD: No. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. The following
persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as
herein enumerated:
(b) A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent;
nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one
against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other;
There is a dictum that "where the marital and domestic relations are so strained
that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be
disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case
identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of
private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home".
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too
narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony
comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly
attacks or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception
to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
In the law of evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a
crime committed by him against his wife (the victim's mother).
That conclusion is in harmony with the practices and traditions of the Filipino
family where, normally, the daughter is close to the mother who, having breast-fed and
reared her offspring, is always ready to render her counsel and assistance in time of
need. Indeed, when the daughter is in distress or suffers moral or physical pain, she
usually utters the word Inay (Mother) before she invokes the name of the Lord.
That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and
revolting crime with incestuous implications, positively undermines the connubial
relationship, is a proposition too obvious to require much elucidation.
The trial court did not err in holding that Catalina Ordoo could testify against her
husband, Avelino Ordoo, in the case where he is being tried for having raped their
daughter, Leonora.
G.R. No. 125861. September 9, 1998.

ROSITA G. TAN, EUSEBIO V. TAN, REMIGIO V. TAN, JR., EUFROSINA V. TAN,
VIRGILIO V. TAN and EDUARDO V. TAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO V. TAN KIAT, respondents.
FACTS: Respondent Fernando claimed to have bought the subject properties from Mr.
Tan Keh in 1954 and was given an owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 35656 since the
transfer of title in his favor cannot be done yet because he was a foreign national at that
time. A lease ocntract for 40 years was also executed. However, in Mr. Tan Keh sold
the protperties to Remigio Tan. TCT No. 53284 was issued in the name of Remigio.
Another contract of lease was executed in favor of the respondent but he did not pay
any rental. At Remegio's wake, petitioners promised to convey the subject properties to
private respondent who had already acquired Filipino citizenship. However, petitioners
had the subject properties fraudulently transferred to their names under TCT No.
117898. So, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of property. The trial court
dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent's reliance on parol evidence may be allowed without
violating the Dead Man's Statute
HELD: No. Petitioners are in possession of TCT No. 117898 which evidences their
ownership of the subject properties. On the other hand, private respondent relies simply
on the allegation that he is entitled to the properties by virtue of a sale between him and
Alejandro Tan Keh who is now dead. Obviously, private respondent will rely on parol
evidence which, under the circumstances obtaining, cannot be allowed without violating
the "Dead Man's Statute" found in Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. viz:
Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party
Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before
such person became of unsound mind.
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false
testimony in regard of the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party, and
further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity
to giving testimony. If one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by
death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.
Clearly then, from a reading of the complaint itself, the annexes attached thereto
and relevant laws and jurisprudence, the complaint indeed does not spell out any cause
of action.
The complaint of Fernando is dismissed.
G.R. No. 117740. October 30, 1998.

CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H.
ABAD and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de
Mesa Abad. Petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
The petitioners were successful in having the titles of properties of Ricardo transferred
under their respective names. Private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad
Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed an opposition. Honoria claimed that
she had been the common-law wife of Ricardo for twenty-seven years before his death
and they have two children, Cecilia and Marian. Honoria also disclosed that Ricardo had
another child with another woman. The trial court declared the three as natural children
of Ricardo, and excluded the petitioners from participating in the administration and
settlement of the estate of Ricardo. The petitioners appealed the decision. They
presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Abads physician, declaring that
Ricardo was infected with gonorrhea and had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contents of the affidavit of Dr. Arenas is privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
HELD: Yes. The rule on confidential communications between physician and patient
requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment given or any information is
to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient existed between the
person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the advice
or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while
professionally attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the
performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would
tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They
assert, however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abads sterility does not blacken the
character of the deceased. Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abads sterility
arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his
reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without
the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be
sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit
inadmissible in evidence. And the same remains inadmissible in evidence,
notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad.
The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as
stated in established precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose of the law
would be thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if
death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures which a
patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are not
permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light
communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.
Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to
establish their claim by the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the
evidence presented by private respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the
acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad.
Petition is denied.
G.R. No. L-28482. January 30, 1971.

vs.
JUAN BRIOSO and MARIANO TAEZA, defendants-appellants.
FACTS: Spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in their house. Silvino was
making rope in the annex of their house when he was shot. Susana called for help and
rushed to her husband. He told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano
Taeza. After an hour, Silvino died. Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses,
witnessed the incident. The motive for the killing appears to have been the disapproval
by the spouses Silvino and Susana Daria of Mariano Taeza's courtship of their
daughter, Angelita. The defendants interposed alibi as defense. The court found the two
accused guilty as charged. They appealed and presented witnesses ti corroborate their
alibi.
ISSUE: Whether or not the affidavit of Antonio Daria should be rejected as hearsay
HELD: Yes. Exhibit "2," the alleged affidavit of Antonio Daria, was presented in court to
corroborate Mariano Taeza's testimony. But while the said affidavit was identified by the
Provincial Fiscal as having been subscribed and sworn to before him, he also stated
that he did not know Antonio Daria personally and that was the only time he appeared
before him. Exhibit "2" does not have the seal of the Fiscal's Office. Moreover, the said
exhibit was never identified by the supposed affiant and there was no opportunity for the
prosecution to cross-examine him. As stated in People vs. Mariquina, affidavits are
generally not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiants' statements, which may thus be either committed or
misunderstood by the one writing them. For this reason, and for the further reason that
the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits
are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. In view hereof, We find
Exhibit "2" of no probative value, and that the lower court did not err when it rejected the
same. In this connection, it is markworthy that the prosecuting attorney stated in open
court that Antonio Daria had also executed another affidavit (Exhibit "D") in the Fiscal's
office "to the effect that he went to the office of defense counsel, ...... and there affixed
his thumbmark on a statement that was never read to him." Be that as it may, not one of
the other persons who, Mariano Taeza claimed, were with him in the barrio clinic
(Narciso Valera and Jose Cabais) was produced in court to support his alibi. Mariano
Taeza's testimony, therefore, remains uncorroborated. It has been repeatedly held that
in the face of direct evidence, alibi is necessarily a weak defense and becomes more so
if uncorroborated. It is worse if the alibi could have been corroborated by other persons
mentioned by the accused but they are not presented.
Evidence also shows that from Tiker to Catungawan is only about nine kilometers
and only a two-hour walk. The place is also accessible by motor transportation,
although motor vehicles are allegedly rare in the said place. As in the case of Mariano
Taeza, it was not physically impossible for Juan Brioso to be at the locus criminis at the
time the crime was committed.
The sentence under appeal is affirmed.
G.R. No. L-44364. April 27, 1979.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICTOR GARCIA y DALIT, defendant-appellant
FACTS: While resting at home, Ignacia Cristobal, Wilfredo Cristobal and Teodoro
Cristobal heard someone screaming from the creek. When they responded, they saw
thier younger sister, Imelda, naked and unconscious. When she regained her
consciousness, Imelda told them that Victor Garcia maltreated, abused and dishonored
her. They took her to the house of their parents. On her deathbed, Imelda recounted to
her mother, brothers and sister and neighbors what happened to her and explicitly
named Victor Garcia as the man who abused, dishonored and mercilessly maltreated
her. She died that night. Teodoro reported the incident to the police the next day. Three
policemen came to their place with the municipal health officer, Dr. Conrado Gabriel,
who examined the victim. Victor Garcia interposed an alibi that he was not in town when
the incident occurred. The defense presented witnesses to corroborate his alibi. Victor
was convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the
statements of the victim on the circumstances surrounding her death are admissible in
evidence as her dying declaration
HELD: Yes. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the statements of the
victim on the circumstances surrounding her death are admissible in evidence as her
dying declaration, pursuant to Section 31, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
SECTION 31. DYING DECLARATION. The declaration of a dying person,
made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal
case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death.
We have held that "it is not necessary to the validity or admissibility of a dying
declaration that the declarant expressly state that he has lost a hope of recovery; it is
sufficient that the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that at
the time the declaration was made, the declarant did not expect to survive the injury
from which he actually died."
That the victim, Imelda Cristobal, was under a consciousness of an impending
death at the time she made the statements identifying the defendant as the one who
raped her and inflicted upon her the injuries which caused her death can be inferred
from the circumstances under which the declaration was made. She had just recovered
her consciousness and her physical condition bespeaks the imminence of her death.
She was so weak that she had to be carried by her brothers and Aunt Rosa from the
creek to the house of her parents. Added to the physical pain which she was then
suffering by reason of the serious injuries inflicted upon her, was the mental anguish
and shock brought about by the unmitigated violation of her honor. With face swollen,
lower hip cut and bleeding, hematoma all over the body, broken ribs, right nipple
removed and bleeding, hymen lacerated, with blood streaks in the vaginal wall, and
abdomen filled with water, the victim could not have entertained any hope of surviving
the beastly attack on her by her "Manong Victor". In fact she died barely three (3) hours
after the beastly assault.
The decision of conviction is affirmed.
G.R. No. 31320. December 3, 1929.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CRISPO LARA E ILANO, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS: Three weeks before the incident, Juan Advincula saw Crispo Lara e Ilano his
yard at nighttime. Juan scolded Crispo thinking that he desired his chickens in the
stable. Juan also reported the incident to the authorities. On the day of the homicide,
Juan met Crispo on his way home. Crispo confronted, then fired at him using an
automatic revolver. Juan found shelter at a nearby house owned by Felix Ramirez. Juan
told him what happened and that Crispo shot him. He repeated his account upon the
arrival of the barrio lieutenant. The next day, the justice of the peace of the municipality
took Juan's affidavit. Juan was taken to the hospital where he stayed for three weeks
before he was discharged. However, the bullet on his side which was not extracted
caused complications and eventually his death. Crispo Lara e Ilano was convicted of the
crime of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Juan is admissible as dying declaration
HELD: Yes, but only with respect to his statement to Felix and the barrio lieutenant.
The only testimony directly connecting the accused with the shooting of the
deceased is contained in the statements made by the deceased subsequent to the
shooting and prior to his death; and it is insisted for the appellant that these statements
are not admissible is evidence. We are of the opinion that this contention is well taken
with respect to the affidavit given to the justice of the peace by the deceased on the day
after the fatal injury was inflicted, for the reason that when that declaration was made
the deceased indicated that he was under the impression that the injury would not be
fatal. On the other hand the statement made to Ciriaco Reyes, the barrio lieutenant, in
the house of Felix Ramirez, was in our opinion admissible as a dying declaration,
because when this declaration was made the deceased was weak, complained of the
pain which he was suffering from the wound and stated that he would not survive. It is
true that the deceased lived for nearly six weeks after that statement was made, and in
this interval recovered, to external appearances, almost completely from the wound.
Nevertheless it appears that in the end the deceased died from the same wound; and
the admissibility of the first declaration depends upon the state of mind of the deceased
when the declaration was made, and not upon the length of time that elapsed between
the infliction of the wound and the declarants death. This statement supplies ample
proof that the accused was the author of Advinculas death.
The admissibility of the dying declaration of a deceased person with respect to
the person who inflicted the fatal injury depends upon whether, at the time the
declaration was made, the deceased believed that the injury received would be fatal.
The circumstance that he thereafter recovered sufficiently to engender the belief that he
was going to live, does not render the declaration inadmissible, where death in fact
results from the same injury.
G.R. No. 4740. November 18, 1908.

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JUAN DE LA CRUZ, ET .AL., Defendants-Appellants.
FACTS: A band of not less than five persons, armed with revolvers, bolo and clubs met
Fortunato Jimenez, his wife and his sister. Jimenez and his party was threatened and
ordered to return to his house. Timoteo Dizon went up the house of Jimenez and
demanded P500 from but since he did not have money, he gave his up his watch.
Before the robbers encountered Jimenez and his party, they met Delfin Esquivel, who
was compelled at the point of a revolver to accompany them. Delfin was left downstairs
under guard together with Jimenez's wife and sister. When the robbers left the house,
Delfin was thrust inside together with the women. Thereafter, the Constabulary forces
attacked the band, killing Dizon and wounding another member of the band. They were
convicted of the crime of robbery in an armed band.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the ante-mortem statement of Dizon is admissible as a dying
declaration
(2) Whether or not the silence of the defendants should be construed as an
extra-judicial admission
HELD: (1) No. The ante-mortem statements admitted by the trial court were an alleged
extra-judicial declaration made by the bandit Timoteo Dizon, a few hours before his
death, wherein he confessed his guilt of the robbery on the night in question, and stated
that the appellants were members of the band. The evidence further discloses that this
confession was made to the provincial fiscal and an officer of the Constabulary, and
that, although the appellants were there present, under arrest, charged with the
commission of the crime, and heard the dying man charge them with being members of
the band, they kept silent and did not attempt to deny the charge.
Dying declarations or affirmations, made not under the sanction of an oath but of
a solemn sense of impending death, are sometimes accepted as evidence, though
made extra-judicially and without cross-examination, the declarant not being regarded
as a witness whom the defendant is entitled to meet face to face; but the admission of
such declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide
or murder, and must proceed from the very person alleged to have been killed.
Manifestly, therefore, the ante-mortem statement in this case is not admissible as a
"dying declaration."
(2) No. It is suggested, however, that while the statements in question were
inadmissible as proof of the truth of their contents, they might have been received for
the purpose of showing that, when they were made in the presence of the defendants,
they made no attempt to deny them, and by their silence implicitly admitted their truth.
We do not doubt that silence may sometimes be equivalent to the admission of the truth
of statements made by one person in the presence and hearing of another, when these
statements have been made under such circumstances that the natural impulse of an
innocent person hearing such statements would impel him to deny their truth if they
were false. But it must appear that there was a proper opportunity for reply and that the
surroundings were such as to render a denial expedient and proper; and the right of a
defendant in all criminal prosecutions "to be exempt from testifying against himself"
clearly prohibits any inference of guilt from the silence of an accused person who has
been arrested and charged with crime.
G.R. No. L-13109. March 6, 1918.

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DALMACIO ANTIPOLO, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS: The trial court convicted the appellant of homicide and he appealed. Appellant
presented as witness Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the victim Fortunato Dinal to testify
as a witness on certain alleged dying declarations. The prosecution objected and
argued that the witness is disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband
is the injured party. Defense insisted that Susana is competent because the marriage
was dissolved by the death of Dinal, thus she is not subject to any disqualification
arising from the status of marriage. The trial court sustained the objection.
ISSUE: Whether or not the widow is a competent witness in a prosecution regarding
dying declarations to her by the deceased concerning the cause of his death
HELD: Yes. Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:
"Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one
against the other, neither husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against
the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be parties."
The great object of the rule is to secure domestic happiness by placing the
protecting seal of the law upon all confidential communications between husband and
wife; and whatever has come to the knowledge of either by means of the hallowed
confidence which that relation inspires, cannot be afterwards divulged in testimony even
through the other party be no longer living."
The purpose of section 58 is to protect accused persons against statements
made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the husband
or wife to whom such confidential communications might have been made from the
obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously, when a
person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement
regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the communication so made
is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for the
express purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the
authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.
"A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a
wife for or against her husband without his consent; nor can either, during the marriage
or afterwards, be, without the consent of the other, examined as to any communication
made by one to the other during the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a
civil action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other."
The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending
death, concerning the circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a
prosecution of the person charged with killing the declarant. Such dying declaration are
admissible in favor of the defendant as well as against him. It has been expressly held
in several jurisdictions in the United States that the widow of the deceased may testify
regarding his dying declarations.
"The next bill is as to the competency of the widow of the deceased to prove his
dying declarations. We see no possible reason for excluding her . . . after the
husbandss death she is no longer his wife, and the rules of evidence, as between
husbands and wives, are no longer applicable."
We are therefore of the opinion that the court below erred in excluding the
testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason of such exclusion, the
accused was deprived of one of his essential rights. That being the case, a new trial
must be granted.
G.R. No. 94736. June 26, 1998.

MELECIO MACASIRAY, VIRGILIO GONZALES, and BENEDICTO GONZALES,
petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and ROSALINA
RIVERA VDA. DE VILLANUEVA,respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners were the accused in a case for the murder of Johnny Villanueva,
husband of private respondent Rosalina Rivera Villanueva. The prosecution introduced
in evidence, as Exhibit B, an extrajudicial confession executed by petitioner Benedicto
Gonzales in which he admitted participation in the crime and implicated his co-accused.
Prosecution also presented, as Exhibit D, the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the preliminary investigation containing the statements allegedly given by
Benedicto which he affirmed in his extrajudicial confession. The petitioners objected to
the admissibility of the documents on the ground that they were given without the
assistance of counsel. The trial court declared the two documents to be inadmissible.
However, the CA declared the two documents admissible in evidence and ordered the
trial court to admit them.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners waived objection to the admissibility of the
documents, either by failing to object to their introduction during the trial or by using
them in evidence
HELD: No. Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally offered.
In the case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party
making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being
offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary
evidence may be made.
In this case, petitioners objected to the admissibility of the documents when they
were formally offered. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, petitioners did not
waive objection to admissibility of the said documents by their failure to object when
these were marked, identified, and then introduced during the trial. That was not the
proper time to make the objection. "Objection to the documentary evidence must be
made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier." Thus, it has been held that the
identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the
formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the
identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the
document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to
the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.
Objections should be made at the stage of formal offer. Objections to the
admissibility of documents may be raised during trial and the court may rule on them
then, but, if this is not done, the party should make the objections when the
documentary evidence is formally offered at the conclusion of the presentation of
evidence for the other party.
Indeed, before it was offered in evidence, the confession in this case cannot
even be considered as evidence to which the accused should object.
G.R. No. 9113. December 24, 1915.

BENITO LOPEZ, administrator of the estate of Marcela Emradura, dcceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TOMAS VALDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS: Benito Lopez, the deceased administrator of the estate of Marcela Emradura
filed an action against Tomas Valdez for the recovery of possession of the land
described in the complaint. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The court
ordered the defendant to deliver possession of land to the plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court should rule on the objection at the time the objection is
made
HELD: Yes. It appears from the record that appellee relied on certain written contracts
entered into between the appellant and Marcela Emradura during her lifetime to prove
the cause of action set out in the complaint. The documents themselves were not
produced and when counsel for appellee sought to prove by certain witnesses the
contents of these documents, without presenting facts justifying secondary evidence
with reference thereto, counsel for appellant made the objection that the evidence was
incompetent and improper as the documents themselves were the best evidence.
Several of these objections were made, to each of which the court, without a decision
on the objections, stated: "The objection of Mr. Reyes will be taken into consideration."
The witnesses were thereupon allowed, over the exception of appellant, to answer the
questions to which the objections were interposed. A decision on these objections was
thus left in abeyance and the trial terminated without a resolution of the questions
presented. In spite of that the trial court in its final decision took into consideration the
secondary evidence thus introduced and based its decision thereon.
Parties who offer objections to questions on whatever ground are entitled to a
ruling at the time the objection is made unless they present a question with regard to
which the court desires to inform itself before making its ruling. In that event it is
perfectly proper for the court to take a reasonable time to study the question presented
by the objection; but a ruling should always be made during the trial and at such time as
will give the party against whom the ruling is made an opportunity to meet the situation
presented by the ruling. The disadvantageous position in which a party may be put by
the reservation of a ruling on an objection to a question is illustrated by the case in
hand. If the court had given a prompt ruling on the objections, appellant would have had
an opportunity to meet the situation presented. If his objection had been overruled, he
could have taken his exception and offered evidence to rebut that adduced by the
objectionable questions. If the ruling had been the other way, appellee would have been
under the necessity of offering the documents themselves, at which time appellant
would have been able to present any defense to them which the facts and
circumstances might have required or permitted. There having been no decision during
the course of the trial, appellants counsel had no means of knowing what the ruling of
the court would be on the objection and, consequently, he could not know whether or
not he would be compelled to meet any evidence at all; for, if the objection were
sustained, then appellee had offered no competent evidence to support his case;
whereas, if the objection were overruled, then appellant would not have the benefit of a
ruling on his objection or of the exception taken thereto. We do not regard the
procedure objected to as permissible under the facts and circumstances of this case
and we believe that it prejudiced the substantial rights of Appellant.
The judgment appealed from is reversed.
G.R. No. 21074. February 9, 1924.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BUDA SINGH ET AL., Defendants. BUDA SINGH, Appellant.
FACTS: The accused Buda Singh confessed to his friend Ram Singh that he and five
others killed Santa Singh. Ram Singh reported the matter to the authorities. The case
was dismissed against the five but Buda Singh was found guilty of homicide. The court
found that he had strong motive to commit the crime. Santa Singh had previously
secured Buda Singh's conviction of the crime of estafa and as a consequence, Buda
Singh assaulted him with a knife. On appeal, Buda Singh moved to have the testimony
of Ram Singh disregarded.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of Buda Singh is admissible
HELD: Yes. It appears that after this testimony had been received without objection,
counsel for the defendant moved that it be stricken from the record on the ground that it
had not been shown affirmatively by direct evidence that the confession had been made
freely and voluntarily. The court took the motion under advisement and counsel asserts
that it has never been ruled upon and that this has resulted to the defendants prejudice,
inasmuch as he has had no opportunity to rebut the evidence of the confession.
The evidence was clearly admissible. Act No. 619, upon which the argument of
counsel is evidently based, has been repealed by the Administrative Code and evidence
of a confession may now be received without direct affirmative evidence that the
confession was freely and voluntarily made. The fact that the court, in its decision, takes
the confession into consideration must be regarded as a denial of the motion to strike it
from the record and if the defendant desired to introduce further evidence rebuttal, the
matter should have been brought to the attention of that court through the appropriate
motion will not now reopen the case for a new trial.
The Administrative Code has repealed the provisions of Act No. 619 that no
confession of a person charged with a crime shall be received in evidence unless it be
first shown to the satisfaction of the court that it was freely and voluntarily made, and
evidence of a confession may now be received without direct affirmative proof that it
was so made, thus shifting the burden of proof on the accused to show that the
confession was obtained by undue pressure.

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Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U.

G.R. No. 140079. March 31, 2005.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |2

G.R. No. 12724. March 27, 2000.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |3

G.R. No. 153660. June 10, 2003.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |4

G.R. No. 123546. July 2, 1998.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |5

G.R. No. 158203. March 31, 2005.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |6

G.R. No. 152807. August 12, 2003.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |7

G.R. No. 142856-57. August 25, 2003.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |8

G.R. No. 14440. February 24, 2004.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |9

G.R. No. 152954. March 10, 2004.

G.R. Nos. 139751-52. January 26, 2004.

G.R. No. L-3544. March 27, 1907.

G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005.

G.R. No. 144773. May 16, 2005.

G.R. No. L-45137. September 23, 1985.

G.R. No. 115625. January 23, 1998.

G.R. No. 151827. April 29, 2005.

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601. August 11, 2005.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876. December 11, 1995.

G.R. No. 79094. June 22, 1988.

G.R. No. 117728. June 26, 1996.

G.R. No. L-19101. February 29, 1964.

G.R. No. 112573. February 9, 1995.

G.R. No. L-26053. February 21, 1967.

G.R. No. L-18247. August 31, 1963.

G.R. No. 119288. August 18, 1997.

G.R. No. 85423. May 6, 1991.

ISSUE: Whether or not evidence not formally offered should be admitted

G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001.

A.M. No. P-03-1708. February 16, 2005.

G.R. No. L-7973. April 27, 1959.

G.R. No. 123542. June 26, 2001.

G.R. No. 136975. March 31, 2005.

G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.

G.R. No. 117384. October 21, 1998.

G.R. No. L-28498. July 14, 1986.

G.R. No. L-11346. March 21, 1918.

G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300. August 6, 1986.

G.R. No. L-568. July 16, 1947.

G.R. No. L-39012. January 31, 1975.

G.R. No. 125861. September 9, 1998.

G.R. No. 117740. October 30, 1998.

G.R. No. L-28482. January 30, 1971.

G.R. No. L-44364. April 27, 1979.

G.R. No. 31320. December 3, 1929.

G.R. No. 4740. November 18, 1908.

G.R. No. L-13109. March 6, 1918.

G.R. No. 94736. June 26, 1998.

G.R. No. 9113. December 24, 1915.

G.R. No. 21074. February 9, 1924.

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