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repealed by EO No. 279, the administrative aspect of the former law nonetheless
remains applicable. Hence, the transfer or assignment of exploration permits still
needs the prior approval of the Secretary of the DENR. Not only did the
assignment of EP 133 to SEM violate Section 97 of Presidential Decree No. 463, it
likewise transgressed one of the conditions stipulated in the grant of the said
permit. Furthermore, with the expiration of EP 133 on 6 July 1994, MMC lost any
right to the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
(2) SEM did not acquire vested right over the disputed area because its
supposed right was extinguished by the expiration of its exploration permit and by
its violation of the condition prohibiting the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to
SEM. In addition, even assuming that SEM has a valid exploration permit, such is
a mere license that can be withdrawn by the State. In fact, the same has been
withdrawn by the issuance of Proclamation No. 297, which places the disputed
area under the full control of the State through the Executive Department.
(3) The assailed Decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in
Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia. The former was decided on facts and issues that
were not attendant in the latter, such as the expiration of EP 133, the violation of
the condition embodied in EP 133 prohibiting its assignment, and the unauthorized
and invalid assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since this assignment was
effected without the approval of the Secretary of DENR.
(4) Assuming that SEM has a valid exploration permit, it cannot assert any
mining right over the disputed area, since the State has taken over the mining
operations therein, pursuant to Proclamation No. 297. Since the Executive
Department has control over the exploration, development and utilization of the
resources in the disputed area, SEMs exploration permit, assuming that it is still
valid, has been effectively withdrawn. The exercise of such power through
Proclamation No. 297 is in accord with jura regalia, where the State exercises its
sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain and the mineral deposits
found within, pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
(5) The issue of the constitutionality and the legality of Proclamation No.
297 was raised belatedly, as SEM questions the same for the first time in its
Motion for Reconsideration. Even if the issue were to be entertained, the said
proclamation is found to be in harmony with the Constitution and other existing
statutes.
The motion for reconsideration of CamiloBanad, et al. cannot be passed
upon because they are not parties to the instant cases. The prayers of Apex and
Balite asking the Court to direct the MGB to accept their applications for
exploration permits cannot be granted, since it is the Executive Department that
has the prerogative to accept such applications, if ever it decides to award the
mining operations in the disputed area to a private entity. The Court cannot pass
upon the issue of whether or not MMC complied with the mandatory exploration
work program, as such was a non-issue and was not raised before the Court of
Appeals and the lower tribunals.
The Motions for Reconsideration filed by CamiloBanad, et al. and Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation are denied for lack of merit. The Motion for
Clarification of Apex Mining Co., Inc. and the Manifestation and Motion of the
Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative, insofar as these
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motions/manifestation ask the Court to direct the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau
to accept their respective applications for exploration permits, are denied. The
Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated 25 January 2007 of Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corporation is denied.
G.R. No. 163101
BENGUET CORPORATION v. DENR-MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD
and J.G. REALTY AND MININGCORPORATION
FACTS:In 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with
Option to Purchase (RAWOP), wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the
owner of four mining claims with a total area of 288.8656 hectares in SitioBagong
Bayan, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. Benguet obligated itself to perfect the
rights to the mining claims, including the option to develop the mining claims upon
written notice to J.G. Realty. In 1989, Benguet issued a letter informing J.G.
Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims, but in 1999, J.G. Realty sent a
letter informing Benguet that it was terminating the RAWOP due to violations of
the contract. Benguet insisted that there was no valid ground for the termination of
the RAWOP because Benguet complied with its obligations. In 2001, the RAWOP
was cancelled upon petition of J.G. Realty. Upon appeal, the Mining Adjudication
Board (MAB) assailed the previous decision. Their Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. Benguet filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: (1) Whether there was serious and palpable error when the Honorable
Board failed to rule that the contractual obligation of the parties to arbitrate under
the Royalty Agreement is mandatory;
(2) Whether the Honorable Board exceeded its jurisdiction when it
sustained the cancellation of the Royalty Agreement for alleged breach of contract
despite the absence of evidence;
(3) Whether the Questioned Decision of the Honorable Board in
cancelling the RAWOP prejudiced the substantial rights of Benguet under the
contract to the unjust enrichment of JG Realty.
HELD: The petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an improper
remedy.The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition for review by certiorari and
question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB]. Petitioner
having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB
has become final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be
denied.
(1) There is a clear distinction between compulsory and voluntary
arbitration. The arbitration provided by the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) is
compulsory, while the nature of the arbitration provision in the RAWOP is
voluntary, not involving any government agency. There can be no quibbling that
POA is a quasi-judicial body which forms part of the DENR, an administrative
agency. Hence, the provision on mandatory resort to arbitration, freely entered into
by the parties, must be held binding against them. In sum, on the issue of whether
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POA should have referred the case to voluntary arbitration, we find that, indeed,
POA has no jurisdiction over the dispute which is governed by RA 876, the
arbitration law. The Court ruled that the jurisdiction of POA and that of MAB can
no longer be questioned by Benguet. What Benguet should have done was to
immediately challenge the POAs jurisdiction by a special civil action for certiorari
when POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute. To redo the proceedings
fully participated in by the parties after the lapse of seven years from date of
institution of the original action with the POA would be anathema to the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
(2) The cancellation of the RAWOP by the POA was based on two grounds:
(a) Benguets failure to pay J.G. Realtys royalties for the mining claims; and (b)
Benguets failure to seriously pursue MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 over
the mining claims. In the instant case, the obligation of Benguet to pay royalties to
J.G. Realty has been admitted and supported by the provisions of the RAWOP.
Thus, the burden to prove such obligation rests on Benguet. In fact, Benguet never
even alleged that it continuously followed-up the application with the MGB and
that it was in constant communication with the government agency for the
expeditious resolution of the application. Such allegations would show that,
indeed, Benguet was remiss in prosecuting the MPSA application and clearly failed
to comply with its obligation in the RAWOP.
(3) The cancellation of the RAWOP was based on valid grounds and is,
therefore, justified. Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the
cancellation of the RAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal right to
participate in further developing the mining claims, was brought about by its
violation of the RAWOP. Hence, Benguet has no one to blame but itself for its
predicament.
The petition is dismissed.
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substantive and vested rights of the parties. Third, the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals from quasijudicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are
now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. Fourth, the
Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended by RA No.
7902, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial
bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more
elbow room to resolve them. Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of
courts dictates that direct resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not
be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate
lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction. Consistent with these rulings and legal bases, the Court held that
Section 79 of RA 7942 is likewise to be understood as having been modified by
Circular No. 1-91, BP Blg. 129 as amended by RA 7902, Revised Administrative
Circular 1-95, and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Appeals from decisions of the
MAB shall be taken to the CA through petitions for review in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The petition is granted.
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Mining Lease Contract areas of Lebach and the said leased areas were declared
automatically abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid
Lebachs areas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the
MAB. Lebach did not file any notice of appeal and the resolution became final and
executory. The MAB affirmed the POA findings that Macroasia abandoned its
mining claims. The MAB found that Macroasia did not comply with its work
obligations from 1986 to 1991. The MAB found that it was Blue Ridge that had
prior and preferential rights over the mining claims of Macroasia, and not
Celestial. Celestial and Macroasia moved for reconsideration. In 2004, MAB
issued a Resolution holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power to
revoke a mineral agreement duly entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB
further held that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement was
exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary; that a petition for cancellation is not
a mining dispute under the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA pursuant to Sec. 77 of
RA 7942; and that the POA could only adjudicate claims or contests during the
MPSA application and not when the claims and leases were already granted and
subsisting.
In 2005, Celestial assailed the Resolution before the CA. Blue Ridge filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. The CA Twelfth Division affirmed
the MAB Resolution. Celestial filed a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 169080). The
CA Special Tenth Division canceled Macroasias lease contracts and granted Blue
Ridge prior and preferential rights. It treated the cancellation of a mining lease
agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under
Sec. 77 of RA 7942. Upon inquiry with the DENR, Blue Ridge discovered that
sometime in December 2005 two MPSAs, duly approved and signed by the DENR
Secretary, were issued in favor of Macroasia. The Blue Ridge filed a Petition for
Certiorari (G.R. No. 172936) to invalidate the MPSAs issued to Macroasia.
Macroasia and Celestial filed petition (G.R. No. 176319, G.R. No. 176226) to
assail the CAs Resolution granting Blue Ridge prior and preferential rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not POA and MAB have jurisdiction to cancel Mineral
Agreements.
HELD: In G.R. Nos. 169080, 176226 and 176319, RA 7942 or The Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 is silent on who has authority to cancel the agreement. RA
7942 is also silent as to who is empowered to cancel existing lease contracts and
mineral agreements. After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279,
RA 7942 and its implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and case
law, the Court ruled that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to
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mining claims. Also, Macroasia had various valid existing mining lease contracts
over the subject mining lode claims issued by the DENR. Thus, Macroasia has an
advantage over Blue Ridge and Celestial insofar as the administrative aspect of
pursuing the mineral agreements is concerned.
The petitions under G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, and 176229 are dismissed
while the petition under G.R. No. 176319 is granted.
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(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service
contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the
subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts, which, though permitted under
the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the
principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign
control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the
Filipino nation.
The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized
service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive
management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the
event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and
development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the
products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the
point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources.
According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII)
effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (DENR
Secretary), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGBDENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc.
filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control
over the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources
HELD: The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to enter into
agreements with foreign owned corporations. On the other hand, Congress may
review the action of the President once it is notified of every contract entered into
in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its
execution. In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the
exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of
the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President
and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a
proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the
judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power
of control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and
coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding
into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum
discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of
foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry
for viable employment opportunities in the country. The judiciary is loath to
interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official
functions. As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm,
Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as
strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. Let the development of the mining
industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not
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documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon in denying the PPA
had already settled the issue.
The petition is denied.
G.R. No. 178188
OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. PLATINUM GROUP
METALS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 180674
CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. HON.
JUDGE BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95, Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan, and PLATINUM GROUP METAL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 181141
PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION v. CITINICKEL MINES
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, acting for its own interest and on
behalf of OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 183527
PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
and POLLY C. DY
FACTS: In 1971 and 1980, Olympic was granted Mining Lease Contracts by the
DENR Secretary covering mining areas in the Narra and Espanola, Palawan. In
2003, Olympic entered into an Operating Agreement with Platinum whereby
Platinum was given the exclusive right to control, possess, manage/operate, and
conduct mining operations, and to market or dispose mining products on the
Toronto Nickel Mine in Narra, and the Pulot Nickel Mine in Espanola for a period
of 25 years. In return, Platinum would pay Olympic a royalty fee of 2% of the
gross revenues. Subsequently, Olympic and Platinum were granted government
permits and environmental compliance certificates. In 2006, Olympic informed
Platinum of the immediate termination of the Operating Agreement on account of
Platinums gross violations of its terms, and directed Platinum to surrender
possession of the subject mining areas. In 2006, Olympic instituted an action for
the issuance of an injunctive writ against Platinum. The RTC dismissed Olympics
complaint. Olympic then filed two cases with the DENR. The first case was
dismissed and the other was subsequently wihdrawn by Olympic. Meanwhile,
without the knowledge or consent of Platinum, Olympic transferred its applications
for mineral agreements, including its rights under the Operating Agreement, to
Citinickel via a Deed of Assignment in 2006, This was approved by the Regional
Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB). Citinickel filed 3
administrative cases. Citinickels petition to cancel Platinums SSMPs was
dismissed.
Citinickels request for the cancellation of the Environmental Compliance
Certificates (ECCs) of Platinum was not granted by the Office of the President. In
the other case, the POA issued a Resolution to cancel the Operating Agreement as
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well as Platinums SSMPs, and ordered Platinum to cease and desist from
operating the subject mining areas. The appellate court dismissed Platinums
certiorari petition. Platinum filed four petitions. In G.R. No. 181141, Platinum
contends that the non-filing of an appeal with the MAB would be useless, as the
POA declared that its decision to cancel the Operating Agreement was not just its
own, but also that of the DENR, which includes the MAB. G.R. Nos. 178188,
180674, and 183527 involve issues arising from the complaint for quieting of title,
damages, breach of contract, and specific performance filed by Platinum against
Olympic.
ISSUES: Whether or not the POA has the authority to hear and decide the dispute
between Olympic/Citinickel and Platinum, as parties to the operating agreement.
HELD: No. Although Section 77 (d) of the Mining Act has transferred to the POA
jurisdiction over disputes pending before the Bureau of Mines and the DENR, it
did not include all other forms of contracts involving mining rights nor a general
catch-all phrase to cover other agreements involving mining rights. POAs
jurisdiction over disputes involving rights to mining areas has nothing to do with
the cancellation of existing mineral agreements. The Operating Agreement is not
a contract between the government and a contractor; instead, it is a purely civil
contract between two private entities one of whom happens to be a party to a
mineral agreement with the government, and to contend that a dispute involving
operating agreements can be classified as a dispute involving mineral agreements
or permits stretches the definition of mineral agreement beyond the clear terms
of the law. The Mining Act has limited the jurisdiction of the POA, as successor of
the adjudicatory functions of the Bureau of Mines, to mineral agreements between
the government and the private contractor. Otherwise stated, while disputes
between parties to any mining contract, including operating agreements, may
previously fall within the Bureau of Mines jurisdiction under PD No. 1281, it can
no longer be so placed now within the authority of the POA to settle under Section
77 (b) of the Mining Law because its jurisdiction has been limited to the resolution
of disputes involving public mineral agreements. Since the Operating Agreement is
not the mineral agreement contemplated by law, the contention that jurisdiction
should be with the POA under Section 77(b) of the Mining Act cannot be legally
correct. In plainer terms, no jurisdiction vests in the POA under the cited provision
because the Operating Agreement is not the mineral agreement that Section
77(b) refers to.
Additionally, the Court notes that both Olympic and Citinickel have
previously recognized the RTCs jurisdiction to decide the dispute when they filed
civil cases before the trial courts of Palawan and Paraaque, respectively, for the
cancellation of the Operating Agreement on account of Platinums alleged gross
violations. By doing so, both Olympic and Citinickel acknowledged the authority
and jurisdiction of the trial court to resolve their dispute with Platinum. In other
words, they are now estopped from claiming that the POA, rather than the trial
court, has the sole and exlcusive authority to resolve the issue of whether the
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Operating Agreement may be rescinded for Platinums alleged violations. With the
foregoing, the Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC of Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, Branch 95, and dismissed Olympics petition for review on certiorari in
G.R. 178188. Platinums petition in G.R. No. 183527 was granted.
In the other case, although the Deed of Assignment between Olympic and
Citinickel was executed on June 9, 2006, the actual transfer of rights occurred only
after the Regional Director of the MGB Regional Office No. IV-B had given its
approval to the assignment on September 6, 2006, or after Civil Case No. 4199 was
filed on June 14, 2006. Accordingly, Citinickel, being a mere successor-in-interest
of Olympic, is bound by the questioned injunction order. Even if we disregard the
inclusion of Citinickel in the July 16, 2006 Order granting the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction, the result would be the same the injunction imposed on
Olympic will similarly bind Citinickel. Thus, the Court dismissed Citinickels
petition (G.R. No. 180674) for lack of merit.
Going into the merits of G.R. No. 181141, the Court finds that the POA
Resolution was issued in disregard of the injunctive writs in Civil Case No. 4199.
Both Olympic and Citinickel evidently trifled with the courts and abused its
processes by improperly instituting several cases before various judicial and quasijudicial bodies, one case after another, some even simultaneously filed during the
pendency of other cases, once it became evident that a favorable decision will not
be obtained in the previously filed case all of which are focused on the
termination of the Operating Agreement and the cancellation of Platinums mining
permits. The actions of Olympic and Citinickel, taken separately or collectively,
betray a pattern of calculated and intentional forum shopping that warrants denial
of the reliefs they pray for. Thus, the Court grants Platinums petition in G.R. No.
181141, and annul the POA Resolution.
The Court ruled that in G.R. Nos. 178188 and 180674, the assailed CA
Decisions are affirmed, while in G.R. Nos. 183527 and 181141, the assailed CA
Resolutions are reversed and set aside.
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HELD: No. There is no merit to PICOPs contention that the area covered by Base
Metals MPSA is, by law, closed to mining activities.
Sec. 6 of RA 7942 provides that mining operations in reserved lands other
than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain
limitations. RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves
but only those proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. There is no evidence in
this case that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA has been proclaimed as
watershed forest reserves. Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in
timberland or forestry subject to existing rights and reservations. Sec. 47 of PD 705
permits mining operations in forest lands which include the public forest, the
permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations. Furthermore, these
provisions do not require that the consent of existing licensees be obtained but that
they be notified before mining activities may be commenced inside forest
concessions. PICOP also failed to present any evidence that the area covered by
the MPSA is a protected wilderness area designated as an initial component of the
National Ingrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) pursuant to a law, presidential
decree, presidential proclamation or executive order as required by RA 7586.
In addition, the Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as
a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment
of its concession areas. The Court emphasized that the reinstatement of Base
Metals MPSA does not automatically result in its approval. Base Metals still has
to comply with the requirements outlined in DENR Administrative Order (DAO
96-40), including the publication/posting/radio announcement of its mineral
agreement application.
The petition is denied.
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HELD: (1) Yes. The Verified Protest/Opposition to the Application for Exploration
Permit of the respondent was filed beyond the reglementary period.
In the present case, notices of the Application for Exploration Permit of
private respondent were published in newspapers, announced on the radio, and
posted in public places. The posting was done the latest, so we reckon the last
possible date petitioner could have validly filed its Verified Petition/Opposition
with the Panel of Arbitrators therefrom.
Since the notice of the Application for Exploration Permit of private
respondent was last posted on July 28, 2005, the 30-day reglementary period for
filing any adverse claim/protest/opposition thereto ended on August 27, 2005. As
petitioner explained, however, August 27, 2005 was a Saturday; and August 29,
2005, Monday, was declared a national holiday, so the next working day was
August 30, 2005, Tuesday. Petitioner did send its Verified Protest/Opposition,
through registered mail, on August 30, 2005, as evidenced by the Affidavit of
Service of even date and Registry Receipts No. 10181; No. 10182; No. 10183; and
No. 10184. Nevertheless, the Court still could not consider the Verified
Protest/Opposition of petitioner as having been filed within the reglementary
period. The Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for
Exploration Permit of respondent is deemed filed with the Panel of Arbitrators only
upon payment of the prescribed docket fee on September 6, 2005, clearly beyond
the reglementary period, which ended on August 30, 2005.
(2) Yes. The Panel of Arbitrators dismissed the Verified Protest/Opposition of
petitioner because it has become moot and academic.
When the exploration permit issued to private respondent, petitioner had
nothing more to protest/oppose. More importantly, with the issuance by MGB of
EP No. 05-001 to private respondent, the remedy of petitioner is to seek the
cancellation thereof. The Panel of Arbitrators cannot simply consider or convert the
Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit
of respondent as a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 05-001. Since the Panel
of Arbitrators can no longer grant petitioner any actual substantial relief by reason
of the foregoing circumstances, then the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner
was appropriately dismissed for being moot and academic. Furthermore, the Panel
of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions
relating to applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not over cancellation of
mineral rights already granted and existing. The authority to deny, revoke, or
cancel EP No. 05-001 of respondent is lodged with the MGB, and not with the
Panel of Arbitrators.
The petition is denied.
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Corporation (SEM). The SEM applied for an integrated MPSA over the land
covered by the permit which was approved.
In 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act was enacted
and mining cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA). In 1997,
the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao passed Resolution No. 26,
Series of 1997, authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits (OTPs) to smallscale miners operating in the Diwalwal mines. The petitioner filed a complaint.
The RPA reiterated the validity of the EP No. 133. The petitioner elevated the case
to the CA but it was dismissed.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the
assailed memorandum order did not adopt the direct state utilization scheme in
resolving the Diwalwal dispute.
HELD: No.The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals ruling that the challenged
MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as a policy in
resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate
that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing
else.
Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any
party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to
undertake studies to determine its feasibility.
Incidentally, it must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances
may petitioners rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No. 133
merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended,
modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so
since the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral
resources are matters impressed with great public interest.
Pursuant to Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4,
Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, the State may pursue the
constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the exploration,
development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources, by either
directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified
entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study
of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the
constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded
from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy
in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. As implied
earlier, the State need be guided only by the demands of public interest in settling
for this option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility.
The petition is denied.
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reversion should be instituted by the Republic through the Solicitor General. The
petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the
previous decision.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law when it
ruled that the lands in question belong to the public domain;
(2) Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the complaint on
the ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same.
HELD: (1) No. The Court ruled for the private respondents. Applying Article XIII,
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution to the case at bar, the Court conclude that the
issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the President of the Philippines
in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract or utilize the
minerals which may be found on or under the surface of the land. On the other
hand, the issuance of the free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979
in favor of the private respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to
use the land for agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right
to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.
Although the original certificates of titles of the petitioner were issued prior to the
titles of the private respondents, the former cannot prevail over the latter for the
provisions of the Constitution which governed at the time of their issuance
prohibited the alienation of mineral lands of the public domain.
(2) No. The appellate court did not err in concluding that the petitioner has
no personality to institute the action for annulment and cancellation of patents.
The mineral lands over which it has a right to extract minerals remained part of the
inalienable lands of the public domain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the
person acting in his stead can bring an action for reversion.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
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