REPUBLIC ACT NO.

947
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 947 - AN ACT MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON, CORPORATION
OR ASSOCIATION TO FORCIBLY ENTER OR OCCUPY PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AND
PENALIZING VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public agricultural land including such public lands as are granted to private
individuals under the provisions of the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the disposal of public agricultural lands in
the Philippines, and are duly covered by the corresponding applications required for the purpose notwithstanding the fact that title
thereto still remains in the Government; or for any person, natural or juridical, to instigate, induce or force another to commit such
acts.
Section 2. The criminal action for any violation of the provisions of this Act shall be instituted within one year from the time the
cause
of
action
arises.
Section 3. Any violation of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand pesos or
imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. In case of
insolvency, the offender shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Revised
Penal
Code.
If the offender is a corporation or association, the president, director, manager or managing partner thereof shall be held
criminally
liable
therefor.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Estafa (deceit/swindling) under Art. 315, Rev. Penal Code
For legal research purposes of my readers, may I share the jurisprudential part of a motion for
reconsideration I have just filed with the office of the city prosecutor of a city in southern Metro
Manila seeking the indictment for estafa of the respondent therein. The investigating fiscal had
earlier indicted the respondent only for violation of BP Blg. 22 (bouncing check law). I felt that the
respondent should be likewise indicted for Estafa under Art. 315 of the Rev. Penal Code. I removed
all references to names of parties and the like.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
THE COMPLAINANT, by counsel, respectfully states:
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1. <!--[endif]-->On March 27, 2012 the complainant received via registered mail a
copy of the RESOLUTION, dated March 13, 2012, dismissing the complaint for SYNDICATED
ESTAFA and indicting the respondent x x x merely for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The 15th day of the complainant to file this motion expires on April 11, 2012.
Hence, this motion.
<!--[if !supportLists]-->2. <!--[endif]-->The complainant submits that the resolution erred in not indicting x
x x at the very least for the felony of regular or ordinary ESTAFA under Art. 315 of the Rev. Penal
Code (assuming, arguendo, that PD 1689, re: Syndicated Estafa does not apply in the instant case).
The complainant agrees, though, that x x x was correctly indicted for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
(As of this date, the complainant has paid the requisite filing and docket fees with the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court of x x x City, in the amount of more than P95, 000.00,
so that the said case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 may forthwith proceed with dispatch in the said
Court).
<!--[if !supportLists]-->3. <!--[endif]-->The complainant humbly submits that the resolution erred in finding
that there was no estafa (whether syndicated or regular/ordinary) because the transaction was a
simple loan; that what motivated the complainant to issue his checks was not the malice or deceit of
SON but the complainants desire for interest income.

The complainant will not contest anymore the issue of Syndicated Estafa under P.D. No. 1689 but
will simply focus herein on the sole issue of whether or not x x x should have been likewise
indicted for the felony of Ordinary/Regular Estafa under Art. 315, Rev. Penal Code.
<!--[if !supportLists]-->4. <!--[endif]-->The resolution failed to appreciate the points of law and fact raised
by the complainant in his Reply-Affidavit, to wit:
X x x.
<!--[if !supportLists]-->4. <!--[endif]-->Likewise, the resolution erred in not appreciating the proofs of
deceit/malice described in the Complaint as alleged bythe complainant, to wit:
X x x.
<!--[if !supportLists]-->5. <!--[endif]-->The complainant does not have the duty to submit proofs of the
nonexistence of the alleged x x x PROJECT. Sufficie it to state that upon the presentation by the
complainat in his Complaint of concrete allegations aboput the clear use by x x x of the x x x
PROJECT as her express excuse to exact money from the complainant, the BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
had shifted to x x x to prove the existence of the said Project to show the purity of her intentions and
conscience. But x x x failed to do this.
<!--[if !supportLists]-->6. <!--[endif]-->LOAN per se does not exempt a criminal from indictment for estafa
so long as it can be proved, as is the factual mileu in the instant case, that the motive behind such a
transaction was deceit, swindling and malice on the part of the debtor/respondent.
<!--[if !supportLists]-->7. <!--[endif]-->We repeat hereinbelow what we had argued in our previous
pleadings before this Honorable Office.
<!--[if !supportLists]-->8. <!--[endif]-->In the case of LIBERATA AMBITO, BASILIO AMBITO, and
CRISANTO AMBITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.
127327, February 13, 2009, it was held that in the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the RPC,<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[1]<!--[endif]--> it is indispensable that the
element of deceit, consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be
made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant; and that
false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud, it being essential that such false statement or representation constitutes the very cause
or the only motive which induces the offended party to part with his money. Thus:
x x x.
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or concealment,
are the following (a) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (b)
That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. (c) That the offended party must have relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or
property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (d) That as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage.<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[2]<!--[endif]-->
In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC,<!--[if !
supportFootnotes]-->[3]<!--[endif]--> it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the
false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least
simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant.
The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, it being essential that such false statement or representation constitutes the
very cause or the only motive which induces the offended party to part with his money. In the
absence of such requisite, any subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent and suspicious it
might appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under the said provision.<!--[if !
supportFootnotes]-->[4]<!--[endif]-->
In the case at bar, the records would show that PSI was given assurance by petitioners that they
will pay the unpaid balance of their purchases from PSI when the CCTDs with petitioners banks,
the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. (RBBI) and/or the Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. (RBLI), and issued
under the name of PSI, would be presented for payment to RBBI and RBLI which, in turn, will pay
the amount of deposit stated thereon. The amounts stated in the CCTDs correspond to the purchase
cost of the machineries and equipment that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito bought from PSI as
evidenced by the Sales Invoices presented during the trial. It is uncontroverted that PSI did not apply
for and secure loans from RBBI and RBLI. In fine, PSI and co-petitioner Basilio Ambito were
engaged in a vendor-purchaser business relationship while PSI and RBBI/RBLI were connected as
depositor-depository. It is likewise established that petitioners employed deceit when they were
able to persuade PSI to allow them to pay the aforementioned machineries and equipment through

down payments paid either in cash or in the form of checks or through the CCTDs with RBBI and
RBLI issued in PSIs name with interest thereon. It was later found out that petitioners never made
any deposits in the said Banks under the name of PSI. In fact, the issuance of CCTDs to PSI was not
recorded in the books of RBBI and RBLI and the Deputy Liquidator appointed by the Central Bank
of the Philippines even corroborated this finding of anomalous bank transactions in her testimony
during the trial. <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[5]<!--[endif]-->
As borne by the records and the pleadings, it is indubitable that petitioners representations were
outright distortions of the truth perpetrated by them for the sole purpose of inducing PSI to sell and
deliver to co-petitioner Basilio Ambito machineries and equipments. Petitioners knew that no
deposits were ever made with RBBI and RBLI under the name of PSI, as represented by the subject
CCTDs, since they did not intend to deposit any amount to pay for the machineries. PSI was an
innocent victim of deceit, machinations and chicanery committed by petitioners which resulted in its
pecuniary damage and, thus, confirming the lower courts finding that petitioners are guilty of the
complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents.
X x x.
10. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on deceit/swindling (estafa) provides any person
who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned therein shall be punished by the penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of
the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years; provided that the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
X x x.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
X x x.
<!--[if !supportLists]-->(a) <!--[endif]-->By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without
prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended
party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be
punished by the maximum period of the penalty.
<!--[if !supportLists]-->(b) <!--[endif]-->By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit
the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the
bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack of insufficiency
of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
(As amended by Republic Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)
10.1. Article 316 (other forms of swindling) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the
damage caused and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon any person
who, to the prejudice of another, shall execute any fictitious contract.
10.2. Article 318 (other deceits) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such
amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other
deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.
<!--[if !supportLists]-->9. <!--[endif]-->In PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA BABY P.
MONTANER, G.R. No. 184053, August 31, 2011, the accused was convicted for the crime of Estafa
as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Information alleged that on or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused Virginia (Baby) P. Montaner did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one Reynaldo Solis in the following
manner: said accused by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks are fully
funded draw, make and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis ten (10) Prudential Bank Checks, all
having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and all aforesaid checks were

postdated June 17, 1996 in exchange for cash knowing fully well that she has no funds in the
drawee bank and when the said checks were presented for payment the same were dishonored by
the drawee bank on reason of ACCOUNT CLOSED and despite demand accused failed and
refused to pay the value thereof to the damage and prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in the
aforementioned total amount of P50,000.00.
X x x.
The Court cited Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender
had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check
has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
According to the Court, the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(3) damage to the payee.<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[6]<!--[endif]-->
In the said case, the prosecution sufficiently established appellants guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According to Soliss
clear and categorical testimony, appellant issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks,
each in the amount of P5, 000.00 or a total of P50, 000.00, in his house in exchange for their cash
equivalent.
From the circumstances, the Court held that it was evident that Solis would not have given
P50, 000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her issuance of the 10 Prudential Bank checks.
These postdated checks were undoubtedly issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his cash.
However, when Solis attempted to encash them, they were all dishonored by the bank because the
account was already closed.
Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 1996 which was received by
appellants husband to inform appellant that her postdated checks had bounced and that she must
settle her obligation or else face legal action from Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand
nor did she deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of
notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is an element of the crime of estafa,
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 2(d),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
X x x.
<!--[if !supportLists]-->10. <!--[endif]-->In the case of BETTY GABIONZA AND ISABELITA TAN,
PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, LUKE ROXAS AND EVELYN NOLASCO,
RESPONDENTS, [G.R. No. 161057, September 12, 2008], it was held that to be clear, it is
possible to hold the borrower in a money market placement liable for estafa if the creditor
was induced to extend a loan upon the false or fraudulent misrepresentations of the
borrower; that such estafa is one by means of deceit; that the borrower would not be generally
liable for estafa through misappropriation if he or she fails to repay the loan, since the liability in such
instance is ordinarily civil in nature, except when deceit is present, of course. Thus:
x x x.
We can thus conclude that the DOJ Resolution clearly supports a prima facie finding that the crime
of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) has been committed against petitioners. Does it also establish a
prima facie finding that there has been a violation of the then-Revised Securities Act, specifically
Section
4
in
relation
to
Section
56
thereof?

Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 176, or the Revised Securities Act, generally requires the
registration of securities and prohibits the sale or distribution of unregistered securities. [29] The DOJ
extensively concluded that private respondents are liable for violating such prohibition against the
sale
of
unregistered
securities:
<!--[if
!supportLineBreakNewLine]-->
<!--[endif]-->
Respondents Roxas and Nolasco do not dispute that in 1998, ASB borrowed funds about 700
individual investors amounting to close to P4 billion, on recurring, short-term basis, usually 30 or 45
days, promising high interest yields, issuing therefore mere postdate checks. Under the
circumstances, the checks assumed the character of "evidences of indebtedness," which are among
the "securities" mentioned under the Revised Securities Act. The term "securities" embodies a
flexible rather than static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek to use the money of others on the promise of profits
(69 Am Jur 2d, p. 604). Thus, it has been held that checks of a debtor received and held by the
lender also are evidences of indebtedness and therefore "securities" under the Act, where the debtor
agreed to pay interest on a monthly basis so long as the principal checks remained uncashed, it
being said that such principal extent as would have promissory notes payable on demand (Id., p.
606, citing Untied States v. Attaway (DC La) 211 F Supp 682). In the instant case, the checks were
issued by ASB in lieu of the securities enumerated under the Revised Securities Act in a clever
attempt, or so they thought, to take the case out of the purview of the law, which requires prior
license to sell or deal in securities and registration thereof. The scheme was to
designed to circumvent the law. Checks constitute mere substitutes for cash if so issued in payment
of obligations in the ordinary course of business transactions. But when they are issued in exchange
for a big number of individual non-personalized loans solicited from the public, numbering about 700
in this case, the checks cease to be such. In such a circumstance, the checks assume the character
of evidences of indebtedness. This is especially so where the individual loans were not evidenced by
appropriate debt instruments, such as promissory notes, loan agreements, etc., as in this case.
Purportedly, the postdated checks themselves serve as the evidences of the indebtedness. A
different rule would open the floodgates for a similar scheme, whereby companies without prior
license or authority from the SEC. This cannot be countenanced. The subsequent repeal of the
Revised Securities Act does not spare respondents Roxas and Nolasco from prosecution
thereunder, since the repealing law, Republic Act No. 8799 known as the "Securities Regulation
Code," continues to punish the same offense (see Section 8 in relation to Section 73, R.A. No.
8799).[30]
The Court of Appeals however ruled that the postdated checks issued by ASBHI did not constitute a
security under the Revised Securities Act. To support this conclusion, it cited the general definition of
a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand," and took cognizance of
the fact that "the issuance of checks for the purpose of securing a loan to finance the activities of the
corporation is well within the ambit of a valid corporate act" to note that a corporation does not need
prior registration with the SEC in order to be able to issue a check, which is a corporate prerogative.
This analysis is highly myopic and ignorant of the bigger picture. It is one thing for a corporation to
issue checks to satisfy isolated individual obligations, and another for a corporation to execute an
elaborate scheme where it would comport itself to the public as a pseudo-investment house and
issue postdated checks instead of stocks or traditional securities to evidence the investments of its
patrons. The Revised Securities Act was geared towards maintaining the stability of the national
investment market against activities such as those apparently engaged in by ASBHI. As the DOJ
Resolution noted, ASBHI adopted this scheme in an attempt to circumvent the Revised Securities
Act, which requires a prior license to sell or deal in securities. After all, if ASBHI's activities were
actually regulated by the SEC, it is hardly likely that the design it chose to employ would have been
permitted
at
all.
But was ASBHI able to successfully evade the requirements under the Revised Securities Act? As
found by the DOJ, there is ultimately a prima facie case that can at the very least sustain
prosecution of private respondents under that law. The DOJ Resolution is persuasive in citing
American authorities which countenance a flexible definition of securities. Moreover, it bears pointing
out that the definition of "securities" set forth in Section 2 of the Revised Securities Act includes
"commercial papers evidencing indebtedness of any person, financial or non-financial entity,
irrespective of maturity, issued, endorsed, sold, transferred or in any manner conveyed to
another."[31] A check is a commercial paper evidencing indebtedness of any person, financial or nonfinancial entity. Since the checks in this case were generally rolled over to augment the creditor's
existing investment with ASBHI, they
most
definitely
take
on
the
attributes
of
traditional
stocks.
We should be clear that the question of whether the subject checks fall within the classification of
securities under the Revised Securities Act may still be the subject of debate, but at the very least,
the DOJ Resolution has established a prima facie case for prosecuting private respondents for such
offense. The thorough determination of such issue is best left to a full-blown trial of the merits, where
private respondents are free to dispute the theories set forth in the DOJ Resolution. It is clear error
on the part of the Court of Appeals to dismiss such finding so perfunctorily and on such flimsy

grounds that do not consider the grave consequences. After all, as the DOJ Resolution correctly
pointed out: "[T]he postdated checks themselves serve as the evidences of the indebtedness. A
different rule would open the floodgates for a similar scheme, whereby companies without prior
license
or
authority
from
the
SEC.
This
cannot
be
countenanced." [32]
This conclusion quells the stance of the Court of Appeals that the unfortunate events befalling
petitioners were ultimately benign, not malevolent, a consequence of the economic crisis that beset
the Philippines during that era.[33] That conclusion would be agreeable only if it were undisputed that
the activities of ASBHI are legal in the first place, but the DOJ puts forth a legitimate theory that the
entire modus operandi of ASBHI is illegal under the Revised Securities Act and if that were so, the
impact of the Asian economic crisis would not obviate the criminal liability of private respondents.
X x x.
It is ineluctable that the DOJ Resolution established a prima facie case for violation of Article 315 (2)
(a) of the Revised Penal Code and Sections 4 in relation to 56 of the Revised Securities Act. X x x
X x x.
<!--[if !supportLists]-->11. <!--[endif]-->IN FINE, respondent x x x must be indicted at the least for the
felony of ordinary/regular ESTAFA under Art. 315, Rev. Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that resolution, dated March 13,
2012, be reconsidered and that a new resolution be issued FURTHER indicting x x x for the felony of
regular/ordinary ESTAFA under Art. 315, Rev. Penal Code. Involving the two checks issued by the
complainant to satisfy the total claim of the complainant in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,
000,000.00), plus exemplary damages of P100, 000.00, moral damages of P100, 000.00,
attorneys fees of P125, 000.00 plus 5% of the recoverable amounts, and costs of suit.
Las Pinas

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47033 June 16, 1978
GENEROSO CASTRODES and LAMBERTO CASTRODES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO V. CUBELO as Municipal Judge of Anda, Bohol; PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES; DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, and JULIAN, BENEDICTO, VENANCIO and
JOSEPATRO, all surnamed AMPONG, respondents.
Artemio P. Cabatos for petitioners.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor
Amado D. A Aquino for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
This petition for certiorari was filed on September 9, 1977 in order to annul, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, the judgment of the municipal court of Anda, Bohol dated April 28, 1976 which was not
appealed trial which was duly served or complied with by the accused (Criminal Case No. 660).
In that judgment, Generoso Castrodes was convicted of usurpation of real property trial sentenced to
pay a fine of P350 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He served the subsidiary
imprisonment.
On the other hand, his son trial co-accused, Lamberto Castrodes, was convicted of usurpation of
real property trial grave threats, a supposed complex crime. He was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of four months trial one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to five years of prision
correccional as maximum. He served that imprisonment in the New Bilibid Prison. He was paroled
on August 10, 1977 but his counsel came to know of the parole only after the filing of the petition
herein.
The complaint on which the judgment of conviction was based reads as follows:
The undersigned Chief of Police of Anda, Bohol, after having been duly
sworn in accordance with law, hereby accuses Generoso A. Castrodes trial
Lamberto Castrodes of Sta. Cruz, Anda, Bohol, Philippines of the crime of
Usurpation of Real Property by means of violence with Threats committed as
follows:

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1975, in the barrio of Sta. Cruz, Anda,
Bohol Philippines, trial within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused did then trial there maliciously, criminally, feloniously trial unlawfully
enter the land of offended parties Julian Ampong. Benedicto Ampong,
Venancio Ampong trial Josepatro Ampong, trial proceeded to plant coconut
trees therein without the consent trial permission from its owners, trial when
offended party Julian Ampong confronted both accused regarding heir illegal
acts the accused merely replied that "the Ampong's do not have a parcel of
land here" and proceeded to threaten Julian Ampong by saying that "if you
touch this land trial my plants here blood will drain in this soil" so that
offended parties are now deprived of their rightful enjoyment of their own
property, trial likewise the victims are deprived of cultivating their ricefield for
two successive planting seasons, to their damage trial prejudice an amount
which they will prove during the trial.
Acts contrary to law.
17 Sept. '75
Anda, Bohol, Philippines.
(Sgd.)
CRESCENCIO
TONGCO
Chief of Police
The municipal court found that Generoso is the elder half-brother (uterine) of the offended parties
Julian, Benedicto, Venancio trial Josepatro, all surnamed Ampong; that Damiana Simacio, the
mother of Generoso, acquired a parcel of land; that after Damiana became a widow, she married the
man who became the father of complainants Ampong, trial that after her death, the land was
partitioned trial a portion thereof was given to the Ampong's, which portion is the disputed land.
The municipal court also found that Lamberto trial Generoso occupied that disputed land in the
morning of July 10, 1975 trial planted coconuts therein; that when Julian Ampong was apprised of
that fact, he repaired to the land trial inquired why Lamberto trial Genoroso were planting coconuts in
that land; that Generoso answered that the land belonged to the Castrodes family trial not to the
Ampong family while Lamberto told his uncle, Julian: "If you touch this land, the blood of the
Ampong's will drain here because the Ampong's have no land here", trial that, after remarking that
there is a court of justice, Julian trial his companions left.
The municipal court concluded that Generoso committed only usurpation of real property while
Lamberto allegedly committed the complex crime of grave threats trial usurpation of real property
because he threatened to inflict serious physical injuries on Julian Ampong trial he attained his
purpose by means of that threat.
The petitioners contend that the municipal court has no jurisdiction to impose the penalty meted to
Lamberto Castrodes trial that there is no complex crime of usurpation of real property with grave
threats.
The issues are whether the complaint filed by the chief of police charges Lamberto Castrodes with
the complex crime of usurpation of real property trial grave threats trial whether the municipal court
has jurisdiction over that offense or could impose the penalty which it meted to Lamberto. The
Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property.
Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons,
shall take possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in
property belonging to another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts
of violence executed by him. shall be punished by a fine of from 50 to 100
per centum of the gain which he shall have obtained, but not less than 75
pesos.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine of from 200 to 500
pesos shall be imposed.
The elements of the offense are (1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right
belonging to another Person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possession the real
property or in usurping the real right, trial (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain.
(2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal. 14th Edition, pp. 911-912).
We hold that the offense charged by the chief of police in the aforequoted complaint is only the crime
of usurpation of real property. The threat uttered by Lamberto Castrodes did not give rise to the
complex offense of usurpation of real property with grave threats. That threat is the intimidation
contemplated in the crime of usurpation of real property. It does not constitute a distinct crime. (See
Decision dated October 3, 1883 of the Supreme Court of Spain, 3 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Edition,
pp. 460-1; 2 Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, pp. 730-731).
The crime of usurpation of real property, if punishable with a fine of from 200 to 500 pesos, is within
the jurisdiction of the municipal court, because, according to section 87(c) of the Judiciary Law, the
municipal court has jurisdiction over offenses in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment
for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than three thousand pesos, or both such fine trial
imprisonment. Hence, the penalty imposed upon Generoso Castrodes is correct.

On the other hand, the municipal court in this case has no jurisdiction to impose upon Lamberto
Castrodes an indeterminate penalty of four months trial one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
five years of prision correccional as maximum.
Respondent judge admits that he has no jurisdiction over the crime of grave threats trial that he
imposed a penalty which he is not empowered to impose. However, he argues that, because his
court has jurisdiction over the "principal crime" of usurpation of real property, he has jurisdiction also
over "all its qualifications trial complexities" (pp. 64-65, Rollo). That contention is wrong. The
sentence imposed upon Lamberto Castrodes is void for lack of jurisdiction (Caluag vs. Pecson, 82
Phil 8).
Contrary to respondent judge's belief, the fact that Lamberto was paroled after serving a portion of
his sentence did not render the instant certiorari case moot trial academic. A parole is a conditional
pardon. If the sentence imposed upon Lamberto is void for lack of jurisdiction, as we have already
shown above, he need not have been paroled. He should have been released because his detention
was illegal (See sec. 1, Rule 102. Rules of Court; Cruz vs. Director of Prisons, 17 Phil. 269: Caluag
vs. Pecson, supra).
WHEREFORE, the sentence imposed upon Lamberto Castrodes is set aside for- lack of jurisdiction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Santos, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139603. July 14, 2000]
CONCHITA QUINAO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, rep. by the OFFICE
OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, and FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, respondents.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision, dated 14 January
1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19412 which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Eighth Judicial Region, Branch 21, Laoang, Northern Samar finding herein
petitioner Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Property.
Likewise sought to be reversed is the Resolution, dated 30 June 1999, of the appellate court denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Information filed against petitioner and Cases read as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of February, 1993, at about 9:00 oclock in the morning,
more or less, at Sitio Bagacay, Bgy. Petong, Lapinig, Northern Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to gain, with the use of
force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously usurped
[sic] and occupied [sic] a real property owned by FRANCISCO F. DEL MONTE, and
while there gathered 12,000 coconuts and converted it into copra [sic] and sold the
same in the amount of P14,580, to the damage and prejudice to the said owner in
the total amount of FOURTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY
(P14,580.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1[1]
At the arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The facts established during the
trial are as follows:
As borne out by the evidence, both the accused and private complainant are claiming
ownership over the land in question. Private complainant Francisco Delmonte
submitted and offered in evidence Tax Declaration No. 1202 (Exh. "D") in the name
of Petre Delmonte, the predecessor-in-interest of complainant. This Tax Declaration
No. 1202 cancels Tax Declaration No. 18612 which shows that the land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 1202 is the same land litigated and awarded to the predecessorin-interest of the complainant in Civil Case No. 3561. The decision in Civil Case No.
3561 shows that the land being claimed by the accused was already litigated and
awarded to the parents of the complainant in Civil Case No. 3561.
The accused-appellant, on the other hand, presented Tax Declaration No. 1195 (Exh.
"1") in the name of Lorenzo Cases Leoniso dated January 25, 1993. He alleged that
the land being claimed by the complainant in the present criminal case is different
from the land litigated in Civil Case No. 3561 and that the land subject of Civil Case
No. 3561 which came from Angel Pelison is now in the possession of the
complainant.
1[1] Rollo, p. 34-35.

The parties presented witnesses during the hearing of the case to buttress their
claims. Complainants witness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on February 2,
1993 at around 9 oclock in the morning while he was busy working in the agricultural
land which he owns in common with complainant Francisco Delmonte, accused
Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao, together with their other close relatives
suddenly appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and intimidation,
usurped and took possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their
inheritance from their ascendants and while there, accused immediately gathered
coconuts and made them into copra. Complainant was forcibly driven out by the
accused from their landholding and was threatened that if he will try to return to the
land in question, something will happen to him. Complainant was thus forced to seek
assistance from the Lapinig Philippine National Police.
Complainants witness further declared that the actual primitive owner of the land in
question was Angel Pelison but the land was purchased by his grandfather Petre
Delmonte. The land is situated at Sitio Bagacay, Brgy. Potong, Lapinig, N. Samar
with an area of 9 hectares, bounded on the East by the properties of Roman
Vernas and Marcelino Delmonte; on the North by Dimas Moscosa; on the West by
Alcantara and on the South by Bagacay group (tsn, pp. 31-32, April 20, 1994)
Accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao testified for the defense. They
claimed that they are the grandchildren of Lorenzo Cases; that during the lifetime of
their grandfather, he acquired the real property in question and declared the same in
his name under Tax Declaration No. 1195 (Exh. "1"); that the land has an area of 6
hectares, 34 centares and 28 ares and is devoted to rice and coconut; that they are
in actual possession of the land and paid realty taxes thereon; that the father of
accused Conchita Quinao was Pedro Cases, the son of Lorenzo Cases; that the land
is located in Brgy. Potong, Lapinig, Northern Samar; and that the boundaries are as
follows: on the North: Dimas Moscosa; on the East: Petre Delmonte; on the South:
Ananias Delmonte; and on the West: Bagacay River.2[2]
The trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds both accused guilty of
the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property, defined and penalized under Art.
312 of the Revised Penal Code, beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences
both of them jointly and severally, to pay a fine in the amount of One Hundred
Seventy Four Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty (P174,960.00) Pesos which amount
is equivalent to the gain which said accused have obtained in a period of almost
three (3) years from the time they forcibly took possession of this land belonging to
Francisco Delmonte computed at the rate of P14,580.00 per quarter proceeds from
the produce of the land as alleged in the Information.
The accused are further sentenced not to enter or intrude upon this property rightfully
adjudged to belong to Francisco Delmonte, private complainant herein and they are
ordered under pain of imprisonment for Contempt of Court, to Cease and Desist
forever from disturbing or molesting the peaceful and quiet possession and
ownership of the herein private offended party over the property subject of litigation.
The Chief of Police of the PNP, Lapinig, Northern Samar, is hereby ordered to assist
the private offended party in his possession of the herein property and see to it that
he is not disturbed or molested in such state, and in implementing this directive, the
Chief of Police may, in his discretion, use reasonable force necessary to carry out
this decision. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Chief of Police of Lapinig,
N. Samar.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.3[3]
Upon a notice of death filed only on 25 September 1997, it was learned that accused Cases died on
9 April 1995.
Petitioner appealed her conviction to the CA. The appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereof but the CA denied the same.
Before this Court, petitioner assails the decision of the CA raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHO IS A WOMAN OF AN
ADVANCE AGE COULD BE HELD LIABLE OF THE CRIME OF USURPATION OF
REAL PROPERTY ON THE BASIS OF THE BARE ALLEGATION OF CONSPIRACY
AND WHICH CONCLUSION WAS BASED ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND
CONJECTURES;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED FORCE AND INTIMIDATION WHICH TOOK
PLACE SUBSEQUENT TO THE ALLEGED ENTRY INTO THE PROPERTY WILL
2[2] CA Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 37-38.
3[3] Id., at 35.

SUFFICE TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF

USURPATION OF REAL PROPERTY;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHO CLAIMS TO BE OWNER
OF THE LAND IN QUESTION COULD BE HELD LIABLE OF USURPATION OF
HER OWN PROPERTY.4[4]
The petition is bereft of merit.
Contrary to petitioners allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court convicting her of the crime
of usurpation of real property was not based on "speculations, surmises and conjectures" but clearly
on the evidence on record and in accordance with the applicable law. Article 312 of Revised Penal
Code defines and penalizes the crime of usurpation of real property as follows:
Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. - Any
person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take
possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to
another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him
shall be punished by a fine from P50 to P100 per centum of the gain which he shall
have obtained, but not less than P75 pesos.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine from P200 to P500 pesos shall
be imposed.
The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of anothers real property or
usurped real rights in anothers property; that the possession or usurpation was committed with
violence or intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for
"usurpacion de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or usurped
belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and that the possession of the
usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to the person ousted of possession
of the property.5[5]
More explicitly, in Castrodes vs. Cubelo,6[6] the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (1)
occupation of anothers real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another person; (2)
violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in usurping the real
right, and (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain. 7[7]
Thus, in order to absolve herself of any liability for the crime, petitioner insists that the elements of
the crime are not present in this case. Specifically, she maintains that she owns the property
involved herein. The matter on the ownership of the lot in question, however, had long been settled
when, in Civil Case No. 3561 (ownership of real property) involving the predecessors-in-interest of
private complainant and that of accused Cases, the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch III,
Thirteenth Judicial Region, adjudicated said lot to private complainants predecessors-in-interest. 8[8]
Further, as established by the commissioner appointed by the trial court to look into petitioners
defense, i.e, she owns the lot subject of this criminal case, the area being claimed by petitioner is the
same area adjudicated in Civil Case No. 3561. Deputy Sheriff A. Anacta, as commissioner, made the
following the report:
Taking the matter in relation to the order of the Honorable Court dated February 1,
1994 which is the basis of this commission, which merely directs the undersigned to
find out if the area claimed by by the accused encroached the area of the plaintiffs,
then, based from the above findings and the herein sketch, it is indeed very clear
that the area claimed by the accused encroached the area of the plaintiffs.9[9]
The foregoing findings of the commissioner was adopted by the trial court and the latter
subsequently convicted petitioner for the crime of usurpation of real property. This findings of the
commissioner was affirmed by the CA stating, thus:
Based on the above findings and the sketch maps submitted, it is clear that the
disputed land which is the red shaded area (Exh. "B-2") is within the boundary of the
land awarded to the complainant in Civil Case No. 3516 [should be 3561]. The issue
of ownership over the land in question having been decided in Civil Case No. 3516
[should be 3561] in favor of the complainant in 1949, the same will not be disturbed.
The accused has to respect the findings of the court. 10[10]

4[4] Id., p. 13.

5[5] Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Volume III, 1988 Edition, p. 222.
6[6] 83 SCRA 670 (1978)
7[7] Ibid., p. 674.
8[8] Rollo, pp. 52-54.
9[9] Id., at 38-39.
10[10] See Note 2, p. 6; Rollo, p. 39.

We fully agree with the findings of both the trial court and the CA on the issue of the ownership of the
lot involved in this case. The evidence on record sufficiently refuted petitioners claim of ownership.
The next issue that needs to be resolved is whether the other requisites of the usurpation of real
property are attendant in this case. These two (2) other requisites are: the employment of violence in
acquiring possession over the real property or in usurping the real right and accused was animated
by intent to gain.11[11] On this point, the trial court and the CA ruled in the affirmative citing the
testimony of prosecution witness Bienvenido Delmonte as follows:
x x x Complainants witness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on February 2, 1993
at around 9 oclock in the morning while he was busy working in the agricultural land
which he owns in common with complainant Francisco Delmonte, accused Salvador
Cases and Conchita Quinao, together with their other close relatives suddenly
appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, usurped
and took possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their inheritance
from their ascendants and while there, accused immediately gathered coconuts and
made them into copra. Complainant was forcibly driven out by the accused from their
landholding and was threatened that if he will try to return to the land in question,
something will happen to him. Complainant was thus forced to seek assistance from
the Lapinig Philippine National Police.12[12]
It is well settled that "factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and carry even more
weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court."13[13] Petitioner failed to give
any cogent reason for this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.
Finally, the fact that the judge who tried the case was different from the judge who penned the
decision does not in any way taint the same. Indeed, "the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily
impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the
trial, unless there is showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him." 14[14]
There is no such showing in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19412 is affirmed in toto.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Best matches for usurpation of real property

More matches
Usurpation of real rights in real property

PUBLIC SERVICE

ITO ANG BATAS:

Usurpation of real rights in
real property
Dear Atty. AGA,
Mabuhay po kayo Atty. Aga. Ako po ay lumiham sa inyo hinggil sa aking problema sa
aking taniman.
Ang naturang taniman po ay minana ko sa aking mga magulang at ang titulo nito ay
nakapangalan sa akin. Isang araw nung ako ay gumagawa sa naturang taniman ay bigla
na lamang pumunta roon ang mag-asawang Jimeno at Rencia kasama ang iba pa nilang
mga kamag-anak at sinasabing kanila raw ang lupain at namana nila sa kanilang mga
ninuno.
11[11] See Note 6.
12[12] See Note 2.
13[13] Boneng vs. People, 304 SCRA 252 (1999); Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corp. vs. CA, 267 SCRA 653 (1997)
14[14] People vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 (1998)

Ako ay tinakot nila at pilit na pinaalis. Dahil ako ay nag-iisa sa araw na iyon, hindi na ako
lumaban pa at lumisan na lamang. Dulot nito, sila po ang umani ng aking mga pananim
at ito ay kanilang pinakinabangan.
Ang ginawa po ba nina Jimeno at Rencia at mga kasama nito ay may kaparusahang
kriminal sa ating batas?
Salamat,
Tano
Maraming salamat sa iyong pagliham Tano. Ang ginawa sa iyo nina Jimeno, Rencia at
kanilang mga kasama ay may kaparusahan sa ating Revised Penal Code. Ang ginawa
nilang krimen ay tinatawag na, Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights
in property.
Isinasaad sa ating Revised Penal Code partikular na sa Article 312 ang sumusunod:
Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. - Any person
who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take possession of
any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in
addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him shall be
punished by a fine from P50 to P100 per centum of the gain which he shall have
obtained, but not less than P75.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine from P200 to P500 shall be
imposed.
Ayon sa kaso ng Quinao vs. People, G.R. 139603, July 14, 2000, ang naturang krimen ay
may mga sumusunod na elemento:
1) Occupation of anothers real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to
another person;
2) Violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in
usurping the real right, and
3) The accused should be animated by the intent to gain.
Base sa iyong salaysay, ang lupain mo ay inokupa nila Jimeno at Rencia at kanilang mga
kasama, ikaw ay tinakot nila upang magawa nila ito, at inani rin nila ang bunga ng iyong
maga tanim, na malinaw na nagbabadya nsa sila ay may intensyon na kumita sa iyong
lupain.
Dahil dito, ang maga nasabing elemento ng pag-okupa, pananakot at intensyon na
kumita sa iyong lupain ay ginawa nila Jimeno at Rencia, kung kayat sila nagkasala ng
Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Real Property.
***
Kung kayo ay may mga bagay na nais malaman o problemang nais na idulog, maaari
kayong magsadya o sumulat sa aming tanggapan sa DZXL RMN MANILA sa Guadalupe
Complex, 4th Floor, Guadalupe, EDSA, Makati City. Patuloy rin tayong makinig sa ating
radio program, ITO ANG BATAS WITH ATTY. AGA, Lunes hanggang Biyernes, sa bagong
time slot 4:00-6:00 pm, DZXL RMN Manila sa 558 khz or through live streaming at
www.rmnnews.com/tv. Pwede ring mag-email sa agalaw@pldtdsl.net.
Lagi po nating tandaan, ITAGUYOD NATIN ANG LAKAS NG ATING BATAS!

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139603. July 14, 2000]
CONCHITA QUINAO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, rep. by the OFFICE
OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, and FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, respondents.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision, dated 14 January
1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19412 which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Eighth Judicial Region, Branch 21, Laoang, Northern Samar finding herein
petitioner Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Property.
Likewise sought to be reversed is the Resolution, dated 30 June 1999, of the appellate court denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Information filed against petitioner and Cases read as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of February, 1993, at about 9:00 oclock in the morning,
more or less, at Sitio Bagacay, Bgy. Petong, Lapinig, Northern Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to gain, with the use of
force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously usurped
[sic] and occupied [sic] a real property owned by FRANCISCO F. DEL MONTE, and
while there gathered 12,000 coconuts and converted it into copra [sic] and sold the
same in the amount of P14,580, to the damage and prejudice to the said owner in
the total amount of FOURTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY
(P14,580.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15[1]
At the arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The facts established during the
trial are as follows:
As borne out by the evidence, both the accused and private complainant are claiming
ownership over the land in question. Private complainant Francisco Delmonte
submitted and offered in evidence Tax Declaration No. 1202 (Exh. "D") in the name
of Petre Delmonte, the predecessor-in-interest of complainant. This Tax Declaration
No. 1202 cancels Tax Declaration No. 18612 which shows that the land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 1202 is the same land litigated and awarded to the predecessorin-interest of the complainant in Civil Case No. 3561. The decision in Civil Case No.
3561 shows that the land being claimed by the accused was already litigated and
awarded to the parents of the complainant in Civil Case No. 3561.
The accused-appellant, on the other hand, presented Tax Declaration No. 1195 (Exh.
"1") in the name of Lorenzo Cases Leoniso dated January 25, 1993. He alleged that
the land being claimed by the complainant in the present criminal case is different
from the land litigated in Civil Case No. 3561 and that the land subject of Civil Case
No. 3561 which came from Angel Pelison is now in the possession of the
complainant.
The parties presented witnesses during the hearing of the case to buttress their
claims. Complainants witness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on February 2,
1993 at around 9 oclock in the morning while he was busy working in the agricultural
land which he owns in common with complainant Francisco Delmonte, accused
Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao, together with their other close relatives
suddenly appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and intimidation,
usurped and took possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their
inheritance from their ascendants and while there, accused immediately gathered
coconuts and made them into copra. Complainant was forcibly driven out by the
accused from their landholding and was threatened that if he will try to return to the
land in question, something will happen to him. Complainant was thus forced to seek
assistance from the Lapinig Philippine National Police.
Complainants witness further declared that the actual primitive owner of the land in
question was Angel Pelison but the land was purchased by his grandfather Petre
Delmonte. The land is situated at Sitio Bagacay, Brgy. Potong, Lapinig, N. Samar
with an area of 9 hectares, bounded on the East by the properties of Roman
Vernas and Marcelino Delmonte; on the North by Dimas Moscosa; on the West by
Alcantara and on the South by Bagacay group (tsn, pp. 31-32, April 20, 1994)
Accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao testified for the defense. They
claimed that they are the grandchildren of Lorenzo Cases; that during the lifetime of
their grandfather, he acquired the real property in question and declared the same in
his name under Tax Declaration No. 1195 (Exh. "1"); that the land has an area of 6
hectares, 34 centares and 28 ares and is devoted to rice and coconut; that they are
in actual possession of the land and paid realty taxes thereon; that the father of
accused Conchita Quinao was Pedro Cases, the son of Lorenzo Cases; that the land
is located in Brgy. Potong, Lapinig, Northern Samar; and that the boundaries are as
follows: on the North: Dimas Moscosa; on the East: Petre Delmonte; on the South:
Ananias Delmonte; and on the West: Bagacay River.16[2]
The trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

15[1] Rollo, p. 34-35.

16[2] CA Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 37-38.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds both accused guilty of
the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property, defined and penalized under Art.
312 of the Revised Penal Code, beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences
both of them jointly and severally, to pay a fine in the amount of One Hundred
Seventy Four Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty (P174,960.00) Pesos which amount
is equivalent to the gain which said accused have obtained in a period of almost
three (3) years from the time they forcibly took possession of this land belonging to
Francisco Delmonte computed at the rate of P14,580.00 per quarter proceeds from
the produce of the land as alleged in the Information.
The accused are further sentenced not to enter or intrude upon this property rightfully
adjudged to belong to Francisco Delmonte, private complainant herein and they are
ordered under pain of imprisonment for Contempt of Court, to Cease and Desist
forever from disturbing or molesting the peaceful and quiet possession and
ownership of the herein private offended party over the property subject of litigation.
The Chief of Police of the PNP, Lapinig, Northern Samar, is hereby ordered to assist
the private offended party in his possession of the herein property and see to it that
he is not disturbed or molested in such state, and in implementing this directive, the
Chief of Police may, in his discretion, use reasonable force necessary to carry out
this decision. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Chief of Police of Lapinig,
N. Samar.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.17[3]
Upon a notice of death filed only on 25 September 1997, it was learned that accused Cases died on
9 April 1995.
Petitioner appealed her conviction to the CA. The appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereof but the CA denied the same.
Before this Court, petitioner assails the decision of the CA raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHO IS A WOMAN OF AN
ADVANCE AGE COULD BE HELD LIABLE OF THE CRIME OF USURPATION OF
REAL PROPERTY ON THE BASIS OF THE BARE ALLEGATION OF CONSPIRACY
AND WHICH CONCLUSION WAS BASED ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND
CONJECTURES;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED FORCE AND INTIMIDATION WHICH TOOK
PLACE SUBSEQUENT TO THE ALLEGED ENTRY INTO THE PROPERTY WILL
SUFFICE TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF
USURPATION OF REAL PROPERTY;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHO CLAIMS TO BE OWNER
OF THE LAND IN QUESTION COULD BE HELD LIABLE OF USURPATION OF
HER OWN PROPERTY.18[4]
The petition is bereft of merit.
Contrary to petitioners allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court convicting her of the crime
of usurpation of real property was not based on "speculations, surmises and conjectures" but clearly
on the evidence on record and in accordance with the applicable law. Article 312 of Revised Penal
Code defines and penalizes the crime of usurpation of real property as follows:
Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. - Any
person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take
possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to
another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him
shall be punished by a fine from P50 to P100 per centum of the gain which he shall
have obtained, but not less than P75 pesos.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine from P200 to P500 pesos shall
be imposed.
The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of anothers real property or
usurped real rights in anothers property; that the possession or usurpation was committed with
violence or intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for
"usurpacion de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or usurped
belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and that the possession of the
usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to the person ousted of possession
of the property.19[5]
17[3] Id., at 35.
18[4] Id., p. 13.
19[5] Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Volume III, 1988 Edition, p. 222.

More explicitly, in Castrodes vs. Cubelo,20[6] the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (1)
occupation of anothers real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another person; (2)
violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in usurping the real
right, and (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain. 21[7]
Thus, in order to absolve herself of any liability for the crime, petitioner insists that the elements of
the crime are not present in this case. Specifically, she maintains that she owns the property
involved herein. The matter on the ownership of the lot in question, however, had long been settled
when, in Civil Case No. 3561 (ownership of real property) involving the predecessors-in-interest of
private complainant and that of accused Cases, the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch III,
Thirteenth Judicial Region, adjudicated said lot to private complainants predecessors-in-interest. 22[8]
Further, as established by the commissioner appointed by the trial court to look into petitioners
defense, i.e, she owns the lot subject of this criminal case, the area being claimed by petitioner is the
same area adjudicated in Civil Case No. 3561. Deputy Sheriff A. Anacta, as commissioner, made the
following the report:
Taking the matter in relation to the order of the Honorable Court dated February 1,
1994 which is the basis of this commission, which merely directs the undersigned to
find out if the area claimed by by the accused encroached the area of the plaintiffs,
then, based from the above findings and the herein sketch, it is indeed very clear
that the area claimed by the accused encroached the area of the plaintiffs.23[9]
The foregoing findings of the commissioner was adopted by the trial court and the latter
subsequently convicted petitioner for the crime of usurpation of real property. This findings of the
commissioner was affirmed by the CA stating, thus:
Based on the above findings and the sketch maps submitted, it is clear that the
disputed land which is the red shaded area (Exh. "B-2") is within the boundary of the
land awarded to the complainant in Civil Case No. 3516 [should be 3561]. The issue
of ownership over the land in question having been decided in Civil Case No. 3516
[should be 3561] in favor of the complainant in 1949, the same will not be disturbed.
The accused has to respect the findings of the court. 24[10]
We fully agree with the findings of both the trial court and the CA on the issue of the ownership of the
lot involved in this case. The evidence on record sufficiently refuted petitioners claim of ownership.
The next issue that needs to be resolved is whether the other requisites of the usurpation of real
property are attendant in this case. These two (2) other requisites are: the employment of violence in
acquiring possession over the real property or in usurping the real right and accused was animated
by intent to gain.25[11] On this point, the trial court and the CA ruled in the affirmative citing the
testimony of prosecution witness Bienvenido Delmonte as follows:
x x x Complainants witness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on February 2, 1993
at around 9 oclock in the morning while he was busy working in the agricultural land
which he owns in common with complainant Francisco Delmonte, accused Salvador
Cases and Conchita Quinao, together with their other close relatives suddenly
appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, usurped
and took possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their inheritance
from their ascendants and while there, accused immediately gathered coconuts and
made them into copra. Complainant was forcibly driven out by the accused from their
landholding and was threatened that if he will try to return to the land in question,
something will happen to him. Complainant was thus forced to seek assistance from
the Lapinig Philippine National Police.26[12]
It is well settled that "factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and carry even more
weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court."27[13] Petitioner failed to give
any cogent reason for this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.
Finally, the fact that the judge who tried the case was different from the judge who penned the
decision does not in any way taint the same. Indeed, "the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily
impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the

20[6] 83 SCRA 670 (1978)

21[7] Ibid., p. 674.
22[8] Rollo, pp. 52-54.
23[9] Id., at 38-39.
24[10] See Note 2, p. 6; Rollo, p. 39.
25[11] See Note 6.
26[12] See Note 2.
27[13] Boneng vs. People, 304 SCRA 252 (1999); Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corp. vs. CA, 267 SCRA 653 (1997)

trial, unless there is showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him." 28[14]
There is no such showing in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19412 is affirmed in toto.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

28[14] People vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 (1998)