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G.R. No.

94986

February 23, 1995

HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI, petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
Zamboanga City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to
resume the use of maiden name" (Sp. Proc. No. 06-3). The petition reads:
1.
That she is of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and a resident of Suterville, Zamboanga
City, Philippines, and is duly represented in this act by her elder brother and attorney-in-fact, HADJI
HASAN S. CENTI by virtue of an instrument of a Special Power of Attorney, original copy of which is
hereto attached and marked as Annex "A" hereof;
2.
That she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in
accordance with Muslim rites and customs, and who is now residing at Barangay Recodo,
Zamboanga City, but sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by the
Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law, the divorce rites was
officiated by Ustadz Sharif Jain Jali as evidenced by his Certification, dated march 13, 1984, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "B" to form an integral part hereof;
3.
That, thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another
woman;
WHEREFORE, invoking the provisions of Article 143, par. 1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 in
relation to Article 371 (2) of the New Civil Code, and after due notice and hearing, it is most
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that petitioner be allowed to resume the use of her
maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul.
On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order which reads as follows:
It patently appearing that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and substance in accordance with
Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name
sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names
by which the petitioner has been known (Ng Yao Siong v. Republic of the Philippines, L-20306, March
31, 1966, 16 SCRA [483]; Go v. Republic of the Philippines, L-31760, May 25, 1977; Pabellar v.
Republic, L-27298, march 4, 1976), the pleading must be rectified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby ordered to effect the necessary amendment of the petition within
one (1) week from receipt hereof so as to reflect the formal requirements adverted to. (Rollo, p. 9)
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not
covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden
name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083), and after marriage of her former husband to
another woman.

The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10, 1990, on the ground
that the petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule
103, Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is to be granted as it would result
in the resumption of the use of petitioner's maiden name and surname.
Hence, this petition alleging that respondent court erred in applying Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to
the instant case.
In his Comment dated June 14, 1991, the respondent court, among others, contends:
5.
. . . (R)espondent court is of the honest opinion that the said petition is substantially one for
change of name, particularly of surname Hatima C. Yasin to Hatima Centi y Saul, the latter being
her maiden name and surname. Her reasons: The (1) dissolution of her marriage, and (2) her legal
right to resume the use of her maiden name and surname. In effect, if petition is granted, it will result
in the resumption of the use of her surname.
Moreover, the use of surnames is governed by law (Arts. 364-380, Title XIII, New Civil Code). This is
the substantive requirements. And as to procedural requirements, no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority (Art. 376, Civil Code of the Philippines) (Emphasis supplied).
Change of name under judicial authorization is governed by Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under Sec. 1 of said rule: "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the
Court of First Instance of the province (now RTC) in which he resides, or in the City of Manila, to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." The State has an interest in the names borne by individual
and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right.
Therefore, before a person can be authorized to change his name (given him either in his birth
certificate or civil registry), he must show proper or compelling reason, which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng Oan v. Republic, 102 Phil. 468) (See:
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, 8th Ed., 1978, pp. 739-740). (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
The basic issue to be resolved is: whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce
under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to
another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to
file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.
Stated otherwise, the issue is: whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname
is also a petition for change of name.
The Court rules in the negative.
The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register (Chomi v.
Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 [1956]; Ng Yao Siong v. Republic, 16 SCRA 483 [1966];
Rendora v. Republic, 35 SCRA 262 [1970]; Pabellar v. Republic, 70 SCRA 16 [1976]).
While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official
name recorded in the Civil Register. Thus, this Court in Ng Yao Siong v. Republic (16 SCRA 483
[1966]), held:
In a proceeding for a change of name the following question may crop up: What is the name to be
changed? By Article 408 of the Civil Code a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. So it

is, that the civil register records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal purposes, is his real
name. And correctly so, because the civil register is an official record of the civil status of persons. A
name given to a person in the church record or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community
when at variance with that entered in the civil register is unofficial and cannot be recognized as
his real name.
We therefore rule that for the purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the
Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register.
Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to
change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her
maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a decree of
divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.
Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, as
follows:
Art. 45.
Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in
accordance with this Code to be granted only after exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation
between the spouses. It may be effected by:
(a)

Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

xxx

xxx

(c)

Judicial decree ( faskh).

xxx

Divorce (talaq or faskh) severs the marriage bond. Thus, Article 54 of PD 1086 provides:
Art. 54.
Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it become
irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
(a)
The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in
accordance with this Code;
The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda (Art. 56, PD
1086) the duration of which is 3 monthly courses after termination of the marriage by divorce (Art.
57[b], PD 1083). Under Article 187, PD 1083, the Civil Code of the Philippines, the Rules of Court and
other existing laws, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Code (the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws), shall be applied suppletorily.
Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil
Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art.
373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil
Code). Thus, Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 370.

A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2)

Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or

(3)

Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."

Art. 371.
In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1)

The court decrees otherwise, or

(2)

She or the former husband is married again to another person.

According to Tolentino:
. . . Under the present article of our Code, however, the word "may" is used, indicating that the use of
the husband's surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. We have no law which
provides that the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon marriage. This is in
consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. It seems, therefore, that a married
woman may use only her maiden name and surname. She has an option, but not a duty, to use the
surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by this Article. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. I, p. 724, 1983 ed.)
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her
husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code).
Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband
or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial
confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her
former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.;
Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only
her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her
husband after the marriage as no law requires it.
In view of the foregoing considerations, We find the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed
by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law
requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a
decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right,
nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained.
In view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on
change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to
resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision governing such
a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent proof as annexes,
which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of change of civil status
and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and summarily granted as in
fact it is a right conferred by law.
While the petition filed in the instant case leaves much to be desired in matters of form and averment
of concise statements of ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action, nevertheless,
giving it a most liberal construction, the petition suffices to convey the petitioner's desire and prayer to
resume her maiden surname on grounds of her divorce from her former husband and subsequent
marriage of the latter to another woman.

The remand of this case to the trial court would only delay the final disposition of this case and would
not serve the public interest. We have consistently ruled that the remand of the case to a lower court
for further reception of evidence is not necessary if this Court can already resolve the dispute on the
basis of the records before it (Dimayuga v. PCIB, 200 SCRA 143 [1991]; Board of Liquidators v.
Zulueta, 115 SCRA 548 [1982]: Quisumbing v. CA, 120 SCRA 703 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated July 4, 1990 and
August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to resume her maiden name and
surname.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan,
Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ROMERO, J., concurring:


From birth, a person's identity is established by his name. Although oftener used by others in
addressing him, he identifies himself with this name, such that in his mind, he not only has a name
but he is that name.
Thus, to set him apart from the rest of mankind, he makes certain that people know him by the name
his parents have given him from birth. Recognizing the implications of confused identities, the law
requires the registration of a newly-born infant's name along with the fact of birth reflective of his civil
status. As a badge of identity, one's name is protected by law from usurpation 1 or unauthorized or
unlawful use by others. 2 Not only this, a person is prohibited by law from using different names and
surnames. 3 An alias or assumed name may be used for business purposes provided this is duly
registered. 4 In the event that one employs pen names or stage names, this must be done in good
faith and there should be no injury to third persons. 5 During elections, only votes bearing names
registered by a candidate are to be counted in his favor. Indeed, the man of law parts ways with the
poet who rhetorically asks:
What's in a name?
A rose by any other name smells as sweet.
So fraught with complications is the use of an individual of another name that, in case he decides to
change it, the law requires him to seek judicial permission to do so, even if it be merely to rectify an
error committed in one's birth or baptismal records, unless it be an innocuous clerical error. 6

On instance where tradition or custom, even more than law, sanctions the use of another or an
additional name is the adoption by a woman who gets married of her husband's name. In certain
cultures, this signifies her formal joining of her husband's family, on the one hand, and on the other,
her acceptance therein.
Conceding the importance of laying down rules as regards the use of names resulting from the
contracting of marriage, or its breakup, the Civil Code has provided for each eventuality. For instance,
Art. 370 gives a married woman certain options with respect to the change of name reflective of the
change of her civil status, without need of recourse to judicial process:
It provides:
Art. 370.

A married woman may use:

(1)

Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2)

Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or

(3)
Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
(Emphasis supplied)
It is to be noted that the introductory sentences uses the directory "may" instead of the mandatory
"shall." Its obvious intendment is that the married woman, if she chooses to, need not use her
husband's surname. Clearly, no law prohibits her from continuing to use her maiden name and
surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to resume the same even as she uses her husband's
family name during matrimony, as long as there is disclosure and no fraudulent intent.
In recognition of the increasing clamor of women worldwide for equality, the 1987 Constitution laid
down the basic policy with respect to the standing of women and men in the eyes of the law, thus:
Sec. 14.
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights
accorded by law and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage. To give
substance and meaning to the policy, laws have been enacted by Congress, and rules and
regulations issued by administrative agencies, notably Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the
integration of women as full and equal partners of men in development and nation building. . . ."
Whatever rights or opportunities used to be denied to women in categorical language or due to
ambiguity or implied from long-continued practice or custom, are now clearly granted to them, such
as the right to "enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar
circumstance," 7 equal membership in clubs, 8 admission to military schools, 9 voluntary PAG-IBIG,
GSIS and SSS Coverage 10 and others.
Now that doors hitherto closed to them have been flung open with the approbation and active
collaboration of men, should we refuse to recognize their right to the continued used of their (maiden)
name and surname even after marriage, without doubt a comparatively minor concession? Other than
the bruising of the male ego, there can hardly be any legal injury or damage resulting to personal,
property or contractual rights of the husbands.

In many countries, the trend is for married women to retain their maiden names. Even in the
Philippines, the use of the title "Ms." to refer to women in general, whether single, married, widowed
or separated, has gained acceptance.
Where, however, a woman voluntarily assumes her husband's family name upon marriage, the
dissolution of the matrimonial bonds consequent upon the granting of absolute divorce or the
declaration of nullity of marriage or its annulment, provides legal ground for the automatic dropping of
said family name and the resumption of the use of her maiden name. This is but in recognition of the
change of her civil status from "married" to "unmarried." Such right should not be begrudged her,
whether her former husband contracts another union or not.
I could not agree more with the enlightened ponencia of my respected colleague who, being a Muslim
like the petitioner, is in the best position to understand the customs, mores and practices, as well as
the feelings of the men and women of his faith.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, on his well-written ponencia.
Allow me, nonetheless, to express my views, in general, on the use of surnames by married women.
The accepted rule is that a person may only use his own name and surname. One exception involves
a married woman. When a woman marries, the law, or what I believe to be its intendment, would
appear to mandate, in brief outline, thusly
A.

During the existence of the marriage, she may choose to use any of the following names:

(1)

Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2)

Her maiden first name and husband's surname, or

(3)
Her husband's full name but must prefix a word to indicate that she is his wife (Art. 370, Civil
Code).
Notes:
(1)
It is mandatory that the husband's surname should, in any of the above options, be somehow
used.
Interestingly, in one of the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee at the U.P. Law Center
(participated in by Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, Justice Ricardo C. Puno, Justice Eduardo Caguioa,
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Atty. Ofelia Calcetes-Santos, Dean Fortunato Gupit and Dean Jose C.
Vitug), a proposal to allow a married woman to use her maiden name and surname (after noting the
provision of Sec. 14, Article II, of the Constitution which expresses the "fundamental equality before
the law of women and men") was turned down by the Committee.
(2)
In case of legal separation, the wife must continue using her name and surname employed
before the decree of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code), i.e., she may not at will revert to her
maiden name and surname (Laperal vs. Republic, 6 SCRA 357).
B.

In the event of annulment of marriage

(1)
but

If the wife is adjudged to be the guilty party, she must resume her maiden name and surname,

(2)

If the wife is the innocent party

(i)

She may resume her maiden name and surname, or

(ii)

She may choose o continue using her husband's surname unless

(a)

The court decrees otherwise, or

(b)

She or he remarries (Art. 371, Civil Code).

C.
In case of death of the husband The widow may use her husband's surname (Art. 373, Civil
Code), or resume her maiden name and surname (pursuant to the general rule).
D.

In case of divorce

The rule has been held to be akin to Item C (death of husband), i.e., she may use her husband's
surname (Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66) or resume her maiden name and surname
(general rule).
Note: It would seem preferable to have this situation governed instead by the rules on annulment
where we would distinguish between a case where the wife gives cause for divorce (annulment) and
the instance when she is the innocent party.
E.
In case of declaration of nullity of marriage No marriage having, or being deemed to have,
technically existed, the general rule, i.e., that she may only use her own name and surname, should
apply, but if she has, in fact, theretofore used the husband's surname, she obviously should cease
from such use upon the finality of the decree of nullity.

Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J., concurring:
From birth, a person's identity is established by his name. Although oftener used by others in
addressing him, he identifies himself with this name, such that in his mind, he not only has a name
but he is that name.
Thus, to set him apart from the rest of mankind, he makes certain that people know him by the name
his parents have given him from birth. Recognizing the implications of confused identities, the law
requires the registration of a newly-born infant's name along with the fact of birth reflective of his civil
status. As a badge of identity, one's name is protected by law from usurpation 1 or unauthorized or
unlawful use by others. 2 Not only this, a person is prohibited by law from using different names and
surnames. 3 An alias or assumed name may be used for business purposes provided this is duly
registered. 4 In the event that one employs pen names or stage names, this must be done in good
faith and there should be no injury to third persons. 5 During elections, only votes bearing names

registered by a candidate are to be counted in his favor. Indeed, the man of law parts ways with the
poet who rhetorically asks:
What's in a name?
A rose by any other name smells as sweet.
So fraught with complications is the use of an individual of another name that, in case he decides to
change it, the law requires him to seek judicial permission to do so, even if it be merely to rectify an
error committed in one's birth or baptismal records, unless it be an innocuous clerical error. 6
On instance where tradition or custom, even more than law, sanctions the use of another or an
additional name is the adoption by a woman who gets married of her husband's name. In certain
cultures, this signifies her formal joining of her husband's family, on the one hand, and on the other,
her acceptance therein.
Conceding the importance of laying down rules as regards the use of names resulting from the
contracting of marriage, or its breakup, the Civil Code has provided for each eventuality. For instance,
Art. 370 gives a married woman certain options with respect to the change of name reflective of the
change of her civil status, without need of recourse to judicial process:
It provides:
Art. 370.

A married woman may use:

(1)

Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2)

Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or

(3)
Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
(Emphasis supplied)
It is to be noted that the introductory sentences uses the directory "may" instead of the mandatory
"shall." Its obvious intendment is that the married woman, if she chooses to, need not use her
husband's surname. Clearly, no law prohibits her from continuing to use her maiden name and
surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to resume the same even as she uses her husband's
family name during matrimony, as long as there is disclosure and no fraudulent intent.
In recognition of the increasing clamor of women worldwide for equality, the 1987 Constitution laid
down the basic policy with respect to the standing of women and men in the eyes of the law, thus:
Sec. 14.
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights
accorded by law and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage. To give
substance and meaning to the policy, laws have been enacted by Congress, and rules and
regulations issued by administrative agencies, notably Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the
integration of women as full and equal partners of men in development and nation building. . . ."
Whatever rights or opportunities used to be denied to women in categorical language or due to
ambiguity or implied from long-continued practice or custom, are now clearly granted to them, such

as the right to "enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar
circumstance," 7 equal membership in clubs, 8 admission to military schools, 9 voluntary PAG-IBIG,
GSIS and SSS Coverage 10 and others.
Now that doors hitherto closed to them have been flung open with the approbation and active
collaboration of men, should we refuse to recognize their right to the continued used of their (maiden)
name and surname even after marriage, without doubt a comparatively minor concession? Other than
the bruising of the male ego, there can hardly be any legal injury or damage resulting to personal,
property or contractual rights of the husbands.
In many countries, the trend is for married women to retain their maiden names. Even in the
Philippines, the use of the title "Ms." to refer to women in general, whether single, married, widowed
or separated, has gained acceptance.
Where, however, a woman voluntarily assumes her husband's family name upon marriage, the
dissolution of the matrimonial bonds consequent upon the granting of absolute divorce or the
declaration of nullity of marriage or its annulment, provides legal ground for the automatic dropping of
said family name and the resumption of the use of her maiden name. This is but in recognition of the
change of her civil status from "married" to "unmarried." Such right should not be begrudged her,
whether her former husband contracts another union or not.
I could not agree more with the enlightened ponencia of my respected colleague who, being a Muslim
like the petitioner, is in the best position to understand the customs, mores and practices, as well as
the feelings of the men and women of his faith.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, on his well-written ponencia.
Allow me, nonetheless, to express my views, in general, on the use of surnames by married women.
The accepted rule is that a person may only use his own name and surname. One exception involves
a married woman. When a woman marries, the law, or what I believe to be its intendment, would
appear to mandate, in brief outline, thusly
A.

During the existence of the marriage, she may choose to use any of the following names:

(1)

Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2)

Her maiden first name and husband's surname, or

(3)
Her husband's full name but must prefix a word to indicate that she is his wife (Art. 370, Civil
Code).
Notes:
(1)
It is mandatory that the husband's surname should, in any of the above options, be somehow
used.
Interestingly, in one of the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee at the U.P. Law Center
(participated in by Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, Justice Ricardo C. Puno, Justice Eduardo Caguioa,
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Atty. Ofelia Calcetes-Santos, Dean Fortunato Gupit and Dean Jose C.
Vitug), a proposal to allow a married woman to use her maiden name and surname (after noting the

provision of Sec. 14, Article II, of the Constitution which expresses the "fundamental equality before
the law of women and men") was turned down by the Committee.
(2)
In case of legal separation, the wife must continue using her name and surname employed
before the decree of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code), i.e., she may not at will revert to her
maiden name and surname (Laperal vs. Republic, 6 SCRA 357).
B.

In the event of annulment of marriage

(1)
but

If the wife is adjudged to be the guilty party, she must resume her maiden name and surname,

(2)

If the wife is the innocent party

(i)

She may resume her maiden name and surname, or

(ii)

She may choose o continue using her husband's surname unless

(a)

The court decrees otherwise, or

(b)

She or he remarries (Art. 371, Civil Code).

C.
In case of death of the husband The widow may use her husband's surname (Art. 373, Civil
Code), or resume her maiden name and surname (pursuant to the general rule).
D.

In case of divorce

The rule has been held to be akin to Item C (death of husband), i.e., she may use her husband's
surname (Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66) or resume her maiden name and surname
(general rule).
Note: It would seem preferable to have this situation governed instead by the rules on annulment
where we would distinguish between a case where the wife gives cause for divorce (annulment) and
the instance when she is the innocent party.
E.
In case of declaration of nullity of marriage No marriage having, or being deemed to have,
technically existed, the general rule, i.e., that she may only use her own name and surname, should
apply, but if she has, in fact, theretofore used the husband's surname, she obviously should cease
from such use upon the finality of the decree of nullity.

DIGEST:
FACTS:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to
resume the use of maiden name. The respondent court ordered amendments to the petition as it was
not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence
of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which
should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the

dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,
and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion
since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the
resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name and surname.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former desires
to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and
comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her
husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code).
Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband
or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial
confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her
former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband,
she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial
authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the
husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the
husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.
The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the
respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her
former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in
accordance with Muslim laws.

[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1351. September 3, 1998]


SARAH B. VEDAA, complainant, vs. JUDGE EUDARLIO B. VALENCIA, respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Respondent Judge Eudarlio B. Valencia, Presiding Judge of Branch 222 (Quezon City) of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, was charged with gross misconduct and
immoral acts by complainant Sarah B. Vedaa in a sworn letter dated 15 May 1996 addressed to the
Chief Justice through then Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis.
Complainant serves as the court interpreter in respondent's court, and at the same time, is distantly
related to respondent as their maternal grandmothers are first cousins.
Complainant narrated the factual basis of her charge thus:
On May 8, 1996 on or about 2:00 p.m. before the start of the scheduled hearing of cases, the
undersigned complainant in her capacity as a court employee, being a Court Interpreter knocked at
the door of the chamber of the respondent, opened the door to inform the respondent that the cases
scheduled for hearing are ready. At this juncture, respondent directed the undersigned to come in
said chamber. Being a subordinate and thinking that instructions will be given, I did [sic] complied and
went inside the chamber. When I was standing beside his table awaiting for instructions, respondent
held my hands. Bearing in mind that the respondent is a relative and the holding of my hand was
without malice, I did not make any reaction. It was only when my hand was held for quite sometime
and sensing ulterior motive, I pulled my hand. Respondent stood up from his chair, hugged me and
tried to kiss me on the lips which I was able to evade and his lips landed on my cheek.
Feeling totally shocked by the actuation of the respondent and considering that he is a relative, I ran
out from the chamber and went to my office table to have a relief [sic]. With the dastardly acts
committed in the person of the herein complainant that caused mental anguish, a request was made
on my co-employee, Mr. Eduard Lorenzo to take my place in the court hearing.
In the resolution of 15 July 1996, we required respondent to comment on the complaint and, upon
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, placed him under preventive suspension
and referred the case to Associate Justice Delilah V. Magtolis of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On 13 August 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of his preventive
suspension and asked to have it lifted as he was entitled to: (a) the presumption of innocence against
a false and fabricated administrative complaint; and (b) due process of law. Moreover, the lifting of
[the] suspension order will not affect the impartial investigation of [the] case; and the suspension
order will create a false impression of guilt.
On 15 August 1996, respondent filed his Comment (cum Motion to Dismiss) wherein, as his defense,
he alleged that: (a) the commission of the alleged misconduct is inherently and highly improbable;

and (b) the complaint is motivated by [a] personal grudge. He then prayed once more that the
suspension order be lifted.
In the resolution of 2 September 1996, we noted the motion for reconsideration and referred the
comment to the designated investigating Justice, Mme. Justice Magtolis, who was directed to conduct
the investigation and submit her report and recommendation within ninety (90) days.
On 19 September 1996, complainant filed her reply to respondents comment. She asserted that the
denial of respondent could not prevail over her clear and positive assertion and that she could have
never been motivated by a personal grudge; if, indeed, respondent had not committed the imputed
acts, he would not have requested immediate common relatives, such as the Mayor of Masbate,
together with Fiscal Narciso Resero, Jr., to mediate and seek her forgiveness.
On 7 October 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Second Motion to Lift Indefinite Preventive
Suspension.
On 14 October 1996, we granted the inhibition of Mme. Justice Magtolis because her daughter and
respondents son were batchmates in law school and re-assigned the case to Mme. Justice Portia A.
Hormachuelos for investigation, report and recommendation. However, the latter requested that she
be allowed to inhibit herself to avoid being "misinterpreted" in view of her recommendation in another
case involving sexual harassment by a judge which resulted in the latter's dismissal from the service.
On 22 January 1997, we granted the request and designated Mr. Justice Romeo A. Brawner of the
Court of Appeals the investigating Justice.
On 7 March 1997, we required Mr. Justice Brawner to furnish a report and recommendation on
respondents Urgent Second Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension; and in his Report and
Recommendation filed on 2 April 1997, Justice Brawner recommended that the motion be granted.
On 28 April 1997, we approved Justice Brawner's recommendation and lifted respondent's preventive
suspension.
Justice Brawner conducted hearings and received the evidence for the parties. Thereafter, on 13 May
1998, he submitted his Report and Recommendation, wherein he disclosed that the tedious
hearing[s] starting on March 5, 1997 and ending on December 10, 1997 piled up 2,432 pages of
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the eleven (11) trial dates when complainant and her
witnesses Marife Opulencia, Joselito Bacolod and Vife Legaspi, and respondent and his witnesses
Bernardo Mortel and Neri G. Loi testified; and made the following findings of fact and conclusions:
The complainant is the Court Interpreter while the respondent is the Presiding Judge, of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 222 at Quezon City.
On May 8, 1996 at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, as was her want to do, the complainant went
to the respondent Judges chamber to inform him that the cases were ready for trial. She knocked on
the door and upon being told to enter, she poked her head inside the room and told the respondent
that the parties were all present. The respondent however, called her inside the chamber and bidding
to the request, she went in and stood beside his table. The respondent then held her right hand and
tried to kiss her on the lips. However, she evaded the kiss and it landed on her cheek. The
respondent then held her left breast. In her struggle to beak free of the respondents hold, the pen she
held in her hand fell to the floor. She was able to free herself, hence she picked up the pen and left
the room in a hurry. No one was in the staff room when she went out and she went straight to the
courtroom to perform her duties as Court Interpreter. The rest of the staff were already at their
respective stations awaiting the Judges entrance. Feeling shocked at what happened, the

complainant approached Eduardo Lorenzo who was then on apprenticeship training in the court and
asked him to help her do the interpreting just in case the need would arise. Eduardo Lorenzo acceded
to her request. The complainant, however, remained in the courtroom during the entire session
except for a few minutes when she went out to the staff room to get a needed record.
During the whole time that she was inside the courtroom, the complainant never revealed what
happened. When the court session was over however at around 4:30 oclock in the afternoon, she
approached the court stenographer, Vife Legaspi, and asked her if she was going somewhere.
Receiving a negative answer, the complainant requested her to accompany her (complainant) to
Shoemart Shopping Mall (SM). They took a cab and while inside and on their way to SM, the
complainant could not hold it any longer and the dam broke. The complainant was hysterical,
trembling and crying at the same time when she told Vife Legaspi that something terrible happened.
She narrated what the respondent Judge did to her inside the chamber. Upon reaching SM, the two
ladies stayed at a fast food restaurant where they sat conversing for around 3 hours on what the
complainant should do about the incident.
While at SM, the complainant called her best friend and classmate at the Manuel Luis Quezon
University College of Law, Marife Opulencia.
Marife Opulencia recalls receiving a call from the complainant at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of
May 8, 1996. She was then in her office working overtime when a distraught complainant who could
hardly speak called her up. She then told the complainant to calm down, take a deep breath and
relate what happened. Crying over the phone, the complainant narrated what the respondent Judge
did to her. Marife Opulencia advised the complainant to go home to her parents and tell them what
happened as it was a family matter, the respondent Judge being a distant relative of the complainant.
The complainant then went home to Dagupan City and informed her parents who were both shocked
at what happened considering that the respondent Judge was a distant relative on complainants
maternal side and a colleague, complainants father being a Judge in Dagupan City.
The following day, May 9, 1996, the complainants mother went with her back to Manila as the former
wanted to talk to the respondent Judge about what happened. However, that day was the sports
festival of the RTCs in Quezon City and thus it was not a working day. The respondent Judge was not
around and hence there was no occasion for complainants mother to talk to him.
Because of the incident, the complainant could not face going back to work at Branch 222 and hence
she went on leave from May 10, to June 10, 1996. She subsequently requested that she be detailed
elsewhere, which letter-request, although citing a different cause for the detail, was approved and
thus she was detailed in the office of Judge Amelia R. Andrade of the RTC, Branch 5 in Manila.
Wanting the respondent Judge to face sanction[s] for his unbecoming behavior, the complainant
instituted the present charges for Gross Misconduct and Immoral Acts.
In her complaint, complainant stated that the respondent Judge made attempts to try to dissuade her
from continuing with her charges. She presented a common relative, Joselito Bacolod, to prove this.
Joselito Bacolod testified that respondent Judge is a grandson of his mother while complainant is his
niece, complainants mother being his older sister. Sometime during the last week of June, 1996, the
respondent Judge paid a visit to Joselito Bacolods mother. His mother then called for him and his
elder brother. The respondent Judge then requested all of them to go to Dagupan City and try to
persuade the complainant and her parents to drop the case against him as he was retiring from the
service in two years time. When asked why he would do such a thing to a relative, the respondent

Judge stated that it was only a fatherly kiss and besides, it was complainants hair that he kissed as
her perfume smelled good. The respondent Judge gave Joselito Bacolod P1,000.00 for the use of his
taxi to go to Dagupan City.
Respondent Judge absolutely denied all charges against him. He categorically asserted that on that
day at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, he was inside his chamber waiting to be called if the cases were
ready. The complainant then came and knocked on his door and entered informing him that the cases
were ready for trial. He then prepared himself and stood up and got his robe which was hanging on
the wall and as soon as the complainant went out of his chamber, he followed, entered the courtroom
and heard the cases that day.
He recalls that the complainant applied and was appointed as Court Stenographer in 1995 but she
never did any courtroom duty as such causing him to believe that she was not proficient at
stenography. She then transferred to the position of Court Interpreter sometime in October, 1995.
The respondent admits that indeed he and the complainant are distant relatives as their maternal
grandmothers are first cousins and that they visit each others families.
The respondent further declares that the complainant came to him and requested that she be detailed
somewhere near Manuel Luis Quezon University where she is a law student as she has difficulty
commuting from the office to school. However, the respondent did not agree to a detail as the position
would not be vacant and his court would be without an Interpreter. He did agree to a transfer so he
could fill in the vacancy and not unduly paralyze the operations of his office.
As he denied the request for detail, he surmised that this might have prompted the complainant to file
this false and malicious charges [sic] against him.
The complainant did not report for work after May 8, 1996 and he was informed by the Clerk of Court
that she was on leave until June 10, 1996. However, after the said date, the complainant did not yet
put in an appearance so he recommended that she be declared absent without official leave (AWOL).
He only found out about the case against him on August 9, 1996 when he was required by the
Supreme Court to comment on the complaint at the same time putting him on preventive suspension.
Coming to his defense are two of his staff, Bernardo Mortel, the Process Server and Neri G. Loi, the
Sheriff IV. Both executive an affidavit stating that because the Chambers door remained open, we
saw Ms. Sarah Vedana and the Judge conversing and we did not see any untoward incident
happening inside the chamber, much less the Judge allegedly hugging and kissing Ms. Sarah Vedana
(Joint Affidavit, Exhibit 23). Further, both claimed that they voluntarily executed the affidavit without
any prodding nor pressure from the respondent.
With these facts presented, the Investigating Justice has thoroughly sifted through the voluminous
transcript of records to separate the material from the immaterial facts, the true [sic] from the fiction.
Amidst all the complainants assertions and the respondents counter-statements, one thing stands
out: that the incident did happen the way the complainant said it be [sic].
First, the complainant narrated her story complete with details. She narrated basically the same story
without any change to her best friend and to the stenographer as soon as she was able to. Although
the respondent questions the time lapse between the actual happening of the incident to the time the
complainant narrated her story to the stenographer, this cannot be taken against her. She was aware
that she had duties to attend to considering the absence of the Clerk of Court and the Legal
Researcher. She could not have left right after the incident nor go blurting it out as there were cases

ready for trial. Thus, as soon as it was possible, she revealed it to the stenographer, Vife Legaspi,
who claimed that the complainant was hysterical, crying and angry at the time that she relayed the
incident. She did not even wait for them to reach their destination as she vent [sic] it out during their
taxi ride to SM.
Again when she called her friend Marife Opulencia, the latter manifested that she was crying and was
not able to talk such that she (Marife) advised her to take a deep breath and calm down. If it is true
that she was just making up the story, then she must have been the consummate actress as she
could even fake her emotions and her hysteria.
Second, the respondent claims that the reason for the filing of the charges against him is his refusal
to grant complainants request that she be detailed in some other office nearer her school. There is
something wrong with this reasoning. The complainant lodged her complaint against the respondent
on May 15, 1996 with the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court. Subsequently
because of what happened, she could no longer report back to her workplace and hence she made
the letter-request asking that she be detailed elsewhere using the difficulty of commuting as her
excuse. The respondent Judge recommended the denial of the request in his 2nd Indorsement dated
July 18, 1996, which is more than 2 months after the incident on May 8, 1996.
If we follow the reasoning of the respondent that the charges were an offshoot of the denial of
complainants request, how come the denial came long after the incident happened and long after the
charges were already filed? It would appear that the complainant is psychic as she knew her request
would be denied and so to get even, she filed the complaint way ahead of the yet-to-come denial. The
respondent Judges reasoning defies logic.
Third, both complainant and respondent agree that they are distant relatives who maintain friendly
and close relations and who exchange favors with each other. Filipino families are close-knit and
would rather keep skeletons in the closet than air dirty linen in public. However, in this instance,
complainant disregarded the close family ties, disregarded the relationship and went on to denounce
the respondent for his act. Why would she go to the extent of breaking up friendly relations between
relatives for no apparent reason? Unless, of course, that her charges against the respondent are true
that she feels she has to right a wrong against her committed by the very person who she should look
up to as her protector.
Her act of revealing what happened to her despite the tension it may create between their families,
despite the break-up of family relations, bespeaks the truth that indeed the respondent Judge
committed such a dastardly act upon her person.
Amidst this unfazed accusation hurdled against the respondent, he denies it all. But his denial is a
feeble attempt to exculpate him from the wrongdoing he is accused of. The clear assertion of the
complainant and that of her witnesses prevails over the denial of the respondent.
What must have possessed the respondent Judge to commit such an act against his very own
relative is difficult to comprehend. Was his lust too great that he would take it out on his helpless
female relative in the hope that being a relative, it would not leak out as some things are better kept
within the family? He did not reckon that the complainant would defy family relations and bare all if
only to put a stop to respondents shenanigan [sic], isolated though it may be.
Being a person cloaked with authority to uphold the law, the respondent Judge should be the first to
be circumspect in his behavior. As held in Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. V.[sic] Tapucar,
102 SCRA 494:

The personal and official actuations of every member of the Bench must be beyond reproach and
above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the public in the administration of justice cannot be
maintained if a Judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral
integrity, and if he obtusely continues to commit an affront to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is
more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the Judiciary. x x x
This Investigation [sic] Justice believes that based on the facts and the law, the respondent Judge
should be meted out a punishment.
Justice Brawner then recommended:
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent GUILTY of the complaint [sic] filed against him, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that respondent Judge EUDARLIO B. VALENCIA be
suspended from office for sixty (60) days without pay.
The main issue in this case is factual and depends on the assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses, a function which is primarily lodged in the investigating Justice. The rule which concedes
due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and
criminal cases where preponderance of evidence[1] and proof beyond reasonable doubt,[2]
respectively, are required, applies, a fortiori, in administrative cases where the quantum of proof
required is only substantial evidence.[3] The trial judge is in a better position to determine whether the
witnesses are telling the truth or lying considering that the latter are in his immediate presence and
can thus hear the witnesses themselves and observe their deportment and manner of testifying.
Unless it be shown that the judge has plainly overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts
or circumstances of weight and substance which, if otherwise taken into account, would alter the
result, or it be clearly shown to be arbitrary, his evaluation of the credibility of a witness should be
upheld.[4] We find no room to accommodate the exception to the rule in the case of Justice Brawner's
assessment, which we find to be a meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the
complainant, the respondent and their respective witnesses.
While we concur, without reservation, with Justice Brawners factual findings, we are, however, unable
to adopt his recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed, which we find too light in view of the
gravity, nature and import of the offense as to complainant and the Judiciary.
It is truly beyond us what possessed respondent Judge to commit acts which may be deemed
deplorable, to say the least, against complainant, who, although a distant relative in legal
contemplation, was from a family with whom respondent admittedly maintained friendly and close
relations. If this were a criminal prosecution and assuming that the procedural and evidentiary
requirements had been complied with, respondent would be found guilty of, at least, unjust vexation,
as defined by and penalized in Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
As it stands, respondents violation of complainants personhood, coupled with his being a public
official, holding a position in the Judiciary and specifically entrusted with the sacred duty of
administering justice, breached Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics which mandate, respectively, that "a judge should avoid impropriety and appearance
of impropriety in all activities," and that "a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance
of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." These most exacting standards of
decorum are demanded from magistrates if only, in the language of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, to "promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
The spirit and philosophy underlying these Canons is best expressed in Castillo v. Calanog[5]thus:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior
outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very
recently explained, a judge's official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence: Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior
of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.[6]
Verily, no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any
individual than a seat on the Bench. Within the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important
and visible symbol of government, especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial
court judges are those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities which
the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of
justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must
comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the
most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.[7] In
insulating the Bench from unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our democratic way of life, it is
essential that judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion.
That the acts complained of were committed within respondent's sanctum in his court and without any
third party to witness the commission likewise compounded the reprehensible nature of respondent's
malfeasance. By daring to violate complainant within the sanctity and secrecy of his chambers,
respondent did the utmost violence to complainant within a place which, properly viewed, is an
integral part of a temple of justice -- in his court.
Respondent judge likewise violated Canon 22 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which exhorts a judge to
be "studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing
example to others." In De la Paz v. Inutan,[8] we held that the judge is the visible representation of the
law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, people draw their will and awareness to obey the law.
They see in him an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests. Thus, for the judge to
earn and reciprocate the respect, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for
others to follow. As such, he should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the
law.
Indeed, when a judge himself becomes a transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply in
appropriate cases before him, or before any court for that matter, as where he commits any crime
punished by the Revised Penal Code or special laws, he places his office in disrepute, encourages
disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary itself, as well as
the legal system.
Before closing, it is apropos to discuss the implications of the enactment of R.A. No. 7877[9] or the
Anti-Sexual Harassment Law to the Judiciary. Under our system of governance, the very tenets of our
republican democracy presuppose that the will of the people is expressed, in large part, through the
statutes passed by the Legislature. Thus, the Court, in instances such as these, may take judicial
notice of the heightened sensitivity of the people to gender-related issues as manifested through

legislative issuances. It would not be remiss to point out that no less than the Constitution itself has
expressly recognized the invaluable contributions of the womens sector to national development,[10]
thus the need to provide women with a working environment conducive to productivity and befitting
their dignity.[11]
In the community of nations, there was a time when discrimination was institutionalized through the
legalization of now prohibited practices. Indeed, even within this century, persons were discriminated
against merely because of gender, creed or the color of their skin, to the extent that the validity of
human beings being treated as mere chattel was judicially upheld in other jurisdictions. But in
humanitys march towards a more refined sense of civilization, the law has stepped in and seen it fit to
condemn this type of conduct for, at bottom, history reveals that the moving force of civilization has
been to realize and secure a more humane existence. Ultimately, this is what humanity as a whole
seeks to attain as we strive for a better quality of life or higher standard of living. Thus, in our nations
very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of
sexual harassment or hazing,[12] acts previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal. In
disciplining erring judges and personnel of the Judiciary then, this Court can do no less.
Plainly, respondent's conduct against complainant, a woman young enough to be his daughter or
niece, violated numerous Canons of judicial decorum. Respondents indiscretions may be deemed, for
the lack of more forceful and emphatic words, grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of an officer of
the Judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service. The penalty of suspension
from office, without pay, for one (1) year is in order, this being his first offense.
If only to underscore respondents temerity, he even attempted to insult the intelligence of this Court
and its Members by claiming ill motive on the part of complainant in filing this suit, but the folly of his
charge was so readily exposed by Justice Brawner.
WHEREFORE, for violations of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons 3 and 22 of the
Code of Judicial Ethics which amount to grave misconduct, conduct becoming an officer of the
Judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, respondent Judge EUDARLIO B.
VALENCIA, Presiding Judge, Branch 222 (Quezon City), National Capital Judicial Region, is
SUSPENDED from the office, without pay, for ONE (1) YEAR, with the period of preventive
suspension he has thus served so far being credited to him in the service of said penalty.
SO ORDERED.

DIGEST:
Facts:
On May 8, 1996, before the start of the scheduled hearing of cases, Sarah Vedana as a Court
Interpreter knocked at the door of the chamber of Judge Valencia. She opened the door to inform the
judge that the cases scheduled for hearing are ready. Judge Valencia directed the Sarah to come in
said chamber. Being a subordinate and thinking that instructions will be given, she complied and went
inside the chamber. When she was standing beside his table awaiting for instructions, the judge held
her hands. Since they were distantly related, Sarah did not react since she thought it was without
malice. It was only when her hand was held for quite some time, she sensed the judges ulterior
motive. So she pulled her hand and the judge stood up from his chair, hugged her and tried to kiss
her on the lips which she was able to evade and so his lips landed on her cheek. The judge then held
her left breast until Sarah was able to free herself.

Issue:
Whether or not the conduct of Judge Valencia is acceptable in Judicial ethics.
Ruling:
No. Judge Valencia breached Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which mandate, respectively, that "a judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of
impropriety in all activities," and that "a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." In order to "promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary" as stated in Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
Judge Valencia has also violated Canon 22 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which exhorts a judge to be
"studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing
example to others." For the judge to earn and reciprocate the respect, he must be the first to abide by
the law and weave an example for others to follow. As such, he should be studiously careful to avoid
even the slightest infraction of the law. Indeed, when a judge becomes a transgressor of any law, he
places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the
integrity of the Judiciary itself, as well as the legal system.

[G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]


GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA
ALMONTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care,
including appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth.[1] In case of assault on his rights
by those who take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with
the single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte,
and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989.[2]
After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas parents in Fairview, Quezon City.[3] Almost a year
later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.[4]
Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19,
1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy.
[5] He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had
married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled.[6] Gerardo also found out that Mario
was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.[7]
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that
the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.[8]
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married
Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be
an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo
was granted visitation rights.[9]
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him
responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above
decision INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called
visitation rights between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday.[10] She argued
that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an
illegitimate child.[11] She further maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from
Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the
mothers surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of Concepcion as
Jose Gerardos surname.

Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas motion and made
the following observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the other, something
they should never do if they want to assure the normal development and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father, especially as he
is a boy, who must have a father figure to recognize something that the mother alone cannot give.
Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and psychological well-being of the boy would be
better served if he were allowed to maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this matter, the Court
invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, to wit:
In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be
the paramount consideration.
WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby DENIED.[12]
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the trial court
granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardos surname
(Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been declared illegitimate and should
therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.[13]
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a putative father
visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the best interest of the child
policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that [a]t bottom, it (was) the childs welfare and not the
convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting visitation rights a few
hours once a week.[14]
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mothers surname motu
proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a separate proceeding for a change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil registry.[15]
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the appellate
court. She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate the
issues involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court
resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was
not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case that the appellant [Ma. Theresa]
was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee
[Gerardo] since the so-called marriage with the latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who
had established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao
when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo
under the law is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and
Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent marriage

between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and
existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently,
[she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child
Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal
basis (even supposing the child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend
to destroy the existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible
rapproachment between the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate
relationship.[16]
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose
Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth certificate showing that he was born
a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that various evidence exist that appellee and the
appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein, We
cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy
or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate
status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the
law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his
status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed
father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was
denied.[18] Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.[19] Article 164 of the Family Code is clear.
A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.[20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child[21] and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.[22] We explained
the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals[23]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the
policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to
dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case,[25] his
heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.[26] Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.[27]
Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became
her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception.[28] To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the
Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have
enabled the husband to father the child.[29] Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal
access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.[30]
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical
impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child.[31]
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital
intimacy impossible.[32] This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or
provinces and they were never together during the period of conception.[33] Or, the husband was in
prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the
violation of prison regulations.[34]
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City,
Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only
a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was
presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the
separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it
physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be
presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario,
stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer[35] to the petition for annulment of
marriage[36] that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never
any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.
Gerardos argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario
but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration an avowal by the mother that her child is
illegitimate is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her
child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance
where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no
intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that
nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose
Gerardos conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity

to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was
never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right
exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs.[37] A mother has no right to disavow
a child because maternity is never uncertain.[38] Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to
question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no
intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate.[39] The proscription is in
consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law
to lean toward the legitimacy of children.[40]
Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and in
the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and
agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that
the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to
allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the
denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which
the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.[41]
Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in
this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall
not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.[42]
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth.[43] Although a
record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child,[44] as the
status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy
of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the
termination of marriage is sought to be established.[45]
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be
contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs.
Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.[46] As
prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant
evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein
by the interested parties.[47] Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose
Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is
also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardos
illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the childs interests at heart. The law, reason and
common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law,
the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both
his father and mother, full support and full inheritance.[48] On the other hand, an illegitimate child is

bound to use the surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim
support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate
counterpart.[49] Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the
eyes of society, a bastard is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to
state, the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the very
persons who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was made
to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent
child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these proceedings began. He is now
almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now comes to his
aid to write finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames.[50] A persons
surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to
child.[51] Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law,
not related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil
register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights
flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each others company. There being no such
parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose
Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a
signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years.[52] Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the
end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be

impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this
case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST:
VER 1
G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29, 1989.
They lived in Fairview, Quezon City and a year later on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to
Jose Gerardo.
On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the
ground of bigamy, alleging that her marriage with Mario Gopiao on December 10, 198- was never
annulled. Although Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario, she averred that the marriage was a
sham and that she have never lived with Mario at all.
The trial court said otherwise, and ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and
subsisting, thus declaring her marriage to Gerardo as void ab initio. It deemed Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation
rights. Also, it allowed the child to use the surname of his father.
Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for the reverse of the courts decisions. The Court of Appeals
ruled that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first
marriage considering the fact that the second marriage was void from the beginning. Therefore, the
child Jose Gerardo under the law is the child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma.
Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
Gerardo Concepcion moved for the reconsideration of the decision.
Issue:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gopiao or the illegimate child of Ma.
Theresa and Gerardo.
Held:
The child, Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised as per Art. 164 of the Family Code which
states, A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. It is fully
supported by Art. 167 of the Family Code which states, The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of the legitimacy.
It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became
her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. The minor
cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even
much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or
illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. It should be what
the law says and not what a parent says it is. Additionally, public policy demands that there be no
compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those
who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. Also, there
being no such parent-child relationship between the child and Gerardo, Gerardo has no legally
demandable right to visit the child.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the
end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this
case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage. The child, by
reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including
appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth. In case of assault on his rights by those who
take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the singleminded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Gerardo is hereby DENIED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondents is AFFIRMED.

VER 2:
FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in
December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on
December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife
married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was
still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and
the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued
that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an
illegitimate child. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from Concepcion to
Almonte, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the
requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo
but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.

HELD:
Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the
formers husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas
contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her
illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because
maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy.
Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the
best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a
legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity
with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used
by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way.

KAREN VERTIDO CASE


In 1996, Karen Tayag Vertido worked as Executive Director of the Davao City Chamber of Commerce
and Industry in the Philippines. She filed a complaint against the then President of the Chamber,
Jose B. Custodio, accusing him of raping her. She alleged that the accused offered her a lift home
following a business meeting one evening and that, instead, raped her in a nearby hotel.
In April 2005, after the case had languished in the trial court for eight years, Judge Virginia HofileaEuropa acquitted the accused of raping Ms Vertido, citing insufficient evidence to prove beyond all
reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty of the offence charged.
Her Honour based her
decision to acquit on a number of guiding principles from other rape cases and her unfavourable
assessment of the Ms Vertidos testimony based, among other things, on her failure to take
advantage of perceived opportunities to escape from the accused.
Ms Vertido subsequently submitted a communication to the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee). She alleged that the acquittal of Mr Custodio
breached the right to non-discrimination, the right to an effective remedy, and the freedom from
wrongful gender stereotyping, in violation of articles 2(c), 2(d), 2(f) and 5(a) of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
In her communication, Ms Vertido claimed that the trial judges decision had no basis in law or fact,
but was grounded in gender-based myths and misconceptions about rape and rape victims
without which the accused would have been convicted. She further claimed that a decision
grounded in gender-based myths and misconceptions or one rendered in bad faith can hardly be
considered as one rendered by a fair, impartial and competent tribunal, and that the Philippines had
failed in its obligation to ensure that women are protected against discrimination by public authorities,
including the judiciary.
The Philippines observations on admissibility
The Philippines contested the admissibility of the communication on the basis that Ms Vertido had
failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by article 4(1) of the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Optional Protocol). It
claimed that Ms Vertido had failed to avail herself of the special remedy of certiorari.
Ms Vertidos comments on the Philippines observations
Ms Vertido countered that she was not required to exhaust the remedy of certiorari, as it could only be
sought by the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. In
addition, she submitted that, even if the remedy were available to her, it would have been ineffective
in redressing her particular complaint of discrimination.

CEDAW Committees admissibility decision


The CEDAW Committee declared the communication admissible, dismissing the suggestion made by
the Philippines that Ms Vertido was required by article 4(1) of the Optional Protocol to exhaust the
remedy of certiorari.
Views
The CEDAW Committee concluded that, in failing to end discriminatory gender stereotyping in the
legal process, the Philippines had violated articles (2)(c) and 2(f) of CEDAW, and article 5(a) read in
conjunction with article 1 and General Recommendation No. 19 (violence against women). The
Committee declined to consider whether or not article 2(d) had been violated, finding that it was less
relevant to the case than the other articles alleged to have been violated.
Committee member Ms Yoko Hayashi issued a separate, concurring opinion.
Right to an effective remedy (art. 2(c))
The CEDAW Committee affirmed that implicit in CEDAW and, in particular article 2(c), is the right to
an effective remedy. It explained that for a remedy to be effective, adjudication of a case involving
rape and sexual offenses claims should be dealt with in a fair, impartial, timely and expeditious
manner.
The Committee determined that the Philippines had failed to comply with its obligation to ensure Ms
Vertidos right to an effective remedy. It noted that her case had languished in the trial court for
approximately eight years before a decision was made to acquit the accused and that, consequently,
it could not be said that Ms Vertidos allegation of rape had been dealt with in a fair, impartial, timely
and expeditious manner.
Freedom from Wrongful Gender Stereotyping (arts. 2(f) and 5(a))
In finding violations of articles 2(f) and 5(a), the Committee affirmed that CEDAW requires States
Parties to take appropriate measures to modify or abolish not only existing laws and regulations, but
also customs and practices that constitute discrimination against women. It also stressed that
stereotyping affects womens right to a fair and just trial and that the judiciary must take caution not to
create inflexible standards of what women or girls should be or . . . have done when confronted with a
situation of rape based merely on preconceived notions of what defines a rape victim.
The majority determined that the trial judge had expected a certain stereotypical behaviour from the
author and formed a negative view of her creditability because she had not behaved accordingly. It
went on to say that the trial judges decision contained several references to stereotypes about male
and female sexuality being more supportive for the credibility of the alleged perpetrator than for the
creditability of the victim.
Recommendations
Having found violations of articles (2)(c), 2(f) and 5(a) of CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee called on
the Philippines to provide appropriate compensation to Ms Vertido. It also made a number of general
recommendations aimed at redressing the systemic nature of many of the violations. These included

taking effective steps to ensure that decisions in sexual assault cases are impartial and fair and not
affected by prejudices or stereotypes.
Communication No. 18/2008, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (22 September 2010)

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