VALLES V COMELEC

G.R.
No.
137000,
o
o
o

Aug.

9,

2000

Principle of jus sanguinis

How Philippine citizenship is acquired
Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express
renunciation of other citizenship
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in
Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In
1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to
settle in the Philippines, where she later married a
Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In
the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles
filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the
ground
that
she
is
an
Australian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a

o
Filipino

HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the
place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus
soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the
basis of place of birth.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children are deemed to be
Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo
Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a
Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were
the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos
daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
TECSON V. COMELEC1
G.R. NO. 161434, 3 MARCH 2004
FACTS: The case at bar is a consolidated case filed by
petitioners questioning the certificate of candidacy of
herein private respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr. The latter filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of President
of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) party. He represented himself in

said certificate as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,

which reason that petitioners filed a petition before the
Comelec to disqualify private respondent Fernando Poe,
Jr. and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy on the ground that the latter made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino when in truth his
parents were foreigners and he is an illegitimate child.
The Comelec dismissed the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
HELD: Before discussing on the issue at hand it is worth
stressing that since private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr.
was born on August 20, 1939, the applicable law then
controlling was the 1935 constitution. The issue on
private respondents citizenship is so essential in view of
the constitutional provision that, No person may be
elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write,
at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and
a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election. Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the
evidence presented which the Supreme consider as
viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe,
father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on
September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San
Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate,
the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San
Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person at the
time of his death was also his residence before death.
Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not
substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may
have been benefited from the en masse Filipinization
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no
doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the
latter is governed by the provisions of the 1935
Constitution which constitution considers as citizens of
the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he
is legitimate or illegitimate.

MOY YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF

IMMIGRATION
Posted by kaye lee on 1:40 PM
GR # L-21289, October 4, 1971 [Naturalization Qualification and Disqualification; CA 473]
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien visiting the Philippines, whose
authorized stay in the Philippines was to expire, claims
herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen. Solicitor General opposes the ground that
the marriage of the alien to a Filipino citizen does not
automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship.
Plaintiff-appellant does not possess all the qualifications
required for applicant for naturalization (CA 473), even
she has proven that she possesses none of the
disqualifications in said law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a
Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto, provided
that she does not possess all of the disqualifications
enumerated in CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)
Categories: Citizenship, Constitutional Law 1
TRANQUILINO ROA
vs.
INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
G.R. No. L-7011
October 30, 1912
Facts:
An appeal from the Court of First Instance of Cebus
order recommitting Tranqilino Roa, appellant, to the
custody of the Collector of Customs and declaring its right
to deport the appellant to China as he is a subject of the
Chinese Empire and has no right to enter and live within
the Philippine territory
On July 6, 1889, appellant was born in Luculan,
Mindanao to father, Basilio Roa Uy Tiong Co, a Chinese
native, and mother and native to he Philippines, Basilia
Rodriguez
Appellants parents were legally married in the
Philippins during his time of birth
In 1895, the father of Roa eturned to China and died in
1900
In 1901, Roa went to China on the sole purpose to
study there
Roa returned to the Philippine Islands on the
steamship, Kaifong, on October 1, 1910 from Amoy,

China. The appellant was a few days under 21 years and

three months of age
The Board of Special Inquiry found Roa as a Chinese
and not a citizen of the Philippine Islands thereby not
entitling him to land
Roa was born in lawful wedlock
The appeal to the Incular Collector of Customs was
affirmed and the Court of First
Instance of Cebu remanded the appellant to the Collector
of Customs
The laws of the Philippine Islands state that children,
while they remain under parental
authority, born in the Philippine Islands have the
nationality of their parents
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tranquilino Roa is a citizen of the
Philippine Islands.
HELD:
Yes, Roa is a citizen of the Philippine Islands
Appellant follows the nationality of his mother, thereby
making him a citizen of the
Philippine Islands
Section of the Philippine Bill: That all inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands continuing
to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and
as such entitled to the protection of the United States,
except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
"no principle has been more repeatedly announced by
the judicial tribunals of the
country, and more constantly acted upon, than that the
leaning, in questions of
citizenship, should always be in favor of the claimant of
it."
On the death of her husband she ipso facto reacquired
the nationality of the country of her
birth, as she was then living in that country and had never
left it. She was then the natural
guardian of Tranquilino.
There is no statutory declaration on the question as to
whether or not her minor children
would follow that of their widowed mother. If the children
were born in the United
States, they would be citizens of that country. If they were
born in the country of which

their father (and their mother during coverture) was a

citizen, then they would be a citizen
of that country until the death of their father.
But after his death, they being minors and their
nationality would, as a logical
consequence, follow that of their mother, she having
changed their domicile and
nationality by placing them within the jurisdiction of the
United States.
But, of course, such minor children, on reaching their
majority, could elect, under the
principle that expatriation is an inherent right of all people,
the nationality of the country
of their birth.
CO vs. HRET
Facts:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional
election for the second district of Northern Samar was
held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election
protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural
born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the
Philippines.
Held:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents
grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines fromChina
and established his residence in the municipality of
Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent,
Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed
withthe court an application for naturalization and was
declared a Filipino citizen.In 1984, the private respondent
married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections
of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a
voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those
elections.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of
Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with
analien father were placed on equal footing. They were
both considered as natural born citizens. Besides,
privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right
of suffrage. He has established his life here in
thePhilippines.On the issue of residence, it is not required
that a person should have a house in order to establish

hisresidence and domicile. It is enough that he should

live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of
afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order
to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamountto
a property qualification. The Constitution only requires
that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, votingand
residence requirements.
REPUBLIC VS LI YAO
Posted by kaye lee on 12:47 AM
G.R. No. L-35947, 20 October 1992 [Citizenship;
Naturalization; Grounds for Denaturalization]
FACTS:
William Li Yao was naturalized as a Filipino citizen
pursuant to the C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 530. 15 years
later, the Solicitor General filed a petition to cancel his
naturalization because he obtained such through fraud
and tax evasion. Li Yao denied the allegations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of Li Yao's naturalization
is valid.
RULING:
Yes. The cancellation of the naturalization certificate of Li
Yao was on the ground that it was "fraudulently and
illegally obtained" based on the Section 18(a) of CA 473,
also known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is
subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by
misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and
jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a
certificate of naturalization upon ground had conditions
arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate.
Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein, not
constituting res judicata as to any matter that would
support a judgment cancelling a certificate of
naturalization on the ground of illegal or fraudulent
procurement thereof.

Republic vs. Cesar Guy

G.R. No. 41399
FACTS: August 18,1956, Cesar Guy filed with
the Court of First Instance a petition to be
admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. The
petition was given due course and after
hearing, the Court issued order granting the
application for citizenship of Cesar Guy.
December 22, 1959, Two years later the trial
court issued order allowing Cesar Guy to take

his oath of allegiance as citizen of the

Philippines, he took his oath the same day
and then issued Certificate of Naturalization
No. 27.
September 23,1964, the Solicitor General
filed petition with the court for the
cancellation of the Certificate of
Naturalization issued to Cesar Guy on the
ground that the same was obtained
fraudulently or illegally.
--June 7, 1957 Cesar Guy filed with Bureau of
Forestry a sworn application for the issuance
of an ordinary timber license where he stated
that he was a Filipino citizen though he was
not.
--He was found guilty of the crimes that
demonstrating an utter lack of good moral
character and has ceased to possess the
qualifications to be naturalized citizen of the
Philippines.
Cesar Guy claimed that he acted in good faith
in applying for an ordinary timber license
believing that he is already a citizen of the
Philippines because of the favorable decision
on his naturalization case.
May 28, 1974, the trial court ordered the
cancellation of Certificate of Naturalization
No. 27, previously issued to Cesar Guy, in
view of his conducts which resulted in his
conviction for the crimes of perjury and rape,
acts clearly indicative of his lack of one the
important qualifications, that is good moral
character.

adversary proceeding, the decision rendered

therein is not res judicata, the certificate of
naturalization may be cancelled upon
grounds or conditions subsequent to the
granting of the certificate of naturalization.
The crime of perjury and rape undisputedly
involves moral turpitude. Person convicted of
said offense cannot be said to be possessed
of good moral character, an indispensable
requirement for one applying for Philippine
citizenship. Hence, having been able to
obtain Philippine citizenship despite this
misconduct, rendered his acquisition thereof
fraudulent and illegal. Consequently, the
certificate of naturalization issued to him
under these circumstances was properly
cancelled by the court.
The judgment appealed was affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the convictions of the

appellant for certain crimes he committed
after the probationary period is a valid ground
for the cancellation of his Certificate of
Naturalization.

HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly

stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost through
naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation
of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign
country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.

HOLDING: Yes, because the fact that his

convictions for the said crime were made
after the 2 years probationary period and
after the appellant had already been granted
his citizenship unlike final decisions in actions
and other proceedings in court, a decision or
order granting citizenship to the applicant
does not really become executory, and a
naturalization proceeding not being a judicial

RENUNCIATION/EXPATRIATION PIA
YU VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 83882. January 24, 1989.*

LABO VS. COMELEC, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011
GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989 (Constitutional Law
Loss of Citizenship)
FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a
Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through his
marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and
took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said
marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was
annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization made
him only a dual national and did not divest him of his
Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his
Philippine citizenship.

FACTS
Petitioner- a Portuguese National acquired a Philippine
citizenship by naturalization on Feb. 10, 1978.
Despite naturalization, on 21 July 1981, petitioner
applied for and was issued a renewed

Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the

Consular Section of the Portuguese
Embassy in Tokyo. SaidConsular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.
Petitioner though a naturalized Filipino signed
commercial documents stating his
citizenship as Portuguese without the authentication of an
appropriate Philippine Consul
Petitioner was detained by the CID for obtaining a
Foreign passport while (at the same time) holding a
Filipino citizenship as well
Respondents argue that the petitioner was in full
knowledge and legal capacity when he applied for A
Philippine
citizenship
through
naturalization
he
consequently recognizes, identifies and agrees to the
oath taken which states to renounce absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty and pledged to
maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines,". Hence, petitioner then knows the
limitations or restrictions once solemnizing said
oath and it succeeding consequences should they be
violated.
ISSUE Whether or not petitioner Mr. Willie Yus acts
constitute a renunciation of his Philippine
Citizenship? YES
SC RULING
Petitioners motion for release from detention is DENIED
(along with other motions filed).
COURT HELD:
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation
that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not
left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status
as a
Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in
official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship
While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced,
upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true
faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he
declared his nationality as Portuguese in

commercial documents he signed, specifically, the

Companies registry of Tai Shun EstateLtd. filed in
Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
Further Reference:
How Philippine Citizenship obtained/reacquired:
1.) By direct act of Congress
2.) By naturalization- take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic Act 9225
3.) By administrative repatriationtake the oath of
Allegiance to the Republic and register the same in
the local civil registry or in the place where the person
resides/last resided; original citizenship is
acquired.

FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June
Reacquisition]

1989

[Naturalization;

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the
province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time.
The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that
he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in
the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special
and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as
American citizen only to protect himself against President
Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications,
a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the
United States of America. The Court stated that that the
alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he
really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could
do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA
No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be

reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or

by repatriation.

Bengson v HRET G.R. No 142840, May 7,

2001 G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001
Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the
HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when
the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli.
However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was
naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith. He
reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a
representative. When his nationality was questioned by
petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural
born citizen of the Philippines.
Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.
Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On
the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have
become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally
under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as
the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the
former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant
has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12
and none of the disqualification.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates
the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)
by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former
Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none
of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under

various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

(1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed
forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in
the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5)
political economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the
place where the person concerned resides or last
resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship
when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

Election Laws
MERCADO V. MANZANO 307 SCRA 630 (1999)
G.R. No. 135083

Facts:
Edu Manzano, Ernesto Mercado and Gabriel Daza were
candidates for Vice Mayor of Makati City
during the May 11, 1998 elections.
A certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for
disqualification on Manzano contending that Manzano is
an American citizen thus suspending the proclamation of
the private respondent.
COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition
cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on
May 7, 1998 on the grounds that dual citizens are
disqualified under Sec 40 of the Local Goverment
Code from running any elective position.

 Manzado filed a motion for reconsideration on May 8,

1998 and the motion remained pending even after
the election.
The petitioner, Mercado sought to intervene in the case
for disqualification which was opposed by the
private respondent.
On August 19, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered
its resolution reversing the decision of the
COMELEC's Second Division, declaring that private
respondent Manzano is qualified to run for Vice
mayor of Makati.
Pursuant to the resolution rendered by the COMELEC
enbanc, on August 31, 1998, the board of
canvassers proclaimed private respondent as the Vice
Mayor of the city of Makati.
Thus, this petition for Certiorari praying to set aside the
resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to
declare private respondent Manzano, disqualified to hold
the office Vice Mayor of Makati.

Issues:
1. WON, petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this
suit considering that he was not an original party
in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril.
2. WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification?
3. WON there was a valid election of citizenship?

Reasons:
1. Yes, petitioner Mercado, has the right to bring suit. At
the time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to
File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's
purpose was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified "from running for [an] elective local
position" under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto
Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati
City, was competent to bring the action, so
was Mercado since the he was a rival candidate for vice
mayor of Makati City. Mercado had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from
6 of R.A. No. 6646 or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
which provides that intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there
has been no final judgment rendered. Failure of
COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for
intervention was tantamount to denial of the motion,
justifying this
petition for certiorari.
2. NO. Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner
contends that through Sec. 40(d) of the Local
Government Code (which declares as disqualified from
running for elective local position Those

with dual-citizenship), Congress has command[ed] in

explicit terms the ineligibility of persons
possessing dual allegiance to hold elective office. Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of
circumstances of birth or marriage, where a person is
recognized to be a national by two or more states. Dual
allegiance is a result of a persons volition; it is a
situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
Dual citizenship is an issue because a person who has
this raises a question of which states law must
apply to him/her, therefore posting a threat to a countrys
sovereignty. Hence, dual citizenship in the
aforementioned disqualification clause must mean dual
allegiance. Therefore, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
3. Yes, there was a valid election of citizenship. It should
suffice that upon filing of certificates for
candidacy, such persons with dual citizenship have
elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their
dual citizenship. In private respondents certificate of
candidacy, he made these statements under oath on
March 27, 1998: I am a Filipino citizenNatural-born. I
am not a permanent resident of, or
immigrant to, a foreign country. I am eligible for the
office I seek to be elected. I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance theretoThe
filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dualcitizen.

Ruling:
Petition is DISMISSED.
NATIONALITY THEORY
NGO BURCA VS RP DIGEST
FACTS: Zita Ngo is a Chinese national married to
Florencio Burca a Filipino citizen. She claims that she
possessed all thequalifications and none of the
disqualifications for naturalization as a Filipino citizen ,
she applied for cancellation of her Alien Certificate of
Registration. This was opposed by the Solicitor General,
but the trial court dismissed the opposition and declare
that Zita Ngo Burcahass all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen and that
she being married to aFilipino citizen is hereby declared
as a citizen of the Philippines.Such judgment of the trial
court was appealed
.ISSUE: Whether or not the petition of Zita Ngo Burca
should be granted?

RULING : NO The SC discussed here that an alien wife

of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of the
Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be
lawfully naturalized.
An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a
citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a
petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the
qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the
disqualifications underSection 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law;
(2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First
Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year
immediatelypreceding the filing of the petition; and
(3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or
official, administrative or otherwise other than the
judgment of acompetent court of justice certifying or
declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a
Filipino citizen, ishereby declared null and void.

As to the merits of the case:

Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a
petition for naturalization should state petitioner's
"present and formerplaces of residence.
The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present
and former places of residence is that "information
regarding petitioner and objection to his application are
apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical
surrounding".
the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries
as to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the
places of residence do not appear in the petition. So it is,
that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal.
We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said
petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two
credible persons, "stating that they are citizens of the
Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a
resident of the Philippines for the period of time required
by this Act and a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their
opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a
citizen of the Philippines and is not in anyway disqualified
under the provisions of this Act. Petitioner likewise
failed to "set forth the names and post-officeaddresses of
such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce
at the hearing of the case".
These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they
are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of
this,the petition must fail.
Here, the case was submitted solely on the testimony of
the petitioner. No other witnesses were presented. This
does not meet with the legal requirement. Upon the view

we take of his case, the judgment appealed from is

hereby reversed and the petition dismissed.

COQUILLA VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 11:07 PM
G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002 [Citizenship;
Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras,
Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965,
when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen
after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the
Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although
he continued making several trips to the United States.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No.
8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he
took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a
voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was
approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his
certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for reelection sought to cancel Coquillas certificate of
candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two
year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation
as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a
citizen.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections
commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On
July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez petition and
ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of
candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections held
on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.
RULING:
No. The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy
that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
two years at the time he filed such certificate is not true.

The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in

ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for
this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a
material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering
such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar,
what is involved is a false statement concerning a
candidates qualification for an office for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a
material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioners
certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioners
certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

just recently arrive here and didnt acquired 1 year

residency here yet.
The MTC denied the petition of Advincula in the
Registration of Romuladez on the said precinct and
the right to suffrage. But the RTC reverse the
discretion and disqualified the voter registration of
Romualdez favoring the petitioner.
The respondent prayed that the MTCs discretion
over questioning his right to suffrage will be
affirmed.

ROMUALDEZ V RTC
Topic: Suffrage Qualification
Facts:
Philip G. Romualdez is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines and a son of a former governor of Leyte
Benjamin Kokoy and sole nephew of First lady
Imelda Marcos. He served as a barangay captain of
the said place during snap election in 1986.
He fled the country and went to U.S. and sought
asylum, took special studies in the development of
Leyte-Samar with International business studies as
well.
When Romualdez came back in the Philippines and
run in National Congress the Commission on
Election allowed him to vote and have him
registered on precinct 9 of Tolosa, Malbog Leyte
where he had resided.
However, Advincula filed a petition questioning the
registration of Romualdez to the said Municipality in
MTC. The former allege that Romualdez was not a
resident of the said municipality because he leave
the country and resided in U.S. Massachussets. He

ISSUE:
1. WON MTC and RTC will find jurisdiction over
respective petitions.
2. WON respondents court will not stray the
investigation regarding his sudden leave in the
country, abandoning his residency in Tolosa.
Ruling:
The petition was impressed merit, although the said
respondent had leave the country. He Is still a
sovereign here in the Philippines and not to question
his right to suffrage. The self-exile of the respondent
was for the purpose of safety and security to his
family from the rage of Marcos regime.
The respondent was a domicile in U.S. but it doesnt
mean that there would an estopped to exercise his
privilege as a Filipino citizen in registering his name
from the said precinct in Leyte: questioning right to
suffrage.
The petition was GRANTED WITH DUE COURSE,
RTCs discretion was reverse and the TRO issued is
in permanent to question the decision of the trial
court, initiating a no cost promulgation, and MTCs
decision is hereby REINSTATED.