People vs Sandiganbayan and Plaza

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169004
September 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA,
Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's resolution is a petition 1
dated September 2, 2005 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to
reverse and set aside the Resolution2
of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division),
dated July 20, 2005, dismissing
Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Rolando
Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts follow.
Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant
to this case, with salary grade 25, had
been charged in the Sandiganbayan
with violation of Section 89 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or
The Auditing Code of the Philippines
for his failure to liquidate the cash
advances he received on December
19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three
Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . The
Information reads:
That on or about December 19, 1995,
and for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto at Toledo City, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused ROLANDO
PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer,

being a member of the Sangguniang

Panlungsod of Toledo City, and
committing the offense, in relation to
office, having obtained cash advances
from the City Government of Toledo in
the total amount of THIRTY THREE
THOUSAND
PESOS
(P33,000.00),
Philippine Currency, which he received
by reason of his office, for which he is
duty bound to liquidate the same
within the period required by law, with
deliberate intent and intent to gain,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and criminally fail to liquidate said
cash
advances
of
P33,000.00,
Philippine Currency, despite demands
to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a
Motion to Dismiss3 dated April 7, 2005
with the Sandiganbayan, to which the
latter issued an Order4 dated April 12,
2005 directing petitioner to submit its
comment.
Petitioner
filed
its
Opposition5 to the Motion to Dismiss
on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the
Sandiganbayan
promulgated
its
Resolution6on July 20, 2005 dismissing
the case for lack of jurisdiction,
without prejudice to its filing before
the proper court. The dispositive
portion
of
the
said
Resolution
provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the instant case is hereby ordered
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
without prejudice to its filing in the
proper court.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the present petition.
Petitioner
contends
that
the
Sandiganbayan
has
criminal
jurisdiction over cases involving public
officials and employees enumerated
under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606,

(as amended by Republic Act [R.A.]

Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not
occupying a position classified under
salary grade 27 and above, who are
charged not only for violation of R.A.
3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies
included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
but also for crimes committed in
relation
to
office.
Furthermore,
petitioner
questioned
the
Sandiganbayans appreciation of this
Court's
decision
in
Inding
v.
Sandiganbayan,7 claiming that the
Inding case did not categorically nor
implicitly constrict or confine the
application
of
the
enumeration
provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of
P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to
cases where the offense charged is
either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A.
1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner
adds that the enumeration in Section
4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by
R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was
made applicable to cases concerning
violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, equally applies to
offenses committed in relation to
public office.
In his Comment8 dated November 30,
2005, respondent Plaza argued that,
as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606,
as amended, it is apparent that the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was
defined first, while the exceptions to
the general rule are provided in the
rest of the paragraph and subparagraphs of Section 4; hence, the
Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that
it has original jurisdiction only over
the following cases: (a) where the
accused is a public official with salary
grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases

where the accused is a public official

below grade 27 but his position is one
of
those
mentioned
in
the
enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to
(g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his
offense involves a violation of R.A.
3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code; and (c) if the indictment
involves offenses or felonies other
than
the
three
aforementioned
statutes, the general rule that a public
official must occupy a position with
salary grade 27 and higher in order
that the Sandiganbayan could exercise
jurisdiction over him must apply.
In a nutshell, the core issue raised in
the petition is whether or not the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a
member
of
the
Sangguniang
Panlungsod whose salary grade is
below 27 and charged with violation of
The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
This Court has already resolved the
above issue in the affirmative. People
v. Sandiganbayan and Amante9 is a
case with uncanny similarities to the
present one. In fact, the respondent in
the earlier case, Victoria Amante and
herein respondent Plaza were both
members
of
the
Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the
time pertinent to this case. The only
difference is that, respondent Amante
failed to liquidate the amount of
Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five
Pesos (P71,095.00) while respondent
Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of
Thirty-Three
Thousand
Pesos
(P33,000.00).
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary
grade is below 27 and charged with
violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines, this Court cited the case

ofSerana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 as

a background on the conferment of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created
by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June
11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain
the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that
public officers and employees shall
serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.11
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended
by P.D. No. 1606 which was
promulgated on December 10, 1978.
P.D.
No.
1606
expanded
the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.12
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by
P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983,
further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on
March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5,
1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x
x.
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took
effect on May 16, 1995, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997
by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be
applied in the present case, the
offense
having
been
allegedly
committed on or about December 19,
1995 and the Information having been
filed on March 25, 2004. As
extensively explained in the earlier
mentioned case,
The jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal case is to be determined

at the time of the institution of

the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense.13 The
exception contained in R. A. 7975,
as well as R. A. 8249, where it
expressly
provides
that
to
determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R. A. No. 3019, as
amended, R. A. No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable in the present case as
the offense involved herein is a
violation of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines. The last clause of
the opening sentence of paragraph (a)
of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, other known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity,
at the time of the commission of
the offense: x x x.14
Like in the earlier case, the present
case definitely falls under Section 4
(b) where other offenses and felonies
committed by public officials or
employees in relation to their office
are involved where the said provision,
contains no exception. Therefore,
what applies in the present case is the
general rule that jurisdiction of a court
to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the

time of the commission of the offense.

The present case having been
instituted on March 25, 2004, the
provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern.
P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249
states that:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive
branch
occupying
the
positions of regional director
and
higher,
otherwise
classified as grade "27" and
higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors,
vice-governors, members
of
the
sangguniang
panlalawigan
and
provincial
treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and
other city department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice
mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city
department heads.
(c)
Officials
of
the

diplomatic
service
occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and
air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e)
PNP
chief
superintendent and PNP
officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial
prosecutors
and
their
assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors
or trustees, or managers
of government-owned or
controlled
corporations,
state
universities
or
educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and
officials thereof classified as
Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary
without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of
Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
and
(5) All other national and local
officials classified as Grade
"27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies,
whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of

this section in relation to their

office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed
pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A.
Again, the earlier case interpreted the
above provisions, thus:
The above law is clear as to the
composition of the original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section
4 (a), the following offenses are
specifically enumerated: violations of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order
for the Sandiganbayan to acquire
jurisdiction over the said offenses, the
latter must be committed by, among
others, officials of the executive
branch occupying positions of regional
director
and
higher,
otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of
the
Compensation
and
Position
Classification Act of 1989. However,
the law is not devoid of exceptions.
Those that are classified as Grade
26 and below may still fall within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Sandiganbayan
provided
that
they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law.
Particularly
and
exclusively
enumerated are provincial governors,
vice-govenors,
members
of
the
sangguniang
panlalawigan,
and
provincial
treasurers,
assessors,
engineers,
and
other
provincial
department heads; city mayors, vicemayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department
heads; officials of the diplomatic
service occupying the position as
consul and higher; Philippine army
and air force colonels, naval captains,

and all officers of higher rank; PNP

chief superintendent and PNP officers
of higher rank; City and provincial
prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office
of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor; and presidents, directors
or
trustees,
or
managers
of
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations, state universities or
educational
institutions
or
foundations.
In
connection
therewith, Section 4 (b) of the
same law provides that other
offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) in
relation to their office also fall
under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.15
Clearly, as decided in the earlier case
and by simple application of the
pertinent provisions of the law,
respondent Plaza, a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod during the
alleged commission of an offense in
relation to his office, necessarily falls
within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Finally, as to the inapplicability of the
Inding16 case wherein it was ruled that
the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as
amended, are included within the
original
jurisdiction
of
the
Sandiganbayan regardless of salary
grade and which the Sandiganbayan
relied upon in its assailed Resolution,
this Court enunciated, still in the
earlier
case
of
People
v.
Sandiganbayan and Amante,17 that
the
Inding
case
did
not
categorically
nor
implicitly
constrict
or
confine
the
application of the enumeration
provided for under Section 4 (a)

(1) of P.D. 1606, as amended,

exclusively to cases where the
offense charged is either a
violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379
or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code. As
thoroughly discussed:
x x x In the Inding case, the public
official involved was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary
Grade 25 and was charged with
violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling
that
the
Sandiganbayan
had
jurisdiction over the said public
official, this Court concentrated its
disquisition
on
the
provisions
contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, where the
offenses involved are specifically
enumerated and not on Section 4 (b)
where offenses or felonies involved
are those that are in relation to the
public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides
that:
b.
Other
offenses
or
felonies
committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection
(a) of this section in relation to their
office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading
of the above provision shows that
those public officials enumerated
in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, may not only be
charged in the Sandiganbayan
with violations of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, but also with other
offenses or felonies in relation to
their office. The said other offenses
and felonies are broad in scope but
are limited only to those that are
committed in relation to the public
official or employee's office. This Court

had ruled that as long as the

offense
charged
in
the
information
is
intimately
connected with the office and is
alleged to have been perpetrated
while the accused was in the
performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions,
there being no personal motive to
commit the crime and had the
accused not have committed it
had he not held the aforesaid
office, the accused is held to have
been indicted for "an offense
committed in relation" to his
office.18 Thus, in the case of Lacson v.
Executive Secretary, et al..,19 where
the crime involved was murder, this
Court held that:
The phrase "other offenses or
felonies" is too broad as to include the
crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accuseds
official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the
official position or rank of the offender
that is, whether he is one of those
public
officers
or
employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section
4. x x x
Also,
in
the
case
Alarilla
v.
Sandiganbayan,20 where the public
official was charged with grave
threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended
information contained allegations that
the accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as
municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan when he committed the crime
of grave threats as defined in Article
282 of the Revised Penal Code against
complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged petitioner

with aiming a gun at and threatening

to kill Legaspi during a public hearing,
after the latter had rendered a
privilege speech critical of petitioners
administration. Clearly, based on such
allegations, the crime charged is
intimately
connected
with
the
discharge
of
petitioners
official
functions. This was elaborated upon
by public respondent in its April 25,
1997 resolution wherein it held that
the "accused was performing his
official duty as municipal mayor when
he attended said public hearing" and
that "accuseds violent act was
precipitated by complainants criticism
of his administration as the mayor or
chief executive of the municipality,
during the latters privilege speech. It
was
his
response
to
private
complainants attack to his office. If he
was not the mayor, he would not have
been irritated or angered by whatever
private complainant might have said
during said privilege speech." Thus,
based on the allegations in the
information,
the
Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
case.1avvphi1
Proceeding from the above rulings of
this Court, a close reading of the
Information filed against respondent
Amante for violation of The Auditing
Code of the Philippines reveals that
the said offense was committed in
relation to her office, making her fall
under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of
the law had been to extend the
application of the exceptions to the
other
cases
over
which
the
Sandiganbayan
could
assert
jurisdiction, then there would have
been no need to distinguish between

violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.

1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code on the one
hand, and other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office on
the other. The said reasoning is
misleading because a distinction
apparently exists. In the offenses
involved in Section 4 (a), it is not
disputed that public office is
essential as an element of the
said offenses themselves, while in
those
offenses
and
felonies
involved in Section 4 (b), it is
enough that the said offenses and
felonies
were
committed
in
relation to the public officials or
employees' office. In expounding
the meaning of offenses deemed to
have been committed in relation to
office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA
627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on
the scope and reach of the term
"offense committed in relation to [an
accuseds] office" by referring to the
principle laid down in Montilla v.
Hilario[90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an
exception to that principle which was
recognized in People v. Montejo [108
Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out
in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense
may be considered as committed in
relation to the accuseds office if "the
offense cannot exist without the
office" such that "the office [is] a
constituent element of the crime x x
x." In People v. Montejo, the Court,
through Chief Justice Concepcion, said
that "although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in
[the] abstract," the facts in a
particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is
intimately
connected
with
[the

accuseds] respective offices and was

perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions.
Indeed, [the accused] had no personal
motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they
not held their aforesaid offices. x x x"21
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the
same provisions of Section 4 (b) does
not mention any qualification as to the
public officials involved. It simply
stated, public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of the
same section. Therefore, it refers to
those public officials with Salary Grade
27
and
above,
except
those
specifically enumerated. It is a wellsettled principle of legal hermeneutics
that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary
acceptation
and
signification,22 unless it is evident that
the legislature intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those
words.23
The
intention
of
the
lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained
philologists
and
lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. (Italics supplied.)24
With the resolution of the present case
and the earlier case of People v.
Sandiganbayan and Amante,25 the
issue as to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan has now attained
clarity.
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated
September 2, 2005 is hereby
GRANTED and the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated
July 20, 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE. Let the case
beREMANDED to the Sandiganbayan
for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
People vs Sandiganbayan & Amante
Serana vs Sandiganbayan
Geduspan vs People
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 158187
February
11, 2005
MARILYN GEDUSPAN and DRA.
EVANGELYN FARAHMAND,
petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Does
the
Sandiganbayan
have
jurisdiction
over
a
regional
director/manager
of
governmentowned or controlled corporations
organized and incorporated under the
Corporation Code for purposes of RA
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act? Petitioner Marilyn C.
Geduspan assumes a negative view in
the instant petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
Office of the Special Prosecutor
contends otherwise, a view shared by
the respondent court.
In the instant Rule 65 petition for
certiorari with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or issuance
of a temporary restraining order,
Geduspan seeks to annul and set
aside the resolutions1 dated January
31, 2003 and May 9, 2003 of the
respondent
Sandiganbayan,
Fifth
Division. These resolutions denied her
motion to quash and motion for

reconsideration, respectively.
On July 11, 2002, an information
docketed as Criminal Case No. 27525
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019, as amended, was filed against
petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr.
Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine
Health
Insurance
Corporation
(Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director
and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center,
Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively. The
information read:
That on or about the 27th day of
November, 1999, and for sometime
subsequent thereto, at Bacolod City,
province
of
Negros
Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN, a
public officer, being the Regional
Manager/Director, of the Philippine
Health
Insurance
Corporation,
Regional office No. VI, Iloilo City, in
such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving,
confederating and mutually helping
with DR. EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND,
a private individual and Chairman of
the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi
Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc.,
Mandalangan, Bacolod City, with
deliberate intent, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously release the claims for
payments of patients confined at L.N.
Memorial Hospital with Philippine
Health Insurance Corp., prior to
January 1, 2000, amounting to NINETY
ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
FIFTY-FOUR and 64/100 (P91,954.64),
Philippine Currency, to Tiong Bi
Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc. despite
clear provision in the Deed of
Conditional
Sale
executed
on

November 27, 1999, involving the sale

of West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong
Bi, Inc. or Tiong Bi Medical Center,
that the possession, operation and
management of the said hospital will
be turned over by West Negros
College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. effective
January 1, 2000, thus all collectibles or
accounts receivable accruing prior to
January 1, 2000 shall be due to West
Negros College, Inc., thus accused
MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN in the course
of the performance of her official
functions, had given unwarranted
benefits to Tiong Bi, Inc., Tiong Bi
Medical Center, herein represented by
accused
DR.
EVANGELINE
C.
FARAHMAND, to the damage and
injury of West Negros College, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Both accused filed a joint motion to
quash dated July 29, 2002 contending
that the respondent Sandiganbayan
had
no
jurisdiction
over
them
considering that the principal accused
Geduspan was a Regional Director of
Philhealth, Region VI, a position
classified under salary grade 26.
In a resolution dated January 31, 2003,
the respondent court denied the
motion to quash. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in
a resolution dated May 9, 2003.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Geduspan alleges that she
is the Regional Manager/Director of
Region VI of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Philhealth).
However, her appointment paper and
notice of salary adjustment2 show that
she was appointed as Department
Manager A of the Philippine Health
Insurance
Corporation
(Philhealth)
with salary grade 26. Philhealth is a
government owned and controlled
corporation created under RA 7875,

otherwise known as the National

Health Insurance Act of 1995.
Geduspan argues that her position as
Regional Director/Manager is not
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Sandiganbayan. She cites paragraph
(1) and (5), Section 4 of RA 8249
which defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan:
Section
4.
Jurisdiction.
The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity,
at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional
director
and
higher,
otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of
the
Compensation
and
Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758); specifically including;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials
classified as Grade "27" and higher
under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
The petition lacks merit.
The records show that, although
Geduspan is a Director of Region VI of
the Philhealth, she is not occupying
the position of Regional Director but
that of Department Manager A, hence,
paragraphs (1) and (5) of Section 4 of
RA 8249 are not applicable.
It is petitioners appointment paper
and the notice of salary adjustment

that determine the classification of her

position, that is, Department Manager
A of Philhealth.
Petitioner admits that she holds the
position of Department Manager A of
Philhealth. She, however, contends
that the position of Department
Manager A is classified under salary
grade 26 and therefore outside the
jurisdiction of respondent court. She is
at present assigned at the Philhealth
Regional Office VI as Regional
Director/Manager.
Petitioner anchors her request for the
issuance of a temporary restraining
order on the alleged disregard by
respondent court of the decision of
this Court in Ramon Cuyco v.
Sandiganbayan.3
However, the instant case is not on all
fours with Cuyco. In that case, the
accused Ramon Cuyco was the
Regional
Director
of
the
Land
Transportation Office (LTO), Region IX,
Zamboanga City, but at the time of
the commission of the crime in 1992
his position of Regional Director of LTO
was classified as Director II with salary
grade 26. Thus, the Court ruled that
the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over his person.
In contrast, petitioner held the
position of Department Director A of
Philhealth at the time of the
commission of the offense and that
position
was
among
those
enumerated
in
paragraph
1(g),
Section 4a of RA 8249 over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction:
Section 4. Section 4 of the same
decree is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
Section
4.
Jurisdiction.
The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019,

as amended, otherwise known as the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity,
at the time of the commission of the
offense;
(1) Officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional
director
and
higher,
otherwise
classified as Grade Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758),specifically
including:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx
(d) xxx xxx xxx
(e) xxx xxx xxx
(f) xxx xxx xxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned
and controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions
or
foundations."
(Underscoring
supplied).
It is of no moment that the position of
petitioner is merely classified as salary
grade 26. While the first part of the
abovequoted provision covers only
officials of the executive branch with
the salary grade 27 and higher, the
second part thereof "specifically
includes" other executive officials
whose positions may not be of grade
27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is vested
with
jurisdiction
over
petitioner
together with Farahmand, a private

individual charged together with her.

The position of manager in a
government-owned
or
controlled
corporation, as in the case of
Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of
respondent court. It is the position
that petitioner holds, not her salary
grade, that determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court in Lacson v. Executive
Secretary, et al. 4 ruled:
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4
of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan,
the
following
requisites must concur: (1) the
offense committed is a violation of (a)
R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A.
1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II
of the Revised Penal Code (the law on
bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986
(sequestration cases), or (e) other
offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; (2) the
offender committing the offenses in
items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public
official or employee holding any of the
positions enumerated in paragraph a
of section 4; and (3) the offense
committed is in relation to the office.
To recapitulate, petitioner is a public
officer, being a department manager
of Philhealth, a government-owned
and
controlled
corporation.
The
position of manager is one of those
mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4
of RA 8249 and the offense for which
she was charged was committed in
relation to her office as department
manager of Philhealth. Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over her person as well as the subject
matter of the case.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Valdepenas vs People 16 scra 871
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20687
April 30,
1966
MAXIMINO VALDEPEAS,
petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Jose F. Aquirre for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo
A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General
A. A. Narra and Solicitor O. R. Ramirez
for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal
by
petitioner
Maximino
Valdepeas from a decision of the
Court of Appeals, affirming that of the
Court of First Instance of Cagayan,
convicting him of the crime of
abduction
with
consent,
and
sentencing him to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from three (3) months
and twenty-five (25) days of arresto
mayor to one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision
correccional,
with
the
accessory penalties prescribed by law,
to indemnify Ester Ulsano in the sum
of
P1,000,
with
subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
The only question raised by petitioner
is whether "the Court of Appeals erred
in not reversing the decision of the
trial court, dated June 30, 1960, for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused and the subject matter of

the action for the offense of abduction

with consent".
The pertinent facts are: On January 25,
1956, Ester Ulsano, assisted by her
mother, Consuelo Ulsano, filed with
the Justice of the Peace Court of Piat,
Cagayan, a criminal complaint,1 duly
subscribed and sworn to by both,
charging
petitioner
Maximino
Valdepeas with forcible abduction
with rape of Ester Ulsano. After due
preliminary investigation, the second
stage of which was waived by
Valdepeas, the justice of the peace of
Piat found that there was probable
cause and forwarded the complaint to
the court of first instance of Cagayan 2
in
which
the
corresponding
information for forcible abduction with
rape3 was filed.4 In due course, said
court of first instance rendered
judgment5 finding petitioner guilty as
charged
and
sentencing
him
accordingly.6
On appeal taken by petitioner, the
Court of Appeals7 modified the
decision of the court of first instance,
convicted him of abduction with
consent and meted out to him the
penalty set forth in the opening
paragraph
of
this
decision.1wph1.t
A motion for reconsideration and new
trial having been filed by petitioner
contesting the finding, made by the
Court of Appeals, to the effect that
complainant was below 18 years of
age at the time of the occurrence, said
Court 8granted the motion, set aside
its aforementioned decision and
remanded the case to the court a quo
for the reception of additional
evidence on said issue. After a retrial,
the court of first instance rendered
another
decision,9reiterating
said
finding of the Court of Appeals, as well

as its judgment 10 of conviction for

abduction with consent and the
penalty imposed therein. Petitioner
appealed again to the Court of
Appeals 11 which 12 affirmed that of the
court of first instance 13 with costs
against the petitioner. Again petitioner
filed 14 a motion for reconsideration
based, for the first time, upon the
ground that "the lower court had no
jurisdiction over the person of
appellant and over the subject matter
of the action, with respect to the
offense of abduction with consent."
Upon denial of the motion, 15
petitioner interposed the present
appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner's theory is that no complaint
for abduction with consent has been
filed by either Ester Ulsano or her
mother, Consuelo Ulsano, and that,
accordingly, the lower court acquired
no jurisdiction over his person or over
the crime of abduction with consent
and had, therefore, no authority to
convict him of said crime. We find no
merit in this pretense.
Jurisdiction over the person of an
accused is acquired upon either his
apprehension, with or without warrant,
or his submission to the jurisdiction of
the court. 16 In the case at bar, it is not
claimed that petitioner had not been
apprehended or had not submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Indeed, although brought before the
bar of justice as early as January 25,
1956, first, before the then justice of
the peace court of Piat, then before
the court of first instance of Cagayan,
later before the Court of Appeals,
thereafter back before said court of
first instance, and then, again, before
the Court of Appeals, never, within the
period of six (6) years that had
transpired until the Court of Appeals,

rendered its last decision, 17 had he

questioned the judicial authority of
any of these three (3) courts over his
person. He is deemed, therefore, to
have waived whatever objection he
might have had to the jurisdiction over
his person, and, hence, to have
submitted himself to the Court's
jurisdiction. What is more, his
behaviour and every single one of the
steps taken by him before said courts
particularly the motions therein
filed by him implied, not merely a
submission to the jurisdiction thereof,
but, also, that he urged the courts to
exercise the authority thereof over his
person.
Upon the other hand, it is well settled
that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of an action in this lease the
crime of abduction with consent is
and may be conferred only by law; 18
that jurisdiction over a given crime,
not vested by law upon a particular
court, may not be conferred thereto
by the parties involve in the offense;
and that, under an information for
forcible abduction, the accused may
be convicted of abduction with
consent. 19 It is true that, pursuant to
the third paragraph of Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code,
. . . the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness,
shall
not
be
prosecuted
except
upon
a
complaint filed by the offended
party
or
her
parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in
any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the abovenamed persons, as the case may
be.
The provision does not determine,
however, the jurisdiction of our courts
over the offenses therein enumerated.

It could not affect said jurisdiction,

because the same is governed by the
Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the
Revised Penal Code, which deals
primarily with the definition of crimes
and the factors pertinent to the
punishment of the culprits. The
complaint required in said Article 344
is merely a condition precedent to the
exercise by the proper authorities of
the power to prosecute the guilty
parties. And such condition has been
imposed "out of consideration for the
offended woman and her family who
might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through with
the scandal of a public trial." 20
In the case at bar, the offended
woman and her mother have negated
such
preference
by
filing
the
complaint adverted to above and
going
through
the
trials
and
tribulations concomitant with the
proceedings in this case, before
several courts, for the last ten (10)
years. Petitioner says that the
complaint was for forcible abduction,
not abduction with consent; but, as
already adverted to, the latter is
included in the former. Referring
particularly to the spirit of said
provision of Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code, we believe that the assent
of Ester Ulsano and her mother to
undergo the scandal of a public trial
for forcible abduction necessarily
connotes, also, their willingness to
face the scandal attendant to a public
trial for abduction with consent.
The gist of petitioner's pretense is that
there are some elements of the latter
which are not included in the former,
and, not alleged, according to him, in
the complaint filed herein, 21 namely:
1) that the offended party is a virgin;
and 2) that she is over 12 and under

18 years of age. The second element

is clearly set forth in said complaint,
which states that Ester Ulsano is "a
minor ... 17 years of age ...", and,
hence, over 12 and below 18 years of
age.
As regards the first element, it is
settled that the virginity mentioned in
Article 343 of the Revised Penal Code,
22
as an essential ingredient of the
crime of abduction with consent,
should not be understood in its
material sense and does not exclude
the idea of abduction of a virtuous
woman of good reputation, 23 because
the essence of the offense "is not the
wrong done to the woman, but the
outrage to the family and the alarm
produced in it by the disappearance of
one of its members." 24
The complaint in the case at bar 25
alleges, not only that Ester Ulsano is a
minor 17 years of age, but also that
petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously" took her "by force and
violence ... against her will and taking
advantage of the absence of her
mother" from their dwelling and
carried "her to a secluded spot to gain
carnal intercourse with the offended
party against her will, using force,
intimidation and violence, with lewd
designs." This allegation implies that
Ester is a minor living under patria
protestas, and, hence, single, thus
leading to the presumption that she is
a virgin, 26 apart from being virtuous
and having a good reputation, 27 for,
as Chief Justice Moran has aptly put it,
the
presumption
of
innocence
includes, also, that of morality and
decency, and, as a consequence, of
chastity. 28
Wherefore, the decision appealed from
is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the petitioner Maximino Valdepeas. It

is so ordered.
Republic vs Sunga 162 scra 191
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38634 June 20, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES),
petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as
Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I,
Camarines Sur, ARISTON
ANADILLA, RAFAEL ANADILLA and
JOSE ANADILLA, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari of the order * of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur, 10th
Judicial District, Branch I, dated 20
March 1974, dismissing motu proprio
Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled
"People
of
the
Philippines,
Complainant versus Ariston Anadilla,
Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla,
Accused," as well as of the order
dated 22 April 1974 of the same court
denying
the
motion
for
reconsideration of said earlier order.
The facts are not disputed.
On 10 August 1964, an information for
Attempted Homicide was filed by the
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur
against accused-private respondents
Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and
Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set
on 11 and 12 March 1974. The hearing
set on 11 March 1974 was, however,
postponed in view of the absence of
one of the accused, respondent Rafael
Anadilla who had not yet been

arrested by the police authorities. On

the same date, the court a quo issued
an order for the arrest of said accused,
and at the same time set the trial of
the case for 29 and 30 July 1974.
On 20 March 1974, the court a quo
issued the now assailed order which
reads:
Considering that the offended
party, Jose Dadis is no longer
interested in the further
prosecution of this case and
there being no objection on
the part of the accused
Ariston
Anadilla,
Rafael
Anadilla and Jose Anadilla,
this case is hereby DISMISSED
with costs de oficio.
Consequently, the order of
arrest issued by this Court
against the accused Rafael
Anadilla dated March 11,
1974, is hereby ordered lifted
and has no force and effect.
The bail bond posted for the
provisional liberty of the
accused is hereby ordered
cancelled.
In the case of Ariston Anadilla
and
Jose
Anadilla,
the
Provincial Warden is hereby
ordered
to
release
said
accused from their detention
immediately upon receipt of
this order.
SO ORDERED. 1
The affidavit of desistance, relied upon
by the aforequoted order, was
executed by the offended party on 20
March 1974 and subscribed and sworn
to before the branch Clerk of Court
Atty. R.B. Torrecampo. It alleged,
among others, that:
That he was the complainant

in Criminal Case No. L-244,

entitled, People vs. Ariston
Anadilla, et al., for Attempted
Homicide, which case is
pending before the first
branch of this Court; that he is
no longer interested in the
further prosecution of this
case and that he has already
forgiven the accused for their
acts;
that
his
material
witnesses could no longer be
contacted and that without
their testimonies, the guilt of
the accused cannot be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, and
that
in
view
of
these
circumstances, he requests
the Prosecuting Fiscal for the
dismissal of the said case. 2
The Provincial Fiscal moved to
reconsider the order of dismissal. This
was denied by the court a quo in an
order dated 22 April 1974. 3 This
petition was thereupon filed before
this Court.
The issue in this petition is whether
the courta a quo may dismiss a
criminal case on the basis of an
affidavit of desistance executed by the
offended party, but without a motion
to dismiss filed by the prosecuting
fiscal.
The issue presented is not novel. In
Crespo v. Mogul, 4 promulgated on 30
June 1987, the Court had occasion to
state the rule in regard to the
respective powers of the prosecuting
fiscal and the court, after the
complaint or information has been
filed in court. In said case, the issue
raised was whether the trial court,
acting on a motion to dismiss a
criminal case filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the

Secretary of Justice to whom the case

was elevated for review, may refuse to
grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial of the case on
the merits.
In the Crespo case, an information for
Estafa had already been filed by the
Assistant Fiscal before the Circuit
Criminal
Court of Lucena City.
Arraignment of the accused and trial
of the case were, however, deferred
because of a pending appeal by the
accused/respondent to the Secretary
of Justice. Reversing the resolution of
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, the
Undersecretary of Justice directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal
of the information filed against the
accused. Upon such instructions, the
Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of evidence.
The Judge denied the motion and set
the arraignment. On a certiorari
recourse to the Court of Appeals, the
petition was dismissed. Review of the
Court of Appeals decision was then
sought by the accused with this Court,
raising the issue previously stated
herein, Resolving, the Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of a complaint or
information in Court initiates a
criminal action. The Court
thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case, which is the
authority
to
hear
and
determine the case. When
after
the
filing
of
the
complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial
court and the accused either
voluntarily submitted himself
to the Court or was duly
arrested, the Court thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the

person of the accused.

The preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose
of
determining
whether a prima facie case
exists
warranting
the
prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of
the information in the proper
court. In turn, as above
stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the
criminal action against the
accused in Court. Should the
fiscal find it proper to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case,
at such stage, the permission
of the Court must be secured.
After such reinvestigation the
finding and recommendations
of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. While it is
true that the fiscal has the
quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed
in court or not [sic], once the
case
had
already
been
brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel
should be proper in the case
thereafter
should
be
addressed
for
the
consideration of the Court.
The only qualification is that
the action of the Court must
not impair the substantial
rights of the accused or the
right of the People to due
process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this
jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition

of the case as its dismissal or

the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already
in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The
Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the
case
before
it.
The
determination of the case is
within
its
exclusive
jurisdiction and competence.
A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who
has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of
the accused or that the
motion was filed after a
reinvestigation
or
upon
instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation."
(Emphasis supplied). 5
In the case at bar, the Court has taken
note that before the case was set for
trial, almost ten (10) years had
elapsed from the date of filing of the
information. It was not, therefore,
unusual
that
the
complainantoffended party, in his affidavit of
desistance
manifested
that
his
material witnesses could no longer be
contacted,
but,
without
their
testimony, the guilt of the accused
could
not
be
proved
beyond
reasonable doubt.
The prosecuting fiscal in his motion for

reconsideration
of
the
order
dismissing
the
case,
obviously
believed
that
despite
such
manifestation of the complainant, he
(fiscal) could prove the prosecution's
case.
To avoid similar situations, the Court
takes the view that, while the Crespo
doctrine has settled that the trial court
is the sole judge on whether a criminal
case should be dismissed (after the
complaint or information has been
filed in court), still, any move on the
part of the complainant or offended
party to dismiss the criminal case,
even if without objection of the
accused, should first be referred to the
prosecuting fiscal for his own view on
the matter. He is, after all, in control of
the prosecution of the case and he
may have his own reasons why the
case should not be dismissed. It is
only after hearing the prosecuting
fiscal's view that the Court should
exercise its exclusive authority to
continue or dismiss the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Araula vs Espino 28 scra 567
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28949
June 23,
1969
JIBIN ARULA, petitioner,
vs.
Brigadier General ROMEO C.
ESPINO, Members of the General
Court-Martial, namely, CANDIDO
B. GAVINO, President, CRISOGONO
T. MAKILAN, RUBEN S. MONTOYA,
SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, SEGUNDINO
S. QUINTANS, PEDRO FERNANDEZ,

JOSE APOLINARIO, AVELINO

MENEZ, EFRAIN MACLANG, and
MABINI BERNABE, LAW Member,
respondents.
Gregorio M. Familar for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio
P. Barredo and Solicitor Raul I. Goco
and Col. Manuel V. Reyes (AFP Judge
Advocate General), Col. Primitivo D.
Chingcuangco (AFP Deputy Judge
Advocate General), Lt. Col. Pedro
Malit, Captain Ciriaco P. Cruz of the
AFP, and Amelito Mutuc for
respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
I. Preliminary Statement
The present original petition for
certiorari and/or prohibition with
prayer
for
writ
of
preliminary
injunction seeks the annulment of
Special Order 208 1 (issued on April 6,
1968 by the respondent Brigadier
General
Romeo
C.
Espino
as
commanding general of the Philippine
Army), which special order convenes a
general court-martial and appoints the
members thereof, and to prohibit
permanently the said court-martial,
composed of the other respondents,
from taking cognizance of and
proceeding with the trial of the case
before it with respect to the shooting
and wounding of the petitioner Jibin
Arula. The petition was filed with this
Court on April 25, 1968, 2 and given
due course the following day, April 26.
We issued a temporary restraining
order on the same day, April 26,
"effective immediately and until
further orders from this Court," and
set the "hearing on the injunction and
merits" for May 6.
On May 4 the respondent filed their
answer (with opposition to the
issuance of writ of preliminary

injunction). On this day also, Capt.

Alberto
Soteco,
MSgt.
Benjamin
Munar, Reynaldo Munar and Eugenio
Alcantara, thru counsel filed a motion
to intervene; Attorneys Jesus G.
Barrera, J. Antonio Araneta and Crispin
Baizas
of
the
Citizens'
Legal
Assistance
Committee
of
the
Philippine Bar Association moved for
leave to appear as amici curiae.
At the hearing of the case on May 6, in
Baguio City, Atty. Gregorio M. Familar
argued for the petitioner, Solicitor
General Antonio Barredo argued for
the respondents. 3 The petitioner was
given
5
days
to
submit
a
memorandum of additional facts and
additional
arguments.
The
respondents were granted leave to
submit an answer thereto, and
allowed to present within 3 days the
affidavit of Capt. Ruperto I. Amistoso.
The motion to intervene was likewise
granted, and the intervenors were
given 5 days to file the necessary
pleadings.
On May 7 this Court gave leave to
Attys. Barrera, Araneta and Baizas to
appear as amici curiae, granting them
10 days from notice within which to
submit their memorandum. On the
same day the Solicitor General
submitted the affidavit of Capt.
Amistoso, in compliance with this
Court's May 6 resolution.1awphil.nt
On May 11 the petitioner filed an
amended petition; on May 22 the
intervenor filed an answer with
counter
petition
for
preliminary
injunction; and on May 27 the
respondents submitted their answer to
the amended petition. On June 18 the
amici curiae filed their memorandum,
making common cause with the
petitioner.
This case was reheard on August 26.

The
petitioner
thereafter,
on
September 19, filed his memorandum
of authorities and exhibits. The
intervenors
filed
their
reply
memorandum of authorities and
exhibits on October 23. And on
November 12 the Solicitor General
filed the respondents' reply to the
petitioner's
memorandum
of
authorities and exhibits.
II. Facts
Shorn of trivia and minutiae, the
uncontroverted facts converge in
sharp focus.
The petitioner Arula was on December
17, 1967 recruited by one Capt.
Teodoro R. Facelo of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines at Simunul, Sulu, to
undergo training. On the following
January 3, he, together with other
recruits, was taken to Corregidor
island. On March 18 a shooting
incident
occurred
at
Corregidor,
resulting in, among other things, the
infliction of serious physical injuries
upon the petitioner. Despite his
wounds he succeeded in fleeing
Corregidor, and on March 23, he filed,
a criminal complaint with the city
fiscal of Cavite City for frustrated
murder against Capt. Alberto Soteco,
Benjamin Munar alias Lt. Baqui,
Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey, Eugenio
Alcantara alias Lt. Alcantara, 4 and nine
others. Acting
on the
criminal
complaint, the city fiscal on March 29
sent subpoenas to the persons above
enumerated, advising them that the
preliminary investigation was set for
April 3 at 9: 00 o'clock in the morning,
and requiring them to appear at his
office on the same date and time.
On April 2 the petitioner sent a letter
to the commanding officer of the
Philippine Army, informing the latter
that he was "not filing any charges"

with the military authorities against

the army personnel responsible for his
injuries, for the reason that he had
"already filed the corresponding
criminal complaint" with the city fiscal
of Cavite City. On the following day,
April 3, the date set for the
preliminary
investigation,
army
lawyers
headed
by
Capt.
Jose
Magsanoc appeared on behalf of the
respondents
and
requested
for
transfer
of
the
preliminary
investigation which, as a result of such
request, was reset for April 16.
Meanwhile, the respondent General
Espino directed Capt. Alfredo O.
Pontejos of his command to conduct a
pre-trial
investigation
of
the
Corregidor
incident
to
pinpoint
responsibility therefor. As early as
March 22, however, all of the army
personnel, except two, supposedly
involved in the hapless incident had
already been placed under technical
arrest and restricted to camp limits.
(These last two were subsequently, on
April 16, placed under technical
arrest.)
On April 6 Capt. Pontejos, as pre-trial
investigator, submitted his written
report, which contained the substance
of the declarations of Andrew Gruber,
Colonel Wilfredo E. Encarnacion,
Trainee Capt. Rosauro Novesteras, Lt.
Tomas Rainilo of the Special Forces
Training Unit (provisional), 2nd Class
Trainee Wilfredo Pahayhay, Trainee
Dugasan Ahid and 2nd Lt. Antonio
Santos. Appended thereto was an
array of documents.
Recommended for trial by general
court-martial
are
Major Eduardo
Martelino, alias Major Abdul Latif
Martelino, Capt. Cirilo Oropesa, Capt.
Teodoro R. Facelo, Capt. Ruperto E.
Amistoso, Capt. Alberto G. Soteco, 1st

Lt. Eduardo B. Batalla, 2nd Lt. Rolando

Abadilla, MSgt. Benjamin C. Munar,
MSgt. Federico Ilangilang, MSgt. Cesar
Calinawagan,
TSgt.
Timoteo
C.
Malubay, TSgt. Pedro Banigued, SSgt.
Narciso T. Dabbay, Cpl. Rolando
Buenaventura, Cpl. Felix Lauzon, Cpl.
Evaristo Ruiz, Cpl. Orlando Decena,
Cpl. Francisco Grinn, Cpl. Agustin
Dagdag, Cpl. Alfredo F. Forfieda and
Pfc. Wilfredo Latonero.
On April 14, Capt. Pontejos submitted
a supplemental report, recommending
trial by general court-martial of Capt.
Solferino Titong alias Capt. Mike,
trainee Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey
and trainee Eugenio Alcantara alias Lt.
Alcantara.
On the same day (April 6) that Capt.
Pontejos
submitted
his
pre-trial
investigation report, the respondent
General Espino issued Special Order
208, appointing a General courtmartial, composed of the other
respondents, to try the case against
the army personnel involved in the
Corregidor incident, intervenors herein
being among them. Charges and
specifications for violations of articles
of war 94 and 97 5 were filed with the
general
court-martial;
additional
charges and specifications were
subsequently filed and renumbered.
At the hearing by the general courtmartial on April 16, the petitioner
Arula adduced testimony to prove
specification 1, charge 1 (violation of
the 94th article of war) which directly
and squarely pertains to the shooting
and wounding of the said petitioner.
On April 19 the Armed Forces lawyers
moved to dismiss the complaint filed
with the city fiscal of Cavite upon the
ground that the civil courts had lost
jurisdiction over the case because a
court-martial had been convened.

It is here pertinent to note that on

March 21 President Ferdinand Marcos
(as Commander-in-Chief) ordered an
investigation of the reported killings of
commando trainees on Corregidor
Island, and, on the following day,
March 22, directed the creation of a
court-martial to try whomsoever might
be responsible for the reported
killings. (See the March 22 and 23,
1968 issues of the Manila Times,
Philippines Herald and Manila Daily
Bulletin.) So that before the petitioner
Arula filed his criminal complaint (on
March 23) with the city fiscal of
Cavite, the President had already
ordered an investigation of the
Corregidor incident and the convening
of a court-martial relative thereto.
III. Issues
The petitioner poses as the dominant
issue the jurisdiction of the general
court-martial to take cognizance of
charge 1, specification 1 for frustrated
murder involving the petitioner's
injuries. More specifically he avers
that; .
1. the offense was committed
outside a military reservation
because Corregidor where the
offense was committed had been
declared by President Ramon
Magsaysay as a "national shrine";
2. he, the petitioner, is a civilian,
not subject to military law
because he had never enlisted in
the Army nor had he been
formally inducted therein; and
3. the Court of First Instance of
Cavite
has
already
taken
cognizance of the case, to the
exclusion of the general courtmartial.
On the other hand, the respondents
maintain that the general courtmartial has jurisdiction over the

offense
committed
against
the
petitioner, to the exclusion of the
Cavite CFI, because:
1. the petitioner, like all the
persons
accused
before
the
general court-martial, is subject to
military law:
2. the offense (shooting and
wounding of the petitioner) was
committed
inside
a
military
reservation by persons subject to
military law; and
3.
the
general
court-martial
acquired jurisdiction over the case
ahead of any civil court with
concurrent jurisdiction.
At the threshold, the respondents
traverse
the
petitioner's
legal
personality to bring and maintain the
present action. 6
On their part, the intervenors refuted
point
by
point
the
arguments
advanced by the petitioner in his
amended petition. Upon the other
hand, the amici curiae, as stated
earlier, made common cause with the
petitioner.
On the basis of the pleadings of all the
parties, the following issues are
joined: (1) Does the petitioner have
legal personality to institute and
maintain the present action for
certiorari and prohibition to stop the
general court-martial from proceeding
with the hearing of the case insofar as
it concerns the injuries inflicted upon
him? (2) In the affirmative, does the
general court-martial have jurisdiction
over the case? This in turn depends on
the resolution of the sub-issues of (a)
whether the petitioner is a person
subject to military law; (b) if he is not,
whether Corregidor is a military
reservation; and (c) whether the filing
by the petitioner of a criminal
complaint
(involving
the
same

offense) with the city fiscal of Cavite

City forthwith invested the Court of
First Instance of Cavite jurisdiction to
try the case to the exclusion of the
general court-martial.
IV. Discussion
Of basic and immediate involvement
is article of war 94 of Commonwealth
Act 408, as amended by Republic Act
242, which provides in full as follows:
Various Crimes. Any person
subject to military law who
commits any felony, crime, breach
of law or violation of municipal
ordinance which is recognized as
an offense of a penal nature and
is punishable under the penal laws
of the Philippines or under
municipal ordinances, (A) inside a
reservation of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, or (B) outside any
such
reservation
when
the
offended party (and each one of
the offended parties if there be
more than one) in a person
subject to military law, shall be
punished as a court-martial may
direct, Provided, That, in time of
peace officers and enlisted men of
the Philippine Constabulary shall
not be triable by courts-martial for
any felony, crime, breach of law or
violation of municipal ordinances
committed under this article. In
imposing the penalties for such
offenses falling within this article,
the penalties for such offenses
provided in the penal laws of the
Philippines or such municipal
ordinances shall be taken into
consideration.
The parties are agreed on the purview
and meaning of this article. It places
persons subject to military law 7 under
the jurisdiction of courts-martial,
concurrent with the jurisdiction of the

proper civil courts, when they commit

any felony, crime, breach of law or
violation of municipal ordinance which
is recognized as an offense of a penal
nature and is punishable under the
penal laws of the Philippines or under
municipal ordinances, (a) inside a
reservation of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or (b) outside any such
reservation when the offended party
(and each one of the offended parties
if there be more than one) is a person
subject to military law. Whenever
persons subject to military law commit
offenses punishable under article of
war 94 outside a military reservation
and the offended party (or any one of
the offended parties it there be more
than one) is not a person subject to
military law, they fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.
This article of war removes officers
and enlisted men of the Philippine
Constabulary
entirely
from
the
jurisdiction of courts-martial when
they commit offenses under this
article
in
time
of
peace,
notwithstanding that the said offenses
are
committed
within
military
reservations;
or
outside
such
reservations and the offended party
(and each one of the offended parties
if there be more than one is a person
subject to military law.
Nor is it disputed that the crime of
frustrated
murder,
the
offense
imputed to the military personnel
accused before the general courtmartial, is embraced within the
purview of article of war 94. That the
said accused are members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and
are not officers or enlisted men of the
Philippine Constabulary, is likewise
conceded.
The divergence of opinion is to

whether Corregidor was, on March 18,

1968 (the date when the offense was
allegedly committed), a military
reservation, and, if it was not, as to
whether the petitioner was at that
time a person subject to military law.
1. On May 31, 1948 President Elpidio
Quirino issued Proclamation No. 69 8
(hereinafter referred to as P-69)
declaring "Corregidor, including the
adjacent islands and detached rocks
surrounding the same," a military
reservation and placing it under the
direct supervision and control of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The
petitioner's insistence that Corregidor
is no longer a military reservation is
anchored on Executive Order No. 58
9
(hereinafter referred to as EO 58)
issued on August 16, 1954 by
President Ramon Magsaysay, which
declared "all battlefield areas in
Corregidor and Bataan province" as
national shrines and "except such
portions as may be temporarily
needed for the storage of ammunition
or deemed absolutely essential for
safeguarding the national security,"
opening
them
"to
the
public,
accessible as tourist resorts and
attractions, as scenes of popular
pilgrimages
and
as
recreational
centers," from which the petitioner
argues that Corregidor is no longer a
military reservation because it has
been converted into a national shrine
and made accessible to the public.
For several cogent reasons, it is our
view that this argument is devoid of
merit.
In the first place, EO 58 does not
expressly repeal P-69. From the terms
contained within the four corners of
the later presidential decree cannot be
inferred or implied a repeal of the
former presidential act. It cannot,

therefore, be safely said that implied

repeal of P-69 was intended. Wellentrenched is the rule that implied
repeals are not favored (Camacho vs.
ClR, 80 Phil. 848; Visayan Electric Co.
vs. David, 94 Phil. 969; North
Camarines Lumber Co., Inc. vs. David,
51 OG 1860, Manila Electric Co. vs.
City of Manila, 98 Phil. 951; Manila
Letter Carriers Association vs. Auditor
General, 57 OG 9027).
In the second place, there is nothing in
the language of EO 58 from which it
can be reasonably inferred that the
declaration of certain areas in
Corregidor island as battlefield areas
or as national shrines necessarily
divests such areas or the entire
island of Corregidor itself of their
character as a military reservation and
national defense zone. Even if an area
were actually declared as a "national
shrine" or "battlefield area" or
"historic site" by the National Shrines
Commission, its character as part of a
national defense zone or military
reservation would not thereby be
abated or impaired. A military
reservation or national defense zone
under
the
provisions
of
Commonwealth Act 321 10 can
concurrently be used and developed
as a national shrine without excluding
it from the operation of the said Act.
This Act makes the entry of a private
person into a national defense zone
subject to regulations prescribed by
the President, thereby not precluding
the possibility that civilians may be
permitted to enter and remain in a
proclaimed national defense zone
under
appropriate
regulations.
Paragraph 1 of EO 58 declares that
even portions of battlefield areas
declared as national shrines are not to
be opened to the public as tourist

resorts or recreational centers if they

are deemed "absolutely essential for
safeguarding the national security."
In the third place, if the President had
intended to repeal P-69, he would
have done so in an unequivocal
manner. If he had intended to remove
certain portions of Corregidor island
from the ambit of P-69, he would have
expressly withdrawn such portions,
describing them by specific metes and
bounds. This is the uniform pattern of
presidential orders modifying the
extent of an area previously reserved
for a certain public purpose. A typical
example is Proclamation No. 208
dated May 28, 1967 (63 OG No. 31,
6614) wherein President Ferdinand E.
Marcos excluded from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 dated July 12,
1957 (which had established the Fort
Bonifacio military reservation) a
certain portion of the land embraced
therein situated in Taguig, Rizal, and
reserved the same for national shrine
purposes under the administration of
the National Shrines Commission,
subject to private rights, if any, and to
future survey.
In the fourth place, admitting in gratia
argumenti that the declaration of a
certain area as a battlefield area
under EO 58 would have the effect of
removing it from the Operation of P69, the fact remains that the
Corregidor airstrip, where the shooting
and wounding of the petitioner
allegedly took place, has not been
actually
delimited
and
officially
declared as a national shrine. In its
overall context as well as in its specific
phraseology, EO 58 affects and opens
to the public only those areas of
Corregidor island to be selected,
declared, delimited and developed as
historic sites by the National Shrines

Commission. This official act of the

National Shrines Commission is the
operative act that can give to any
portion of Corregidor island the status
of a "national shrine," or "battlefield
area" or "historic site." There is no
showing that the airstrip in Corregidor
has been officially declared by the
National
Shrines
Commission
a
national shrine, battlefield area, or
historic site.
The duty of the Commission to
recondition the airstrip in Corregidor
(paragraph 6, EO 58) does not, in fact
and in law, make the said air-strip
itself a "battlefield area" or "historic
site" within the contemplation of EO
58. Clearly, the airstrip and resthouses
mentioned are only service facilities to
promote tourism.
To buttress his claim that Corregidor
island, in its entirety, is a battlefield
area, the petitioner invokes Executive
Order No. 123 dated March 15, 1968,
which, amending EO 58, authorizes
the National Shrines Commission, with
the prior approval of the President, "to
enter into any contract for the
conversion of areas within national
shrines into tourist spots and to lease
such areas to any citizen or citizens of
the Philippines, or any corporation
60% of the capital stock of which
belongs to Filipino citizens." In the
absence, however, of the delimitation
and marking of the historical sites or
battlefield areas and pending the
conversion of portions thereof into
tourist spots (disposable for lease to
private parties), the status and
identity of the entire Corregidor island
as a national defense zone remain
unchanged.
With some vehemence, the petitioner
presses the contention that "the entire
island of Corregidor, including the

airstrip, was a battlefield from the

time it was first bombed on December
29, 1941, until its surrender on May 6,
1942." To unmask the emptiness of
this conclusion, we have only to recall
the requirement of EO 58 that the
"Commission
shall
immediately
proceed to determine the historic
areas [battlefield areas in Corregidor
Island and Bataan province] to be
preserved, developed and beautified
for the purposes of this order,
establish the boundaries thereof and
mark them out properly" (par. 4). Such
requirement of delimitation would
indeed be an absolute superfluity
insofar as Corregidor is concerned if
this island in its entirety were in fact
and in design a battlefield area within
the purview of EO 58.
In sum and substance, we do not
discern
any
incompatibility
or
repugnance between P-69 and EO 58
as would warrant the suggestion that
the former has given way to the latter,
or that the latter, in legal effect, has
obliterated the former.
2. We now proceed to assess the claim
of the petitioner that the general
court-martial is barred from asserting
and exercising jurisdiction because the
Court of First Instance of Cavite a
court of concurrent jurisdiction first
acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Let us initially examine the relevant
facts.
On March 23 the petitioner filed a
criminal complaint with the city fiscal
of Cavite City for frustrated homicide
against those accused before the
general court-martial.
On March 29, the city fiscal of Cavite
City sent subpoenas to the aforesaid
accused, advising them that the
preliminary investigation would be
conducted on April 3 at 9:00 a.m.

On April 2 the petitioner wrote to the

Commanding Officer, Philippine Army,
Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, informing the
latter that he was not filing charges
with the military authorities against
those responsible for his injuries,
because he had already filed the
corresponding criminal complaint with
the city fiscal of Cavite City.
On April 3 Army lawyers appeared
before the city fiscal of Cavite City on
behalf of those army personnel
involved in the shooting and wounding
of the petitioner and requested for
transfer
of
the
preliminary
investigation which was, accordingly,
reset for April 16.
On April 19 the same Army lawyers
moved to dismiss Arula's complaint
upon the ground that the civil courts
had lost jurisdiction because a courtmartial had already been convened.
This motion was rejected by the city
fiscal.
This was the status of the criminal
complaint filed by the petitioner with
the city fiscal of Cavite City when the
present petition was instituted by him.
This status has remained static and at
present obtains.
On the other hand, the pertinent
proceedings had by and before the
military
authorities
may
be
summarized as follows:
On March 21 the President of the
Philippines (as Commander-in-Chief)
ordered a full investigation of the
Corregidor incident, and, on the
following day, March 22, directed the
creation of a court-martial to try all
officers and enlisted men responsible
for any crime or crimes committed in
connection with the said incident.
On March 27 Major Eduardo Martelino,
et al., were placed under technical
arrest and restricted to camp limits.

On April 6 Capt. Alfredo O. Pontejos,

pre-trial investigator, submitted his
pre-trial report recommending trial by
general court-martial of Major Eduardo
Martelino, et al. Acting on this
recommendation, General Espino, by
Special Order 208, appointed a
general court-martial to try the case
against the said Major Eduardo
Martelino, et al., for violation of the
94th and 97th articles of war, and
forthwith the corresponding charges
and specifications were filed.
On April 14 the pre-trial investigator,
Capt.
Pontejos,
submitted
a
supplemental report recommending
trial by general court-martial of Capt.
Solferino Titong alias Capt. Mike,
trainee Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey,
and trainee Eugenie Alcantara alias Lt.
Alcantara.
On April 16, the general court-martial
"reconvened." 11 The first prosecution
witness to testify on this day was the
petitioner himself. The court-martial
then adjourned to meet again on April
19, 1968.
This was the status of the case before
the general court-martial when the
present action was commenced.
Does our jurisprudence yield any rule
of
thumb
by
which
we
may
conclusively
resolve
the
issue
generated by the above two sets of
facts? It does.
Although for infractions of the general
penal laws, military courts and civil
courts have concurrent jurisdiction,
the rule enunciated in Crisologo vs.
People of the Philippines 12 accords to
the court first acquiring jurisdiction
over the person of the accused by the
filing of charges and having him in
custody the preferential right to
proceed with the trial. Thus
As to the claim that the Military

Court had no jurisdiction over the

case, well known is the rule that
when
several
courts
have
concurrent jurisdiction of the
same offense, the court first
acquiring
jurisdiction
of
the
prosecution retains it to the
exclusion of the others. This rule,
however, requires that jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant
shall have first been obtained by
the court in which the first charge
was filed (22 C.J.S., pp. 186-187).
The record in the present case
shows that the information for
treason in the People's Court was
filed on March 12, 1946, but
petitioner had not yet been
arrested or brought into the
custody of the Court the
warrant of arrest had not been
issued when the indictment for
the same offense was filed in the
military court on January 13,
1947. Under the rule cited, mere
priority in the filing of the
complaint in one court does not
give that court priority to take
cognizance of the offense, it being
necessary in addition that the
court where the information is
filed has custody or jurisdiction of
the person of the defendant.
(Emphasis supplied)
The salutary rule expounded in
Crisologo was explicitly affirmed in
Quirico Alimajen vs. Pascual Valera, et
al., L-13722, February 29, 1960.
Speaking for the Court, Justice J.B.L.,
Reyes unequivocally restated the rule
in the following words:
While the choice of the court
where to bring an action, where
there are two or more courts
having
concurrent
jurisdiction
thereon, is a matter of procedure

and not jurisdiction, as suggested

by the appellant, the moment
such choice has been exercised,
the matter becomes jurisdictional.
Such choice is deemed made
when the proper complaint or
information is filed with the court
having jurisdiction over the same
and
said
court
acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant; from which time the
right and power of the court to try
the accused attaches (see People
vs. Blanco, 47 Off. Gaz No. 7,
3425; Crisologo vs. People, 50 Off.
Gaz., No. 3, 1021). (Emphasis
supplied).
A thoroughgoing review of American
jurisprudence has failed to yield a
contrary
doctrine.
The
doctrine
restated and re-affirmed in countless
decisions of the Federal and States
courts in the United States is the
same: jurisdiction to try a particular
criminal case is vested in a court only
when the appropriate charge is filed
with it AND when jurisdiction of the
person is acquired by it through the
arrest of the party charged or by his
voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction.
The record in the present case
discloses that on April 6 and
thereafter, charges and specifications
were preferred against Major Eduardo
Martelino and several others including
the accused Soteco, Benjamin Munar,
Reynaldo
Munar
and
Eugenio
Alcantara for violations of the 94th
article of war. An order for their arrest
and/or custody was issued (annex 13).
Reynaldo
Munar
and
Eugenio
Alcantara were subsequently, that is,
on April 16, placed under technical
arrest (annex 14). On the other hand,
no indictment has yet been filed with

the CFI of Cavite on the basis of the

complaint lodged by the petitioner
with the City Fiscal's Office of Cavite
City (see annexes B and C), the same
being merely in the preliminary
investigation phase. The mere filing of
a complaint with the prosecuting fiscal
cannot have parity with the filing of
such complaint with the court. And
even if there could be such parity, the
criterion laid down in Crisologo is not
the mere filing of the complaint or
information but the actual taking into
custody of the accused under the
process of one court or the other.
Evidently, the general court-martial
has acquired jurisdiction, which it
acquired exclusively as against the CFI
of Cavite, not only as to the element
of precedence in the filing of the
charges, but also because it first
acquired custody or jurisdiction of the
persons of the accused. Court-martial
jurisdiction over the accused having
properly attached, such military
jurisdiction continues throughout all
phases of the proceedings, including
appellate review and execution of the
sentence. 13
In the deliberations of this Court on
this case, it was suggested that the
rule clearly delineated in Crisologo
and explicitly affirmed in Alimajen
should be abandoned in the resolution
of the present case, because once
Arula filed his complaint with the city
fiscal of Cavite, the military, as a
matter of "comity" and "public policy,"
should have yielded jurisdiction to the
civil courts. This suggestion, to our
mind, completely ignores, among
other things of fundamental import
which we need not dwell on here, the
overriding consideration that the
military should be accorded, and is
entitled to, priority in disciplining its

own members.
It was also suggested that this Court
adopt a rule which would vest
jurisdiction to try a criminal case in a
civil court once a complaint has been
filed with the proper city or provincial
fiscal. This suggestion is, in our view,
unacceptable because it would be
productive of absurd results which
would obtain even among civil courts
themselves in situations of conflict of
jurisdiction, that is, as between one
civil court and another civil court
having concurrent jurisdiction over the
same offense.
Juan de la Cruz kidnaps a woman in
Manila and takes her by motor vehicle
to Pangasinan, passing the provinces
of Rizal, Bulacan, Pampanga and
Tarlac. In Pangasinan he slays her.
Meanwhile, her relatives learn of the
kidnapping, and forthwith file a
complaint for kidnapping against Juan
de la Cruz with the provincial fiscal of
Bulacan. Shortly after the killing which
takes place two days after the filing of
the complaint by her relatives with the
provincial fiscal of Bulacan, the
provincial fiscal of Pangasinan files an
information
for
kidnapping
with
murder against Juan de la Cruz, who is
thereafter arrested by virtue of
forcible process issued by the court of
first instance of Pangasinan. It is true
that under these circumstances the
courts of first instance of Manila, Rizal,
Bulacan,
Pampanga,
Tarlac
and
Pangasinan
have
concurrent
jurisdiction over the offense of
kidnapping with murder because this
felony is a continuing one. But can it
be
logically
argued,
can
the
proposition be reasonably sustained,
that because the relatives of the
victim had filed with the provincial
fiscal of Bulacan a complaint for

kidnapping, before the provincial fiscal

of Pangasinan filed the information for
kidnapping with murder with the CFI of
Pangasinan, the latter court could not
validly acquire jurisdiction, and the CFI
of Bulacan, by the mere filing of a
complaint by the victim's relatives
with the provincial fiscal of Bulacan,
has thereby preempted jurisdiction to
the
exclusion
of
the
CFI
of
Pangasinan?
To paraphrase: beyond the pale of
disagreement is the legal tenet that a
court acquires jurisdiction to try a
criminal case only when the following
requisites concur: (1) the offense is
one which the court is by law
authorized to take cognizance of, (2)
the
offense
must
have
been
committed
within
its
territorial
jurisdiction, and (3) the person
charged with the offense must have
been brought into its forum for trial,
forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon
his voluntary submission to the court.
In the case at bar, while the first two
requisites are indispensably present
with respect to the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, the third requisite
has not even become viable, because
no information has been filed with the
court, nor have the accused persons
been brought under its jurisdiction.
Upon the other hand, all these three
requisites obtained, by the latest, as
of April 16 in respect to the general
court-martial.
The
charges
and
specifications were before that day
forwarded to the court-martial for trial;
all the accused as of that day were
already under technical arrest and
restricted to camp limits; the offense
is one that is cognizable by the courtmartial under the authority of article
of war 94; the offense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the

court-martial.
3. The petitioner insists nevertheless
that the respondent General Espino
acted in excess of his jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion "in
hastily constituting and convening a
general court-martial to try the case
involving Arula, without the same
being thoroughly investigated by the
pre-trial investigator, resulting in the
filing of charges against persons
without prima facie evidence in
violation of the Constitution, existing
laws, and Art. 71 14of the Articles of
War." The petitioner has not at all
elaborated
on
this
contention,
although apparently on the basis of
this bare accusation, his counsel, in
the oral argument had on May 6,
expressed in no uncertain terms his
apprehension that the trial by the
court-martial will be in the language
of those who are not disinclined to be
mundane one big, thorough
"whitewash."
We are not impressed by this
contention.
It is our view that the respondent
Espino acted well within the periphery
of his authority as commanding
general of the Philippine Army in
constituting
and
convening
the
general court-martial in question. In
issuing Special Order 208 for the
purpose of constituting and convening
the
general
court-martial,
the
respondent Espino was guided by the
report and recommendation of Capt.
Pontejos, the pre-trial investigating
officer. In his report of April 6 (annex
6) Capt. Pontejos gave the abstract of
the declarations made by several
persons concerning the Corregidor
incident.
The
said
report
was
accomplished
pursuant
to
the
provisions of article of war 71. And so

was his supplemental report of April

14 (annex 7).
Moreover, it would appear that the
persons
who
should
be
most
concerned in questioning the absence
of a pretrial investigation, or the
unseemly haste with which it was
conducted, are those accused before
the court-martial and this not one
of the 23 accused has done.
But even a failure to conduct a pretrial investigation does not deprive a
general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pretrial investigation is that it is directory,
not mandatory, and in no way affects
the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In
Humphrey vs. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93
L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial
investigation procedure required
by Article 70 15can property be
construed as an indispensible prerequesiteto exercise of Army
general court-martial jurisdiction.
The Article does serve important
functions in the administration of
the court-martial procedures and
does provide safeguards to an
accused. Its language is clearly
such that a defendant could
object to trial in the absence of
the required investigation. In that
event the court-martial could itself
postpone
trial
pending
the
investigation. And the military
reviewing
authorities
could
consider the same contention,
reversing
a
court-martial
conviction where failure to comply
with Article 70 has substantially
injured an accused. But we are not
persuaded that Congress intended
to make otherwise valid courtmartial judgments wholly void
because pre-trial investigations

fall short of the standards

prescribed by Article 70. That
Congress
has
not
required
analogous pre-trial procedure for
Navy court-martial is an indication
that the investigatory plan was
not intended to be exalted to the
jurisdictional level.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article
70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate
General of the Army did hold that
where there had been no pre-trial
investigation,
court-martial
proceedings were void ab initio.
But this holding has been
expressly repudiated in later
holdings of the Judge Advocate
General. This later interpretation
has been that the pre-trial
requirements of Article 70 are
directory, not mandatory, and in
no way affect the jurisdiction of a
court-martial.
The
War
Department's interpretation was
pointedly called to the attention of
Congress in 1947 after which
Congress amended Article 70 but
left unchanged the language here
under consideration. (Emphasis
supplied)..
A trial before a general court-martial
convened
without
any
pre-trial
investigation under article of war 71
would of course be altogether
irregular; but the court-martial might
nevertheless have jurisdiction. 16
Significantly, this rule is similar to the
one obtaining in criminal procedure in
the civil courts to the effect that
absence of preliminary investigation
does not go into the jurisdiction of the
court but merely to the regularity of
the proceedings. 17
Likewise, the respondent Espino's
authority, as commanding general of

the Philippine Army, to refer military

charges against members of his
command for trial by general courtmartial cannot legally be assailed.
Under article of war 8, 18 as
implemented by the Manual for
Courts-Martial (PA) and Executive
19
Order
493,
series
1952,
the
commanding officer of a major
command or task force is empowered
to appoint general courts-martial.
The referral of charges to a courtmartial involves the exercise of
judgment and discretion (AW 71). A
petition forcertiorari, in order to
prosper,
must
be
based
on
jurisdictional grounds because, as long
as
the
respondent
acted
with
jurisdiction, any error committed by
him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error
of judgment which may be reviewed
or corrected only by appeal. 20 "Even
an abuse of discretion is not sufficient
by itself to justify the issuance of a
writ of certiorari." 21
The speedy referral by the appointing
authority, herein respondent Espino,
of the case to a general court-martial
for trial is not jurisdictional error. (See
Flackman v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 871).
Speedy trial is a fundamental right
accorded by the Constitution (Art. III,
Sec. 1[17]), the Rules of Court (Rule
115, Sec. 7[h]) and article of war 71 to
an
accused
in
all
criminal
prosecutions.
This right to a speedy trial is given
greater emphasis in the military where
the right to bail does not exist. In Ex
parte Milligan (4 Wall [71 US] 1), the
Supreme Court of the United States
observed that the discipline necessary
to the efficiency of the Army required
swifter modes of trial than are
furnished by the common law courts.

In the military, the right to a speedy

trial is guaranteed to an accused by
article of war 71 which requires that
when a person subject to military law
is placed in arrest or confinement,
immediate steps shall be taken to try
the person accused or to dismiss the
charge and release him. This article
further requires that, if practicable,
the general court-martial charges shall
be forwarded to the appointing
authority within eight days after the
accused is arrested or confined; if the
same is not practicable, he shall
report to the superior authority the
reasons for delay.
The importance of the right to speedy
trial is underscored by the fact that an
officer who is guilty of negligence or
omission resulting in unnecessary
delay may be held accountable
therefor under article of war 71 (Reyes
v. Crisologo, 75 Phil. 225).
The
apprehension,
heretofore
adverted to, expressed by the counsel
for the petitioner at the hearing on
May 6 that the rights of the
petitioner will not be fully vindicated
should be dismissed as purely
speculative. Such thinking at this
stage has no basis in law and in fact.
Moreover, it is well-settled that mere
apprehension or fear entertained by
an individual cannot serve as the basis
of injunctive relief. 22 The presumption
that official duty will be regularly
performed by officers sworn to uphold
the Constitution and the law cannot be
overthrown by the mere articulation of
misgivings to the contrary.
We thus ineluctably reach the
following conclusions: (1) the airstrip
on Corregidor island where the
shooting and wounding of the
petitioner Arula allegedly took place
has not been removed from the ambit

of Proclamation No. 69, series of 1948,

and is therefore to be properly
considered a part of the military
reservation that is Corregidor island;
(2) because the prime imputed to the
accused, who are persons subject to
military law, was committed in a
military reservation, the general courtmartial has jurisdiction concurrent
with the Court of First Instance of
Cavite to try the offense; and (3) the
general court-martial having taken
jurisdiction ahead of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, must be deemed to
have acquired jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the latter court.
With the view that we take of this
case, resolving the issue of whether
the petitioner Arula is a person subject
to military law would be at best a
purposeless exercise in exegesis if not
altogether an exercise in futility.
Although it would appear that in the
above disquisition we have assumed
the existence of legal standing on the
part of the petitioner to bring and
maintain the present action we must
hasten, without equivocation, to state
that we have so assumed, but only ad
hoc, that is, solely for the purposes of
the present case. We do not here
resolve the general abstract issue of
whether a complaining witness in any
or every criminal prosecution has legal
standing to question the jurisdiction of
the court trying the case. Happily, in
upholding the jurisdiction of the
general court-martial to the exclusion
of the Court of First Instance of Cavite,
in the context of the environmental
circumstances of the case at bar, we
have not been pressed by any
compelling need to do so.
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is
denied, and the restraining order

issued by this Court on April 26, 1968

is hereby lifted. No costs.
Beltran vs Ramos 96 phil 149
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6410
November
24, 1954
JUAN Y. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EUSEBIO F.
RAMOS, ETC., respondent.
Onofre M. Mendoza for petitioner.
Eusebio F. Ramos in his own behalf.
JUGO, J.:
The petitioner, Juan Y Beltran, was
charged before the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Mindoro with
the crime of malversation of public
funds, alleged in the information to
have
been
committed
in
the
municipality of San Jose, province of
Occidental Mindoro, on or about July 6,
and 12, 1951. The trial commenced in
all the municipalities of San Jose,
Mamburao,
and
Lubang
all
of
Occidental Mindoro, on or about July 6,
and 12, 1951. The trial commenced in
the municipalities of San Jose,
Mamburao, and Lubang, all of
Occidental Mindoro. The continuation
of the trial was transferred to the
municipality of Calapan, province of
Oriental Mindoro. The defendant
Beltran, herein petitioner, objected to
the continuation of the trial in Calapan
on the ground that it is outside of the
territorial boundaries of the province
of Occidental Mindoro where the crime
was committed. The trial court
overruled the objection and ordered
the trial to proceed in Calapan. The
petitioner filed in this Court a petition
for a writ of prohibition to enjoin the

trial court from continuing the trial in

Calapan.
The respondent contends that the
provinces of Occidental and Oriental
Mindoro constitute the Eight Judicial
District under the provisions of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act NO.
296). There being no separate court
for the province of Occidental Mindoro,
it is claimed that the judge of the
district may hold his sessions in either
of the two provinces. This contention
is untenable in the present case for
the reason that the Rules of Court
expressly provide that a criminal case
should be instituted and tried in the
municipality or province where the
offense was committed or any of its
essential ingredients took place. This
is fundamental principle, the purpose
being not to compel the defendant to
move to, and appear in a different
court from that of the province where
the crime was committed, as it would
cause him great inconvenience in
looking for his witnesses and other
evidence in another place. Although
the judge of a district may hold the
trial in any particular case subject to
the specific provisions, or section 14
(a), Rule 106, in order not to violate
the Rules of Court and disregard the
fundamental rights of the accused.
Sometimes a judicial district includes
provinces far distant from each other.
Under the theory of the respondent,
the accused may be subjected to the
great inconvenience of going to a far
distant province with all his witnesses
to attend the trial there. This is
prohibited by the Rules of Court as
being unfair to the defendant.
There is no contradiction between the
Judiciary Act and Rule 106, section 14
(a). They should, therefore, be
enforced together harmoniously.

In view of the foregoing, the

respondent judge is enjoined from
continuing the trial of the abovementioned case in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, without pronouncement to
costs. So ordered.
Fukuzume vs People November 11,
2005
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143647 November 11,
2005
YUSUKE FUKUZUME,* Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,**
Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 13,
2000 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888, which
affirmed
with
modification
the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, Branch 146 dated
October 21, 1996 in Criminal Case No.
95-083,
finding
herein
accusedappellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of estafa,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for twenty (20) years
and to pay private complainant the
sum of P424,000.00; and the CA
Resolution dated June 16, 2000
denying
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration.2
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private complainant Javier Ng Yu (Yu)
is a businessman engaged in buying
and
selling
aluminum
scrap
wires.3Sometime in July 1991, Yu,
accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate,4
who was the vice-president of Manila

Electric Company, went to the house

of herein accused-appellant Yusuke
Fukuzume (Fukuzume) in Paraaque.5
Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu
telling the latter that Fukuzume is
from Furukawa Electric Corporation
(Furukawa) and that he has at his
disposal aluminum scrap wires.6
Fukuzume confirmed this information
and told Yu that the scrap wires
belong to Furukawa but they are
under the care of National Power
Corporation
(NAPOCOR).7Believing
Fukuzumes representation to be true,
Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap
wires from Fukuzume.8 The initial
agreed
purchase
price
was
P200,000.00.9 Yu gave Fukuzume
sums of money on various dates which
eventually
totaled
P290,000.00,
broken down as follows: P50,000.00,
given on July 12, 1991; P20,000.00,
given on July 22, 1991; P50,000.00,
given on October 14, 1991; and,
P170,000.00, given on October 18,
1991.10Fukuzume admitted that he
received the same from Yu and that he
still owes him the amount of
P290,000.00.11To support his claim
that the aluminum scrap wires being
sold are indeed owned by Furukawa,
that these scrap wires are with
NAPOCOR,
and
that
Furukawas
authorized
representatives
are
allowed to withdraw and dispose of
said scrap wires, Fukuzume gave Yu
two certifications dated December 17,
1991 and December 27, 1991
purportedly issued by NAPOCOR and
signed by its legal counsel by the
name of R. Y. Rodriguez.12 At the time
that Fukuzume gave Yu the second
certification, he asked money from the
latter telling him that it shall be given
as gifts to some of the people in
NAPOCOR. Yu gave Fukuzume money

and, in exchange, the latter issued

two checks, one for P100,000.00 and
the other for P34,000.00.13 However,
when Yu deposited the checks, they
were dishonored on the ground that
the account from which the checks
should have been drawn is already
closed.14Subsequently, Yu called up
Fukuzume to inform him that the
checks bounced.15 Fukuzume instead
told him not to worry because in one
or two weeks he will give Yu the
necessary authorization to enable him
to retrieve the aluminum scrap wires
from NAPOCOR.16 On January 17,
1992, Fukuzume gave Yu a letter of
even date, signed by the Director of
the Overseas Operation and Power
Transmission Project Divisions of
Furukawa, authorizing Fukuzume to
dispose of excess aluminum conductor
materials which are stored in their
depots in Tanay and Bulacan.17
Thereafter, Fukuzume agreed to
accompany Yu when the latter is going
to take the aluminum scrap wires from
the NAPOCOR compound.18 When Yu
arrived at the NAPOCOR compound on
the scheduled date, Fukuzume was
nowhere to be found.19 Hence, Yu
proceeded to show the documents of
authorization to NAPOCOR personnel.
However, the people from NAPOCOR
did not honor the authorization letter
issued by Furukawa dated January 17,
1992.20 NAPOCOR also refused to
acknowledge the certifications dated
December 17, 1991 and December
27, 1991 claiming that these are
spurious as the person who signed
these documents is no longer
connected with NAPOCOR as of
December 1991.21 Unable to get the
aluminum scrap wires from the
NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to
Fukuzume and asked from the latter

the refund of the money he paid

him.22Fukuzume promised to return
Yus money.23 When Fukuzume failed
to comply with his undertaking, Yu
sent him a demand letter asking for
the refund of P424,000.00 plus loss of
profits.24 Subsequently, Yu filed a
complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).25
In an Information, dated November 4,
1994, filed with the RTC of Makati,
Fukuzume was charged with estafa
committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of July,
1991 up to September 17, 1992, in
the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent
to prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y
Ng, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make false
representation
and
fraudulent
manifestation that he is the duly
authorized representative of Furukawa
Electric Co. Ltd., in the Philippines,
and was authorized to sell excess
aluminum conductor materials not
being used by Napocor and Furukawa,
the accused knowing full well that
those representations were false and
were only made to induce and
convince said Javier Yu y Ng to buy
said materials, who believing said
representations to be true, gave and
delivered
the
total
amount
of
P424,000.00 but the accused once in
possession of the money, far from
complying with his obligation to
deliver said aluminum conductor
materials to herein complainant, with
intent of gain, unfaithfulness and
abuse of confidence, applied and used
for his own personal use and benefit
the said amount and despite repeated
demands failed and refused and still

fails and refuses to account for, to the

damage and prejudice of Javier Yu y
Ng in the aforementioned amount of
P424,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.26
Upon being arraigned on February 28,
1995, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. 27
Trial ensued.
In its Decision dated October 21,
1996, the trial court found Fukuzume
guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
all
the
foregoing
premises considered, the Court hereby
finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
estafa and hereby orders him to suffer
the
maximum
penalty
of
imprisonment for twenty (20) years.
With respect to his civil liability,
accused is hereby ordered to pay
complainant
the
amount
ofP424,000.00 plus legal interest from
the date of demand until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.28
Aggrieved by the trial courts decision,
Fukuzume filed an appeal with the CA.
On
March
13,
2000,
the
CA
promulgated its decision affirming the
findings and conclusions of the trial
court but modifying the penalty
imposed, thus:
although the trial court correctly
imposed the maximum penalty of
imprisonment for twenty (20) years, it
failed to determine the minimum
penalty for the offense committed
(prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum
period but imposed in the maximum
period), hence, the penalty is modified
to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor in its minimum period,
as the minimum, to not more than
twenty
(20)
years
ofreclusion
temporal in its maximum period, as

maximum.29
Accordingly, the dispositive portion of
the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed
from, except for the aforementioned
modification in the prison term of
appellant, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.30
Hence, herein petition filed by
Fukuzume based on the following
grounds:
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL
COURT OF MAKATI HAS JURISDICTION
IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURT.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE
ALLEGED FALSE
PRETENSE
WAS
EXECUTED
PRIOR
TO
OR
SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ALLEGED
COMMISSION OF THE FRAUD.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE
ORIGINAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN
THE
PETITIONER
AND
PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN NOVATED
AND CONVERTED INTO A MERE
DEBTOR-CREDITOR
RELATIONSHIP,
THEREBY
EXTINGUISHING
THE
INCIPIENT
CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
THEREOF, IF ANY.31
We agree with Fukuzumes contention
that the CA erred in ruling that the
RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the
offense charged. The CA ruled:
The trial court of Makati has

jurisdiction. Subject to existing laws, in

all criminal prosecutions, the action
shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory
wherein the offense was committed or
any one of the essential ingredients
thereof took place (Rule 110, Sec. 15,
Rules of Court). Although the false
representation and verbal contract of
sale of the aluminum scrap wires took
place at appellants residence in
Paraaque, appellant and private
complainant nevertheless admitted
that the initial payment of P50,000.00
for said transaction was made at the
Hotel Intercontinental in Makati City
(Record, pp. 15, 68). Hence, an
element of the crime that the
offended party was induced to part
with his money because of the false
pretense occurred within the
jurisdiction of the lower court giving it
jurisdiction over the instant case.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn
statement of Yu filed with the NBI on
April 19, 199432 and the affidavit of
Fukuzume which was subscribed on
July 20, 1994.33
With respect to the sworn statement
of Yu, which was presented in
evidence by the prosecution, it is clear
that he alleged therein that on July 12,
1991, he gave Fukuzume the amount
of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental
Hotel in Makati. However, we agree
with Fukuzumes contention that Yu
testified during his direct examination
that on July 12, 1991 he gave the
amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in
the latters house. It is not disputed
that Fukuzumes house is located in
Paraaque. Yu testified thus:
Q Mr. Witness, you testified the last
time that you know the accused in this
case, Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume?
A Yes, sir.

Q Now, would you enlighten us under

what circumstance you came to know
the accused?
A I know the accused Mr. Yusuke
Fukuzume through Mr. Hubati.
Q And why or how did Mr. Hubati come
to know the accused, if you know?
A Mr. Hubati came to my place dealing
with the aluminum scrap wires.
ATTY. N. SERING
Your Honor, may I move to strike out
the answer. It is not responsive to the
question.
COURT
Please wait until the answer is
completed.
Q Now, you met this Mr. Hubati. How?
A He came to me offering me
aluminum scrap wires.
FISCAL E. HIRANG
Q When was that, Mr. Witness?
A That was in 1991, sir.
COURT
When?
FISCAL E. HIRANG
Your Honor please, may the witness be
allowed to consult his memorandum.
A July 12, 1991, sir.
Q And what transpired during that
time you met Mr. Hubati?
A We went to the house of Mr.
Fukuzume and game (sic) him some
amount of money.
Q Now, would you tell the Court the
reason why you parted to the accused
in this case the amount of money?
A In payment of the aluminum scrap
wires and we have documents to that
effect.
Q Now, please tell us what really was
that transaction that took place at the
house of Mr. Fukuzume on that
particular date?
A Our agreement with Mr. Hubati and
with Mr. Fukuzume is that, I am going
to give money in payment of the

aluminum scrap wires coming from

Furukawa Eletric Company.
Q How much is the amount of money
which you agreed to give to the
accused?
A Our first agreement was for
P200,000.
Q Where is that aluminum scrap
located?
A The electric aluminum scrap wires
was or were under the care of the
National
Power
Corporation
but
according to Mr. Fukuzume it belongs
to Furukawa Electric Company.
Q In short, Mr. Witness, on July 12,
1991, you only gave to the accused
the amount of P50,000?
ATTY. N. SERING
Objection, Your Honor.
FISCAL E. HIRANG
The complainant testified he gave
P50,000. I am asking how much the
complainant gave to the accused on
that particular date.
A On July 12, I gave him P50,000 on
that date.
Q Not P200,000?
A No, sir.34
Settled is the rule that whenever there
is inconsistency between the affidavit
and the testimony of a witness in
court, the testimony commands
greater
weight
considering
that
affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to
testimony given in court, the former
being almost invariably incomplete
and oftentimes inaccurate.35
More importantly, we find nothing in
the direct or cross-examination of Yu
to establish that he gave any money
to Fukuzume or transacted business
with him with respect to the subject
aluminum scrap wires inside or within
the premises of the Intercontinental
Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in
Makati for that matter. Venue in

criminal cases is an essential element

of jurisdiction.36 Citing Uy vs. Court of
Appeals,37 we held in the fairly recent
case of Macasaet vs. People38 that:
It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases the offense should have
been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients took place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases
is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to
try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction
of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it
is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if
the evidence adduced during the
trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action
for
want
of
jurisdiction.39
(Emphasis supplied)
Where life or liberty is affected by its
proceedings, the court must keep
strictly within the limits of the law
authorizing it to take jurisdiction and
to try the case and to render
judgment.40
In the present case, the criminal
information against Fukuzume was
filed with and tried by the RTC of
Makati. He was charged with estafa as
defined under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of which are as follows:
1. That there must be a false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means.

2. That such false pretense, fraudulent

act or fraudulent means must be
made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud.
3. That the offended party must have
relied
on
the
false
pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means,
that is, he was induced to part with his
money or property because of the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means.
4. That as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.41
The crime was alleged in the
Information as having been committed
in Makati. However, aside from the
sworn statement executed by Yu on
April 19, 1994, the prosecution
presented
no
other
evidence,
testimonial
or
documentary,
to
corroborate Yus sworn statement or to
prove that any of the aboveenumerated elements of the offense
charged was committed in Makati.
Indeed, the prosecution failed to
establish that any of the subsequent
payments made by Yu in the amounts
of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991,
P20,000.00
on
July
22,
1991,
P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and
P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was
given in Makati. Neither was there
proof to show that the certifications
purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has
in its custody the subject aluminum
scrap wires and that Fukuzume is
authorized by Furukawa to sell the
same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in
Makati. On the contrary, the testimony
of Yu established that all the elements
of the offense charged had been
committed in Paraaque, to wit: that
on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house
of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with
the intention of selling the subject

aluminum scrap wires, the latter

pretended that he is a representative
of Furukawa who is authorized to sell
the said scrap wires; that based on the
false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed
to buy the subject aluminum scrap
wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the
initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a
result, Yu suffered damage. Stated
differently, the crime of estafa, as
defined and penalized under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, was consummated when
Yu and Fukuzume met at the latters
house in Paraaque and, by falsely
pretending to sell aluminum scrap
wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu
to part with his money.
The Office of the Solicitor General
argues that Fukuzume himself alleged
in his affidavit dated July 20, 1994 that
in an unspecified date, he received
P50,000.00
from
Yu
at
the
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati.
However, we cannot rely on this
affidavit for the reason that it forms
part of the records of the preliminary
investigation and, therefore, may not
be considered evidence. It is settled
that the record of the preliminary
investigation, whether conducted by a
judge or a prosecutor, shall not form
part of the record of the case in the
RTC.42 In People vs. Crispin,43 this
Court held that the fact that the
affidavit formed part of the record of
the preliminary investigation does not
justify its being treated as evidence
because the record of the preliminary
investigation does not form part of the
record of the case in the RTC. Such
record
must
be
introduced
as
evidence during trial, and the trial
court is not compelled to take judicial
notice of the same.44 Since neither
prosecution nor defense presented in

evidence Fukuzumes affidavit, the

same may not be considered part of
the records, much less evidence.
From the foregoing, it is evident that
the prosecution failed to prove that
Fukuzume committed the crime of
estafa in Makati or that any of the
essential ingredients of the offense
took place in the said city. Hence, the
judgment of the trial court convicting
Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
should be set aside for want of
jurisdiction,
without
prejudice,
however, to the filing of appropriate
charges with the court of competent
jurisdiction.
It is noted that it was only in his
petition with the CA that Fukuzume
raised the issue of the trial courts
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an
objection based on the ground that
the court lacks jurisdiction over the
offense charged may be raised or
considered motu propio by the court
at any stage of the proceedings or on
appeal.45 Moreover, jurisdiction over
the subject matter in a criminal case
cannot be conferred upon the court by
the accused, by express waiver or
otherwise, since such jurisdiction is
conferred by the sovereign authority
which organized the court, and is
given only by law in the manner and
form prescribed by law.46 While an
exception to this rule was recognized
by this Court beginning with the
landmark
case
of
Tijam
vs.
Sibonghanoy,47 wherein the defense of
lack of jurisdiction by the court which
rendered the questioned ruling was
considered to be barred by laches, we
find that the factual circumstances
involved in said case, a civil case,
which justified the departure from the
general rule are not present in the

instant criminal case.

Thus, having found that the RTC of
Makati did not have jurisdiction to try
the case against Fukuzume, we find it
unnecessary to consider the other
issues raised in the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 21888
are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146.
Criminal
Case
No.
95-083
is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Foz,Jr. & Fajardo vs People October 9,
2009
r vs Sandiganbayan October 12, 2009
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170122
October
12, 2009
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,
Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171381
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,
Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before
us are these
two (2)
consolidated petitions under Rule 65,
each interposed by petitioner Clarita
D. Garcia, with application for
injunctive relief. In the first petition for

mandamus and/or certiorari, docketed

as G.R. No. 170122, petitveraioner
seeks to nullify and set aside the
August 5, 2005 Order,1 as reiterated in
another Order dated August 26, 2005,
both issued by the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, which effectively
denied the petitioners motion to
dismiss and/or to quash Civil Case
No. 0193, a suit for forfeiture
commenced by the Republic of the
Philippines against the petitioner and
her immediate family. The second
petition for certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 171381, seeks to nullify and
set aside the November 9, 2005
Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise
denied the petitioners motion to
dismiss and/or quash Civil Case No.
0196,
another
forfeiture
case
involving the same parties but for
different properties.
The Facts
To recover unlawfully acquired funds
and properties in the aggregate
amount of PhP 143,052,015.29 that
retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his
wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children
Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark
(collectively,
the
Garcias)
had
allegedly amassed and acquired, the
Republic, through the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to
Republic Act No. (RA) 1379,3 filed with
the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October
29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of
those
properties.
This
petition,
docketed as Civil Case No. 0193,
was eventually raffled to the Fourth
Division of the anti-graft court.
Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by
the filing on July 5, 2005 of another
forfeiture case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 0196, this time to recover funds
and properties amounting to PhP

202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196

would eventually be raffled also to the
Fourth Division of the SB. For
convenience and clarity, Civil Case No.
0193 shall hereinafter be also referred
to as Forfeiture I and Civil Case No.
0196 as Forfeiture II.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but
subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I,
the OMB charged the Garcias and
three others with violation of RA 7080
(plunder) under an Information dated
April 5, 2005 which placed the value
of the property and funds plundered at
PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed as
Crim.
Case
No.
28107,
the
Information was raffled off to the
Second Division of the SB. The plunder
charge, as the parties pleadings seem
to indicate, covered substantially the
same properties identified in both
forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture I, the
following events transpired in relation
to the case:
(1)
The
corresponding
summons were issued and all
served on Gen. Garcia at his
place of detention. Per the
Sheriffs Return4 dated November
2, 2005, the summons were duly
served on respondent Garcias.
Earlier, or on October 29, 2004,
the SB issued a writ of attachment
in favor of the Republic, an
issuance
which
Gen.
Garcia
challenged before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 165835.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias
filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the SBs lack of
jurisdiction over separate civil
actions for forfeiture. The OMB
countered with a motion to
expunge and to declare the
Garcias in default. To the OMBs

motion, the Garcias interposed an

opposition
in
which
they
manifested
that
they
have
meanwhile repaired to the Court
on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
165835 to nullify the writ of
attachment SB issued in which
case the SB should defer action on
the forfeiture case as a matter of
judicial courtesy.
(2) By Resolution5 of January 20,
2005, the SB denied the motion
to dismiss; declared the same
motion aspro forma and hence
without tolling effect on the period
to answer. The same resolution
declared
the
Garcias
in
default.
Another resolution6 denied the
Garcias
motion
for
reconsideration and/or to admit
answer, and set a date for the exparte
presentation
of
the
Republics evidence.
A
second
motion
for
reconsideration was also denied
on February 23, 2005, pursuant to
the prohibited pleading rule.
(3) Despite the standing default
order, the Garcias moved for the
transfer and consolidation of
Forfeiture I with the plunder case
which were respectively pending
in different divisions of the SB,
contending
that
such
consolidation is mandatory under
RA 8249.7
On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th
Division denied the motion for the
reason that the forfeiture case is
not the corresponding civil action
for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the criminal case of
plunder.
(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias
filed another motion to dismiss

and/or to quash Forfeiture I on,

inter alia, the following grounds:
(a) the filing of the plunder case
ousted the SB 4th Division of
jurisdiction over the forfeiture
case;
and
(b)
that
the
consolidation is imperative in
order to avoid possible double
jeopardy entanglements.
By Order8 of August 5, 2005, the SB
merely noted the motion in view of
movants having been declared in
default which has yet to be lifted.
It is upon the foregoing factual
antecedents that petitioner Clarita has
interposed her first special civil action
for
mandamus
and/or
certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 170122, raising
the following issues:
I. Whether or not the [SB] 4th Division
acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion x x x in issuing its
challenged order of August 5, 2005
and August 26 2005 that merely
"Noted without action," hence refused
to resolve petitioners motion to
dismiss and/or to quash by virtue of
petitioners prior default in that:
A. For lack of proper and valid
service of summons, the [SB]
4th Division could not have
acquired
jurisdiction
over
petitioners, [and her childrens] x
x x persons, much less make them
become the true "parties-litigants,
contestants or legal adversaries"
in forfeiture I. As the [SB] has not
validly acquired jurisdiction over
the
petitioners
[and
her
childrens] x x x persons, they
could not possibly be declared in
default, nor can a valid judgment
by default be rendered against
them.
B. Even then, mere declaration in

default does not per se bar

petitioner from challenging the
[SB] 4th Divisions lack of
jurisdiction over the subject
matter of forfeiture I as the same
can be raised anytime, even after
final judgment. In the absence of
jurisdiction over the subject
matter, any and all proceedings
before the [SB] are null and void.
C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005
rejection of petitioners motion for
reconsideration
of
the
first
challenged order that the issue of
jurisdiction raised therein had
already been passed upon by [the
SB 4th Divisions] resolution of
May 20, 2005, the records clearly
show that the grounds relied upon
by petitioner in her motion to
dismiss and/or to quash dated July
26, 2005 were entirely different,
separate and distinct from the
grounds set forth in petitioners
manifestation and motion [to
consolidate] dated April 15, 2005
that was denied by it per its
resolution of May 20, 2005.
D. In any event, the [SB] 4th
Division has been ousted of
jurisdiction over the subject
matter of forfeiture I upon the
filing of the main plunder case
against petitioner that mandates
the automatic forfeiture of the
subject properties in forfeiture
cases I & II as a function or
adjunct of any conviction for
plunder.
E.
Being
incompatible,
the
forfeiture law (RA No. 1379
[1955]) was impliedly repealed by
the plunder law (RA No. 7080
[1991]) with automatic forfeiture
mechanism.
F. Since the sought forfeiture

includes properties purportedly

located in the USA, any penal
conviction for forfeiture in this
case cannot be enforced outside
of the Philippines x x x.
G. Based on orderly procedure
and sound administration of
justice, it is imperative that the
matter of forfeiture be exclusively
tried in the main plunder case to
avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements, and to avoid
possible conflicting decisions by 2
divisions of the [SB] on the matter
of forfeiture as a penal sanction.9
(Emphasis added.)
With respect to Forfeiture II, the
following events and proceedings
occurred or were taken after the
petition for Forfeiture II was filed:
(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff
served
the
corresponding
summons. In his return of July 13,
2005, the sheriff stated giving
the copies of the summons to
the OIC/Custodian of the PNP
Detention Center who in turn
handed them to Gen. Garcia.
The general signed his receipt of
the summons, but as to those
pertaining
to
the
other
respondents,
Gen.
Garcia
acknowledged receiving the same,
but with the following qualifying
note: "Im receiving the copies of
Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo &
Timothy but these copies will
not guarantee it being served to
the above-named (sic)."
(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and
her
children,
thru
special
appearance of counsel, filed a
motion to dismiss and/or to quash
Forfeiture II primarily for lack of
jurisdiction over their persons and
on the subject matter thereof

which is now covered by the

plunder case.
To the above motion, the
Republic filed its opposition
with a motion for alternative
service of summons. The
motion for alternative service
would be repeated in another
motion of August 25, 2005.
(3)
By
Joint
Resolution
of
November 9, 2005, the SB denied
both the petitioners motion to
dismiss and/or to quash and the
Republics motion for alternative
service of summons.
On January 24, 2006, the SB denied
petitioners
motion
for
partial
reconsideration.10
From the last two issuances adverted
to, Clarita has come to this Court via
the instant petition for certiorari,
docketed as GR No. 171381. As there
submitted, the SB 4th Division acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its Joint Resolution dated
November 9, 2005 and its Resolution
of
January
24,
2006
denying
petitioners motion to dismiss and/or
to quash in that:
A. Based on its own finding that
summons
was
improperly
served on petitioner, the [SB]
ought to have dismissed forfeiture
II for lack of jurisdiction over
petitioners person x x x.
B. By virtue of the plunder case
filed with the [SB] Second Division
that mandates the automatic
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
properties upon conviction, the
[SB] Fourth Division has no
jurisdiction over the subject
matter of forfeiture.
C.
Being
incompatible,
the
forfeiture law (RA No. 1379

[1955]) was impliedly repealed by

the plunder law (RA No. 7080
[1991]) with automatic forfeiture
mechanism.
D. Based on orderly procedure
and sound administration of
justice, it is imperative that the
matter of forfeiture be exclusively
tried in the main plunder case to
avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements
and
worse
conflicting decisions by 2 divisions
of the Sandiganbayan on the
matter of forfeiture as a penal
sanction.11 (Emphasis added.)
Per Resolution of the Court dated
March 13, 2006, G.R. No. 170122
and
G.R.
No.
171381
were
consolidated.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly meritorious.
The core issue tendered in these
consolidated cases ultimately boils
down to the question of jurisdiction
and may thusly be couched into
whether the Fourth Division of the SB
has acquired jurisdiction over the
person of petitionerand her three
sons for that matterconsidering that,
first, vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193
(Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II),
summons against her have been
ineffectively or improperly served and,
second, that the plunder caseCrim.
Case No. 28107has already been
filed and pending with another
division of the SB, i.e., Second Division
of the SB.
Plunder Case in Crim. Case No.
28107 Did Not Absorb the
Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos.
0193 and 0196
Petitioner maintains that the SB 4th
Division has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Forfeitures I and II as
both cases are now covered or

included in the plunder case against

the Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a
bit differently, the filing of the main
plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107),
with
its
automatic
forfeiture
mechanism in the event of conviction,
ousted the SB 4th Division of its
jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the forfeiture cases. The inclusion of
the forfeiture cases with the plunder
case is necessary, so petitioner
claims, to obviate possible double
jeopardy entanglements and colliding
case dispositions. Prescinding from
these premises, petitioner would
ascribe grave abuse of discretion on
the SB 4th Division for not granting its
separate motions to dismiss the two
forfeiture
petitions
and/or
to
consolidate them with the plunder
case on the foregoing ground.
Petitioners contention is untenable.
And in response to what she suggests
in some of her pleadings, let it be
stated at the outset that the SB has
jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture
under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding
thereunder is civil in nature. We said
so in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan12
involving no less than petitioners
husband questioning certain orders
issued in Forfeiture I case.
Petitioners
posture
respecting
Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by
the plunder case, thus depriving the
4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction
over the civil cases, is flawed by the
assumptions holding it together, the
first assumption being that the
forfeiture cases are the corresponding
civil action for recovery of civil liability
ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB
4th Division in its May 20, 2005
Resolution,13 the civil liability for
forfeiture cases does not arise from
the commission of a criminal offense,

thus:
Such liability is based on a statute
that safeguards the right of the State
to
recover
unlawfully
acquired
properties. The action of forfeiture
arises when a "public officer or
employee
[acquires]
during
his
incumbency an amount of property
which is manifestly out of proportion
of his salary x x x and to his other
lawful income x x x."14 Such amount of
property is then presumed prima facie
to have been unlawfully acquired.15
Thus "if the respondent [public official]
is unable to show to the satisfaction of
the court that he has lawfully acquired
the property in question, then the
court shall declare such property
forfeited in favor of the State, and by
virtue of such judgment the property
aforesaid shall become property of the
State.16 x x x (Citations in the original.)
Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order
No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit
defining only the jurisdiction over
cases involving ill-gotten wealth of
former
President
Marcos,
his
immediate
family
and
business
associates, authorizes under its Sec.
317 the filing of forfeiture suits under
RA
1379
which
will
proceed
independently
of
any
criminal
proceedings. The Court, in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,18
interpreted
this
provision
as
empowering
the
Presidential Commission on Good
Government to file independent civil
actions separate from the criminal
actions.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder
Case Have Separate Causes of
Action; the Former Is Civil in
Nature
while
the
Latter
Is
Criminal
It bears stressing, as a second point,
that a forfeiture case under RA 1379

arises out of a cause of action

separate and different from a plunder
case, thus negating the notion that
the crime of plunder charged in Crim.
Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture
cases. In a prosecution for plunder,
what is sought to be established is the
commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of illgotten wealth. In the language of Sec.
4 of RA 7080, for purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it is
"sufficient
to
establish
beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to
amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth]." On the other hand, all
that the court needs to determine, by
preponderance of evidence, under RA
1379
is
the
disproportion
of
respondents
properties
to
his
legitimate
income,
it
being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired
said
properties.
As
correctly
formulated by the Solicitor General,
the forfeitable nature of the properties
under the provisions of RA 1379 does
not proceed from a determination of a
specific overt act committed by the
respondent public officer leading to
the acquisition of the illegal wealth.19
Given the foregoing considerations,
petitioners thesis on possible double
jeopardy entanglements should a
judgment of conviction ensue in Crim.
Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double
jeopardy, as a criminal law concept,
refers to jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense,20 suggesting that
double jeopardy presupposes two
separate
criminal
prosecutions.
Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to
repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary
corollary, one who is sued under RA
1379 may be proceeded against for a

criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a

case under that law is not barred by
the conviction or acquittal of the
defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for
plunder.
Moreover, given the variance in the
nature and subject matter of the
proceedings between the plunder case
and the subject forfeiture cases,
petitioners apprehension about the
likelihood of conflicting decisions of
two different divisions of the anti-graft
court on the matter of forfeiture as a
penal sanction is specious at best.
What the SB said in this regard merits
approving citation:
On the matter of forfeiture as a penal
sanction, respondents argue that the
division where the plunder case is
pending may issue a decision that
would collide or be in conflict with the
decision by this division on the
forfeiture case. They refer to a
situation where this Courts Second
Division
may
exonerate
the
respondents in the plunder case while
the Fourth Division grant the petition
for forfeiture for the same properties
in favor of the state or vice versa.
Suffice it to say that the variance in
the decisions of both divisions does
not give rise to a conflict. After all,
forfeiture in the plunder case requires
the
attendance
of
facts
and
circumstances separate and distinct
from that in the forfeiture case.
Between the two (2) cases, there is no
causal connection in the facts sought
to be established and the issues
sought to be addressed. As a result,
the decision of this Court in one does
not have a bearing on the other.
There is also no conflict even if the
decisions in both cases result in an
order for the forfeiture of the subject
properties. The forfeiture following a

conviction in the plunder case will

apply only to those ill-gotten wealth
not recovered by the forfeiture case
and vise (sic) versa. This is on the
assumption that the information on
plunder and the petition for forfeiture
cover the same set of properties.21
RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379
Petitioner takes a different tack in her
bid to prove that SB erred in not
dismissing Forfeitures I and II with her
assertion that RA 7080 impliedly
repealed RA 1379. We are not
convinced.
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any
provision that would indicate a repeal,
expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA
7080 is a penal statute which, at its
most basic, aims to penalize the act of
any public officer who by himself or in
connivance with members of his
family amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount of at least PhP 50
million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is
not penal in nature, in that it does not
make a crime the act of a public
official
acquiring
during
his
incumbency an amount of property
manifestly out of proportion of his
salary and other legitimate income. RA
1379 aims to enforce the right of the
State to recover the properties which
were not lawfully acquired by the
officer.
It has often been said that all doubts
must be resolved against any implied
repeal and all efforts should be
exerted to harmonize and give effect
to all laws and provisions on the same
subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and
RA 7080 can very well be harmonized.
The Court perceives no irreconcilable
conflict between them. One can be
enforced without nullifying the other.
Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire

Jurisdiction over the Persons of

Petitioner and Her Children
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction,
petitioner argues that the SB did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person
and that of her children due to a
defective
substituted
service
of
summons.
There
is
merit
in
petitioners contention.1 a vv p h i 1
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
provides for the requirements of a
valid substituted service of summons,
thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the
defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons
at the defendants residence with
some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b)
by leaving the copies at defendants
office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge
thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire
jurisdiction over a party for the latter
to be bound by its decision or orders.
Valid
service
of
summons,
by
whatever mode authorized by and
proper under the Rules, is the means
by which a court acquires jurisdiction
over a person.22
In the instant case, it is undisputed
that summons for Forfeitures I and II
were served personally on Maj. Gen.
Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained
at the PNP Detention Center, who
acknowledged receipt thereof by
affixing his signature. It is also
undisputed that substituted service of
summons for both Forfeitures I and II
were made on petitioner and her
children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at

the PNP Detention Center. However,

such substituted services of summons
were invalid for being irregular and
defective.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,23 we
broke down the requirements to be:
(1)
Impossibility
of
prompt
personal service, i.e., the party
relying on substituted service or
the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility
of prompt service within a
reasonable time. Reasonable time
being "so much time as is
necessary
under
the
circumstances for a reasonably
prudent and diligent man to do,
conveniently, what the contract or
duty requires that should be done,
having a regard for the rights and
possibility of loss, if any[,] to the
other party."24 Moreover, we
indicated therein that the sheriff
must show several attempts for
personal service of at least three
(3) times on at least two (2)
different dates.
(2) Specific details in the return,
i.e., the sheriff must describe in
the Return of Summons the facts
and circumstances surrounding
the attempted personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on
a person of suitable age and
discretion residing at defendants
house or residence; or on a
competent person in charge of
defendants office or regular place
of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is
apparent that no valid substituted
service of summons was made on
petitioner and her children, as the
service made through Maj. Gen.
Garcia did not comply with the first

two (2) requirements mentioned

above for a valid substituted service of
summons.
Moreover,
the
third
requirement was also not strictly
complied with as the substituted
service was made not at petitioners
house or residence but in the PNP
Detention Center where Maj. Gen.
Garcia is detained, even if the latter is
of suitable age and discretion. Hence,
no valid substituted service of
summons was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of
summons for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendants,
however,
admits
of
exceptions, as when the party
voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by asking
affirmative relief.25 In the instant case,
the Republic asserts that petitioner is
estopped from questioning improper
service of summons since the
improvident service of summons in
both forfeiture cases had been cured
by their (petitioner and her children)
voluntary appearance in the forfeiture
cases. The Republic points to the
various pleadings filed by petitioner
and her children during the subject
forfeiture
hearings.
We
cannot
subscribe to the Republics views.
Special Appearance to Question a
Courts Jurisdiction Is Not
Voluntary Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule
14 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The
defendants voluntary appearance in
the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in
a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a

voluntary appearance. (Emphasis

ours.)
Thus, a defendant who files a motion
to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, together
with other grounds raised therein, is
not deemed to have appeared
voluntarily before the court. What the
rule on voluntary appearancethe
first sentence of the above-quoted
rulemeans is that the voluntary
appearance of the defendant in court
is without qualification, in which case
he is deemed to have waived his
defense of lack of jurisdiction over his
person due to improper service of
summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the
subject forfeiture cases, however, do
not
show
that
she
voluntarily
appeared
without
qualification.
Petitioner filed the following pleadings
in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss;
(b) motion for reconsideration and/or
to admit answer; (c) second motion for
reconsideration;
(d)
motion
to
consolidate
forfeiture
case
with
plunder case; and (e) motion to
dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I.
And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to
dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II;
and
(b)
motion
for
partial
reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly
the motions to dismiss, were filed by
petitioner
solely
for
special
appearance with the purpose of
challenging the jurisdiction of the
SB over her person and that of
her three children. Petitioner asserts
therein that SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person and of her
three children for lack of valid service
of summons through improvident
substituted service of summons in
both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This

stance
the
petitioner
never
abandoned when she filed her motions
for reconsideration, even with a prayer
to admit their attached Answer Ex
Abundante
Ad
Cautelam
dated
January 22, 2005 setting forth
affirmative defenses with a claim for
damages. And the other subsequent
pleadings, likewise, did not abandon
her stance and defense of lack of
jurisdiction
due
to
improper
substituted services of summons in
the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from
the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure,
petitioner and her sons did not
voluntarily appear before the SB
constitutive of or equivalent to service
of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug
Corp. v. Court of Appeals26 applies to
the instant case. Said case elucidates
the current view in our jurisdiction that
a special appearance before the
courtchallenging its jurisdiction over
the person through a motion to
dismiss even if the movant invokes
other groundsis not tantamount to
estoppel or a waiver by the movant of
his objection to jurisdiction over his
person; and such is not constitutive of
a voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner
and her three children voluntarily
appeared before the SB to cure the
defective substituted services of
summons. They are, therefore, not
estopped
from
questioning
the
jurisdiction of the SB over their
persons nor are they deemed to have
waived such defense of lack of
jurisdiction. Consequently, there being
no valid substituted services of
summons made, the SB did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons

of petitioner and her children. And

perforce, the proceedings in the
subject forfeiture cases, insofar as
petitioner and her three children are
concerned, are null and void for lack
of jurisdiction. Thus, the order
declaring them in default must be set
aside and voided insofar as petitioner
and her three children are concerned.
For the forfeiture case to proceed
against them, it is, thus, imperative
for the SB to serve anew summons or
alias summons on the petitioner and
her three children in order to acquire
jurisdiction over their persons.
WHEREFORE,
the
petitions
for
certiorari
and
mandamus
are
PARTIALLY
GRANTED.
The
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has
not
acquired
jurisdiction
over
petitioner Clarita D. Garcia and her
three children. The proceedings in
Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before
the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division,
insofar as they pertain to petitioner
and her three children, are VOID for
lack of jurisdiction over their persons.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Macasaet vs People 452 scra 255
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G. R. No. 156747
February
23, 2005
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V.
QUIJANO, JR., and ALFIE LORENZO,
petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and JOSELITO TRINIDAD,
respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on

Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court of the Decision 1dated
22 March 2002 and Resolution dated 6
January 2003 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 22067 entitled,
"People of the Philippines v. Alfie
Lorenzo, et al."
The factual antecedents are as
follows:
In an Information dated 10 July 1997,
Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas
Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes,
columnist, publisher, managing editor,
and editor, respectively of the
newspaper "Abante" were charged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, with the crime of libel.
The information, which was raffled off
to Branch 93 of said court, reads:
The
undersigned
accuses
ALFIE
LORENZO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS
QUIJANO JR., ROGER B. PARAJES and
JORDAN CASTILLO, of the crime of
LIBEL, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of July,
1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said
accused
ALFIE
LORENZO,
columnist,
ALLEN
MACASAET,
publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR.,
managing editor, ROGER B. PARAJES,
editor, respectively of "Abante" a
newspaper of general circulation in
the
Philippines,
and
JORDAN
CASTILLO, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one
another, with evident intent of
exposing
JOSELITO
MAGALLANES
TRINIDAD, a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a.
TOTO TRINIDAD to public hatred,
dishonor, discredit and contempt and
ridicule, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully
and
feloniously
and
maliciously write, publish, exhibit and
circulate and/or cause to be written,
published, exhibited and circulated in

the aforesaid newspaper, in its issue

of July 13, 1996 an article which reads
as follows:
"Humarap sa ilang reporters si Jordan
Castillo hindi para magkaroon ng
writeups kundi para ituwid lang ang
ilang bagay na baluktot at binaluktot
pang
lalo
ng
isang
Toto
Trinidad.1a\^/phi1.net
Hindi namin naging barkada si Joey
Trinidad. Bah, Toto na pala siya
ngayon. Anong palagay niya sa sarili
niya, si Direk Toto Natividad siya?
Nakikibuhat lang talaga yang taong
yan sa amin sa Liberty Ave. noon. Ni
hindi nga pinapansin ni Tito Alfie yan
dahil
nga
sa
amoy-pawis
siya
pagkatapos mag-barbell. Kami nakashower na, si Joey punas lang nang
punas sa katawan niya ng T-shirt
niyang
siya
ring
isusuot
niya
pagkatapos na gawing pamunas!
Madalas ngang makikain sa amin yan
noon. Galit na galit nga ang
mayordoma naming si Manang Hilda
noon dahil nagkukulang ang rasyon
namin dahil dagdag pakainin nga yang
si Joey. Tamang-tama nga lang sa amin
ang kanin at ulam, pero sinusugod pa
niya ang kaldero para magkayod ng
natitirang tutong sa kaldero. Naaawa
nga ako madalas diyan kaya sineshare
ko na lang ang pagkain ko sa kanya.
Ewan ko kung anong naisipan ng
taong yan at pagsasalitaan pa niya ng
masama si Tito Alfie. Hindi man lang
siya tumanaw ng utang na loob na
kahit konti at kahit na sandali ay
naitawid ng gutom niya. Hindi ko alam
kung may kunsenya pa ang gangyang
klaseng tao, pero sana naman ay
makunsensya ka, Pare!
Madalas nga itinatago ka na nga
namin ni Tito Alfie para hindi
mahighblood sa iyo, ganyan pa ang
gagawin mo. Napupuyat nga si

Manang Hilda sa pagbabantay sa iyo

at hindi makatulog ang matanda
hanggat hindi ka pa umuuwi,
magsasalita ka pa ng mga inimbento
mo. Pati nga si Eruel ay madalas
mabanas sa iyo, natatandaan mo pa
ba, dahil sa kakulitan mo! Pilit mo
kaming binubuyo na sabihin kay Tito
Alfie na tulungan ka rin tulad ng
tulong na ibinibigay ni Tito Alfie na
pag-aalaga sa amin. Pero hate na hate
ka nga ni Tito Alfie dahil sa masamang
ugali, natatandaan mo pa ba yun?
Kaya tiyak ko na imbento mo lang ang
lahat ng pinagsasabi mo para
makaganti ka kay Tito Alfie," ani
Jordan sa mga nag-interbyu sa
kanyang legitimate writers.
Hindi na siguro namin kailangan pang
dagdagan ang mga sinabi ng sinasabi
ni Toto Trinidad na mga barkada niya
at kapwa niya kuno Liberty Boys!"
thereby publicly imputing a crime,
vice or defect, real or imaginary or an
act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance and causing in view of
their
publication,
discredit
and
contempt upon the person of said
JOSELITO
MAGALLANES
TRINIDAD
a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO
TRINIDAD,
to his damage
and
prejudice.2
In an Order dated 16 July 1997, Judge
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., presiding
judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City,
set the arraignment of the petitioners
on 27 August 1997.3
On 22 August 1997, petitioners filed
before the court a quo an Urgent
Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or
Defer Proceedings dated 21 August
1997 claiming that they intended to
elevate the adverse Resolution of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
for review. Despite this motion, the

scheduled arraignment of petitioners

pushed through on 27 August 1997.
During said proceeding, petitioners
Lorenzo and Quijano, Jr., together with
their co-accused Parajes and Castillo,
refused to enter any plea and so the
trial court ordered that a plea of not
guilty be entered into the records on
their
behalf.4
As
for
petitioner
Macasaet,
his
arraignment
was
rescheduled to 20 October 1997 due
to his failure to attend the previously
calendared arraignment.
On 12 September 1997, petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case
on the ground that the trial court did
not have jurisdiction over the offense
charged. According to petitioners, as
the information discloses that the
residence of private respondent was in
Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did
not have jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
The criminal and civil action for
damages
in
cases
of
written
defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously
or separately with the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where
the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the
offense5 (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, on 23 September 1997,
the trial court received by way of
registered mail, petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea
dated 3 September 1997.6 Petitioners
argued therein that the trial court
committed grave error when it denied
the petitioners Urgent Motion to
Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer
Proceedings and continued with the
scheduled arraignment on 27 August

1997. According to petitioners and

their co-accused, by the trial judges
denial of their Urgent Motion to Defer
Arraignment
and/or
Defer
Proceedings, he had effectively denied
them their right to obtain relief from
the Department of Justice. Moreover,
banking on the case of Roberts, et al.
v. Court of Appeals,7 the petitioners
and their fellow accused contended
that
since
they
had
already
manifested their intention to file a
petition for review of the Resolution of
the city prosecutor of Quezon City
before the DOJ, it was premature for
the trial court to deny their urgent
motion of 21 August 1997. Finally,
petitioners and their co-accused
claimed that regardless of the
outcome of their petition for review
before the DOJ, the withdrawal of their
"not guilty" pleas is in order as they
planned to move for the quashal of
the information against them.
In an Order dated 26 September
1997,8 Judge Bruselas, Jr., ruled that
"with the filing of the Motion to
Dismiss, the court considers the
accused to have abandoned their
Motion for Reconsideration and to
Withdraw Plea and sees no further
need to act on the same."
In his Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss dated 23 September 1997, 9
the public prosecutor argued that the
RTC, Quezon City, had jurisdiction over
the case. He maintained that during
the time material to this case, private
respondent
(private
complainant
below) was a resident of both 28-D
Matino St. corner Malumanay St.,
Sikatuna Village, Quezon City and
Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio,
Marikina, Metro Manila, as shown in
his Reply-Affidavit of 11 October 1996
filed
during
the
preliminary

investigation of the case.

For their part, the petitioners and their
co-accused countered that it was
incorrect for the public prosecutor to
refer to the affidavit purportedly
executed by private respondent as it is
"axiomatic that the resolution of a
motion to quash is limited to a
consideration of the information as
filed with the court, and no other."
Further, as both the complaintaffidavit
executed
by
private
respondent and the information filed
before the court state that private
respondents residence is in Marikina
City, the dismissal of the case is
warranted for the rule is that
jurisdiction is determined solely by the
allegations contained in the complaint
or information.10
On 16 October 1997, petitioners and
their
fellow
accused
filed
a
Supplemental
Reply11
attaching
thereto certifications issued by Jimmy
Ong and Pablito C. Antonio, barangay
captains of Barangay Malaya, Quezon
City and Barangay Sto. Nio, Marikina
City,
respectively.
The
pertinent
portion of the barangay certification12
issued by Barangay Captain Ong
states:
This is to certify that this office has no
record on file nor with the list of
registered voters of this barangay
regarding a certain person by the
name of one MR. JOSELITO TRINIDAD.
This further certifies that our BSDOs
(have) been looking for said person
seeking information regarding his
whereabouts but to no avail.
On the other hand, the certification 13
issued by Barangay Captain Antonio,
reads in part:
This is to certify that JOSELITO
TRINIDAD
of
legal
age,
single/married/separate/widow/widow

er, a resident ofKaren Street, Sto.

Nio, Marikina City is a bonafide
member of this barangay.
...
This is being issued upon request of
the
above-named
person
for
"IDENTIFICATION."
During the hearing on 20 October
1997, the trial court received and
marked
in
evidence
the
two
barangaycertifications. Also marked
for evidence were page 4 of the
information stating the address of
private respondent to be in Marikina
City and the editorial box appearing in
page 18 of Abante indicating that the
tabloid maintains its editorial and
business offices at Rm. 301/305, 3/F
BF Condominium Bldg., Solana cor. A.
Soriano Sts., Intramuros, Manila. The
prosecution was then given five (5)
days within which to submit its
comment to the evidence submitted
by the petitioners and their fellow
accused.
In his Rejoinder to Supplemental
Reply,14 private respondent contended
that the certification issued by
thebarangay captain of Barangay
Malaya was issued after he had
already moved out of the apartment
unit he was renting in Sikatuna
Village, Quezon City; that owners of
residential houses do not usually
declare they rent out rooms to
boarders in order to avoid payment of
local taxes; and that there is no
showing that a census was conducted
among the residents of Barangay
Malaya during the time he resided
therein.
As regards the certification issued by
the barangay chairman of Sto. Nio,
Marikina City, private respondent
argued that it is of judicial notice that
barangay and city records are not

regularly updated to reflect the

transfer
of
residence
of
their
constituents and that a perusal of said
certification reveals that the barangay
captain did not personally know him
(private respondent). Finally, private
respondent claimed that his receipt of
the copy of petitioners Appeal to the
DOJ, which was sent to his alleged
address in Sikatuna Village, Quezon
City, proved that he did, in fact, reside
at said place.
On 24 November 1997, the trial court
rendered an Order dismissing the case
due to lack of jurisdiction. 15 The court
a quo noted that although the
information alleged the venue of this
case falls within the jurisdiction of
Quezon City, the evidence submitted
for
its
consideration
indicated
otherwise. First, the editorial box of
Abanteclearly indicated that the
purported libelous article was printed
and first published in the City of
Manila. In addition, the trial court
relied on the following matters to
support its conclusion that, indeed,
jurisdiction was improperly laid in this
case: a) on page 4 of the information,
the address of private respondent
appeared to be the one in Marikina
City although right below it was a
handwritten notation stating "131 Sct.
Lozano St., Barangay Sacred Heart,
QC";
b)
the
two
barangay
certifications
submitted
by
the
petitioners; and c) the Memorandum
for Preliminary Investigation and
Affidavit-Complaint attached to the
information wherein the given address
of private respondent was Marikina
City.
On 03 December 1997, private
respondent
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration16 insisting that at the
time the alleged libelous article was

published, he was actually residing in

Quezon City. According to him, he
mistakenly stated that he was a
resident of Marikina City at the time of
publication of the claimed defamatory
article because he understood the
term "address" to mean the place
where he originally came from.
Nevertheless, the error was rectified
by his supplemental affidavit which
indicated Quezon City as his actual
residence at the time of publication of
the 13 July 1996 issue of Abante.
On
22
January
1998,
private
respondent filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration to which he
attached an affidavit executed by a
certain Cristina B. Del Rosario,
allegedly the owner of the house and
lot in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City,
where private respondent supposedly
lived from July 1996 until May 1997.
She also stated in her affidavit that
she was not aware of any inquiry
conducted by the barangay officials of
Barangay
Malaya
regarding
the
residency of private respondent in
their locality.
Through an Order dated 12 February
1998, the trial court denied private
respondents
motion
for
reconsideration, ruling thus:
[Del Rosarios] affidavit appears to
have been executed only on 19
January 1998 to which fact the court
can only chuckle and observe that
evidently said affidavit is in the nature
of a curative evidence, the weight and
sufficiency
of
which
is
highly
suspect.17
Undaunted, the public and the private
prosecutors filed a notice of appeal
before the court a quo.18 In the
Decision now assailed before us, the
Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the trial courts conclusion and

ordered the remand of the case to the

court a quo for further proceedings.
The
dispositive
portion
of
the
appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
in
view
of
the
foregoing, the Order dated November
24, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 93, Quezon City, in Criminal
Case No. Q-97-71903, dismissing the
case filed against herein accusedappellees on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and a new one entered
remanding the case to the court a quo
for further proceedings.19
The Court of Appeals held that
jurisprudentially, it is settled that the
"residence of a person must be his
personal, actual or physical habitation
or his actual residence or abode" and
for the purpose of determining venue,
actual residence is a persons place of
abode and not necessarily his legal
residence or domicile.20 In this case,
the defect appearing on the original
complaint wherein the residence of
private respondent was indicated to
be Marikina City was subsequently
cured by his supplemental-affidavit
submitted during the preliminary
investigation of the case. Moreover, as
the amendment was made during the
preliminary investigation phase of this
case, the same could be done as a
matter of right pursuant to the
Revised Rules of Court.21
As for the barangay certifications
issued by the barangay chairmen of
Barangay Malaya and Barangay Sto.
Nio, the Court of Appeals ruled that
they
had
no
probative
value
ratiocinating in the following manner:
. . . With respect to the requirement of
residence in the place where one is to
vote, residence can mean either
domicile or temporary residence

(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution A

Primer, 3rd Ed., p. 209). Therefore,
one who is a resident of Quezon City
can be a voter of Marikina if the latter
is his domicile. Conversely, a person
domiciled in Marikina can vote in
Quezon City if he resides in the latter.
It is just a matter of choice on the part
of the voter. Thus, logic does not
support the supposition that one who
is not a registered voter of a place is
also
not
a
resident
theref.
Furthermore, the right to vote has the
corollary right of not exercising it.
Therefore, one need not even be a
registered voter at all. The same
principle applies to the certification
issued by the barangay in Marikina.22
The appellate court likewise gave
weight to the affidavit executed by Del
Rosario and observed that petitioners
failed to controvert the same.
The petitioners thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution promulgated on 6 January
2003.23
Hence, this petition raising the
following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY HAS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION
OVER
THE
CRIME
CHARGED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING
THE AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA B. DEL
ROSARIO.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING RESPONDENT TRINIDADS
PERSONALITY TO APPEAL A CRIMINAL
CASE.24

Petitioners insist that the evidence

presented before the trial court
irrefutably established the fact that
private respondent was not a resident
of Quezon City at the time the alleged
libelous
publication
saw
print.
According to them, the information
dated 10 July 1997 filed before the
RTC of Quezon City indicated private
respondents address to be in Karen
St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio, Marikina City.
Further supporting this claim were the
affidavit-complaint25
and
the
memorandum
for
preliminary
investigation26 where references were
explicitly made to said address. Thus,
petitioners are of the view that the
Court of Appeals erred in relying on
the supplemental affidavit executed
by private respondent claiming that its
execution amounted to nothing more
than a mere afterthought.1awphi1.nt
In addition, petitioners argue that the
appellate court erred when it took into
account the affidavit executed by Del
Rosario. They insist that its belated
submission before the trial court and
the prosecutions failure to present the
affiant to testify as regards the
veracity
of
her
statements
undermined the evidentiary value of
her affidavit. More, as the affidavit
was not formally offered as evidence,
it was only proper that the trial court
disregarded the same in dismissing
the case.
Finally,
petitioners
contend
that
private respondent did not have the
requisite personality to appeal from
the decision of the trial court as it is
only the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) which is authorized by law to
institute appeal of criminal cases.
Thus, the Court of Appeals made a
mistake in holding that While it is true that only the OSG

can file an appeal representing the

government in a criminal proceeding,
the private complainant nevertheless
may appeal the civil aspect of the
criminal case. The case at bar was
dismissed due to the alleged improper
laying of venue resulting in the
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court and not based on the merits of
the case. It cannot therefore be
argued that private complainants
appeal pertains to the merits of the
criminal case as what happened in
accused-appellees cited case in the
motion to strike,VicentePalu-ay vs.
Court of Appeals(GR No. 112995,
July 30, 1998). Needless to say, the
private complainant has an interest in
the civil aspect of the dismissed
criminal case which he had the right
to protect. In the interest of justice
and fair play, therefore, the Brief filed
by private complainant in the present
case should be treated as pertaining
only to the civil aspect of the case.27
In his Comment/Opposition dated 25
April 2003,28 private respondent
reiterated his position that the RTC of
Quezon City had jurisdiction over this
libel case. According to him, the
affidavit executed by Del Rosario, the
alleged owner of the house he leased
in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City,
established, beyond doubt, that he
resided in said place during the time
the
claimed
defamatory
article
appeared on the pages of Abante. In
addition, he draws attention to the
fact that petitioners and their coaccused furnished him a copy of the
petition for review, filed before the
DOJ, at the aforementioned address in
Quezon City.
Anent the affidavit of Del Rosario,
private respondent maintains that the
prosecution exerted efforts to present

the affiant before the trial court.

Unfortunately, Del Rosario was out of
town when she was supposed to be
presented and so the public and the
private prosecutors decided to submit
for
resolution
their
motion
for
reconsideration sans the affiants
testimony. Citing the case of Joseph
Helmuth, Jr. v. People of the
Philippines, et al.,29 private respondent
avers that this Court had previously
admitted the affidavits of witnesses
who were not presented during the
trial phase of a case.
As regards the petitioners contention
that he (private respondent) did not
have the personality to bring this case
to the appellate level,
private
respondent contends that the proper
party to file the Notice of Appeal
before the trial court is the public
prosecutor as what happened in this
case.
On its part, the OSG filed its Comment
dated 07 July 200330 wherein it prayed
for the dismissal of this petition based
on the following: First, as the petition
is concerned with the determination of
the residence of private respondent at
the time of the publication of the
alleged libelous article, Rule 45 should
be unavailing to the petitioners
because this remedy only deals with
questions of law.
Second, venue was properly laid in
this case as private respondents
residency in Quezon City during the
time material to this case was
sufficiently established. The OSG
claims that the errors appearing in the
memorandum
for
preliminary
investigation and in the affidavit
complaint with regard to private
respondents residence were corrected
through the supplemental affidavit
private respondent executed during

the preliminary investigation before

the Quezon City prosecutors office.
Third, the OSG takes the view that the
public prosecutor was the proper party
to file the notice of appeal before the
trial court since its (OSGs) office is
only "authorized to bring or defend
actions on appeal on behalf of the
People or the Republic of the
Philippines once the case is brought
before this Honorable Court of the
Court of Appeals.
We find merit in the petition and
therefore grant the same.
Jurisdiction has been defined as "the
power conferred by law upon a judge
or court to try a case the cognizance
of
which
belongs
to
them
exclusively"31 and it constitutes the
basic
foundation
of
judicial
proceedings.32 The term derives its
origin from two Latin words "jus"
meaning law and the other, "dicere"
meaning to declare.33 The term has
also been variably explained to be
"the power of a court to hear and
determine a cause of action presented
to it, the power of a court to
adjudicate the kind of case before it,
the power of a court to adjudicate a
case when the proper parties are
before it, and the power of a court to
make the particular decision it is
asked to render."34
In criminal actions, it is a fundamental
rule
that
venue
is
jurisdictional.l^vvphi1.net Thus, the
place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the
action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction.35 In the case ofUy v. Court
of Appeals and People of the
Philippines,36 this Court had the
occasion to expound on this principle,
thus:
It is a fundamental rule that for

jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in

criminal cases the offense should have
been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients took place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases
is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to
try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction
of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it
is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if
the evidence adduced during the trial
show that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.37
The law, however, is more particular in
libel cases. The possible venues for
the institution of the criminal and the
civil aspects of said case are concisely
outlined in Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 4363. It provides:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . .
The criminal action and civil action for
damages
in
cases
of
written
defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously
or separately with the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where
the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, however, That
where one of the offended parties is a
public officer whose office is in the
City of Manila at the time of the

commission of the offense, the action

shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila or of the
city or province where the libelous
article is printed and first published,
and in case such public officer does
not hold office in the City of Manila,
the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense or where
the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the
offended
parties
is
a
private
individual, the action shall be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he actually
resides at the time of the commission
of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published.
In Agbayani v. Sayo,38 we summarized
the foregoing rule in the following
manner:
1. Whether the offended party is a
public official or a private person,
the criminal action may be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous
article
is
printed
and
first
published.
2. If the offended party is a
private individual, the criminal
action may also be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the
province
where
he
actually
resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public
officer whose office is in Manila at
the time of the commission of the
offense, the action may be filed in
the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public
officer holding office outside of
Manila, the action may be filed in

the Court of First Instance of the

province or city where he held
office at the time of the
commission of the offense.39
In the case at bar, private respondent
was a private citizen at the time of the
publication of the alleged libelous
article, hence, he could only file his
libel suit in the City of Manila where
Abante was first published or in the
province or city where he actually
resided at the time the purported
libelous article was printed.
A perusal, however, of the information
involved in this case easily reveals
that the allegations contained therein
are
utterly insufficient to vest
jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City.
Other
than
perfunctorily
stating
"Quezon City" at the beginning of the
information,
the
assistant
city
prosecutor
who
prepared
the
information did not bother to indicate
whether the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon
City was invoked either because
Abante was printed in that place or
private respondent was a resident of
said city at the time the claimed
libelous article came out. As these
matters deal with the fundamental
issue of the courts jurisdiction, Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, mandates that either one of
these statements must be alleged in
the information itself and the absence
of both from the very face of the
information renders the latter fatally
defective.l^vvphi1.net
Sadly
for
private respondent, the information
filed before the trial court falls way
short of this requirement. The
assistant city prosecutors failure to
properly lay the basis for invoking the
jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City,
effectively denied said court of the
power to take cognizance of this

case.1a\^/phi1.net
For the guidance, therefore, of both
the bench and the bar, this Court finds
it appropriate to reiterate our earlier
pronouncement in the case of
Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to
the venue of the criminal action for
written defamation, the complaint or
information should contain allegations
as to whether, at the time the offense
was committed, the offended party
was a public officer or a private
individual and where he was actually
residing at that time. Whenever
possible, the place where the written
defamation was printed and first
published should likewise be alleged.
That allegation would be a sine qua
non if the circumstance as to where
the libel was printed and first
published is used as the basis of the
venue of the action.40
Anent private respondent and OSGs
contention that the supplemental
affidavit
submitted
during
the
preliminary investigation of this libel
suit
cured
the
defect of
the
information, we find the same to be
without merit. It is jurisprudentially
settled that jurisdiction of a court over
a criminal case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or
information.41 In resolving a motion to
dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction,
the general rule is that the facts
contained
in
the
complaint
or
information should be taken as they
are.42 The exception to this rule is
where the Rules of Court allow the
investigation of facts alleged in a
motion to quash43 such as when the
ground invoked is the extinction of
criminal liability, prescriptions, double
jeopardy, or insanity of the accused. 44
In these instances, it is incumbent

upon the trial court to conduct a

preliminary trial to determine the
merit of the motion to dismiss. As the
present case obviously does not fall
within
any
of
the
recognized
exceptions, the trial court correctly
dismissed this action.
In the assailed decision, the Court of
Appeals likewise put premium on the
affidavit executed by Del Rosario
which was attached to private
respondents supplemental motion for
reconsideration. According to the
appellate
court,
said
document
"supports private (respondents) claim
that indeed, he was a resident of
Quezon City at the time the alleged
libelous article was published."45 The
pertinent provision of the Rules of
Court, under Rule 10, Section 6
thereof, states:
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may,
upon reasonable notice and upon such
terms as are just, permit him to serve
a supplemental pleading setting forth
transactions, occurrences or events
which have happened since the date
of the pleading sought to be
supplemented. The adverse party may
plead thereto within ten (10) days
from notice of the order admitting the
supplemental pleading.
By the very nature of a supplemental
pleading, it only seeks to reinforce and
augment the allegations contained in
the principal pleading. It does not
serve to supplant that which it merely
supplements; rather, it ought to coexist with the latter. Further, the
admission of a supplemental pleading
is not something that parties may
impose upon the court for we have
consistently held that its admittance is
something which is addressed to the
discretion of the court.46

Explicit in the aforequoted provision of

the Rules of Court is the requirement
that the contents of a supplemental
pleading
should
deal
with
transactions, occurrences or events
which took place after the date of the
pleading it seeks to supplement. A
reading of the supplemental motion
for reconsideration filed by private
respondent discloses no additional or
new matters which transpired after he
filed
his
original
motion
for
reconsideration. The fact that he
attached thereto the affidavit of his
alleged lessor fails to persuade us into
giving to said supplemental motion
the same evidentiary value as did the
Court of Appeals. For one, private
respondent did not even bother to
explain the reason behind the belated
submission of Del Rosarios affidavit
nor did he claim that he exerted
earnest efforts to file it much earlier in
the
proceedings.l^vvphi1.net
He
must,
therefore,
bear
the
consequences of his own lethargy.
Finally, we come to the issue of
whether the private prosecutor and
the
public prosecutor
had
the
personality to file the notice of appeal
before the trial court. Petitioners insist
that the OSG should have been the
one to file said notice in its capacity as
the "sole representative of the
[g]overnment in the Court of Appeals
in criminal cases."47
Under Presidential Decree No. 478,
among the specific powers and
functions of the OSG was to "represent
the government in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings." This provision has been
carried
over
to
the
Revised
Administrative Code particularly in
Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof.
Without doubt, the OSG is the

appellate counsel of the People of the

Philippines in all criminal cases. In
such capacity, it only takes over a
criminal case after the same has
reached the appellate courts.48
The next question should then be:
when does the jurisdiction of the trial
court end and that of the Court of
Appeals commence? Happily, the
Revised Rules of Court is clear on this
point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules
states that "(i)n appeals by notice of
appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon the perfection of
the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties."49 When a party files a
notice of appeal, the trial courts
jurisdiction over the case does not
cease as a matter of course; its only
effect is that the appeal is deemed
perfected as to him.50 As explained by
our former colleague, Justice Florenz
Regalado
. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court
still retains jurisdiction over the case.
However, where all the parties have
either thus perfected their appeals, by
filing their notices of appeal in due
time and the period to file such notice
of appeal has lapsed for those who did
not do so, then the trial court loses
jurisdiction over the case as of the
filing of the last notice of appeal or
the expiration of the period to do so
for all the parties.51
Applied to the case at bar, we deem it
proper that the notice of appeal was
filed by the private and the public
prosecutors before the trial court. The
Rules cannot be any clearer: until the
filing of the last notice of appeal and
the expiration of the period to perfect
an appeal by all the parties, the lower
court still has jurisdiction over the
case. It is only after the occurrence of

these
two
incidents
when
the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
begins and at which time the OSG is
supposed to take charge of the case
on behalf of the government.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
GRANTED. The Decision dated 22
March 2002 and Resolution dated 6
January 2003 of the Court of Appeals
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the 24 November 1997 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93,
Quezon City, dismissing Criminal Case
No.
Q-97-71903
is
hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
People vs Sandiganbayan 597 scra 49
(And amante?)
People vs Rivera (DILI SURE)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 139180
July 31,
2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO RIVERA, accusedappellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a review pursuant to Rule 122,
10 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
of the decision,1 dated June 22, 1999,
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49,
Guagua, Pampanga, finding accusedappellant Rolando Rivera guilty of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death and to pay the
offended party, Erlanie Rivera, the
sum of P75,000.00 as compensatory
damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
The information against accusedappellant charged

That sometime in the month of

March
1997,
in
barangay
Santiago, municipality of Lubao,
province
of
Pampanga,
Philippines,
and
within
the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused
ROLANDO RIVERA, by means of
violence, threat and intimidation,
did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and
maliciously succeeded in having
carnal knowledge [of] his 13 year
old daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera,
against the latters will and
without her consent.
Contrary to law.2
When the information was read to him
in the local dialect (Pampango) during
his arraignment on September 30,
1997, accused-appellant, duly assisted
by counsel de oficio, pleaded not
guilty
to
the
crime
charged,3
whereupon trial was held.
The prosecution presented as its
witnesses complainant Erlanie Rivera,
her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and Dr.
Demetria Barin, who conducted the
physical examination of complainant.
Complainant Erlanie Rivera testified
that sometime in March 1997, her
younger sister, Zaira,4 was taken by
their parents to the Escolastica
Romero Memorial Hospital in Lubao,
Pampanga.
Complainants
mother
stayed with her sister in the hospital,
but her father, herein accusedappellant, went back home to
Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga. At around
11 oclock in the evening of the same
day, complainant was awakened as
accused-appellant started kissing her
and fondling her breasts. Complainant
tried to resist by kicking and pushing
accused-appellant, but her efforts
were to no avail. Accused-appellant

removed her shorts and panty,

touched her private parts, and then
had sexual intercourse with her. After
he was through with her, accusedappellant told complainant not to tell
anyone what had happened or he
would kill complainants mother and
sister. Hence, when her mother came
home the following day, Erlanie did
not tell her what had happened
because she was afraid of accusedappellant.
On April 9, 1997, however, Erlanie, in
the presence of her mother, told her
aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and her
grandmother, Maxima Payumo, that
she had been raped by accusedappellant. For this reason, she was
referred to Dr. Barin for physical
examination. She also executed a
sworn statement before the police of
Lubao, Pampanga.5
Erlanie testified that she became
pregnant as a result of the rape
committed against her by accusedappellant, but the pregnancy was
aborted.6 On cross-examination, she
said she was 13 years old at the time
of her testimony, the second child in
the family. She said that her parents
were not on good terms with each
other and that she knew that her
father
had
a
mistress.
Atty.
Mangalindan, then defense counsel,
questioned
Erlanie
about
other
supposed
acts
of
molestation
committed
by
accused-appellant
against her previous to the rape
subject of the present case, but, upon
objection of the prosecution, the trial
court disallowed the question on the
ground that it concerned matters not
covered by her direct examination.7
Erlanie testified that her mother,
grandmother, aunt, and a certain Nora
Baluyut were present when she made

her sworn statement before the police.

She said that her father raped her only
once, sometime in March 1997. She
could not remember the exact date
when she was raped by accusedappellant, but she did remember that
the same took place in March as her
sister, Zaira, was hospitalized at the
time. When the rape occurred, her
younger brother and sister were in
their house asleep. She did not tell her
mother after the latter had returned
home that she had been raped by
accused-appellant because she was
afraid of her father who had
threatened her. After the rape,
accused-appellant would only come
home on Sundays.8
Questioned
further
on
crossexamination, Erlanie said that she
gave her sworn statement before the
police and that her answers to
questions asked during her direct
examination were freely given without
coaching by anyone. She could
understand Tagalog, the language
used in her sworn statement. She told
the court that she struggled against
accused-appellant,
kicking
and
pushing
him,
but
she
was
overpowered by her father. At that
time,
Erlanies
younger
sister,
Corazon, was lying beside her, but
Erlanie did not shout even when her
father succeeded in penetrating her.
Erlanie could not remember how long
the sexual act took place, but she felt
something like urine come out of her
fathers penis after he was finished
with her. Erlanie testified that she was
12 years old when she was raped by
her father.9
On re-direct examination, when asked
about the discrepancy between her
testimony that her mother returned
home only the day after the rape and

her statement in her affidavit that

accused-appellant slept beside her
mother after the rape, Erlanie replied
that she made a mistake as the
incident narrated in her affidavit
referred to a different occasion when
no rape was committed against her by
accused-appellant.10
The next witness for the prosecution
was
Marietta
Pagtalunan,
complainants aunt and the sister of
complainants mother, Evangeline.
Marietta
corroborated
Erlanies
testimony that the latter told her
sometime in April 1997 that she had
been raped by accused-appellant.
Marietta said she took complainant to
Dr.
Barin,
who
examined
complainant.11
Dr. Demetria Barin was Chief Physician
of the Escolastica Romero District
Hospital. Her findings are as follows:
P.E. FINDINGS:
- No signs of external Physical
Injuries
I.E. FINDINGS:
HYMEN - healed laceration at 3:00
oclock
VAGINA - Admits one finger with
ease two fingers with difficulty
UTERUS - not enlarged
LMP - March 3, 1997
Pregnancy Test (+)12
Dr. Barin testified that on April 10,
1997, she examined complainant
Erlanie Rivera and found that the
victim had an injury in the hymen at
the 3 oclock position which could
possibly have been caused by the
insertion of a hard object, such as a
male organ. Dr. Barin testified that
complainant Erlanie went back to see
her on May 2, 1997 because she
suffered
from
vaginal
bleeding
indicative of a threatened abortion.
She said that she found that

complainant was then pregnant. Upon

examination of the patient at that
time, Dr. Barin found that abortion had
not yet taken place and prescribed
medicines for the complainant. Erlanie
was subjected to another pregnancy
test on May 13, 1997, but the result
was negative. Dr. Barin stated that the
vaginal
bleeding
suffered
by
complainant could have caused the
abortion of the fetus.13
Thereafter, the defense presented its
evidence.
Accused-appellant,
his
sister,
Concepcion
Sayo,
and
Natividad Pinlac, Records Officer of the
Escolastica Romero District Hospital,
were presented as witnesses.
Accused-appellant denied that he
raped Erlanie Rivera. He alleged that
the rape charge was filed against him
because his wife, Evangeline, had a
paramour and resented him because
he hurt her. He explained that he saw
his wife talking with another man in
their house and beat her up on April 1,
1997 because he heard that she had a
lover. He also said that his wife was
angry with him because he had a
mistress who stayed in their house for
three weeks. He further stated that his
wifes relatives were likewise angry
with him because he caused the lot
owned by his father-in-law in Santiago,
Lubao, Pampanga to be registered in
his name. He said that he was
compelled to sign a waiver of his
rights over the land owned by his
parents-in-law.14
The
defense
presented a letter to accusedappellant written by his wife, who was
asking him to sign a document so that
she could attend to it before he got
out of prison.15
The defense also offered as evidence
a document, designated as Waiver of
Rights,16 signed by accused-appellant,

in which he acknowledged that he was

a tenant of a parcel of land and that
he waived and voluntarily surrendered
his right over the said landholding to
the "SMPCI," recommending that a
certain Ponciano Miguel be given the
land to work on the same. The
document was identified by accusedappellant in open court. He said that
Ponciano Miguel was a first cousin of
his wife and that he signed the
document because his wifes relatives
promised him that he would get out of
prison after signing the document.17
Another witness for the defense was
Concepcion Sayo, accused-appellants
sister, who testified that in March
1997, accused-appellant lived with her
family in Malawak, Bustos, Bulacan, to
help her husband operate a fishpond.
She said that accused-appellant
stayed in their house during the entire
month of March, except in March 19,
1997 when he stayed with their sister,
Perla, in Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan.18
The
last
defense
witness
was
Natividad Pinlac, Records Officer of the
Escolastica Romero District Hospital,
who identified19 a certification, dated
April 29, 1999, in which it was stated
that Zaira Rivera was confined at that
hospital from March 1 to March 2,
1997.20
On June 22, 1999, the trial court
rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, the court finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape as
charged. For having violated
Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act
7659,
with
the
attendant
circumstances that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is the father of

the victim and absent any

circumstance that could mitigate
the commission thereof, accused
is hereby sentenced to suffer the
supreme penalty of death by
lethal injection.
In
line
with
established
jurisprudence, said accused is also
ordered to indemnify the offended
party Erlanie Rivera in the sum of
P75,000.00
as
compensatory
damages and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.21
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant
contends that:
1. The lower court failed to
observe the constitutional right of
the Accused-Appellant to due
process and right to counsel;
2. The lower court failed to
consider the evidence of the
Accused-Appellant.22
I. Accused-appellant invokes his right
to due process of law. He claims that
he was denied the same because: (a)
the trial judge disallowed his lawyer
from cross-examining Erlanie Rivera
concerning
the
latters
sworn
statements
on
the
ground
of
irrelevance and immateriality; (b) the
trial court denied the motion made by
accused-appellants counsel de oficio
to postpone the cross-examination of
Dr. Barin, the examining physician,
because of which the said counsel
consequently
waived
the
crossexamination of Dr. Barin; (c) the judge
propounded numerous questions to
accused-appellant during his crossexamination by the prosecutor; and
(d) the trial courts decision was
promulgated just one day after
accused-appellant
submitted
his
memorandum.
Procedural due process simply means

that a person must be heard before he

is condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a persons
basic rights, not a mere formality that
may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily.23 Considering both the
evidence and the law applicable to
this case, we hold that accusedappellant has been accorded his right
to due process.
A. One basis for accused-appellants
contention that he was denied due
process is the refusal of the trial judge
to allow Atty. Mangalindans questions
concerning the other alleged acts of
molestation committed by accusedappellant
against
complainant.
Accused-appellant argues that no
legal ground exists for the trial courts
ruling.
The transcript of stenographic notes
concerning this incident shows the
following:
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Q
You mentioned in your
testimony that you were molested
by your father since 1996.
COURT:
Are you referring to a chain of
events because police station
you are referring is something
there are two places this girl
testified that she was raped,
you referred to us Acts of
Lasciviousness and she did
not testified about that, that
is another case with another
Court, we are only trying here
a rape case that is only they
you never mention. Only on
the matters that she testified
(sic).
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
But this is also related to the
rape case your Honor because
I will confront it with another

form of a question.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Q
Prior to this incident, were
you molested by your father?
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:
Immaterial,
your
Honor,
whatever acts w[ere] done by
the accused is not a subject of
the case at bar.
COURT:
Let us confine [questioning] to
the complaint at bar which is
a rape case.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
This is related to the incident
because we are here your
Honor to prove, we are trying
to discredit her testimony. We
will just direct our question
touching
on
the
direct
examination.
COURT:
Only on the matters that she
only testified that is only thing
you can cross-examine. Only
matters testified which is only
a rape case let us not dwell
the Court knows there are
other
cases
Acts
of
Lasciviousness pending in the
lower Court at the proper
Court otherwise if I will allow
you to ask questions on other
matters specially I know you
are pinpointing the Acts of
Lasciviousness
you
are
prolonging this case here
(sic).
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
I am trying to discredit the
witness as one where the
credibility as witness here
your Honor is very important.
I stated before our main
cross-examination
is
the
accused is not a plan in such

case,
although
I
do
sympathize (sic). We would
like to propound question that
will discredit her as witness
and a complainant not with
her testimony alone. Our
center of cross-examination is
to
discredit
her
as
complaining witness that is
why our question may not be
limited to be accepted under
the rule of cross-examination
your
Honor
the
crossexamination your Honor the
cross-examiner is not limited
on the direct-testimony of the
witness but he can propound
questions which may petition
or destroy the credibility of
the witness that is our view
point (sic).
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:
We cannot dispute the right of
accused to discredit or to
adopt our credibility of our
witness, but it should be done
in the proper way, not to ask
immaterial questions which
are not related.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
The rule for cross-examination
insofar as to destroy the
credibility of the witness is not
only limited to what the
Honorable Fiscal we came
approach of so many crossexaminations goes allow your
Honor under the rules of Court
insofar as this case is related
to the present case we are
trying, this is very related
because even the witness I
have transcript in my hand,
testified not only the rape
case your Honor she had
testified
by
direct-

examination the preparatory

acts before the testimony of
rape that she was been
molested early, finger of the
father, this were testified
through by the witness, it is
here direct-testimony it is not
limited (sic).
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:
Prior to this incident were you
molested by your father,
obviously your Honor the
question is not relevant.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Your Honor please Im very
disagreeable (sic), I have not
with me the transcript but I
have read that you [can] ask
questions concerning the rape
case.
COURT:
A question referring to events
prior to the complaint at bar.24
The trial court later issued an order,
dated
December 9,
1997,
the
pertinent parts of which provided:
After private complainant testified
on direct-examination, counsel for
accused attempted to crossexamine her on matters relevant
to the complaint for Acts of
Lasciviousness
which
was
objected to by Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Arturo G. Santos on the
ground that private complainant
did not testify on that matter but
limited her testimony on the rape
case only. Counsel for the accused
argued that although that is
correct nonetheless because [of]
the sworn statement executed by
private complainant identified by
said
witness
in
her
direct
examination and marked as
Exhibit "C" for the prosecution, he
is at liberty to cross-examine the

witness on all matters stated in

her sworn statement including
that portion touching on the acts
of lasciviousness subject matter of
another case before another
court.
The Court sustained the objection.
Section 6, Rule 132, Revised Rules
on Evidence provides that "the
witness may be cross-examined
by the adverse party as to any
matters stated in the direct
examination,
or
connected
therewith, with sufficient fullness
and freedom to test his accuracy
and truthfulness and freedom
from interest or bias or the
reverse, and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue."
The witness testified only on the
rape case. She did not testify
anything
about
acts
of
lasciviousness committed upon
her person. She may not therefore
be questioned on this matter
because it is not connected with
her direct testimony or has any
bearing upon the issue. To allow
adverse party to cross-examine
the witness on the acts of
lasciviousness which is pending
trial in another court and which
the witness did not testify is
improper.
Questions concerning acts of
lasciviousness will not in any way
test the accuracy and truthfulness
and freedom from interest or bias
or the reverse. On the contrary
such questions, if allowed, will
unduly burden the court with
immaterial testimonies.25
In another order, dated January 13,
1998, the trial court gave accusedappellants counsel 20 days within
which to elevate its ruling to the

appellate court.26 The records reveal,

however, that no such petition was
filed by Atty. Mangalindan as regards
this particular matter.
The question, therefore, is whether
the trial court correctly disallowed
accused-appellants
counsel
from
questioning complainant as regards
the
other
supposed
acts
of
lasciviousness contained in her sworn
statement. On this point, Rule 132, 6
of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be
cross-examined by the adverse
party as to any matters stated in
the
direct
examination,
or
connected
therewith,
with
sufficient fullness and freedom to
test his accuracy and truthfulness
and freedom from interest, bias or
the reverse and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the
issue.
The right of a party to cross-examine a
witness is embodied in Art. III, 14(2)
of the Constitution which provides that
the accused shall have the right to
meet the witnesses face to face and in
Rule 115, 1(f) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which states that,
in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have the right to
confront
and
cross-examine
the
witnesses against him.27 The crossexamination of a witness is essential
to test his or her credibility, expose
falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the
truth
which
rehearsed
direct
examination
testimonies
may
successfully
suppress,
and
demonstrate
inconsistencies
in
substantial matters which create
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused and thus give substance to

the constitutional right of the accused

to confront the witnesses against
him.28
The right of the accused to crossexamine a witness is, however, not
without limits but is subject to the
rules
on
the
admissibility
and
relevance of evidence. Thus, in People
v. Zheng Bai Hui,29 this Court upheld
the ruling of the trial judge disallowing
the questions propounded by the
accuseds counsel on the ability of the
arresting
officer
to
distinguish
between tawas and shabu without a
laboratory examination, the academic
degree of his training instructor, and
the officers authorship of books on
drug identity and analysis for being
irrelevant, improper, and impertinent.
In this case, accused-appellants
counsel argued that his questions to
Erlanie
on the
other acts
of
lasciviousness supposedly committed
by accused-appellant against her were
for the purpose of testing her
credibility. There was, however, no
showing on his part how these
questions had any bearing on
complainants credibility or on the
truth of her claims. One is led to
suspect that the purpose of these
questions was to confuse complainant
into committing mistakes in her
answers during cross-examination that
accused-appellants counsel
could
later use to possibly put complainants
credibility, not to mention her
character, in question.
Accused-appellant insists that his
counsel should have been allowed to
ask questions in relation to the sworn
statement executed by complainant.
He cites Rule 132, 17 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence which provides that:
When part of an act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record is

given in evidence by one party,

the whole of the same subject
matter may be inquired into by
the other.
Neither can this rule be invoked to
justify the questioning of complainant
which the trial court did not allow. As
the above provision states, this rule
applies to parts of "an act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record" which
is given in evidence.
Indeed, the records show that after
Erlanie had finished with her direct
examination on November 25, 1997,
the trial judge granted the motion
made by Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan,
accused-appellants private counsel,
to postpone Erlanie Riveras crossexamination to allow him time to
secure copies of the transcript of
stenographic
notes
of
Erlanies
testimony and thus enable him to fully
question complainant.30 Erlanie was
first cross-examined on December 2,
1997, but several postponements,
namely, on January 13, 1998, 31
February 10, 1998,32 March 12, 1998,33
March 31, 1998,34 April 7, 1998,35 May
12, 1998,36 May 26, 1998,37 May 28,
1998,38 and June 11, 1998, 39 on
Erlanies cross-examination took place
because of the failure of Atty.
Mangalindan to appear on the said
trial dates. Erlanies cross-examination
was continued on July 14, 1998 and
July 23, 1998. Her cross-examination
by accused-appellants counsel was
thorough
and
covered
various
subjects, such as the nature of the
relationship between her parents, who
were present during the execution of
her sworn statement, whether the
same had been executed by her
voluntarily, the date when she was
raped
by
accused-appellant
the
reason for her delay in reporting the

rape committed by accused-appellant,

her understanding of Tagalog, who
were with her in the house at the time
of the rape, the details surrounding
the rape committed against her, and
her age. It is evident that accusedappellant and his counsel were given
ample opportunity to conduct the
cross-examination of Erlanie Rivera in
order to test her truthfulness.
B. The record shows that because
accused-appellants private counsel
was not present when Dr. Barin
testified, Atty. Eddie Bansil was
appointed by the trial court as
accused-appellants counsel de oficio
for that particular hearing. Atty. Bansil
moved for the postponement of the
witness cross-examination, but the
trial court denied his request because,
on the one hand, accused-appellant
was a detention prisoner and Dr. Barin
was a very busy person, while, on the
other hand, Atty. Bansil had heard the
testimony of the said witness. Atty.
Bansil then decided not to crossexamine Dr. Barin.40
Accused-appellant now contends that
the trial judge denied the motion of
Atty. Bansil for postponement because
he was biased against him. Accusedappellant claims that the counsel de
oficio was not familiar with the facts of
his case and was thus in no position to
cross-examine Dr. Barin.
While the Constitution recognizes the
accuseds right to competent and
independent counsel of his own
choice, his option to secure the
services of a private counsel is not
absolute. For considering the States
and the offended partys right to
speedy and adequate justice, the
court may restrict the accuseds
option to retain a private counsel if
the accused insists on an attorney he

cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel

is not a member of the bar, or if the
attorney declines to represent the
accused for a valid reason.41
The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a
counsel de oficio to represent
accused-appellant on October 6, 1998
because his regular counsel, Atty.
Anselmo Mangalindan, was absent
without
any
explanation.
Atty.
Mangalindan had previously been
granted several postponements. As
this Court ruled in another case:
. . . Courts are not required to wait
indefinitely the pleasure and
convenience of the accused as
they are also mandated to
promote the speedy and orderly
administration of justice. Nor
should they countenance such an
obvious trifling with the rules.
Indeed, public policy requires that
the trial continue as scheduled,
considering that appellant was
adequately
represented
by
counsels who were not shown to
be negligent, incompetent or
otherwise unable to represent
him.42
Atty. Bansil was present and heard the
testimony of Dr. Barin, the prosecution
witness, on that day. Dr. Barins
testimony on direct examination was
simple,
containing
primarily
a
discussion of her findings on the
hymenal laceration sustained by
complainant. Her testimony did not
require
considerable
study
and
extraordinary preparation on the part
of defense counsel for the purpose of
cross-examination. It seems Atty.
Bansil no longer found it necessary to
cross-examine Dr. Barin.
Moreover, beyond stating that Dr.
Barin was a vital witness, accusedappellant has not indicated what

questions his counsel wanted to ask

from Dr. Barin. It may well be that
these questions do not exist at all and
that the importance given by accusedappellant to counsel de oficios failure
to cross-examine the witness is
exaggerated.
Indeed,
a
medical
examination of the victim, together
with the medical certificate, is merely
corroborative
and
is
not
an
indispensable element of rape.43 The
primordial issue in this case remains
to be whether the complainants
testimony, not Dr. Barins, established
beyond reasonable doubt the crime of
rape.
C. Accused-appellant likewise points to
the trial judges questions propounded
to him during his cross-examination as
an indication of the latters partiality
for the prosecution.
We find no merit in this contention.
Where the trial court is judge both of
the law and of the facts, it is
oftentimes necessary in the due and
faithful administration of justice for
the presiding judge to re-examine a
witness so that his judgment, when
rendered, may rest upon a full and
clear understanding of the facts.44 Our
reading
of
the
transcript
of
stenographic notes in this case shows
that the trial judge merely wanted to
clarify certain points relating to the
defense of accused-appellant and not
to establish his guilt. It is a judges
prerogative to ask questions to ferret
out the truth.45 It cannot be taken
against him if the questions he
propounds reveals certain truths
which, in turn, tend to destroy the
theory of one party.46 As this Court
held:
In any case, a severe examination
by a trial judge of some of the
witness for the defense in an

effort to develop the truth and to

get at the real facts affords no
justification for a charge that he
has assisted the prosecution with
an evident desire to secure a
conviction, or that he had
intimidated the witnesses for the
defense. The trial judge must be
accorded a reasonable leeway in
putting
such
questions
to
witnesses as may be essential to
elicit relevant facts to make the
record speak the truth. Trial
judges in this jurisdiction are
judges of both the law and the
facts, and they would be negligent
in the performance of their duties
if they permitted a miscarriage of
justice as a result of a failure to
propound a proper question to a
witness which might develop
some material bearing upon the
outcome. In the exercise of sound
discretion, he may put such
question to the witness as will
enable him to formulate a sound
opinion as to the ability or the
willingness of the witness to tell
the truth. A judge may examine or
cross-examine a witness. He may
propound clarificatory questions
to test the credibility of the
witness and to extract the truth.
He may seek to draw out relevant
and material testimony though
that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. . .
47

D. We also find no merit in accusedappellants argument that he was

denied due process considering the
speed with which the trial court
rendered judgment against him, which
judgment was promulgated one day
after he filed his memorandum.

The decision rendered by the trial

court gives a clear account of the facts
and the law on which it is based. It
discusses in full the courts findings on
the credibility of both the prosecution
and defense witnesses and its
evaluation of the evidence of both
parties. What we said in the analogous
case of People v. Mercado48 applies to
this case:
. . . A review of the trial courts
decision shows that its findings
were based on the records of this
case and the transcripts of
stenographic notes during the
trial. The speed with which the
trial court disposed of the case
cannot thus be attributed to the
injudicious performance of its
function. Indeed, a judge is not
supposed to study a case only
after all the pertinent pleadings
have been filed. It is a mark of
diligence and devotion to duty
that a judge studies a case long
before the deadline set for the
promulgation of his decision has
arrived.
The
one-day period
between the filing of accusedappellants memorandum and the
promulgation of the decision was
sufficient time to consider their
arguments and to incorporate
these in the decision. As long as
the trial judge does not sacrifice
the orderly administration of
justice in favor of a speedy but
reckless disposition of a case, he
cannot be taken to task for
rendering his decision with due
dispatch. . .
II. Coming now to the merits of this
case, we find that the evidence proves
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
accused-appellant. In reviewing rape
cases, we have been guided by the

following principles: (a) An accusation

for rape is easy to make, difficult to
prove, and even more difficult to
disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime, the testimony of
the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution; and (c) The
evidence for the prosecution must
stand on its own merits and cannot
draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.49
A. Well-settled is the rule that the lone
testimony of a rape victim, by itself, is
sufficient to warrant a judgment of
conviction if found to be credible. It
has likewise been established that
when a woman declares that she has
been raped she says in effect all that
is necessary to mean that she has
been raped, and where her testimony
passes the test of credibility the
accused can be convicted on the basis
thereof. This is because from the
nature of the offense, the sole
evidence that can usually be offered
to establish the guilt of the accused is
the complainants testimony.50
Considering complainants tender age,
her shy demeanor, and manner of
testifying in court, the trial court found
Erlanies
testimony
to
be
straightforward,
natural,
and
convincing and accorded the same full
faith and credit.51
Complainant told the court how she
was awakened because accusedappellant kissed her and fondled her
breasts. She narrated that she tried to
resist accused-appellants advances
by pushing and kicking him, but the
latter succeeded in ravishing her. She
told of how her father threatened to
kill her mother and her siblings if she
reported the incident. Despite the
lengthy cross-examination of accusedappellants counsel, she remained firm

and steadfast in her story of how she

was raped by her father. Her narration
not only rings true and sincere but is
consistent and unshaken on its
material
points.
Complainants
testimony is fully corroborated by the
medical findings of Dr. Barin who
examined complainant shortly after
she had been raped. She found
complainant to have suffered a
hymenal laceration at the 3 oclock
position which could have been
caused by the penetration of a hard
object, such as a male organ.
Complainants failure to remember the
date of the commission of the rape
cannot be taken against her. The
exact date when complainant was
sexually abused is not an essential
element of the crime of rape. 52 Nor
does the fact that complainant was
sleeping beside her sister when the
rape occurred detract from her
credibility. The possibility of rape is not
negated by the fact that the presence
of even the whole family of the
accused inside the same room
produced the possibility of discovery.
For rape to be committed, it is not
necessary for the place to be ideal, for
rapists respect neither time nor place
for carrying out their evil designs.53
In sum, accused-appellant failed to
show any reason why this Court
should
disbelieve
complainants
testimony. Indeed, the gravity of filing
a case for incestuous rape is of such a
nature that a daughters accusation
must be taken seriously. It is against
human experience for a girl to
fabricate a story which would drag
herself and her family to a lifetime of
dishonor, unless it is the truth. More
so when her charge could mean the
execution of her own father, as in this
case.54

Accused-appellants counsel on crossexamination made much of the

discrepancy between complainants
sworn statement where she stated
that accused-appellant slept beside
her mother after the rape55 and her
testimony that her mother returned
home from the hospital only the day
after the rape took place.56 It must be
pointed
out,
however,
that
discrepancies between a witness
affidavit and his testimony in open
court does not necessarily impair his
credibility. Affidavits, which are taken
ex parte, are often incomplete or
inaccurate for lack of or absence of
searching
inquiries
by
the
investigating officer.57
Moreover, whether accused-appellant
slept alone or with complainants
mother after committing the rape of
complainant is of no moment as it is a
minor point that does not reflect on
the commission of the crime itself. The
rule
is
that
discrepancies
and
inconsistencies on minor matters
neither impair the essential integrity
of the prosecution evidence as a
whole nor reflect on the witness
honesty. Such inconsistencies may in
fact strengthen rather than weaken
the credibility of the witness as they
erase any suspicion of rehearsed
testimony.58
Accused-appellant
contends
that
complainant could not have been
raped on March 1 or 2, 1997, the
dates when her sister Zaira was
hospitalized, because she had her last
menstrual period on March 3, 1998
and thus she could not have gotten
pregnant as a result of the rape. He
argues that a woman who had her
monthly
period
cannot
be
impregnated as a result of sexual
intercourse five days before or five

days after her last menstruation.59

Accused-appellant does not, however,
cite any legal or medical authority for
his thesis, except what he claims to be
common knowledge. On the other
hand, we have previously held that it
is hard to ascertain the exact date of
fertilization inasmuch as more than
two weeks is considered to be the life
span of the spermatozoa in the
vaginal canal.60 Hence, even granting
that complainant could not have been
impregnated by accused-appellant
during the period alleged by him, it
remains possible for complainant to
have gotten pregnant afterwards.
More
importantly,
it
must
be
emphasized that pregnancy is not an
element of the crime of rape and is,
therefore, totally immaterial to the
question of accused-appellants guilt.61
In other words, accused-appellant
being the cause of complainants
pregnancy is a non-issue in the
prosecution of the crime of rape. What
should not be lost sight of is the fact
that
complainants
testimony
constitutes proof beyond reasonable
doubt that accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of her without her
consent, and such fully established
the crime of rape.
B. Accused-appellant imputes ill
motive on the part of complainants
mother and her relatives for bringing
charges against him. He claims that
complainants mother resented the
fact that he used to beat her up out of
jealousy and that he had several
paramours in the past. He further
asserts that his wifes relatives were
angry with him because of the land
which he caused to be registered in
his name to the prejudice of the latter.
This allegation is without merit.
Accused-appellant makes it appear

that
complainants
mother
was
responsible for the filing of this case
against him. This is not so. For that
matter, his wife did not testify against
him. It was his daughter, complainant,
alone who denounced him in court.
Accused-appellants claim that the
motivation for the filing of this case
was the animosity of his wifes
relatives towards him caused by his
land-grabbing of their land is likewise
without any basis. It may be that his
wifes relatives took advantage of his
incarceration and made him sign his
waiver of rights over the land. 62 But
this does not necessarily mean they
conspired to persecute him. It is
noteworthy that accused-appellant
never claimed that the document
which he signed (Exh. 3) existed
before the filing of the criminal
complaint against him or that his
wifes relatives fabricated the charge
against him because of his failure to
sign the same.
Indeed,
what
accused-appellants
defense cannot explain is the hymenal
laceration sustained by complainant
or the steadfastness she has exhibited
in pursuing the charge against her
own father. It is doubtful that
complainant would let herself be
embroiled in a petty family dispute in
exchange for her honor and dignity.
We cannot believe that a young girl,
like complainant, would invent a
sordid tale of sexual abuse by
accused-appellant unless it was the
truth.63 Where there is no evidence to
show a doubtful reason or improper
motive why a prosecution witness
should testify against the accused or
falsely implicate him in a crime, her
testimony is trustworthy.64
Accused-appellant also raises the
defense of denial and alibi. But the

bare denial of accused-appellant

cannot
overcome
the
positive
declarations of complainant. Denial,
when unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing
evidence,
constitutes
negative self-serving evidence which
deserves no greater evidentiary value
than the testimony of a credible
witness who testified on affirmative
matters.65
Accused-appellants
sister,
Concepcion
Sayo,
testified
that
accused-appellant lived with her
family in Bulacan at the time of the
rape. No other witness not related to
accused-appellant,
however,
was
called to corroborate her claim. We
have already held that the defense of
alibi cannot prosper if it is established
mainly by the accused and his
relatives, and not by credible persons.
It is not improbable that these
witnesses
would
freely
perjure
themselves for the sake of their loved
ones.66 Accused-appellants defense
thus fails to convince this Court.
C.
The
foregoing
discussion
notwithstanding, we think that the
imposition of the death penalty by the
trial court is erroneous. It is settled
that to justify the imposition of the
death penalty, both the relationship of
the victim and her age must be
alleged and proved.67 Thus, in People
v. Javier,68 where the victim was
alleged to be 16 years old at the time
of the commission of the rapes, it was
held:
. . . Although the victims age was
not contested by the defense,
proof of age of the victim is
particularly necessary in this case
considering that the victims age
which was then 16 years old is
just two years less than the
majority age of 18. In this age of

modernism, there is hardly any

difference between a 16-year old
girl and an 18-year old one insofar
as physical features and attributes
are
concerned.
A
physically
developed 16-year old lass may
be mistaken for an 18-year old
young woman, in the same
manner that a frail and younglooking 18-year old lady may pass
as a 16-year old minor. Thus, it is
in this context that independent
proof of the actual age of a rape
victim becomes vital and essential
so as to remove an iota of doubt
that the victim is indeed under 18
years of age as to fall under the
qualifying
circumstances
enumerated in Republic Act No.
7659. In a criminal prosecution
especially of cases involving the
extreme penalty of death, nothing
but proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which an
accused is charged must be
established by the prosecution in
order for said penalty to be
upheld.
A duly certified certificate of live birth
showing complainants age, or some
other official document on record,
such as a school record, has been
recognized as competent evidence.69
In this case, although complainants
minority has been alleged in the
information, no independent evidence
was presented by the prosecution to
prove the same. Complainant did not
even state her age at the time of the
rape during direct examination; it was
only during her cross-examination
when she stated that she was 12
years old at the time she was raped
by her father.70
Nor was her birth certificate or

baptismal certificate or any school

record presented by the prosecution
to prove the age of Erlanie at the time
of the rape. Not even her mother,
whose testimony could have been
sufficient to prove the age of
complainant,71 testified in this case.
What was relied upon by the trial
court was that fact that the age of the
victim
was
undisputed
by
the
defense.72 It also took judicial notice of
the victims minority on account of her
appearance.73
We do not agree with this conclusion.
The trial court can only take judicial
notice of the victims minority when
the latter is, for example, 10 years old
or below. Otherwise, the prosecution
has the burden of proving the victims
age at the time of the rape and the
absence of denial on the part of
accused-appellant does not excuse
the prosecution from discharging its
burden.74 In a similar case, People v.
Tundag,75 in which the trial court took
judicial notice of the minority of the
victim who was alleged to be 13 years
old, we ruled:
In this case, judicial notice of the
age of the victim is improper,
despite the defense counsels
admission, thereof acceding to the
prosecutions motion. As required
by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any
other matters such as age, a
hearing is required before courts
can take judicial notice of such
fact. Generally, the age of the
victim may be proven by the birth
or baptismal certificate of the
victim, or in the absence thereof,
upon
showing
that
said
documents were lost or destroyed,
by other documentary or oral
evidence
sufficient
for
the
purpose.

The prosecution having failed to

present evidence as to complainants
age,
accused-appellant
can
be
convicted only of simple rape, for
which the penalty is reclusion
perpetua.
Consequently, the award of civil
indemnity
in
the
amount
of
P75,000.00 made by the trial court
cannot be sustained. Such amount can
only be awarded if the crime of rape
was effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the applicable
amendatory laws.76 Accordingly, the
civil
indemnity
awarded
to
complainant must be reduced to
P50,000.00
in
consonance
with
current rulings.77
The award of moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 to complainant
is correct. Moral damages is awarded
in rape cases without need of showing
that the victim suffered from mental,
physical, and psychological trauma as
these are too obvious to require recital
by the victim during trial.78
In addition to the damages given by
the trial court, exemplary damages in
the amount of P25,000.00 should
likewise be awarded in favor of
complainant. Accused-appellant being
the father of complainant, such
relationship can be appreciated as a
generic
aggravating
circumstance
warranting the award of exemplary
damages. In rapes committed by
fathers against their daughters, such
award may be imposed to serve as a
deterrent to other parents similarly
disposed to commit the same crime.79
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 49,
Guagua, Pampanga, finding accusedappellant guilty of the crime of rape is
AFFIRMED with the modification that

accused-appellant is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay complainant
Erlanie
Rivera
the
amount
of
P50,000.00
as
civil
indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Bonifacio et al vs RTC of Makati May 5,
2010
Magno vs People April 6, 2011
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 171542
April 6,
2011
ANGELITO P. MAGNO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
MICHAEL MONSOD, ESTHER LUZ
MAE GREGORIO, GIAN CARLO
CAJOLES, NENETTE CASTILLON,
DONATO ENABE and ALFIE
FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Through a petition for review on
certiorari,1
petitioner
Angelito
P.
Magno seeks the reversal of the
Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated September 26,
20052 in "People of the Philippines, et
al. v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil,
Presiding Judge, RTC Mandaue City, Br.
56, et al." (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
79809), and its Resolution dated
February
6,
20063
denying
respondents
motion
for
reconsideration.4 The assailed rulings
denied the petition for certiorari filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and upheld the ruling5 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City,

which precluded Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy

from acting as private prosecutor in
Criminal Case No. DU-10123.6
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On May 14, 2003, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed an information for
multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder against several
accused, including Magno, who were
public officers working under the
National Bureau of Investigation.7
During the scheduled arraignment,
Magno, in open court, objected to the
formal appearance and authority of
Atty. Sitoy, who was there as private
prosecutor to prosecute the case for
and on behalf of the Office of the
Ombudsman.8 The oral objection was
reduced to writing on July 21, 2003
when Magno filed an opposition9
before Branch 56 of the RTC of
Mandaue City, citing the provisions of
Section 31 of Republic Act (RA) No.
6770.10
The Office of the Ombudsman
submitted its comment,11 while the
accused
submitted
their
joint
opposition.12 The respondents likewise
submitted their comments to the
opposition of the other co-accused.13
On September 25, 2003, the RTC
issued an Order, ruling that "the
Ombudsman is proper, legal and
authorized entity to prosecute this
case to the exclusion of any other
entity/person
other
than
those
authorized under R.A. 6770."14
In open court, the Office of the
Ombudsman
moved
for
the
reconsideration of the Order, which
the RTC later denied in its October 1,
2003 Order.15
Proceedings before the CA
On
October
13,
2003,
the
respondents, through the Ombudsman
for the Visayas and Atty. Sitoy, filed a

petition for certiorari before the CA. 16

They
contended
that
the
RTC
committed a grave abuse of discretion
in prohibiting the appearance of Atty.
Sitoy as counsel for the private
offended parties, as the Rules of Court
expressly provides that a private
offended party may intervene, by
counsel,
in the
prosecution
of
offenses.17
Magno, in his comment18 filed on
December 15, 2003, insisted that
what he questioned before the RTC
was the appearance and authority of
the private prosecutor to prosecute
the
case
in
behalf
of
the
Ombudsman.19 He stressed that while
the Office of the Ombudsman can
designate prosecutors to assist in the
prosecution of criminal cases, its
authority in appointing, deputizing or
authorizing prosecutors to prosecute
cases is confined only to fiscals, state
prosecutors and government lawyers.
It does not extend to private
practitioners/private prosecutors.20 He
further stressed that while the Order
of the RTC states that the Office of the
Ombudsman is the proper legal and
authorized entity to prosecute the
case, it did not affect the right to
intervene personally, as the Office of
the Ombudsman can take the cudgels
for the private respondents in
prosecuting the civil aspect of the
case.21
On February 16, 2005, the CA, in its
original Decision, declared that the
private prosecutor may appear for the
petitioner in the case, but only insofar
as the prosecution of the civil aspect
of the case is concerned.22
The respondents moved for the
reconsideration23 of the CA decision.
On September 26, 2005, the CA
amended its decision,24 ruling that the

private prosecutor may appear for the

petitioner in Criminal Case No. DU10123 to intervene in the prosecution
of the offense charged in collaboration
with any lawyer deputized by the
Ombudsman to prosecute the case.25
Failing to obtain a reconsideration26 of
the amended CA decision, Magno
elevated the dispute to this Court
through the present petition for review
on certiorari27 filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Procedure.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
Magno submits that the CA did not
have jurisdiction to entertain the
petition for certiorari; the power to
hear and decide that question is with
the Sandiganbayan.28 To support this
contention, Magno invokes Engr.
Teodoto B. Abbot v. Hon. Judge Hilario
I. Mapayo, etc., et al.29 where the
Court held that the Sandiganbayan
has the exclusive power to issue
petitions for certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.30
Even if the Court were to set aside this
procedural lapse, Magno adds, the
private prosecutor cannot be allowed
to intervene for the respondents as it
would violate Section 31 of RA No.
6770.31
Section
31
limits
the
Ombudsmans
prerogative
to
designate prosecutors to fiscals, state
prosecutors and government lawyers.
It does not, Magno maintains, allow
the Ombudsman to deputize private
practitioners to prosecute cases for
and on behalf of the Office of the
Ombudsman.32
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
The Office of the Ombudsman,
through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, submitted its
memorandum on February 8, 2008.
Substantively, the Ombudsman
maintains that Atty. Sitoy may

intervene in the case pursuant to

Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
Sec. 16. Intervention of the offended
party in criminal action. Where the
civil action for recovery of civil liability
is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111, the offended
party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense.
The Ombudsman maintains that
Section 31 of RA No. 6770 did not
amend Section 16, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court.33 Section 31 merely
allows the Ombudsman to designate
and deputize any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist in
the investigation and prosecution in
certain cases.34 The Ombudsman
opines that the two provisions of law
"are not diametrically opposed nor in
conflict,"35 as "a private prosecutor
may appear for the private offended
complainants in the prosecution of an
offense independent of the exclusive
right of the Ombudsman to
deputize."36 The Ombudsman,
however, did not address the
contention that the Sandiganbayan,
not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction
over the RTC in this case.
THE COURTS RULING
We resolve to grant the petition.
The Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has
appellate jurisdiction over the RTCs
decision not to allow Atty. Sitoy to
prosecute the case on behalf of the
Ombudsman
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606
created the Sandiganbayan. Section 4
thereof
establishes
the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction:
Section
4.
Jurisdiction.
The
Sandiganbayan
shall
exercise

exclusive original jurisdiction in all

cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity,
at the time of the commission of the
offense:
xxxx
B. Other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection of
this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed
pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused
are occupying positions corresponding
to Salary Grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military or PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas
Pambansa
Blg.
129,
as
amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments, resolutions or orders
of regional trial courts whether in the
exercise
of
their
own
original
jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.
The
Sandiganbayan
shall
have

exclusive original jurisdiction over

petitions for the issuance of the writs
of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including
quo warranto, arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be
filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided,
That the jurisdiction over these
petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may
hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the
Court of Appeals, shall apply to
appeals and petitions for review filed
with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases
elevated to the Sandiganbayan and
from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special
prosecutor, shall represent the People
of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged
as
co-principals,
accomplices
or
accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with
said
public
officers
and
employees in the proper courts which
shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
Any provision of law or Rules of Court
to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil
liability shall at all times be

simultaneously instituted with, and

jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or
to appropriate courts, the filing of the
criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of
civil action, and no right to reserve the
filing of such civil action separately
from the criminal action shall be
recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had theretofore
been filed separately but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered,
and the criminal case is hereafter filed
with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action
shall
be
transferred
to
the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination
with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be deemed
abandoned."
[emphasis
and
underscoring supplied]
This is clear: the Sandiganbayan has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
resolutions issued by RTCs in the
exercise
of
their
own
original
jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction.
We reaffirmed this rule in Abbot.37 In
that case, petitioner Engr. Abbot filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA,
claiming that the RTC gravely abused
its discretion for not dismissing the
information for Malversation thru
Falsification of Public Document. The
CA refused to take cognizance of the
case, holding that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over the petition.
Recognizing the amendments made to
PD No. 1606 by RA No. 7975, 38 we
sustained the CAs position since
Section 4 of PD No. 1606 has
expanded
the
Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction to include petitions for

"mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,

habeas corpus, injunction, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction."39
In the present case, the CA erred
when it took cognizance of the
petition for certiorari filed by Magno.
While it is true that the interlocutory
order issued by the RTC is reviewable
by certiorari, the same was incorrectly
filed with the CA. Magno should have
filed the petition for certiorari with the
Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over the RTC
since the accused are public officials
charged of committing crimes in their
capacity as Investigators of the
National Bureau of Investigation.40
The CA should have dismissed the
petition outright. Since it acted
without authority, we overrule the
September
26,
2005
Amended
Decision of the CA and the subsequent
denial of Magnos motions for
reconsideration.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
the CAs judgment, issued without
jurisdiction, is void.
There is no rule in procedural law as
basic as the precept that jurisdiction is
conferred by law,41 and any judgment,
order or resolution issued without it is
void42 and cannot be given any
effect.43 This rule applies even if the
issue on jurisdiction was raised for the
first time on appeal or even after final
judgment.44
We reiterated and clarified the rule
further in Felicitas M. Machado, et al.
v. Ricardo L. Gatdula, et al.,45 as
follows:
Jurisdiction over a subject matter is
conferred by law and not by the
parties action or conduct. Estoppel
generally does not confer jurisdiction
over a cause of action to a tribunal

where none, by law, exists. In Lozon v.

NLRC, we declared that:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit is yet another
matter.1avvphil Whenever it appears
that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the action shall be
dismissed. This defense may be
interposed at any time, during appeal
or even after final judgment. Such is
understandable, as this kind of
jurisdiction is conferred by law and not
within the courts, let alone the parties,
to
themselves
determine
or
conveniently set aside.
We note that Magno had already
raised in his supplemental motion for
reconsideration before the CA46 the
ground of lack of jurisdiction before
the CAs Decision became final. The
CA did not even consider this
submission, choosing instead to brush
it aside for its alleged failure to raise
new or substantial grounds for
reconsideration.47 Clearly, however, its
lack of jurisdiction is a new and
substantial argument that the CA
should have passed upon.
The Office of the Ombudsman cannot
rely on the principle of estoppel to
cure the jurisdictional defect of its
petition before the CA
The Ombudsman cannot rely on the
principle of estoppel in this case since
Magno raised the issue of jurisdiction
before the CAs decision became final.
Further, even if the issue had been
raised only on appeal to this Court,
the CAs lack of jurisdiction could still
not be cured. In Machado, 48 citing
People of the Philippines v. Rosalina
Casiano,49 we held:
In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the
issue of estoppel, held:
The operation of the principle of
estoppel
on
the
question
of

jurisdiction seemingly depends upon

whether the lower court actually had
jurisdiction or not. If it had no
jurisdiction, but the case was tried and
decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred,
on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same "must exist
as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or
by estoppel." However if the lower
court had jurisdiction, and the case
was heard and decided upon a given
theory, such, for instance, as that the
court had no jurisdiction, the party
who induced it to adopt such theory
will not be permitted, on appeal, to
assume an inconsistent position that
the lower court had jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE,
we
DENY
the
petitioners petition for review on
certiorari, and DECLARE the Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79809, promulgated on
September 26, 2005, as well as its
Resolution of February 6, 2006, NULL
AND VOID for having been issued
without jurisdiction. The respondents
are hereby given fifteen (15) days
from the finality of this Decision within
which to seek recourse from the
Sandiganbayan. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
People vs Cawaling 293 scra 267
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 117970 July 28, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ULYSSES M. CAWALING, ERNESTO
TUMBAGAHAN, RICARDO DE LOS

SANTOS, and HILARIO

CAJILO,accused-appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
It is axiomatic that once an accusedappellant admits killing the victim, he
bears the burden of establishing the
presence of any circumstance like selfdefense, performance of a lawful duty
or, for that matter, double jeopardy,
which
may
relieve
him
of
responsibility, or which may mitigate
his criminal liability. 1 If he fails to
discharge this burden, his conviction
becomes inevitable. In this Decision,
we also reiterate the following
doctrines: (1) the regional trial court,
not
the
Sandiganbayan,
has
jurisdiction over informations for
murder committed by public officers,
including a town mayor; (2) the
assessment of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies deserve great respect; (3)
the equipoise rule cannot be invoked
where the evidence of the prosecution
is overwhelming; (4) alibi cannot be
believed in the face of credible
testimony identifying the appellants;
and (5) conspiracy may be proven by
circumstantial evidence.
The Case
Before us is an appeal from the 34page Decision 2 dated October 21,
1994, promulgated by the Regional
Trial Court of Romblon in Criminal
Case No. OD-269. Convicted of murder
were former Mayor Ulysses M.
Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto
Tumbagahan, 3 Ricardo De los Santos
and Hilario Cajilo.
Prior to the institution of the criminal
case against all the appellants, an
administrative case 4 had been filed
before
the
National
Police

Commission, in which Policemen

Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los
Santos, Hilario Cajilo (three of herein
appellants) and Andres Fontamillas
were charged by Nelson Ilisan 5 with
the killing of his brother Ronie 6 Ilisan.
On April 6, 1986, Adjudication Board
No. 14 7 rendered its Decision which
found Tumbagahan, De los Santos,
Cajilo and Fontamillas guilty of grave
misconduct
and
ordered
their
dismissal from the service with
prejudice. 8 On June 26, 1986, the
Board issued a resolution, 9 dismissing
the
respondents'
motion
for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Subsequently, on June 4, 1987,
Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Alexander Mortel filed, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan,
Romblon, 10 an Information for murder
11
against the appellants and Andres
Fontamillas. The accusatory portion
reads:
That on or about the 4th day
of December 1982, at around
9:00 o'clock in the evening, in
the Poblacion, [M]unicipality
of San Jose, [P]rovince of
Romblon,
Philippines,
and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said
accused, with intent to kill,
conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another,
did then and there, by means
of treachery and with evident
premeditation
and
taking
advantage of their superior
strenght
[sic]
willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot
RONIE ILISAN, with the use of
firearms, inflicting upon the
latter multiple mortal injuries
in different parts of his body

which were the direct and

immediate cause of his death.
Accused Tumbagahan, De los Santos,
Cajilo and Fontamillas, with the
assistance of their lawyers Atty.
Abelardo V. Calsado and Juanito
Dimaano, pleaded not guilty when
arraigned on February 15, 1988; 12
while Accused Cawaling, assisted by
Counsel Jovencio Q. Mayor, entered a
plea of not guilty on March 16, 1988.
13

After due trial, 14 the court a quo 15

rendered its Decision dated October
21, 1994, 16 the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds
the accused (1) ULYSSES M.
CAWALING,
(2)
ERNESTO
TUMBAGAHAN, (3) RICARDO
DELOS SANTOS, (4) HILARIO
CAJILO, AND (5) ANDRES
FONTAMILLAS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime
of
MURDER
under
the
Information, dated June 4,
1987, and sentences each of
them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties of the
law.
The accused, jointly and
severally, are ORDERED to
pay Nelson Elisan the sum of
P6,000.00 as actual damages
and the heirs of the deceased
Ronie Elisan the sums of
P116,666.66 by way of lost
earnings and P50,000.00 as
indemnity for death, without
subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
The bail bonds of all the
accused
are
ORDERED

CANCELLED and all said

accused
ORDERED
immediately confined in jail.
The slug (Exh. A); the .38
caliber revolver (with 3 empty
shells and 3 live bullets) (Exh.
G); and the slug of bullet (Exh.
H) are confiscated in favor of
the government.
After
the
judgment
has
become final, the Officer-inCharge, Office of the Clerk of
Court, this Court, is ordered to
deliver
and
deposit
the
foregoing Exhibits A, F, G and
H, inclusive, to the Provincial
Director, PNP, of the Province
of
Romblon
properly
receipted.
Thereafter,
the
receipt must be attached to
the record of the case and
shall form part of the record.
The period of preventive
imprisonment the accused
had undergone
shall
be
credited in their favor to its
full extent pursuant to Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
The case against co-accused
ALEX BATUIGAS who is at
large is ORDERED ARCHIVED
pending his arrest. 17
Hence, this appeal.

18

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The trial court gives this summary of
the facts as viewed by the prosecution
witnesses:
The
killing
occurred
on
December 4, 1982 at around
9:00 o'clock in the evening at

the ricefield of Poblacion, San

Jose, Romblon when the
bright moon was already
above the sea at an angle of
about 45 degrees, or if it was
daytime, it was about 9:00
o'clock in the morning (Imelda
Elisan Tumbagahon, on direct
examination, tsn, Jan. 17,
1989, p. 5, and on cross
examination, tsn, April 18,
1989, p. 22).
On December 4, 1982, about
8:00 o'clock or 8:30 o'clock in
the evening, Vicente Elisan
and his elder brother Ronie
Elisan,
the
victim,
were
drinking tuba at C & J-4
Kitchenette of co-accused
Andres
Fontamillas
in
Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon.
When they stood up to go
home, Luz Venus, the wife of
Diosdado Venus, told them
not to go out because the
accused were watching them
outside
about
three
(3)
meters from the restaurant.
Diosdado Venus accompanied
them upon their request and
they went out and walked
towards
home.
About
a
hundred meters from the
restaurant,
the
six
(6)
accused,
that
is,
Mayor
Cawaling,
the
four
(4)
policemen, namely, Hilario
Cajilo, Andres Fontamillas,
Ernesto
Tumbagahan
and
Ricardo delos Santos, and
civilian Alex Batuigas, the
mayor's
brother-in-law,
flashlighted
them
and
Diosdado Venus ran going
back. The two (2) brothers
also ran towards home to the

house of their elder sister

Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon.
Co-accused
Andres
Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo
blocked them on the gate of
the fence of their sister's
house.
Ronie
Elisan
ran
towards the ricefield. The
accused were chasing them.
Vicente Elisan saw his brother
Ronie f[a]ll down on the
ricefield while he ran towards
the bushes and la[y] on the
ground. Ronie Elisan rose up
by kneeling and raising his
two (2) hands. All the six (6)
accused approached him with
their flashlights and shot him.
Ronie fell down about twenty
(20) meters from the bushes
where Vicente Elisan hid
behind the coconut tree. Coaccused Cawaling said ["]you
left him, he is already dead.["]
Mayor Cawaling was armed
with .45 caliber, policemen
Andres Fontamillas and Hilario
Cajilo
were
both
with
armalites,
Ernesto
Tumbagahan
and
Ricardo
delos Santos were both with .
38 caliber and so with civilian
Alex Batuigas. They left
towards the house of Mayor
Cawaling. After they were
gone, Vicente Elisan ran
towards the house of his older
brother Nelson Elisan. Upon
seeing him, Vicente told
Nelson that Ronie was already
dead. Nelson said nothing.
While they were there, elder
sister
Imelda
Elisan
Tumbagahon, who was crying
came. She said: "Manong,
patay ron si Ronie." (Brother,

Ronie is already dead). Nelson

said ["]do not be noisy; they
might come back and kill all
of us.["] Imelda stopped
crying.
After a while, brothers Nelson
and Vicente Elisan went to the
house of barangay captain
Aldolfo
Tumbagahon.
The
three (3) went to the townhall
and called the police but
there was none there. Going
to the house of the Chief of
Police Oscar Montero, they
were told by his wife that
Commander Montero was in
the house of Mayor Cawaling.
They proceeded to the place
where Ronie Elisan was shot.
The cadaver was brought to
the house of Nelson Elisan.
Vicente Elisan found an empty
shell of a .45 caliber about
three (3) arm's length from
the body of the victim. They
surrendered
it
to
the
Napolcom. 19

2. Right Axilla:

3. Left Axilla:

4. Back:
Dr. Blandino C. Flores described the
gunshot wounds of the victim as
follows:
Gunshot Wounds:
1. Shoulder:
Gun
shot
wound 1/2 x
1/2 inch in
diameter
shoulder
right 2 inches
from
the
neck
with
contussion
[sic]
collar
s[u]rrounding
the wound.

Gun
shot
wound 1/4 x
1/4 inch in
diameter, 2
inches below
the
right
nipple
with
contussion
[sic]
collar
s[u]rrounding
the wound.
Exit of the
gun
shot
wound from
the
right
axilla,
measuring
1/2 x 1/2 inch
with
edges
everted, one
inch
below
the axilla and
one
inch
below
the
level of the
nipple.
Gun
shot
wound
measuring
1/4
x
1/4
inch,
along
the vertebral
column, right
at the level of
the 10th ribs
with
contussion
[sic] collar.

5. Leg, Left:

Gun
shot
wound
measuring
1/4
x
1/4

anterior
aspect upper
third leg with
contussion
[sic]
collar,
with the exit
1/2
x
1/2
posterior
aspect upper
third leg, left.
20

Based on the death certificate (Exhibit

E) issued by Dr. Flores, Ronie Ilisan
died of "severe hemorrhage and gun
shot wo[unds]." 21
Version of the Defense
Appellant Cawaling, in his 47-page
Brief, 22 presented his own narration of
the incident as follows:
At around 7:00 in the evening
of December 4, 1982, Ulysses
Cawaling, then the mayor of
the [M]unicipality of San Jose
in the [P]rovince of Romblon,
arrived
aboard
a
hired
motorized boat from Manila in
the seashore of San Jose.
From
the
seashore,
he
immediately proceeded to his
home. At around 7:30 in the
evening, Cawaling went to the
municipal hall to check on
administrative matters that
piled up in the course of his
trip to Manila. He also went
inside the police station
(located inside the municipal
building) to be apprised of

any
developments,
after
which he went out and joined
Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc.
Cajilo who were standing near
the flagpole in front of the
municipal building. The three
engaged in a conversation.
Cawaling learned that the two
police officers were the ones
assigned for patrol/alert for
that night. The three of them
went inside the INP office and
there Cawaling informed the
two
policemen
that
he
received information from
reliable persons that certain
persons were plotting to kill
him and a member of the
town's police force. It is to be
noted that this occurred at
the height of the communist
insurgency
and
political
violence in the countryside in
the early 80's. Hence, such
information was taken very
seriously, having been relayed
by sources independent of
each other.
Cawaling, as town chief then
empowered with supervisory
authority over the local police,
accompanied
Pfc.
Tumbagahan and Pfc. Cajilo in
conducting
patrol
and
surveillance
operations
around the small municipality.
He usually did this as routine
since Romblon was then
plagued
with
political
assassinations and armed
conflict. On their way to the
seashore, they passed by C &
J-4 Kitchenette, and chanced
upon Ronnie Ilisan and his
brother Vicente Ilisan drinking
liquor and discussing in very

loud voices. They stopped

right in the front of the
restaurant and there they
heard Ronnie Ilisan state in a
every loud voice that he will
kill a person that night. Inside
the restaurant, without the
knowledge then of Cawaling
and the two police officers,
witness Gil Palacio, who was
buying cigarettes and Luz
Venus, the cook/server of the
restaurant, saw Ronnie Ilisan,
very drunk, brandishing in the
air a .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson
revolver
with
a
protruding screw.
Initially
dismissing
Ronnie
Ilisan's statement as just
another hollow swagger of an
intoxicated person ("salitang
lasing"), Cawaling and the two
policemen proceeded on their
way. After the patrol, they
returned to the municipal
building
and
stationed
themselves in front. At around
8:30 in the evening, Ronnie
Elisan
passed
by
the
municipal
hall
walking
towards the direction of the
house
of
Nelson
Ilisan,
another brother, and shouted
the challenge, "gawas ang
maisog",
meaning
THOSE
WHO ARE BRAVE, COME OUT.
Cawaling and the two police
officers again brushed aside
[the]
challenge
as
just
another
foolish
drunken
revelry [o]n the part of Ronnie
Ilisan,
a
well-known
troublemaker in the small
municipality.
A few moments later, after
Ronie Ilisan had passed by,

they
distinctly
heard
a
gunshot and hysterical female
voices
shouting,
"pulis,
tabang"
meaning
POLICE!
HELP! four times. Impelled by
the call of duty, Cawaling and
the
two
policemen
immediately
ran
in
the
direction of the gunshot and
the desperate female voices
until they reached the house
of Nelson Ilisan in San Jose
Street. At this point, they saw
Ronnie Ilisan holding a .38
caliber revolver. They also
saw Vicente Ilisan, Francisco
Tesnado, Fe Ilisan, the wife of
Nelson and Delma Ilisan, the
wife of Vicente, the latter two
being the same persons who
cried "pulis, tabang" four
times. Cawaling then told
Ronnie to surrender his gun
but the latter responded by
pointing the gun at Cawaling
and pulling the trigger.
At the precise moment that
the
gun
fired,
Cawaling
warned the two policemen to
drop to the ground by
shouting "dapa". Fortunately,
Cawaling was not hit. Ronnie
Ilisan then turned around and
ran towards the church. The
two policemen gave chase.
Cawaling, still shaken and
trembling after the mischance
was initially left behind but
followed shortly. When Ronnie
Ilisan reached the church, he
turned around and again fired
at the pursuing Pfc. Cajilo.
Fortunately, the gun misfired.
When they finally reached the
ricefield, Pfc. Cajilo fired two
(2) warning shots in the air for

Ronnie to surrender. Ronnie

responded by firing once
again at Pfc. Tumbagahan but
failed to hit the latter. At that
instance, Pfc. Cajilo counterfired at Ronnie Ilisan hitting
him. Pfc. Tumbagahan also
fired his weapon in the heat of
exchange and also hit Ronnie
Ilisan. As a result of the
gunshot wounds, Ronnie Ilisan
later on succumbed.
Pfc. Tumbagahan picked up
the gun still in the hand of the
dead Ronnie Ilisan and gave it
to Pfc. Cajilo. The three,
Cawaling, who subsequently
caught up with them after the
incident, and the two police
officers, then proceeded to
the police station located in
the municipal building to
formally report the incident in
their station blotter. 23
The "Brief for All of the AccusedAppellants" filed by Atty. Napoleon U.
Galit and the "Brief for Appellants
Ernesto Tumbagahan and Hilario
Cajilo" submitted by Atty. Joselito R.
Enriquez merely repeated the facts as
narrated by the trial court.
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the prosecution witnesses and
their testimonies credible, the court a
quo convicted the appellants. The
killing was qualified to murder
because
of
the
aggravating
circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and treachery. The trial court
ruled that there was a notorious
inequality of forces between the
victim and his assailants, as the latter
were greater in number and armed
with guns. It further ruled that abuse

of
superior
strength
absorbed
treachery, as it ratiocinated:
"Certain cases," an authority
wrote, "involving the killing of
helpless victim by assailants
superior to them in arms or
numbers, or victims who were
overpowered before being
killed, were decided on the
theory that the killing was
treacherous, when perhaps
the
correct
qualifying
circumstance would be abuse
of superiority. In these cases
the attack was not sudden nor
unexpected and the element
of surprise was lacking." (Id., I
Aquino, pp. 423-424). In the
instant case, we earlier ruled
that the qualifying treachery
should be considered as an
exception to the general rule
on treachery because it was
not present at the inception of
the attack. The killing was not
sudden nor unexpected and
the element of surprise was
lacking. It is for this reason
that we hold that alevosia
should be deemed absorbed
or included in abuse of
superiority. Even assuming
ex-gratia argumenti that it
should be the other way
around, the situation will not
be of help, penaltywise, to the
accused. 24
The defenses raised by the appellants
were dismissed and their witnesses
declared unworthy of belief for the
following reasons:
1. It was highly improbable
that Defense Witness Tesnado
would not tell his wife (Dory)

and Bebelinia Ilisan Sacapao

about the incident he had
allegedly witnessed, more so
when Sacapao was the
victim's first cousin.
2. The spot report prepared
by Station Commander Oscar
M. Montero, the testimonies of
Cajilo and Tumbagahan and
the medical findings of Dr.
Flores
contradicted
one
another on the following
details: the caliber of the gun
used in shooting the victim,
the wounds inflicted and the
whereabouts
of
Cawaling
during the shoot-out.
3. Cawaling and his men,
armed with guns, could have
immediately disarmed the
victim at the initial encounter.
The
court
could
not
understand why the victim
was able to fire his gun, run,
then stop and again fire his
gun, without being caught.
4. The positive identification
made by the prosecution
witnesses prevails over the
alibi posed by De los Santos
and Fontamillas, a defense
that was not corroborated by
any other witness.
5. The .38 caliber revolver,
allegedly
owned
by
the
victim, was in fact owned and
used by Alex Batuigas.
6. The defense presented a
photo and a sketch to prove
that
Imelda
Ilisan
Tumabagahan
had
an
obstructed view of the killing.
The trial court ruled that such
evidence
was
misleading,
because the window, from
where said witness allegedly

saw the incident, was at the

eastern side of her house, and
thus afforded a clear view of
the incident, while the window
referred to by the defense
was at the southern portion.
7. The questioned testimonies
of Dr. Flores, Nelson Ilisan and
Provincial Prosecutor Pedro
Victoriano, Jr., though not
formally offered as evidence,
may be admitted because of
the failure of the defense to
object thereto at the time
they were called to testify.
8. The defense failed to prove
that
the
prosecution
witnesses had any ill motive
to testify falsely against the
appellant.
9. Appellants had a motive to
kill the victim. Nelson Ilisan
testified that his brother Ronie
(the victim) had witnessed
Bonifacio Buenaventura (a
former chief commander of
the San Jose Police Force) kill
a certain Ruben Ventura.
Cawaling,
who
was
Buenaventura's first cousin,
wanted Ronie dead, because
the latter had not followed his
instruction to leave town to
prevent him from testifying in
said case.
Assignment of Errors
The appellants, through their common
counsel, Atty. Napoleon Galit, assign
the following errors to the lower court:
1. The trial court gravely erred
in
sustaining
prosecutor's
theory of conspiracy and thus
renders nugatory or has
totally
forgotten
that
policemen when in actual call
of duty normally operate in

group but not necessarily in

conspiracy.
2. The trial court gravely
erred in believing the theory
of
the
prosecution
that
accused-appellant
Ulysses
Cawaling was one of the
alleged co-conspirators in the
killing of the deceased Ronnie
Elisan.
3. The trial court gravely
erred in not believing the
defense of accused-appellant
Ulysses Cawaling that he has
nothing to do with the
shooting incident except to
shout to arrest the accused[,]
which
prompted
his
coaccused policemen to chase
the accused and sho[o]t him
when he resisted, after he
fired at Mayor Cawaling.
4. The trial court gravely
erred in not giving weight to
accused-appellant
policemen['s]
testimonies
which carry the presumption
of regularity.
5. The trial court gravely
erred in not acquitting all the
accused-appellants
by
applying "the equipoise rule"
thereby
resulting
[i]n
reasonable doubts on the
guilt. 25
In their joint brief, 26 Appellants
Tumbagahan and Cajilo cite these
other errors:
1. The trial court gravely
erred in relying on the theory
of
the
prosecution
that
accused-appellants
Ernesto
Tumbagahan and Hilario Cajilo
were alleged co-conspirators

in the killing of the victim,

Ronie Ilisan.
2. The trial court gravely
erred in not believing the
defense that herein accusedappellants merely did a lawful
duty when the shooting
incident happened which led
to the death of Ronnie Ilisan.
3. The trial court gravely
erred in not acquitting herein
accused-appellants
by
applying the equipoise rule,
thereby
resulting
in
reasonable doubt on their
guilt.
4.
Prescinding
from
the
foregoing, herein accusedappellants do press and hold,
that
the
lower
court
committed grave, serious and
reversible
error
in
appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery
(alevosia).
5. The lower court committed
grave, serious and reversible
error
in
convicting
both
accused-appellants of murder,
instead merely of homicide,
defined and penalized under
the Revised Penal Code.
6. The lower court committed
grave, serious and reversible
error in appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of
taking advantage of superior
strength.
7. The consummated crime
being merely homicide, the
mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be
considered to lower the
penalty of homicide.
8. The lower court committed
error
in
not
considering

double jeopardy.
9 The lower court committed
error in not dismissing the
case for want of jurisdiction. 27
Appellant Cawaling imputes these
additional errors to the court a quo:
1. The trial court gravely
erred in not acquitting herein
accused-appellant, Ulysses M.
Cawaling, considering that he
had no part in the killing and
the prosecution failed to
prove
his
guilt
beyond
reasonable doubt;
2. The trial court gravely
erred in not finding the
shooting incident a result of
hot pursuit and shoot-out
between the deceased Ronnie
Ilisan and the police officers in
the performance of their duty
and self-defense, and in
sustaining the prosecution's
conspiracy theory;
3. The trial court gravely
erred
in
not
acquitting
Accused-Appellant Ulysses M.
Cawaling considering that
there was blatant absence of
due
process
in
the
proceedings tantamount to
mistrial. 28
This Court's Ruling
We affirm the conviction of the
appellants. In so ruling, we will resolve
the following issues: (1) jurisdiction of
the trial court, (2) double jeopardy, (3)
credibility of prosecution witnesses
and their testimonies, (4) self-defense,
(5) performance of lawful duty, (6)
alibi, (7) conspiracy, (8) rule on
equipoise,
(9)
qualifying

circumstances, (10) damages and (11)

attending circumstances as they affect
the penalty.
We shall address the first two issues
as important preliminary questions
and discuss the merits of the
remaining ones, which we have culled
from the errors cited by the appellants
in their aforementioned briefs.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo
argue that the trial court erred when it
assumed jurisdiction over the criminal
case.
They
insist
that
the
Sandiganbayan,
not
the
regular
courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear
the case against the appellants, as
they were public officers at the time of
the killing which was allegedly
committed by reason of or in relation
to their office.
We do not agree.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal case is determined by the law
in force at the time of the institution of
the action. Once the court acquires
jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from
the case by any subsequent events,
such as a new legislation placing such
proceedings under the jurisdiction of
another tribunal. The only recognized
exceptions to the rule, which find no
application in the case at bar, arise
when: (1) there is an express provision
in the statute, or (2) the statute is
clearly intended to apply to actions
pending before its enactment. 29
The statutes pertinent to the issue are
PD 1606, as amended; 30 and PD
1850, as amended by PD 1952 and BP
129.
Sec. 4 of PD 1606 31 reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a)
Exclusive
original
jurisdiction
in
all
cases
involving:
xxx xxx xxx
(2)
Other
offenses
or
felonies
committed
by
public
officers and
employees in
relation
to
their
office,
including
those
employed in
governmentowned
or
controlled
corporations,
whether
simple
or
complexed
with
other
crimes,
where
the
penalty
prescribed by
law is higher
than prision
correccional
or
imprisonmen
t for six (6)
years, or a
fine
of
P6,000.00:
PROVIDED,
HOWEVER,
that offenses
or
felonies
mentioned in
this
paragraph
where
the
penalty

prescribed by
law does not
exceed
prision
correccional
or
imprisonmen
t for six (6)
years or a
fine
of
P6,000.00
shall be tried
by the proper
Regional Trial
Court,
Metropolitan
Trial
Court,
Municipal
Trial
Court
and
Municipal
Circuit
Trial
Court.
xxx xxx xxx
However, former President Ferdinand
Marcos
issued
two
presidential
decrees placing the members of the
Integrated National Police under the
jurisdiction of courts-martial. Section 1
of PD 1952, 32 amending Section 1 of
PD 1850, reads:
Sec.
1.
Court
Martial
Jurisdiction over Integrated
National Police and Members
of the Armed Forces. Any
provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding
(a) uniformed members of the
Integrated National Police who
commit any crime or offense
cognizable by the civil courts
shall
henceforth
be
exclusively tried by courtsmartial pursuant to and in
accordance
with
Commonwealth Act No. 408,

as amended, otherwise known

as the Articles of War; (b) all
persons subjects to military
law under Article 2 of the
aforecited Articles of War who
commit any crime or offense
shall be exclusively tried by
courts-martial or their case
disposed of under the said
Articles of War; Provided, that,
in
either
of
the
aforementioned
situations,
the case shall be disposed of
or tried by the proper civil or
judicial
authorities
when
court-martial jurisdiction over
the offense has prescribed
under
Article
38
of
Commonwealth Act Numbered
408, as amended, or courtmartial jurisdiction over the
person of the accused military
or Integrated National Police
personnel can no longer be
exercised by virtue of their
separation from the active
service without jurisdiction
having
duly
attached
beforehand unless otherwise
provided by law:
PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT
THE PRESIDENT MAY, IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ORDER
OR DIRECT, AT ANY TIME
BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT, THAT
A PARTICULAR CASE BE TRIED
BY THE APPROPRIATE CIVIL
COURT.
As used herein, the term
uniformed members of the
Integrated
National
Police
shall refer to police officers,
policemen, firemen, and jail
guards.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of
regular courts over civil and criminal

cases was laid down in BP 129, the

relevant portion of which is quoted
hereunder:
Sec.
20.
Jurisdiction
in
Criminal Cases. Trial Courts
shall
exercise
exclusive
original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the
exclusive
and
concurrent
jurisdiction
of
the
Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter. 33
In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2
of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861,
quoted earlier, lists two requisites that
must
concur
before
the
Sandiganbayan
may
exercise
exclusive and original jurisdiction over
a case: (a) the offense was committed
by the accused public officer in
relation to his office; and (b) the
penalty prescribed by law is higher
than
prision
correccional
or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or
higher than a fine of six thousand
pesos (P6,000). 34 Sanchez vs.
Demetriou 35 clarified that murder or
homicide may be committed both by
public officers and by private citizens,
and that public office is not a
constitutive element of said crime,
viz.:
The relation between the
crime
and
the
office
contemplated
by
the
Constitution is, in our opinion,
direct and not accidental. To
fall into the intent of the
Constitution, the relation has
to be such that, in the legal

sense, the offense cannot

exist without the office. In
other words, the office must
be a constituent element of
the crime as defined in the
statute, such as, for instance,
the
crimes
defined
and
punished in Chapter Two to
Six, Title Seven, of the
Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not the
essence of murder. The taking
of human life is either murder
or homicide whether done by
a private citizen or public
servant, and the penalty is
the same except when the
perpetrator, being a public
functionary, took advantage
of his office, as alleged in this
case, in which event the
penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office
does not adhere to the crime
as an element; and even as
an aggravating circumstance,
its materiality arises, not from
the allegations but on the
proof, not from the fact that
the
criminals
are
public
officials but from the manner
of the commission of the
crime.
Furthermore, the Information filed
against the appellants contains no
allegation that appellants were public
officers who committed the crime in
relation to their office. The charge was
for murder, a felony punishable under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
As clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs.
Domagas, et al., 36 "[I]n the absence
of such essential allegation, and since
the present case does not involve
charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019
(the
Anti-Graft
etc.
Act),
the

Sandiganbayan
does
not
have
jurisdiction over the present case.
(Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459
[1986]) Even before considering the
penalty prescribed by law for the
offense charged, it is thus essential to
determine whether that offense was
committed or alleged to have been
committed by the public officers and
employees in relation to their offices."
Jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or
information. 37 In the absence of any
allegation that the offense was
committed in relation to the office of
appellants
or
was
necessarily
connected with the discharge of their
functions, the regional trial court, not
the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case. 38
Second Issue:
Double Jeopardy
In seeking their acquittal, Appellants
Tumbagahan and Cajilo also invoke
their right against double jeopardy.
They argue that the first jeopardy
attached when a criminal case for
murder was filed before the Judge
Advocate General's Office (JAGO),
which was allegedly dismissed after
several hearings had been conducted.
39
We are not persuaded.
There is double jeopardy when the
following requisites are present: (1) a
first jeopardy has attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as
that in the first. And the first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when
a valid plea has been entered; and (e)
when the accused was acquitted or

convicted, or the case was dismissed

or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. 40
For a better appreciation of appellants'
argument, we must consider PD 39 41
and its implementing rules, 42 which
prescribe the procedure before a
military commission. A summary
preliminary investigation shall be
conducted before trial for the purpose
of determining whether there is prima
facie evidence to pursue trial before a
military commission. The investigation
report shall contain a summary of the
evidence, the acts constituting the
offense or offenses committed, and
the findings and recommendations of
the investigating officer. Thereafter,
the report shall be forwarded to the
judge advocate general, who shall
determine for either the defense
secretary or for the AFP chief of staff
whether the case shall be referred for
trial to a military commission. 43
Where a prima facie case is found
against the accused, formal charges
shall be signed by a commissioned
officer designated by the judge
advocate general. 44 The accused shall
then be arraigned, during which the
charge and specification shall be read
and the accused shall enter his plea.
45
After hearings, a record of the trial
shall be forwarded to the AFP chief of
staff for proper action. 46
In the present case, the appellants
have presented no sufficient and
conclusive evidence to show that they
were charged, arraigned and acquitted
in a military commission, or that the
case was dismissed therein without
their consent. The defense merely
offered as evidence certain disposition
forms 47 and a

letter, 48 dated March 8, 1983,

recommending that the case against
Appellants Tumbagahan, Cajilo and De
los Santos be dropped and considered
closed. 49 No charge sheet and record
of
arraignment
and
trial
were
presented to establish the first
jeopardy.
As pointed out by the solicitor general,
"appellants were never arraigned,
they never pleaded before the Judge
Advocate General's Office, there was
no trial, and no judgment on the
merits had been rendered." 50
Third Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses
As a general rule, the factual findings
of trial courts deserve respect and are
not disturbed on appeal, unless some
facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted,
and would otherwise materially affect
the disposition of the case. 51 This
rule, however, does not apply when
the judge who penned the decision
was not the same one who had heard
the prosecution witnesses testify, 52 as
in the present case. Nonetheless, we
have carefully perused and considered
the voluminous records of this case,
and we find no reason to alter the
findings of the court a quo in regard to
the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and their testimonies.
Vicente Ilisan, the victim's brother,
narrated before the trial court the
circumstances relevant to the crime:
Q. In the evening of
December 4, 1982, at
about 8:00 or 8:30,
where were you?
A. I was inside the
restaurant of Andres

Fontamillas.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What were you
doing there?
A. I was drinking
tuba.
Q. When you were
about
to
finish
drinking tuba, what
did you do?
A.
I
stood
up
preparing
to
go
home.
Q. Were you able to
leave that restaurant
actually?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Luz Venus told us
not to go out when [I]
stood up to go home.
Q. Do you know why
you were advise[d]
not to go out?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because we were
being watched by
Mayor
Cawaling,
Andres
Fontamillas,
Hilario Cajilo and Alex
Bat[ui]gas.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you were
informed
by
Luz
Venus that you should
not go out because
Mayor Cawaling and
the
persons
you
mentioned
were
outside watching for
you, what did you do?
A. We did not go out.
Q.
Since
you
remained inside, what
did you do?

A. I also viewed thru

the window.
Q. Did you see them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How far were they
from the restaurant?
A.
About
three
meters.
Q. What were they
doing
outside
the
restaurant?
A. They were also
viewing us.
Q. For how long did
they remain there
viewing you?
A. Just a short time.
Q. And later on, do
you know where did
they go? [sic]
A. No, sir. I went out
from the restaurant
and when I went out,
I did not see them
anymore.
Q. Before you went
out of the restaurant,
what did you do?
A. Diosdado Venus
accompanied us.
Q. Why did you ask
Diosdado Venus to
accompany you?
A. Yes, sir. Because
we were aware that
we
were
being
watched from outside
so we asked to be
accompanied
by
Diosdado Venus.
Q.
From
the
restaurant
accompanied
by
Diosdado Venus, what
did you do?
A. Towards home.

Q. Were you able to

reach home?
A. No, sir.
Q.
Why,
what
happened
on
the
way?
A. Diosdado Venus
ran
going
back
because
we
were
lighted
by
a
flashlight.
Q.
How
many
flashlight[s]
were
trimed [sic] to you?
A. Six.
Q. Did you come to
know who trimed [sic]
the flashlight towards
you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who were they?
A. Mayor Cawaling,
Andres
Fontamillas,
Hilario Cajilo, Ernesto
Tumbagahan, Ricardo
delos Santos and Alex
Batuigas.
Q. How were you able
to recognize them
when that was night
time?
A.
Because
the
flashlight[s]
were
bright.
Q. When Diosdado
Venus ran back to his
restaurant, what did
your brother Ronie
Elisan and you do?
A.
We
also
ran
towards home.
Q. To whose house?
A. That of my older
sister Imelda [E]lisan.
Q. Were you able to
reach that house?

A. No, sir.
Q.
Why,
what
happened when you
ran away?
A. Andres Fontamillas
and
Hilario
Cajilo
were blocking us on
the gate of the fence
of my sister's house.
Q. Since your way
was blocked, where
did Ronie Elisan go?
A. We ran towards the
ricefield.
Q. When you ran,
what
did
Mayor
Cawaling do?
A. They were chasing
us.
Q. What about Alex
Batuigas, what did he
do?
A. He also followed
helping chasing us.
[sic]
Q. What about the
four policemen, what
did they do?
A. The same. They
were also chasing us.
Q. About how far is
that restaurant [from]
the spot where you
were first lighted by
the flashlight of the
accused?
A. About one hundred
meters.
Q. Now, according to
you, you ran towards
the ricefield, what
happened while you
were running towards
the ricefield?
A. I saw my brother
fell [sic] down.

Q. Fell down where?

A. On the ricefield.
Q. What about you,
where were you when
your brother fell down
in the ricefield?
A. I ran towards the
bushes.
Q. What did you do
upon reaching the
bushes?
A. I la[y] on the
ground with my belly
touch[ing]
on
the
ground behind the
coconut tree.
Q. When your brother
according to you had
fallen on the ricefield,
what
did
he
do
thereafter?
A.
He
rose
up,
[raised] his hands
and surrender[ed] to
them.
Q. In rising, what was
his position?
A. He was rising like
this.
(Witness
demonstrating
by
kneeling [and] raising
his two hands).
Q. While Ronie Elisan
was
kneeling
and
raising both of his
hands,
what
happened?
A. Mayor Cawaling
approached
him
together with the four
policemen and his
brother-in-law
and
they shot him.
Q. Do you know what
weapon[s] were used
in
shooting
your

brother?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What weapon were
used?
A. The weapon of
Mayor Cawaling is .45
caliber and that of
Andres
Fontamillas
and
Hilario
Cajilo
were both armalite
and that of Ernesto
Tumbagahan,
Alex
Batuigas and Ricardo
delos Santos were .38
caliber.
Q. How were you able
to
identify
their
weapons?
A.
Because
the
flashlight[s]
were
bright.
Q.
Now,
what
happened to your
brother when he was
fired upon by the
accused in this case?
A. He fell down.
Q. And how far is that
spot where your elder
brother had fallen
down to the spot
where
Diosdado
Venus left you when
he returned to the
restaurant?
A. To my estimate it is
about 300 meters.
Q. After your brother
had fallen down, what
did the accused do?
A. Mayor Cawaling
said, ["]you left him,
he is already dead.["]
Q. Where did they
go?
A. They went towards

the house of Mayor

Cawaling. 53

Imelda Tumbagahan was at home

feeding her child when she heard her
brother Ronie shouting for help. After
getting a flashlight and looking
through the window of her house, she
saw Cawaling and Alex Batuigas
chasing Ronie who was running
towards her house. Tumbagahan and
De los Santos prevented Ronie from
entering the fence of her house, as a
result of which, her brother ran
towards a rice field nearby. There, on
bended knees and with hands raised,
Ronie was shot by Cawaling and his
men. 54
Nelson Ilisan also heard his younger
brother Ronie shouting for help while
being chased by the group of
Cawaling. As Cajilo and Fontamillas
blocked Ronie from entering the gate
of Imelda's house, the victim ran
towards a rice field. Nelson stopped
Cawaling and asked, "Nong, basi
guinalagas ninyo and acon hali?
(Nong, why do you chase my
brother?)" But the mayor merely
continued chasing Ronie. Thereafter,
Nelson saw his brother, on his knees
with both hands raised, shot by
appellants. 55
The three aforementioned witnesses
narrated in detail the assault against
their brother Ronie and positively
identified the appellants as the
perpetrators. The trial court cannot be
faulted for relying on their testimonies
and accepting them as true, 56
especially when the defense failed, to

prove any ill motive on their part. 57 In

addition, family members who have
witnessed the killing of their loved one
usually strive to remember the faces
of the assailants. 58 Thus, the
relationship per se of witnesses with
the victim does not necessarily mean
that the former are biased. On the
contrary,
it
is
precisely
such
relationship that would impel them to
seek justice and put the real culprit
behind bars, rather than impute the
offense to the innocent. 59
Appellant Cawaling submits that the
prosecution witnesses tampered with
the evidence by cleaning the cadaver
before an autopsy could be done.
"Such irregular washing of the cadaver
by a close relative of the deceased,
who is educated and who presumably
knew perfectly well the need to
preserve it in its original state for the
medico-legal examination[,] is highly
suspicious. It points to the fact that
the relatives of the deceased wanted
to hide, or erase something that would
bolster and assist the defense (that is,
state of drunkenness, powder burns or
lack thereof, indicating the firing of a
weapon or the proximity of the
weapon used on the deceased, etc.)."
60

Such contention is unavailing. First,

Bebelinia Sacapao merely cleaned
the cadaver and made no further
examination. Second, appellants had
an opportunity to have the body
examined again to determine or prove
important matters, such as whether
Ronie was drunk, if he fired a gun, how
many and what caliber of guns were
used in shooting him; they did not,
however, avail themselves of this
opportunity.
As
public
officers,

appellants knew that it was within

their power to request or secure from
the court, or any other competent
authority, an order for another
autopsy 61 or any such evidence as
may affirm their innocence. Third,
their conviction lies in the strong and
convincing testimonial evidence of the
prosecution, not in the corroborative
testimony of Bebelinia Sacapao.
Relying on the testimonies of Luz
Venus and Gil Palacio, Appellant
Cawaling also pointed out that "[t]he
power of observation of alleged
eyewitness Vicente was severely
affected by his intoxication. It may be
inferred that an intoxicated person's
sense[s] of sight and hearing and of
touch are less acute than those of a
sober person and that his observation
are inexact as to what actually
occurred." 62
This argument is not persuasive. The
evidence presented fails to show that
Vicente was so intoxicated that night
as to affect his powers of observation
and retrospection. Defense Witness
Palacio merely saw the witness
drinking tuba on the night of the
killing. 63 Meanwhile the whole
testimony of Luz on the matter mainly
reveals that Ronie was the person she
was referring to as drunk, as shown by
this portion: 64

Q When Ronie and

Vicente
both
surnamed
Ilisan
entered the C & J-4
kitchenette what if
any did you observe?
A I saw them so

dr[u]nk (Nakita ko sila

lasing na lasing).
Q Who was lasing na
lasing or so dr[u]nk?
A Ronie Ilisan sir.
Granting that Vicente was drunk, the
conviction of the appellants is still
inevitable in view of the positive
declarations of Witnesses Nelson and
Imelda, who unequivocally identified
appellants as perpetrators of the
senseless killing of their brother Ronie.
Appellant Cawaling also questions the
trial
court's
reliance
on
the
testimonies of Dr. Blandino Flores, 65
Nelson Ilisan 66 and Prosecutor Pedro
Victoriano, Jr., 67 for failure of the
prosecution to offer them as evidence.
In People vs. Java, 68this Court ruled
that the testimony of a witness,
although not formally offered in
evidence, may still be admitted by the
courts, if the other party does not
object to its presentation. The Court
explained: "Section 36 of [Rule 132]
requires that an objection in the
course of the oral examination of a
witness should be made as soon as
the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably
apparent.
Since
no
objection to the admissibility of
evidence was made in the court
below, an objection raised for the first
time
on
appeal
will
not
be
considered." In the present case, a
cursory reading of the stenographic
notes reveals that the counsel for the
appellants did not raise any objection
when said witnesses testified on the
matters
now
being
impugned.
Moreover, they repeatedly crossexamined the witnesses, which shows
that they had waived their objections
to the said testimonies of such
witnesses.
Lastly, Appellant Mayor Cawaling

questions the motive of Prosecutor

Pedro Victoriano Jr. This contention is
likewise bereft of merit. Unlike judges
who are mandated to display cold
69
neutrality
in
hearing
cases,
prosecutors are not required to divest
themselves
of
their
personal
convictions and refrain from exhibiting
partiality. In this case, there is
reasonable ground for Prosecutor
Victoriano to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the
accused was probably guilty thereof. 70
Under the circumstance, it is his sworn
duty to see that justice is served. 71
Thus, "[h]e may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty
to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just
one." 72 Further,
Under the prevailing criminal
procedure, the fiscal's sphere
of action is quite extensive,
for he has very direct and
active intervention in the trial,
assuming
as
the
Government's representative
the defense of society, which
has been disturbed by the
crime, and taking public
action as though he were the
injured party, for the purpose
of securing the offender's
punishment, whenever the
crime has been proved and
the guilt of the accused as the
undoubted
perpetrator
thereof established. 73
Fourth Issue:
Self-Defense

To escape criminal liability, the

appellants also invoke the justifying
circumstances of self-defense and
74
lawful
performance
of duty.
Allegedly, Ronie was firing his gun and
shouting. "Guwa ang maisog! (Come
out who is brave!)." Then the mayor
and the policemen arrived at the
scene to pacify him. Ronie fired at
them, which forced them to chase him
and return fire.
We find this scenario bereft of
plausibility.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim is a condition sine qua non for
the successful invocation of selfdefense. 75 As factually found by the
trial court, unlawful aggression did not
start with the victim, but rather with
the appellants. Cawaling and his men
proceeded to the C & J-4 Kitchenette
and waited for Ronie to come out.
When the victim did, they chased and
shot him without giving him any
opportunity to defend himself.
Granting arguendo the veracity of the
defense's factual version, it is
important to note that appellants
admitted that Ronie was running away
from them when they chased and shot
him. Thus, unlawful aggression
assuming it was initially present
had ceased, and the appellants no
longer had any right to pursue the
offender. Basic is the rule that when
unlawful aggression ceases, the
defender no longer has the right to kill
or even wound the former aggressor.
Upon the cessation of the unlawful
aggression and the danger or risk to
life and limb, there should be a
corresponding cessation of hostilities
on the part of the person defending
himself. 76

Furthermore, the means employed to

ward off the attack was unreasonably
excessive.
Being
armed,
the
appellants could have easily ordered
the victim to surrender. Even the first
shot at his shoulder would have been
sufficient to immobilize him, yet they
fired a succession of shots at him
while he was in no position to put up a
defense.
Jurisprudence teaches that when an
accused admits having committed the
crime but invokes self-defense to
escape criminal liability, the burden of
proof is reversed and shifted to him.
He must then prove the elements of
self-defense. 77 It necessarily follows
that he must now rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution;
for even if the latter evidence were
weak, it could not be disbelieved after
the accused has admitted the
killing. 78 Thus, appellants must
establish with clear and convincing
evidence that the killing was justified,
and that they incurred no criminal
liability therefor. 79 They failed to do
so, and their conviction thus becomes
inevitable. 80
Fifth Issue:
Lawful Performance of Duties
Appellants contend that the killing of
Ronie resulted from the lawful
performance of their duties as police
officers. However, such justifying
circumstance may be invoked only
after the defense successfully proves
that (1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty, and (2) the
injury or offense committed is the
necessary consequence of the due
performance or lawful exercise of such

duty. 81 These two requisites are

wanting in this case.
The
appellants,
except
Mayor
Cawaling, were men in uniform who
happened to be on duty when they
killed Ronie. The victim was nor
committing any offense at the time.
Killing
the
victim
under
the
circumstances of this case cannot in
any wise be considered a valid
performance of a lawful duty by men
who had sworn to maintain peace and
order and to protect the lives of the
people. As aptly held in People vs. De
la Cruz, 82 "Performance of duties does
not include murder." That Ronie was a
troublemaker in their town is not an
excuse; as the Court declared in the
same case of People vs. De la Cruz,
"Murder is never justified, regardless
of the victim."
Sixth Issue:
Alibi
We likewise brush aside the defenses
of alibi and denial raised by Appellant
De los Santos. Prosecution witnesses
positively
identified
him
and
Fontamillas as part of the group which
chased and shot Ronie Ilisan. It is
elementary that alibi and denial are
outweighed by positive identification
that is categorical, consistent and
untainted by any ill motive on the part
of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter. Alibi and denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and selfserving evidence undeserving of
weight in law. 83
In fact, De los Santos failed to
establish with clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the

scene of the crime during its

commission. 84 The evidence he had
presented demonstrated only that, at
the time, he was sleeping in his house,
which was near the locus criminis.
Alibi is always considered with
suspicion and received with caution,
not only because it is inherently weak
and unreliable, but also because it is
easily fabricated and concocted. 85 It is
therefore
incumbent
upon
the
appellant to prove that he was at
another place when the felony was
committed, and that it was physically
impossibie for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. 86 This he failed to prove.
Seventh Issue:
Conspiracy
The trial court correctly appreciated
the
presence
of
conspiracy.
Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Direct proof
of conspiracy is rarely found, for
criminals do not write down their
lawless
plans
and
plots.
The
agreement to commit a crime,
however, may be deduced from the
mode and manner of the commission
of the offense or inferred from acts
that point to a joint purpose and
design,
concerted
action,
and
community of intent. 87 It does not
matter who inflicted the mortal
wound, as the act of one is the act of
all, and each incurs the same criminal
liability. 88 We concur with the trial
court's elucidation:
All of the accused chased the
victim and his brother; four
(4) of whom blocked their
ways, first, to their elder

brother Nelson Elisan's house

and, second, to their elder
sister
Imelda
Elisan
Tumbagahon's house. Having
changed
course
by
proceeding to the ricefield in
their desperate attempt to
evade the accused, all the six
(6) armed accused continued
their pursuit. Their victim,
having fallen on the rice
paddy,
and
rising
and
kneeling on it with raised
hands, all the said accused
with their flashlights beamed
on their victim, in a united
and concerted manner, shot
him. After Ronie Elisan had
fallen
down,
co-accused
Mayor Cawaling was even
heard as saying "(Y)ou left
[sic] him, he is already
dead." . . . . 89
Eighth Issue:
Equipoise Rule
We reject appellants' position that the
equipoise rule should apply to this
case. 90 In People vs. Lagnas, 91 the
Court, through Mr. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, described this rule as
follows:
Once again, albeit in effect a
supportive and cumulative
consideration in view of the
preceding disquisition, the
equipoise
rule
finds
application in this case, that
is, if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one
of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does

not fulfill the test of moral

certainty, and is not sufficient
to support a conviction.
In this case, the inculpatory facts point
to only one conclusion: appellants are
guilty. As amplified in the discussion
above, the Court agrees with the trial
court that the guilt of the appellants
was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ninth Issue:
Murder or Homicide?
The
Information
alleges
three
qualifying circumstances: treachery,
evident premeditation and taking
advantage of superior strength. If
appreciated, any one of these will
qualify the killing to murder. However,
Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo
posit that there was no treachery,
reasoning that Ronie was not an
unsuspecting victim, as he had been
forewarned by Diosdado Venus of the
presence of the appellants inside the
restaurant, and there had been a
chase prior to the killing. Further, they
contend that abuse of superior
strength is deemed absorbed in
treachery, and that "the addition of
abuse of superior strength to qualify
the case to murder is nothing more
than mere repetition a legal
chicanery, so to say. Similarly, where
treachery is not proved, there can be
no abuse of superior strength, viceversa." 92
We partly agree.
Treachery exists when the malefactors
employ means and methods that tend
directly and especially to insure their
execution without risk to themselves
arising from the defense which the
victims might make. The essence of
treachery
is
the
sudden
and
unexpected
attack
without
the
slightest provocation on the part of

the person attacked. 93 While we do

not disregard the fact that the victim,
together with his brother Vicente, was
able to run towards a rice field, we still
believe that treachery attended the
killing.
In People vs. Landicho, 94 we ruled
that
treachery
might
still
be
appreciated even when the victim was
warned of danger to his person, for
"what is decisive is that the execution
of the attack made it impossible for
the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate."
The appellants waited for Ronie to
come out of the restaurant. All of
them chased the victim and prevented
him from seeking refuge either in the
house of his sister Imelda or that of his
brother Nelson. All of them carried
firearms and flashlights. They fired
their guns at the victim while he was
on his knees with arms raised,
manifesting his intention not to fight
back.
We cannot appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, however, as we have
consistently ruled that it is deemed
absorbed in treachery. 95

the records shows how and when the

plan to kill was hatched, or how much
time had elapsed before it was carried
out.

We also affirm the finding of the trial

court that the prosecution failed to
prove the attending circumstance of
evident premeditation. To prove this
aggravating
circumstance,
the
prosecution must show the following:
(1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2)
an act manifestly indicating that the
offender clung to his determination;
and (3) a lapse of time, between the
determination to commit the crime
and the execution thereof, sufficient to
allow the offender to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 96 Nothing in

We cannot do the same to the award

of actual damages and lost earnings,
however.
The
award
of
actual
damages has no basis, as no receipts
were presented to substantiate the
expenses
allegedly
incurred.
An
alleged pecuniary loss must be
established by credible evidence
before actual damages may be
awarded. 99 Similarly erroneous is the
award for loss of earning capacity,
which should be computed as follows:

Tenth Issue:
Damages
The trial court awarded the following:
(a) P50,000.00, as civil indemnity; (b)
P6,000.00, as actual damages; and (c)
P116,666.66, for lost earnings. In
computing the latter, the trial court
used the following formula:
Total annual net income =
10% x total annual gross
income
= .10 x P25,000.00
= P2,500.00.
xxx xxx xxx
Loss of earning capacity of
Ronie Elisan = 2/3 (90-20) x
P2,500.00 = P116,666.66. 97
Consistent with jurisprudence, we
affirm the ruling of the trial court
awarding the amount of P50,000 as
civil indemnity to the heirs of the
victim. 98

100

2/3 x [80 age of victim at

the
time
of
death]
x
[reasonable portion of the
annual net income which
would have been received as
support by heirs]
As testified to by Nelson Ilisan, the
deceased had been earning an
average of P100 daily or P3,000
monthly. 101From this monthly income
must be deducted the reasonable
amount of P1,000 representing the
living and other necessary expenses
of the deceased. Hence, the lost
earnings of the deceased should be
computed as follows:
= 2/3 x [80 - 22] x
[P24,000]
= 2/3 x [58] x
[P24,000]
= 2[P1,392,000]
3
= P2,784,000
3
= P928,000.
Eleventh Issue:
Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances
Prior to the amendment of Section 248
of the Revised Penal Code, 102 the
imposable penalty for murder was
reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. In their Brief,
Appellants Cajilo and Tumbagahan
argue for the imposition of the lower
penalty
of
reclusion
temporal,
contending that their filing of bail
bonds/property bonds, before the
order for their arrest was issued,
should be treated as voluntary
surrender. 103
We cannot accept this contention. In
the first place, it has no factual basis.
The warrant for the arrest of herein

appellants was issued on August 18,

1987, 104 but appellants' counsel filed
the Urgent Motion for Bail only
thereafter, on September 2, 1987. 105
In the second place, appellants failed
to prove the requisites for voluntary
surrender, which are: (1) the offender
has not been actually arrested; (2) the
offender surrenders himself to a
person in authority or to the latter's
agent; and (3) the surrender is
voluntary. 106 The records reveal that a
warrant of arrest was actually served
on Tumbagahan and Cajilo107 on
September 2, 1987 and that they were
in fact detained. 108
In view of the absence of any other
aggravating
or
mitigating
circumstance, the trial court correctly
imposedreclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby
DENIED and the assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED
with
the
following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the award of
P6,000
as
actual
damages
is
DELETED, and (2) the award for loss of
earning capacity is INCREASED to
P928,000. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Macasaet vs People 452 scra 255
Buaya vs Polo 169 scra
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989
SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M.
POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch
XIX, Regional Trial) Court of
Manila and the COUNTRY
BANKERS INSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.

Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner.

Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent
Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation.
PARAS, J.:
Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in
the instant petition for certiorari,
seeks to annul and set aside the
orders of denial issued by the
respondent Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XIX on her
Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion
for Reconsideration in Criminal Case
No. L-83-22252 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Solemnidad M. Buaya."
The Motion to Dismiss was anchored
on the following grounds (a) the court
has no jurisdiction over the case and
(b) the subject matter is purely civil in
nature.
It appears that petitioner was an
insurance agent of the private
respondent, who was authorized to
transact and underwrite insurance
business
and
collect
the
corresponding premiums for and in
behalf of the private respondent.
Under the terms of the agency
agreement, the petitioner is required
to make a periodic report and
accounting of her transactions and
remit premium collections to the
principal office of private respondent
located in the City of Manila.
Allegedly, an audit was conducted on
petitioner's account which showed a
shortage
in
the
amount
of
P358,850.72. As a result she was
charged with estafa in Criminal Case
No. 83-22252, before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX with
the respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo
as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss. which motion was
denied by respondent Judge in his

Order dated March 26, 1986. The

subsequent motion for reconsideration
of this order of denial was also denied.
These two Orders of denial are now
the subject of the present petition. It is
the contention of petitioner that the
Regional trial Court of Manila has no
jurisdiction because she is based in
Cebu City and necessarily the funds
she allegedly misappropriated were
collected in Cebu City.
Petitioner further contends that the
subject matter of this case is purely
civil in nature because the fact that
private respondent separately filed
Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the
same alleged misappropriated amount
is an acceptance that the subject
transaction complained of is not
proper for a criminal action.
The respondents on the other hand,
call for adherence to the consistent
rule that the denial of a motion to
dismiss
or
to
quash,
being
interlocutory in character, cannot be
questioned by certiorari and it cannot
be the subject of appeal until final
judgment or order rendered (See. 2,
Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary
procedure to be followed in such a
case is to enter a Plea, go to trial and
if the decision is adverse, reiterate the
issue on appeal from the final
judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142
SCRA 171).
The general rule is correctly stated.
But this is subject to certain
exceptions the reason is that it would
be unfair to require the defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or
offense or it is not the court of proper
venue.
Here,
petitioner
questions
the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court

of Manila to take cognizance of this

criminal case for estafa.
It is well-settled that the averments in
the
complaint
or
information
characterize
the
crime
to
be
prosecuted and the court before which
it must be tried (Balite v. People, L21475, Sept. 30,1966 cited in People
v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 680).
In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344,
May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this
Court ruled that in order to determine
the jurisdiction of the court in criminal
cases,
the
complaint
must
be
examined
for
the
purpose
of
ascertaining whether or not the facts
set out therein and the punishment
provided for by law fall within the
jurisdiction of the court where the
complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of
courts in criminal cases is determined
by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and not by the findings
the court may make after the trial
(People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).
The information in the case at reads
as follows:
The undersigned accuses Solemnidad
Buaya of the crime of estafa,
committed as follows:
That
during
the
period 1980 to June
15, 1982, inclusive, in
the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said
accused did then and
there
wilfully,
unlawfully
and
feloniously
defraud
the Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation
represented by Elmer
Banez duly organized
and earth under the
laws of the Philippine
with principal address

at 9th floor, G.R.

Antonio Bldg., T.M.
Kalaw, Ermita, in said
City, in the following
manner, to wit. the
said
having
been
authorized to act as
insurance agent of
said
corporation,
among whose duties
were
to
remit
collections due from
customers
thereat
and to account for
and turn over the
same to the said
Country
Bankers
Insurance Corporation
represented by Elmer
Banez, as soon as
possible
or
immediately
upon
demand,
collected
and
received
the
amount
of
P368,850.00
representing
payments
of
insurance premiums
from customers, but
herein accused, once
in possession of said
amount,
far
from
complying with her
aforesaid obligation,
failed and refused to
do so and with intent
to
defraud,
absconded with the
whole
amount
thereby
misappropriated,
misapplied
and
converted the said
amount
of
P358,850.00 to her

own personal used

and benefit, to the
damage
and
prejudice
of
said
Country
Bankers
Insurance Corporation
in the amount of
P358,850.00
Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44,
Rollo)
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides: In all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the
offense was committed or any of the
essential elements thereof took place.
The subject information charges
petitioner with estafa committed
"during the period 1980 to June 15,
1982 inclusive in the City of Manila,
Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)
Clearly then, from the very allegation
of the information the Regional Trial
Court of Manila has jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a
continuing or transitory offense which
may be prosecuted at the place where
any of the essential elements of the
crime took place. One of the essential
elements of estafa is damage or
prejudice to the offended party. The
private respondent has its principal
place of business and office at Manila.
The failure of the petitioner to remit
the insurance premiums she collected
allegedly
caused
damage
and
prejudice to private respondent in
Manila.
Anent petitioners other contention
that the subject matter is purely civil
in nature, suffice it to state that
evidentiary facts on this point have
still to be proved.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is

DISMISSED for lack of merit The case

is remanded to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XIX for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Geduspan vs People 451 scra 187
De Guzman vs Sandiganbayan 256
scra 171
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103276 April 11, 1996
DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Second
Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:p
The Court in its June 16, 1994 En Banc
Resolution 1 denied with finality
petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the Court's April 12, 1994 Decision 2
affirming his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan 3 of violation of
Section 3(e) of the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act" 4 for his alleged
failure to account for P200,000.00
received for certain official training
programs of the Department of
Agriculture Entry of judgment was
ordered, to be made in due course. 5
Six (6) years and one (1) month as
minimum, to nine (9) years and one
(1) day as maximum in jail await
petitioner.
As the Sandiganbayan and the Court
saw it then, petitioner's guilt was duly
established by 1) lone prosecution
6
witness
Josephine
Angeles'
testimony that no such training

programs were held at the designated

places 7 , and 2) petitioner's failure to
present a single receipt to support due
disbursement of the P200,000.00,
resulting from his former lawyers'
insistence in filing a demurrer to
evidence despite prior leave for that
purpose having been denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
To avert his looming imprisonment and
with full awareness that he has
nothing in our Rules of Court to rely
on, petitioner takes a novel recourse
by filing the instant "Omnibus Motion
For Leave to Vacate First Motion For
Reconsideration In The Light Of The
Present
Developments
And
To
Consider Evidence Presented Herein
And To Set Aside Conviction". 8 This
was filed on petitioner's behalf by a
new counsel, as shown by the "Entry
of Appearance and Motion For Leave
To Submit Attached Omnibus Motion"
filed on June 27, 1994 9 after
petitioner's former lawyers withdrew
their appearance. 10
In this Omnibus Motion, petitioner, for
the first time, seeks to be relieved
from what he considers as the serious
and costly mistake of his former
lawyers 11 in demurring to the
prosecution evidence after court leave
was denied, the effect of which
deprived him of presenting before the
Sandiganbayan
the
pieces
of
documentary evidence that would
have completely belied the accusation
against him. Annexed to the Omnibus
Motion are photocopies of the list of
expenses and receipts 12 in support of
the liquidation voucher (Exhibit "E")
showing due disbursement of the
P200,000.00 received for training
programs actually conducted the
original records of which are all along

kept in the Records Section of the

Bureau of Plants Industry as per letter
of the Bureau Director Emillano P.
Gianzon 13 and which are readily
available. Petitioner now appeals to
the Court's sense of justice and equity
that these documents be summoned
and appreciated by the Court itself or
by
the
Sandiganbayan
after
remanding the case thereto, if only to
give him the final chance to prove his
innocence.
When required by the Court to
comment on the "Omnibus Motion" 14 ,
the Solicitor General, representing
respondents, was granted no less than
eight (8) extensions to do so 15 , the
last one with warning that no further
extension will be given. None was
filed. Instead, the Solicitor General
filed a ninth (9th) motion for extension
which was denied considering the
warning contained in the eighth (8th)
extension. 16 The tenth (10th) motion
for extension was merely noted by the
Court. 17Thereafter, the Court in a
Resolution dated August 15, 1995
required the Solicitor General's Office
to 1) SHOW CAUSE why it should not
be disciplinarily dealt with for its
repeated failure to file comment and
2) file its comment, both within ten
(10) days from notice. In compliance
therewith, the Solicitor General's
Office
filed
its
Comment
and
Explanation. The Court accepted such
Explanation, noted the Comment filed
and required petitioner to file a Reply
thereto within ten (10) days from
notice in a Resolution dated October
10, 1995. A Reply was thus filed by
petitioner in due time.
The
Solicitor
General's
Office
advances the following arguments in
its Comment:
1. Petitioner's "Omnibus Motion" is

violative of the Court's adopted policy

on second motions for reconsideration
as expressed in a Resolution dated
April 7, 1988 stating that:
Where the Court has resolved
to
deny
a
motion
for
reconsideration and decrees
the denial to be final, no
motion for leave to file second
motion for reconsideration
shall be entertained.
2. Petitioner is bound by the mistake
of his former lawyers, assuming that
the latter indeed committed one.
3. Even granting the petitioner is not
bound by his former lawyer's mistake,
the documentary evidence petitioner
now attempts to present would
nonetheless not cast at all a
reasonable doubt on his guilt for
violation of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, to warrant a reversal of
his conviction by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner's Reply, on the other hand,
contains
the
following
counterarguments.
1. The "Omnibus Motion" is not
violative of the prohibition on second
motions for reconsideration since such
motion does not seek leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration but
for leave to vacate the first Motion For
Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1994
and in its stead to admit the "Omnibus
Motion" containing the petitioner's
documentary
evidence
and
arguments. Thus, petitioner's Motion
to vacate the first motion for
reconsideration is but necessary to his
defense that he should be excused
from the mistake of his former
lawyers.
2. Adherence to the general rule that
the client is bound by his counsel's
mistake is to deprive petitioner of his
liberty through a technicality.

3. The pieces of evidence petitioner is

now presenting for appreciation either
by this Court or the Sandiganbayan
will, contrary to the OSG's claim,
disprove his guilt of the charge
levelled against him.
After carefully considering anew
petitioner's plight and keeping in mind
that substantial rights must ultimately
reign supreme over technicalities, this
Court is swayed to reconsider.
The power of this Court to suspend its
own rules or to except a particular
case from its operations whenever the
purposes of justice require it, cannot
be questioned. 18 In not a few
instances, this Court ordered a new
trial in criminal cases on grounds not
mentioned in the
statute,
viz:
retraction of witness, 19 negligence or
incompetency
of
counsel,
20
improvident plea of guilty, 21
disqualification of an attorney de
oficio to represent the accused in trial
court, 22 and where a judgment was
rendered on a stipulation of facts
entered into by both the prosecution
and the defense. 23 Similarly, in a
considerable host of cases has this
prerogative been invoked to relax
even procedural rules of the most
mandatory character in terms of
compliance, such as the period to
appeal. Take for instance the relatively
recent case of "PNB, et. al. v. CA, et.
al." 24where the Court once again
extended this liberality of allowing an
appeal filed beyond the reglementary
15-day period. It should be noted that
Mr. Justice Melo, while dissenting
therein, 25 nonetheless made this
crucial observation:
The majority opinion, with due
respect would suspend the
rule actually the law for
what it says are "petitioners"

detailed demonstration of the

merits of the appeal' without,
however, delving on such socalled "merits". The simple
merits of one's case, lost
through neglect, to my mind
should not automatically call
for
the
suspension
of
applicable rules, laws, or
jurisprudence. At the very
least, before this may be
done, transcendental matters,
surely, life, liberty, or the
security of the State, should
be at risk, but obviously, not
simple matters which can be
reduced
to
pesos
and
centavos.
(Emphasis
supplied).
Clearly, when "transcendental
matters" like life, liberty or State
security are involved, suspension
of the rules is likely to be
welcomed more generously.
Petitioner's
present
dilemma
is
certainly not something reducible to
pesos and centavos. No less than his
liberty is at stake here. And he is just
about to lose it simply because his
former lawyers pursued a carelessly
contrived procedural strategy of
insisting on what has already become
an
imprudent
remedy,
as
aforediscussed, which thus forbade
petitioner from offering his evidence
all the while available for presentation
before the Sandiganbayan. Under the
circumstances, higher interests of
justice and equity demand that
petitioner be not penalized for the
costly importunings of his previous
lawyers based on the same principles
why this Court had, on many
occasions where it granted new trial,
excused parties from the negligence
or mistakes of counsel. 26 To cling to

the general rule in this case is only to

condone rather than rectify a serious
injustice to petitioners whose only
fault was to repose his faith and
entrust his innocence to his previous
lawyers. Consequently, the receipts
and other documents constituting his
evidence which he failed to present in
the Sandiganbayan are entitled to be
appreciated, however, by that forum
and not this Court, for the general rule
is that we are not triers of facts.
Without prejudging the result of such
appreciation, petitioner's documentary
evidences prima facie appear strong
when
reckoned
with
the
lone
prosecution
witness
Angeles'
testimony, indicating that official
training
programs
were
indeed
actually conducted and that the
P200,000.00
cash
advance
he
received were spent entirely for those
programs. In this connection, the
Court in "US v. Dungca", 27 had
occasion to state that:
. . ., the rigor of the rule might
in an exceptional case be
relaxed, this would be done
only under very exceptional
circumstances, and in cases
where a review of the whole
record taken together with
the evidence improvidently
omitted would clearly justify
the
conclusion
that
the
omission had resulted in the
conviction of one innocent of
the crime charged. (Emphasis
supplied).
Let us not forget that the rules of
procedure should be viewed as mere
tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote susbstantial

justice, must always be avoided. Even

the Rules of Court envision this
liberality. 28 This power to suspend or
even disregard the rules can be so
pervasive and encompassing so as to
alter even that which this Court itself
has already declared to be final, as we
are now compelled to do in this case.
And this is not without additional
basis. For in "Ronquillo v. Marasigan",
29
the Court held that:
The fact that the decision . . .
has become final, does not
preclude a modification or an
alteration thereof because
even with the finality of
judgment, when its execution
becomes impossible or unjust,
as in the instant case, it may
be modified or altered to
harmonize the same with
justice
and
the
facts.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Rules of Court was conceived
and promulgated to set forth
guidelines in the dispensation of
justice but not to bind and chain
the hand that dispenses it, for
otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical
rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
That is precisely why courts in
rendering real justice have always
been, as they in fact ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the
norm that when on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat
against substantive rights, and
not the other way around. Truly
then,
technicalities,
in
the
appropriate language of Justice
Makalintal, "should give way to
the realities of the situation". 30
And the grim reality petitioner will
surely face, if we do not
compassionately bend backwards

and flex technicalities in this

instance, is the disgrace and
misery of incarceration for a crime
which
he
might
not
have
committed after all. More so,
considering
that
petitioner's
record as public servant remained
unscathed until his prosecution.
Indeed, "while guilt shall not
escape, innocence should not
suffer". 31
In resume, this is a situation where a
rigid application of rules of procedure
must bow to the overriding goal of
courts of justice to render justice
where justice is due to secure to
every individual all possible legal
means to prove his innocence of a
crime of which he is charged. To
borrow Justice Padilla's words in
"People v. CA, et. al.",32 (where
substantial justice was upheld anew in
allowing therein accused's appeal
despite the withdrawal of his notice of
appeal and his subsequent escape
from confinement) that "if only to
truly make the courts really genuine
instruments in the administration of
justice",
the
Court
believes
it
imperative, in order to assure against
any possible miscarriage of justice
resulting from petitioner's failure to
present his crucial evidence through
no fault of his, that this case be
remanded to the Sandiganbayan for
reception
and
appreciation
of
petitioner's evidence.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's "Omnibus
Motion" is GRANTED and the Court's
April 12, 1994 Decision and June 16,
1994
Resolution
are
hereby
RECONSIDERED. Accordingly, let this
case
be
REMANDED
to
the
Sandiganbayan for reception and
appreciation of petitioner's evidence.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.