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Counterfactual Game: Turning points in peace talks between the Guomindang (GMD) and
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1944-45
Cody Colvin

In summer 1944, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a personal envoy, Gen. Patrick
Hurley, to China, to ensure cooperation between Chiang Kai-shek and the USs Gen. Joseph
Stilwell, whom had been tasked with overseeing several Chinese armies in the fight against
Japan.1
Instead, Hurleys attention quickly turned to the increasingly-nebulous relationship
between Chiangs Nationalists and Mao Zedongs Communists. The two forces had united to
resist Japanese encroachment, but seemed increasingly opposed on nearly every other domestic
issue. Still, as the US would note, open hostilities between the two had largely ceased, mostly
due to the presence of a common enemy; this, coupled with the Chinese Communist Partys
(CCP) recent commitment to diplomacy,2 gave the US reason to be hopeful for a peaceful
resolution.
The American government thus pressured Chiang to approve the Dixie Mission, an
attempt by US diplomats to establish relations with Chinese Communists at their capital in Yenan.
This mission appeared successful, producing on 7 November a Hurley-approved CCP proposal
for a new government.3 It called upon the national government to reorganize itself into an antiJapanese coalition government, one which would employ representatives from multiple parties;
furthermore, it demanded that the GMDs National Military Council be reorganized to include
every anti-Japanese army. The coalition government and the NMC would share supplies from
foreign powers equally.4

Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956), 280.

Directive of the CC on Diplomatic Work (18 August 1944) in Saich, Tony, and Bingzhang Yang. The Rise to Power of the Chinese
Communist Party: Documents and Analysis. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996. p. 1211.
3

Saich, Chinese Communist Party, p. 1186.

The China White Paper, August 1949, p. 638-639.

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The general returned to the GMDs capital at Chongqing with this agreement, but the
Nationalists refused it. On 22 November, they responded with their own proposal: rather than
participating in a coalition government, the CCP would have to subjugate itself to the existing
government, and rather than reorganizing the National Military Council, the CCP would simply
place its troops under the existing one.5 Naturally, the Communists refused this counteroffer.
In these Chongqing GMD-Hurley-CCP negotiations of November 1944 lies a turning point,
which we shall call Turning Point 1. What might have happened had the either party accepted
the others terms, or at the very least, worked with each other in late 1944 to create a
compromise? Could the Civil War have been averted, or at the very least, postponed? The GMD
allegedly judged the CCPs attempts to negotiate a ruse, devised in order to supplant them;6 what
mightve happened had this notion not arisen? Would decreased (or increased) US involvement in
the CCPs proposal have made it less suspicious?
This interaction only worked to drive the two sides further apart. Although both parties did
agree to a political consultative conference, supposed to take place at a later date, CCP leaders
analyzed the Nationalists with emboldened skepticism. As Communist leader Zhou Enlai argued
before leaving Chonqing in February, the GMDs unwillingness to relinquish its one-party system
essentially constituted an outright refusal of the CCPs attempts to cooperate.7 Conversely,
Chiang Kai-shek argued that the war with Japan necessitated a strong central government with
only one party, and that the upcoming conference would offer a chance to create a post-war
democracy, but that wartime efficiency took precedent.8 Still, the CCP renounced the Political
Consultative Conference arguing, among other things, that it would have merely prolonged
substantive negotiations and Mao continued to call publicly for a semi-democratic coalition
government, which the GMD never approved.9
5

Ibid, p. 675.

Ibid, p. 82.

Statement of Comrade Zhou Enlai Before Leaving Chongqing (15 February 1945) in Saich, p. 1215.

Furuya, Keiji, and Chun-ming Chang. Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times. New York: St. John's University, 1981. p. 848.

Mao Zedong, On Coalition Government (24 April 1945). In Saich. p. 1216.

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The two sides met again in what we might call Turning Point 2, occurring in August 1945
following Japans surrender. After intense disagreement over whom would claim the northeastern
territory abandoned by withdrawing Japanese forces and after the US seemed to declare their
commitment to the Nationalists when they airlifted GMD forces to the region, attempting to beat
the Communist advance10 Mao agreed to attend peace talks with Chiang in Chongqing.11
There the CCP drastically reduced its demands. It withdrew its previous request for a
coalition government and high command, agreeing once more to a Political Consultative
Conference, and made numerous other concessions.12 The US and USSR played prominent roles
in mediating these discussions, with the latter scrambling to secure its own territory in the
northeast. However, while the negotiations broke significant ground, they failed to address the
conflicts most pressing issue: who would receive the northeastern land being vacated by the
Japanese. Indeed, the sides were allegedly close to determining an agreement, but ultimately
exited the negotiations without a resolution.13
Part of the blame for their failure to reach an agreement might lie with then-Ambassador
Patrick Hurley. Respected at the very least as a connection to US power, both sides requested his
presence in the Chongqing negotiations. However, Hurley stressed the importance of reaching an
agreement on basic overall principles, leaving the details for later,14 and as a result, the two
parties decided not to negotiate details regarding Manchuria. Whether he meant to stall for the
Nationalists so they might move into the northeast regardless, or whether he truly believed that
there would be enough time to work these issues out in the future, remains unknown. However,
one must ask: what might have happened had Hurley either remained silent, or encouraged both
sides to reach an agreement about the Japanese withdrawal then and there? The Communists
were at their weakest, so why not press the issue?
10

Tsou, Tang. America's Failure in China: 1941-50. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1967. p. 305.

11

Saich, Chinese Communist Party, p. 1190.

12

Tsou, Americas Failure in China, p. 319.

13

Ibid. p. 324

14

Ibid. p. 321.

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With no resolution in Manchuria, both sides continued to clash, and in November 1945,
Hurley was replaced by General George C. Marshall.15 In January 1946, Marshall successfully
convinced both sides to meet once more in what we might call Turning Point 3. Marshall, along
with the CCPs Zhou Enlai and the GMDs Zhang Qun, convened a political consultative
conference in Chongqing. They succeeded in resolving most of the parties qualms, and on 25
February agreed to large-scale troop reductions.16 However, they created no organization to
ensure the implementation of these reductions, and with the USs reluctance to involve itself
militarily, they never occurred.17 Thus, we must further ask: what might have happened if the US
had enforced these agreements? What if either side had actually committed themselves to this
resolution? What if the USSR had not moved so successfully into the northeast, and had thereby
made the situation less urgent?
Conflict continued, and though various methods of Soviet intervention gave the CCP a
considerable advantage in taking the countryside, the Nationalists also won significant gains.18
Indeed, in June Chiang felt confident in the GMDs chances of victory, but Marshall once again
pressured both sides into peace talks. The Generalissimo would later write that this June 1946
ceasefire allowed the Communists to stall, meanwhile building their strength, and that USimposed restraints on GMD expansion effectively doomed the party.19 Here, in these final peace
talks, lies Turning Point 4. What mightve happened had the GMD defied the United States and
attacked the CCP in June? Would the USSR have further reinforced the Communists, and would
it have been enough? Furthermore, Chiang refused an invitation from Stalin to meet Moscow;20
what mightve happened had he attempted to cooperate with the Soviets?

15

Ibid. p. 349.

16

Saich, Chinese Communist Party, p. 1194.

17

Ibid. p. 1194.

18

Furuya, Chiang Kai-Shek, p. 874.

19

Chiang, Kai-shek. Soviet Russia in China. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957. p. 117.

20

Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek, p. 880.

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A different resolution in any of these four turning points could have changed the worlds
international landscape completely. Had the Nationalists successfully defeated the Communists,
or at least negotiated with them to secure long-term peace, the Peoples Republic of China might
never have existed. Decisive action by either the US or the USSR in the region, too, might have
led to these changes, and at the very least, mightve significantly altered the timeline and
conclusion of the Cold War. Regardless, it should be noted that a different resolution at any of
these four turning points could have led to a completely different version of modern China, and
thus completely different versions of East Asia and the modern world.
I have therefore created a counterfactual game scenario which allows individuals to
explore these alternative outcomes. Playing as as GMD, CCP, US, and USSR negotiators,
players actively participate in negotiations at our four various turning points, played out in four
sessions, and receive numerous chances to alter Chinese history. This game subscribes to a
philosophy of minimal rewrites, but in order to ensure a seamless transition from session to
session, allows certain historical figures to participate counterfactually in all four sessions; for
example, while Patrick Hurley resigned in favor of George C. Marshall, players have the
opportunity to continue with Hurley throughout the entirety of the game if he is not pressured to
resign. Since the game relies primarily on faction goals rather than individual goals, their play isnt
affected by the uniqueness of their role, and thus this rewrite remains minimal.
Nationalists, Communists, US Diplomats, and USSR Diplomats comprise player factions.
At the outset of the game, each participant receives a list of secret faction goals, which I detail
later in this summary. Throughout the game, factions also receive prewritten communiques from
their respective leaders and governments with new information, developments, and commands.
Factions receive game points if their factional goals are met, and the faction with the most game
points at the conclusion of the final conference achieves victory. It should be noted that actually
achieving a lasting peace agreement is designed to be especially difficult; as it wouldve been
historically, the desire to win will often override the desire for peace. Indeed, just as in any conflict,
if there is any point where any faction feels especially close to victory, they will likely choose to

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advance their own goals at the cost of peace. This tension between ambition and peace serves
as one of the primary lessons of the game: while many individuals in a civil war might indeed want
a settlement at various points, victory at a low cost is usually preferred. Most students will enter
the game planning to conclude a quick peace agreement and avoid bloodshed; immediately they
will realize, however, that their factional goals prohibit them from doing so. The difficulty of
concluding a quick and decisive peace agreement should mirror that of actual history, where
competing interests and powerful suspicions often prevented compromise.
For example, see the faction goals of the Chinese Communist Party. These players first
read a primary source detailing the 1927 Shanghai Massacre and its aftermath,21 and thus begin
the game questioning the GMDs intentions. They also receive a report detailing their impressive
military strength,22 which estimates that the war with Japan will soon come to an end. The CCPs
first goal is to develop, in conjunction with the United States (as per the Dixie Mission), a peace
agreement with the GMD based on the points enumerated in the actual aforementioned
document:23 coalition government, coalition high command, and foreign aid distributed between
the two. Later, when the Japanese withdraw from Manchuria (a predetermined event), the CCP
should attempt to secure settlement and disarmament rights. The CCP wins outright, regardless
of game points, if the Nationalists withdraw completely from Manchuria, and agree to a coalition
government at the end of session four. Roles might include negotiators Zhou Enlai and Lin Boqu,
but do not include Mao, as his face-to-face interactions with the GMD were heavily limited, and he
serves the game more effectively as an external force controlled by the gamemaster. The
gamemaster may thus write letters from Mao to his negotiators as needed.
The Guomindang seek to counter each Communist demand. From the outset, however,
the GMD faces increasing pressure from the US to conclude a peace agreement, and faces the
loss of US-provided resources if this demand is not met. At first, the GMD should fight for an

21

Chen Dixius Report to the CCPs Fifth National Congress (29 April 1927). in Saich, p. 228.

22

Directive of the CC on Reforming and Training the Military (1 July 1944) in Saich, p. 1207.

23

See note 4.

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agreement which includes the survival of the one-party system, the subjugation of the CCP under
that system, and the maintenance of the status quo regarding Nationalist military control. When
the Japanese withdraw from Manchuria, the GMD should attempt to work with the US to secure
the vacated land before the Communists can. The Nationalists win outright, regardless of gamepoints, if they take Manchuria completely, and the CCP agrees to subjugate itself to the national
government at the end of session four. Roles include Chiang Kai-shek who, unlike Mao,
involved himself considerably in the Chongqing negotiations, and also unlike Mao, was largely
limited in power by US diplomats and chief GMD negotiators24 Wang Shijie and Zhang Qun.
Conversely, US Diplomats must, above all else, prevent further hostilities between the
CMD and CCP. The US representative should work closely with the GMD, and should use the
USs monetary and logistical support as leverage in case the GMD attempts to act violently
toward the Communists. As was the case in actuality, the US is not authorized to offer direct
military assistance in the case of a large-scale civil war, but can assist in a number of other ways,
including troop transport.25 Throughout the game, diplomats receive prewritten letters from the US
government with various directives, although the gamemaster may also write and send his or her
own notes. Due to the precariousness of the USs position, it possesses no way to win the game
outright without collecting a plurality of game points.
To serve as checks against US power in the region, enter the USSR Diplomats who, due
to their minimal historical involvement in face-to-face negotiations, receive more creative license
than any other group; in our scenario, they attend each peace talk. However, the significance of
Soviet involvement in these events cannot be understated, as its policy in Manchuria actually
scrippled the Nationalists; after concluding peace agreements with the GMD, it invaded the
Chinese north, and when forced to withdraw, prolonged the process significantly, allowing
Communist forces to occupy a large portion of the region.26 In our game, the USSRs first priority
24

Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek, p. 845.

25

Letter from President Truman to General Marshall in Holdridge, John H. U.S. Relations with China. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept.
of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Editorial Division, 1981.
26

Tsou, Americas Failure in China, p. 337.

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is to declare public support for a coalition government, as Stalin did,27 and upon Japans
withdrawal, move into Manchuria. If the Soviets face enough pressure to withdraw the point at
which they would do so will be noted in the games instructions, with the gamemaster informing
the Soviet diplomat of this decision policy should shift toward supporting the CCP, and
prolonging Soviet withdrawal until Communist forces can move into formerly occupied areas. The
USSR wins outright if at the end of session four it possess all of Manchuria. The main character
role for the Soviets is Appolon A. Petrov, ambassador to China in 1946.28
The primary method of negotiation in this game is the written agreement. Factions will
earn game points based on how advantageously agreements in each session affect them, but it
should be noted that only the final session is binding. Indeed, relations between these groups
vacillated significantly in 1944 and 1945, and that should be reflected in these deliberations; how
each side ends up is most important.
If any agreements or interactions occur which lead to military conflict, the gamemaster
must work in accordance with the gamebook to determine an outcome. Numerous battles might
occur between factions or with Japans withdrawing forces, and most of these conflicts lead to
modified die rolls. These will in turn determine each sides leverage in subsequent negotiations.
Additionally, a significant number of similar events are predetermined, including Allied victory in
World War II and, as mentioned, the subsequent withdrawal of Japanese forces from China. Many
of Stalin, Truman and Maos responses will be scripted, but the gamemaster can write and send
notes from these figures at any time.
Ultimately, the goal of the game is to create a framework which adheres closely to
historical fact, but allows participants to alter history at moments when such alterations were
highly possible. Players will thus learn not only about a significant moment in East Asian history,
but also of human agency in general, gaining an appreciation for those turning points where, had
a small detail or decision been altered, history might have been rewritten. Rather than simply
27

28

Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946. New York: Columbia University Press. 1958. p. 209.

Garver, John W. Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988. p. 212.

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reading an account of these events, participants will do something only counterfactual games can
allow: they will become their roles, think like them, and come to these conclusions on their own.