Bagatsing vs Ramirez

The chief question to be decided in this case is what law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance
enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which
requires publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code
(P.D. No. 231), which only demands publication after approval.
On June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, "AN ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE
RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES." The petitioner City Mayor, Ramon D. Bagatsing, approved the ordinance on June 15, 1974.
On February 17, 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced Civil Case
96787 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by respondent Judge, seeking the
declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 for the reason that (a) the publication requirement under the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with; (b) the Market Committee was not
given any participation in the enactment of the ordinance, as envisioned by Republic Act 6039; (c) Section
3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated; and (d) the ordinance would violate
Presidential Decree No. 7 of September 30, 1972 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on
livestock and animal products.
Resolving the accompanying prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, respondent Judge
issued an order on March 11, 1975, denying the plea for failure of the respondent Federation of Manila
Market Vendors, Inc. to exhaust the administrative remedies outlined in the Local Tax Code.
After due hearing on the merits, respondent Judge rendered its decision on August 29, 1975, declaring
the nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila on the primary ground of non-compliance with the
requirement of publication under the Revised City Charter. Respondent Judge ruled:
There is, therefore, no question that the ordinance in question was not published at all in two daily
newspapers of general circulation in the City of Manila before its enactment. Neither was it published in
the same manner after approval, although it was posted in the legislative hall and in all city public markets
and city public libraries. There being no compliance with the mandatory requirement of publication before
and after approval, the ordinance in question is invalid and, therefore, null and void.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the adverse decision, stressing that (a) only a post-publication is
required by the Local Tax Code; and (b) private respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
before instituting an action in court.
On September 26, 1975, respondent Judge denied the motion. Forthwith, petitioners brought the matter
to Us through the present petition for review on certiorari. We find the petition impressed with merits.
1. The nexus of the present controversy is the apparent conflict between the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila and the Local Tax Code on the manner of publishing a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal
Board of Manila. For, while Section 17 of the Revised Charter provides:
Each proposed ordinance shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, and
shall not be discussed or enacted by the Board until after the third day following such publication. * * *
Each approved ordinance * * * shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the
city, within ten days after its approval; and shall take effect and be in force on and after the twentieth day
following its publication, if no date is fixed in the ordinance.

Section 43 of the Local Tax Code directs:

Within ten days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio
ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges shall be published for three consecutive days
in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government, or posted in
the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction
of the local government. In either case, copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio ordinances shall
be furnished the treasurers of the respective component and mother units of a local government for
dissemination.
In other words, while the Revised Charter of the City of Manila requires publication before the enactment
of the ordinance and after the approval thereof in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city,
the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication after the approval of " ordinances levying or imposing
taxes, fees or other charges" either in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction
of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two
other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Petitioners' compliance
with the Local Tax Code rather than with the Revised Charter of the City spawned this litigation.
There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to
the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local
governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and
special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class. 1 And the rule commonly said is that
a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and
the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of
the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. 2 However, the rule
readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general
statute treats in particular. The exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and
scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing
taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it
approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular.
There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular
provision. 3 Special provision governs. 4 This is especially true where the law containing the particular
provision was enacted later than the one containing the general provision. The City Charter of Manila was
promulgated on June 18, 1949 as against the Local Tax Code which was decreed on June 1, 1973. The
law-making power cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems
upon the same subject, or to leave in force provisions of a prior law by which the new will of the legislating
power may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a useless and Idle
ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility. 5
The case of City of Manila v. Teotico 6 is opposite. In that case, Teotico sued the City of Manila for
damages arising from the injuries he suffered when he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin
or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. The City of Manila denied liability on the basis of the City Charter (R.A.
409) exempting the City of Manila from any liability for damages or injury to persons or property arising
from the failure of the city officers to enforce the provisions of the charter or any other law or ordinance, or
from negligence of the City Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce the provisions of the charter or of any other law or ordinance. Upon the other hand, Article 2189
of the Civil Code makes cities liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any persons by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under
their control or supervision. On review, the Court held the Civil Code controlling. It is true that, insofar as
its territorial application is concerned, the Revised City Charter is a special law and the subject matter of
the two laws, the Revised City Charter establishes a general rule of liability arising from negligence in
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription for

liability due to defective streets in particular. In the same manner, the Revised Charter of the City
prescribes a rule for the publication of "ordinance" in general, while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule
for the publication of "ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other charges in particular.
In fact, there is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special or specific act by a
general or broad one. 7 A charter provision may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute,
and where a statute is controlling, it must be read into the charter notwithstanding any particular charter
provision. 8 A subsequent general law similarly applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter
provision, for the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of
the state. 9 A chartered city is not an independent sovereignty. The state remains supreme in all matters
not purely local. Otherwise stated, a charter must yield to the constitution and general laws of the state, it
is to have read into it that general law which governs the municipal corporation and which the corporation
cannot set aside but to which it must yield. When a city adopts a charter, it in effect adopts as part of its
charter general law of such character. 10
2. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is strongly asserted by petitioners as having
been violated by private respondent in bringing a direct suit in court. This is because Section 47 of the
Local Tax Code provides that any question or issue raised against the legality of any tax ordinance, or
portion thereof, shall be referred for opinion to the city fiscal in the case of tax ordinance of a city. The
opinion of the city fiscal is appealable to the Secretary of Justice, whose decision shall be final and
executory unless contested before a competent court within thirty (30) days. But, the petition below plainly
shows that the controversy between the parties is deeply rooted in a pure question of law: whether it is
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila or the Local Tax Code that should govern the publication of the
tax ordinance. In other words, the dispute is sharply focused on the applicability of the Revised City
Charter or the Local Tax Code on the point at issue, and not on the legality of the imposition of the tax.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of
exceptions. Where the question litigated upon is purely a legal one, the rule does not apply. 11 The
principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may
and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage. 12
3. It is maintained by private respondent that the subject ordinance is not a "tax ordinance," because the
imposition of rentals, permit fees, tolls and other fees is not strictly a taxing power but a revenue-raising
function, so that the procedure for publication under the Local Tax Code finds no application. The
pretense bears its own marks of fallacy. Precisely, the raising of revenues is the principal object of
taxation. Under Section 5, Article XI of the New Constitution, "Each local government unit shall have the
power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such provisions as may be
provided by law." 13 And one of those sources of revenue is what the Local Tax Code points to in
particular: "Local governments may collect fees or rentals for the occupancy or use of public markets and
premises * * *." 14 They can provide for and regulate market stands, stalls and privileges, and, also, the
sale, lease or occupancy thereof. They can license, or permit the use of, lease, sell or otherwise dispose
of stands, stalls or marketing privileges. 15
It is a feeble attempt to argue that the ordinance violates Presidential Decree No. 7, dated September 30,
1972, insofar as it affects livestock and animal products, because the said decree prescribes the
collection of other fees and charges thereon "with the exception of ante-mortem and post-mortem
inspection fees, as well as the delivery, stockyard and slaughter fees as may be authorized by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources." 16 Clearly, even the exception clause of the decree itself
permits the collection of the proper fees for livestock. And the Local Tax Code (P.D. 231, July 1, 1973)
authorizes in its Section 31: "Local governments may collect fees for the slaughter of animals and the use
of corrals * * * "
4. The non-participation of the Market Committee in the enactment of Ordinance No. 7522 supposedly in
accordance with Republic Act No. 6039, an amendment to the City Charter of Manila, providing that "the
market committee shall formulate, recommend and adopt, subject to the ratification of the municipal

board, and approval of the mayor, policies and rules or regulation repealing or maneding existing
provisions of the market code" does not infect the ordinance with any germ of invalidity. 17 The function of
the committee is purely recommendatory as the underscored phrase suggests, its recommendation is
without binding effect on the Municipal Board and the City Mayor. Its prior acquiescence of an intended or
proposed city ordinance is not a condition sine qua non before the Municipal Board could enact such
ordinance. The native power of the Municipal Board to legislate remains undisturbed even in the slightest
degree. It can move in its own initiative and the Market Committee cannot demur. At most, the Market
Committee may serve as a legislative aide of the Municipal Board in the enactment of city ordinances
affecting the city markets or, in plain words, in the gathering of the necessary data, studies and the
collection of consensus for the proposal of ordinances regarding city markets. Much less could it be said
that Republic Act 6039 intended to delegate to the Market Committee the adoption of regulatory
measures for the operation and administration of the city markets. Potestas delegata non delegare potest.
5. Private respondent bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed ordinance are diverted to
the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been
let by the City of Manila to the said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract." The
assumption is of course saddled on erroneous premise. The fees collected do not go direct to the private
coffers of the corporation. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made for the corporation but for the purpose of
raising revenues for the city. That is the object it serves. The entrusting of the collection of the fees does
not destroy the public purpose of the ordinance. So long as the purpose is public, it does not matter
whether the agency through which the money is dispensed is public or private. The right to tax depends
upon the ultimate use, purpose and object for which the fund is raised. It is not dependent on the nature
or character of the person or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it. The
people may be taxed for a public purpose, although it be under the direction of an individual or private
corporation. 18
Nor can the ordinance be stricken down as violative of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act because the increased rates of market stall fees as levied by the ordinance will necessarily
inure to the unwarranted benefit and advantage of the corporation. 19 We are concerned only with the
issue whether the ordinance in question is intra vires. Once determined in the affirmative, the measure
may not be invalidated because of consequences that may arise from its enforcement. 20

Grego vs COMELEC
The instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition impugns the resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPA No. 95-212 dated July 31, 1996, dismissing petitioners motion for
reconsideration of an earlier resolution rendered by the COMELECs First Division on October 6, 1995,
which also dismissed the petition for disqualificationi[1] filed by petitioner Wilmer Grego against private
respondent Humberto Basco.
The essential and undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court
upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas.
The Court held:
WHEREFORE, FINDING THE RESPONDENT DEPUTY SHERIFF HUMBERTO BASCO OF THE CITY
COURT OF MANILA GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE FOR THE SECOND TIME, HE IS
HEREBY DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS
AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL

GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED

OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.

1.
The respondent cannot be disqualified on the ground of Section 40 paragraph b of the Local
Government Code because the Tordesillas decision is barred by laches, prescription, res judicata, lis
pendens, bar by prior judgment, law of the case and stare decisis;

x x x x x x x x xii[2]
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during
the January 18, 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office.
After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national elections. Again, he
succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the six (6) City Councilors. However, his victory this
time did not remain unchallenged. In the midst of his successful re-election, he found himself besieged by
lawsuits of his opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position.
One such case was a petition for quo warrantoiii[3] filed before the COMELEC by Cenon Ronquillo,
another candidate for councilor in the same district, who alleged Bascos ineligibility to be elected
councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. At about the same time, two more cases were also
commenced by Honorio Lopez II in the Office of the Ombudsman and in the Department of Interior and
Local Government.iv[4] All these challenges were, however, dismissed, thus, paving the way for Bascos
continued stay in office.
Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted and ran again for councilor in the
May 8, 1995, local elections seeking a third and final term. Once again, he beat the odds by emerging
sixth in a battle for six councilor seats. As in the past, however, his right to office was again contested. On
May 13, 1995, petitioner Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City of
Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Bascos disqualification, for the
suspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected
Councilor of Manilas Second District.
On the same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) was duly furnished with a
copy of the petition. The other members of the BOC learned about this petition only two days later.
The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda.
Before the parties could comply with this directive, however, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco on
May 17, 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several
candidates who vied for the seats.v[5] Basco immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma.
Ruby Bithao-Camarista, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.
In view of such proclamation, petitioner lost no time in filing an Urgent Motion seeking to annul what he
considered to be an illegal and hasty proclamation made on May 17, 1995, by the Manila City BOC. He
reiterated Bascos disqualification and prayed anew that candidate Romualdo S. Maranan be declared the
winner. As expected, Basco countered said motion by filing his Urgent Opposition to: Urgent Motion (with
Reservation to Submit Answer and/or Motion to Dismiss Against Instant Petition for Disqualification with
Temporary Restraining Order).
On June 5, 1995, Basco filed his Motion to Dismiss Serving As Answer pursuant to the reservation he
made earlier, summarizing his contentions and praying as follows:
Respondent thus now submits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief for the following reasons:

2.
Section 4[0] par. B of the Local Government Code may not be validly applied to persons who were
dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive
legislation which impairs vested rights. It is also a class legislation and unconstitutional on the account.
3.
Respondent had already been proclaimed. And the petition being a preproclamation contest under
the Marquez v. Comelec Ruling, supra, it should be dismissed by virtue of said pronouncement.
4.
Respondents three-time election as candidate for councilor constitutes implied pardon by the
people of previous misconduct (Aguinaldo v. Comelec G.R. 105128; Rice v. State 161 SCRA 401;
Montgomery v. Newell 40 SW 2d 4181; People v. Bashaw 130 P. 2nd 237, etc.).
5.
As petition to nullify certificate of candidacy, the instant case has prescribed; it was premature as an
election protest and it was not brought by a proper party in interest as such protest.:

PRAYER
WHEREFORE it is respectfully prayed that the instant case be dismissed on instant motion to dismiss the
prayer for restraining order denied (sic). If this Honorable Office is not minded to dismiss, it is respectfully
prayed that instant motion be considered as respondents answer. All other reliefs and remedies just and
proper in the premises are likewise hereby prayed for.
After the parties respective memoranda had been filed, the COMELECs First Division resolved to dismiss
the petition for disqualification on October 6, 1995, ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the
Supreme Court on respondent Basco on October 31, 1981 was wiped away and condoned by the
electorate which elected him and that on account of Bascos proclamation on May 17, 1965, as the sixth
duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila, the petition would no longer be viable. vi[6]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the COMELEC en banc in its
assailed resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996.vii[7] Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had
been removed from office as a result of an administrative case pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (the Code), which took effect on January 1,
1992.viii[8]
Petitioner wants the Court to likewise resolve the following issues, namely:
1.
Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed
from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992;
2.
Whether or not private respondents election in 1988, 1992 and in 1995 as City Councilor of
Manila wiped away and condoned the administrative penalty against him;

3.
Whether or not private respondents proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17,
1995, while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC, is void ab initio; and

(b)

Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992.

4.
Whether or not Romualdo S. Maranan, who placed seventh among the candidates for City
Councilor of Manila, may be declared a winner pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646.
While we do not necessarily agree with the conclusions and reasons of the COMELEC in the assailed
resolution, nonetheless, we find no grave abuse of discretion on its part in dismissing the petition for
disqualification. The instant petition must, therefore, fail.
We shall discuss the issues raised by petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from office
before it took effect on January 1, 1992?
Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code under which petitioner anchors Bascos alleged
disqualification to run as City Councilor states:

The rule is:

xxx xxx xxx
x x x Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which
do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes
are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings,
unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the
enactment. x x x (Jones vs. Summers, 105 Cal. App. 51, 286 Pac. 1093; U.S. vs. Whyel 28 (2d) 30;
Espiritu v. Cipriano, 55 SCRA 533 [1974], cited in Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 [1974]. See
also Puzon v. Abellera, 169 SCRA 789 [1989]; Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines v.
Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 100599, April 8, 1992).
There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively.

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:

It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present
case. (Underscoring supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

(b)

Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

x x x x x x x x x.
In this regard, petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40
(b) must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Bascos dismissal from office which took
place in 1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the
date of removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach. Hence,
petitioner impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an
administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the
disqualification applies.ix[9] To him, this interpretation is made more evident by the manner in which the
provisions of Section 40 are couched. Since the past tense is used in enumerating the grounds for
disqualification, petitioner strongly contends that the provision must have also referred to removal from
office occurring prior to the effectivity of the Code.x[10]
We do not, however, subscribe to petitioners view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to the
provision of Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reasons for us to
depart therefrom. Thus, in Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC,xi[11] reiterated in the more recent cases of Reyes
vs. COMELECxii[12] and Salalima vs. Guingona, Jr.,xiii[13] we ruled, thus:
The COMELEC applied Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160) which
provides:
Sec. 40. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local positions:
xxx xxx xxx

That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidates removal from office
and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter us from the applying the law prospectively. The
basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively provides the
qualification sought by petitioner. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so
construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non
respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.xiv[14]
II.
Did private respondents election to office as City Councilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992 and 1995
elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for
public office?
Petitioner maintains the negative. He quotes the earlier ruling of the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELECxv[15]
to the effect that a candidates disqualification cannot be erased by the electorate alone through the
instrumentality of the ballot. Thus:
x x x (T)he qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will
of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. x x x
At first glance, there seems to be a prima facie semblance of merit to petitioners argument. However, the
issue of whether or not Bascos triple election to office cured his alleged ineligibility is actually beside the
point because the argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place disqualified when
he ran in the three previous elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco
was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which,
as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after January 1, 1992. In view of the
irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner, there is no more reason for the Court to still dwell on the
matter at length.

Anent Bascos alleged circumvention of the prohibition in Tordesillas against reinstatement to any position
in the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, as well as governmentowned or controlled corporations, we are of the view that petitioners contention is baseless. Neither does
petitioners argument that the term any position is broad enough to cover without distinction both
appointive and local positions merit any consideration.
Contrary to petitioners assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective
position. As can be gleaned from the decretal portion of the said decision, the Court couched the
prohibition in this wise:
x x x AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED
OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.

To support its position, petitioner argues that Basco violated the provisions of Section 20, paragraph (i) of
Republic Act No. 7166, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, as well as our ruling in the cases of
Duremdes v. COMELEC,xviii[18] Benito v. COMELECxix[19] and Aguam v. COMELEC.xx[20]
We are not convinced. The provisions and cases cited are all misplaced and quoted out of context. For
the sake of clarity, let us tackle each one by one.
Section 20, paragraph (i) of Rep. Act 7166 reads:
SEC. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.xxx xxx xxx

In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term reinstatement. Under the former Civil
Service Decree,xvi[16] the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively
dismissed from office, the term reinstatement had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive
position. Thus:

(i)
The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the
Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any
proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not
adversely affect the results of the election.

ARTICLE VIII. PERSONNEL POLICIES AND STANDARDS.

x x x x x x x x x.

SEC. 24. Personnel Actions. -

The inapplicability of the abovementioned provision to the present case is very much patent on its face
considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to
contested qualifications of a candidate.

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Reinstatement. - Any person who has been permanently APPOINTED to a position in the career
service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be
reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified.
x x x x x x x x x.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
The Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies issued by the Civil Service Commission on November 10,
1975,xvii[17] provides a clearer definition. It reads:
RULE VI. OTHER PERSONNEL ACTIONS.
SEC. 7. Reinstatement is the REAPPOINMENT of a person who was previously separated from the
service through no delinquency or misconduct on his part from a position in the career service to which he
was permanently appointed, to a position for which he is qualified. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
In light of these definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from
running for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is
reinstatement to an appointive position.
III.
Is private respondents proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the
disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC, void ab initio?

Next, petitioner cites Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646 which states:

SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Underscoring supplied).
This provision, however, does not support petitioners contention that the COMELEC, or more properly
speaking, the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word may
indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates
to confer discretion.xxi[21] What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the
continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in view of this discretion
granted to the COMELEC, the question of whether or not evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant
suspension of proclamation must be left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith
and substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been exercised whimsically and
capriciously.xxii[22] The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body
charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall,xxiii[23] has more than enough expertise in its field
that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality.xxiv[24] The COMELEC has
not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so as to
warrant a different conclusion from this Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
It is to be noted that Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedurexxv[25] states that:

SEC. 5. Effect of petition if unresolved before completion of canvass. - x x x (H)is proclamation shall be
suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning number of votes in such election.
However, being merely an implementing rule, the same must not override, but instead remain consistent
with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations
are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.xxvi[26] Thus, in Miners Association of
the Philippines, Inc. v. Factoran, Jr.,xxvii[27] the Court ruled that:
We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in
the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the
legislative enactment. The principle was enunciated as early as 1908 in the case of United States v.
Barrias. The scope of the exercise of such rule-making power was clearly expressed in the case of United
States v. Tupasi Molina, decided in 1914, thus: Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not
be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the
law, they are valid.
Recently, the case of People v. Maceren gave a brief delineation of the scope of said power of
administrative officials:
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended (U.S. v. Tupasi
Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil.
419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585;
Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned (University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12
C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise &
Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51
SCRA 340, 349).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x The rule or regulations should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling
Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the
basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word may, it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular for
the COMELEC to have used instead the word shall in its rules.

Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as the sixth
winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as well as an order
enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of the
Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result. This
has been the rule as early as in the case of Dizon v. Provincial Board of Canvassers of Lagunaxxviii[28]
where we clarified the nature of the functions of the Board of Canvassers, viz.:
The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to ascertain and declare the apparent result of
the voting. All other questions are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for contesting elections or
in quo warranto proceedings. (9 R.C.L., p. 1110)
To the same effect is the following quotation:
x x x Where there is no question as to the genuineness of the returns or that all the returns are before
them, the powers and duties of canvassers are limited to the mechanical or mathematical function of
ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of the election by adding or compiling the votes cast for
each candidate as shown on the face of the returns before them, and then declaring or certifying the
result so ascertained. (20 C.J., 200-201) [Underscoring supplied]
Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, supra, cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and
inapplicable to the factual circumstances at bar and serve no other purpose than to muddle the real issue.
These three cases do not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of
a disqualification case.
In Duremdes, the proclamation was deemed void ab initio because the same was made contrary to the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code regarding the suspension of proclamation in cases of contested
election returns.
In Benito, the proclamation of petitioner Benito was rendered ineffective due to the Board of Canvassers
violation of its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes and pave
the way to succession in office. In said case, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes for the
mayoralty position died but the Board of Canvassers, instead of proclaiming the deceased candidate
winner, declared Benito, a mere second-placer, the mayor.
Lastly, in Aguam, the nullification of the proclamation proceeded from the fact that it was based only on
advanced copies of election returns which, under the law then prevailing, could not have been a proper
and legal basis for proclamation.
With no precedent clearly in point, petitioners arguments must, therefore, be rejected.
IV.

May Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared a winning candidate?

Obviously, he may not be declared a winner. In the first place, Basco was a duly qualified candidate
pursuant to our disquisition above. Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes which
put him in sixth place. Thus, petitioners emphatic reference to Labo v. COMELEC,xxix[29] where we laid
down a possible exception to the rule that a second placer may be declared the winning candidate, finds
no application in this case. The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely:
(1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware
in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both assumptions,
however, are absent in this case. Petitioners allegation that Basco was well-known to have been

disqualified in the small community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and conjectural,
unsupported as it is by any convincing facts of record to show notoriety of his alleged disqualification.xxx
[30]
In sum, we see the dismissal of the petition for disqualification as not having been attended by grave
abuse of discretion. There is then no more legal impediment for private respondents continuance in office
as City Councilor for the Second District of Manila.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The assailed resolution of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is SPA 95-212 dated July
31, 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

i
ii
iii

ivKare vs Platon
v
viIn this original action arising from an election contest with reference to the office of third member of the provincial board of Albay, it is
prayed that a writ of prohibition be issued against the respondent judge requiring him to desist and refrain from having his order of July
11, 1931, executed or enforced.
It appears from the complaint and the answer: (1) That the petitioner filed a motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of Albay
contesting the election of the respondent Francisco Perfecto, upon the grounds alleged therein; (2) that the respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Albay entered an order on July 11, 1931, requiring the petitioner to give two kinds of bond in order that proper
proceedings might be taken on his motion of protest: A personal bond for P3,000 and a cash bond of P2,000 to be deposited with the
provincial treasurer of Albay within the time specified in the order. These sums were later changed so that the cash bond was for P1,500
and the personal bond for P3,500.
The petitioner invoked section 482 of the Election Law in support of his contention. The respondent judge bases his action upon the
same section and also upon section 479 as lately amended by Act No. 3699. Section 482 provides:
Bond or cash deposit required of contestants. Before the court shall entertain any such contest or counter-contest or admit an
appeal, the party filing the contest, counter-contest, or appeal shall give bond in an amount fixed by the court with two sureties
satisfactory to it, conditioned that he will pay all expenses and costs incident to such motion or appeal, or shall deposit cash in court in
lieu of such bond. . . .
This section, it should be observed, is preceded by the heading, "Bond or cash deposit required of contestants," which apparently
indicates that the court taking cognizance of the election contest may require the contestant either to give a bond or to make a cash
deposit. But the petitioner contends that the right to choose between giving a personal bond and depositing a sum of money in lieu
thereof is granted only to the contestant or appellant. If there be any conflict between the heading of the section under question and the
body, it must be settled according to the canons of statutory construction. Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 181, says: "Headings
prefixed to the titled, chapters, and sections of a statute or code may be consulted in aid of the interpretation, in case of doubt or
ambiguity; but inferences drawn from such headings are entitled to very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the
enacting clauses." In a case in Kansas (Griffith vs. Carter, 8 Kan., 565), it is said that when a statute is divided into separate subjects or
articles, having appropriate headings, it must be presumed and held that the provisions of each article are controlling upon the subject
thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such questions as are embraced therein. But the rule accepted by most of the
authorities is that if the chapter or section heading has been inserted merely for convenience of reference, and not as an integral part of
the statute, it should not be allowed to control the interpretation. (Union Steamship Co. vs. Melbourne Harbour Trust Comm'rs., L.R. 9
App. Cas., 365.)1awphil.net
Applying this rule to the case at bar, it will be seen that the present section provides that before the court entertain any contest or
counter-contest or admits an appeal, the party filing the contest, counter-contest or appeal shall give bond with two sureties to the
satisfaction of the court, or deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond. The contending parties differ in this that while the respondent
judge holds that the court may require either a bond or a cash deposit, the petitioner maintains that it is to him alone the choice is given
to file a personal bond or to make a cash deposit in lieu thereof, inviting our attention to the opinion of the Attorney-General dated
August 21, 1928, on the interpretation of the aforesaid section 482 of the Election Law. The Attorney-General was of the opinion that in
election contests the contestant had to give a personal bond in the amount fixed by the court with two sureties satisfactory to it, and that
since he was under this alternative obligation, according to article 1132 of the Civil Code, he was entitled to choose one or the other of
the alternatives. We hold that the court may only require a personal bond, and that the contestant may make a cash deposit in lieu
thereof.
We shall now see how the court has demanded two kinds of bond of the petitioner by means of the order dated July 11, 1931. It reads
as follows:
The bond to be given by the petitioner within five days hereafter with solvent sureties satisfactory to this court is hereby fixed at five
thousand pesos (P5,000) whereof P3,000 shall be in the form of a personal bond, and P2,000 in cash to be deposited by the petitioner
with the provincial treasurer within the time given. Both bonds shall answer for the costs and expenses arising from this contest. The
P2,000 cash shall be applied to the payment of the first costs of transportation and the daily allowances of such municipal treasurers,
and municipal, provincial, and insular employees as may be cited to appear before the court in connection with this contest, and the
commissioners' fees of those whom the court may appoint.
Although this order provides that of the P5,000 bond, P3,000 shall be in the form of a personal bond, and P2,000 in cash (or as
subsequently altered, P3,500 shall be in the form of a personal bond, and P1,500 in cash); nevertheless, the amount of P1,500 in cash
does not coincide with the legal definition of a bond, inasmuch as it is intended to defray the initial expenses arising from the contest. In
reality, this sum of money is an advance given by the contestant to defray the required expenses for the expedition of the contest.
Formerly the provincial treasury paid these expenses in the first instance, but section 479 of the Election Law which so provided, was
amended by Act No. 3699, relieving the provincial treasury of this obligation, thereby implying that in election cases the contestant is to
supply whatever may be necessary for the prompt despatch of his protest.
There is no question as to the court's discretionary power to demand of a contestant a certain sum of money in advance to meet the
initial expenses arising from the contest, such as the production of ballot boxes in court, etc. It is true that the bond obliges the
contestant or his sureties to pay all the costs arising from the contest, should he be defeated, but the bond is not to be executed until the
final determination of the protest. And it is well known that certain services are required in the course of election contests which must be
paid for immediately, because it would be unjust to delay their payment until the termination of the contest.

Considering the order of July 11, 1931, in this sense, we believe that although it does not adhere strictly to legal technical phraseology,
there is in it no excess of jurisdiction or abuse of judicial discretion to be rectified by means of the writ applied for.
Wherefore, the petition must be and is hereby denied, without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered.

viiLlamado vs CA
viii
ixPetitioner now asks this Court to review and reverse the opinion of the majority in the Court of Appeals and, in effect, to accept and
adopt the dissenting opinion as its own.
The issue to be resolved here is whether or not petitioner's application for probation which was filed after a notice of appeal had been
filed with the trial court, after the records of the case had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals had issued
the notice to file Appellant's Brief, after several extensions of time to file Appellant's Brief had been sought from and granted by the
Court of Appeals but before actual filing of such brief, is barred under P.D. No. 968, as amended.
P.D. No. 968, known as the Probation Law of 1976, was promulgated on 24 July 1976. Section 4 of this statute provided as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant and upon application at any time of said defendant, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be
filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be noted that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, the trial court could grant an application for probation "at any time" "after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant" and certainly after "an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction." Thus, the
filing of the application for probation was "deemed [to constitute] automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal."
On 1 December 1977, Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D. No. 1257 so as to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, senteafter it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his application, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the filing of the application for probation and he may submit his
comment on such application within ten days from receipt of the notification.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken
from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal
of a pending appeal. In the latter case, however, if the application is filed on or after the date of the judgment of the appellate court, said
application shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate court. (Emphasis supplied)
Examination of Section 4, after its amendment by P.D. No. 1257, reveals that it had established a prolonged but definite period during
which an application for probation may be granted by the trial court. That period was: 'After [the trial court] shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence." Clearly, the cut-off time-commencement of service of sentencetakes place not only after an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction, but even after judgement has been rendered by
the appellate court and after judgment has become final. Indeed, in this last situation, Section 4, as amended by P.D. No. 1257 provides
that "the application [for probation] shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate court"; for the
appellate court might have increased or reduced the original penalty imposed by the trial court. It would seem beyond dispute then that
had the present case arisen while Section 4 of the statute as amended by P.D. No. 1257 was still in effect, petitioner Llamado's
application for probation would have had to be granted. Mr. Llamado's application for probation was filed well before the cut-off time
established by Section 4 as then amended by P.D. No. 1257.
On 5 October 1985, however, Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 was once again amended. This time by P.D. No. 1990. As so
amended and in its present form, Section 4 reads as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only An application for probation shall be filed
with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis supplied)
In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by PD No. 1257, in its present form, Section 4 establishes a much narrower period during
which an application for probation may be filed with the trial court: "after [the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant
and within the period for perfecting an appeal ." As if to provide emphasis, a new proviso was appended to the first paragraph of
Section 4 that expressly prohibits the grant of an application for probation "if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment
of conviction." It is worthy of note too that Section 4 in its present form has dropped the phrase which said that the filing of an application
for probation means "the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal". The deletion is quite logical since an application for probation can
no longer be filed once an appeal is perfected; there can, therefore, be no pending appeal that would have to be withdrawn.
In applying Section 4 in the form it exists today (and at the time petitioner Llamado was convicted by the trial court), to the instant case,
we must then inquire whether petitioner Llamado had submitted his application for probation "within the period for perfecting an appeal."
Put a little differently, the question is whether by the time petitioner Llamado's application was filed, he had already "perfected an
appeal" from the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, under Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines for the Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129 and under the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, or more specifically Section 5 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, is fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation or notice of the judgment appealed from. It is also clear from Section 3 (a) of Rule 122 that such appeal is taken or
perfected by simply filing a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court which rendered the judgment appealed from and by serving a
copy thereof upon the People of the Philippines. As noted earlier, petitioner Llamado had manifested orally and in open court his
intention to appeal at the time of promulgation of the judgment of conviction, a manifestation at least equivalent to a written notice of
appeal and treated as such by the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner urges, however, that the phrase "period for perfecting an appeal" and the clause "if the defendant has perfected an appeal
from the judgment of conviction" found in Section 4 in its current form, should not be interpreted to refer to Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Court; and that the "whereas" or preambulatory clauses of P.D. No. 1990 did not specify a period of fifteen (15) days for
perfecting an appeal. 3 It is also urged that "the true legislative intent of the amendment (P.D. No. 1990) should not apply to petitioner
who filed his Petition for probation at the earliest opportunity then prevailing and withdrew his appeal." 4
Petitioner invokes the dissenting opinion rendered by Mr. Justice Bellosillo in the Court of Appeals. Petitioner then asks us to have
recourse to "the cardinal rule in statutory construction" that "penal laws [should] be liberally construed in favor of the accused," and to
avoid "a too literal and strict application of the proviso in P.D. No. 1990" which would "defeat the manifest purpose or policy for which the
[probation law] was enacted-."
We find ourselves unable to accept the eloquently stated arguments of petitioner's counsel and the dissenting opinion. We are unable to
persuade ourselves that Section 4 as it now stands, in authorizing the trial court to grant probation "upon application by [the] defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal" and in reiterating in the proviso that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day period established, as indicated above, by B.P. Blg. 129, the Interim Rules and Guidelines
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, but rather to some vague and undefined time, i.e., "the earliest
opportunity" to withdraw the defendant's appeal. The whereas clauses invoked by petitioner did not, of course, refer to the fifteen-day
period. There was absolutely no reason why they should have so referred to that period for the operative words of Section 4 already do
refer, in our view, to such fifteen-day period. Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speaking; they are not part of the
operative language of the statute. 5 Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be helpful to the extent they articulate the general purpose or
reason underlying a new enactment, in the present case, an enactment which drastically but clearly changed the substantive content of
Section 4 existing before the promulgation of P.D. No. 1990. Whereas clauses, however, cannot control the specific terms of the statute;
in the instant case, the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1990 do not purport to control or modify the terms of Section 4 as amended. Upon
the other hand, the term "period for perfecting an appeal" used in Section 4 may be seen to furnish specification for the loose language
"first opportunity" employed in the fourth whereas clause. "Perfection of an appeal" is, of course, a term of art but it is a term of art
widely understood by lawyers and judges and Section 4 of the Probation Law addresses itself essentially to judges and lawyers.
"Perfecting an appeal" has no sensible meaning apart from the meaning given to those words in our procedural law and so the lawmaking agency could only have intended to refer to the meaning of those words in the context of procedural law.
Turning to petitioner's invocation of "liberal interpretation" of penal statutes, we note at the outset that the Probation Law is not a penal
statute. We, however, understand petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory language that appears to favor the accused in a
criminal case should be given a "liberal interpretation." Courts, however, have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation' or "the spirit
of the law" where the words of the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or
interpretation. We do not believe that "the spirit of law" may legitimately be invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and
definite meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously be given effect by judges and all
others who are charged with the application and implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind, however, that the
spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect are to be derived from the words actually used by the law-maker, and not from
some external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and transcending the words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation rather than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of
1976 as amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too frequently impede a disciplined and principled search

for the meaning which the law-making authority projected when it promulgated the language which we must apply. That meaning is
clearly visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose on a man's face. The Court is simply reading Section 4 as
it is in fact written. There is no need for the involved process of construction that petitioner invites us to engage in, a process made
necessary only because petitioner rejects the conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the statute. The first duty of a
judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would like it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court of First
Instance of Manila warned, confusion and uncertainty in application will surely follow, making, we might add, stability and continuity in
the law much more difficult to achieve:
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not
only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the
public to understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference
by judicial tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting the words here and inserting them there,
making them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them
meanings which they do not ordinarily have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to
advise their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its interpretation and
construction. 6
The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our people's grasp of English is steadily attenuated.
There is another and more fundamental reason why a judge must read a statute as the legislative authority wrote it, not as he would
prefer it to have been written. The words to be given meaning whether they be found in the Constitution or in a statute, define and
therefore limit the authority and discretion of the judges who must apply those words. If judges may, under cover of seeking the "true
spirit" and "real intent" of the law, disregard the words in fact used by the law-giver, the judges will effectively escape the constitutional
and statutory limitations on their authority and discretion. Once a judge goes beyond the clear and ordinary import of the words of the
legislative authority, he is essentially on uncharted seas. In a polity like ours which enshrines the fundamental notion of limiting power
through the separation and distribution of powers, judges have to be particularly careful lest they substitute their conceptions or
preferences of policy for that actually projected by the legislative agency. Where a judge believes passionately that he knows what the
legislative agency should have said on the particular matter dealt with by a statute, it is easy enough for him to reach the conclusion that
therefore that was what the law-making authority was really saying or trying to say, if somewhat ineptly As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
explained:
Even within their area of choice the courts are not at large. They are confined by the nature and scope of the judicial function in its
particular exercise in the field of interpretation. They are under the constraints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic society.
As a matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one will gainsay that the function in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of
words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature . The great
judges have constantly admonished their brethren of the need for discipline in observing the limitations A judge must not rewrite a
statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest,
construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration He must not read in by way of creation. He must not read out except to avoid
patent nonsense of internal contradictions. ... 7
Petitioner finally argues that since under Section 4 of Probation Law as amended has vested in the trial court the authority to grant the
application for probation, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the same and should have (as he had prayed in the
alternative) remanded instead the records to the lower court. Once more, we are not persuaded. The trial court lost jurisdiction over the
case when petitioner perfected his appeal. The Court of Appeals was not, therefore, in a position to remand the case except for
execution of judgment. Moreover, having invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is not at liberty casually to attack that
jurisdiction when exercised adversely to him. In any case, the argument is mooted by the conclusion that we have reached, that is, that
petitioner's right to apply for probation was lost when he perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAGR No. 04678 is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
x
xi
xii

xiiiMagtajas vs Pryce
CRUZ, J.:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily
denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations
were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the
city.
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to
Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein
private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted
Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3353

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO
ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE
OPERATION OF CASINO.
BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that:
Sec. 1. That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall
be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits.
Sec. 2. That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership or corporation to use its business
establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling activities.
Sec. 3. PENALTIES. Any violation of such existing business permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following
penalties, to wit:
a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day
b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second offense, and a fine of P3,000.00/day
c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third and subsequent offenses.
Sec. 4. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.
WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment
of CASINO;
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel
existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of
CASINO;
WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art.
99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall enact
measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity
pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral welfare of the community;
NOW THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:
Sec. 1. The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 2. Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties:
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the operation,
conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof;
b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion
of the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling
CASINO.
Sec. 3. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local newspaper of general circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner.
Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to
prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. 2

Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that:
1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro does not have the power and authority to prohibit
the establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial limits.
2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) (v) of R.A. 7160 could only
mean "illegal gambling."
3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that point.
4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point.
5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general powers and purposes of the instrumentality
concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in
disposing of the issues presented in this present case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land
and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court
sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest
revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local
Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in
Section 16 as follows:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:
Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and
shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places,
vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities
inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest
of the general welfare. 5
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because
they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution
itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal
gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the
government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the
Local Government Code.
It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of
the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local
government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the Local Government Code has recognized
the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their
inhabitants in line with the policies of the State.

The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and
other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and
other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local
government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories, including the operation of casinos.
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not
only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers
of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and
provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or
parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local
government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:
Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to
the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions
of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper
upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria, 7 which sustained a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D.
1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."
This is the opportune time to stress an important point.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests
of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it
at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may
consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such
choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the
legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive.
Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge
their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own
convictions on the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the
following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or
suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which
are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded
such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a
sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated.
Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be
read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the
petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift
from this Court.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they
prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an
ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot
prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted
by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto"
in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of
P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal another law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are
actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all
power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit;
in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given
its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view
includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize
as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this
situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its
powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision
which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869
is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No.
112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or
concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act.
No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741;
Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential
Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections
2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69,
70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or
parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of
such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained:
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a
sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former
law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question
arises bear to each other the relation of general to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is
mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the
Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for
measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR
charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more
responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.

It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts
must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate
branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and
annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of
the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and
suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in
such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized
gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the
Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear
indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San
Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in
question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well
as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in
general.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents
of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to
suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and
negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath
of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is
some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and
so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know
of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of
the legislature. 11
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in
the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress
retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The
power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are
certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, 12 which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government
units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their apprehensions that the
welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope of large or easy
gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that "habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In
People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be
enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling "the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father of mischief."
Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was
done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court only if it
contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such contravention here.
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which
empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere
ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires
and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against
the petitioners. It is so ordered.

People vs Echavez
xiv
xvThe legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural
lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides:

SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other
purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more
than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is omitted.)
The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen
persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which is
similar to the other fifteen informations, reads:
That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy
and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to
the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into the area has been and is
still against the win of the offended party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said
grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the
land applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and
prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)
Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the accused,
were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively).
Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the
five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under
the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of
the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with threat, and
taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order
be reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted.
The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not include agricultural
purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.
From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.
We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was
intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do
individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the
Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC
General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City
and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad
tracks and those built without permits on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the
country;
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class;
WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice.
It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is complemented by
Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace and order.
On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished
by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural
lands. That law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth, any public agriculture land including such public lands as are granted to private individuals under the provision of the Public
Land Act or any other laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the corresponding
applications for the notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or for any person, natural or
judicial to investigate induce or force another to commit such acts.
Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both such
fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100
Phil. 40.)

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the
decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem
generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp.
vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

xvi
xvii
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xxi
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xxviiiPrimicias vs Urdaneta
xxix
xxxThe main issue in this appeal is the validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, enacted on March 13,1964 by the Municipal Council
of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which was declared null and void by the Court of First Instance of Lingayen, Pangasinan, in its decision dated
June 29, 1966, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders decision declaring Ordinance No, 3, Series of 1964, to be null and void; making the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued against the defendant, Felix D. Soriano definite and permanent; and further restraining the defendants,
Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., Lorenzo G. Suyat and Estanislao Andrada, from enforcing the said ordinance all throughout Urdaneta; and
ordering the said defendants to return to the plaintiff his drivers (sic) license CIN 017644, a copy of which is Exhibit D-1, and to pay the
costs of suit. 1
From the aforecited decision, defendants appealed to this Court. The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:

On February 8, 1965, Juan Augusta B. Primacias plaintiff appellee, was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when a
member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3,
Series of 1964, "and more particularly, for overtaking a truck." The policeman then asked for plaintiff's license which he surrendered, and
a temporary operator's permit was issued to him. This incident took place about 200 meters away from a school building, at Barrio
Nancamaliran, Urdaneta.
Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of
1964. Due to the institution of the criminal case, plaintiff Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for
the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief
Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from
further proceeding in the criminal case.
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered the questioned decision holding that the ordinance was null and void and had been
repealed by Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Now, defendants, appellants herein,
allege that the lower court erred in: 3
1. declaring that Municipal Ordinance No. 3 (Series of 1964) of Urdaneta is null and void;
2. requiring the municipal council of Urdaneta in the enactment of said ordinance to give maximum allowable speed and to make
classification of highways;
3. holding that said ordinance is in conflict with section 35 par. b(4) of Republic Act 4136;
4. requiring that said ordinance be approved by the Land Transportation Commissioner;
5. holding that said ordinance is not clear and definite in its terms;
6. issuing ex-parte a writ of injunction to restrain the proceedings in criminal case no. 3140.
The ordinance in question provides: 4

SECTION 1 - That the following speed limits for vehicular traffic along the National Highway and the Provincial Roads within the
territorial limits of Urdaneta shall be as follows:
a. Thru crowded streets approaching intersections at 'blind corners, passing school zones or thickly populated areas, duly marked with
sign posts, the maximum speed limit allowable shall be 20 kph.
SECTION 2 - That any person or persons caught driving any motor vehicle violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be fined
P10.00 for the first offense; P20.00 for the second offense; and P30.00 for the third and succeeding offenses, the Municipal Judge shall
recommend the cancellation of the license of the offender to the Motor Vehicle's Office (MVO); or failure to pay the fine imposed, he
shall suffer a subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with law.
Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid, being "patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 par. 4 of Act No. 3992, as amended
(Revised Motor Vehicle Law)." In so arguing, appellants fail to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by Republic Act No. 4136,
the Land Transportation and 'Traffic Code, which became effective on June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned
ordinance was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council. The explicit repeal of the aforesaid Act is embodied in Section 63, Republic
Act No. 4136, to wit:
Act Numbered thirty-nine hundred ninety-two (3992) as amended, and all laws, executive orders, ordinance, resolutions, regulations or
paints thereof in conflict with the provisions of this Act are repealed.
By this express repeal, and the general rule that a later law prevails over an earlier law, 6 appellants are in error in contending that "a
later enactment of the law relating to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of
the original law." Pursuant to Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, the ordinance at bar is thus placed within the ambit of Republic Act No.
4136, and not Act No. 3992. The validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, must therefore be determined vis-a-vis Republic Act No.
4136, the "mother statute" so to speak, which was in force at the time the criminal case was brought against Primicias for the violation of
the said ordinance.
An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "must not contravene . . . the statute," 7 for it is a "fundamental
principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state." 8 Following this general rule, whenever
there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance "must give way. 9
Since the Ordinance is aimed at regulating traffic, Chapter IV Traffic Rules), Article I (Speed Limits and Keeping to the Right), consisting
of sections 35, to 38 of Republic Act No. 4136, particularly Sections 35, 36, 38 contain the provisions material to its validity. Section 35
(b), Republic Act No. 4136, which took the place of Section 53, par. (4), Act No. 3992, provides restrictions as to speed thus:
A look at the aforecited section and Section 1, par. (a) of the Ordinance shows that the latter is more or less a restatement only of
number (4), par. (b), Section 35. As observed by the trial court, the Ordinance "refers to only one of the four classifications mentioned in
paragraph (b), Section 35." 10 limiting the rates of speed for
vehicular traffic along the national highway and The provincial roads within the territorial limits of Urdaneta to 20 kilometers per hour
without regard to whether the road is an open country roads (six), or through streets or boulevards, or city or municipal streets with light
traffic. 11
As also found correctly by the lower court, the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its thoroughfares,
contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38, Republic Act No. 4136, which provides:
Classification of highways. - Public highways shall be properly classified for traffic purposes by the provincial board or city council
having jurisdiction over them, and said provincial board, municipal board or city council shall provide appropriate signs therefor, subject
to the approval of the Commissioner. It shall be the duty of every provincial, city and municipal secretary to certify to the Commissioner
the names, locations, and limits of all "through streets" designated as such by the provincial board, municipal board or council.
Under this section, a local legislative body intending to control traffic in public highways 12 is supposed to classify, first, and then mark
them with proper signs, all to be approved by the Land Transportation Commissioner. To hold that the provisions of Section 38 are
mandatory is sanctioned by a ruling 13 that
statutes which confer upon a public body or officer . . . power to perform acts which concern the public interests or rights of individuals,
are generally, regarded as mandatory although the language is permissive only since the are construed as imposing duties rather than
conferring privileges.
The classifications which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36 which states that "no provincial, city or
municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided
in this Act." In this case, however, there is no showing that the marking of the streets and areas falling under Section 1, par. (a),
Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, was done with the approval of the Land Transportation Commissioner. Thus, on this very ground
alone, the Ordinance becomes invalid. Since it lacks the requirement imposed by Section 38, the provincial, city, or municipal board or
council is enjoined under Section 62 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code from "enacting or enforcing any ordinance or resolution
in conflict with the provisions of this Act."
Regarding the contention that the lower court erred in holding that said "Ordinance is not clear and definite in its terms." We agree with
the Court a quo that when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta used the phrase "vehicular traffic" (Section 1, Ordinance) it "did not

distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses." 14 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that
nowhere in the Ordinance is "vehicular traffic" defined. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and
certainty are all the more important so that "an average man should be able with due care, after reading it,, to understand and ascertain
whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct." 15 In comparison, Section 35(b), Republic Act No. 4136 on
which Section 1 of the Ordinance must be based, stated that the rates of speed enumerated therein refer to motor vehicle, 16 specifying
the speed for each kind of vehicle. At the same time, to avoid vagueness, Art. 11, Section 3 defines what a motor vehicle is and
passenger automobiles are.
On the issue of whether a writ of injunction can restrain the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3140, the general rule is that "ordinarily,
criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction." 17 Exceptions however are allowed in the following instances:
1. for the orderly administration of justice;
2. to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner;
3. to avoid multiplicity of actions;
4. to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights;
5. in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid.

18

The local statute or ordinance at bar being invalid, the exception just cited obtains in this case. Hence, the lower court did not err in
issuing the writ of injunction against defendants. Moreover, considering that "our law on municipal corporations is in principle patterned
after that of the United States, " 19 it would not be amiss for Us to adopt in this instance the ruling that to enjoin the enforcement of a void
ordinance, "injunction has frequently been sustained in order to prevent a multiplicity of prosecutions under it." 20

RMBSA vs HDMF
Once again, this Court is confronted with the issue of the validity of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 7742, which require the existence of a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits for exemption
from the Pag~IBIG Fund coverage under Presidential Decree No. 1752, as amended.
Pursuant to Section 19[1] of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De
Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER), a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995 from the Pag~IBIG
Fund coverage by respondent Home Development Mutual Fund (hereafter HDMF) because of a superior retirement plan.[2]
On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No.
1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule
VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage,[3] it must have a plan providing for both
provident/ retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag~IBIG Fund.
On 16 November 1995, PETITIONER filed with the respondent an application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage because of
its superior retirement plan.[4] In support of said application, PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the 1995
Amendments to the Rules are invalid.[5] Jksm
In a letter dated 18 March 1996, the President and Chief Executive Officer of HDMF disapproved PETITIONER's application on the
ground that the requirement that there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase
"and/or," and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement
the law.[6]
PETITIONER's appeal[7] with the HDMF Board of Trustees was denied for having been rendered moot and academic by Board
Resolution No. 1208, Series of 1996, removing the availment of waiver of the mandatory coverage of the Pag~IBIG Fund, except for
distressed employers.[8]
On 31 March 1997, PETITIONER filed a petition for review[9] before the Court of Appeals. On motion by HDMF, the Court of Appeals
dismissed[10] the petition on the ground that the coverage of employers and employees under the Home Development Mutual Fund is
mandatory in character as clearly worded in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742. There is no allegation that
petitioner is a distressed employer to warrant its exemption from the Fund coverage. As to the amendments to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, the same are valid. Under P.D. No. 1752 and R.A. No. 7742 the Board of Trustees of the
HDMF is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations, as well as amendments thereto, concerning the extension, waiver or
suspension of coverage under the Pag~IBIG Fund. And the publication requirement was amply met, since the questioned amendments
were published in the 21 October 1995 issue of the Philippine Star, which is a newspaper of general circulation.
PETITIONER's motion for reconsideration[11] was denied.[12] Hence, on 6 November 1997, PETITIONER filed a petition before this
Court assailing the 1995 and the 1996 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742 for being
contrary to law. In support thereof, PETITIONER contends that the subject 1995 Amendments issued by HDMF are inconsistent with the
enabling law, P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, which merely requires as a pre~condition for exemption from coverage the
existence of either a superior provident/ retirement plan or a superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans. Hence,

considering that PETITIONER has a provident plan superior to that offered by the HDMF, it is entitled to exemption from the coverage in
accordance with Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. The 1996 Amendment are also void insofar as they abolished the exemption granted by
Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended. The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power, which cannot be
delegated to HMDF. Kycalr
PETITIONER also cites Section 9 (1), Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 9. Public Participation ~~ (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or
circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the
adoption of any rule.
Since the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742 involve an imposition of an additional burden,
a public hearing should have first been conducted to give chance to the employers, like PETITIONER, to be heard before the HDMF
adopted the said Amendments. Absent such public hearing, the amendments should be voided.
Finally, PETITIONER contends that HDMF did not comply with Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, which
provides that "[e]very agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted
by it."
On the other hand, the HDMF contends that in promulgating the amendments to the rules and regulations which require the existence of
a plan providing for both provident and housing benefits for exemption from the Fund Coverage, the respondent Board was merely
exercising its rule-making power under Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. It had the option to use "and" only instead of "or" in the rules on
waiver in order to effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing "and," the Board has clarified the confusion brought about
by the use of "and/or" in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended.
As to the public hearing, HDMF maintains that as can be clearly deduced from Section 9(1), Chapter 2, book VII of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, public hearing is required only when the law so provides, and if not, only if the same is practicable. It
follows that public hearing is only optional or discretionary on the part of the agency concerned, except when the same is required by
law. P.D. No. 1752 does not require that pubic hearing be first conducted before the rules and regulations implementing it would become
valid and effective. What it requires is the publication of said rules and regulations at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
Having published said 1995 and 1996 Amendments through the Philippine Star on 21 October 1995[13] and 15 November 1996,[14]
respectively, HDMF has complied with the publication requirement.
Finally, HDMF claims that as early as 18 October 1996, it had already filed certified true copies of the Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations with the University of the Philippines Law Center. This fact is evidenced by certified true copies of the Certification from the
Office of the National Administrative Register of the U.P. Law Center.[15]
We find for the PETITIONER. Calrky
The issue of the validity of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, specifically Section I, Rule
VII on Waiver and Suspension, has been squarely resolved in the relatively recent case of China Banking Corp. v. The Members of the
Board of Trustees of the HDMF.[16] We held in that case that Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124~B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Application for
Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, are null and void insofar as they require
that an employer should have both a provident/ retirement plan and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order
to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund coverage. In arriving at said conclusion, we ruled:
The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words "and/or."
In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words "and/or" should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., "either
and or; e.g. butter and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or eggs.
"The term and/or means that the effect shall be given to both the conjunctive "and" and the
disjunctive "or"; or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will
best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The
term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive "or" alone will exclude
the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive "and" will exclude
the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone."
It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term "and/or" is that the word "and"
and the word "or" are to be used interchangeably.
It ... seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 intended that an
employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from
coverage. If the law had intended that the employee [sic] should have both a superior provident plan and a housing
plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words "and" instead of "and/or." Notably, paragraph (a)
of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the features of the plan or plans are
superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is
considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is
more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for

waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word "or" in the implementing
rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority. Slx
It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule~making power as provided in Section 5[17] of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13[18] of
P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well~settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to
the administrative agency.[19] It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.[20]
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its
employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board
subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and
subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the
exercise of its rule~making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must
not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.[21] Only Congress can repeal
or amend the law. Scslx
While it may be conceded that the requirement of having both plans to qualify for an exemption, as well as the abolition of the
exemption, would enhance the interest of the working group and further strengthen the Home Development Mutual Fund in its pursuit of
promoting public welfare through ample social services as mandated by the Constitution, we are of the opinion that the basic law should
prevail. A department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by the statute.[22]
Considering the foregoing conclusions, it is unnecessary to dwell on the other issues raised.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of 31 July 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA~G.R. No. SP~43668 and
its Resolution of 15 October 1997 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The disapproval by the Home Development Mutual Fund of
the application of the petitioner for waiver or suspension of Fund coverage is SET ASIDE, and the Home Development Mutual Fund is
hereby directed to refund to petitioner all sums of money it collected from the latter.
SO ORDERED. Slxsc

Solicitor General vs MMA

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment ofjustice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.
(Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and
excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a
lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the
case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them
present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass
up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the
question whether prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these
procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners'cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is
not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821
cited in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition against the enforcement
of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropohtan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners and
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed
as G.R. No. 102782. The comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the resolution of
the substantive issues raised.
It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recognized often enough as necessary
to the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is because of the failure of the proper parties to
file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important
substantive issues raised.
Now to the merits.
The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. 4 It is
not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening
traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules.

The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of
such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a
sufficient standard. 5
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will
have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law
shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been met. It
is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable
sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of the
exercise of such delegated power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of
these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we
apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6)
must be general and consistent with public policy. 7
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do
not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the
decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions:
Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers and operators of
motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such
penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of
Transportation under existing laws over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila
Commission. When the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of public convenience,
the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or
revoked driver's license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land
Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for their records update.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a twelve-month period, reckoned from the date
of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for the and offense,
P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver's license for
the fifth offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations
of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a
traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine
imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed
or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the
citation ticket.
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the lawenforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the
case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court.
If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's license shall not be renewed
until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose
fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the
decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the

Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated."
These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan
Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to
legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their
own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). 8 They are mere agents vested with what is called the
power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times
the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the
decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was
enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction.
In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City for being violative of the
Land Registration Act. The decision held in part:
In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:
From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of
said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to
the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the
Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section
44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application;
Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification
to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said
ordinance impose a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of
Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the
government. But as already intimated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when
it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance.
We affirm.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of
implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to
prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts,
to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end
be valid, would be ultra vires.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow
and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the
general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere
in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.
The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public
for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties
upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of
such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory
authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative
powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a
statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605
remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in
LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 of the Municipality
of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and

(2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when
authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
SO ORDERED.

Victorias Milling vs SSC

On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor: .
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the
Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will
comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of
P500 for any one month.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in
effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime
pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, "In
order to assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term 'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their
observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words "compensation", "remuneration"
and "wages". Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to
promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the
approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a
mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.
The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of
Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a
law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it
"makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a
statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually
couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The
details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this
sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that
have the effect of law. (Davis, op. cit., p. 194.) .
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory
authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op.
cit., 195-197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.
Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social
Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads
as follows: .
(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash
except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3)
dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:
(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash
except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.
It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base
pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by
the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination.
Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law
as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely
stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. 1wph1.t

The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by appellant, does not support its contention that
the circular in question is a rule or regulation. What was there said was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a
circular. Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive in determining its nature. It does
not lay down a general proposition of law that any circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a
rule or regulation which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect.
The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to the present case, because the penalty that
may be incurred by employers and employees if they refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the
employer pays to his employees, is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of the specific legal
provisions contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161.
We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the
amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security
contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its
effectivity.
It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular No. 22, is correct. The express
elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the
"compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's
remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable
because it is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is
demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such
bonuses shall be considered compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the employees. While it is
true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or
word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be
gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is
the case that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this Act".
Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express
substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in
question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.