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II. Discussion
We first address Faushs claims under Title VII and
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, then his claim under
1981.
A. Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act
1.
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Standard of review
employers
involvement
in
day-to-day
employee supervision, including employee
discipline; and 4) the alleged employers actual
control of employee records, such as payroll,
insurance, or taxes.
Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 469. As with the Darden test, this list
of factors is not exhaustive, and other indicia of
significant control may suggest that a given employer was
a joint employer of an employee. Id. at 469-70.
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Darden was the primary basis for the hybrid test. See Butler,
2015 WL 4269615, at *5-9 & nn.11, 13.
The First Circuits decision in Rivas v. Federacion de
Asociaciones Pecuarias de Puerto Rico, 929 F.2d 814 (1st
Cir. 1991), is not to the contrary. There, a ships agent
provided work gangs of stevedores and foremen to the
operator of a grain mill for the purpose of unloading cargo
vessels. The ships agent was contractually obligated to
supervise the laborers, and the grain mill operators
supervision of the gangs amounted to merely deciding which
materials were to be unloaded first. Id. at 821. Under these
circumstances, it is unsurprising that the First Circuit held
that the grain mill operator was not the laborers employer.
See id.
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B. Section 1981
Faushs 1981 claim, by contrast, was properly
dismissed. Section 1981 offers relief when racial
discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual
relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an
existing contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff has
or would have rights under the existing or proposed
contractual relationship. Dominos Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald,
546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006).
While it is true that the substantive elements of a
1981 claim mirror those of a Title VII claim in many respects,
see Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 267
(3d Cir. 2010), the types of individuals who can bring such
claims are not identical. Section 1981 does not limit itself,
or even refer, to employment contracts. Brown, 581 F.3d at
181 (quoting Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d
8, 14 (1st Cir. 1999)). As a result, an independent contractor
may bring a cause of action under section 1981 for
discrimination occurring within the scope of the independent
contractor relationship. Id.12
Faush cannot avoid summary judgment on his 1981
claim, however, unless he has (or would have) rights under
the existing (or proposed) contract that he wishes to make
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