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prepared by a police officer who did not testify at trial. Ambrose sought a remand to the
Superior Court with instructions to enter judgments of acquittal on Counts 1 and 2.
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions on Counts 1 and 2 and remanded for
a new trial, after finding a lack of juror unanimity. Ambrose v. People of the Virgin
Islands, 2008 WL 5422862 (V.I. Dec. 18, 2008). In doing so, the Court noted that
Ambrose had raised other arguments but concluded that it is not necessary to address
them in light of its favorable ruling on the juror unanimity issue. Id. at *1 n.2 and n.4.
Ambrose then filed this petition for a writ of certiorari pursuant to 48 U.S.C.
1613 and Third Circuit LAR 112.2.1 We granted the writ by an order dated May 29,
2009. The order reads as follows:
The foregoing petition for a writ of certiorari is granted
limited to the following questions: (1) whether petitioner was
entitled to relief on the merits of his arguments based on the
filing of multiple criminal informations against him and that
his conviction on Count Two (weapon possession) was not
supported by sufficient evidence; (2) whether relief on either
of those arguments would have entitled petitioner to a remand
with an instruction to enter a judgment of acquittal instead of
a remand for a new trial, see, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1, 15-18 (1978); McMullen v. Tennis, 562 F.3d 231, 237
(3d Cir. 2009); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Joseph,
765 F.2d 394, 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1985); and (3) whether the
Virgin Islands Supreme Court erred in declining to address
those arguments. In addition to these questions, the parties
are directed to brief the issue of whether this Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. 1613 given the Virgin
Islands Supreme Courts decision to remand this matter for
retrial.
48 U.S.C. 1613 provides as follows:
1
Third Circuit LAR 112.2 explains how to petition for a writ of certiorari.
3
Which provides: The judicial power of the Virgin Islands shall be vested in a court of
record designated the District Court of the Virgin Islands established by Congress, and
in such appellate court and lower local courts as may have been or may hereafter be
established by local law. 48 U.S.C. 1611(a).
4
trial creates a particularly serious problem when considering finality. As we have just
noted, the Supreme Court reversed both convictions and remanded for a new trial, and
therefore concluded that it did not have to address the other issues Ambrose raised in his
appeal. The Courts failure to address the remaining issues is problematic given the
remand for a new trial.
The remedy for most kinds of trial error is a new trial, not a judgment of acquittal,
because the Double Jeopardy Clause usually does not bar a new trial when a conviction is
set aside on appeal. See, e.g., McMullen v. Tennis, 562 F.3d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 2009).
This principle clearly applies to Ambroses arguments regarding juror unanimity, see
Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1236 (3d Cir. 1992) (double jeopardy
clause does not bar retrial when jury fails to reach unanimous verdict), and the
Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 225 (3d Cir. 2003)
(remanding for a new trial following Confrontation Clause violation). This principle,
however, does not apply when an appellate court sets aside a verdict because it is not
supported by sufficient evidence. See McMullen, 562 F.3d at 237 (discussing, inter alia,
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)). There, the proper remedy is a remand with an
instruction to enter a judgment of acquittal. See id. This follows from the fact that an
appellate ruling that the evidence submitted to the jury was insufficient to convict is the
functional equivalent of an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes; thus, no retrial can
occur without violating the prohibition against Double Jeopardy. Id.
As noted, in his appeal to the Supreme Court, Ambrose claimed that there was
insufficient evidence to sustain his weapon possession conviction, but the claim was not
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addressed because of the Courts favorable ruling on his challenge to the jurys
unanimity. However, remanding for a new trial under the circumstances here was
inconsistent with the protection against Double Jeopardy because Ambrose was thereby
exposed to a retrial even though the original guilty verdict may not have been supported
by evidence that was sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If he
could have established such a failure of proof, he would have been entitled to a judgment
of acquittal, not a retrial which would have allowed the government the proverbial
second bite of the apple. See, e.g., United States v. Dotson, 871 F.2d 1318, 1324 (6th
Cir. 1989) (While we have determined that the jury charge on these counts was
inadequate, we find it necessary to consider the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue in order
to determine the proper scope of our remand. If the evidence at trial was insufficient to
support [defendants] conviction . . . then we would be compelled to remand for an entry
of judgment of acquittal. If, on the other hand, the evidence was sufficient . . . we would
merely remand for further consistent proceedings. The sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue
is therefore necessary for the resolution of our case.) (citations omitted).
The Courts failure to address Ambroses claim of a variance between the
informations and the verdict creates a similar problem. On two occasions, we have
remanded for the entry of a judgment of acquittal instead of a new trial after granting
relief on variance arguments similar to Ambroses. See Government of the Virgin Islands
v. Joseph, 765 F.2d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 1985); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Aquino,
378 F.2d 540, 554 (3d Cir. 1967). Once again, the Supreme Courts remand for a new
trial is in potential violation of Ambroses Double Jeopardy rights.
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We are therefore faced with reviewing an order of the Virgin Islands Supreme
Court that is not final on its face as it remands for further proceedings. Yet, which may
be final insofar as it allows Ambrose to be subjected to a retrial that would violate his
Fifth Amendment guarantee against Double Jeopardy from which he would have no
appeal because any appeal would necessarily come after the very trial that would violate
his Fifth Amendment protection. It is within this procedural context that we must
determine if the Supreme Courts order remanding for a new trial is a final decision
over which we have certiorari review.
To further complicate things, the order granting the writ of certiorari specifically
directed the parties to brief the issue of whether this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
48 U.S.C. 1613 given the Virgin Islands Supreme Courts decision to remand this
matter for retrial. However, for reasons known only to defense counsel and the
government, neither Ambrose nor the Government of the Virgin Islands has bothered to
address that all important issue. 3 Rather, both counsel completely ignored that portion of
our order. Instead, they simply pasted boilerplate into their briefs stating that we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. 1613 and Third Circuit LAR 112.2.
Nevertheless, we have a special obligation to satisfy ourselves of our own
jurisdiction even if the parties agree that we have jurisdiction. In re Seven Fields
Development Corp., 505 F.3d 237, 244 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation, internal quotation
The parties also did not bother to brief the issue of whether the Supreme Court of the
Virgin Islands erred in declining to address the first two issues upon which the writ was
granted.
7