Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 54
Further relevant facts as alleged in the complaint are as follows: Mohan was the
service manager of Banes Ford. One of his duties as service manager was to
road test automobiles belonging to customers of Banes Ford. Mohan was
accustomed, with Banes Ford's permission, to drive customers' cars from Banes
Ford's shop to his home at night and back to the shop again in the morning in
order to road test them despite the fact that company cars were at his disposal
for his own transportation. While driving a customer's car home on the evening
of December 7, 1959, in order to road test it at the request of the customer,
Mohan negligently struck Francis Pillo, injuring him. Pillo recovered a verdict
of $25,000 in a suit brought against Mohan, Banes Ford, and others, in the
Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County.2 The judgment was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Appeal of Banes Ford Inc., 410 Pa. 417,
189 A.2d 850 (1963). The amount of that judgment with interest, in the sum of
$26,838.62, was satisfied by Ohio and is the basis of the suit at bar in which
Ohio now seeks to recover from Mohan and Carolina. The complaint has three
counts.
3
Carolina was served with a copy of the summons together with copies of the
complaint by registered mail sent to the Insurance Commissioner of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Service of the
summons and complaint was made upon Mohan by serving Mohan's wife at
Mohan's apparent 'dwelling house or usual place of abode' in accordance with
Rule 4(d) (1), Fed.R.Civ.Proc., 28 U.S.C., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85
S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965). Insofar as the record shows Mohan is not
represented by an attorney and seems not to have appeared pro se.
Our difficulty with the judgment from which the appeal is taken, the order of
dismissal of May 27, 1964 quoted above, lies in the fact that it does not
definitely dispose of Ohio's claim against Mohan, who it has asserted is
primarily liable to it. Rule 54(b), as amended, Fed.R.Civ.Proc., 28 U.S.C.,
provides: 'When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment
as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than
all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before
the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.'3
We hold the order appealed from is not a final decision within the purview of
Section 1291, as amended, 28 U.S.C. Consequently the appeal will be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The complaint alleges that Ohio Casualty Insurance Company has its principal
place of business in Ohio and that Carolina Casualty Insurance Company has its
principal place of business in Florida. See Section 1332(c), Title 28, U.S.C
81 Montg. (1962)