Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 305
I. FACTS
2
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the facts
relevant to this appeal are as follows. Certain union locals and retail food stores
maintained the Retail Clerks Tri-State Health and Welfare Fund ("Fund")
which administered various benefit programs for approximately 14,000 retail
food workers. The Fund was managed by a board of trustees ("Board") that met
regularly to discuss matters related to the Fund. John Bogan was the Fund's
The Board contracted with various companies to provide benefit services to the
Fund for the Fund's beneficiaries. One of these companies was Health
Corporation of America (HCA), which provided and administered dental
benefit coverage. Cusumano was president of HCA. In that capacity he
appeared before the Board at its regular meetings.
In the early 1980's the Board instructed Bogan to solicit bids for life insurance
benefit coverage to be provided by the Fund. Although he was not an official of
the Fund, at some point not disclosed by the record, Cusumano learned of the
Board's plan to purchase life insurance coverage. Thereafter Cusumano
approached insurance agent Dennison Fincke to discuss Fincke's becoming the
agent for the life insurance plan. Cusumano explained that he himself was not
allowed to be the broker for life insurance coverage because he was already a
vendor for the dental plan. Cusumano told Fincke that he and Fincke would
"split the commission 50-50." When Fincke advised Cusumano that he had
obtained a bid from an insurance company that would yield a fifteen percent
commission, Cusumano instructed Fincke to obtain a bid providing a twenty
percent commission. Cusumano and Fincke discussed how Fincke would set up
and use a dummy offshore corporation to avoid paying taxes on the
commissions.
Cusumano also met with Bogan to solicit his agreement to entertain Fincke's
bid, telling him that "he would be taken care of" if the Board accepted Fincke's
bid. Bogan recommended Fincke's bid to the Board, which approved it.
Fincke's bid contained a misrepresentation of the amount of the commission,
proposing an annual $12,000 commission when in actuality he would receive
almost $100,000 annually.
On July 25, 1990, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. The district
court imposed multiple three and six year prison terms for Cusumano's preGuidelines conduct and multiple Guidelines terms of 71 months, all to run
concurrently. Significant fines and restitution were also imposed under the
Guidelines. Final judgment of conviction and sentence was entered December
7, 1990, and Cusumano appealed to this court.
II. DISCUSSION
9
A. Section 1954
10
Whoever being:
11
12
....
13
receives or agrees to receive or solicits any fee, kickback, commission, gift, loan,
14
money, or thing of value because of or with intent to be influenced with respect to,
any of his actions, decisions, or other duties relating to any question or matter
concerning such plan....2
15
This court has characterized this provision broadly to reach "all persons who
exercise control, direct or indirect, authorized or unauthorized, over the fund."
United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 199-200 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 967, 101 S.Ct. 1484, 67 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (cited in United States v.
Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 90 (3d Cir.1984); United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d
919, 925, 927 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 2268, 73
L.Ed.2d 1283 (1982)).
16
17did knowingly and unlawfully solicit and receive ... a fee, kickback, commission,
...
gift, money and thing of value, that is, currency and securities ... from an insurance
agent ... because of and with intent to be influenced, in respect to [his] actions,
decisions and other duties relating to questions and matters concerning the Fund,
that is, the placement of insurance coverage for the Fund with an insurance agent....
18
As noted above, the government's theory in this case was that Cusumano held
the necessary position of influence with respect to the Fund. Cusumano
contends that 1954 does not encompass such a theory because the Fund is not
a "welfare benefit plan" within the meaning of ERISA. Consequently,
Cusumano argues that the government failed to prove the first element of a
1954 prosecution, i.e., that the plan in question was a welfare benefit plan
under ERISA.
21
Initially, we note that the question whether the Fund was a welfare benefit plan
under ERISA was submitted to the jury without objection from Cusumano. In
fact Cusumano delayed until oral argument in this court before raising this
issue. Therefore, our power to grant relief is limited to circumstances in which
the district court's instruction to the jury was plain error affecting substantial
rights. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30, 52(b). Given that the challenge to the
construction of the statute goes to the existence vel non of criminal
responsibility, we think that the error, if such it was, would affect Cusumano's
due process rights and would constitute plain error. United States v. Piccolo,
835 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032, 108 S.Ct. 2014,
100 L.Ed.2d 602 (1988). We therefore turn to the merits of Cusumano's
contention.
22
23 plan, fund, or program ... to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was
any
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing ... (A) medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training
programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B)
any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on retirement
or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
29 U.S.C. 1002(1).3
24
Cusumano contends that the Fund is not a welfare benefit plan because it
provides more than one of the listed types of benefits. Thus, he construes
narrowly the quoted disjunctive language to exclude from ERISA coverage any
plan that provides more than one type of benefit. He supports his position by
arguing that each individual benefit plan under the Fund, including the dental
and life insurance plans, requires a separate application and approval by federal
agencies such as the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service.
25
conclusion, it is not suggested that the ultimate question was not for the jury.
Therefore, the district court did not err in submitting the 1954 counts to the
jury.
2. Can the Fund be the Subject of Cusumano's 1954 Prosecution?
26
27
Cusumano challenges the government's use of the Fund as the relevant plan in
this case. He contends that in referring to a welfare benefit plan and to "such
plan," 1954 refers to the specific plan that is the subject of the kickback
scheme. Further, he argues that in this case it was the life insurance plan alone
that was the subject of the kickback scheme. Thus it is his position that the
government was required to prove Cusumano's relationship to the life insurance
plan. 4
28
29
30
We agree with Cusumano that the language "such plan" refers to the same plan
to which the defendant bears the relevant relationship. Further, because the
wrongful transaction must involve "such plan," we also agree that the plan to
which the defendant bears the relationship must be the plan that is the subject
of the kickback scheme. The question, then, is whether the Fund was a subject
of the kickback scheme. If it was, the Fund was properly the subject of the
1954 counts.
31
involved the premiums paid by the Fund for life insurance coverage, the
relevant plan for 1954 purposes was the life insurance plan. However, the
issue is not whether the life insurance plan could be the subject of a 1954
prosecution, but whether the Fund could be. While he does not state his
argument in this way, the necessary implication of Cusumano's position is that
the Fund was not involved in the kickback scheme. However, Cusumano does
not explain why it is that the Fund was not defrauded, nor would such an
argument be convincing on the facts of this case.
32
The evidence demonstrates that the Fund was established for the purpose of
providing various types of benefits through the purchase of individual
insurance contracts. The Board, on the Fund's behalf, accepted Fincke's
proposed bid to purchase life insurance coverage from an insurance company.
That bid was the product of the scheme orchestrated by Cusumano. The money
the Fund used to pay for the life insurance coverage went in part to Cusumano
under the scheme. Therefore, we cannot say, as a matter of law or fact, that the
Fund was not the subject of the kickback scheme. We therefore reject
Cusumano's contention.
33
B. Embezzlement Counts
34
Cusumano seeks a new trial on the counts charging him with embezzlement
under 18 U.S.C. 664. That provision imposes criminal liability on
35
36
The indictment charged that Cusumano did embezzle, steal and unlawfully and
willfully convert to [his] own use ... the moneys, funds, securities, premiums,
credits, property and other assets of the Fund....
37
Cusumano assigns two grounds of error in the district court's charge to the jury.
It is suggested at the outset by both parties that we should review these
objections only for plain error. The record is not entirely clear as to whether the
objections were preserved. However, because of our conclusion, we will
proceed to address the merits under the abuse of discretion standard as if the
objections had been preserved. See United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 247
(3d Cir.1991); United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 458 n. 3 (3d Cir.1987).
38
Cusumano first argues that the district court improperly charged the jury in the
disjunctive rather than conjunctive. He asserts that, although 664 is written in
the disjunctive, the indictment charged in the conjunctive, and thus the district
court, in instructing the jury in the disjunctive, permitted the jury to go beyond
the indictment.
39
Where the relevant statute lists alternative means of violation, "[t]he general
rule is that when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging
several acts in the conjunctive ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient
with respect to any of the acts charged." Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398,
420, 90 S.Ct. 642, 654, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970). This rule obviously extends to a
trial court's jury instructions in the disjunctive in the context of a conjunctively
worded indictment. See United States v. Klein, 850 F.2d 404, 405-06 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867, 109 S.Ct. 173, 102 L.Ed.2d 143 (1988); United
States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945,
107 S.Ct. 1603, 94 L.Ed.2d 789 (1987); United States v. Uzzolino, 651 F.2d
207, 210 n. 2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865, 102 S.Ct. 327, 70 L.Ed.2d
166 (1981). Cusumano does not argue that the evidence was insufficient with
respect to any of the acts charged. Therefore, the failure to charge in the
conjunctive cannot be treated as an improper amendment of the indictment. We
thus conclude that the district court's charge did not constitute an abuse of
discretion.
40
Next, Cusumano argues that the district court should have given a specific
unanimity instruction on the embezzlement counts under United States v.
Beros, 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir.1987). He states that the district court gave merely
a general unanimity instruction, but failed to specify to the jury that it must be
unanimous in concluding that Cusumano committed one of the disjunctive acts.
Thus he argues that the jury might have thought that it could convict as long as
each of them believed he committed one of the listed offenses but without being
unanimous as to any offense. His proposed point for charge illustrates his
grievance. Cusumano proposed that, after charging as to the disjunctive list of
offenses, the district court instruct the jury that "you are instructed that ... the
jury must unanimously agree on one or more of these charged elements."
41
The Beros rule comes into play only when the circumstances are such that the
C. Sentencing Challenges
43
Cusumano first contends that the district court improperly relied on the money
laundering counts to determine his base offense level. Guidelines 3D1.1
directs a district court, in the case of convictions on multiple counts, to group
the counts into "Groups of Closely-Related Counts" under 3D1.2, and then to
determine the offense level applicable to each group under 3D1.3. Under
3D1.2(b), counts are grouped together when they "involve the same victim and
two or more acts or transactions connected by a common criminal objective or
constituting a part of a common scheme or plan." Under 3D1.3(a), the district
court is instructed to assign the offense level "for the most serious of the counts
comprising the Group, i.e., the highest offense level of the counts in the
Group."
45
The district court, rejecting Cusumano's argument that the money laundering
offenses were "ancillary" to the primary kickback offenses, concluded that "the
money laundering ... is very much in the thick of this entire scheme." On that
basis the court grouped the money laundering offenses with the other offenses
for the purposes of determining the offense level. The district court assigned a
base offense level of 23 under Guidelines 2S1.1(a) relating to money
laundering.7
46
Cusumano contends that the district court erred in relying on the money
laundering counts to determine the base offense level. He argues that the
money laundering counts were not related, but were ancillary, to the other
counts in the indictment. This contention requires us to determine whether the
counts were properly grouped under 3D1.2(b).
47
We have previously stated that a construction of 3D1.2 is a legal issue for our
plenary review. See United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1304 (3d
Cir.1991). However, in that case the issue was "whether offenses for which
society is the victim are properly grouped together...." In contrast, Cusumano's
particular objection requires us to decide whether his various offenses were part
of one overall scheme, which we view as an "essentially factual" issue. On that
basis, our review of the district court's determination that the offenses were not
"ancillary" is governed by the clearly erroneous standard. See United States v.
Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 126-27 (3d Cir.1989).
48
Cusumano contends that the evidence showed that Fincke made all the
arrangements concerning the handling of the money, and that Cusumano played
a minimal role in the conduct that was the basis for the money laundering
counts. Thus he contends that the money laundering offenses were ancillary to
the "real" charged offense, the kickbacks.
49
laundering were all part of one overall scheme to obtain money from the Fund
and to convert it to the use of Cusumano, Fincke and Bogan. Therefore, the
district court's conclusion that the money laundering offenses were not
"ancillary" is not clearly erroneous.
50
While less than clear, Cusumano also seems to contend that, even if the district
court properly applied the language of 3D1.2(b) to group the counts together,
that result is inconsistent with the overall intent of the Guidelines which is to
sentence on the bases of a "real offense" system rather than a "charge offense"
system. He argues that the "real" or "core" offenses of which he was convicted
were those involving the kickback scheme, and he should thus be sentenced on
that basis. This objection does raise an issue of construction, and our review is
plenary. See Riviere, 924 F.2d at 1304.
51
52
53
We find no error in the district court's determination of the base offense level.
2. Aggravating Role
55
Second, Cusumano argues that the district court erred in making an upward
adjustment of two levels on the basis of his "aggravating role" under Guidelines
3B1.1. Because the adjustment is based on the district court's factual
determination, our review is defined by the clearly erroneous standard. See
Ortiz, 878 F.2d at 127.
56
57
58
The evidence supports the district court's conclusions that Cusumano played a
more central role. For example, it was Cusumano who first approached both
Fincke and Bogan to suggest the scheme. It was Cusumano who demanded that
Fincke obtain a twenty percent commission rate to increase their return, and
who told Bogan that if the Board accepted the proposal Bogan would "be taken
care of." Further, Cusumano participated in organizing all aspects of the
scheme, including the financial transactions. The district court's conclusion that
Cusumano played an aggravating role is not clearly erroneous, and thus the
district court did not err in making the upward adjustment. See Gonzalez, 918
F.2d at 1139.
3. Obstruction of Justice
59
Finally, Cusumano contends that the district court improperly adjusted his
offense level upward under Guidelines 3C1.1 relating to "Obstructing or
Impeding the Administration of Justice" based on his statements to the
probation officer concerning his financial circumstances.
60
61
The district court found that Cusumano told the probation officer, upon
questioning as to his financial resources, that stock which he owned was
"essentially worthless." In fact, the court found that "[t]here was a very
vigorous, ongoing, well-nigh concluded negotiation to sell the aforesaid for
over a half million dollars, which of course, is not well-nigh worthless." The
district court concluded that Cusumano's statement to the probation officer was
"at the very best a half truth," and that he had engaged in "willful misleading of
the Probation authorities." On that basis the court adjusted Cusumano's offense
level upward pursuant to 3C1.1. We read the district court to have implicitly
concluded that the false information provided by Cusumano was "material."
62
Cusumano disputes that the information he provided was false. He asserts that
the evidence shows that at the time of his statements to the probation officer the
negotiations involving the sale of Cusumano's stock were preliminary. Our
review of the district court's finding that Cusumano lied and willfully mislead
the probation officer is governed by the clearly erroneous standard. See United
States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 292 (3d Cir.1989).
63
We do not disagree that the sale of Cusumano's property might not have been
completed at the time of his interview by the probation officer. However, that
does not make the district court's conclusion clearly erroneous. Cusumano's
report that his property was "essentially worthless" is entirely inconsistent with
the fact that he was negotiating the sale of that property, even apart from the
actual magnitude of the value of the sale. The sale need not have been
consummated to give the property value. Therefore, the district court's finding
that Cusumano lied about his financial resources was not clearly erroneous.
64
Cusumano also states that, even if his report were "less than totally candid, it
did not constitute a 'material falsehood.' " While he does not elaborate, we take
Cusumano to be arguing that his misrepresentation was not "material" because
it did not influence the probation officer's report.
65
We have found no case that has directly held on the question whether
materiality under 3C1.1 is an issue of law or fact for the district court. To the
extent courts have spoken to the issue, it appears that there may be some
difference of opinion. Compare, e.g., United States v. Torres-Rodriguez, 930
F.2d 1375, 1389-90 (9th Cir.1991) (review district court's finding of obstruction
of justice, for false testimony as to material fact, for clear error) with United
States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1063 (2d Cir.1990) (district court
determination of obstruction of justice reviewed as factual finding except where
question turns on interpretation of guideline term), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----,
111 S.Ct. 1319, 113 L.Ed.2d 252 (1991). The parties have not addressed the
specific question of our standard of review of a materiality determination by the
district court. We will assume without deciding that our standard of review is
plenary, because even under this more rigorous standard the district court did
not err.
66
III. CONCLUSION
67
The indictment makes clear that only the quoted portion of 1954 is potentially
applicable to Cusumano in this case. Thus other portions of the section are
omitted
Section 186(c), a provision of the Labor Management Relations Act, refers to,
inter alia, pooled vacation, holiday and severance benefits. 29 U.S.C. 186(c)
(6) (1988). The effect of 1002(1)(B) "is to include in the definition of 'welfare
plan' those plans which provide holiday and severance benefits, and benefits
which are similar (for example, benefits which are in substance severance
benefits, although not so characterized)". 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-1(a)(3) (1990)
We note that Cusumano cites United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 51 (3d
Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 732, 50 L.Ed.2d 748 (1977), in
the context of his argument under Beros. Dansker is inapplicable here for a
variety of reasons, not the least of which is that this court has not reversed
Cusumano's conviction on any count
The offenses which were the basis of the Guidelines sentences occurred prior to
the effective date of the current Guidelines, November 1, 1990. Both the parties
and the district court refer to the current Guidelines without mention of this
fact. Because our disposition is unaffected by amendments to the Guidelines in
effect at the time of the offenses, we also will apply the current version
Cusumano contends that the district court should have assigned a base offense
level under Guidelines 2E5.1(a)(2) relating to violations concerning employee
welfare plans
The factors involved in a court's determination under this section include the
following: (1) the exercise of decision-making authority; (2) the nature of
participation in the commission of the offense; (3) the recruitment of
accomplices; (4) the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime;
(5) the degree of participation in planning and organizing the offense; (6) the
nature and scope of the illegal activity; and (7) the degree of control and
authority exercised over others. See U.S.S.G. 3B1.1, application note 3;
United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1138 n. 9 (3d Cir.1990), cert.
denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1015, 112 L.Ed.2d 1097 (1991)