Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 446
71-1 USTC P 9356
Nicholas Martini, Passaic, N.J. (Sam Weiss, Newark, N.J., on the brief),
for appellant.
Stephen M. Greenberg, Asst. U.S. Atty., Newark, N.J. (Frederick B.
Lacey, U.S. Atty., Newark, N.J., on the brief), for appellee.
Before KALODNER, STALEY and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
STALEY, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, a county court judge for Passaic County, New Jersey, was convicted
of willfully failing to file Federal Income Tax returns for the years 1962, 1963,
1964, 1965, and 1966, in violation of Title 26 U.S.C. 7203.1 This appeal
followed.
Appellant next contends that the district court erred in permitting crossexamination of his character witnesses on matters that were irrelevant. He
specifically takes issue with questions such as whether one witness, a lawyer,
was shocked by the news that a local judge had failed to file returns and
whether this news was a blow to and shocked the witness and other lawyers;
whether another witness believed that a judge's conduct should be free from
impropriety, from the appearance of impropriety, and from infractions of the
law; and whether the latter witness, a former State senator, would have moved
for confirmation of the appointment of appellant as a judge, putting him on the
bench 'with a black robe around his shoulders, sitting in judgment in criminal
cases,' 'returning that kind of a man to the bench.' It is a fundamental principle
of law that the scope of the Government's cross-examination of defense
character witnesses is determined by the trial court as a matter of discretion and
the ruling of the trial court will be disturbed only 'on clear showing of
prejudicial abuse of discretion.' Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480,
69 S.Ct. 213, 221, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948). We do not find an abuse of discretion
in the instant case. Defendant had voluntarily put his reputation in issue and
had thus made it a proper area for cross-examination, Michelson v. United
States, supra. The Government's cross-examination of these character witnesses
went to their knowledge of the appellant's reputation and to the witnesses'
standard of good repute. The facts upon which these witnesses were crossexamined were relevant to issues raised by the appellant.2
5
Appellant further contends that the district court erred in its charge to the jury
on the element of willfulness. The instructions given adequately stated the law
governing the element of willfulness and were in accord with this court's
holding in United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (C.A. 3, 1966), and United
States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (C.A. 3, 1958). Even assuming arguendo that
the instructions as given were incorrect, no objection was made to them by
appellant as required by Rule 51, F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.3 Rule 51 thus precludes
him from raising this objection for the first time on appeal. We cannot say that
the charge was so fundamentally unfair as to have resulted in a gross
miscarriage of justice. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 56 S.Ct. 391,
80 L.Ed. 555 (1936); McNello v. John B. Kelly, Inc., 283 F.2d 96 (C.A. 3,
1960).
We have carefully considered all of appellant's other arguments and find them
to be without merit. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
The statute provides that 'any person * * * required by this title * * * to make a
return * * * who willfully fails to * * * make such return * * * shall * * * be
guilty of a misdemeanor * * *.'
The district court twice instructed the jury on the element of willfulness; once
in its intial charge, and again in a supplemental charge given in response to a
question by the jury. Following each of these instructions, appellant's trial
counsel specifically did not take exception to the instruction given by the court