855 F.

2d 67
57 USLW 2110, 22 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 662,
Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 14105A

ZEBLEY, Brian, by his parent and natural guardian,

ZEBLEY,
John, on behalf of himself and on behalf of a
class of all others similarly situated
Intervenor:
Raushi, Evelyn, by her parent and natural guardian, Raushi,
Mary
Intervenor:
Love, Joseph, Jr., by his parent and natural guardian,
Margarite Love, Appellants,
v.
Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human
Services.
No. 87-1692.

United States Court of Appeals,

Third Circuit.
Argued May 3, 1988.
Decided Aug. 10, 1988.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 18, 1988.

Mark Kauffman, Delaware County Legal Assistance, Chester, Pa.,

Jonathan M. Stein (argued), Richard P. Weishaupt, Sheila Zakre,
Community Legal Services, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants.
Barbara Koppa Gerolamo, Asst. U.S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., Peter S.
Krynski (argued), Office of the General Counsel, Social Sec. Div., Dept.
of Health and Human Services, Baltimore, Md., Dorothea Lundelius,
DHHS/OGC/Region 111, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees.
Ilene W. Shane, Disabilities Law Project, Philadelphia, Pa., amicus curiae,
Pennsylvania Protection and Advocacy, Inc., et al.--on side of appellants.

Leonard S. Rubenstein, Mental Health Law Project, Washington, D.C.,

amicus curiae, The American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry, et al.--on side of appellants.
Marilyn Holle, Protection and Advocacy, Inc., Los Angeles, Cal.,
Elizabeth Jameson, Youth Law Center, Alice Bussiere, Nat. Center for
Youth Law, San Francisco, Cal., Grace Galligher, Dir. Atty., Coalition of
California Welfare Rights Organizations, Sacramento, Cal., amicus curiae,
Spina Bifida Ass'n of Greater Los Angeles, Welfare Recipients League
and Russell Champaign--on side of appellants.
Before GIBBONS, Chief Judge, and MANSMANN and COWEN, Circuit
Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to examine the policies and procedures used by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services in determining whether a child is
"disabled," so as to be eligible for Supplemental Security benefits. A child is
defined by statute to be disabled by "any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment of comparable severity " to one which would enable an
adult to qualify for disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1382c(a)(3)(A) (emphasis
added). The Secretary's regulatory scheme confines eligibility for benefits to
children who can demonstrate an impairment with medical findings that meet or
equal those of one of the specific impairments listed in an Appendix to the
regulations. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.924.

The Appendix has not been shown to provide an exhaustive catalog of medical
findings which could, singly or in combination, describe, "any" impairment
which might satisfy the statutory standard of "comparable severity." Therefore,
we hold that the Secretary's regulatory scheme is too restrictive to be consistent
with the statute. The statutory standard requires that children, like adults, be
given an opportunity for individualized assessment of the severity of their
functional limitations.

Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the district court, 642 F.Supp. 220,
with respect to the claim of the plaintiff class that the procedure set forth in 20
C.F.R. Sec. 416.924 is inconsistent with the statutory mandate of 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 1382c(a)(3)(A), and we will remand the case for the entry of summary
judgment for the class with respect to that claim. We will, however, affirm the

order of the district court with respect to the additional claim of the plaintiff
class that the regulations are inconsistent with the Social Security Disability
Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1381 et seq.
I.
4

In 1974, to complement the existing contributory social insurance program,

Congress established the Supplemental Security Income program to assist
"individuals who have attained age 65 or are blind or disabled." 42 U.S.C. Sec.
1381. Although welfare benefits are available under a separate program for
needy families with children, Congress included disabled children under the
somewhat more generous Supplemental Security Income program in the "belief
that disabled children who live in low-income households are certainly among
the most disadvantaged of all Americans and that they are deserving of special
assistance in order to help them become self-supporting members of our
society." H.R.Rep. No. 231, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 4989, 5133.
The precise statute provides that:

An individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of this subchapter

if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months (or, in the case of a child under the age of
18, if he suffers from any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment of comparable severity ).

42 U.S.C. Sec. 1382c(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).

The Secretary has promulgated regulations setting forth the procedure to be

followed in determining whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of
disability. Under the regulations, an adult or a child who is not performing any
substantial gainful activity, and who has an impairment which meets the
duration requirement and has medical findings which meet or equal the findings
associated with a listing of specific impairments set forth in Appendix 1 to the
regulations, will be found disabled under the regulations without considering
any evidence except the medical findings. 28 C.F.R. Sec. 416.920(d); Sec.
416.924(b). Medical equivalence to a listed impairment must be based on
medical findings. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.926(b). The functional consequences of
combined impairments, "irrespective of their nature, cannot justify a

determination of equivalence with a listed impairment." Soc.Sec.Rul. 83-19

(emphasis in original).
8

Part A of the Appendix sets forth medical criteria for evaluating impairments in
adults and, where appropriate, in children as well. 20 C.F.R. Chapter III, Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix I. Part B of the Appendix lists additional medical
criteria applicable to children only. Id. Part B is to be used first in evaluating
disability for a person under age 18. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.925(b)(2).

If an adult's medical findings do not meet or equal the listings, the regulations
provide for an individualized assessment of the actual degree of functional
impairment. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.920(e) & (f).1

10

No such individual assessment is provided for children in the Secretary's

regulations. If a child's medical findings do not meet or equal the listings, the
child may not be found to be disabled regardless of the severity of the actual
impairment.2

II.
11

Brian Zebley was born July 13, 1978 and received Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) disability benefits as a disabled child from September 12, 1980
until January 26, 1983. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Social
Security Administration, Department of Health and Human Services,
determined later that the medical evidence of congenital brain damage with
spastic right hemiparesis, mental retardation, development delay, eye problems
and musculoskeletal impairments on the right side no longer met or equaled the
requirements of any section of the Listing of Impairments at Appendix 1.
Therefore, the Administration found that Brian's childhood disability ceased as
of June, 1982 and that his eligibility for SSI terminated August 31, 1982. The
Appeals Council denied review and, on July 1, 1983, Zebley filed a class action
complaint against the Secretary in the district court.

12

Zebley asserted as an individual that the decision to terminate his benefits was
not supported by substantial evidence. On behalf of the class, he asserted that
the Secretary's policy and regulations violated the Social Security Act,
specifically 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1382(a)(3)(A), by the Secretary refusing to consider
all pertinent facts and medical and vocational factors in determining children's
eligibility for SSI disability payments.

13

Joseph Love, Jr., whose claim for SSI benefits was denied, and Evelyn Raushi,

whose benefits were terminated, filed petitions to intervene on September 2,

1983 and November 1, 1983 respectively. On January 10, 1984, the district
judge certified a class of
14

"[a]ll persons who are now, or who in the future will be, entitled to an
administrative determination (whether initially, on reconsideration, or on
reopening) as to whether supplemental security income benefits are payable on
account of a child who is disabled, or as to whether such benefits have been
improperly denied, or improperly terminated, or should be resumed."

15

On October 12, 1984, the district court granted Zebley's motion for partial
summary judgment. The court reversed the Secretary's decision on Zebley's
individual claim and remanded it to the Secretary for calculation and award of
benefits.

16

On March 13, 1985, upon the Secretary's uncontested motion, the district court
remanded Evelyn Raushi's claim to the Secretary for review in accordance with
the Social Security Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1381 et seq.
(Supp.1987).

17

On July 16, 1986, the district court granted the Secretary's motion for partial
summary judgment and dismissed the claims of the plaintiff class challenging
the Secretary's regulations.

18

On April 23, 1987, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the claim of intervenor
Joseph Love was remanded to the Secretary for review under the Social
Security Benefits Reform Act of 1984.

19

On October 26, 1987, the district court certified the entry of final judgment in
accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). On November 5, 1987, plaintiffs,
intervenors and all members of the certified class appealed. Numerous amici
curiae filed briefs in support of the appellants.3

III.
20

The plaintiffs challenge only the dismissal of the certified class' claim that the
Secretary's regulatory scheme for determining disability in children is
inadequate to identify "any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment of comparable severity " to one which would disable an adult as
required by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1382c(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). The plaintiffs
argue that the regulatory scheme violates the statutory standard by restricting

eligibility for benefits to children who can demonstrate an impairment with

medical findings that meet or equal those of one of the specific impairments
listed in Appendix 1 to the regulations. The plaintiffs assert that the statutory
standard requires the same individualized assessment of the severity of a child's
functional limitations as is available for adults who are not able to establish
their disability on the basis of medical evidence alone.
21

Between the filing of the complaint and the entry of the final order in this case,
Congress passed the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984,
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1381 et seq. The plaintiffs assert that the regulatory scheme
violates the Reform Act, which requires the Secretary to consider the medical
severity of a combination of impairments without regard to whether any
individual impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient medical
severity to be the basis of eligibility for benefits. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1382c(a)(3)(G)
and (H) (Supp.1987).

22

The plaintiffs also argue that the Secretary has ignored section 5(a) of the
Reform Act which, plaintiffs assert, directs the Secretary to revise the "Mental
and Emotional Disorders" listings for children.

23

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec.
405(g) and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1383(C)(3). We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.

IV.
24

The question on our review of district court decisions in suits challenging

Social Security regulations is whether the district court applied the correct legal
precepts in reaching its conclusions. Barnes v. Cohen, 749 F.2d 1009, 1013 (3d
Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061, 105 S.Ct. 2126, 85 L.Ed.2d 490 (1985).
Our review of the district court's interpretation and application of legal precepts
is plenary. Gaines v. Amalgamated Ins. Fund, 753 F.2d 288, 290 (3d Cir.1985).

25

A reviewing court must defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute which

the agency administers so long as the interpretation is reasonable. Lugo v.
Schweiker, 776 F.2d 1143, 1147 (3d Cir.1985). Section 1383(d)(1) of the SSI
statute grants the Secretary "full power and authority to make rules and
regulations and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of
this subchapter, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such
provisions...." Because Congress did not describe explicitly a method for
determining whether a claimant is disabled, our review is limited to

determining if the regulation in question, 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.924, exceeds the

Secretary's authority or is arbitrary or capricious. Bowen v. Yuckert, --- U.S. ---, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458,
466, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1956, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983).
26

The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must
reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional
intent. Lugo v. Schweiker, 776 F.2d at 1147. The agency's regulations must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Id.

A.
27

The plaintiffs and amici curiae argue that the Secretary's child disability
evaluation policy is inconsistent with the statute because it fails to afford an
individualized assessment of the actual extent of functional impairment
resulting from a child's medical pathology. They assert that the regulatory
procedure fails to identify many children who are disabled as defined by the
statute and the regulations. The following assertions by the Spina Bifida
Association of Greater Los Angeles are illustrative of the numerous examples
alleged by amici to demonstrate the inadequacy of the Secretary's exclusive
reliance on the medical listings.

28

Many of the disability problems children with spina bifida have, and which
result in functional limitations, are not catalogued in the children's listings of
impairments: gastrostomy tubes into the stomach through which a child is fed;
tracheostomies which are openings into the neck through which the child
breathes and through which the child is suctioned to prevent aspiration or
pneumonia; and shunts to remove excess fluid from the head to prevent or
minimize brain damage from the pressure of water on the brain. As a result of
having functional limitations due to disability problems not catalogued in the
Listings, some severely disabled spina bifida children have not been able to
qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI).

29

Brief of Amici Curiae at p. 2.

30

In interpreting a statute, our starting point is the language itself; it is to be

presumed that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of
the words used, and if the statutory language is clear, it is not necessary to
examine legislative history. Barnes v. Cohen, 749 F.2d 1009, 1013 (3d
Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061, 105 S.Ct. 2126, 85 L.Ed.2d 490 (1985).

The statute provides that:

31

An individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of this subchapter

if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months (or, in the case of a child under the age of
18, if he suffers from any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment of comparable severity ).

32

42 U.S.C. Sec. 1382c(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).

33

In keeping with the statute, the regulations provide that a child will be found
disabled if "suffering from any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which compares in severity to an impairment that would make an
adult (a person over age 18) disabled." 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.906. The Secretary
adopted listings for children which were determined to be of "comparable
severity" to the adult criteria. Id. According to the regulations, the listed
impairments "are considered severe enough to prevent a person from doing any
gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.925. Thus, the functional consequence of
the listed impairments is presumed.

34

When a court reviews an agency's construction of a statute which it administers,

the court is confronted with two questions: whether Congress has directly
spoken on the precise question at issue; if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104
S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227, 105 S.Ct. 28,
82 L.Ed.2d 921; Kean v. Heckler, 799 F.2d 895 (3d Cir.1986).

35

Congress has expressed unambiguously its intent that "any" impairment which
meets the statutory standard shall be found disabling. Therefore, the Secretary's
regulatory method for determining disability must be adequate to identify any
qualifying impairment.

36

The listings however, do not purport to be an exhaustive compilation of medical

conditions which could impair functioning to the extent necessary to satisfy the
statutory standard for liability. The regulations recognize this by providing for
individualized assessment of the actual degree of functional impairment of
adults whose medical findings do not entitle them to a presumption of disability

by meeting or equaling the listings. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.920(e) and (f).

37

As we explained above, the regulations do not provide for such individual

assessment for children, although they are entitled by statute to receive benefits
if suffering from "any" impairment of "comparable severity" to one which
would render an adult unable to engage in "substantial" gainful activity. It is the
expressed intention of Congress that children be given the opportunity to show
that they suffer from "any" impairment of "comparable severity" to one which
would actually, even if not presumptively, disable an adult.

38

Therefore we find that the regulations are inconsistent with the statute in
precluding a finding that a child is disabled unless his impairment meets or
equals a listed one.

39

The district court rejected the challenge to the validity of the regulations relying
principally on the precedential force of two appellate court decisions, Powell v.
Schweiker, 688 F.2d 1357 (11th Cir.1982), reh'g denied, 694 F.2d 727 (11th
Cir.1982) and Hinckley v. Secretary of HHS, 742 F.2d 19 (1st Cir.1984). The
Secretary's arguments on this appeal are essentially those adopted by the courts
in Powell and Hinckley. We find neither decision persuasive.

40

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Powell considered the
argument that the Secretary's regulations were inadequate in failing to provide
criteria for children, comparable to vocational factors for adults, against which
to compare the medical evidence in determining the actual degree of a child's
functional impairment. The court, however, concluded that the regulations were
"reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation" because some
impairments of "comparable severity" would be identified by certain of the
listings in Part B which evaluate the degree of medical impairment in terms of a
child's ability to perform age-appropriate activities. 688 F.2d at 1360. We
decline to accept this reasoning.

41

We reiterate that Congress has unambiguously expressed its intent that "any"
impairment which meets the statutory standard shall be found disabling. The
Secretary's regulatory method for determining disability, which is adequate to
identify only some comparable impairments is not enough.

42

Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded in Hinckley that
the regulation "allows for an assessment of a child's mental or physical
limitations on an individual basis by providing that a child may be found
disabled if his impairment 'is determined by [the Secretary] to be medically

equal to an impairment listed in [the Appendix].' " 742 F.2d at 23. We also
decline to accept this conclusion.

43

Medical equivalence to a listed impairment must be based on medical findings.

20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.926(b). In the final analysis, it is functional impairment
which is meant to be evidenced by the medical findings. It is only impaired
ability to function which results in disability. Nevertheless, the Secretary has
made it clear that the functional consequences of combined impairments,
"irrespective of their nature, cannot justify a determination of equivalence with
a listed impairment." Soc.Sec.Rul. 83-19 (emphasis in original). Therefore,
something more is necessary in order to determine whether the degree of a
claimant's impairment satisfies the statutory standard for disability.

44

The Secretary argues vigorously that the Staff of the Senate Committee on
Finance reporting publication of the regulations, approves the regulations as
consistent with the statute, an argument which was adopted by the Hinckley
court. 742 F.2d at 22. The report noted that "[t]he nonmedical vocational
factors were not applied to the children for basically the same reasons they had
not been applied to disabled widows in earlier legislation, i.e., that as a group
they had not had enough attachment to the labor force to make application of
these factors feasible." Staff of Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., The Supplemental Security Income Program 125 (Comm.Print 1977). We
disagree that children's and widows' similar lack of attachment to the labor
force justifies the Secretary's limited procedures with respect to children.

45

At the time Congress amended the Social Security Act to provide for widows'
benefits, the existing test for disability was the one which was later adopted for
SSI benefits, i.e., the ability to engage in "substantial gainful activity." In
providing for widows' benefits, Congress explicitly authorized a more stringent
disability standard. The statute provides as follows:

46widow, surviving divorced wife, or widower shall not be determined to be under a

A
disability ... unless his or her physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a
level of severity which under regulations prescribed by the Secretary is deemed to be
sufficient to preclude an individual from engaging in any gainful activity.
47

The legislative history shows that Congress was well aware of the difference.
The House version of the bill offered inability to engage in "any" gainful
activity as the standard. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1967 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2834, 3197. The Senate
version was more liberal, using the "substantial" gainful activity standard. Id.
The conference agreement settled on the language from the House bill. Id.

48

In enacting the SSI plan, Congress explicitly provided that adult eligibility is to
be measured by inability to engage in "substantial" gainful activity, and that
children's disability is to be evidenced by "any" impairment of "comparable
severity." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Significantly, the
statute did not provide that children's impairments need be comparable to those
which would disable an adult from any gainful activity.

49

The finance committee report cited by the Secretary postdated the passage of
the statute by approximately five years, and post-enactment comment by a
legislative committee generally does not serve as a reliable indicator of
congressional intent Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 99 S.Ct. 2066,
60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979). Even if the report can be said to evidence Congress'
implicit approval of ignoring vocational factors in gauging disability in
children, this does not mean that the Secretary is not required to assess a child's
functional impairment against appropriate criteria comparable to vocational
factors for adults.

50

The court in Hinckley expressed its concern that in requiring the Secretary to
measure the actual degree of functional impairment caused by each child's
medical condition(s), the court would also have to devise a standard against
which to assess when a child's remaining capabilities are comparable to an
adult's inability to engage in "substantial gainful activity." 742 F.2d at 23. We
see no necessity for such an intrusion upon the Secretary's authority.

51

The Secretary has already interpreted the statutory standard of "comparable

severity" to comprehend those impairments which impact on a child's
"development" to the same extent that a disabling impairment impacts on an
adult's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. 42 Fed.Reg. 14705
(1977).

52

We recognize that our decision places us in the minority among courts which
have considered the legality of these regulations.4 Nevertheless, our review of
authorities upholding the regulations5 does not persuade us to abandon our
conclusion that the Secretary's prescribed method for determining disability in
children is too restrictive to be consistent with the statute.

53

A reviewing court must reject administrative constructions of a statute, whether

reached by adjudication or by rule making, that are inconsistent with the
statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to
implement. Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve
System, 468 U.S. 137, 104 S.Ct. 2979, 82 L.Ed.2d 1107 (1984). We are

persuaded that in the statutory directive that "any" impairment may be

disabling if severe enough, Congress has clearly expressed an intention that
children be given the opportunity for individual evaluations comparable to the
residual functional capacity assessment for adults. This intent is contrary to that
of the agency, which is to restrict children to listed impairments.
54

Therefore we will vacate the district court's order of summary judgment for the
Secretary and remand with the direction to enter summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff class as to this claim.

B.
55

The plaintiffs' second argument is that the regulations are inconsistent with the
1984 Reform Act with respect to children because the regulations do not require
consideration of the "combined effect of all impairments" and "all evidence
available."

56

This claim need not detain us long because its resolution follows from our
disposition of the previous issue. The 1984 Disability Reform Act does require
that the Secretary shall consider the combined impact of multiple impairments
throughout the disability determination process, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1382c(a)(3)(G)
(Supp.1987), and that the Secretary shall consider all evidence available, 42
U.S.C. S1382c(a)(3)(H) (Supp.1987).

57

The regulations recognize those mandates by providing expressly that multiple

impairments will be considered in assessing medical equivalence, 20 C.F.R.
Sec. 416.926, and by providing generally that the combined effect of all of a
claimant's impairments will be considered throughout the disability
determination process. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.923. As we held earlier, an
individualized determination of the degree of functional incapacitation is
required by statute during the disability determination process for children.
Existing regulations will serve to assure consideration of multiple impairments
during that additional evaluative step.

C.
58

The Plaintiffs' final contention is that the Secretary has violated Section 5(a) of
the 1984 Reform Act by failing to revise the mental disorder listings for
children. The Secretary contends that the Reform Act directed the Secretary to
revise only the listings of mental impairments for adults and not those for
children. The mandate of the Reform Act reads as follows:

59 Secretary of Health and Human Services (hereafter in this Section referred to as

The
the "Secretary") shall revise the criteria embodied under the category "Mental
Disorders " in the "Listing of Impairments" in effect on the date of the enactment of
this Act [Oct. 9, 1984] under the Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Part 404 of Title 20 of
Code of Federal Regulations. The revised criteria and listings, alone and in
combination with assessments of the residual functional capacity of the individuals
involved, shall be designed to realistically evaluate the ability of a mentally impaired
individual to engage in substantial gainful activity in a competitive workplace
environment. Regulations establishing such revised criteria and listings shall be
published no later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this act [Oct. 9,
1984].
60

42 U.S.C. Sec. 421 note (Supp.1987) (emphasis added).

61

In August, 1985, the Secretary issued new listings under the category "Mental
Disorders" in Appendix 1, Part A, which are applicable to adults and children.
The Secretary did not revise the listings under the category "Mental and
Emotional Disorders" in Appendix 1, Part B, which are applicable to children
only. Since the statutory time limit for revising the listings has expired, the
plaintiffs request the equitable remedy of a court-ordered timetable for revision
of the children's listings.

62

The Secretary argues that Congress mandated revision only of the category
expressly designated by the statute. The precise designation "Mental Disorders"
appears only in Part A of Appendix 1 of the regulations. The comparable
category in Part B is entitled "Mental and Emotional Disorders." Therefore,
argues the Secretary, Congress intended only that the Part A listings be revised.

63

In addition, the Secretary points to Congress' expressed purpose that the

revision result in criteria and listings "designed to realistically evaluate the
ability of a mentally impaired individual to engage in a competitive workplace
environment." The argument proceeds that since children, for the most part,
have no connection with the workplace, Congress' manifest purpose is to
achieve revision of only the adult criteria.

64

An agency's interpretation of a statute which it administers is entitled to

deference, and need not be the only reasonable one in order to gain judicial
approval. Lugo v. Schweiker, 776 F.2d 1143, 1147 (3d Cir.1985). Plaintiffs and
amici urge that the children's listings are based on outmoded medical and
scientific concepts of disability assessment. They are unable, however, to point
to any unambiguous evidence of congressional intent which would compel us to

find the Secretary's interpretation of the Reform Act to be "arbitrary and

capricious." Id. Neither the legislative history nor the statutory language itself
makes any reference to whether Congress intended that the children's listings in
Part B be included in the mandated revision. If a statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, and the agency's construction is reasonable, a
court must defer to that construction, although it may not be the only or even
the most reasonable one. Kean v. Heckler, 799 F.2d 895 (3d Cir.1986).
Accordingly, we will defer to the Secretary's interpretation of the statute.
VI.
65

In accordance with the foregoing, we will vacate in part the order of summary
judgment in favor of the Secretary and remand to the district court with the
direction that summary judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff class as to
the claim that the Secretary is required by statute to give child claimants for
SSI benefits an opportunity for individualized assessment of their functional
limitations.

20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.920(e) & (f) provide:

(e) Your impairment(s) must prevent you from doing past relevant work. If we
cannot make a decision based on your current work activity or on medical facts
alone, and you have a severe impairment(s), we then review your residual
functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work you have
done in the past. If you can still do this kind of work, we will find that you are
not disabled.
(f) Your impairment(s) must prevent you from doing other work. (1) If you
cannot do any work you have done in the past because you have a severe
impairment(s), we will consider your residual functional capacity and your age,
education, and past work experience to see if you can do other work. If you
cannot, we will find you disabled. (2) If you have only a marginal education,
and long work experience (i.e., 35 years or more) where you only did arduous
unskilled physical labor, and you can no long do this kind of work, we use a
different rule (see Sec. 416.962).

20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.924 (1980) provides:

How we determine disability for a child under age 18.
We will find that a child under age 18 is disabled if he or she--

(a) Is not doing any substantial gainful activity; and

(B) Has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) which
compares in severity to any impairment(s) which would make an adult (a
person age 18 or over) disabled. This requirement will be met when the
impairment(s)
(1) Meets the duration requirement; and
(2) Is listed in Appendix I of Subpart P of Part 404 of this chapter; or
(3) Is determined by us to be medically equal to an impairment listed in
Appendix I of Subpart P of Part 404 of this chapter.
3

Briefs in support of the plaintiff class were filed by the following amici curiae:
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American Psychiatric
Association, Association for Retarded Citizens of the United States, Center for
Law and Social Policy, National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, National
Association of Private Residential Resources, National Association of
Protection and Advocacy Systems, National Mental Health Association,
Pennsylvania Protection and Advocacy, Inc., Pennsylvania Tourette Syndrome
Association, Sickle Cell Genetic Disease Council, Spina Bifida Coalition of
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens, United Cerebral
Palsy of Pennsylvania, Eastern Pennsylvania Chapter of the Arthritis
Foundation, Parent Education Network, Chester County Right to Education
Task Force, Media Child Guidance Community Mental Health/Mental
Retardation Services, Inc., Mental Health Association in Indiana County, Inc.,
Spina Bifida Association of the Delaware Valley, Inc., The Spina Bifida
Association of Greater Los Angeles, Welfare Recipients League, and Russell
Champaign.

The following cases support the position of the plaintiff class: See Mental
Health Assoc. of Minnesota v. Schweiker, 554 F.Supp. 157 (D.Minn.1982),
aff'd 720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.1983) (Sec'y may not presume that mentally
impaired claimants are not disabled unless they meet the listings); Burt v.
Bowen, --- F.Supp. ----, No. C-85-1033-JBH, (E.D.Wash. May 12, 1988)
(Secretary does not possess statutory authority to limit children's disability to
less than any impairment of comparable severity to one which would support
an award to an adult after step 3 in the sequential process); Gordon v. Secretary
of HEW, No. CV 75-4088-F(G) (C.D.Calif. May 6, 1977) (remand because of
exclusive application of listed impairment test--Secretary failed to consider
whether child might be disabled under language in regulations to effect that
medical equivalence determination must give "appropriate consideration of the

particular effect of disease processes in childhood" 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.904,

which is intended to extend to children the same individualized determination
of disability as is available to adults). See also, Bowen v. City of New York,
476 U.S. 467, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986) (SSA rules for
determining disability based on mental impairment are illegal in confining
mental disability determinations to the narrow "listings");
5

The following authorities arguably support the Secretary's position: Burnside v.

Bowen, 845 F.2d 587 (5th Cir.1988) (minor claimant with cystic fibrosis was
evaluated under proper legal standards); Hinckley v. Secretary of H.H.S., 742
F.2d 19 (1st Cir.1984) (Secretary's guidelines for determining whether a child
under 18 is disabled are valid); Powell v. Schweiker, 688 F.2d 1357, (11th
Cir.1982), reh'g denied, 694 F.2d 727 (11th Cir.1982) (failure to carry over
adult evaluation scheme for children's disabilities was not inconsistent with the
statutory definition of disability); Wills v. Secretary, 686 F.Supp. 171, 1987
WL 46333 (W.D.Mich.1987). (The Secretary has permissibly construed the
"comparable severity" language of the statute); Blankenship v. Schweiker, No.
79-3134 (S.D.W.Va. June 19, 1981) ("comparable severity" doesn't mean that
vocational factors test must be applied in determining children's disability
because statute specifically excludes children from discussion of work activity
standard); Zukow v. Harris, No. 80-3199 (M.D.Tenn. December 15, 1980).
(Secretary need not consider whether child of disability claimant's impairments
prevent her from engaging in substantial gainful activity because statute and
legislative history exclude children when discussing work activity, and typical
child has not expectation of income but for the existence of an impairment)