882 F.

2d 820
64 A.F.T.R.2d 89-5418, 89-2 USTC P 9488

Bruce A. and Marianne S. PRABEL, Appellants,

v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Appellee.
No. 89-1265.

United States Court of Appeals,

Third Circuit.
Argued July 25, 1989.
Decided Aug. 18, 1989.
Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied
Sept. 13, 1989.

Robert D. Whoriskey (argued), Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle,

New York City, and John A. Craig, Hawthorne, N.Y., for appellants
(Marilyn K. Freedman and Judith D. Szokol, Curtis, Mallet-Provost, Colt
& Mosle, of counsel).
Shirley D. Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary R. Allen, Chief Appellate
Section, David English Carmack, and Mary Frances Clark (argued),
Attys. Tax Div. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for appellee.
Before GIBBONS, Chief Judge, and HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge, and
WOLIN, District Judge *
OPINION OF THE COURT
GIBBONS, Chief Judge:

Bruce and Marianne Prabel appeal from an adverse decision by the United
States Tax Court. The Prabels owned an interest in a partnership which had
calculated its interest expense for a long-term loan using the Rule of 78
method. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that this method
did not clearly reflect the actual interest expense. The Commissioner required
that the interest expense be calculated under the economic accrual method and
issued a notice of deficiency. The Tax Court found that the Commissioner did

not abuse his discretion under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 446(b) and upheld the deficiency.
We will affirm the Tax Court decision.
I. BACKGROUND
2

Bruce and Marianne Prabel, residents of Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania, are cash
basis taxpayers who timely filed joint federal income tax returns for 1981 and
1982. On or about October 20, 1980, Bruce Prabel became a limited partner in
Quincy Associates, Ltd., acquiring a 3.7485 percent share. In late 1980, Quincy
Associates purchased a shopping center from First Delaware Equity Corp.
(FDEC) for $2,471,000. The shopping center was located in Quincy, Florida.
The purchase price was payable by a cash downpayment of $192,000 and the
balance of $2,279,000 by a nonrecourse, 23-year, 20-month purchase-money
note. The note was issued in the total amount of $7,268,249, reflecting the
$2,279,000 deferred purchase price and $4,989,249 of stated, precomputed
interest. In effect, the note is issued at a discount. The discount substitutes for
or is the equivalent of interest. According to the terms of the note, the discount
is written off, or interest accrues, in accordance with the Rule of 78's method.
The note matures on December 31, 2003, and is secured by a mortgage and
security agreement issued by Quincy Associates.

The terms of the transaction including the terms of the note were the result of
dealings between related entities and were not the result of arms-length
negotiations.

The payment schedule for the note is set forth infra and includes a comparison
to economic accrual of the interest expense. During the first 13 years, interest
expense under the Rule of 78's amortization substantially exceeds actual cash
payments. This is negative amortization. The accrued but unpaid interest is
carried over to subsequent years. However, interest does not accrue on unpaid
interest owed. There is no compounding of interest for the entire term of the
loan.

Pursuant to the terms of the note, Quincy Associates had the right, at its
discretion, to prepay in whole or in part the outstanding principal of the note. In
the event of a prepayment, Quincy was required to pay all unpaid and accrued
interest thereon. The note provides:

6
Regular
monthly payments will be allocated first to the Interest Element and then to
the Principal Element in accordance with the "Rule of 78."
7* * *

8* * *
9
Mortgagor
shall have the right to prepay this Note in whole, at any time that First
Mortgage or Subsequent First Mortgage may be prepaid, by paying to mortgagee the
sum of: (i) the then outstanding principal balance of this Note; (ii) all unpaid and
accrued interest on this Note; (iii) and the amount of any prepayment charge or
penalty due on the First Mortgage and/or Subsequent First Mortgage.
***
10
***
11
12 prepayment of this Note in whole, the Mortgagor will receive a credit for the
On
unearned portion of the Interest Element determined in accordance with the "Rule of
78."
13

(A. 166, 169-70).

14

For federal income tax purposes, Quincy Associates reports its income on an
accrual basis. Quincy Associates determined its annual interest expense for this
loan by taking the total precomputed interest (discount) and allocating it to
annual accounting periods according to the Rule of 78.

15

Following an examination of Quincy Associates' tax returns for 1980, 1981 and
1982, the Commissioner determined that the Rule of 78 method of computing
interest expense did not clearly reflect income and that Quincy Associates must
recompute interest under the economic accrual method.1 See 26 U.S.C. Sec.
446(b). The partnership's alleged excessive accrual for 1980 was adjusted by
way of a section 481 adjustment reflected in deficiencies issued with respect to
1981.

16

As a result of these adjustments, the Commissioner determined deficiencies in

the Prabel's tax liabilities for 1981 and 1982 based on their distributive share of
the partnership loss claimed on their tax returns. For 1981, the Commissioner
determined a deficiency in the amount of $2,986.00 and for 1982, he
determined a deficiency of $1,870.28.

17

The Prabels filed a petition with the Tax Court. Both parties moved for
summary judgment. The Tax Court held that the Rule of 78 method used to
compute interest expense distorted partnership income and that it was within
the Secretary's discretion under Sec. 446(b) to require recomputation of interest
pursuant to the economic accrual method. We shall affirm the tax court's

decision.
II. DISCUSSION
18

The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 446(b), gives the Commissioner
the power to disallow any accounting method which does not clearly reflect
income and requires that the taxpayer's income be computed under such method
which in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect income.2 In the
present case, the Commissioner determined that Quincy Associates' use of the
Rule of 78 to compute interest expense distorted the partnerships' reported
income and that its income must instead be computed by economic accrual. The
Commissioner has broad discretion both to determine whether an accounting
method clearly reflects income and to choose an accounting method which does
clearly reflect income. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S.
522, 532-33, 99 S.Ct. 773, 780-81, 58 L.Ed.2d 785 (1979); Commissioner v.
Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 467, 79 S.Ct. 1270, 1281, 3 L.Ed.2d 1360 (1959); Ferrill
v. Commissioner, 684 F.2d 261, 264 (3d Cir.1982). In the present context, we
hold that the Commissioner has not committed an abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, we reject taxpayer's argument that entry of summary judgment
was improper. There is no material issue of fact precluding summary judgment.

19

The economic accrual method of calculating interest expense is set forth in

Revenue Ruling 83-84, 1983-1 C.B. 97. It is merely a traditional present value
analysis of the cost of borrowing. See W. Meigs & R. Meigs, Financial
Accounting 488-91 (4th ed.1983); T. Maness, Introduction to Corporate
Finance 154-56 (1988). The concept of present value, like interest, is based
upon the time value of money. If a debt instrument is issued at face amount,
has a stated interest rate, and requires periodic payments which cover accrued
interest, the cost of borrowing is fairly easy to determine. For example a oneyear note for $1,000, for which $1,000 was received, which pays 12% annual
interest has an effective cost of borrowing of 12%. At the end of the one-year
term, the borrower will be required to repay $1,120. The cost of borrowing or
effective interest rate equals the stated interest rate.

20

However, suppose the one-year $1,000 note has no stated interest rate. The
note merely pays $1,000 at the end of the one-year term. Assuming a sale, the
purchaser will not pay $1,000 today for the note. The note will be purchased
for less than $1,000. The difference between the face amount and the purchase
price is an original issue discount. Assuming that the note is acquired for $909,
the purchaser will effectively receive $91 in interest when the note is paid off,
or approximately a 10% return. Another way of stating this is that assuming an
implicit rate of return of 10%, $909 is the present value of a debt instrument

paying $1,000 in one year. If we had only been told that the note had been
acquired for $909 and that it would pay $1,000 in one year, we could have used
present value analysis to determine that the implicit interest rate is
approximately 10%.
21

In the previous two examples, determining the cost of borrowing is fairly

simple. However, when notes have below market stated interest rate, issue at a
discount and provide that interest is not compounded on interest owed but not
paid, then the determination of the cost of borrowing becomes more complex.
At a certain discount factor, the present value of cash outlays equals the present
value of cash receipts. See Introduction to Corporate Finance at 129-32. The
interest rate corresponding to this discount factor in the present value table3 is
the real or effective cost of borrowing, the implicit interest rate.

22

Determining the real or effective interest rate and interest expense is the
essence of the economic accrual method. Revenue Rule 83-84 describes it as
follows:

23

The amount of interest attributed to the use of money for a period between
payments is determined by applying the "effective rate of interest" on the loan
to the "unpaid balance" of the loan for that period. The unpaid balance of a loan
is the amount borrowed plus interest earned minus amounts paid. The effective
rate of interest is a measure of the cost of credit, expressed as a yearly rate, that
relates the amount and timing of values received to the amount and timing of
payments made, and is thus a reflection of the cost of the amount borrowed for
the time it is actually available. See Conf. Rep. No. 97-760, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 553 (1982), 1982-2 C.B. 600, 637; S.Rep. No. 97-494 (Vol. 1), 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 209 (1982); Supplement I to Regulation Z issued by the Federal
Reserve System, 12 CFR Sections 226.6 and 226.40 (1979). Therefore, the
effective rate of interest, which is a uniform rate over the term of the loan and
is based on the amount of the loan and the repayment schedule provided in the
loan agreement, when applied to the unpaid balance of the indebtedness for a
given period, will produce the true cost of that indebtedness for that period.
That cost is referred to as the economic accrual of interest for that period.

24

Rev.Rul. 83-84, 1983-1 C.B. 97, 98. Revenue Ruling 83-84 provides that even
though a loan agreement provides that interest shall be earned in accordance
with Rule of 78, no deduction for interest will be allowed for any year in excess
of the economic accrual of interest. The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Sec.
7805, which authorizes the issuance of rules and regulations by the
Commissioner, also grants the Commissioner the discretion to apply them
retroactively.4

25

Interest is defined as the amount charged for the use or forbearance of money.
See Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 52 S.Ct. 211, 76
L.Ed. 484 (1932). Economic accrual, or present value analysis, is in general the
most precise measure of the cost of borrowing or effective interest. When a
note is not issued at a discount or premium and the stated (market) rate of
interest is compounded periodically, the effective rate of interest may equal the
stated rate. Also, other more simple accounting methods such as straight-line
amortization may so closely approximate the real cost of borrowing that they
are permissible.

26

Quincy Associates attempted to use the Rule of 78 method for computing

annual interest expense. The Rule of 78 is also referred to as the sum of the
years digits. It is a method of allocating the total interest due over the course of
a loan to the respective periods. The total interest for the loan is multiplied by a
fraction, the numerator of which is the number of periods remaining on such
indebtedness and the denominator is the sum of the periods' digits for the term
of the indebtedness. It is called the Rule of 78 method because a twelve period
loan, for which the sum of the digits equals 78, is often used to demonstrate
how it works. The Tax Court used the following explanation:

27 rule of 78's is based on the idea of a 12-month loan repayable in equal

The
installments. If the borrower takes out a $1200 loan, he has the use of 12 $100 bills
the first month. 11 $100 bills the second month, 10 the third month, and only one
the last month. During the full 12 months, he therefore has the use of 78 $100 bills
(12 plus 11 plus 10 * * * plus 1). The number 78 becomes the denominator of the
fraction, while the numerator depends upon when the prepayment takes place. If
prepayment is made at the 7th installment, 57/78 of the total finance charge [is
regarded as having] been earned by the creditor (the numerator is the sum of 12, 11,
10, 9, 8, and 7). * * * this would amount to 57/78 of $211.68 [the total interest due
on the loan], or approximately $155. Therefore, [the debtor's] rebate due on August
1 would be approximately $57. [1 J. Fonseca, Handling Consumer Credit Cases, sec.
3:7, at 101 (3d ed.1986). Fn. ref. omitted].
28

Prabel v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1101, 1105 (1980). Where a loan has more
than 12 periods, the sum of the years digits is greater than 78.

29

Quincy Associates' note stated that the total precomputed interest owed over the
term of the loan was $4,989,249. The note also stated that payments would be
allocated to accrued interest determined under the Rule of 78 and next to
principal. In the event of prepayment of the whole note, Quincy Associates was
to receive a credit for the unearned portion of the interest element of the note
determined in accordance with the Rule of 78. The present situation is the

equivalent of a note issued at a discount where the note calls for Rule of 78
amortization of the discount for purposes of interest expense and a credit upon
prepayment of the note for any unamortized discount.
30

This Court may not interfere with the Commissioner's audit adjustments under
Sec. 446(b) unless they are "clearly unlawful," or "plainly arbitrary." Thor
Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532-33, 99 S.Ct. 773, 781, 58
L.Ed.2d 785 (1979). As will be demonstrated, the adjustments are neither of the
above. The note requires the following annual payments:

Year
31
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984 through 2003

32

Year
33

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Payments
$ 133,000
385,000
379,000
362,000
206,000
---------

An additional balloon payment of $1,889,249 is due upon maturity in the year

2003 to pay off the principal balance of the note. The following schedule
provides the annual accrual under the different methods:
Annual
Payments
*

$ 71,402
385,000
379,000
362,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000
206,000

Rule of 78's
Amortization
of Precomputed
Interest

Economic
Accrual
of
Interest
$ 71,402
417,604
399,078
380,552
362,026
343,500
324,976
306,448
287,924
269,396
250,872
232,345
213,820
195,293
176,766
158,241
139,716
121,190
102,664
84,139
65,612
47,087

Difference
Between
Rule of 78
and
Economic
Accrual
$ 43,964
249,847
233,415
216,349
207,659
207,866
208,098
208,358
208,651
208,981
209,351
209,768
210,236
210,763
211,354
212,020
212,768
213,609
214,555
215,618
216,813
218,156

**

$ 27,438
167,757
165,663
164,203
154,367
135,634
116,878
98,090
79,278
60,415
41,521
22,577
3,584
(15,470
(34,586
(53,779
(73,052
(92,419
(111,891
(131,479
(151,201
(171,069

2002
2003

206,000
206,000

28,560
***

219,667
10,036

(191,107
221,366

--------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL $5,185,213
$4,989,249 $4,989,249
0

* The total payments due in 1981 through 1992 are allocated solely to
34
interest, and the excess interest accruals result in negative
35
amortization of accrued interest that is charged to the payments due
36
in the 11 subsequent years. Thus, even though the Rule of 78's accrual
37
of interest in years 1993 through 2003 is less than the payments due,
38
in years 1993 through 2001 the entire payments due still are to be
39
allocated or credited to the negatively amortized interest from the
40
earlier years.
41
** In years 1985 through 2003, interest accruals under the economic-accrual
42
method increase from year to year due to the negative amortization of
43
interest that also occurs under this method.
44
*** On maturity of the note in 2003, an additional balloon payment of
45
$1,889,249 is due in order to pay off the principal balance of the
46
note.
47
48

We fundamentally disagree with the taxpayers' position that the Rule of 78

accrual represents economic reality and clearly reflects income. For example,
from 1981 to 1982, the Rule of 78 method results in negative amortization.
Interest accrued exceeds interest paid. Yet no interest is accrued on this unpaid
amount. Furthermore, the principal owed remains the same from 1981 to 1982
and yet interest expense goes down. In other words, the effective interest rate
decreases from 1981 to 1982. This is not economic reality. From 1981 to 1992,
the amount of interest accrued annually exceeds the annual payments. While

interest is owed and unpaid, further interest does not accrue on this unpaid
amount. There is no compounding of interest. Throughout the course of the
loan, the annual interest expense decreases according to the Rule of 78. Thus,
from 1981 to 1992, while the total amount owed (principal plus unpaid but
accrued interest) is increasing, the interest expense is decreasing. Again, this is
not economic reality. By way of contrast, the economic accrual method applies
the effective interest rate to the total amount owed consistently among periods.
49

The taxpayer argues that economic accrual was not a permissible method of
accounting for tax years 1981 and 1982. Section 446(c) lists permissible
methods by which the taxpayer may calculate taxable income. The second
method listed is accrual. The taxpayer argues that the economic accrual method
is not an accrual method because it disregards the all events test. Treasury
Regulation 26 C.F.R. Sec. 1.446-1(c)(ii) provides:

50 Accrual method. Generally, under an accrual method, income is to be included

(ii)
for the taxable year when all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive
such income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy.
Under such a method, deductions are allowable for the taxable year in which all the
events have occurred which establish the fact of the liability giving rise to such
deduction and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy. The
method used by the taxpayer in determining when income is to be accounted for will
be acceptable if it accords with generally accepted accounting principles, is
consistently used by the taxpayer from year to year, and is consistent with the
Income Tax Regulations. For example, under an accrual method, a taxpayer engaged
in manufacturing may account for the sale of an item when the item is shipped,
when the item is delivered, when the item is accepted, or when title to the item
passes to the purchaser, whether or not billed, depending upon the method regularly
employed in keeping the taxpayer's books; however, see Sec. 1.451-5 relating to
advance payments. The determination of when an item is shipped, delivered or
accepted, or when title passes, does not depend upon when any other item in the
contract is shipped, delivered or accepted, or when title passes.
51

The taxpayer argues that the all events test requires that interest be computed in
accordance with the parties' agreement. In the present case, the note calls for
amortization of precomputed interest in accordance with the Rule of 78.
However, the agreement is between related parties and the Rule of 78 does not
reflect economic reality. Conversely, economic accrual precisely reflects the
cost of borrowing per period. Economic accrual complies with the all events
test. It is a traditional accrual method within the meaning of section 446(c).

52

Taxpayers point out that in the event of prepayment, a credit against the interest

element of the note is determined in accordance with the Rule of 78. This does
not change the economic reality of the cost of borrowing for the term of the
loan or the years in dispute. Prepayment is an event which did not happen in
1981 or 1982 and under the all events test does not affect the interest
computation for those years. Moreover, prepayment is an event solely within
the control of the taxpayers. In economic reality, the difference between the
interest element in the event of prepayment and the economic accrual interest
owed should be considered a prepayment penalty.
53

The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 441, requires that income be
computed on an annual basis. See Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner,
321 U.S. 281, 64 S.Ct. 596, 88 L.Ed. 725 (1944); Burnett v. Sanford & Brooks
Co., 282 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 150, 75 L.Ed. 383 (1931). The taxpayers argue that
by considering the whole term of the loan, the Tax Court violated the annual
accounting principle found in Sec. 441. The taxpayers argue that for the years
in question, 1981 and 1982, the amount of interest accrued under the Rule of 78
method was not significantly greater than the payments made. The taxpayers'
argument ignores the fact that interest expense is the amount charged for the
use or forbearance of money, not the total amount repaid on an obligation. See
Old Colony Railroad Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 52 S.Ct. 211, 76
L.Ed. 484 (1932). In reality, a significant portion of those payments should be
applied to principal. Moreover, it was not improper for either the Commissioner
or the Tax Court to determine the economic reality of the transactions occurring
in the relevant annual accounting periods by reference to the whole term of the
note. Taxpayers ask this court to miss the forest for the trees.

54

In summary, the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in determining that
the Rule of 78 method of computing interest expense failed to clearly reflect
income. He, furthermore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in determining
that the economic accrual method of computing interest does clearly reflect
income. There are no unresolved issues of fact material to our determination.
We, therefore, affirm the Tax Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Commissioner.

Honorable Alfred M. Wolin, United States District Judge for the District of
New Jersey, sitting by designation

Mulholland v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 252 (1989) is a related case. See
Appellant's Brief, Ex. B. Kenneth and Catherine Mulholland owned an interest
in Quincy Associates, Ltd. for the years 1981 and 1982. The Mulhollands
brought suit for a refund of federal taxes as recomputed by the Commissioner

using the economic accrual method. The three count complaint provided: (i) the
Commissioner erroneously determined that Quincy was not entitled to deduct
interest expenses calculated pursuant to the Rule of 78's method of accounting
to the extent that such method resulted in claimed interest expense in excess of
that which would be computed under the economic accrual method, Revenue
Ruling 83-84, 1983-1 C.B. 97; alternatively, (ii) the Commissioner abused his
discretion under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7805(b): (a) in failing to apply the rationale of
Rev. Rul. 83-84 on a prospective only basis to loans and notes entered into on
or after June 6, 1983, and (b) in exempting short-term consumer loans from its
mandate; alternatively, (iii) the Commissioner erred in refusing to allow Quincy
to utilize the procedures outlined in Revenue Procedure 84-28, 1984-1 C.B.
475, for changing from the Rule of 78 method to economic accrual
The parties made cross-motions for partial summary judgment as to counts II &
III. The parties stipulated that count I is not currently before the court because
of a material issue of fact. As to count II, the court found no abuse of discretion
in the Commissioner's decision retroactively applying Rev. Rule 83-84, see 26
U.S.C. Sec. 7805. As to count III, the court found that there was a material
issue of fact as to the application of Rev. Proc. 84-28, Sec. 3.08: the parties
disputed whether the issue of Quincy Associates' interest calculations had been
raised and was pending before the Service on or before April 2, 1984. The
court did not grant partial summary judgment as to count III.
In another similar but unrelated case, the Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's
discretion under section 446(b) to disallow interest deductions in excess of
economic accrual when the taxpayer has used the Rule of 78 method. See Levy
v. Commissioner, 92 TC, No. 92, CCH Dec. 45,808 (1989).
2

Sec. 446. General rule for methods of accounting

(a) General rule.--Taxable income shall be computed under the method of
accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in
keeping his books.
(b) Exceptions.--If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the
taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation
of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the
Secretary, does clearly reflect income.
(c) Permissible methods.--Subject to the provisions of subsections (a) and (b), a
taxpayer may compute taxable income under any of the following methods of
accounting-(1) the cash receipts and disbursements method;

(2) an accrual method;

(3) any other method permitted by this chapter; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing methods permitted under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary....
26 U.S.C. Sec. 446.
3

A present value table provides discount factors for various interest rates by
period

The Tax Court determined that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion
in retroactively applying Revenue Rule 83-84 to the years in question. On
appeal, taxpayers do not challenge the retroactive application as an abuse of
discretion