Abangan v.

Abangan, 40 Phil 476, AVANCENA

On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangans will executed July, 1916. From
this decision the opponents appealed.
The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the
bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses.
The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three
instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three
witnesses, nor numbered by letters. These omissions, according to appellants contention, are defects
whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.
Whether or not the will was duly admitted to probate.
YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the testator and
three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object the avoidance of
substitution of any of said sheets which may change the disposition of the testatrix. But when these
dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet (as in the instant case) signed at the bottom by the
testator and three witnesses, their signatures on the left margin of said sheet are not anymore necessary as
such will be purposeless.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of
the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the
object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be
hidden.
In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed
at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is
signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on
their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the
other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail
the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustative of the testators last will, must be disregarded.

Nenita de Vera SUROZA vs. Judge Reynaldo P. HONRADO and Evangeline YUIPCO
A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981

Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the US Army (Philippine Scouts) married Marcelina
Salvador but they were childless. However, they reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname
Suroza and who considred them as parents as shown in his marriage contract with Nenita de Vera. When
Mauro died, Marcelina, as a veterans widow, became a pensioner of the Federal Government. Agapito
and Nenita begot a child named Lilia and afterwards, Agapito also became a soldier. However, he was
disabled and his wife was appointed as his guardian when he was declared an incompetent. In connection
to this, a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girlfriend of Agapito) wanted also to be his
guardian however the court confirmed Nenitas appointment as guardian of Agapito.

The spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who was delivered to
Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her
granddaughter. Marilyn used the surname Suroza and stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted
by Agapito.

Marcelina, being a veterans widow accumulated some cash in two banks. She executed a notarial will
which is in English and was thumbmarked by her for she was illiterate. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed
all her estate to Marilyn. After her death, Marina Paje (alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and
the executrix in her will) filed a petition for probate of Marcelinas alleged will. As there was no
opposition, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratix and subsequently, issued two orders
directing the two banks to allow Marina to withdraw from the savings of Marcelina and Marilyn Suroza
and requiring the custodian of the passbooks to deliver them to Marina. Upon motion of Marina, Judge
Honrado issued another order instructing the sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix house among
whom was Nenita and to place Marina in possession thereof.

Nenita was then alerted to the existence of the testamentary proceeding hence, she and other occupants
filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that the decedents son Agapito was the sole
heir of the deceased; that he has a daughter named Lilia; that Nenita was Agapitos guardian; and that
Marilyn was not Agapitos daughter nor the decedents granddaughter. Later, they questioned the probate
courts jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order. In spite of such fact, Judge Honrado issued on order
probating Marcelinas supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress. Nenita filed in the testate
case an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter petition for
administration and preliminary injunction reiterating that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina; that the
will was not duly executed and attested; and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud
or trick.

Further, that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition of Agapito and that
Marina was not qualified to act as executrix. Not contented with her motions, Nenita filed an opposition
to the probate of the will and a counter-petition which was however, dismissed. Instead of appealing,
Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings which was also dismissed. Hence, this complaint.

Whether or not a disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for having admitted a will,
which on its face is void.

Disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the testate
case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedents legal heirs and not the
instituted heiress in the void will should have inherited the decedents estate. Inefficiency implies
negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be inexcusably negligent if he
failed in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires
in the rendition of any public service.
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was
thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.

Matias vs. Salud

G.R. L-10907 June 29, 1957
Ponente: Concepcion, J.

Facts:
1. This case is an appeal from a CFI Cavite order denying the probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. The
document consist of 3 pages and it seems that after the attestation clause, there appears the siganture of
the testatrix 'Gabina Raquel', alongside is a smudged in violet ink claimed by the proponents as the
thumbmark allegedly affixed by the tetratrix. On the third page at the end of the attestation clause appears
signatures on the left margin of each page, and also on the upper part of each left margin appears the same
violet ink smudge accompanied by the written words 'Gabina Raquel' with 'by Lourdes Samonte'
underneath it.

2. The proponent's evidence is to the effect that the decedent allegedly instructed Atty. Agbunag to drat
her will and brought to her on January 1950. With all the witnesses with her and the lawyer, the decedent
affixed her thumbmark at the foot of the document and the left margin of each page. It was also alleged
that she attempted to sign using a sign pen but was only able to do so on the lower half of page 2 due to
the pain in her right shoulder. The lawyer, seeing Gabina unable to proceed instructed Lourdes Samonte
to write 'Gabina Raquel by Lourdes Samonte' next to each thumbmark, after which the witnesses signed
at the foot of the attestation clause and the left hand margin of each page.

3. The probate was opposed by Basilia Salud, the niece of the decedent.

4. The CFI of cavite denied the probate on the ground that the attestation clause did not state that the
testatrix and the witnesses signed each and every page nor did it express that Lourdes was specially
directed to sign after the testatrix.

Issue: Whether or not the thumbprint was sufficient compliance with the law despite the absence of a
description of such in the attestation clause

HELD: YES
The absence of the description on the attestation clause that another person wrote the testatrix' name at
her request is not a fatal defect, The legal requirement only ask that it be signed by the testator, a
requirement satisfied by a thumbprint or other mark affixed by him.

As to the issue on the clarity of the ridge impression, it is held to be dependent on the aleatory
circumstances. Where a testator employs an unfamiliar way of signing and that both the attestation clause
and the will are silent on the matter, such silence is a factor to be considered against the authenticity of the
testament. However, the failure to describe the signature itself alone is not sufficient to refuse probate
when evidence fully satisfied that the will was executed and witnessed in accordance with law.

Garcia v. Lacuesta

Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will appears to have been signed by Atty.
Florentino Javier as he wrote the name of Antero Mercado and his name for the testatior on the will.
HOWEVER, immediately after Antero Mercados will, Mercado himself placed an X mark.
The attestation clause was signed by three instrumental witnesses. Said attestation clause states that all
pages of the will were signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the
presence of the testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses. The attestation clause however
did not indicate that Javier wrote Antero Mercados name.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.

HELD: No. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty.
Florentino Javier to write the testators name under his express direction, as required by Section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.

But is there really a need for such to be included in the attestation clause considering that even though
Javier signed for Antero, Antero himself placed his signature by virtue of the X mark, and by that,
Javiers signature is merely a surplusage? That the placing of the X mark is the same as placing
Anteros thumb mark.

No. Its not the same as placing the testators thumb mark. It would have been different had it been proven
that the X mark was Anteros usual signature or was even one of the ways by which he signs his name.
If this were so, failure to state the writing by somebody else would have been immaterial, since he would
be considered to have signed the will himself.

Noble v. Abaja
450 SCRA 265
FACTS:
The case is about the probate of the will of Alipio Abada (Not respondent Abaja). Petitioner Belinda
Noble is the administratrix of the estate of Abada. Respondent Alipio Abaja filed a petition for the probate
of Abadas will. Petitioner Noble moved for dismissal of the petition for probate.
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the Spanish
language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will.

ISSUE:
Should it be expressly stated in the will that it (the will) was in a language known by the testator?

HELD:
No. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knewthe language or
dialect used in the will.[25] This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. In this case,
Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings,
Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks
the Spanish language.

Barut vs. Cabacungan

G.R. L-6825 Febriary 15, 1912
Ponente: SC Justice Moreland
Facts:
1.Pedro Barut applied for the probate of the will of Maria Salomon. It is alleged in the petition that
testatrix died on Nov. 1908 in Sinait, Ilocos Sur leaving the will dated March 3, 1907. The said will was
witnessed by 3 persons. From the terms it appears that the petitioner received a larger part of decedent's
property. After this disposition, the testatrix revoked all other wills and stated that since she is unable to
read nor write, the will was read to her and that she has instructed Severino Agapan, one of the witnesses
to sign her name in her behalf.
2. The lower court ruled that the will is not entitled to probate on the sole ground that the handwriting of
the person who signed the name of the testatrix does not appear to be that of Agapan but that of another
witness.
Issue: Whether or not a will's validity is affected when the person instructed by a testator to write his
name did not sign his name
HELD: No, it is immaterial who wrote the name of the testator provided it is written at her request and in
her present, and in the presence of the witnesses. This is the only requirement under Sec. 618 of the Civil
Code of procedure at that time.

*No Azuela v. CA

Balonan v. Abellana

Anacleta Abellana left a will. In said will, she let a certain Juan Bello sign the will for her. The will
consists of two pages. The first page is signed by Juan Abello and under his name appears typewritten
Por la testadora Anacleta Abellana. On the second page, appears the signature of Juan Bello under
whose name appears the phrase, Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana this time, the phrase is
handwritten.

ISSUE: Whether or not the signature of Bello appearing above the typewritten phrase Por la testadora
Anacleta Abellana comply with the requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which a will shall
be executed.

HELD: No. Article 805 of the Civil Code provides that:

Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or
by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.

In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the will by
said Abellana herself, or by Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the express
requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by
some other person in his presence and by his express direction.

Note that the phrase Por la testadora Anacleta Abellana was typewritten and above it was the signature
of Abello so in effect, when Abello only signed his name without writing that he is doing so for
Anacleta, he actually omitted the name of the testatrix. This is a substantial violation of the law and would
render the will invalid.

Nera v. Rimando

When a certain will was being signed, it was alleged that the testator and some subscribing witnesses
were in the inner room while the other subscribing witnesses were in the outer room. What separates the

inner room from the outer room was a curtain. The trial court ignored this fact in its determination of the
case as it ruled that the determination of this specific fact will not affect the outcome of the case.

ISSUE: What is the true test of the testators or the witness presence in the signing of a will?

HELD: The Supreme Court emphasized that the true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in
the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen
each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position
with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.

The position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature,
must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so.

The Supreme Court, in this case, determined that all the parties were in the same small room when each
other signed. Hence, they were in each others presence (though the facts of the case didnt elaborate the
SC just ruled so). The SC ruled that if some of the witnesses were really in the outer room (a fact which
was not established according to the SC) separated by a curtain, then the will is invalid, the attaching of
those signatures under circumstances not being done in the presence of the witness in the outer room.

Taboada v. Rosal

Dorotea Perez left a will. The will has two pages. On the first page, which contains the entire
testamentary dispositions, were the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses and that of Dorotea
Perez. The signatures of the three instrumental witnesses were on the left margin while Perez signature
was on the bottom. On the second page, which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgement,
were the signatures of the three attesting witnesses and that of Dorotea Perez. The attestation clause failed
to state the number of pages used in the will. Taboada petitioned for the admission to probate of the said
will. The judge who handled the petition was Judge Ramon Pamatian. He denied the petition. Taboada
filed a motion for reconsideration but Pamatian was not able to act on it because he was transferred to
another jurisdiction. The case was inherited by Judge Rosal who also denied the MFR on the grounds that
a) that the testator and the instrumental witnesses did not all sign on the left margin of the page as
prescribed by law; that the testator and the witnesses should have placed their signature in the same place
b) that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will this, according
to Judge Rosal violated the requirement that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or

sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective
safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the
prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will should be admitted to probate.

HELD: Yes. The law must be interpreted liberally.

Further, there is substantial compliance with the law. It would be absurd that the legislature intended to
place so heavy an import on the space or particular location where the signatures are to be found as long
as this space or particular location wherein the signatures are found is consistent with good faith.

The failure to include in the attestation clause of the number of pages used in writing the will would have
been a fatal defect. But then again, the matter should be approached liberally. There were only two pages
in the will left by Perez. The first page contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions and signed by
the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The
other page which is marked as Pagina dos comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment.
Further, the acknowledgment itself states that This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages
including this page.

Icasiano vs. Icasiano

G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964

Facts:
1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his appointment
as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She
executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an original
and a carbon copy.
2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will
while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the
pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he signed
the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other witnesses in his
presence.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is

sufficient to deny probate of the will

RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the
duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the
original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be
defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be
probated.
The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the law
is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is no intentional or
deliberate deviation existed.
Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be signed by the
witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all respects.

Testate Estate of Cagro vs. Cagro

G.R. L-5826

Facts:
1. The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the CFI of Samar which admitted
to probate a will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan, Samar on Feb. 14, 1949.

2. The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the attestation was not signed by the witnesses
at the bottom although the page containing the same was signed by the witnesses on the left hand margin.

3. Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3 witnesses on the left hand margin conform
substantially to law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

HELD: Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of
the will. It is required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear their
signatures.
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses since the omission of their
signatures at the bottom negatives their participation.

Moreover, the signatures affixed on the let hand margin is not substantial conformance to the law. The
said signatures were merely in conformance with the requirement that the will must be signed on the lefthand margin of all its pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3 witnesses at the bottom, it would
be easier to add clauses to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all
of the witnesses.

The probate of the will is denied.

Cruz v. Villasor
G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973
Ponente: Esguerra, J.:

Facts:
1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However,
the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed without the
testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance with law.

2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged.
Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is substantial
compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one of
them.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC

HELD: NO.
The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he
cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot
serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in front
of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one will
appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such
situation would be absurd.

Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a
function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be interested in
sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. he would
be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize
fraud.

Gabucan v. Manta

FACTS:

This case is about the dismissal of a petition for the probate of the notarial will of the late Rogaciano
Gabucan on the ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp. The probate court
refused to reconsider the dismissal in spite of petitioners manifestation that he had already attached the
documentary stamp to the original of the will.
ISSUE:
W/N the probate correct was correct in dismissing the petition on the ground of failure to affix the
documentary stamp to the will
HELD:
The Court held that the lower court manifestly erred in declaring that, because no documentary stamp was
affixed to the will, there was no will and testament to probate and, consequently, the alleged action
must of necessity be dismissed.
What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix the requisite
thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the taxable portion
of that document. The documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is presented in
evidence.

Javellana vs. Ledesma

G.R. No. L-7179

Facts:
1. The CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate a will and codicil executed by the deceased Apolinaria Ledesma
in July 1953. This testament was deemed executed on May 1950 and May 1952. The contestant was the
sister and nearest surviving relative of the deceased. She appealed from this decision alleging that the
will were not executed in accordance with law.

2. The testament was executed at the house of the testatrix. One the other hand, the codicil was executed
after the enactment of the New Civil Code (NCC), and therefore had to be acknowledged before a notary
public. Now, the contestant, who happens to be one of the instrumental witnesses asserted that after the
codicil was signed and attested at the San Pablo hospital, that Gimotea (the notary) signed and sealed it on

the same occasion. Gimotea, however, said that he did not do so, and that the act of signing and sealing
was done afterwards.

2. One of the allegations was that the certificate of acknowledgement to the codicil was signed
somewhere else or in the office of the notary. The ix and the witnesses at the hospital, was signed and
sealed by the notary only when he brought it in his office.

Issue: Whether or not the signing and sealing of the will or codicil in the absence of the testator and
witnesses affects the validity of the will

RULING: NO. Unlike in the Old Civil Code of 1899, the NCC does not require that the signing of the
testator, the witnesses and the notary be accomplished in one single act. All that is required is that every
will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and witnesses. The subsequent signing
and sealing is not part of the acknowledgement itself nor of the testamentary act. Their separate execution
out of the presence of the testator and the witnesses cannot be a violation of the rule that testaments
should be completed without interruption.

Guerrero vs BihisG.R. No. 174144 April 17, 2007

Facts:
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero andrespondent Resurreccion A.
Bihis, died. Guerrero filed for probate in the RTCQC. Respondent Bihis opposed her elder sisters petition
on the following grounds: the will was not executed and attested as required by law; itsattestation clause
and acknowledgment did not comply with the requirementsof the law; the signature of the testatrix was
procured by fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and improper pressure
andinfluence. The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was
not complied with because the will was acknowledged bythe testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrixs
residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a
commissionednotary public for and in Caloocan City.

ISSUE: Did the will acknowledged by the testatrix and the instrumental witnessesbefore a notary
public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy therequirement under Article 806 of the Civil
Code?

HELD:
No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is that it
must be acknowledged before a notary public by thetestator and the witnesses. This formal requirement is
one of theindispensable requisites for the validity of a will. In other words, a notarial willthat is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and theinstrumental witnesses is void and cannot be
accepted for probate.The Notarial law provides: SECTION 240.Territorial jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with theprovince. The jurisdiction
of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess
authority to do any notarialact beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.Sine Atty. Directo was not a
commissioned notary public for and in QuezonCity, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment
of the testratix andthe instrumental witnesses. In the same vain, the testratix and theinstrumental
witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the will beforehim. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventuras
last will and testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as required by law.

*No Ortega v. Valmonte

GIL VS MURCIANO 88 PHIL 260

The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will and testament of the deceased
Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano appealed to this Court, raising only question of law.
Her counsel assigns the two following alleged errors:

Primer Error. El Juzgado inferior erro al dejar de declarar que el alegado testamento de Carlos Gil no
ha sido otogar de acuerdo con la ley.

Segundo Error. Erro finalmente a legalizar el referido testamento. (HIJO DE PUTA!!! DO I SPEAK
SPANISH?! NO ME HABLE ESPAOL ESE!!!)

It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that the alleged testor signed the
will. It declares only that it was signed by the witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the precise purpose of
the attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being the most essential element of
the clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is said that the court may correct a mere clerical error.
This is too much of a clerical error for it affects the very essence of the clause. Alleged errors may be
overlooked or correct only in matters of form which do not affect the substance of the statement.

It is claimed that the correction may be made by inference. If we cure a deficiency by means of
inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills? Where are
we to draw the line? Following that procedure we would be making interpolations by inferences,
implication, and even by internal circumtantial evidence. This would be done in the face of the clear,
uniquivocal, language of the statute as to how the attestation clause should be made. It is to be supposed
that the drafter of the alleged will read the clear words of the statute when he prepared it. For the court to
supply alleged deficiencies would be against the evident policy of the law. Section 618 of Act No. 190,
before it was amended, contained the following provision:

. . . But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it proven that the will
was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.

However, Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature, passed on July 1, 1916, besides increasing the
contents of the attestation clause, entirely suppressed the above-quoted provision. This would show that
the purpose of the amending act was to surround the execution of a will with greater guarantees and
solemnities. Could we, in view of this, hold that the court can cure alleged deficiencies by inferences,
implications, and internal circumstantial evidence? Even in ordinary cases the law requires certain
requisities for the conclusiveness of circumstantial evidence.

It is said that the rules of statutory construction are applicable to documents and wills. This is true, but
said rules apply to the body of the will, containing the testamentary provisions, but not to the attestation
clause, which must be so clear that it should not require any construction.

In the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30, 31), the court had the following to say:

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. An attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and
each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a
defect annuls the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, supra.)

The Supreme Court fully affirmed the decision, laying down the following doctrine:

1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; EVIDENCE TO SUPPLY DEFECTS OF. The attestation clause
must be made in strict conformity with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended.
Where said clause fails to show on its face a full compliance with those requirements, the defect
constitutes sufficient ground for the disallowance of the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban
vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30). Evidence aliunde should not be admitted to establish facts not appearing on the
attestation clause, and where said evidence has been admitted it should not be given the effect intended.
(Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 409.).

2. ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 618 OF ACT NO. 190, AS AMENDED. Section 618
of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a strict interpretation in order to give effect to the intention
of the Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very
strictly construed. Courts cannot supply the defensive execution of will. (40 Cyc., p. 1079; Uy Coque vs.
Navas L. Sioca, supra.)

Tedoro CANEDA, et al.petitioners vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and William CABRERA, as
Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.

On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, already in the twilight years of
his life executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses and he was duly assisted by his
lawyer and a notary public. It was declared therein that, among other things that the testator was leaving
by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to specific persons, all of whom do not
appear to be related to Mateo. Not long after, he himself filed a petition before the CFI seeking the
probate of his last will and testament but the scheduled hearings were postponed, until the testator passed
away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees
named in the will, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testators estate but due to his
death, he was succeeded by William Cabrera, who was appointed by RTC which is already the probate
court.

PETITIONERS: The petitioners assail to the allowance of the testators will on the ground that it was not
executed in accordance with all the requisites of law since the testator was already in a poor state of
health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise contend that the will is
null and void because its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the
instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they
also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
RESPONDENTS: The respondent, on the other hand, argue that Mateo was of sound and disposing mind
and in good health when he executed his will. Further, they also contend that the witnesses attested and
signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is fatally defective such that
whether or not it affects the validity of the will.

Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial compliance pursuant to Article 809 of
the Civil Code.

An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the
instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate
memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the
witnesses; it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law
has been observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which
would result in the invalidity of the will, should state:
- The number of pages used upon which the will is written;
- That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the attesting witnesses; and
- That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that
the said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.

It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the
presence of the testator and of one another. Attestation and subscription differ in meaning. Attestation
is the act of sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein assailed is that
while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly
state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. What is then clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses
signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily
result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct
in pointing out that the defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely
involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the
substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfection in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it
is not proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of Article 805.

The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the language
employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not render a will invalid should it be proved that
the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations do not
apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every
page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only
in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by
Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect
complained of in the present case since there is no plausible way by which it can be read into the
questioned attestation clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually
bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental
witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

CALDE VS CA June 27, 1994

The records show that decedent left behind nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) worth of property. She also left a Last
Will and Testament, dated October 30, 1972, and a Codicil thereto, dated July 24, 1973. Both documents contained
the thumbmarks of decedent. They were also signed by three (3) attesting witnesses each, and acknowledged
before Tomas A. Tolete, then the Municipal Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province.
Nicasio Calde, the executor named in the will, filed a Petition for its allowance before the RTC of Bontoc, Mt.
Province, Br. 36. He died during the pendency of the proceedings, and was duly substituted by petitioner. Private
respondents, relatives of decedent, opposed the Petitioner filed by Calde, on the following grounds: that the will
and codicil were written in Ilocano, a dialect that decedent did not know; that decedent was mentally
incapacitated to execute the two documents because of her advanced age, illness and deafness; that
decedents thumbmarks were procured through fraud and undue influence; and that the codicil was
not executed in accordance with law.
On June 23, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment on the case, approving and allowing decedents will and its
codicil. The decision was appealed to and reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals. It held:
. . . (T)he will and codicil could pass the safeguards under Article 805 of the New Civil Code but for one
crucial factor of discrepancy in the color of ink when the instrumental witnesses affixed their
respective signatures.
The question in the case at bench is one of fact: whether or not, based on the evidence submitted, respondent
appellate court erred in concluding that both decedents Last Will and Testament, and its Codicil were subscribed by
the instrumental witnesses on separate occasions. As a general rule, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
considered final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this court. In the present instance, however,

there is reason to make an exception to that rule, since the finding of the respondent court is contrary to that of the
trial court.
In the case at bench, the autoptic preference (From the point of view of the litigant party furnishing
this source of belief, it may be termed Autoptic Proference) contradicts the testimonial evidence
produced by petitioner. The will and its codicil, upon inspection by the respondent court, show in black and white
or more accurately, in black and blue that more than one pen was used by the signatories thereto. Thus, it was
not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve petitioners claim that both testamentary documents
in question were subscribed to in accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
Neither did respondent court err when it did not accord great weight to the testimony of Judge Tomas
A. Tolete. It is true that his testimony contains a narration of how the two testamentary documents were
subscribed and attested to, starting from decedents thumbmarking thereof, to the alleged signing of the
instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order. Nonetheless, nowhere in Judge Toletes testimony is
there any kind of explanation for the different-colored signatures on the testaments.
a.

Special requirements

Art. 807.

If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if able to do so;
otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it and communicate to him, in some
practicable manner, the contents thereof. (n)

Art. 808.

If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing
witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged. (n)

CUEVAS VS ACHACOSO 88 PHIL 730

On January 19, 1946, Jose Venzon died in Iba, Zambales, leaving a will. In said will the deceased instituted as his
heirs, Valentina Cuevas, his widow and Rosario Asera Venzon, his daughter. He named therein his widow as
executrix of the will. On February 1, 1946, Valentina Cuevas filed a petition for the probate of said will.
On May 10, 1946, one Pilar Achacoso filed an alternative petition for the probate of a previous will executed by the
deceased praying therein that, if the will submitted by the widow be rejected, the other will be admitted to probate
in lieu thereof. In the previous will there are other heirs instituted, among them petitioner Pilar Achacoso. Pilar
Achacoso objected to the probate of the second will executed by the deceased on October 10, 1945. After due
hearing, the court found that the latter will was executed in accordance with law and ordered that it be admitted to
probate. Pilar Achacoso took the case to the Court of Appeals, but the latter certified it to this Court on the ground
that it involves purely questions of law.
The main error assigned refers to the alleged lack of attestation clause in the will under consideration,
or to the fact that, if there is such attestation clause, the same has not been signed by the
instrumental witnesses, but by the testator himself, and it is claimed that this defect has the effect of
invalidating the will.
The will in question, after reciting in separate paragraphs, and under correlative numbers, the provisions of the will,
winds up with the following clause:
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign this testament or last will in the municipality of Iba, Zambales, Philippines, this 10th
day of October, 1945, in the presence of the three witnesses, namely Dr. Nestorio Trinidad, Don Baldomero
Achacoso, and Mr. Proceso Cabal as instrumental witnesses to my signing; this testament is written in three (3)
sheets marked by letter "A", "B" and "C" consecutively on top of each sheet and upon my request and in my
presence and also in the presence of each of the aforesaid instrumental witnesses, they also signed this testament
already reffered to.
I hereby manifest that every sheet of the aforesaid testament, on the left-hand margin as well as the testament
itself have been signed by me as also each of the witnesses has also signed in my presence and in the presence of
each other.
(Sgd.) JOSE VENZON
Witnesses:
(Sgd.) NESTORIO TRINIDAD
(Sgd.) BALDOMERO L. ACHACOSO
(Sgd.) PROCESO CABAL.

The clause above quoted is the attestation clause reffered to in the law which, in our opinion,
substantially complies with its requirements. The only apparent anomaly we find is that it appears to be an
attestation made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental witnesses. This apparent anomaly, as to
affect the validity of the will, it appearing that right under the signature of the testator, there appear the signatures
of the three instrumental witnesses.
"Instrumental witness, as define by Escriche in his Diccionario Razonado de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, Vol. 4, p.
1115, is one who takes part in the execution of an instrument or writing" (In re will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil., 807, 809).
An instrumental witness, therefore, does not merely attest to the signature of the testator but also to the proper
execution of the will. The fact that the three instrumental witnesses have signed the will immediately
under the signature of the testator, shows that they have in fact attested not only to the genuineness
of his signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
As was said in one case, "the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of the wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be intrepreted in such a way
as to attain this premordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the
object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands
more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's will, must be
disregarded."
b.

Witnesses to wills

1.

Who are competent

Art. 820.

Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more , and not blind, deaf
or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in
Article 805 of this Code. (n)

Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
1.

Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;

2.

Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false

testimony. (n)

GONZALES VS CA 90 SCRA 183

There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and without issue in the
municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85),
having been born in 1876. It is likewise not controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and
petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private respondent, with her husband and
children, lived with the deceased at the latters residence prior an- d up to the time of her death.
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was executed and attested as
required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witness
In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have
the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article
821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not
mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the
community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person
is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental
witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will
they have attested.
CRUZ VS VILLASOR 54 SCRA 31
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging
witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in
contravention of the provisions of Article 80 be requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of
Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary
public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as has been said, that only two witnesses appeared before the
notary public for or that purpose. In the circumstances, the law would not be duly in observed.
c.

Holographic wills

1.

In general

Art. 804.
2.

Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. (n)
Specific requirements

Art. 810.

A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made
in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (678, 688a)

Art. 812.

In holographic wills, the dispositions of the testator written below his signature must be
dated and signed by him in order to make them valid as testamentary dispositions. (n)

Art. 813.

When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being
dated, and the last disposition has a signature and a date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions. (n)

Art. 814.

In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the

testator must authenticate the same by his full signature. (n)

GONZALES VS CA 90 SCRA 183

There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and without issue in
the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of
eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. It is likewise not controverted that herein private respondent
Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private
respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latters residence prior an- d up
to the time of her death.
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was executed and
attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were
credible witness
In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have
the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821
and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory
that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or
that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be
such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be
competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have
attested.

Ajero v. CA
236 SCRA 488
FACTS:

The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testaments body nor the signature
therein was in decedents handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed
by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.
The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the disposition in the will of a house and lot.
He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole
owner.
However, the trial court still admitted the decedents holographic will to probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity of the will, its due execution
and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its
failure to comply with the formalitiesprescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the
testatrix.
On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not comply with Articles 313 and
314 of the NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed
by not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made had not been authenticated
by decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC were not complies with.
HELD:
YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of thedispositions contained
in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions,
the result is that these dispositionscannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole
testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814.
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic
will or on testators signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication
will only result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that he requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions (Article 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
necessary conditions for the validity of theholographic will (Article 810).
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only therequirements of Article 810
of the NCC and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 are essential to the probate of a holographic
will.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil Code enumerate the grounds for
disallowance of wills. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.

In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be resolved are:

1.whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
2.whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
3.whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and
4.whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud; accordingly, laws on this subject should be interpreted to attain these primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally
authographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no
result in the disallowance of a holographicwill that is unquestionable handwritten by the testator.

Magsaysay-Labrador, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals

[GR 58168, 19 December 1989]
Facts: On 9 February 1979, Adelaida Rodriguez-Magsaysay, widow and special administratix of the estate
of the late Senator Genaro Magsaysay, brought before the then Court of First Instance of Olongapo an
action against Artemio Panganiban, Subic Land Corporation (SUBIC), Filipinas Manufacturer's Bank
(FILMANBANK) and the Register of Deeds of Zambales, for the annulment of the Deed of Assignment
executed by the late Senator in favor of SUBIC (as a result of which TCT 3258 was cancelled and TCT
22431 issued in the name of SUBIC), for the annulment of the Deed of Mortgage executed by SUBIC in
favor of FILMANBANK (dated 28 April 1977 in the amount of P 2,700,000.00), and cancellation of TCT
22431 by the Register of Deeds, and for the latter to issue a new title in her favor. On 7 March 1979,
Concepcion Magsaysay-Labrador, Soledad Magsaysay-Cabrera, Luisa Magsaysay-Corpuz, Felicidad
Magsaysay, and Mercedes Magsaysay-Diaz, sisters of the late senator, filed a motion for intervention on
the ground that on 20 June 1978, their brother conveyed to them 1/2 of his shareholdings in SUBIC or a
total of 416,566.6 shares and as assignees of around 41 % of the total outstanding shares of such stocks of
SUBIC, they have a substantial and legal interest in the subject matter of litigation and that they have a
legal interest in the success of the suit with respect to SUBIC. On 26 July 1979, the trial court denied the
motion for intervention, and ruled that petitioners have no legal interest whatsoever in the matter in
litigation and their being alleged assignees or transferees of certain shares in SUBIC cannot legally entitle
them to intervene because SUBIC has a personality separate and distinct from its stockholders.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found no factual or legal justification to disturb the findings of the lower
court. The appellate court further stated that whatever claims the Magsaysay sisters have against the late
Senator or against SUBIC for that matter can be ventilated in a separate proceeding. The motion for
reconsideration of the Magsaysay sisters was denied. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether the Magsaysay sister, allegedly stockholders of SUBIC, are interested parties in a case
where corporate properties are in dispute.
Held: Viewed in the light of Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Magsaysay sisters have
no legal interest in the subject matter in litigation so as to entitle them to intervene in the proceedings. To
be permitted to intervene in a pending action, the party must have a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties or an interest against both, or he must be so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of the property in the custody of the court or
an officer thereof . Here, the interest, if it exists at all, of the Magsaysay sisters is indirect, contingent,
remote, conjectural, consequential and collateral. At the very least, their interest is purely inchoate, or in
sheer expectancy of a right in the management of the corporation and to share in the profits thereof and in
the properties and assets thereof on dissolution, after payment of the corporate debts and obligations.
While a share of stock represents a proportionate or aliquot interest in the property of the corporation, it
does not vest the owner thereof with any legal right or title to any of the property, his interest in the
corporate property being equitable or beneficial in nature. Shareholders are in no legal sense the owners
of corporate property, which is owned by the corporation as a distinct legal person.