G.R. No.

128096 January 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA
ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which
further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this
petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitionersintervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the
Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057
(for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and
documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of
the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been
involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the
Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the
Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force
Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson;
Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon;
and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief
Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that
what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub
out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the
incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and
personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said
incident was a legitimate police operation. 1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified
modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple
murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and
intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the
withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as
principal in eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second

Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed
them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11)
amended informations 5 before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged
only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other.
One of the accused 6 was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a
and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal
accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials
with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest
ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief
Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996),
penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and
Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the
amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of
the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration,
insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by
petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the
issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March
1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C.
Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill
No. 844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,
defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills
sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the
word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c)
of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249
President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.

13

by the

Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14

denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands
pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997
Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou
concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and
dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the

President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering

the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou
are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special
Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done
so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP
Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and
Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in
fact, no order of arrest has been issued this court has competence to
take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3
of 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the
unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained
jurisdiction to try and decide the cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including
Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in
any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues
that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the
authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation
in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due
process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from
the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the
resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to
overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate
the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan
law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was
again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases
were under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as provided
in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded
to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone
should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial
of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2304723057 to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid
"innocuous" provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather
than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the
one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under
Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. 17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while
Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed
upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to
apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the

Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could
no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired
under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings
in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question
and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously
within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional
memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed a
Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused
therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249,
so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the
Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible
reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of
proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we
regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known
as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil
cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office
as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following
provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may
be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the
Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological
order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D.
No. 1860, 24 P.D. No. 1861, 25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest
amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is
hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity,
at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while
occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and
up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with
Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in
the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including
quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be
filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive
of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court
of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employee, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in
any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975
provides:

Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as

amended) is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and
up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and

employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent
or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on
appelas from the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court
where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or
not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has
not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the
word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A.
7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties
herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and
intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the
principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent 28 or
higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special
Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in
certain cases, 29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A.
8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30
(d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), 31 or
(e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the

offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee 32 holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and
(3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder
which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing
on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A.
8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The
phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under
said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official
position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in
pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal
participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the
original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of
the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their
right to equal protection of the law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed
only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow
to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to
warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges
the law must present proof of arbitrariness. 34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification
between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has
not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial
had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that
makes real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective
proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of
Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37

it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would

necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the
form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that
Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated
as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case
involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to
"all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory
provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any
court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the
law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the
transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on
what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the
Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In
particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against
those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted
on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends
that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from
among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word
"principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory
provision of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered
by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved
by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the
Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against
petitioner during the committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient
justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the
legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the
committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and
the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it
whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of
R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law 41 for they
are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the
two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In
Calder v. Bull, 42 an ex post facto law is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of
the law and which was innocent when committed, and
punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when
it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed.

(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less
or different testimony that the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense on order to convict the
defendant. 43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage. 44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies
only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of a amnesty. 45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not
penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal
laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations; 47 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and
provide dor their punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e.
one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice. 49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which
they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is
incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times 50
considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that
can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of
appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it
does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty
and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. 52 Moreover, the law did not alter
the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled that adjective statutes
may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. 54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme
Court to review questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts,
the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of
innocence has been convincing overcome. 56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision
of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that
it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand"
its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be
considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law
because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement
that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title 57 is satisfied if the

title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the

general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally
interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There
is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249
expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the
amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane
to that general subject. 59 The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of
the law, acted within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself
empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts. 60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of
Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section
7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the
Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions
over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of
that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which
court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations, 61 and not by
the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls
under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense
charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This jurisdictional requirement is in
accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public
officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled
corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law." This
constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared
in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder
was committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. 65
This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties
"must be alleged in the informations." 66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as
constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language
without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the
offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the
actual recital of the facts." 67 The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not

from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was
explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused
with such a descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense and second to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause
and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be
had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated,
not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent
these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularly of
time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short,
the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to
him as "he is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense." 70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the
amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of
specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the
offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman
hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.
DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON,
SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO
C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF
SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL
L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused
CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE,
SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO,
SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking

advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members

of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged
in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using
firearms with treachery evident premeditation and taking advantage of
their superior strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M.
ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G.
ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II,
CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts
in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National
Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the
crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that
there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused
herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the
early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused
committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused
was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested
and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and
intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is
vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime
herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no
arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995."
The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused"
surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim
was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and
arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila"
but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information,
the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos
Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places
far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the
amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to
office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate
connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which,
as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed
in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere
allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a

conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official
duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court
and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after
trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended
information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has
organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes
consisting of regular policeman and . . . special policemen
appointed and provided by him with pistols and higher
power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo
which is under his command . . . supervision and control
where his co-defendants were stationed entertained
criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding
investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest
and detain person without due process of law and without
bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this
set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such,
and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence
thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office
of the accused because it was perpetreated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and
would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides,
the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime thus, there
was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the
accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and
15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and
investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the
investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused for the
purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted,
kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not
the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase
committed in relation to public office "does not appear in the information, which only
signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify
the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the
accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder
and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, 73
not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby
sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos.
23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-38308 December 26, 1984

MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and MANUEL MORENO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court of First
Instance, Negros Oriental, PABLO E. CABAHUG, as City Fiscal of Dumaguete,
and JULIAN L. TEVES, respondents.
CUEVAS, J.:
Petitioners Milagros Donio-Teves and Manuel Moreno are accused of and charged with
'ADULTERY' before the defunct Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental under
Criminal Case No. 1079 assigned to Branch Ill thereof, presided over by the Honorable
respondent Judge. The said criminal proceeding was initiated by a letter-complaint
dated July 13, 1972 1 thumbmarked and sworn to by complainant Julian L. Teves, the
husband of petitioner Milagros Donio-Teves, on the same date before respondent City
Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug. Said letter-complaint reads as follows:

Sir:
I have the honor to file a criminal complaint for 'Adultery' against my wife
Milagros Donio-Teves and her paramour, Manuel Moreno, residents of this
City and Bouffard Subdivision, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, respectively.
The affidavits of my witnesses are hereto attached
Truly
yours,
(Thumbmark)
JULIAN L.TEVES
Complainant
WITNESSES TO THUMBMARK:
1. (Sgd) Mita D. Escao
2. (Sgd) Rubi Villariza Destano
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of July, 1972, at
Dumaguete City.
(Sgd)
PABLO
CABAHUG
City
Fiscal
Dumaguete City

E.

Attached to the said letter-complaint were the affidavits of Elisa Chiu, Milagros
Quiteves and Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina, witnesses of complainant Julian L. Teves. 2
On the basis thereof, respondent City Fiscal conducted a preliminary investigation of
the aforesaid charge. Complainant Julian L. Teves took the witness stand affirmed the
statements appearing in his letter-complaint. He also Identified one of the
respondents, his wife Milagros Donio-Teves. Thereafter, he was cross-examined
lengthily by counsel for both respondents, now petitioners.
After terminating his examination, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, assailing the
jurisdiction of the City Fiscal to take cognizance of the case on the ground that there
was no proper complaint filed by complainant Julian L. Teves. The motion was denied
and continuation of the preliminary investigation was thereafter set for December 2,
1972. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order of denial was
likewise denied by the respondent City Fiscal. Meanwhile, complainant Julian L. Teves
filed a new letter-complaint dated January 16, 1973, this time attaching his affidavit
thereto.
The said letter-complaint
The
Dumaguete City
Sir:

reads as follows:
City

Fiscal

I hereby accused my wife Milagros Donio-Teves and her paramour Manuel

Moreno, residents of Bais City and Bouffard Subdivision, Sibulan, Negros
Oriental, respectively of the crime of 'Adultery committed as follows:
That on or about and during the months of May, 1970, to December,
1970, in the City of Dumaguete, and within the jurisdiction of this Office
for preliminary investigation, the said Milagros Donio-Teves who is my
wife, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with her
co-accused Manuel Moreno, who is not her husband, while the latter,
knowing her to be married, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge of her.
Contrary to law.
I hereby attach my affidavit in support of this complaint, in addition to
the affidavits of Milagros Quiteves, Elisa Chin and Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina
.... . This complaint is in amplication of my complaint , dated July 23,
1972, against the same persons for the same offense, filed with your
office on July 13, 1972. ...
Truly
yours,
(THUMBMARK)
JULIAN L. TEVES
Complainant
xxx xxx xxx
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of January, 1973, at
Dumaguete City.
(Sgd)
PABLO
CABAHUG
City Fiscal

E.

Continuation of the preliminary investigation was set for February 12, 1973. It was
later reset to March 6, 1973 and finally to March 23, 1973 at the instance of
respondents-petitioners.
At the resumption of the preliminary investigation scheduled on March 23, 1973,
petitioners filed a Joint Urge Omnibus Motion dated March 23, 1973, praying that
portions of the affidavits of Elisa Chiu, Milagros Quiteves and Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina
which relate to the adulterous acts allegedly committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of Dumaguete City be ordered stricken out, the same not falling within the
jurisdiction of the respondent City Fiscal. With the said motion still unresolved, an
information to which a complaint thumbmarked by complainant Julian L. Teves, was
filed before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental on March 26, 1973
which, as herein earlier stated, was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 1097. The
complaint reads:
Complaint
The undersigned complainant accused MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and
MANUEL MORENO of the crime of ADULTERY, committed as follows:

That on or about and during the months of May, 1970 to December,

1970, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES, being then united in
lawful wedlock with the undersigned complainant, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lay with, and had carnal knowledge of, her co-accused
MANUEL MORENO, who in turn, knowing that said MILAGROS DONIOTEVES was a married woman, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with,
and had carnal knowledge of her.
Contrary to law.
City of Dumaguete, Philippines, March 26,1973.
His Thumbmark
JULIAN L. TEVES
Complainant
WITNESS TO THUMBMARK:
(Sgd) YOLANDA D. BAGUIO
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of March, 1973, in
the City of Dumaguete, Philippines.
(Sgd)
City Fiscal

PABLO

E.

CABAHUG

Witnesses:
1. Julian L. Teves, Bais City
2. Elisa Chiu, Bais City
3. Milagros Quiteves, Bais City
4. Lorenza Regala-Lacsina, Bais City and others.
On September 28, 1973, the day before the scheduled arraignment, petitioner
Milagros Donio-Teves filed a Motion to Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the
respondent Court over the offense charged and the persons of both accused; and the
authority of respondent City Fiscal of Dumaguete to file the information. In a
"Manifestation" dated September 28, 1973, petitioner Manuel Moreno formally
adopted as his own, Milagros Donio-Teves' aforesaid Motion to Quash.
After the Opposition and Joint Answer to Opposition were filed, respondent Judge
issued an Order dated December 3, 1973 denying petitioners' Motion to Quash for
lack of merit. Petitioners' joint motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an
Order dated January 14, 1974. Arraignment of petitioners was set for March 1, 1974
and later reset to March 7, 1974.
Hence, the instant petition for CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION and mandamus with
preliminary injunction praying for the annulment of:

(1) all the proceedings conducted by the respondent City Fiscal that led
to the filing of the challenged information;
(2) the Order of the Honorable respondent Judge dated December 3,
1973 denying petitioners' motion to quash as well as the Order dated
January 14, 1974 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration; and
(3) commanding the respondent Trial Judge and respondent City Fiscal to
desist from taking any further action.
The petition is devoid of merit. Hence, its dismissal is in order.
Petitioners' attack against the validity of the proceedings conducted by the
respondent City Fiscal is anchored on the lack of a valid complaint on the part of the
offended party. The challenge against jurisdiction having been acquired over the case
and persons of the accused, is similarly predicated on the same ground absence of
a valid complaint.
Adultery, being a private offense, it cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended spouse who cannot institute the criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders. 4
This Court has invariably maintained strict adherence to this jurisdictional requirement
of a complaint by the offended party, as defined in Section 2 of Rule 106 of the Rules
of Court and Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. 5 So much so, that an Information
filed with the provincial fiscal wherein the offended party signed at the bottom thereof
over and above the signature of the prosecuting officer, the information even reciting
that the provincial fiscal charges defendant with the crime of seduction at the
"instance of the offended party" was considered insufficient. 6 In another case, 7 this
Court motu proprio dismissed the case for failure of the aggrieved party to file the
proper complaint for the offense of oral defamation imputing the commission of an
offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, although the accused never raised the
question on appeal, thereby dramatizing the necessity of strict compliance with the
above legal requirement even to the extent of nullifying all the proceedings already
had in the lower court.
However, this legal requirement was imposed "out of consideration for the aggrieved
party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the
scandal of a public trial. 8 Thus, the law leaves it to the option of the aggrieved spouse
to seek judicial redress for the affront committed by the erring spouse. This should be
the overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition
precedent prescribed by said Article 344 has been complied with. For, indeed, it is the
spirit rather than the letter of the law which should prevail. 9
The complaint referred to which is required by way of initiating the criminal
prosecution of crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio is, however, that one filed
with the Court and not that which is necessary to start the required preliminary
investigation by the fiscal's office. 10 In the latter case, a letter of complaint sufficed
for the purpose.
Coming back to the case at bar, the desire of the offended party Julian L. Teves to
bring his wife and her alleged paramour before the bar of justice is only too evident.
Such determination of purpose on his part is amply demonstrated in the strong and
unequivocal statement contained in his first complaint of July 13, 1972 making clear

and implicit his purpose, which is no other than "to file a criminal complaint for
ADULTERY against my wife Milagros Donio-Teves and her paramour Manuel Moreno"...
plus the fact that he filed no less than three (3) complaints in order to meet the
objections of the petitioner herein as to the sufficiency of his first complaint dated July
13, 1972.
Petitioners' submission that there is no sufficient and valid complaint instituted in
the instant case so as to confer jurisdiction over the offense and persons of the
accused (herein petitioners), hardly convince Us. The second complaint dated January
16, 1973 filed with the Fiscal's Office and that filed with the respondent Court on
March 26, 1973, are both sufficient and valid complaints. Both state the name of the
defendants; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense
was committed which is an absolute compliance with what Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court prescribe. 11 Both
complaints were also thumbmarked by and under oath of the complainant. The
allegations of the complaints fully apprised petitioners of the facts and acts subject
matter thereof and enables them to fully comprehend to which acts of theirs it refers.
12 Both sufficiently identify the acts constituting the offense, sufficient enough to
enable the Court to pronounce a valid judgment thereon in case of conviction. 13
As it is, doubt could not have set in and confusion would not have arisen had the
Fiscal limited himself merely to the filing of the complaint (thumbmarked and under
oath of the complainant) instead of an information with the complaint annexed
thereto.
Finally, as a last-ditch attempt to throw the ADULTERY case out of court, petitioners
invoked the death of the complainant which took place on April 14, 1974 and during
the pendency of this case, as an added argument in support of their plea for dismissal.
Such a stand is erroneous. Death of the offended party is not a ground for
extinguishment of criminal liability whether total 14 or partial. 15 The participation of
the offended party is essential not for the maintenance of the criminal action but soley
for the initiation thereof.
The term "private crimes" in reference to felonies which cannot be prosecuted except
upon complaint filed by the aggrieved party, is misleading. Far from what it implies, it
is not only the aggrieved party who is offended in such crimes but also the State.
Every violation of penal laws results in the disturbance of public order and safety
which the State is committed to uphold and protect. If the law imposes the condition
that private crimes like adultery shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint filed
by the offended party, it is, as herein pointed earlier "out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial." Once a complaint is filed, the will of the offended
party is ascertained and the action proceeds just as in any other crime. This is shown
by the fact that after filing a complaint, any pardon given by the complainant to the
offender would be unavailing. 16 It is true, the institution of the action in so- called
private crimes is at the option of the aggrieved party. But it is equally true that once
the choice is made manifest, the law will be applied in full force beyond the control of,
and in spite of the complainant, his death notwithstanding. 17
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED. The Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court Branch of Negros Oriental to whose sala Criminal Case No. 1097
had been assigned, is hereby ordered to immediately continue with the trial of the

aforementioned case and render judgment thereon on the basis of the evidence
presented.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127444

September 13, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 88,
Quezon City, and HONORATO GALVEZ, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case nudges the Court to revisit the doctrine on double jeopardy, a revered
constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice
for the same offense. In this case, after trial on the merits, the accused was acquitted
for insufficiency of the evidence against him in the cases for murder and frustrated
murder (although his co-accused was convicted), and finding in the illegal carrying of
firearm that the act charged did not constitute a violation of law. But the State through
this petition for certiorari would want his acquittal reversed.
We narrate a brief factual backdrop.
The idyllic morning calm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of Manila, was
shattered by gunshots fired in rapid succession. The shooting claimed the life of young
Alex Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin brother Levi who permanently lost his
left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. A slug tunneled through his
right arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed in his stomach where it
remained until extracted by surgical procedure.
As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two (2)
for frustrated homicide - were originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo
Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. On 14 December
1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the same
accused upgrading the crimes to murder (Crim. Case No. 4004-M-93) and frustrated
murder (Crim. Cases Nos. 4005-M-93 and 4006-M-93). Mayor Galvez was charged, in
addition, with violation of PD 1866 (Crim. Case No. 4007-M-94) for unauthorized
carrying of firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth Information had to be filed.
After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the cases was transferred to
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila. There the cases were stamped
with new docket numbers (Nos. Q-94-55484, Q-94-55485, Q-94-55486 and Q-9455487, respectively), and raffled to Branch 103 presided over by Judge Jaime Salazar,
Jr. In the course of the proceedings, the judge inhibited himself and the cases were reraffled to respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89.

On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated.
The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor
Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved
him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not
a violation of law.
The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the
Government before this Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution. It is the submission of petitioner that
the exculpation of the accused Galvez from all criminal responsibility by respondent
Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately and
wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously
considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and
arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court
upon a determination that a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary because the
judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt.
The main hypothesis of the Government is that elevating the issue of criminal
culpability of private respondent Galvez before this Tribunal despite acquittal by the
trial court should not be considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused
against double jeopardy, for it is now settled constitutional doctrine in the United
States that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by US
trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial is required should judgment be
overturned.1 Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced from
American constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of
Kepner v. United States,2 and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not
follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be
allowed to take the same directional course. Petitioner in this regard urges the Court
to take a second look at Kepner, it being the "cornerstone of the battlement of the
Double Jeopardy Clause" in the Philippines 3 and seriously examine whether the
precedents it established almost a century ago are still germane and useful today in
view of certain modifications wrought on the doctrine by the succeeding American
cases of United States v. Wilson4 and United States v. Scott.5
Two (2) threshold issues therefore, interlocked as they are, beg to be addressed. One
is the propriety of certiorari as an extraordinary mode of review under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court where the result actually intended is the reversal of the acquittal of
private respondent Galvez. The other is the permissibility of a review by the Court of a
judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy.
The recent untimely demise of respondent Galvez at the hands of alleged assassins
(not discounting too the earlier dismissal of respondent judge from the service) may
arguably have rendered these matters moot and academic, thus calling for a dismissal
of the petition on this basis alone. The Court however is not insensitive to nor
oblivious of the paramount nature and object of the pleas forcefully presented by the
Government considering especially the alleged new directions in American
jurisprudence taken by the doctrine of double jeopardy. We are thus impelled to
respond to the issues advanced by petitioner for these bear unquestionably farreaching contextual significance and implications in Philippine juristic philosophy and
experience, demanding no less, explicit and definitive rulings.

For it may be argued from a historico-analytical perspective that perhaps none of the
constitutionally ensconced rights of men has followed a more circuitous and tortuous
route in the vast sea of jurisprudence than the right of a person not to be tried or
prosecuted a second time for the same offense. 6 This prohibition does not consist
merely of one rule but several, each rule applying to a different situation, each rule
marooned in a sea of exceptions. 7 It must have been this unique transpiration that
prompted even the redoubtable Mr. Justice Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court to
remark in Albernaz v. United States8 that "the decisional law (in the area of double
jeopardy) is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most
intrepid judicial navigator." It is therefore necessary that, in forming a correct
perspective and full understanding of the doctrine on double jeopardy and the rules so
far established relative to the effect thereon of appeals of judgments of acquittal, a
compendious review of its historical growth and development be undertaken. This
approach is particularly helpful in properly situating and analyzing landmark
interpretive applications of the doctrine in light of the varying legal and factual milieu
under which it evolved.
Jeopardy, itself "a fine poetic word," 9 derives from the Latin "jocus" meaning joke, jest
or game,10 and also from the French term "jeu perdre" which denotes a game that one
might lose. Similarly, the Middle English word "iuparti" or "jupartie" means an
uncertain game.11 The genesis of the concept itself however rests deep in the ancient
Grecian view of tragedy and suffering and in the old Roman legal concepts of
punishment. Greek law bound prosecutor and judge to the original verdict as can be
seen in the remark of Demosthenes in 355 B. C. that "the laws forbid the same man to
be tried twice on the same issue." 12 The Justinian Digest13 providing that "(a) governor
should not permit the same person to be again accused of crime of which he has been
acquitted,"14 suggests certain philosophical underpinnings believed to have been
influenced by works of the great Greek tragedians of the 5th century B.C. reflecting
mans "tragic vision" or the tragic view of life. For the ancient Greeks believed that
man was continuously pitted against a superior force that dictated his own destiny.
But this prevailing view was not to be taken in the sense of man passing from one
misfortune to another without relief, as this idea was repugnant to Greek sensibilities.
Rather, it expressed a universal concept of catharsis or vindication that meant
misfortune resolving itself into a final triumph, and persecution, into freedom and
liberation. To suffer twice for the same misfortune was anathema to ancient thought.
The 18th century B. C. Babylonian king and lawgiver Hammurabi recognized that
humans could err in prosecuting and rendering judgment, thus limits were needed on
prosecutors and judges. A gruesome but effective way of preventing a second trial by
the same prosecutor after an acquittal can be found in the first law of the
Hammurabic Code: "If a man has accused a man and has charged him with
manslaughter and then has not proved [it against him], his accuser shall be put to
death."15
The repugnance to double trials strongly expressed by the Catholic Church is
consistent with the interpretation by St. Jerome in 391 A. D. of the promise by God to
his people through the prophet Nahum that "(a)ffliction shall not rise up the second
time"16 and "(t)hough I have afflicted thee, I will afflict thee no more." 17 Taken to mean
that God does not punish twice for the same act, the maxim insinuated itself into
canon law as early as 847 A. D., succintly phrased as "(n)ot even God judges twice for
the same act."18
The most famous cause clbre on double jeopardy in the Middle Ages was the
dispute between the English King Henry II and his good friend, Thomas Becket,
Archbishop of Canterbury. Henry wished to continue the observance of certain
customs initiated by his predecessors called "avitae consuetudines," one of the known

purposes of which was that clerics convicted of crimes before Church courts be
delivered to lay tribunals for punishment. He asserted in the Constitutions of
Clarendon that the clergy were also subject to the kings punishment. This was met
with stinging criticism and stiff opposition by the Archbishop who believed that
allowing this practice would expose the clergy to double jeopardy. The issue between
the two erstwhile friends was never resolved and remained open-ended, for Thomas
was later on mercilessly murdered in his cathedral, allegedly at the instance of his
king.19
It was in England though, a century ago, that double jeopardy was formally
institutionalized "as a maxim of common law"20 based on the universal principles of
reason, justice and conscience, about which the Roman Cicero commented: "Nor is it
one thing at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another in the future, but
among all nations, it is the same." 21 But even as early as the 15th century, the English
courts already began to use the term "jeopardy" in connection with the doctrine
against multiple trials.22 Thereafter, the principle appeared in the writings of Hale
(17th c.), Lord Coke (17th c.) and Blackstone (18th c.). 23 Lord Coke for instance
described the protection afforded by the rule as a function of three (3) related
common law pleas: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and pardon.24 In Vauxs Case,25 it
was accepted as established that "the life of a man shall not be twice put in jeopardy
for one and the same offense, and that is the reason and cause that autrefois
acquitted or convicted of the same offense is a good plea x x x x" Blackstone likewise
observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a formal acquittal is grounded on the
universal maxim of the common law of England that "(n)o man is to be brought into
jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. And hence, it is allowed as a
consequence that when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or
other prosecution before any court having competent jurisdiction of the offense, he
may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime." 26
The English dogma on double jeopardy, recognized as an "indispensable requirement
of a civilized criminal procedure," became an integral part of the legal system of the
English colonies in America. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, an early
compilation of principles drawn from the statutes and common law of England,
grandly proclaimed that "(n)o man shall be twise sentenced by Civill Justice for one
and the same crime, offence or Trespasse" and that "(e)verie Action betweene partie
and partie, and proceedings against delinquents in Criminall causes shall be briefly
and destinctly entered on the Rolles of every Court by the Recorder thereof."27
Ineluctably, this pronouncement became the springboard for the proposal of the First
Congress of the United States that double jeopardy be included in the Bill of Rights. It
acknowledged that the tradition against placing an individual twice in danger of a
second prosecution for the same offense followed ancient precedents in English law
and legislation derived from colonial experiences and necessities. Providing abundant
grist for impassioned debate in the US Congress, the proposal was subsequently
ratified as part of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
In 1817 the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed an appeal by the State after an
acquittal from perjury, declaring that: "A writ of error, or appeal in the nature of a writ
of error, will not lie for the State in such a case. It is a rule of common law that no one
shall be brought twice into jeopardy for one and the same offense. Were it not for this
salutary rule, one obnoxious to the government might be harassed and run down by
repeated attempts to carry on a prosecution against him. Because of this rule, a new
trial cannot be granted in a criminal case where the defendant is acquitted. A writ of
error will lie for the defendant, but not against him." 28 Verily, these concepts were
founded upon that great fundamental rule of common law, "Nemo debet bis vexari
pro una et eadem causa," in substance expressed in the Constitution of the United
States as: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense, to be twice put into

jeopardy of life or limb." It is in the spirit of this benign rule of the common law,
embodied in the Federal Constitution - a spirit of liberty and justice, tempered with
mercy - that, in several states of the Union, in criminal cases, a writ of error has been
denied to the State.29
The relationship between the prohibition against second jeopardy and the power to
order a new trial following conviction or dismissal stirred a no small amount of
controversy in United States v. Gibert.30 There, Mr. Justice Story, on circuit, declared
that "the court had no power to grant a new trial when the first trial had been duly
had on a valid indictment before a court of competent jurisdiction." The opinion
formulated was that the prohibition against double jeopardy applied equally whether
the defendant had been acquitted or convicted.
But it must be noted that even in those times, the power to grant a new trial in the
most serious cases was already being exercised by many American courts, the
practice having been observed from an early date, in spite of provisions of law against
double jeopardy.31 For this reason, the rule in Gibert was stoutly resisted.32 As if to
taunt Gibert, the 1839 case of United States v. Keen33 declared that the constitutional
provision did not prohibit a new trial on defendants motion after a conviction. In Hopt
v. Utah,34 the defendant was retried three (3) times following reversals of his
convictions.
Then in 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Ball35 affirmed that the
double jeopardy rule did not prevent a second trial when, on appeal, a conviction had
been set aside. It declared that a defendant who procured on appeal a reversal of a
judgment against him could be tried anew upon the same indictment or upon another
indictment for the same offense of which he had been convicted. This principle of
autrefois convict was expanded nine (9) years later in Trono v. United States36 where
the Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippines by holding
that "since the plaintiffs in error had appealed their convictions of the lower offense in
order to secure a reversal, there was no bar to convicting them of the higher offense
in proceedings in the appellate court that were tantamount to a new trial." Mr. Justice
Peckham, holding for the Court, concluded that "the better doctrine is that which does
not limit the court or the jury upon a new trial, to a consideration of the question of
guilt of the lower offense of which the accused was convicted on the first trial, but that
the reversal of the judgment of conviction opens up the whole controversy and acts
upon the original judgment as if it had never been." 37 It was ratiocinated that the
result was justified not only on the theory that the accused had waived their right not
to be retried but also on the ground that "the constitutional provision was really never
intended to x x x cover the case of a judgment x x x which has been annulled at the
request of the accused x x x x"
It must be stressed though that Ball also principally ruled that it had long been settled
under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendants
jeopardy, and, even when "not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. It is one of the elemental principles of our criminal
law that the Government cannot secure a new trial by means of an appeal, even
though an acquittal may appear to be erroneous."
In 1891 the United States Judiciary Act was passed providing that appeals or writs of
error may be taken from the district court or from the existing circuit courts direct to
the Supreme Court in any case that involved the construction of the Constitution. The
following year an issue was raised in United States v. Sanges38 on whether this Act
conferred upon the government the right to sue out a writ of error in any criminal
case. In that case, existing rules on double jeopardy took a significant turn when the
United States Supreme Court observed that while English law was vague on the

matter, it had been settled by overwhelming American authority that the State had no
right to sue out a writ of error upon a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal
case, except under and in accordance with express statutes, whether that judgment
was rendered upon a verdict of acquittal, or upon the determination by the court of a
question of law. The Court noted that in a few states, decisions denying a writ of error
to the State after a judgment for the defendant on a verdict of acquittal proceeded
upon the ground that to grant it would be to put him twice in jeopardy, in violation of
the constitutional provision.39 Sanges therefore fixed the rule that absent explicit
legislative authority, the United States Government had no right of appeal in criminal
cases in case of an acquittal as it would expose the defendant twice to jeopardy.
Notably, however, in 1892 the Attorneys General of the United States began to
recommend the passage of legislation allowing the Government to appeal in criminal
cases. Their primary objective was to resist the power of a single district judge (under
the law then obtaining) by dismissing an indictment to defeat any criminal prosecution
instituted by the Government. No action was taken on the proposal until 1906 when
President Theodore Roosevelt in his annual message to the US Congress demanded
the enactment of legislation on the matter. Consequently, on 2 March 1907 such
legislative authority was provided when the Criminal Appeals Act became a law 40 Ch.
2564, 34 Stat. 1246.40 permitting the United States to seek a writ of error from the
Supreme Court from any decision dismissing all indictment on the basis of the
"invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictments is founded."41 The
law narrowed the right to appeal by the Government to cases in which the ground of
the District Courts decision was invalidity or construction of the statute upon which
the charge was founded, and that a verdict in favor of the defendant based on
evidence could not be set aside on appeal no matter how erroneous the legal theory
upon which it may be based. For these purposes, it made no difference whether the
verdict be the result of the jurys decision or that of the judge. In other words,
Government could appeal from a decision dismissing an indictment or arresting
judgment on the basis of the statutory invalidity or misconstruction of the pertinent
criminal statute and from a decision sustaining a special plea in bar, so long as the
defendant would not be put in jeopardy.42
On 10 December 1898 the Philippine Islands was ceded by Spain to the United States
by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 which was ratified by the State Parties on 11
April 1899. The Islands was placed under military rule until the establishment of the
Philippine Commission in 1902. On 23 April 1900 the military government issued
General Order No. 58 which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure then in force by,
among others, extending to the Islands the double jeopardy provision under the Fifth
Amendment of the US Constitution. This was pursuant to the 7 April 1900 Instructions
of President McKinley issued to the Philippine Commission headed by William Howard
Taft. The Instructions read in part: "x x x the Commission should bear in mind, and the
people of the Islands should be made to understand, that there are certain great
principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental
system, which we deem essential to the rule of law x x x and maintained in their
islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict
with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar x x x x Upon every
division and branch of the Government of the Philippines therefore must be imposed
these inviolable rules: x x x that x x x no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the
same offense x x x x"43
General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 which permitted an appeal by the
government after acquittal. The Philippine Civil Government Act of 1 July 1902 of the
U.S. Congress repealed the Act, adopted and restored the same principle in Gen.
Order No. 58 as enunciated in the Fifth Amendment and in McKinleys Instructions by
providing immunity from second jeopardy for the same criminal offense. It did not

take long however for the meaning and significance of the doctrine held forth in
McKinleys Instructions to be placed under severe test and scrutiny.
In 1901 Mr. Thomas E. Kepner, a practicing lawyer in Manila, Philippines, was charged
with embezzlement of funds (estafa). He was tried by a court of first instance, minus a
jury, and was acquitted of the crime. The U.S. Government appealed to the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands and judgment was reversed. Kepner was sentenced
with imprisonment and suspended from public office or place of trust.
Questioning his conviction before the US Supreme Court, Kepner argued that the
appeal by the US government to the Philippine Supreme Court of his judgment of
acquittal constituted double jeopardy construed in light of existing US jurisprudence.
On the other hand, the Attorney General for the Philippines and the Solicitor General
of the United States jointly contended that the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902 which
included the prohibition against double jeopardy should be construed from the
perspective of the system of laws prevailing in the Philippines prior to its cession to
the United States. Under this system, the Audiencia (Supreme Court) could entertain
an appeal of a judgment of acquittal since the proceedings before it were regarded
not as a new trial but an extension of preliminary proceedings in the court of first
instance. The entire proceedings constituted one continuous trial and the jeopardy
that attached in the court of first instance did not terminate until final judgment had
been rendered by the Audiencia. Double jeopardy was described not only in the
Spanish law Fuero Real44 as: "After a man accused of any crime has been acquitted by
the court, no one can afterwards accuse him of the same offense (except in certain
specified cases), but also in the Siete Partidas45 which provided that: "If a man is
acquitted by a valid judgment of any offense of which he has been accused, no other
person can afterwards accuse him of the offense x x x x" Under this system of law, a
person was not regarded as jeopardized in the legal sense until there had been a final
judgment in the court of last resort. The lower courts then were deemed examining
courts, exercising preliminary jurisdiction only, and the accused was not finally
convicted or acquitted until the case had been passed upon in the Audiencia or
Supreme Court, whose judgment was subject to review by the Supreme Court in
Madrid (Spain) for errors of law, with power to grant a new trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court however threw out the Governments argument and held that
the proceedings after acquittal had placed the accused Kepner twice in jeopardy. It
declared in no uncertain terms that the appeal of the judgment of conviction was in
essence a trial de novo and that, whatever the Spanish tradition was, the purpose of
Congress was to carry some at least of the essential principles of American
constitutional jurisprudence to the Islands and to engraft them upon the law of these
people newly subject to its jurisdiction. There was little question therefore that Kepner
soldered into American jurisprudence the precedent that as to the defendant who had
been acquitted by the verdict duly returned and received, the court could take no
other action than to order his discharge. "x x x (I)t is then the settled law of this court
that former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered,
although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective
indictment. The protection is not x x x against the peril of second punishment, but
against being tried again for the same offense." 46
This doctrine was echoed in United States v. Wills47 where the Court further clarified
that "jeopardy implies an exposure to a lawful conviction for an offense of which a
person has already been acquitted x x x x" It was reiterated in 1957 in Green v. United
States48 in which Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, professed that the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was designed to protect an
individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more
than once for an alleged offense. Thus, under the Fifth Amendment, a verdict of

acquittal was considered final, ending the accuseds jeopardy and that once a person
has been acquitted of an offense, he cannot be prosecuted again on the same charge.
American jurisprudence on the effect of appealed acquittals on double jeopardy since
then sailed on, following the main sea lanes charted by Kepner, but not without
encountering perturbance along the way. For it may be mentioned, albeit en passant,
that the case of Bartkus v. Illinois49 did cause some amount of judicial soul-shaking in
1959 when it burst into the scene. Alfonse Bartkus was tried before a federal district
court in Illinois and was later acquitted by the jury. Less than a year later, Bartkus was
indicted this time by an Illinois grand jury on facts substantially identical to those of
the federal charge and was subsequently convicted. His conviction was affirmed by
the Illinois Supreme Court.
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a close vote of 5 to 4, affirmed the
conviction. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, declared that the Fifth
Amendments double jeopardy provision was inapplicable to states so that an
acquittal of a federal indictment was no bar to a prosecution by a state based on the
same charge. Since there was no proof offered to show that the participation of the
federal authorities in the Illinois state prosecution was of such nature as to render the
state proceedings a mere cover for a federal prosecution to render the state
indictment essentially a constitutionally prohibited second prosecution, no double
jeopardy attached.
Mr. Justice Black dissented, joined in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Douglas, with Mr. Justice Brennan writing a separate dissenting opinion. Black rued
that the Courts ruling by a majority of one only resulted in "further limiting the
already weakened constitutional guarantees against double prosecution," citing the
earlier case of United States v. Lanza,50 where the Court allowed the federal conviction
and punishment of a man previously convicted and punished for identical acts by a
state court. The dissent called attention to the fact that in Bartkus, for the first time in
its history, the Court allowed the state conviction of a defendant already acquitted of
the same offense in the federal court. This, Mr. Justice Black asserted, was
unacceptable, for as the Court previously found in Palko v. Connecticut,51 "double
prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to the spirit of our free country that
they violate even the prevailing view of the Fourteenth Amendment since some of the
privileges and immunities of the Bill of Rights . . . have been taken over and brought
within the Fourteenth Amendment by process of absorption x x x x One may infer,
from the fewness of the cases, that retrials after acquittal have been considered
particularly obnoxious, worse even, in the eyes of many, than retrials after
conviction."
Whether such forceful pronouncements steered back into course meandering views on
double jeopardy is open to question. Nonetheless, the case of Fong Foo v. United
States,52 decided per curiam, reaffirmed the pronouncements in Ball and Kepner that
"the verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed x x x without putting (the
petitioners) twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution."
In the meantime, from 1907 up to 1970 the Criminal Appeals Act underwent
significant alterations. The 1942 amendment of its Section 682 permitted for the first
time appeals to the circuit appeals court from orders sustaining demurrer to
indictment in cases not directly appealable to the Supreme Court. 53 However, due to
the many modifications the law was subjected to, construction and interpretation
became more laborious, effectively transforming appeals into highly technical
procedures. As such, the Criminal Appeals Act developed into a judicial "bete noire,"
for even the U.S. Supreme Court itself had "to struggle in a number of occasions with

the vagaries of the said Act."54 In one of those unhappy efforts, it concluded that the
Act was "a failure x x x a most unruly child that has not improved with age."55
The U.S. Congress finally got rid of the dismal statute in 1970 and replaced it with
a new Criminal Appeals Act intended to broaden the right of Government to appeal
whenever the Constitution would permit. It was apparent that the legislative body left
to the courts the prerogative to draw the constitutional limits of double jeopardy
rather than define them itself. Since then, pronouncements by the courts on the jouble
jeopardy guarantee of the Fifth Amendment focused on three (3) related protections:
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and, against multiple punishments
for the same offense.56
In Wilson,57 the Court expressed that the interests underlying these three (3)
protections are quite similar. Thus, when a defendant has been once convicted and
punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he be
not subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being tried or sentenced for
the same offense.58 And when a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the
Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to
convict him, "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." 59 It can
thus be inferred from these cases that the policy of avoiding multiple trials has been
considered paramount so that exceptions to the rule have been permitted only in few
instances and under rigid conditions.
Accordingly, in United States v. Scott 60 the US Supreme Court synthesized two (2)
venerable principles of double jeopardy jurisprudence: first, the successful appeal of a
judgment of conviction on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge; and
second, a judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a
ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed
and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a
reversal.61 It would seem that the conditionality of "when a second trial would be
necessitated by a reversal" was attached thereto because ordinarily, the procedure
obtaining was that if on appeal a judgment of acquittal is reversed, i. e., a finding is
had against the defendant, a remand of the case for another trial may be allowed if
needed.
At this juncture, it must be explained that under existing American law and
jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal convictions but also, in
some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes loosely
termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not
involve determination of evidence, such as when the judge: (a) issues a post-verdict
acquittal, i.e., acquits the defendant on a matter of law after a verdict of guilty has
been entered by a trier of facts (a jury); (b) orders the dismissal on grounds other than
insufficiency of evidence, as when the statute upon which the indictment was based is
defective; (c) conducts a judicial process that is defective or flawed in some
fundamental respect, such as incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect
instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct; (d) issues an order arresting judgment, i.e.,
an act of a trial judge refusing to enter judgment on the verdict because of an error
appearing on the face of the record that rendered the judgment; 62 or, (e) pronounces
judgment on a special plea in bar (a non obstante plea) - one that does not relate to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but which is set up as a special defense
relating to an outside matter but which may have been connected with the case. 63
Interestingly, the common feature of these instances of dismissal is that they all bear

on questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual resolution of the case which

consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of evidence. Its logical effect in
American law is to render appeals therefrom non-repugnant to the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
This contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of criminal cases are
allowed under American rules of procedure does not obtain in the Philippines. To be
sure, United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an
appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. Mr. Justice Rehnquist
explained that what may seem superficially to be a "disparity in the rules governing a
defendants liability to be tried again" refers to the underlying purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. He elaborated that "(a)s Kepner and Fong Foo illustrate, the law
attaches particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an
acquittal however mistaken x x x would present an unacceptably high risk that the
Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so
that even though innocent he may be found guilty. x x x x On the other hand, to
require a criminal defendant to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked the
statutory right of appeal to upset his first conviction is not an act of governmental
oppression of the sort against which the x x x Clause was intended to protect."
In proposing a re-evaluation of Philippine jurisprudence on double jeopardy, petitioner
insists that Wilson and Scott have unquestionably altered the seascape of double
jeopardy previously navigated by Kepner and Ball. Using as its flagship the
pronouncement in Wilson that appeals of acquittal are possible provided the accused
will not be subjected to a second trial, it argues that this should apply to the case at
bar because, anyway, a review of the acquittal of private respondent Honorato Galvez
will not result in another trial inasmuch as the Court will only have to examine the
evidence adduced below to pass final judgment on the culpability of the accused.
Petitioners own hermeneutic sense of the phrase "another trial" is that which solely
adverts to a proceeding before a competent trial court that rehears the case and
receives evidence anew to establish the facts after the case has been finally disposed
of by the Supreme Court. Obviously, it adheres to the Holmesian hypothesis in Kepner
and, for that matter, the concept under Spanish law then applicable in the Philippines
before the American colonization, that a trial consists of one whole continuing process
from reception of evidence by a trier of facts up to its final disposition by the Supreme
Court. But petitioner conveniently forgets that this theory has been consistently
spurned by both American and Philippine jurisprudence that has faithfully adhered to
the doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by
the court in a bench trial is, quintessentially, a new trial. In Kepner, the Court regarded
the two (2) events, i. e., trial by the lower court and the appellate proceedings, as
equivalent to two (2) separate trials, and the evil that the Court saw in the procedure
was plainly that of multiple prosecutions. 64 Although Kepner technically involved only
one proceeding, the Court deemed the second factfinding, that is, the review by the
appellate court, as the equivalent of a second trial. Accordingly, in subsequent cases,
the Court has treated the Kepner principle as being addressed to the evil of
successive trials.65
No less than the case of Wilson,66 petitioners main anchor for its propositions, affirms
this rule. There, the Court emphasized that it has, up to the present, rejected the
theory espoused by the dissenting Mr. Justice Holmes in Kepner that " a man cannot
be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause however often he may be
tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the end of the
cause." It declared unequivocally that "we continue to be of the view that the policies
underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the Government to
appeal after a verdict of acquittal." Wilson therefore pronounced that if acquittal is

declared on the basis of evidence adduced, double jeopardy attaches for that
particular cause.
To explain further, Wilson involved an appeal by Government of a post-verdict ruling
of law issued by the trial judge resulting in the acquittal of the defendant due to preindictment delay (a delay between the offense and the indictment prejudiced the
defendant) after a verdict of guilty had been entered by the jury. But it was not an
acquittal that involved "factual resolution." It was one anchored on an extraneous
cause. Factual resolution is defined in United States v. Sorenson 67 following the rulings
in Ball, Fong Foo and Sisson as "the finding that government failed to prove all the
elements of the offense." It is clear therefore that the acquittal of Wilson, not being
based on evidence, could be appealed. The rule therefore fixed in Wilson is that where
a judge holds for the defendant on a ruling of law, and not on the basis of evidence,
after a jury entered a verdict of guilty, the prosecution may appeal the acquittal
without violating double jeopardy, as this is allowed under the pertinent law. 68 This is
so since no second trial will ensue, as a reversal on appeal would merely reinstate the
jurys verdict.69 And if the prosecution is upheld, the case simply goes back to the trial
court for disposition of the remaining matters. It bears emphasis that in Wilson, no
double jeopardy problem was presented because the appellate court, upon reviewing
the asserted legal errors of the trial judge, could simply order the jurys guilty verdict
reinstated, no new factfinding would be necessary, and the defendant would not be
put twice in jeopardy.70
The case of Scott, also considerably relied upon by petitioner, involved an accused
who, having been indicted for several offenses, himself moved for the dismissal of two
(2) counts of the charges on the ground that his defense was prejudiced by preindictment delay. The trial judge granted the motion. Government appealed the
dismissals but the appellate court rejected the appeal on the basis of double jeopardy.
This time the US Supreme Court reversed, holding that "(w)here a defendant himself
seeks to avoid his trial prior to its conclusion by a motion for a mistrial, the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not offended by a second prosecution. Such a motion by the
defendant is deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to forego his valued right
to have his guilt or innocence determined by the first trier of facts."
The inapplicability of this ruling to the case at bar is at once discernible. The dismissal
of the charges against private respondent Galvez was not upon his own instance;
neither did he seek to avoid trial, as it was in Scott, to be considered as having waived
his right to be adjudged guilty or innocent. Here, trial on the merits was held during
which both government and accused had their respective day in court.
We are therefore insufficiently persuaded to adopt petitioners concept of "another
trial" because, as discussed above, it disregards the contextual interpretation of the
term in light of the legal and factual morphology of the double jeopardy principle
obtaining in Wilson and Scott. To sum up, in the cause before us, the records show
that respondent trial judge based his finding of acquittal, no matter how erroneous it
might seem to petitioner, upon the evidence presented by both parties. The judgment
here was no less than a factual resolution of the case. Thus, to the extent that the
post-verdict acquittal in Wilson was based on a ruling of law and not on a resolution of
facts, Wilson is not, to reiterate, pertinent to nor persuasive in the case at bar. The
same observation holds true for Scott. That it was the defendant who secured the
dismissal of the charges against him without any submission to either judge or jury as
to his guilt or innocence, but on a ground totally outside evidentiary considerations,
i.e., pre-indictment delay, definitely forecloses the applicability, if not relevance, of
Scott to the instant case.

Wilson, Scott and all other pertinent American case law considered, it still behooves
us to examine if at this time there is need to rethink our juristic philosophy on double
jeopardy vis--vis acquittals. In this respect, it would be instructive to see how
Philippine law and jurisprudence have behaved since Kepner. Has the principle since
then beneficially evolved, or has it remained an "unruly child that has not improved
with age?"
The moorings of double jeopardy in the Philippines, as Mr. Justice Manuel Moran
observed in People v. Tarok,71 are not indigenous but are a matter of constitutional or
statutory history. Enunciated in the Constitution of the United States, from there it
found its way into this country, first, in the Philippine Bill of 1902, then in the Jones
Law of 1916, and finally, in the 1935 Philippine Constitution. Being thus a mere
recognition of the maxim of the common law, and adopted from the Constitution of
the United States, the principle of double jeopardy followed in this jurisdiction the
same line of development - no narrower nor wider - as in the Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence.
While some reservations may be had about the contemporary validity of this
observation considering the variety of offsprings begotten, at least in the United
States, by the mother rule since then, perhaps it is safer to say that not much
deviation has occurred from the general rule laid out in Kepner. For Kepner may be
said to have been the lighthouse for the floundering issues on the effect of acquittals
on jeopardy as they sail safely home. The cases of People v. Bringas,72 People v.
Hernandez,73 People v. Montemayor,74 City Fiscal of Cebu v. Kintanar,75 Republic v.
Court of Appeals,76 and Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme,77 to name a few, are illustrative.
Certainly, the reason behind this has not been due to a stubborn refusal or reluctance
to "keep up with the Joneses," in a manner of speaking, but to maintain fidelity to the
principle carefully nurtured by our Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence. As early
as Julia v. Sotto78 the Court warned that without this safeguard against double
jeopardy secured in favor of the accused, his fortune, safety and peace of mind would
be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness who might repeat his accusation
as often as dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other
limitation or restriction than his own will and pleasure.
The 1935 Philippine Constitution provided in its Sec. 20, Art. III, that "(n)o person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act." The discussions by the members of the
Constitutional Convention of 1934 on the effect on double jeopardy of an appeal from
a judgment of acquittal are enlightening. Foreclosing appeal on a judgment of
acquittal was recognized by the Convention and the proposal to make an appeal from
acquittal permissible even only "on questions of law provided that a verdict in favor of
the defendant shall not be set aside by reason thereof" was strongly voted down. Thus
MR. GULLAS: Dear Colleagues x x x x I wish to summarize our points. The amendment
is commendable, but we submit that the reason against far outweighs the reason in
favor of it. In the first place, it would tend to multiplicity of suits and thus increase the
burden of the Supreme Court. Second, suits will be expensive if we meet fiscals who
have an exaggerated opinion of themselves, who have more ego than gray matter or
more amor propio. In the third place, as has been stated by a certain Gentleman, the
provision would convert the Supreme Court into a sort of academy of consulting body.
In the fourth place, as pointed out by Mr. Sevilla, fights in the Supreme Court would be
one-sided. In the fifth place, as demonstrated by Delegate Labrador, the matter
should be procedural rather than constitutional. And lastly, as explained by Delegate
Singson Encarnacion, should the Supreme Court reverse the judgment of the lower

court, the defendant would suffer morally for the rest of his life. He would walk around
under a veil of humiliation, carrying with him a stigma.
For all these reasons, Mr. President, we oppose the amendment.
PRESIDENT: We can vote on the amendment. (Various delegates: YES). Those who are
in favor of the amendment please say YES. (A minority: YES). Those against the
amendment say NO. (A majority: NO). The amendment is rejected x x x x
(1934 Constitutional Convention Record, Journal No. 95, November 24, 1934, p. 361)
The case of People v. Bringas79 was the first case to be decided under this Constitution
pertinent to the matter at hand. There the Supreme Court, guided by Kepner, cited its
finding in United States v. Tam Yung Way 80 against the right of appeal by the
government from a judgment discharging the defendant in a criminal case after he
has been brought to trial, whether defendant was acquitted on the merits or whether
his discharge was based upon the trial courts conclusion of law that the trial had
failed for some reason to establish his guilt as charged.
The Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 22, Art. IV thereof,
reproduced verbatim the same double jeopardy provision of the 1935 Constitution. So
did the 1987 Freedom Constitution drafted by the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Noteworthy is that during the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional Commission
attempts were made to introduce into the Fundamental Law the right of government
to appeal verdicts of acquittal promulgated by trial courts. The proposed text for Sec.
14, Art. VIII, on the Judicial Department read as follows Sec. 12. - x x x x An appeal by the State and/or offended party from a judgment of
acquittal may be allowed in the discretion of the Supreme Court by a petition for
review on certiorari on the ground that it is manifestly against the evidence with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 81
This proposal was strongly opposed, the controlling consideration as expressed by
Commissioner Rustico de los Reyes being the "inequality of the parties in power,
situation and advantage in criminal cases where the government, with its unlimited
resources, trained detectives, willing officers and counsel learned in the law, stands
arrayed against a defendant unfamiliar with the practice of the courts, unacquainted
with their officers or attorneys, often without means and frequently too terrified to
make a defense, if he had one, while his character and his life, liberty or property
rested upon the result of the trial." 82
Commissioner Joaquin Bernas likewise articulated his fear that "we could be subjecting
an accused individual to a very serious danger of harassment from a prosecutor x x x
x The harm, however, which will follow from waving this flag of possibility of appeal x
x x could be much more than letting a guilty person go." 83 Put to a vote, the proposal
was defeated.84
Then again, during the debates on double jeopardy under Sec. 23, Art. III, on the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla reopened the matter
already settled at the deliberations on the article on the Judiciary. The following
exchanges ensued:
MR. PADILLA. x x x On Section 23, on double jeopardy, there was Davide resolution
which allowed an appeal in a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case that states: An

acquittal by a trial court is, however, appealable provided that in such event, the
accused shall not be detained or put up bail. This has been deleted by the
Commission x x x x
FR. BERNAS. Yes.
MR. PADILLA. I recall that when this same idea, but in different phraseology, was
presented and approved by the Committee on the Judiciary, the great objection was
that it would violate the immunity against double jeopardy. But I recall, the sponsor
admitted, after I had explained the day before, that it did not violate double jeopardy
but it was unnecessary and harmful. What is the real position, Mr. Presiding Officer? Is
it in violation of double jeopardy or is it just because it need not be stated in the Bill of
Rights nor in the Article on the Judiciary?
FR. BERNAS: I explained my position on that, Mr. Presiding Officer, when we
considered the matter in the Article on the Judiciary. The position I took was that it
was not a departure from existing jurisprudence. In fact, it was more strict than
existing jurisprudence in that it required not just abuse of discretion but it also
required that the judgment be clearly against the evidence.
MR. PADILLA. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer, because we want to make the
exercise of that right by the state or offended party restrictive not only through a
petition for review on certiorari in the discretion of the Supreme Court which may
dismiss it outright, but also on certain grounds that are really covered by "in excess or
lack of jurisdiction."
But my common impression, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that most lawyers are of the
opinion that when a judgment of acquittal is rendered by a trial court, that is final,
executory and not appealable.
Does not the sponsor think, Mr. Presiding Officer, an appeal from an arbitrary
judgment of acquittal rendered by a few corrupt judges of the offended party or the
state will improve the administration of justice?
FR. BERNAS. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have expressed my position on this when we
voted on Third Reading on the Article on the Judiciary. But if the Commissioner wants
to raise the matter for reconsideration, he can present a motion on the floor.
Padilla did not ask for a reconsideration. 85
The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the effect
thereon of acquittals adhere strictly to constitutional provisions. The pertinent portions
of Sec. 7 of Rule 117 thereof provide Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information x x x x

From this procedural prescription alone, there can be no mistaking the requisites for
invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent
court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge;
and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 86 It bears repeating that where
acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the
trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the
finality-of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution,
statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the
ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the
Court of Appeals.
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought
before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of
mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan.87 Condemning the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, which
resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, this Court minced no words in
declaring that "[i]t is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against
this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due
process x x x x [T]he sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president
ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial, and closely
monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of
acquittal and absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused x x x x Manifestly,
the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a
partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and
pressure exerted by the authoritarian president to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal, such as that in the
case at bar, is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is a lawless thing which can be
treated as an outlaw. It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the
people. 'To paraphrase Brandeis: If the authoritarian head of government becomes the
lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law; he invites every man to become a law
unto himself; he invites anarchy. The contention of respondent-accused that the
Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ended the case and could not be appealed or
reopened without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court
in People v. Court of Appeals:88
x x x x That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed
out, however, respondent Court's Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for
having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A
void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested.
Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it
are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it
and all claims flowing out of it are void x x x x Private respondents invoke 'justice for
the innocent.' For justice to prevail the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed
for the accused alone. The interests of the society which they have wronged, must
also be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of
justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. 1wphi1 To
the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where
the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is due.
Thus, the doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply
only when the Court finds that the "criminal trial was a sham" because the
prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due
process.89 The Court in People v. Bocar90 rationalized that the "remand of the criminal

case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy."91
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court
cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights
of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x" 92 Thus Green
expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty."93
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of
his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of
acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to
the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." 94 The interest in the
finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to
understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's
liability.95 With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection
to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys leniency,
will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. 96
Related to his right of repose is the defendants interest in his right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal.97 This interest encompasses his right to have his
guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to
try him, for societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial
represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit
Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws.98 The ultimate goal is prevention of government
oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. 99 As
observed in Lockhart v. Nelson,100 "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double
Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the
abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second
trial would be unfair.101
Petitioner resists the applicability of the finality-of-acquittal doctrine to the Philippine
adjudicative process on the ground that the principle is endemic to the American
justice system as it has specific application only to jury verdicts of acquittal, and thus
finds no valid use in our jurisdiction since the "underlying rationale of jury acquittals, a
special feature of American constitutional law, has no parallel nor analogy in the
Philippine legal system." This is a rather strained if not facile approach to the issue at
hand, for it attempts to introduce the theory that insofar as the objective of factfinding
is concerned, factfinding forming the core of the philosophy behind double jeopardy,
there exists a difference between a jury acquittal and a "judge acquittal, Philippine
version." To support its contention, petitioner sedulously explains that in the United
States there is an "emerging consensus to differentiate the constitutional impact of
jury verdicts of acquittal vis--vis judgments of acquittal rendered by the bench."
While this consensus may have emerged in the United States, it is not difficult to
surmise that it must have been so because of countless instances of conflict between
jury verdicts and judgments of trial judges in the same case. Resultantly, procedural
statutes and jurisprudence have been wont to draw lines of distinction between the

two, hopefully to keep each other at bay. Since this phenomenon does not occur in our
jurisdiction, as we have no juries to speak of, petitioners hypothesis is inappropriate.
Be that as it may, the invalidity of petitioners argument lies in its focus on the
instrumentality empowered to rule against the evidence, i.e., the American jury versus
the Philippine judge, no matter how emphatic it qualifies its proposition with the
phrase "underlying rationale of jury acquittals," rather than on the essential function
of factfinding itself which consists of reception, sifting and evaluation of evidence.
Where the main task of factfinding is concerned, there exists no difference between
the American jury and the Philippine trial judge. Both are triers of facts. This much
petitioner has to concede. The attempt therefore to close the door on the applicability
of the finality rule to our legal system abjectly fails when one considers that,
universally, the principal object of double jeopardy is the protection from being tried
for the second time, whether by jury or judge. Thus, "emerging American consensus
on jury acquittals" notwithstanding, on solid constitutional bedrock is well engraved
our own doctrine that acquittals by judges on evidentiary considerations cannot be
appealed by government. The jurisprudential metes and bounds of double jeopardy
having been clearly defined by both constitution and statute, the issue of the effect of
an appeal of a verdict of acquittal upon a determination of the evidence on the
constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused against being twice placed in jeopardy
should now be finally put to rest.
Petitioner assails the decision rendered by the court a quo as blatantly inconsistent
with the material facts and evidence on record, reason enough to charge respondent
judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction resulting in a
denial of due process. Citing People v. Pablo,102 it alleges that "respondent aggravated
his indiscretion by not x x x reviewing the evidence already presented for a proper
assessment x x x x It is in completely ignoring the evidence already presented x x x
that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion." It adds that
"discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural
due process, i.e., after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any
order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of
whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness." 103
Private respondent remonstrates against the propriety of petitioners certiorari as a
mode of impugning the judgment of acquittal not only as a strategy to camouflage the
issue of double jeopardy but also for the fact that, contrary to petitioners assertions,
evidence in the case at bar was subjected to scrutiny, review, assessment and
evaluation by respondent trial judge. By reason thereof, there cannot be perceived
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to warrant issuance of the great writ
of certiorari.
We agree. The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the court
for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order that the
superior court may determine from the face of the record whether the inferior court
has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not proceeded according to the essential
requirements of the law. However, the original function and purpose of the writ have
been so modified by statutes and judicial decisions. It is particularly so in the field of
criminal law when the state is applying for the writ and problems arise concerning the
right of the state to appeal in a criminal case. As a general rule, the prosecution
cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in
a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. The problem
comes into sharper focus when the defendant contends, in effect, that the prosecution
is attempting to accomplish by the writ what it could not do by appeal, and that his
constitutional rights are being thus encroached upon. 104

Generally, under modern constitutions and statutes, provisions are available as guides
to the court in determining the standing of the prosecution to secure by certiorari a
review of a lower court decision in a criminal case which has favored the defendant. In
most instances, provisions setting forth the scope and function of certiorari are found
together with those relating to the right of the state to appeal or bring error in criminal
matters. There is some indication that courts view the writ of certiorari as an appeal in
itself where the applicant shows that there is no other adequate remedy available, 105
and it is not uncommon to find language in cases to the effect that the state should
not be permitted to accomplish by certiorari what it cannot do by appeal. 106 Thus, if a
judgment sought to be reviewed was one entered after an acquittal by a jury or the
discharge of the accused on the merits by the trial court, the standing of the
prosecution to review it by certiorari is far more likely to be denied than if it were such
an order as one sustaining a demurrer to, or quashing the indictment, or granting a
motion for arrest of judgment after a verdict of guilty. 107
Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy
Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason,
applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting
the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and
evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the
questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered the evidence received at
trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the positions of the
victims vis--vis the accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot
wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the
appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it
nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and
passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writs limiting requirement
of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and
therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be
confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC, BRANCH 139,
MAKATI, M.M. and HON. FRANK DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not
surrender any individual for any offense not included in a treaty of extradition. This
principle arises from the reality of extradition as a derogation of sovereignty.
Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the host State and a
delimitation of the sovereign power of the State within its own territory. 1 The act of
extraditing amounts to a "delivery by the State of a person accused or convicted of a
crime, to another State within whose territorial jurisdiction, actual or constructive, it
was committed and which asks for his surrender with a view to execute justice." 2 As it
is an act of "surrender" of an individual found in a sovereign State to another State
which demands his surrender 3, an act of extradition, even with a treaty rendered
executory upon ratification by appropriate authorities, does not imposed an obligation
to extradite on the requested State until the latter has made its own determination of
the validity of the requesting State's demand, in accordance with the requested
State's own interests.
The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from that
arising from treaty. 4 Pursuant to these principles, States enter into treaties of
extradition principally for the purpose of bringing fugitives of justice within the ambit
of their laws, under conventions recognizing the right of nations to mutually agree to
surrender individuals within their jurisdiction and control, and for the purpose of
enforcing their respective municipal laws. Since punishment of fugitive criminals is
dependent mainly on the willingness of host State to apprehend them and revert them
to the State where their offenses were committed, 5 jurisdiction over such fugitives
and subsequent enforcement of penal laws can be effectively accomplished only by
agreement between States through treaties of extradition.

Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the Government
of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, 6 the two countries entered into a Treaty
of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance
with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution
adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective thirty (30) days
after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for
the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. 7
The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader
coverage of extraditable offenses between the two countries and (which) embraces
crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least one (1) year. Additionally, the Treaty
allows extradition for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity,
provided that these crimes were in the statute books of the requesting State at the
time of their commission.
Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite. . . "persons
. . . wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the
Requesting State for an extraditable offense." 8 A request for extradition requires, if
the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of either a
warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where
appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be extradited.
9

In defining the extraditable offenses, the Treaty includes all offenses "punishable
under the Laws of both Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least
one (1) year, or by a more severe penalty." 10 For the purpose of the definition, the
Treaty states that:
(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of
the Contracting States place the offense within the same category or
denominate the offense by the same terminology;
(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose
extradition is requested shall be taken into account in determining the
constituent elements of the offense. 11
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable
crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deportation of petitioner. Said
decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner came to this Court
by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation. Petitioner
contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition
treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. He assails the trial court's decision ordering his extradition, arguing that
the evidence adduced in the court below failed to show that he is wanted for
prosecution in his country. Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the petitioner
before this Court strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the
government against him.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,

12

are undisputed:

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the

Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice
Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the
Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney
General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the

extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for the

following indictable crimes:
1. Wright/Orr Matter one count of Obtaining Property by Deception
contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and
2. Wright/Cracker Matter Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Properties
by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of
1958; one count of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary
to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and one count of
Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, which
crimes were allegedly committed in the following manner:
The one (1) count of Obtaining Property by Deception
contrary to Section 81 (1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of
1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and co-offender, Herbert
Lance Orr's, dishonesty in obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy,
Mendelson and Round Solicitors (MM7R), secured by a
mortgage on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by
Ruven Nominees Pty. Ltd., a company controlled by a
Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the
relevant legal documents relating to the mortgage had been
signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell.
The thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by Deception
contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958
constitutes in Mr. Wright's and co-offender Mr. John Carson
Craker's receiving a total of approximately 11.2 in
commission (including $367,044 in bonus commission) via
Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., depending on the volume of
business written, by submitting two hundred fifteen (215)
life insurance proposals, and paying premiums thereon (to
the acceptance of the policies and payment of commissions)
to the Australian Mutual Provident (AMP) Society through
the Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, of which
respondent is an insurance agent, out of which life proposals
none are in existence and approximately 200 of which are
alleged to have been false, in one or more of the following
ways:
( i ) some policy-holders signed up only because they were
told the policies were free (usually for 2 years) and no
payments were required.
(ii) some policy-holders were offered cash inducements ($50
or $100) to sign and had to supply a bank account no longer
used (at which a direct debit request for payment of
premiums would apply). These policy-holders were also told
no payments by them were required.
(iii) some policy-holders were introduced through the "Daily
Personnel Agency", and again were told the policies were
free for 2 years as long as an unused bank account was
applied.
(iv) some policy-holders were found not to exist.

The one count of Attempting to Obtain Property by

Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian
Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and Mr.
Craker's attempting to cause the payment of $2,870.68
commission to a bank account in the name of Amazon Bond
Pty. Ltd. by submitting one proposal for Life Insurance to the
AMP Society, the policy-holder of which does not exist with
the end in view of paying the premiums thereon to insure
acceptance of the policy and commission payments.
The one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian
Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and Mr.
Craker's signing and swearing before a Solicitor holding a
current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal
Profession Practice Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration
attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life
Insurance proposals of AMP Society and containing three (3)
false statements.
Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty
concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and Australia on
September 10, 1990, extradition proceedings were initiated on April 6,
1993 by the State Counsels of the Department of Justice before the
respondent court.
In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent court directed the
petitioner to appear before it on April 30, 1993 and to file his answer
within ten days. In the same order, the respondent Judge ordered the NBI
to serve summons and cause the arrest of the petitioner.
The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and
summons signed by NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the
information that the petitioner was arrested on April 26, 1993 at Taguig,
Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at the NBI detention cell
where petitioner, to date, continue to be held.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.
In the course of the trial, the petitioner testified that he was jobless,
married to a Filipina, Judith David, with whom he begot a child; that he
has no case in Australia; that he is not a fugitive from justice and is not
aware of the offenses charged against him; that he arrived in the
Philippines on February 25, 1990 returned to Australia on March 1, 1990,
then back to the Philippines on April 11, 1990, left the Philippines again
on April 24, 1990 for Australia and returned to the Philippines on May 24,
1990, again left for Australia on May 29, 1990 passing by Singapore and
then returned to the Philippines on June 25, 1990 and from that time on,
has not left the Philippines; and that his tourist visa has been extended
but he could not produce the same in court as it was misplaced, has
neither produced any certification thereof, nor any temporary working
visa.
The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for extradition
requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the documents submitted
by the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of
Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country

are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover,
held that under the provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted
irrespective of when the offense in relation to the extradition was committed,
provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the
time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed. 13
Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of
Appeals assigning the following errors:
I. THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOW
THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO BE
EXTRADITED TOOK PLACE IN 1988-1989 AT THE TIME THERE WAS NO
EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUSTRALIA.
II. THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN GIVING
RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA AMOUNTS
TO AN "EX POST FACTO LAW" AND VIOLATES SECTION 21, ARTICLE VII OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING
THE EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED DO NOT SHOW THAT PETITIONER IS WANTED FOR
PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
IV. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING
TO
LACK
OF
JURISDICTION,
IN
MISINTERPRETING THE EXTENDED STAY OF PETITIONER AS EVIDENCE OF
PETITIONER'S DESIGN TO HIDE AND EVADE PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
V. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING
THE EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER WITHOUT SPECIFYING IN HIS ORDER
OR DECISION THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS TO
STAND TRIAL IN AUSTRALIA.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on September 14, 1993 and
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on December 16, 1993. 14 Reiterating
substantially the same assignments of error which he interposed in the Court of
Appeals, petitioner challenges in this petition the validity of the extradition order
issued by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals under the Treaty.
Petitioner vigorously argues that the trial court order violates the Constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws. He avers that for the extradition order to be
valid, the Australian government should show that he "has a criminal case pending
before a competent court" in that country "which can legally pass judgement or
acquittal or conviction upon him."
Clearly, a close reading of the provisions of the Treaty previously cited, which are
relevant to our determination of the validity of the extradition order, reveals that the
trial court committed no error in ordering the petitioner's extradition. Conformably
with Article 2, Section 2 of the said Treaty, the crimes for which the petitioner was
charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were undeniably
offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have been
committed. From its examination of the charges against the petitioner, the trial court

correctly determined that the corresponding offenses under our penal laws are Articles
315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false
testimony/perjury, respectively. 15
The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents required for
extradition are sufficiently clear and require no interpretation. The warrant for the
arrest of an individual or a copy thereof, a statement of each and every offense and a
statement of the acts and omissions which were alleged against the person in respect
of each offense are sufficient to show that a person is wanted for prosecution under
the said article. All of these documentary requirements were dully submitted to the
trial court in its proceedings a quo. For purposes of the compliance with the provisions
of the Treaty, the signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of Australia were
sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts and
Omissions, including the statement itself. 16 In conformity with the provisions of Article
7 of the Treaty, the appropriate documents and annexes were signed by "an officer in
or of the Requesting State" 17 "sealed with . . . (a) public seal of the Requesting State
or of a Minister of State, or of a Department or officer of the Government of the
Requesting State," 18 and "certified by a diplomatic or consular officer of the
Requesting State accredited to the Requested State." 19 The last requirement was
accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra,
Australia.
The petitioner's contention that a person sought to be extradited should have a
"criminal case pending before a competent court in the Requesting State which can
legally pass judgement of acquittal or conviction" 20 stretches the meaning of the
phrase "wanted for prosecution" beyond the intended by the treaty provisions
because the relevant provisions merely require "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of
the warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be extradited." 21 Furthermore, the
'Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that petitioner is not only
wanted for prosecution but has, in fact, absconded to evade arrest and criminal
prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only when
appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the
Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy
thereof is not required if the offender has in fact already absconded before a criminal
complaint could be filed. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, limiting the phrase
"wanted for prosecution" to person charged with an information or a criminal
complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the purpose
of evading arrest and prosecution. 22
This brings us to another point raised by the petitioner both in the trial court and in
the Court of Appeals. May the extradition of the petitioner who is wanted for
prosecution by the government of Australia be granted in spite of the fact that the
offenses for which the petitioner is sought in his country were allegedly committed
prior to the date of effectivity of the Treaty.
Petitioner takes the position that under Article 18 of the Treaty its enforcement cannot
be given retroactive effect. Article 18 states:
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION
This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which
the Contracting States have notified each other in writing that their
respective requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty have been
complied with.

Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at

any time and it shall cease to be in force on the one hundred and
eightieth day after the day on which notice is given.
We fail to see how the petitioner can infer a prohibition against retroactive
enforcement from this provision. The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's
date of effectivity; the second paragraph pertains to its termination. Absolutely
nothing in the said provision relates to, much less, prohibits retroactive enforcement
of the Treaty.
On the other hand, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that:
4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty
irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is
requested was committed, provided that:
(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or
omissions constituting the offense; and
(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the
Territory of the Requested State at the time of the making of the request
for extradition, have constituted an offense against the laws in force in
that state.
Thus, the offenses for which petitioner is sought by his government are clearly
extraditable under Article 2 of the Treaty. They were offenses in the Requesting State
at the time they were committed, and, irrespective of the time they were committed,
they fall under the panoply of the Extradition Treaty's provisions, specifically, Article 2
paragraph 4, quoted above.
Does the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against
ex post facto laws? Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all
laws of retrospective application, whether civil or criminal. 23 However, Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state
constitutions in Calder vs. Bull 24 concluded that the concept was limited only to penal
and criminal statutes. As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1)
statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense
when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the
seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a crime
already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it
substantially easier to convict a defendant. 25 "Applying the constitutional principle,
the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which
affects the substantial rights of the accused." 26 This being so, there is no absolutely
no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the
Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the
Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a
piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides for
the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which
offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was
ratified." 27
In signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it is
within its interests to enter into agreement with the government of Australia regarding
the repatriation of persons wanted for criminal offenses in either country. The said
Treaty was concurred and ratified by the Senate in a Resolution dated September 10,

1990. Having been ratified in accordance with the provision of the 1987 Constitution,
the Treaty took effect thirty days after the requirements for entry into force were
complied with by both governments.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals, we hereby AFFIRM the same and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 117472 June 25, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty is
indeed a deterrent as far as the commission of heinous crimes is concerned and while
the attendant details pertaining to the execution of a death sentence remain as yet
another burning issue, we are tasked with providing a clear-cut resolution of whether
or not the herein accused-appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society for
the infliction of the primitive and bestial act of incestuous lust on his own blood.
Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated September 7,
1994, for the crime of Rape, rendered after marathon hearing by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO
ECHEGARAY Y PILO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE
as charged in the complaint, aggravated by the fact that the same was
commited by the accused who is the father/stepfather of the
complainant, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, as
provided for under RA. No. 7659, to pay the complainant Rodessa
Echegaray
the
sum
of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties provided by
law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. 1
We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE,
committed as follows:
That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complainant, his daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all
against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW 2
Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his
counsel de oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty."
These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in his
brief:
This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.
Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifthgrader, born on September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the eldest of five

siblings. She has three brothers aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively, and a 3month old baby sister. Her parents are Rosalie and Leo Echegaray, the
latter being the accused-appellant himself. The victim lives with her
family in a small house located at No. 199 Fernandez St., Barangay San
Antonio, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City (pp. 5-9, Aug. 9, 1994,
TSN).
Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after
her three brothers in their house as her mother attended a gambling
session in another place, she heard her father, the accused-appellant in
this case, order her brothers to go out of the house (pp. 10-11, ibid). As
soon as her brothers left, accused-appellant Leo Echegaray approached
Rodessa and suddenly dragged her inside the room (p. 12, ibid). Before
she could question the appellant, the latter immediately, removed her
panty and made her lie on the floor (p. 13, ibid). Thereafter, appellant
likewise removed his underwear and immediately placed himself on top
of Rodessa. Subsequently, appellant forcefully inserted his penis into
Rodessa's organ causing her to suffer intense pain (pp. 14-15, ibid).
While appellant was pumping on her, he even uttered. "Masarap ba,
masarap ba?" and to which Rodessa answered: "Tama na Papa, masakit"
(p. 16, ibid). Rodessa's plea proved futile as appellant continued with his
act. After satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant threatened to kill her
mother if she would divulge what had happened. Scared that her mother
would be killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she
suffered. She was very afraid of appellant because the latter, most of the
time, was high on drugs (pp. 17-18, ibid.). The same sexual assault
happened up to the fifth time and this usually took place when her
mother was out of the house (p. 19, ibid.). However, after the fifth time,
Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who in
turn told Rosalie, Radessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded
to the Barangay Captain where Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she
suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she
executed an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.). From there, she was accompanied to
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for medical examination
(p. 22, ibid.).
Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the
time when her mother was pregnant. Rodessa added that at first, her
mother was on her side. However, when appellant was detained, her
mother kept on telling her. "Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo, nakakulong"
(pp. 39-40, ibid.).
When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the person of
Dra. Ma. Cristina B. Preyna, 3 the complainant was described as physically
on a non-virgin state, as evidenced by the presence of laceration of the
hymen of said complainant (TSN, Aug. 22, 1995, pp. 8-9). 4
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:
. . . the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She
asserted that the RAPE charge against the accused was only the figment
of her mothers dirty mind. That her daughter's complaint was forced
upon her by her grandma and the answers in the sworn statement of
Rodessa were coached. That the accusation of RAPE was motivated by
Rodessa's grandmother's greed over the lot situated at the Madrigal
Estate-NHA Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte,

Quezon City, which her grandmother's paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave

to the accused in order to persuade the latter to admit that Rodessa
executed an affidavit of desistance after it turned out that her complaint
of attempted homicide was substituted with the crime of RAPE at the
instance of her mother. That when her mother came to know about the
affidavit of desistance, she placed her granddaughter under the custody
of the Barangay Captain. That her mother was never a real mother to
her.
She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted
homicide as her husband poured alcohol on her body and attempted to
burn her. She identified the certification issued by the NHA and Tag No.
87-0393 (Exh. 2). That the Certification based on the Masterlist (Exh. 3)
indicates that the property is co-owned by accused and Conrado Alfonso.
That Rodessa is her daughter sired by Conrado Alfonso, the latter being
the paramour of her mother. That Conrado Alfonso waived his right and
participation over the lot in favor of the accused in consideration of the
latter's accepting the fact that he is the father of Rodessa to simulate the
love triangle and to conceal the nauseating sex orgies from Conrado
Alfonso's real wife.
Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the
complainant has a very strong motive in implicating him to the crime of
RAPE since she was interested to become the sole owner of a property
awarded to her live-in partner by the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project. That
he could not have committed the imputed crime because he considers
Rodessa as his own daughter. That he is a painter-contractor and on the
date of the alleged commission of the crime, he was painting the house
of one Divina Ang of Barangay Vitalis, Paraaque, Metro Manila (Exh. 4).
The travel time between his work place to his residence is three (3) hours
considering the condition of traffic. That the painting contract is
evidenced by a document denominated "Contract of Services" duly
accomplished (see submarkings of Exh. 4). He asserted that he has a big
sexual organ which when used to a girl 11 years old like Rodessa, the
said female organ will be "mawawarak." That it is abnormal to report the
imputed commission of the crime to the grandmother of the victim.
Accused further stated that her (sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a charge
of drug pushing earlier and he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of using
drugs. The decretal portion of the judgment of conviction ordering the
accused to be confined at the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center irked the
grandmother of Rodessa because it was her wish that accused should be
meted the death penalty.
Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong motive
of Rodessa's grandmother in implicating him in this heinous crime
because of her greed to become the sole owner of that piece of property
at the National Housing Authority-Madrigal Project, situated at San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, notwithstanding rigid crossexamination. He asserted that the imputed offense is far from his mind
considering that he treated Rodessa as his own daughter. He
categorically testified that he was in his painting job site on the date and
time of the alleged commission of the crime.
Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that she
is the laundry woman and part time baby sitter of the family of accused.

That at one time, she saw Rodessa reading sex books and the Bulgar
newspaper. That while hanging washed clothes on the vacant lot, she
saw Rodessa masturbating by tinkering her private parts. The
masturbation took sometime.
This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray,
the fourth and last witness for the defense. She stated that she tried hard
to correct the flirting tendency of Rodessa and that she scolded her when
she saw Rodessa viewing an X-rated tape. Rodessa according to her was
fond of going with friends of ill-repute. That (sic) she corroborated the
testimony of Mrs. Punzalan by stating that she herself saw Rodessa
masturbating inside the room of her house. 5
In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape,
the lower court dismissed the defense of alibi and lent credence to the straightforward
testimony of the ten-year old victim to whom no ill motive to testify falsely against
accused-appellant can be attributed. The lower court likewise regarded as
inconsequential the defense of the accused-appellant that the extraordinary size of his
penis could not have insinuated itself into the victim's vagina and that the accused is
not the real father of the said victim.
The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a reversal of
the lower court's verdict through the following assignment of errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER
MOTIVE OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S GRANDMOTHER? THAT
PRECIPITATED THE FILING OF THE CHARGE OF RAPE, HENCE
IT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED GUILTY AS CHARGED.
2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE
HEALED LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7 O'CLOCK COULD NOT
HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF
ACCUSED TO THE VAGINA OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT,
HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED
THE CRIME CHARGED, NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT
DENIAL.
3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE DEFENSE
OF ALIBI THAT ACCUSED WAS IN PARAAQUE ON THE DATE
AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED CRIME HENCE, IT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN THE CASE AT
BAR. 6
Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death penalty,
requires a thorough and judicious examination of the circumstances relating thereto,
this Court remains guided by the following principles in evaluating evidence in cases
of this nature: (a) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
prove but more difficult for the accused though innocent to disprove; (b) In view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The
evidence for the prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 7
Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this Court to tilt
the scales of justice in favor of the accused-appellant notwithstanding that he cries
foul insisting that the rape charge was merely concocted and strongly motivated by

greed over a certain lot situated at the NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project,
Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The accused-appellant
theorizes that prosecution witness Asuncion Rivera, the maternal grandmother of the
victim Rodessa, concocted the charge of rape so that, in the event that the accusedappellant shall be meted out a death sentence, title to the lot will be consolidated in
her favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-owned by the accused-appellant and
Conrado Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera, according to the records of
the National Housing Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-appellant would want us to
believe that the rape charge was fabricated by Asuncion Rivera in order to eliminate
the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So, the live-in partners would have the
property for their own. 8
We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as
to instigate her 10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case against her own father
simply on account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot. 9
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is
credible where she has no motive to testify against the accused. 10
We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old
Rodessa which the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted by the
defense. The trial court not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's narration in detail of her
father's monstrous acts had made her cry. 11 Once again, we rule that:
. . . The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of
the rape as to the circumstances of the rape must be given weight, for
testimony of young and immature rape victims are credible (People v.
Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 [1993]). No woman especially one of tender age,
practically only a girl, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter expose herself to a public
trial, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished (People v. Guibao, supra). 12
The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape accusation
against him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the accusedappellant was already naked when he dragged her inside the room is inconsistent with
her subsequent testimony that the said accused-appellant was still wearing short
pants when she was dragged inside the room. Secondly, Rodessa's sworn statement
before the police investigator which indicated that, while the accused was executing
pumping acts, he uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in court
wherein she related that, when the accused took out his penis from her vagina, the
accused said "Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's grandmother, Asuncion Rivera,
recounted in her sworn statement that it was the accused who went to see her to
apprise her of the rape committed on her granddaughter. However, in her testimony
in court , Asuncion Rivera claimed that she was the one who invited the accusedappellant to see her in her house so as to tell her a secret. 13 These alleged
discrepancies merely pertain to minor details which in no way pose serious doubt as
to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Whether or not the accused was naked
when he dragged Rodessa inside the room where he sexually assaulted her bears no
significant effect on Rodessa's testimony that she was actually raped by the accusedappellant. Moreover, a conflicting account of whatever words were uttered by the
accused-appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's private organ
against her will cannot impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole. A determination
of which version earmarks the truth as to how the victim's grandmother learned about
the rape is inconsequential to the judgment of conviction.

As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin:

14

This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the
narration of the witness do not detract from its essential credibility as
long as it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically believable.
Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth and
has not been rehearsed as it is not to he expected that he will be able to
remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall.
After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect in the absence of
arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft of
clear and concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his penis
and that if that be the fact, it could not have merely caused shallow healed lacerations
at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock. 15 In his testimony, the accused-appellant stated that he
could
not
have
raped
Rodessa
because
of
the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually done so. 16
This Court gives no probative value on the accused-appellant's self-serving statement
in the light of our ruling in the case of People v. Melivo, supra, 17 that:
The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs capable
of varying degrees of distensibility. The degree of distensibility of the
female reproductive organ is normally limited only by the character and
size of the pelvic inlet, other factors being minor. The female
reprodructive canal being capable of allowing passage of a regular fetus,
there ought to be no difficulty allowing the entry of objects of much
lesser size, including the male reproductive organ, which even in its
largest dimensions, would still be considerably smaller than the full-term
fetus.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts
of he vaginal wall, though not as extensive as appellant might have
expected them to be, indicate traumatic injury to the area within the
period when the incidents were supposed to have occurred. (At pp. 1314, emphasis supplied)
In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof. 18 A mere knocking
at the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis suffices to constitute
the crime of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is not required to sustain a
conviction. 19 In the case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal examiner, categorically testified
that the healed lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina were consistent with the date of
the commission of the rape as narrated by the victim to have taken place in April,
1994. 20
Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant
erroneously argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered as evidence in
support of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not be corroborated because
there is no law expressly requiring so. 21 In view of our finding that the prosecution
witnesses have no motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellant, the defense
of alibi, in this case, uncorroborated by other witnesses, should be completely
disregarded. 22 More importantly, the defense of alibi which is inherently weak

becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused-appellant as

perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim, Rodessa. 23
The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to do some
painting job at the house of one Divina Ang in Paraaque, Metro Manila, within 25
days from April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of the accused-appellant at
the time of the commission of the offense.
The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of the
complaint, dated July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said offense, as stated in
paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of a
woman below twelve years old. 24 Rodessa positively identified his father accusedappellant, as the culprit of Statutory Rape. Her account of how the accused-appellant
succeeded in consummating his grievous and odious sexual assault on her is free from
any substantial self-contradiction. It is highly inconceivable that it is rehearsed and
fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal grandmother Asuncion Rivera as
asserted by the accused-appellant. The words of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando,
speaking for the Court, more than two decades ago, are relevant and worth
reiterating, thus:
. . . it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended
parties are young and immature girls like the victim in this case, (Cited
cases omitted) there is marked receptivity on its, part to tend credence
to their version of what transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The state,
as parens patria, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to
those, who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost protection.
Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate
victim alone. The consternation it causes her family must also be taken
into account It may reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in
the fundamental law for such institution There is all the more reason then
for the rigorous application of the penal law with its severe penalty for
this offense, whenever warranted. It has been aptly remarked that with
the advance in civilization, the disruption in public peace and order it
represents defies explanation, much more so in view of what currently
appears to be a tendency for sexual permissiveness. Where the
prospects of relationship based on consent are hardly minimal, selfrestraint should even be more marked. 25
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty Law,
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eigthteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)

Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty

imposed by the trial court by declaring that he is neither a father, stepfather or
grandfather of Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother. 26 On
direct examination, he admitted that before the charge of rape was riled against him,
he had treated Rodessa as his real daughter and had provided for her food, clothing,
shelter and education. 27 The Court notes that Rodessa uses the surname of the
accused-appellant, not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her
grandmother's live-in partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the crossexamination that she, the accused-appellant, and her five children, including Rodessa,
had been residing in one house only. 28 At any rate, even if he were not the father,
stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him from the abyss
where perpetrators of heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering
that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother, 29 he falls
squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under the term
"common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."
The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is
reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of
Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the accused on his young
victim has become all the more repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and
the accused-appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over her are factors which
forced Rodessa to succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has
made it inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant
face the supreme penalty of death. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO
ECHEGARAY,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

petitioner,

PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the
submission of public respondents that:
1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its
execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that
sphere of executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous
precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is
always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To
be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty
Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this
Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks
forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in
issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to
the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death
penalty has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto
any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against
the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears
his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents
attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez
entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any
move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the
position of the House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to
exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law."
The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the
scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on
congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay
execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental
matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped
from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on
capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and
considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that
are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on
petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions
were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177
(Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by
petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted

the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and
Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal
standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the
State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that
this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain
the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule
that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is
just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to
begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final
Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the
Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled
out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the
above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner
seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No.
8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections
17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement
Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby
declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for
review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the
Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual
confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties
including the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are
hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic
Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the
Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177
are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and
executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippine.
Clerk of
Court
By:
(SGD)

TERESIT
A
G.
DIMAISI
P
Acting
Chief
Judicial
Records
Office
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the
Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance
where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177
in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a
Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said
Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is
crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable
mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19
of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No.
8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this
Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the
Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason
synthesized
the
well
established
jurisprudence
on
this
issue
as
follows: 2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its
powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses
is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the
judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute
and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the
court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or
alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has
become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter
terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the
judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which
can render the execution unjust or impossible. 5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably
ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 6 viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which
constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the
sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same
cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . .
When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto
for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it
performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not
follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with
reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates

by having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of

the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the
judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the
control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over
the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty
and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is
that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a
hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can
be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof
on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be
postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the
King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render
impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has
once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the
ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the
date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general
rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering
the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises
that ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to
investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the
question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution
ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and
so to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction.
It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the
entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or
criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may
change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the
rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and
necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to
law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer
and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or
rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution
of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of
supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to
popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by
Congress.1wphi1.nt
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this
Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish
the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our
courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord
with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading,

practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of
judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the
inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of
execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of
judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be
stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was
granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the
words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that
popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9
Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances
its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be
co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to
repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress
have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its
surface. In In re Cunanan 10 Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of
the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in
the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar
examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr.
Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a
judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments
even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of
these department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the
law in question." 12 The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the
ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its
ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal,
alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution.
For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be
repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely,
Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the
integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules
governing the integration of the Bar. 13
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary.
Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5),
Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was
given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter,
or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987
Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as
public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of
execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since
time immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of
this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at
bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998.
The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than
the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A.
Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the
Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day
of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents
thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when
requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the
Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's
Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the
instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that
the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of
his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the
constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right
to information of public concern, and (b) to ask this
Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives
herein respondent of vital information necessary for the
exercise of his power of supervision and control over the
Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to
Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the
enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended
Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177
is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing
to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of
sentence are faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the
information about the precise day of execution limits the
exercise by the President of executive clemency powers
pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the
death sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the
exercise by the President of his executive powers at all
times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President
cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a
sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110
[1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The
exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even
work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose
of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when the
date at execution set by the President would be earlier than
that designated by the court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information

about the date of execution to herein respondent and the
public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and
Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development shall, be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.
9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It
supplies "the rules by means of which the right to
information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the
right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of
information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the
ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary
act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided
for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be
overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed
by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec.
7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the
adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme
Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150
SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of
petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7,
1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's right to information.
The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's
motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of
execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of
Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998.
There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now
estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief.
The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this
case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of
authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court
has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents

cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution
which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the
public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control
the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has
been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can
be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become
insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As
observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will
prevent the government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is
insane at the time of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is
undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential
power of reprieve though its effects is the same the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress
can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of
sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its
plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the
President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each
other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed,
in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly
granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality
has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to
grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to
violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must
be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those
who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for
Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several
grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of
1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency
and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator
Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and
that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other
senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have
publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator
Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman
Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding review of
the same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess
and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to
deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to
resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court
had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves
in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not.
To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not
immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They
noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were
widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that
the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130)
new members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present
Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law
(R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's
minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly
a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And
verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these
constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely
cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension
was temporary "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the
present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal
or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the
Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not
stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights
stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize
haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the
certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was
believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the
State to take the life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the
crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment.
The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate
beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law.
He names these supervening events as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the
repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his
signature and that of Senator Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor
General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled
"Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any move
to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying
the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under
the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was
signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday
that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative with minor,
the House of Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez

resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the

sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act
7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify
the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In
light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its
legal and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of
capital punishment had been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never
be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime and time when
heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral
predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism
because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and
righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an
exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to
discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the
majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds
us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights
to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political
majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a
hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be
blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by
rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business
of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when
they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of
the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of
Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148560

November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in
defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the
inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the
limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual
spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a
civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who
would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to selfpreservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body
politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel
obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought
changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights
and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies.
In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured,
enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken.
Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of
the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and
dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State
authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under
RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA
7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that
it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally
infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to
the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from
the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations

of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have
transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are
reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business,
enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity
in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office
or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise
of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection
or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime
of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered
by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests
and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived
from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring
supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall
not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight
(8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA
7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for
violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation
of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The
Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No.
142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the
charges
in
the
Information
in
Crim.
Case
No.
26558;
and,
for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to
give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents
necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only
lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges
and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that
Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder
Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case
No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify
the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558
on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense
since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the
Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001
the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or
on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September
2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder
Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the
accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum
prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation
is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in
harmony with the Constitution. 3 Courts invariably train their sights on this
fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is
the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for
constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of
the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been

said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its
coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence
in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental
law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of
its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore
the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is
fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon 4 we held that as long as there is some
basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not
be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of
the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the
safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably
transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight
lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of
doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a
showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded,
will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And
petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and
overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.
Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable
certainty and particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids
on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission,
gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project
or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or
fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of
future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by
establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official

position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich

himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those
who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the
counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the
accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be
understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a
public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00
through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder
Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law,
indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which
petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE
VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of
Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A.
No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS
FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF
HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate
and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS
AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO
THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts,
OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection
with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing

DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit,
public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED
MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in
connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN
DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION
ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50)
AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY
NINE
MILLION
SEVEN
HUNDRED
THOUSAND
PESOS
(P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE
OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously
none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these
factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon
such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations
against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word
"pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative
of his fundamental right to due process.

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered

uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them;6 much less do we have to define every
word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the
words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity
of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute
will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7
unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning
to those words.8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following
commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To
combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in
their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the
bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A
COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION
ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are
two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and
something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example,
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means
not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two
different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination
or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said,
that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary
crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe
even "two" acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the
Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or
conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a
series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts
mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the
particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder" there should be, at least, two or
more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr.
President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2)
acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g.,
raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance
of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or
criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d),
say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or
distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains
in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term
is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d).
Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an
'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or
method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the
overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's
reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine
has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a
statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that
is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving
clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its

application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that
are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard
though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever
directed against such activities. 11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked
where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice. 12 It must be stressed,
however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly
delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the
nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all
other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder
Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law." 13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand,
decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." 15 The possible harm
to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by
the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not

recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First

Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid." 18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." 19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical
tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they
are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional."20 As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only]
'as applied' to a particular defendant." 21 Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on
the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected.22 It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. 23 But, as the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all
the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," 25
and is generally disfavored. 26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. 27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more
imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting
parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of
scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in
relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than
nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and
validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the

Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate
and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative
vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate
and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for
uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is
susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that
case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par.
(e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited,
among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no
common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does
not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners
further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to
wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted"
benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official
function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The
phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable
negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in
Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in
the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct
offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without
justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice,
C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A
1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt
practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep.
Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions
penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which
is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use
of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in
that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section
unconstitutional.

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of
the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it
requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or
conspiracy SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall
not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability
lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. 29 The use of the "reasonable doubt"
standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community
in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be
not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual
going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge
him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with
utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature
in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 30 The
following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score
during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is
alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove
only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does
that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed,
say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is
P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document,
coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an
enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of
pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but
these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just
because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now,
what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of
plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt
criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to
accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to
accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required
under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single
act, so how can we now convict him?

MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential
element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt.
For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100
million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the
enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain
acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those
transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions,
proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder
(underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion
the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with
the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime
suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an
Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury.
The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by
pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they
amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that
"pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden
wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is
merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent
with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a
combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not
required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission
that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is
"two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the
crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the
Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in
the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved
beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction
under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an
accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive
element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of
evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no
way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the
predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by
applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important
element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. 32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of
plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1,
par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause
of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a
criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define
or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law.
Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for
what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that
moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is
flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed
from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law;
after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough.
Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this
Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not
be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared
invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case
although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated

independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute
can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a
malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring
Opinion x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens
rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and
criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea
and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following
remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not
be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to
establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. 33
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of
the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in
Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a
speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit
plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further
the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the
elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal
Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea
is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as
well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to
all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is
no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."35

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be

deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993
to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659.
Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like
an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his
or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim
or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the
victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than
three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him
were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to
death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the
very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are
the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson
resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or
officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and
damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies
that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg.
22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of
the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA
7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the
day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The
declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a
declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the
Constitution now as an integral part of it.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of
officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft
and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous
people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the
government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the
national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those
ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a
malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our
nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to
ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and
other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few
issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated
by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution
and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of
dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to
the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we
emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition
to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167011

April 30, 2008

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners
Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez seeking to annul and set aside
the Resolutions, dated 11 June 20041 and 27 January 20052 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in E.O. Case No. 2000-36. In the Resolution of 11 June 2004, the
COMELEC En Banc directed the Law Department to file the appropriate Information
with the proper court against petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez
for violation of Section 10(g) and (j) 3 in relation to Section 45(j) 4 of Republic Act No.
8189, otherwise known as The Voters Registration Act of 1996. 5 Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration thereon was denied.
The factual antecedents leading to the instant Petition are presented hereunder:
On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino Apostol 6 filed a
Complaint-Affidavit7 with the COMELEC thru the Office of the Election Officer in
Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners with violation of Section 261(y)(2) 8 and Section
261(y)(5)9 of the Omnibus Election Code, similarly referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg.
881; and Section 1210 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages and residents
of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City; on 9
May 2000 and 11 May 2000, petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R.
Romualdez, applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election
Officer of Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 42454095
and 07902952, respectively; in their sworn applications, petitioners made false and
untruthful representations in violation of Section 10 11 of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by
indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when
in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa
Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, as evidenced
by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that petitioners,
knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in
said applications corresponding to the length of time which they have resided in
Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private respondent charged petitioners, to wit:
Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez
committed and consummated election offenses in violation of our election laws,
specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (2), for knowingly making
any false or untruthful statements relative to any data or information required
in the application for registration, and of Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph
(5), committed by any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew
without filing an application for cancellation of his previous registration, both of
the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881), and of Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter
Registration Act) for failure to apply for transfer of registration records due to
change of residence to another city or municipality." 12
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be
conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding
Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
prosecution of the same.

Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss 13 dated 2 April 2001.
They contended therein that they did not make any false or untruthful statements in
their application for registration. They avowed that they intended to reside in
Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9 May 2000, they took actual residence in
Burauen, Leyte, by leasing for five (5) years, the house of Juanito and Fe Renomeron
at No. 935, San Jose Street in Burauen, Leyte. On even date, the Barangay District III
Council of Burauen passed a Resolution of Welcome, expressing therein its gratitude
and appreciation to petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his
official residence.14
On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal, COMELEC Investigating
Officer, issued a Resolution, recommending to the COMELEC Law Department
(Investigation and Prosecution Division), the filing of the appropriate Information
against petitioners, disposing, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution
Division), RECOMMENDS to file the necessary information against Carlos Sison
Romualdez before the proper Regional Trial Court for violation of Section 10 (g)
and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act 8189 and to authorize the
Director IV of the Law Department to designate a Comelec Prosecutor to handle
the prosecution of the case with the duty to submit periodic report after every
hearing of the case.15
On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart from the
recommendatory Resolution of 28 November 2003, and ordered, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is hereby directed to
file the appropriate information with the proper court against respondents
CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA ROMUALDEZ for violation of Section 10
(g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of the Republic Act No. 8189. 16
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.
Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to disturb the assailed En
Banc Resolution of 11 June 2004,17 rationalizing, thus:
However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the arguments and issues
raised in the Motion for Reconsideration are merely a rehash of the arguments
advanced by the Respondents in [their] Memorandum received by the Law
Department on 17 April 2001, the same [w]as already considered by the
Investigating Officer and was discussed in her recommendation which
eventually was made as the basis for the En Bancs resolution.
As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of request for the
cancellation and transfer of Voting Registration Record does not automatically
cancel the registration records. The fact remains that at the time of application
for registration as new voter of the herein Respondents on May 9 and 11, 2001
in the Office of Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte their registration in Barangay
4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame Quezon City was still valid and
subsisting.18
On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of the COMELEC
filed with the RTC, Burauen, Leyte, separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S.
Romualdez19 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act
No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez 20 for violation of Section 10(g),

in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as Crim.
Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4183, respectively. Moreover,
separate Informations for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189 were filed against petitioners. 21
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting the following
arguments:
I
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION; and
II
COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PREMISED ITS
RESOLUTION ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND FAILED TO CONSIDER
CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION. 22
On 4 May 2006, petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt, 23 alleging that two separate
Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, were filed with the RTC by the COMELEC
against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to
Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9184; and for
violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in
Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion alleged that the COMELEC
filed with the RTC, two separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, against
petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez, charging her with the same offenses as those
charged against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez, and thereafter, docketed as Criminal
Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and No. BN-06-03-9183.
On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution 24 denying for lack of merit petitioners
Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for
Indirect Contempt.
We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by private
respondent are entirely different from those which they stand to be accused of before
the RTC by the COMELEC. According to petitioners, private respondents complaint
charged them for allegedly violating, to wit: 1) Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5)
of the Omnibus Election Code, and 2) Section 12 of the Voters Registration Act;
however, the COMELEC En Banc directed in the assailed Resolutions, that they be
charged for violations of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of the Voters
Registration Act. Essentially, petitioners are of the view that they were not accorded
due process of law. Specifically, their right to refute or submit documentary evidence
against the new charges which COMELEC ordered to be filed against them. Moreover,
petitioners insist that Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act is vague as it does
not refer to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an
election offense; hence, it runs contrary to Section 14(1) 25 and Section 14(2),26 Article
III of the 1987 Constitution.
We are not persuaded.

First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is

couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the
charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act
No. 8189.
A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus:
Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide as follows:
SEC. 10 Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall be registered in the
permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he
resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall
personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the
Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during
office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.
The application shall contain the following data:
xxxx
(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
xxxx
(j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct;
The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of
the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints,
with four identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto, to
be taken at the expense of the Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election
Officer shall inform him of the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by
law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it that the accomplished application
contains all the data therein required and that the applicants specimen
signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are properly affixed in all copies of
the voters application.
Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus:
SEC. 45. Election Offense. The following shall be considered election offenses
under this Act:
xxxx
(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was filed with the Law
Department of the COMELEC, support the charge directed by the COMELEC En Banc to
be filed against petitioners with the RTC. Even a mere perusal of the ComplaintAffidavit would readily show that Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 was specifically
mentioned therein. On the matter of the acts covered by Section 10(g) and (j), the
Complaint-Affidavit, spells out the following allegations, to wit:

5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful representations in their

applications (Annexes "B" and "C") in violation of the requirements of Section
10, RA 8189 (The Voters Registration Act):
5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn applications (Annexes "B" and
"C", claimed to be residents of 935 San Jose [S]treet, Burauen, Leyte,
when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113
Mariposa Loop, Mariposa [S]treet, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon
City and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, a copy of the Certification
issued by Hon. Emmanuel V. Gozon, Punong Barangay, Bagong Lipunan
ng Crame, Quezon City is hereto attached and made an integral part
hereof, as Annex "D";
5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and
willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in their applications (Annexes "B"
and "C") corresponding to the length of time they have resided in
Burauen, Leyte;
6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes, were and still are
residents and registered voters of Quezon City, as evidenced by Voter
Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively; photocopies of
which are hereto attached as Annexes "E" and "F"[.] Likewise, attached is a
"Certification" (Annex "G") of Ms. Evelyn B. Bautista, Officer-in-Charge of the
Office of the Election Officer, Fourth District, Quezon City, dated May 31, 2000,
together with a certified copy of the computer print-out of the list of voters of
Precinct No. 4419-A (Annex "G-1" ) containing the names of voters Carlos
Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez. The Certification reads as follows:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record MR. CARLOS ROMUALDEZ
and MS. ERLINDA REYES ROMUALDEZ are registered voters of Barangay
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct Number
4419A with voters affidavit serial nos. 26195824 and 26195823,
respectively.
This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve."
7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the Municipality of
Burauen, Leyte, [in spite of] the fact that they were and still are, registered
voters of Quezon City as early as June 22, 1997;
7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense.
A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to register once.
If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting registration,
the new application for registration will be disapproved. The registrant is
also liable not only for an election offense of double registration, but also
for another election offense of knowingly making any false or untruthful
statement relative to any data or information required in the application
for registration.
In fact, when a person applies for registration as a voter, he or she fills
up a Voter Registration Record form in his or her own handwriting, which
contains a Certification which reads:

"I do solemnly swear that the above statements regarding my person are
true and correct; that I possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints, specimen signatures
and photographs appearing herein are mine; and that I am not registered
as a voter in any other precinct."27
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the
election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely different
from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the
COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges
as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC,
notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to
be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code
and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be
filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC,
were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondents
Complaint-Affidavit.
Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the case of Lacson
v. Executive Secretary.28 Citing Lacson, petitioners argue that the real nature of the
criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or
Information; and that the object of such written accusations was to furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him, as will enable him to make
his defense. Let it be said that, in Lacson, this court resolved the issue of whether
under the allegations in the subject Informations therein, it is the Sandiganbayan or
the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against
therein petitioner and intervenors. In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that
the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or
Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 29 Indeed, in
Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not
from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information. 30
Petitioners reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due
process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private respondents
Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based
on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private
respondents Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the Informations
filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such
that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary
evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were
afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the
allegations in private respondents Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition
to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to
Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a
Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with
under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the Office of
the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and
description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary
investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint
and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to
adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners
actively participated.

The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v. People,31 wherein the concerned
police officer therein designated the offense charged as sexual harassment; but, the
prosecutor found that there was no transgression of the anti-sexual harassment law,
and instead, filed an Information charging therein petitioner with acts of
lasciviousness. On a claim that there was deprivation of due process, therein
petitioner argued that the Information for acts of lasciviousness was void as the
preliminary investigation conducted was for sexual harassment. The court held that
the designation by the police officer of the offense is not conclusive as it is within the
competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence submitted and determine
therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged.
Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all the allegations to
support the charge of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code; hence, the
conduct of another preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness
would be a futile exercise because the complainant would only be presenting the
same facts and evidence which have already been studied by the prosecutor. 32 The
court frowns upon such superfluity which only serves to delay the prosecution and
disposition of the criminal complaint. 33
Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of Republic Act No.
8189 vague, on the ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987
Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof.
Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a
definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election
offense.
We are not convinced.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. 34
However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in
the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial
invalidation35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate. 36
We have so enunciated in no uncertain terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 37 thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been
pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the
ground of ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-forvagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu
Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because
it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v.
Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally,
Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional
because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness.

Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result

in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached
the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the
usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit
decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual
concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S.
Supreme Court in these words:
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and
requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of
the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of
statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have
allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct
with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which
seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in
Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate "as
applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in
relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189the provisions upon which
petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions
which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for
judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.
We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the proscription anent a
facial challenge:38
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a
law that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control
over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and
"constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly
be held void on its face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But
the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial
overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of
practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates
as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to
sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct
even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal
laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.

Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes

which, by their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct." Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017
pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject
to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is
"generally disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the
traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a
person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e.,
in other situations not before the Court. A writer and scholar in
Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it
marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth
analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its
face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The
factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an
overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the
Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of
its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its
very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression.
Xxx xxx xxx
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there
can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners
did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness.
This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine"
which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."
It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is

also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on
its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. 39 This
Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude.40
As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election
offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification
that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense.
The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no
other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no guesswork. We
do not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague.
Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import
or meaning of which they do not understand. This is in stark contrast to the case of
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan42 where therein petitioner sought for statutory definition of
particular words in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected
the argument.
This Court reasoned:
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not
rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining
them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides,
there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define
the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be
gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law."
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words. The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner
is always presumed.
Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held invalid merely because
it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially
where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the
details in advance as in all other statutes. 43
The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of election offenses the
violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is to subsume as
punishable, not only the commission of proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts
enjoined to be observed. On this score, the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is
illuminating. The law articulates the policy of the State to systematize the present
method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and

updated list of voters. A reading of Section 45 (j) conjointly with the provisions upon
which petitioners are charged, i.e., Sections 10 (g) and (j) would reveal that the
matters that are required to be set forth under the aforesaid sections are crucial to the
achievement of a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. The factual
information required by the law is sought not for mere embellishment.
There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that such facts
should be set forth in the application. The periods of residence in the Philippines and
in the place of registration delve into the matter of residency, a requisite which a
voter must satisfy to be deemed a qualified voter and registered in the permanent list
of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides. Of even
rationality exists in the case of the requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the
applicant should state that he/she is not a registered voter of any precinct. Multiple
voting by so-called flying voters are glaring anomalies which this country strives to
defeat. The requirement that such facts as required by Section 10 (g) and Section 10
(j) be stated in the voters application form for registration is directly relevant to the
right of suffrage, which the State has the right to regulate.
It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v. Gatchalian44 where the
therein assailed law contains a similar provision as herein assailed before us. Republic
Act No. 602 also penalizes any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of
the Act. The Court dismissed the challenged, and declared the provision
constitutional. The Court in Gatchalian read the challenged provision, "any of the
provisions of this [A]ct" conjointly with Section 3 thereof which was the pertinent
portion of the law upon which therein accused was prosecuted. Gatchalian considered
the terms as all-embracing; hence, the same must include what is enjoined in Section
3 thereof which embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been
adopted. This Court ruled that the law by legislative fiat intends to punish not only
those expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly
enjoined to be observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law. 45 Gatchalian
remains good law, and stands unchallenged.
It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in Section 45(j) is
employed by Congress in a number of our laws. 46 These provisions have not been
declared unconstitutional.
Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity. 47 To justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and
not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. 48 We hold that petitioners
failed to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of the law. Its constitutionality
must be upheld in the absence of substantial grounds for overthrowing the same.
A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of constitutionality
unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota. In the case at bar, the lis mota
is the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC in finding probable cause for
the filing of criminal charges against petitioners.
Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc, premised its finding on a
misapprehension of facts, and committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the
filing of Informations against them with the RTC.
We are once again unimpressed.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds statutory
expression under Section 26549 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code.50 The task of the COMELEC whenever any election offense

charge is filed before it is to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, and
make a determination of probable cause. Under Section 8(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the investigating officer makes a determination of whether there is
a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed. 51 In Baytan v.
COMELEC,52 this Court, sufficiently elucidated on the matter of probable cause in the
prosecution of election offenses, viz:
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of
election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The COMELEC
exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offense and malpractices. Generally, the Court will
not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be
provided by law.53
It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by
the COMELEC in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.54
According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the case at bar, held
that there was sufficient cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners,
and found no reason to depart therefrom. Without question, on May 9 and 11 of 2001,
petitioners applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer
of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of petitioners registration records as
registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
District IV, Quezon City. The directive by the COMELEC which affirmed the Resolution 55
of 28 November 2000 of Investigating Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal does not appear
to be wanting in factual basis, such that a reasonably prudent man would conclude
that there exists probable cause to hold petitioners for trial. Thus, in the aforesaid
Resolution, the Investigating Officer, found:
A violation therefore of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election
offense.
In the instant case, when respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez
filed their respective applications for registration as new voters with the Office
of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte on May 9 and 11, 2001, respectively,
they stated under oath that they are not registered voters in other precinct
(VRR Nos. 42454095 and 07902941). However, contrary to their statements,
records show they are still registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A, barangay
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, as per VRR Nos. 26195825
and 26195823. In other words, respondents registration records in Quezon City
is (sic) still in existence.
While it may be true that respondents had written the City Election Officer of
District IV, Quezon City for cancellation of their voters registration record as
voters (sic) therein, they cannot presume that the same will be favorably acted
upon. Besides, RA 8189 provides for the procedure in cases of transfer of
residence to another city/municipality which must be complied with, to wit:

"Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. Any

registered voter who has transferred residence to another city or municipality
may apply with the Election Officer of his new residence for the transfer of his
registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements
of notice and hearing and the approval of the Election Registration Board, in
accordance with this Act. Upon approval, of the application for transfer, and
after notice of such approval to the Election Officer of their former residence of
the voter, said Election Officer shall transmit by registered mail the voters
registration record to the Election Officer of the voters new residence."
They cannot claim ignorance of the abovestated provision on the procedure for
transfer of registration records by reason of transferred new residence to
another municipality. Based on the affidavit executed by one Eufemia S.
Cotoner, she alleged that the refusal of the Assistant Election Officer Ms.
Estrella Perez to accept the letter of respondents was due to improper
procedure because respondents should have filed the required request for
transfer with the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte. Despite this knowledge,
however, they proceeded to register as new voters of Burauen, Leyte,
notwithstanding the existence of their previous registrations in Quezon City.
In their subsequent affidavit of Transfer of Voters Registration under Section
of Republic Act 8189, respondents admitted that they erroneously filed
application as a new voter (sic) with the office of the Election Officer
Burauen, Leyte, by reason of an honest mistake, which they now desire
correct. (underscoring ours).

12
an
of
to

Respondents lose sight of the fact that a statutory offense, such as violation of
election law, is mala prohibita. Proof of criminal intent is not necessary. Good
faith, ignorance or lack of malice is beside the point. Commission of the act is
sufficient. It is the act itself that is punished.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department respectfully submits that there is
probable cause to hold respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez
for trial in violation of Section 10(g) and (j) in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189. There is no doubt that they applied for registration as
new voters of Burauen, Leyte consciously, freely and voluntarily. 56
We take occasion to reiterate that the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the power
to prosecute cases or violations of election laws. Article IX (C), Section 2 (6) of the
1987 Constitution, provides:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and where appropriate, prosecute
cases or violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to determine who shall be
prosecuted, and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. 57 Evidently, must
this power to prosecute also include the right to determine under which laws
prosecution will be pursued. The courts cannot dictate the prosecution nor usurp its
discretionary powers. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutors

discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. 58 Its rationale cannot be doubted.
For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get
involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. 59 Every now and
then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not
for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the
defense.60
Fourth. In People v. Delgado,61 this Court said that when the COMELEC, through its
duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election
offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the Information in the
proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all
the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court.
The records show that Informations charging petitioners with violation of Section 10(g)
and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 had been filed with the
RTC. The case must, thus, be allowed to take its due course.
It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before this Court to restrain the COMELEC from
executing its Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005. In a Resolution dated
20 June 2006, this Court En Banc denied for lack of merit petitioners Motion
Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect
Contempt. Logically, the normal course of trial is expected to have continued in the
proceedings a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004
and 27 January 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169364

September 18, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y MEFANIA,
Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as
Michelangelo painted, or Beethoven composed music, or Shakespeare wrote poetry.
He should sweep streets so well that all the hosts of Heaven and Earth will pause to
say, here lived a great street sweeper who did his job well.
Martin Luther King, Jr.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 Order 1 of Branch
11, Davao City Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 granting
respondents Petition for Certiorari and declaring paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the
Revised Penal Code unconstitutional.

Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy
pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code in two separate Informations
dated November 18, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and
115,717-C-2003 and raffled to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao
City. The Informations, read:
That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously wandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this
City, without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose. 2
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical
ability to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful
calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means
of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or
pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this
Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging
to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be
punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of
recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate
Motions to Quash3 on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being
vague and overbroad.
In an Order4 dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and
directed respondents anew to file their respective counter-affidavits. The municipal
trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the States
police power and justified by the Latin maxim "salus populi est suprem(a) lex," which
calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number,
thus:
Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State. An
authority on police power, Professor Freund describes laconically police power "as the
power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and

property." (Citations omitted). In fact the persons acts and acquisitions are hemmed
in by the police power of the state. The justification found in the Latin maxim, salus
populi est supreme (sic) lex" (the god of the people is the Supreme Law). This calls for
the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the greater number.In the
case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA with Annex "A"
lucidly shows that there was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the reports that
vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place where the two accused (among other
women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night and soliciting male customer.
Thus, on that basis the prosecution should be given a leeway to prove its case. Thus,
in the interest of substantial justice, both prosecution and defense must be given their
day in Court: the prosecution proof of the crime, and the author thereof; the defense,
to show that the acts of the accused in the indictment cant be categorized as a
crime.5
The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer,
SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated that there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two
accused in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who
solicited sexual favors. Hence, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to
prove the crime, and the defense to rebut the evidence.1avvphi1
Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, 6 directly challenging the constitutionality of the
anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article
202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of
violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are
otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202
(2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it
discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and
unreasonable classification.
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant to the
Courts ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,7 the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
apply only to free speech cases and not to penal statutes. It also asserted that Article
202 (2) must be presumed valid and constitutional, since the respondents failed to
overcome this presumption.
On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the
petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED. Paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared
unconstitutional and the Order of the court a quo, dated April 28, 2004, denying the
petitioners Motion to Quash is set aside and the said court is ordered to dismiss the
subject criminal cases against the petitioners pending before it.
SO ORDERED.8
In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the law is
vague and it violated the equal protection clause. It held that the "void for vagueness"
doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes. Citing
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,9 where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck
down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, the trial court
ruled:

The U.S. Supreme Courts justifications for striking down the Jacksonville Vagrancy
Ordinance are equally applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being "found loitering about
public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country
or the streets without visible means of support" offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary
determinations as to who should be arrested and who should not.
Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these
times of recession when there are many who are "without visible means of support"
not by reason of choice but by force of circumstance as borne out by the high
unemployment rate in the entire country.
To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other reason
than the fact that he cannot find gainful employment would indeed be adding insult to
injury.10
On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, the trial court declared:
The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at
present runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the constitution as it offers no
reasonable classification between those covered by the law and those who are not.
Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to
others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon
another in like case offending.
Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of
the Revised Penal Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to
differentiate those who have no visible means of support by force of circumstance and
those who choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the proper subjects of
vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality. 11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE 12
Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan,13 the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application
to free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
statutes; that respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute,
failing to prove that it was vague under the standards set out by the Courts; and that
the State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare in the
exercise of its police power.
On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines. They insist that Article 202 (2) on its face
violates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due process and the equal protection
of the laws; that the due process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free
speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to declare Article 202 (2) unconstitutional

and void on its face; and that the presumption of constitutionality was adequately
overthrown.
The Court finds for petitioner.
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative
in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as
an aspect of police power. The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
considered innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been
abridged.14 However, in exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime,
the legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends
to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know
what acts it is his duty to avoid. 15 This requirement has come to be known as the
void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that "a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."16
In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,17 the Court recognized the application of the voidfor-vagueness doctrine to criminal statutes in appropriate cases. The Court therein
held:
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which
seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in
Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate "as
applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in
relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 the provisions upon which
petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions
which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for
judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory. 18
The first statute punishing vagrancy Act No. 519 was modeled after American
vagrancy statutes and passed by the Philippine Commission in 1902. The Penal Code
of Spain of 1870 which was in force in this country up to December 31, 1931 did not
contain a provision on vagrancy. 19 While historically an Anglo-American concept of
crime prevention, the law on vagrancy was included by the Philippine legislature as a
permanent feature of the Revised Penal Code in Article 202 thereof which, to repeat,
provides:
ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical
ability to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful
calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means
of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or
pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;

4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this
Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging
to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be
punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of
recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as
any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping
or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support. This
provision was based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined
"vagrant" as "every person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling
houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of
support." The second clause was essentially retained with the modification that the
places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in general
terms public or semi-public places.
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take
support mainly from the U.S. Supreme Courts opinion in the Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville20 case, which in essence declares:
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all
persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453.
Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair
notice of the offending conduct. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S.
385, 269 U. S. 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the field of regulatory statutes governing business
activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed.
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337; United States v. National Dairy
Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1.
The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in business and
not alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would
have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them. Nor are they
protected from being caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a specific
intent to commit an unlawful act. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; Boyce
Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra.
The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern standards, are
normally innocent. "Nightwalking" is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to make
criminal one night's wandering, Johnson v. State, 202 So.2d at 855, only the "habitual"
wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, "common night walkers." We know,
however, from experience that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful
that sleep-inducing relaxation will result.

Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that "loafing" was
a national virtue in his Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged. It is,
however, a crime in Jacksonville.
xxxx
Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been extolled by Walt
Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. The qualification "without any lawful purpose or object"
may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons "neglecting all lawful business and habitually
spending their time by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold or
served" would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.
Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary.
Loafers or loiterers may be "casing" a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support
him is an intra-family matter, and normally of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of
course, be the setting for numerous crimes.
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we
have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights.
These unwritten amenities have been, in part, responsible for giving our people the
feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities
have dignified the right of dissent, and have honored the right to be nonconformists
and the right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits,
rather than hushed, suffocating silence.
xxxx
Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this
ordinance, those convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to
police authority:
"The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles
before the magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which
permits 'conviction' for almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House of
Correction as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear to
have no other immediate solution." Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration,
104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.
xxxx
Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not on the lack
of notice given a potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it
places in the hands of the Jacksonville police. Caleb Foote, an early student of this
subject, has called the vagrancy-type law as offering "punishment by analogy." Such
crimes, though long common in Russia, are not compatible with our constitutional
system.
xxxx
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses
where liquor is sold, or who are supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the
police are to become future criminals is too precarious for a rule of law. The implicit
presumption in these generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime is being nipped in
the bud -- is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course, vagrancy
statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they are nets making easy the roundup of

so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality and justice in its
application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of justice are
so tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law,
evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the
great mucilage that holds society together. 21
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville
ordinance "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute;" and 2) it encourages or promotes
opportunities for the application of discriminatory law enforcement.
The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article
202 (2) in this case, fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct,
finds no application here because under our legal system, ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.22 This principle is of Spanish origin, and
we adopted it to govern and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction. Under American
law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule that admits of exceptions. 23
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of
specific provisions thereof, which are not found in Article 202 (2). The ordinance
(Jacksonville Ordinance Code 257) provided, as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; common
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards,
common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property,
lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and
brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful
purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful
business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming
houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work
but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be
deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as
provided for Class D offenses.
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional,
because such activities or habits as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around
without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at
places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of
wives or minor children, which are otherwise common and normal, were declared
illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not found in Article 202 (2).
The closest to Article 202 (2) "any person found loitering about public or semi-public
buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without
visible means of support" from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be "persons
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or
object." But these two acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified by
"without visible means of support" while the Jacksonville ordinance prohibits
wandering or strolling "without any lawful purpose or object," which was held by the
U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a "trap for innocent acts."
Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.24 Thus, as with any other act or offense, the requirement of

probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that

may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be
violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the respondents, echoing Jacksonville,
that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of the police to make an arrest or
search, is therefore assuaged by the constitutional requirement of probable cause,
which is one less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility. 25
Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily
without pain of punishment, for, absent this requirement, the authorities are
necessarily guilty of abuse. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the
arrest.26
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as
into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private
individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It
protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and
other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly cut off from that
domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure
agreeable.27
As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been
conducting previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On
the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under our Constitution. For
this reason, we are not moved by respondents trepidation that Article 202 (2) could
have been a source of police abuse in their case.
Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made
upon the constitutionality of Article 202 except now. Instead, throughout the years, we
have witnessed the streets and parks become dangerous and unsafe, a haven for
beggars, harassing "watch-your-car" boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets,
swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performing acts that go beyond decency
and morality, if not basic humanity. The streets and parks have become the training
ground for petty offenders who graduate into hardened and battle-scarred criminals.
Everyday, the news is rife with reports of innocent and hardworking people being
robbed, swindled, harassed or mauled if not killed by the scourge of the streets.
Blue collar workers are robbed straight from withdrawing hard-earned money from the
ATMs (automated teller machines); students are held up for having to use and thus
exhibit publicly their mobile phones; frail and helpless men are mauled by thrillseeking gangs; innocent passers-by are stabbed to death by rowdy drunken men
walking the streets; fair-looking or pretty women are stalked and harassed, if not
abducted, raped and then killed; robbers, thieves, pickpockets and snatchers case
streets and parks for possible victims; the old are swindled of their life savings by
conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly pester
and panhandle pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting lawabiding drivers and citizens at risk of running them over. All these happen on the
streets and in public places, day or night.
The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to ply them
each day, or else we can never say that we have performed our task to our brothers
and sisters. We must rid the streets of the scourge of humanity, and restore order,
peace, civility, decency and morality in them.

This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs.
These laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality
and civility in human society. These laws may be traced all the way back to
ancient times, and today, they have also come to be associated with the struggle to
improve the citizens quality of life, which is guaranteed by our Constitution. 28 Civilly,
they are covered by the "abuse of rights" doctrine embodied in the preliminary
articles of the Civil Code concerning Human Relations, to the end, in part, that any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. 29
This provision is, together with the succeeding articles on human relations, intended
to embody certain basic principles "that are to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of the social order." 30
In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent
criminal disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing
themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to
some appropriate action in court to assert their claims. 31 Any private person may
abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if
necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a
breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. 32
Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts from public
indecencies and immoralities, to public nuisances, to disorderly conduct. The acts
punished are made illegal by their offensiveness to societys basic sensibilities and
their adverse effect on the quality of life of the people of society. For example, the
issuance or making of a bouncing check is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against
public order that must be abated.33 As a matter of public policy, the failure to turn
over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt or to return said
goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions.34 Thus, public nuisances must be abated because they have the effect of
interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by members of a
community.
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it
discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are
punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting
themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm
and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a
justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive.
It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a
certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that
are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable
concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community.
Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the
State should train its eye on their effective implementation, because it is in this area
that the Court perceives difficulties. Red light districts abound, gangs work the streets
in the wee hours of the morning, dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade in the
trains stations, drunken men terrorize law-abiding citizens late at night and urinate on
otherwise decent corners of our streets. Rugby-sniffing individuals crowd our national
parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes wait for customers by the roadside all around
the metropolis, some even venture in bars and restaurants. Drug-crazed men loiter
around dark avenues waiting to pounce on helpless citizens. Dangerous groups

wander around, casing homes and establishments for their next hit. The streets must
be made safe once more. Though a mans house is his castle, 35 outside on the streets,
the king is fair game.
The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.
Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2)
should be presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional
question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with grave care and
considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every
reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. 36 The policy of our
courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of
the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming
respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of
Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied,
crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was
finally enacted.37
It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It
has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects
of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general
welfare.38 As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be
viewed in a constitutional light.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch 11 of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 declaring Article 202,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 thus
continue.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170723

March 3, 2008

GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MICHELINA S. AGUIRREOLONDRIZ, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B.
PASCUAL, respondents.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, petitioner Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre (Gloria Aguirre) seeks the reversal of the 21
July 2005 Decision2 and 5 December 2005 Resolution,3 both of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 88370, entitled "Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre v. Secretary of the Department
of Justice, Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr. Juvido Agatep, Dra. Marissa B. Pascual,
Pedro B. Aguirre and John and Jane Does."
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) when the latter issued the twin resolutions dated
11 February 20044 and 12 November 2004,5 respectively, which in turn affirmed the 8
January 2003 Resolution6 of the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City.
The Assistant City Prosecutor for the OCP of Quezon City recommended the dismissal
of the criminal complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466, for violation of Articles 172
(Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents) and 262
(Mutilation), both of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610,
otherwise known as "Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," for
insufficiency of evidence.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner Gloria Aguirre against
respondents Pedro B. Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre), Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz (Olondriz),
Dr. Juvido Agatep (Dr. Agatep), Dr. Marissa B. Pascual (Dr. Pascual) and several
John/Jane Does for falsification, mutilation and child abuse.
The antecedents of the present petition are:
Laureano "Larry" Aguirre7 used to be a charge of the Heart of Mary Villa, a child caring
agency run by the Good Shepherd Sisters and licensed by the Department of Social
Work and Development (DSWD). Sometime in 1978, respondent Pedro Aguirre; the
latter's spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes Aguirre); and their four daughters, who
included petitioner Gloria Aguirre and respondent Olondriz, came to know Larry, who
was then just over a year old. The Aguirres would have Larry spend a few days at their
home and then return him to the orphanage thereafter. In June 1980, Larry, then two
years and nine months of age, formally became the ward of respondent Pedro Aguirre
and his spouse Lourdes Aguirre by virtue of an Affidavit of Consent to Legal
Guardianship executed in their favor by Sister Mary Concepta Bellosillo, Superior of
the Heart of Mary Villa. On 19 June 1986, the Aguirre spouses' guardianship of Larry
was legalized when the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan, duly
appointed them as joint co-guardians over the person and property of Larry.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children noticed that his
developmental milestones were remarkably delayed. His cognitive and physical
growth did not appear normal in that "at age 3 to 4 years, Larry could only crawl on
his tummy like a frog x x x;" 8 he did not utter his first word until he was three years of
age; did not speak in sentences until his sixth year; and only learned to stand up and
walk after he turned five years old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first enrolled Larry
at the Colegio de San Agustin, Dasmarias Village, but the child experienced
significant learning difficulties there. In 1989, at age eleven, Larry was taken to
specialists for neurological and psychological evaluations. The psychological
evaluation9 done on Larry revealed the latter to be suffering from a mild mental
deficiency.10 Consequent thereto, the Aguirre spouses transferred Larry to St. John Ma.
Vianney, an educational institution for special children.

In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon, was approached

concerning the intention to have Larry, then 24 years of age, vasectomized. Prior to
performing the procedure on the intended patient, respondent Dr. Agatep required
that Larry be evaluated by a psychiatrist in order to confirm and validate whether or
not the former could validly give his consent to the medical procedure on account of
his mental deficiency.
In view of the required psychiatric clearance, Larry was brought to respondent Dr.
Pascual, a psychiatrist, for evaluation. In a psychiatric report dated 21 January 2002,
respondent Dr. Pascual made the following recommendation:
[T]he responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or guardian. 11
the full text of which reads
PSYCHIATRY REPORT
21 January 2002
GENERAL DATA
LAUREANO AGUIRRE, 24 years old, male, high school graduate of St. John
[Marie Vianney], was referred for psychiatric evaluation to determine
competency to give consent for vasectomy.
CLINICAL SUMMARY
Larry was adopted at age 3 from an orphanage and prenatal history is not
known to the adoptive family except that abortion was attempted.
Developmental milestones were noted to be delayed. He started to walk and
speak in single word at around age 5. He was enrolled in Colegio de San Agustin
at age 6 where he showed significant learning difficulties that he had to repeat
1st and 4th grades. A consult was done in 1989 when he was 11 years old.
Neurological findings and EEG results were not normal and he was given
Tecretol and Encephabol by his neurologist. Psychological evaluation revealed
mild to moderate mental retardation, special education training was advised
and thus, he was transferred to St. John Marie Vianney. He finished his
elementary and secondary education in the said school. He was later enrolled in
a vocational course at Don Bosco which he was unable to continue. There has
been no reported behavioral problems in school and he gets along relatively
well with his teachers and some of his classmates.
Larry grew up with a very supportive adoptive family. He is the youngest in the
family of four sisters. Currently, his adoptive parents are already old and have
medical problem and thus, they could no longer monitor and take care of him
like before. His adoptive mother has Bipolar Mood Disorder and used to
physically maltreat him. A year ago, he had an episode of dizziness, vomiting
and headaches after he was hit by his adoptive mother. Consult was done in
Makati Medical Center and several tests were done, results of which were
consistent with his developmental problem. There was no evidence of acute
insults. The family subsequently decided that he should stay with one of his
sisters to avoid similar incident and the possibility that he would retaliate
although he has never hurt anybody. There has been no episode of violent
outburst or aggressive behavior. He would often keep to himself when sad,
angry or frustrated.

He is currently employed in the company of his sister and given assignment to

do some photocopying, usually in the mornings. He enjoys playing billiards and
basketball with his nephews and, he spends most of his leisure time watching
TV and listening to music. He could perform activities of daily living without
assistance except that he still needs supervision in taking a bath. He cannot
prepare his own meal and never allowed to go out and run errands alone. He
does not have friends and it is only his adoptive family whom he has significant
relationships. He claims that he once had a girlfriend when he was in high
school who was more like a best friend to him. He never had sexual relations.
He has learned to smoke and drink alcohol few years ago through his cousins
and the drivers. There is no history of abuse of alcohol or any prohibited
substances.
MEDICAL STATUS EXAMINATION
The applicant was appropriately dressed. He was cooperative and he had
intermittent eye contact. Speech was spontaneous, soft, and relevant. He
responded to questions in single words or simple sentences. He was anxious
specially at the start of the interview, with full affect appropriate to mood and
thought content. There was no apparent thought or perceptual disturbance. No
suicidal/homicidal thoughts elicited. He was oriented to time, place and person.
He has intact remote and recent memory. He could do simple calculation. He
could write his name and read simple words. His human figure was comparable
to a 7-8 year old. He demonstrated fair judgment and poor insight. He had fair
impulse control.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS
Psychological tests done on March 6, 1990 (Dr. Lourdes Ledesma) and on
August 4, 2000 (Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villaosor) consistently revealed mild to
moderate mental deficiency.
SIGNIFICANT LABORATORY EXAMS RESULTS
CT scan done 09 January 2001 showed nonspecific right deep parietal
subcortical malacia. No localized mass lesion in the brain.
MRI done on 10 January 2001 showed bilateral parietal x x x volume loss,
encephalomalacia, gliosis and ulegyria consistent with sequela of postnatal or
neonatal infarcts. Ex-vacuo dilatation of the atria of lateral ventricles associated
thinned posterior half of the corpus callosum.
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
Axis I None
Axis II Mental Retardation, mild to moderate type
Axis III None
Axis IV None at present
Axis V Current GAF = 50-60

Larry's mental deficiency could be associated with possible perinatal insults,

which is consistent with the neuroimaging findings. Mental retardation
associated with neurological problems usually has poorer prognosis. Larry is
very much dependent on his family for his needs, adaptive functioning,
direction and in making major life decisions. At his capacity, he may never
understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits, and consequences of
the procedure (vasectomy) that his family wants for his protection. Thus, the
responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or guardian.

Marissa
Psychiatrist12

B.

Pascual,

M.D.

Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro Aguirre's written consent

was deemed sufficient in order to proceed with the conduct of the vasectomy. Hence,
on 31 January 2002, respondent Dr. Agatep performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry.
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro Aguirre's eldest child,
instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of the Revised Penal Code, particularly
Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 against respondents
Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several John/Jane Does before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The Complaint Affidavit,13 docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466, contained the following
allegations:
2. x x x Dr. Agatep and Dra. Pascual were (sic) medical practitioners specializing
in urology and psychiatry respectively; while respondent Pedro B. Aguirre is my
father; Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz is my sister, and the victim Laureano
"Larry" Aguirre xxx is my common law brother. JOHN and JANE DOES were the
persons who, acting upon the apparent instructions of respondents Michelina
Aguirre-Olondriz and/or Pedro B. Aguirre, actually scouted, prospected,
facilitated, solicited and/or procured the medical services of respondents Dra.
Pascual and Dr. Agatep vis--vis the intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy
of my common law brother Larry Aguirre subject hereof.
xxxx
4. Sometime in March 2002, however, the Heart of Mary Villa of the Good
Shepherd Sisters was furnished a copy of respondent Dra. Pascual's Psychiatry
Report dated 21 January 2004 by the "DSWD," in which my common law brother
"Larry" was falsely and maliciously declared incompetent and incapable of
purportedly giving his own consent to the MUTILATION VIA BILATERAL
VASECTOMY intended to be performed on him by all the respondents.
xxxx
6. Based on the foregoing charade and false pretenses invariably committed by
all of the respondents in conspiracy with each other, on 31 January 2002, my
common law brother Larry Aguirre, although of legal age but conspiratorially
caused to be declared by respondents to be "mentally deficient" and
incompetent to give consent to his BILATERAL VASECTOMY, was then
intentionally, unlawfully, maliciously, feloniously and/or criminally placed
thereafter under surgery for MUTILATION VIA "BILATERAL VASECTOMY" x x x,

EVEN WITHOUT ANY AUTHORIZATION ORDER from the GUARDIANSHIP COURT,

nor personal consent of Larry Aguirre himself.
In addition to the above, the complaint included therein an allegation that
v. x x x without a PRIOR medical examination, professional interview of nor
verification and consultation with my mother, Lourdes Sabino-Aguirre,
respondent Dra. Pascual baselessly, fraudulently and with obvious intent to
defame and malign her reputation and honor, and worse, that of our Sabido
family, falsely concluded and diagnosed, via her falsified Psychiatry Report, that
my mother Lourdes Sabido-Aguirre purportedly suffers from "BIPOLAR MOOD
DISORDER" x x x.
To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirre's accusations against them, respondents Pedro
Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual submitted their respective CounterAffidavits.
In her defense,14 respondent Olondriz denied that she "prospected, scouted,
facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement, mutilated or abused" her
common-law brother, Larry Aguirre. Further, she countered that:
3. x x x While I am aware and admit that Larry went through a vasectomy
procedure, there is nothing in the Complaint which explains how the vasectomy
amounts to a mutilation.
xxxx
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with complete
confidence that I did not participate in any way in the alleged mutilation.
6. Neither did I procure or solicit the services of the physician who performed
the vasectomy, Dr. Juvido Agatep x x x. It was my father, Pedro Aguirre, Larry's
guardian, who obtained his services. I merely acted upon his instructions and
accompanied my brother to the physician, respondents Dra. Marissa B. Pascual
x x x.
xxxx
10. Neither does the Complaint explain in what manner the Complainant is
authorized or has any standing to declare that Larry's consent was not
obtained. Complainant is not the guardian or relative of Larry. While she argues
that Larry's consent should have been obtained the Complaint does not dispute
the psychiatrist's findings about Larry's inability to give consent.
xxxx
13. x x x the Complaint does not even state what alleged participation was
falsified or the portion of the psychiatric report that allegedly states that
someone participated when in fact that person did not so participate.
xxxx
15. Again, I had no participation in the preparation of the report of Dr. Pascual x
x x.

xxxx
17. x x x the Complaint does not dispute that he (Larry) is mentally deficient or
incompetent to give consent.
xxxx
19. x x x I verified that the effect of a vasectomy operation was explained to
him (Larry) by both respondent doctors.
20. x x x I accompanied Larry and obeyed my father on the belief that my
father continues to be the legal guardian of Larry. I know of no one else who
asserts to be his legal guardian x x x.15
Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, respondent Pedro Aguirre argues
against his complicity in the crime of mutilation as charged and asserts that:
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with complete
confidence that I did not participate in any way in the alleged mutilation. 16
Nevertheless, he maintains that the vasectomy performed on Larry does not in any
way amount to mutilation, as the latter's reproductive organ is still completely intact. 17
In any case, respondent Pedro Aguirre explains that the procedure performed is
reversible through another procedure called Vasovasostomy, to wit:
8. I understand that vasectomy is reversible through a procedure called
Vasovasostomy. I can also state with confidence that the procedure enables
men who have undergone a vasectomy to sire a child. Hence, no permanent
damage was caused by the procedure.
Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the charge of falsification in the complaint, to
wit:
14. x x x I did not make it appear that any person participated in any act or
proceeding when that person did not in fact participate x x x.
xxxx
16. x x x I had no participation in the preparation of the report of Dra. Pascual.
She arrived at her report independently, using her own professional judgment x
x x.
xxxx
31. What I cannot understand about Petita's Complaint is how Larry is argued to
be legally a child under the definition of one law but nonetheless and
simultaneously argued to be capacitated to give his consent as fully as an
adult.18
Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that co-guardianship over Larry had been
granted to himself and his wife, Lourdes Aguirre, way back on 19 June 1986 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan. Respondent Pedro Aguirre contends
that being one of the legal guardians, consequently, parental authority over Larry is
vested in him. But assuming for the sake of argument that Larry does have the
capacity to make the decision concerning his vasectomy, respondent Pedro Aguirre

argues that petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no legal personality to institute the subject
criminal complaint, for only Larry would have the right to do so.
Just as the two preceding respondents did, respondent Dr. Agatep also disputed the
allegations of facts stated in the Complaint. Adopting the allegations of his corespondents insofar as they were material to the charges against him, he vehemently
denied failing to inform Larry of the intended procedure. In his counter-statement of
facts he averred that:
(b) x x x I scheduled Larry for consultative interview x x x wherein I
painstakingly explained what vasectomy is and the consequences thereof; but
finding signs of mental deficiency, x x x I advised his relatives and his nurse
who accompanied him to have Larry examined by a psychiatrist who could
properly determine whether or not Larry x x x can really give his consent, thus I
required them to secure first a psychiatric evaluation and clearance prior to the
contemplated procedure.
(c) On January 21, 2002, I was furnished a copy of a psychiatric report prepared
by Dr. Marissa Pascual x x x. In her said report, Dr. Pascual found Larry to suffer
from "mental retardation, mild to moderate type" and further stated that "at his
capacity, he may never understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and
benefits and consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) x x x, thus the
responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or guardian x x x."
(d) x x x I was likewise furnished a copy of an affidavit executed by Pedro
Aguirre stating that he was the legal guardian of Larry x x x Pedro Aguirre gave
his consent to vasectomize Larry x x x.
(e) Only then, specifically January 31, 2002, vasectomy was performed with
utmost care and diligence.19
In defense against the charge of falsification and mutilation, respondent Dr. Agatep
argued that subject complaint should be dismissed for the following reasons:
1. The complainant has no legal personality to file this case. As mentioned
above, she is only a common law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the
person of Pedro Aguirre, one of the herein respondents x x x.
2. x x x [t]he allegations in the complaint clearly centers on the condition of
complainant's mother, Lourdes Aguirre, her reputation, and miserably fails to
implicate the degree of participation of herein respondent. x x x
xxxx
(b) Falsification. x x x I strongly aver that this felony does not apply to me since
it clearly gives reference to co-respondent, Dr. Marissa Pascual's Psychiatry
Report, dated January 21, 2002, in relation with her field of profession, an
expert opinion. I do not have any participation in the preparation of said report,
x x x neither did I utilized (sic) the same in any proceedings to the damage to
another. x x x I also deny using a falsified document x x x.
(c) Mutilation. x x x Vasectomy does not in anyway equate to castration and
what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of law
and medicine, it is quite remote from the penis x x x.

(d) Child Abuse. x x x the complaint-affidavit is very vague in specifying the

applicability of said law. It merely avers that Laureano "Larry" Aguirre is a child,
and alleges his father, Pedro Aguirre, has parental authority over him x x x. 20
Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the criminal charges of falsification and
mutilation imputed to her. She stands by the contents of the assailed Psychiatric
Report, justifying it thus:
x x x My opinion of Larry Aguirre's mental status was based on my own
personal observations, his responses during my interview of him, the results of
the two (2) psychological tests conducted by clinical psychologists, the results
of laboratory tests, including a CT Scan and MRI, and his personal and family
history which I obtained from his sister, Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz x x x.
5. x x x the reference in my report concerning Mrs. Lourdes Aguirre is not a
statement of my opinion of Mrs. Aguirre's mental status, x x x. Rather, it is part
of the patient's personal and family history as conveyed to me by Mrs. AguirreOlondriz.
6. x x x An expression of my opinion, especially of an expert opinion, cannot
give rise to a charge for falsification. A contrary opinion by another expert only
means that the experts differ, and does not necessarily reflect on the truth or
falsity of either opinion x x x.
7. x x x I never stated that I examined Mrs. Aguirre, because I never did x x x.
8. I had no participation in the surgery performed on Larry Aguirre except to
render an opinion on his capacity to give informed consent to the vasectomy x
x x.
9. Without admitting the merits of the complaint, I submit that complainants are
not the proper persons to subscribe to the same as they are not the offended
party, peace officer or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the
law violated x x x.21
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the circumstances attendant to the case did
not amount to the crime of falsification. He held that
[T]he claim of the complainant that the Psychiatric Report was falsified,
because consent was not given by Larry Aguirre to the vasectomy and/or he
was not consulted on said operation does not constitute falsification. It would
have been different if it was stated in the report that consent was obtained from
Larry Aguirre or that it was written therein that he was consulted on the
vasectomy, because that would mean that it was made to appear in the report
that Larry Aguirre participated in the act or proceeding by giving his consent or
was consulted on the matter when in truth and in fact, he did not participate. Or
if not, the entry would have been an untruthful statement. But that is not the
case. Precisely (sic) the report was made to determine whether Larry Aguirre
could give his consent to his intended vasectomy. Be that as it may, the matter
of Larry's consent having obtained or not may nor be an issue after all, because
complainant's (sic) herself alleged that Larry's mental condition is that of a
child, who can not give consent. Based on the foregoing consideration, no
falsification can be established under the circumstances. 22

Even the statement in the Psychiatric Report of respondent Dr. Pascual that Lourdes
Aguirre had Bipolar Mood Disorder cannot be considered falsification since
The report did not state that Lourdes Aguirre was in fact personally interviewed
by respondent Dr. Pascual and that the latter concluded that Lourdes Aguirre
has Bipolar Mood Disorder. The report merely quoted other sources of
information with respect to the condition of Lourdes Aguirre, in the same
manner that the fact that Lourdes Aguirre was physically abusing Larry Aguirre
was also not of Dra. Pascual personal knowledge. But the fact that Dra. Pascual
cited finding, which is not of her own personal knowledge in her report does not
mean that she committed falsification in the process. Her sources may be
wrong and may affect the veracity of her report, but for as long as she has not
alleged therein that she personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation
would not then be true, she cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it
goes without saying that if the author of the report is not guilty, then with more
reason the other respondents are not liable. 23
Respecting the charge of mutilation, the Assistant City Prosecutor also held that the
facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized
under Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not
in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part
of his physical self." He ratiocinated that:
While the operation renders him the inability (sic) to procreate, the operation is
reversible and therefore, cannot be the permanent damage contemplated
under Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code. 24
The Assistant City Prosecutor, 25 in a Resolution26 dated 8 January 2003, found no
probable cause to hold respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr.
Pascual liable for the complaint of falsification and mutilation, more specifically, the
violation of Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610. Accordingly, the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of
petitioner Gloria Aguirre's complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive
portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that the above-entitled case be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.27
On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre appealed the foregoing resolution to
the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a Petition for Review. 28
In a Resolution dated 11 February 2004, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, for
the Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the petition. In resolving said appeal, the Chief
State Prosecutor held that:
Under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular No. 70 dated
July 3, 2000, the Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio, dismiss outright the
petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned
resolution or finds the same to be patently without merit.
We carefully examined the petition and its attachments and found no error that
would justify a reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the law
and evidenced (sic) on the matter. 29

Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality
by the DOJ in another Resolution dated 12 November 2004.
Resolute in her belief, petitioner Gloria Aguirre went to the Court of Appeals by means
of a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
On 21 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing petitioner
Gloria Aguirre's recourse for lack of merit.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, the
assailed Resolutions dated February 11, 2004 and November 12, 2004 of the
Secretary of Justice in I.S. No. 02-12466 are hereby AFFIRMED. 30
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's motion for reconsideration proved futile as it was denied by
the appellate court in a Resolution dated 5 December 2005.
Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
premised on the following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS, GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE
ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED, BASED PURPORTEDLY ON THE
INTERNET WHICH RUNS AMUCK WITH OUR SYSTEM OF THE RULE OF LAW AND
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT BILATERAL VASECTOMY IS PURPORTEDLY
100% REVERSIBLE BY A FUTURE MEDICAL PROCEDURE HENCE NOT AMOUNTING
TO MUTILATION, X X X; AND
xxxx
II.
WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO DIRECT THE INDICTMENT
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR MUTILATION AND FALSIFICATION DESPITE
THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE THEREFOR X X X. 31
The foregoing issues notwithstanding, the more proper issue for this Court's
consideration is, given the facts of the case, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when the latter affirmed the public prosecutor's finding of lack of
probable cause for respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual to
stand trial for the criminal complaints of falsification and mutilation in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610.
In ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals explained that:
Evidently, the controversy lies in the permanency of sterilization as a result of a
vasectomy operation, and the chances of restoring fertility with a reversal
surgery x x x.

We sustain the DOJ in ruling that the bilateral vasectomy performed on Larry
does not constitute mutilation even if intentionally and purposely done to
prevent him from siring a child.
xxxx
Sterilization is to be distinguished from castration: in the latter act the
reproductive capacity is permanently removed or damaged. 32
It then concluded that:
The matter of legal liability, other than criminal, which private respondents may
have incurred for the alleged absence of a valid consent to the vasectomy
performed on Larry, is certainly beyond the province of this certiorari petition.
Out task is confined to the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice and
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City committed grave abuse of
discretion in their determining the existence or absence of probable cause for
filing criminal cases for falsification and mutilation under Articles 172 (2) and
262 of the Revised Penal Code.33
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends that the Court of Appeals and the DOJ
failed to appreciate several important facts: 1) that bilateral vasectomy conducted on
petitioner's brother, Larry Aguirre, was admitted 34; 2) that the procedure caused the
perpetual destruction of Larry's reproductive organs of generation or conception; 35 3)
that the bilateral vasectomy was intentional and deliberate to deprive Larry forever of
his reproductive organ and his capacity to procreate; and 4) that respondents, "in
conspiracy with one another, made not only one but two (2) untruthful statements,
and not mere inaccuracies when they made it appear in the psychiatry report" 36 that
a) Larry's consent was obtained or at the very least that the latter was informed of the
intended vasectomy; and b) that Lourdes Aguirre was likewise interviewed and
evaluated. Paradoxically, however, petitioner Gloria Aguirre does not in any way state
that she, instead of respondent Pedro Aguirre, has guardianship over the person of
Larry. She only insists that respondents should have obtained Larry's consent prior to
the conduct of the bilateral vasectomy.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for public respondent DOJ, argues
that "the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine the existence of probable
cause for the purpose of filing (an) information is the function of the public
prosecutor."37 More importantly, "the element[s] of castration or mutilation of an organ
necessary for generation is completely absent as he was not deprived of any organ
necessary for reproduction, much less the destruction of such organ." 38
Likewise, in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondents Pedro Aguirre
and Olondriz assert that, fundamentally, petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no standing to
file the complaint, as she has not shown any injury to her person or asserted any
relationship with Larry other than being his "common law sister"; further, that she
cannot prosecute the present case, as she has not been authorized by law to file said
complaint, not being the offended party, a peace officer or a public officer charged
with the enforcement of the law. Accordingly, respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz
posit that they, together with the other respondents Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual, may
not be charged with, prosecuted for and ultimately convicted of: 1) "mutilation x x x
since the bilateral vasecto.my conducted on Larry does not involve castration or
amputation of an organ necessary for reproduction as the twin elements of the crime
of mutilation x x x are absent"39; and 2) "falsification x x x since the acts allegedly
constituting falsification involve matters of medical opinion and not matters of fact," 40

and that petitioner Gloria Aguirre failed to prove damage to herself or to any other
person.
Respondent Dr. Agatep, in the same vein, stresses that vasectomy is not mutilation.
He elucidates that vasectomy is merely the "excision of the vas deferens, the duct in
testis which transport semen" 41; that it is the penis and the testis that make up the
male reproductive organ and not the vas deferens; and additionally argues that for the
crime of mutilation to be accomplished, Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code
necessitates that there be intentional total or partial deprivation of some essential
organ for reproduction. Tubes, seminal ducts, vas deferens or prostatic urethra not
being organs, respondent Dr. Agatep concludes, therefore, that vasectomy does not
correspond to mutilation.
Anent the charge of falsification of a private document, respondent Dr. Agatep
asseverates that he never took part in disclosing any information, data or facts as
contained in the contentious Psychiatric Report.
For her part, respondent Dr. Pascual insists that the assailed Psychiatry Report was the
result of her independent exercise of professional judgment. "Rightly or wrongly, (she)
diagnosed Larry Aguirre to be incapable of giving consent, based on interviews made
by the psychiatrist on Larry Aguirre and persons who interacted with him." 42 And
supposing that said report is flawed, it is, at most, an erroneous medical diagnosis.
The petition has no merit.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of
the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.43 The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty.44 It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief; 45 that is, the
belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.46
The executive department of the government is accountable for the prosecution of
crimes, its principal obligation being the faithful execution of the laws of the land. A
necessary component of the power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their
violators,47 the responsibility of which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence, the
determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in
court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the nature of his
office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal
information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments
thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion.
Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a wide range of discretion, the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by (public) prosecutors. 48 And this
Court has consistently adhered to the policy of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, and to leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as
will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against the supposed
offender.49
But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of
the prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the investigating prosecutor may
erroneously exercise the discretion lodged in him by law. This, however, does not

render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.50
Prescinding from the above, the court's duty in an appropriate case, therefore, is
confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive determination of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting from a grave
abuse of discretion. For courts of law to grant the extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as
to justify the reversal of the finding of whether or not there exists probable cause to
file an information, the one seeking the writ must be able to establish that the
investigating prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough. 51 Excess of
jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the
same or acted without authority.52
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of the Assistant
City Prosecutor in dismissing the criminal complaints for falsification and mutilation,
as affirmed by the DOJ, is determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did that no probable cause for falsification and mutilation exists
- the Assistant City Prosecutor deliberated on the factual and legal milieu of the case.
He found that there was no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for the
crimes complained of as defined and punished under Articles 172, paragraph 2, and
262 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, respectively.
Concerning the crime of falsification of a private document, the Assistant City
Prosecutor reasoned that the circumstances attendant to the case did not amount to
the crime complained of, that is, the lack of consent by Larry Aguirre before he was
vasectomized; or the fact that the latter was not consulted. The lack of the two
preceding attendant facts do not in any way amount to falsification, absent the
contention that it was made to appear in the assailed report that said consent was
obtained. That would have been an untruthful statement. Neither does the fact that
the Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder by the
same token amount to falsification because said report does not put forward that such
finding arose after an examination of the concerned patient. Apropos the charge of
mutilation, he reasoned that though the vasectomy rendered Larry unable to
procreate, it was not the permanent damage contemplated under the pertinent
provision of the penal code.
We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the DOJ and the Assistant City Prosecutor was not shown in the present case.
In the present petition, respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr.
Pascual are charged with violating Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
defines the crime of falsification of a private document, viz
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified
documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxxx

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause
such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charges respondents with falsification of a private document
for conspiring with one another in keeping Larry "in the dark about the foregoing
(vasectomy) as the same was concealed from him by the respondents x x x," 53 as well
as for falsely concluding and diagnosing Lourdes Aguirre to be suffering from Bipolar
Mood Disorder.
A scrutiny, however, of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code which defines the acts
constitutive of falsification, that is
Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy
of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such
copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine
original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in
a protocol, registry, or official book.
vis--vis the much criticized Psychiatric Report, shows that the acts complained of do
not in any manner, by whatever stretch of the imagination, fall under any of the eight
(8) enumerated acts constituting the offense of falsification.
In order to properly address the issue presented by petitioner Gloria Aguirre, it is
necessary that we discuss the elements of the crime of falsification of private
document under the Revised Penal Code, a crime which all the respondents have been
accused of perpetrating. The elements of said crime under paragraph 2 of Article 172
of our penal code are as follows: 1) that the offender committed any acts of
falsification, except those in par. 7, enumerated in Article 171; 2) that the falsification
was committed in any private document; and 3) that the falsification caused damage
to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such
damage. Under Article 171, paragraph 2, a person may commit falsification of a
private document by causing it to appear in a document that a person or persons
participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or persons did not in fact so
participate in the act or proceeding. On the other hand, falsification under par. 3 of the
same article is perpetrated by a person or persons who, participating in an act or

proceeding, made statements in that act or proceeding and the offender, in making a
document, attributed to such person or persons statements other than those in fact
made by such person or persons. And the crime defined under paragraph 4 thereof is
committed when 1) the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of
facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3)
the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and 4) the perversion of truth
in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
Applying the above-stated elements of the crime to the case at bar, in order that
respondent Dr. Pascual, and the rest acting in conspiracy with her, to have committed
the crime of falsification under par. 3 and 4 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it
is essential that that there be prima facie evidence to show that she had caused it to
appear that Larry gave his consent to be vasectomized or at the very least, that the
proposed medical procedure was explained to Larry. But in the assailed report, no
such thing was done. Lest it be forgotten, the reason for having Larry psychiatrically
evaluated was precisely to ascertain whether or not he can validly consent with
impunity to the proposed vasectomy, and not to obtain his consent to it or to oblige
respondent Dr. Pascual to explain to him what the import of the medical procedure
was. Further, that Larry's consent to be vasectomized was not obtained by the
psychiatrist was of no moment, because nowhere is it stated in said report that such
assent was obtained. At any rate, petitioner Gloria Aguirre contradicts her very own
allegations when she persists in the contention that Larry has the mental age of a
child; hence, he was legally incapable of validly consenting to the procedure.
In the matter of the supposed incorrect diagnosis of Lourdes Aguirre, with regard to
paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, we quote with approval the
succinct statements of the Assistant City Prosecutor:
[T]he fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own personal
knowledge in her report does not mean that she committed falsification in the
process. Her sources may be wrong and may affect the veracity of her report,
but for as long as she has not alleged therein that she personally diagnosed
Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be true, she cannot be
charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes without saying that if the author of
the report is not guilty, then with more reason the other respondents are not
liable.54
As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime as

Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua

shall be imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by
depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for
reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its
medium and maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements 55 of
mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1)
that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and
2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the
offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According to the public
prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized above, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic)
Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self."

Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this Court to make a ruling that
bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation.
This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to the intentions of
the framers of our penal code.000000000000000000
A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in United States v. Esparcia,56 in which this
Court had the occasion to shed light on the implication of the term mutilation. Therein
we said that:
The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is whether or not the crime
committed is that defined and penalized by article 414 of the Penal Code. The
English translation of this article reads: "Any person who shall intentionally
castrate another shall suffer a penalty ranging from reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua." The Spanish text, which should govern, uses the word
"castrare," inadequately translated into English as "castrate." The word "capar,"
which is synonymous of "castrar," is defined in the Royal Academic Dictionary
as the destruction of the organs of generation or conception. Clearly it is the
intention of the law to punish any person who shall intentionally deprived
another of any organ necessary for reproduction. An applicable construction is
that of Viada in the following language:
"At the head of these crimes, according to their order of gravity, is the
mutilation known by the name of 'castration' which consists of the amputation
of whatever organ is necessary for generation. The law could not fail to punish
with the utmost severity such a crime, which, although not destroying life,
deprives a person of the means to transmit it. But bear in mind that according
to this article in order for 'castration' to exist, it is indispensable that the
'castration' be made purposely. The law does not look only to the result but also
to the intention of the act. Consequently, if by reason of an injury or attack, a
person is deprived of the organs of generation, the act, although voluntary, not
being intentional to that end, it would not come under the provisions of this
article, but under No. 2 of article 431." (Viada, Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p. 70. See
to same effect, 4 Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)
Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or partially, of some
essential organ of reproduction? We answer in the negative.
In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called the vas
deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are transported from the testicle to the
urethra where they combine with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided
and the cut ends merely tied. 57 That part, which is cut, that is, the vas deferens, is
merely a passageway that is part of the duct system of the male reproductive organs.
The vas deferens is not an organ, i.e., a highly organized unit of structure, having a
defined function in a multicellular organism and consisting of a range of tissues. 58 Be
that as it may, even assuming arguendo that the tubular passage can be considered
an organ, the cutting of the vas deferens does not divest or deny a man of any
essential organ of reproduction for the simple reason that it does not entail the taking
away of a part or portion of the male reproductive system. The cut ends, after they
have been tied, are then dropped back into the incision. 59
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such
procedure does not deprive him, "either totally or partially, of some essential organ for
reproduction." Notably, the ordinary usage of the term "mutilation" is the deprivation
of a limb or essential part (of the body), 60 with the operative expression being
"deprivation." In the same manner, the word "castration" is defined as the removal of

the testies or ovaries. 61 Such being the case in this present petition, the bilateral
vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation as
defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. And
no criminal culpability could be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the urologist who
performed the procedure, much less the other respondents. Thus, we find sufficient
evidence to explain why the Assistant City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they
did. Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the writ of certiorari is unavailing;
hence, should not be issued.
It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Court's general policy of noninterference in the conduct of preliminary investigations. As it has been oft said, the
Supreme Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor
does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case.62 The courts
try and absolve or convict the accused but, as a rule, have no part in the initial
decision to prosecute him.63 The possible exception to this rule is where there is an
unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But
that is not the case herein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed 21 July 2005 Decision and 5 December 2005 Resolution, both of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner Gloria Aguirre.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173473

December 17, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
BETH TEMPORADA, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us for review is the February 24, 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
affirming with modification the May 14, 2004 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant Beth Temporada of the crime
of large scale illegal recruitment, or violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, as
amended, and five (5) counts of estafa under Article 315, par. (2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
The antecedents, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:
From September 2001 to January 2002, accused Rosemarie "Baby" Robles,
Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan and Jojo Resco and appellant Beth
Temporada, all employees of the Alternative Travel and Tours Corporation
(ATTC), recruited and promised overseas employment, for a fee, to
complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. as technician in Singapore, and Soledad Atle,
Luz Minkay, Evelyn Estacio and Dennis Dimaano as factory workers in

Hongkong. The accused and appellant were then holding office at Dela Rosa
Street, Makati City but eventually transferred business to Discovery Plaza,
Ermita, Manila. After complainants had submitted all the requirements
consisting of their respective application forms, passports, NBI clearances and
medical certificates, the accused and appellant, on different dates, collected
and received from them placement fees in various amounts, viz: a) from Rogelio
Legaspi, Jr. 57,600.00; b) from Dennis Dimaano P66,520.00; c) from Evelyn
Estacio P88,520.00; d) from Soledad Atle P69,520.00 and e) from Luz Minkay
P69,520.00. As none of them was able to leave nor recover the amounts they
had paid, complainant lodged separate criminal complaints against accused
and appellant before the City Prosecutor of Manila. On November 29, 2002,
Assistant City Prosecutor Restituto Mangalindan, Jr. filed six (6) Informations
against the accused and appellant, one for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
under Article 38 (a) of the Labor Code as amended, and the rest for five (5)
counts of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information for large scale illegal recruitment reads:
Criminal Case No. 02-208371:
"The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE "BABY" ROBLES, BERNADETTE M.
MIRANDA, BETH TEMPORADA, NENITA CATACOTAN and JOJO RESCO x x x.
That in or about and during the period comprised between the months of
September 2001 and January 2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, representing themselves to have the power
and capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully for a fee,
recruit and promise employment to REGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., DENNIS T.
DIMAANO, EVELEYN V. ESTACIO, SOLEDAD B. ATTE and LUZ MINKAY
without first having secured the required license from the Department of
Labor and Employment as required by law, and charge or accept directly
or indirectly from said complainant[s] the amount of PH57,600.00,
PH66,520.00, PH88,520.00, PH69,520.00, PH69,520.00, respectively, as
placement fees in consideration for their overseas employment, which
amounts are in excess of or greater than that specified in the scheduled
of allowable fees prescribed of the POEA and without reasons and without
fault of the said complainants, failed to actually deploy them and failed
to reimburse them the expenses they incurred in connection with the
documentation and processing of their papers for purposes of their
deployment.
Contrary to law."
Except for the name of private complainant and the amount involved, the five
(5) Informations for estafa contain substantially identical averments as follows:
Criminal Case No. 02-208372:
"The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE "BABY" ROBLES, BERNADETTE M.
MIRANDA, BETH TEMPORADA, NENITA CATACOTAN and JOJO RESCO x x x.
That in or about and during the period comprised between November 23,
2001 and January 12, 2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one

another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which they made to said ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., prior
to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the effect
that they have the power and capacity to recruit and employ ROGELIO A.
LEGASPI, JR., as technician in Singapore and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet
the requirements thereof, induced and succeeded in inducing said
ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and
delivered to said accused the amount of P57,600.00 on the strength of
said manifestations and representations said accused well knowing that
the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely for the
purpose of obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the amount of
P57,600.00, which amount, once in their possession, with intend to
defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the same to their own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR. in
the aforesaid amount of P57,000.00 Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law."
The other four (4) Informations for estafa involve the following complainants
and amounts:

1. DENNIS T. DIMAANO

P66,520.00

2. EVELYN V. ESTACIO

P88,520.00

3. SOLEDAD B. ATLE

P69,520.00

4. LUZ T. MINKAY

P69,520.003

Only appellant was apprehended and brought to trial, the other accused remained at
large. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
After joint trial, on May 14, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment convicting appellant of
all the charges:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the GUILT of accused Beth
Temporada BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, judgment is hereby rendered
CONVICTING the said accused, as principal of the offenses charged and she is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment; and the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correctional as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum for the estafa committed against complainant Rogelio A. Legaspi, Jr.;
the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correctional as minimum to ten (10) years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum each for the estafas committed against complainants, Dennis
Dimaano, Soledad B. Atte and Luz T. Minkay; and the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to eleven

(11) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for the estafa
committed against Evelyn Estacio.
The accused is also ordered to pay jointly and severally the complainants actual
damages as follows:

1. Rogelio A. Legaspi Jr.

P57,600.00

2. Dennis T. Dimaano

66,520.00

3. Evelyn V. Estacio

88,520.00

4. Soledad B. Atte

66,520.00

5. Luz T. Minkay

69,520.00

SO ORDERED.4
In accordance with the Courts ruling in People v. Mateo,5 this case was referred to the
CA for intermediate review. On February 24, 2006, the CA affirmed with modification
the Decision of the RTC:
WHEREFORE, with MODIFICATION to the effect that in Criminal Cases Nos. 02208373, 02-208375, & 02-208376, appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as
maximum; and in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, she is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
medium, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal minimum, as maximum, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.6
Before this Court, appellant ascribes the lone error that the trial court gravely erred in
finding her guilty of illegal recruitment and five (5) counts of estafa despite the
insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution.
We affirm the Decision of the CA, except as to the indeterminate penalties imposed for
the five (5) counts of estafa.
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement thusly:
ART. 13. Definitions. x x x
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three (3) elements must concur: (a) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of
the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b)
of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
the said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the
same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group. 7
In the case at bar, the foregoing elements are present. Appellant, in conspiracy with
her co-accused, misrepresented to have the power, influence, authority and business
to obtain overseas employment upon payment of a placement fee which was duly
collected from complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Dennis Dimaano, Evelyn Estacio,
Soledad Atle and Luz Minkay. Further, the certification 8 issued by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and the testimony of Ann Abastra Abas,
a representative of said government agency, established that appellant and her coaccused did not possess any authority or license to recruit workers for overseas
employment. And, since there were five (5) victims, the trial court correctly found
appellant liable for illegal recruitment in large scale.
Appellant insists that she was merely an employee of ATTC and was just "echoing the
requirement of her employer." She further argues that the prosecution failed to prove
that she was aware of the latters illegal activities and that she actively participated
therein. In essence, she controverts the factual findings of the lower courts.
The contention is untenable.
An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held
liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and
consciously participated in illegal recruitment. 9 Appellant actively took part in the
illegal recruitment of private complainants. Rogelio Legaspi testified that after
introducing herself as the General Manager of ATTC, appellant persuaded him to apply
as a technician in Singapore and assured him that there was a job market therefor. In
addition to the placement fee of P35,000.00 which he paid to accused Bernadette
Miranda, he also handed the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant who, in turn, issued
him a receipt for the total amount of P45,000.00. Upon the other hand, Soledad Atle
and Luz Minkay, who applied as factory workers in Hongkong through co-accused,
Emily Salagonos, declared that it was appellant who briefed them on the requirements
for the processing of their application, and assured them and Dennis Dimaano of
immediate deployment for jobs abroad. For her part, Evelyn Estacio testified that
aside from the placement fee of P40,000.00 that she paid to co-accused "Baby"
Robles in connection with her purported overseas employment, she also gave
appellant P10,000.00 for which she was issued a receipt for the amount of P5,000.00.
The totality of the evidence, thus, established that appellant acted as an
indispensable participant and effective collaborator of her co-accused in the illegal
recruitment of complainants. As aptly found by the CA:
Without doubt, all the acts of appellant, consisting of introducing herself to
complainants as general manager of ATTC, interviewing and entertaining them,
briefing them on the requirements for deployment and assuring them that they
could leave immediately if they paid the required amounts, unerringly show
unity of purpose with those of her co-accused in their scheme to defraud
private complainants through false promises of jobs abroad. There being
conspiracy, appellant shall be equally liable for the acts of her co-accused even
if she herself did not personally reap the fruits of their execution. We quote with
approval the trial courts findings on the matter:

"xxx It is clear that said accused conspired with her co-accused

Rosemarie "Baby" Robles, Bernadette M. Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, and
Jojo Resco in convincing complainants xxx to apply for overseas jobs and
giving complainants Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay and Dennis Dimaano
guarantee that they would be hired as factory workers in Hongkong,
complainant Rogelio Legaspi, as Technician in Singapore and Evelyn
Estacio as quality controller in a factory in Hongkong, despite the fact
that the accused was not licensed to do so.
It should be noted that all the accused were connected with the
Alternative Travel and Tours Corporation (ATTC). Accused Beth Temporada
introduced herself as ATTCs General Manager. Saod accused was also
the one who received the P10,000.00 given by complainant Rogelio
Legaspi, Jr. and the P10,000.00 given by complainant Evelyn Estacio as
payment for their visa and plane ticket, respectively." 10
Consequently, the defense of appellant that she was not aware of the illegal nature of
the activities of her co-accused cannot be sustained. Besides, even assuming
arguendo that appellant was indeed unaware of the illegal nature of said activities,
the same is hardly a defense in the prosecution for illegal recruitment. Under The
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, a special law, the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale is malum prohibitum and not malum in se.11 Thus, the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary and the fact alone that the accused
violated the law warrants her conviction.12
In the instant case, we find no reason to depart from the rule that findings of fact of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are generally
accorded great respect by an appellate court. The assessment of credibility of
witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because it is in the position to observe
that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand
while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. 13 Further, there is
no showing of any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses in testifying
against appellant. Absent such improper motive, the presumption is that they were
not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full weight and credit.
Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042 prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 for the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale or by a syndicate. The trial court, therefore, properly meted
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 on the appellant.
Anent the conviction of appellant for five (5) counts of estafa, we, likewise, affirm the
same. Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Article
315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. 14 The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a
third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. 15 The same
evidence proving appellants criminal liability for illegal recruitment also established
her liability for estafa. As previously discussed, appellant together with her co-accused
defrauded complainants into believing that they had the authority and capability to
send complainants for overseas employment. Because of these assurances,
complainants parted with their hard-earned money in exchange for the promise of
future work abroad. However, the promised overseas employment never materialized
and neither were the complainants able to recover their money.
While we affirm the conviction for the five (5) counts of estafa, we find, however, that
the CA erroneously computed the indeterminate penalties therefor. The CA deviated

from the doctrine laid down in People v. Gabres;16 hence its decision should be
reversed with respect to the indeterminate penalties it imposed. The reversal of the
appellate courts Decision on this point does not, however, wholly reinstate the
indeterminate penalties imposed by the trial court because the maximum terms, as
determined by the latter, were erroneously computed and must necessarily be
rectified.
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the
amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prisin correccional maximum to prisin
mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere
within prisin correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for the
five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional since this is within
the range of prisin correccional minimum and medium.
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisin
correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1
year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the
total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. However, the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty of prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum is not
prisin mayor minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC. To compute the maximum
period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor
minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion
shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 17 of the RPC.
Following this procedure, the maximum period of prisin correccional maximum to
prisin mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. 18 The
incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court. 19
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by
P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year
shall be discarded as was done starting with the case of People v. Pabalan20 in
consonance with the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of
the accused. The doctrine enunciated in People v. Benemerito21 insofar as the fraction
of a year was utilized in computing the total incremental penalty should, thus, be
modified. In accordance with the above procedure, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentences imposed by the RTC should be as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, where the amount defrauded was P57,600.00, the
RTC sentenced the accused to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prisin correccional as minimum, to 9 years and 1 day of prisin mayor as maximum.
Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P35,600.00, 3 years shall be
added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest
maximum term, therefore, that can be validly imposed is 9 years, 8 months and 21
days of prisin mayor, and not 9 years and 1 day of prisin mayor.
In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, where the amounts
defrauded were P66,520.00, P69,520.00, and P69,520.00, respectively, the accused
was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin
correccional as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prisin mayor as maximum for
each of the aforesaid three estafa cases. Since the amounts defrauded exceed
P22,000.00 by P44,520.00, P47,520.00, and P47,520.00, respectively, 4 years shall be
added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest

maximum term, therefore, that can be validly imposed is 10 years, 8 months and 21
days of prisin mayor, and not 10 years and 1 day of prisin mayor.
Finally, in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, where the amount defrauded was P88,520.00,
the accused was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prisin correccional as minimum, to 11 years and 1 day of prisin mayor as maximum.
Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P66,520.00, 6 years shall be
added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest
maximum term, therefore, that can be validly imposed is 12 years, 8 months and 21
days of reclusin temporal, and not 11 years and 1 day of prisin mayor.
Response to the dissent.
In the computation of the indeterminate sentence for estafa under Article 315, par.
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the Court has consistently followed the
doctrine espoused in Pabalan and more fully explained in Gabres. The dissent argues
that Gabres should be reexamined and abandoned.
We sustain Gabres.
I.
The formula proposed in the Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Ruben T. Reyes, i.e., the
maximum term shall first be computed by applying the incremental penalty rule, and
thereafter the minimum term shall be determined by descending one degree down the
scale of penalties from the maximum term, is a novel but erroneous interpretation of
the ISL in relation to Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. Under this interpretation, it is
not clear how the maximum and minimum terms shall be computed. Moreover, the
legal justification therefor is not clear because the meaning of the terms "penalty,"
"prescribed penalty," "penalty actually imposed," "minimum term," "maximum term,"
"penalty next lower in degree," and "one degree down the scale of penalties" are not
properly set out and are, at times, used interchangeably, loosely and erroneously.
For purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to first clarify the meaning of certain
terms in the sense that they will be used from here on. Later, these terms shall be
aligned to what the dissent appears to be proposing in order to clearly address the
points raised by the dissent.
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies
defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is what is referred to
as the "prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 24922 of the RPC, the
prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusin temporal which ranges from 12 years and
1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for attending or
modifying circumstances which when present in the commission of a felony affects the
computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified,
is referred to as the "imposable penalty." In the case of homicide which is
committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be the prescribed penalty
in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the court chooses a single fixed
penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the "penalty actually imposed" on a
convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.
Concretely, in U.S. v. Saadlucap,23 a pre-ISL case, the accused was found guilty of
homicide with a prescribed penalty of reclusin temporal. Since there was one

ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances in this case, the

imposable penalty is reclusin temporal in its maximum period, i.e., from 17 years, 4
months and 1 day to 20 years. The court then had the discretion to impose any prison
term provided it is within said period, so that the penalty actually imposed on the
accused was set at 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusin temporal,24 which is a
single fixed penalty, with no minimum or maximum term.
With the passage of the ISL, the law created a prison term which consists of a
minimum and maximum term called the indeterminate sentence. 25 Section 1 of the ISL
provides
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x.
Thus, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the RPC. In other words, the penalty actually imposed
under the pre-ISL regime became the maximum term under the ISL regime. Upon the
other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
the prescribed penalty. To illustrate, if the case of Saadlucap was decided under the
ISL regime, then the maximum term would be 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusin temporal and the minimum term could be anywhere within the range of
prisin mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) which is the penalty next lower to
reclusin temporal. Consequently, an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prisin
mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusin temporal as
maximum could have possibly been imposed.
If we use the formula as proposed by the dissent, i.e., to compute the minimum term
based on the maximum term after the attending or modifying circumstances are
considered, the basis for computing the minimum term, under this interpretation, is
the imposable penalty26 as hereinabove defined. This interpretation is at odds with
Section 1 of the ISL which clearly states that the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense." Consequently, the basis for fixing the minimum term is the
prescribed penalty,27 and not the imposable penalty.
In People v. Gonzales,28 the Court held that the minimum term must be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense "without regard to circumstances
modifying criminal liability." 29 The Gonzales ruling that the minimum term must be
based on the prescribed penalty "without regard to circumstances modifying criminal
liability" is only a restatement of Section 1 of the ISL that the minimum term shall be
taken from within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty (and
from nowhere else).30
Further, the dissent proceeds from the erroneous premise that its so-called "regular
formula" has generally been followed in applying the ISL. To reiterate, according to the
dissent, the "regular formula" is accomplished by first determining the maximum term
after considering all the attending circumstances; thereafter, the minimum term is
arrived at by going one degree down the scale from the maximum term. As previously
discussed, this essentially means, using the terms as earlier defined, that the
minimum term shall be taken from the penalty next lower to the imposable penalty
(and not the prescribed penalty.) In more concrete terms and using the previous
example of homicide with one ordinary aggravating circumstance, this would mean

that the minimum term for homicide will no longer be based on reclusin temporal
(i.e., the prescribed penalty for homicide) but reclusin temporal in its maximum
period (i.e., the imposable penalty for homicide with one ordinary aggravating
circumstance) so much so that the minimum term shall be taken from reclusin
temporal in its medium period (and no longer from prisin mayor) because this is the
penalty next lower to reclusin temporal in its maximum period. The penalty from
which the minimum term is taken is, thus, significantly increased. From this
example, it is not difficult to discern why this interpretation radically
departs from how the ISL has generally been applied by this Court. The
dissents "regular formula" is, therefore, anything but regular.
In fine, the "regular formula" espoused by the dissent deviates from the ISL and
established jurisprudence and is, thus, tantamount to judicial legislation.
II.
There is no absurdity or injustice in fixing or "stagnating" the minimum term within
the range of prisin correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months). Preliminarily, it must be emphasized that the minimum
term taken from the aforementioned range of penalty need not be the same for every
case of estafa when the amount defrauded exceeds P12,000.00. In People v.
Ducosin,31 the Court provided some guidelines in imposing the minimum term from
the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty:
We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment period" referred to in
Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act provides that this "minimum which shall not
be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by said Code for the offense." 32 We are here upon new ground. It
is in determining the "minimum" penalty that Act No. 4103 confers upon the
courts in the fixing of penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever
had. The determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two aspects: first,
the more or less mechanical determination of the extreme limits of the
minimum imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the factors
and circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the
minimum penalty within the ascertained limits.
xxxx
We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum
penalty, namely, the considerations which should guide the court in fixing the
term or duration of the minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind the
basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation
of personal liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of the GovernorGeneral, Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to
consider the criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of
society. This opens up an almost limitless field of investigation and study which
it is the duty of the court to explore in each case as far as is humanly possible,
with the end in view that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as
is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of
protecting the social order.
Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should be
considered are: (1) His age, especially with reference to extreme youth or old
age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity
and personal habits; (4) his previous conduct, environment and mode of life

(and criminal record if any); (5) his previous education, both intellectual and
moral; (6) his proclivities and aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7)
his demeanor during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime committed;
(8) the manner and circumstances in which the crime was committed; (9) the
gravity of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts certain grave
crimes this should be kept in mind in assessing the minimum penalties for
analogous crimes).
In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first,
toward his dependents, family and associates and their relationship with him,
and second, his relationship towards society at large and the State are
important factors. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity
of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and
other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to
individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not heretofore
known in these Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the
courts can give full effect to the beneficent intention of the Legislature. 33
Admittedly, it is possible that the court, upon application of the guidelines in Ducosin,
will impose the same minimum term to one who commits an estafa involving
P13,000.00 and another involving P130 million. In fact, to a lesser degree, this is what
happened in the instant case where the trial court sentenced the accused to the same
minimum term of 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional in Criminal Case Nos.
02-208372, 02-208373, 02-208375, 02-208376, and 02-208374 where the amounts
defrauded were P57,600.00, P66,520.00, P69,520.00, P69,520.00 and P88,520.00,
respectively. However, there is no absurdity and injustice for two reasons.
One, while it is possible that the minimum term imposed by a court would be the
same, the maximum term would be greater for the convict who committed estafa
involving P130 million (which would be 20 years of reclusion temporal) than the
convict who swindled P13,000.00 (which could be anywhere from prisin correccional
maximum to prisin mayor minimum or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).34 Assuming that both convicts qualify for parole after serving the same
minimum term, the convict sentenced to a higher maximum term would carry a
greater "burden" with respect to the length of parole surveillance which he may be
placed under, and the prison term to be served in case he violates his parole as
provided for in Sections 635 and 836 of the ISL. Under Section 6, the convict shall be
placed under a period of surveillance equivalent to the remaining portion of the
maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the
Board of Pardon and Paroles. Further, the convict with the higher maximum term
would have to serve a longer period upon his re-commitment in prison in case he
violates his parole because he would have to serve the remaining portion of the
maximum term, unless the Board of Pardon and Paroles shall, in its discretion, grant a
new parole to the said convict as provided for in Section 8.
Although the differences in treatment are in the nature of potential liabilities, to this
limited extent, the ISL still preserves the greater degree of punishment in the RPC for
a convict who commits estafa involving a greater amount as compared to one who
commits estafa involving a lesser amount. Whether these differences in
treatment are sufficient in substance and gravity involves a question of
wisdom and expediency of the ISL that this Court cannot delve into.
Two, the rule which provides that the minimum term is taken from the range of the
penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty is, likewise, applicable to other offenses
punishable under the RPC. For instance, the minimum term for an accused guilty of

homicide with one generic mitigating circumstance vis--vis an accused guilty of

homicide with three ordinary aggravating circumstances would both be taken from
prisin mayor the penalty next lower to eclusion temporal. Evidently, the convict
guilty of homicide with three ordinary aggravating circumstances committed a more
perverse form of the felony. Yet it is possible that the court, after applying the
guidelines in Ducosin, will impose upon the latter the same minimum term as the
accused guilty of homicide with one generic mitigating circumstance. This reasoning
can be applied mutatis mutandis to most of the other offenses punishable under the
RPC. Should we then conclude that the ISL creates absurd results for these offenses as
well?
In fine, what is perceived as absurd and unjust is actually the intent of the
legislature to be beneficial to the convict in order to "uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness."37 By the legislatures deliberate design, the range of
penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains fixed and only the range of
penalty from which the maximum term is taken changes depending on the number
and nature of the attending circumstances. Again, the reason why the legislature
elected this mode of beneficence to a convict revolves on questions of wisdom and
expediency which this Court has no power to review. The balancing of the States
interests in deterrence and retributive justice vis--vis reformation and reintegration of
convicts to society through penal laws belongs to the exclusive domain of the
legislature.
III.
People v. Romero,38 De Carlos v. Court of Appeals,39 Salazar v. People,40 People v.
Dinglasan41 and, by analogy, People v. Dela Cruz42 do not support the formula being
proposed by the dissent.
The instant case involves a violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. 43 The penalty
for said violation is
ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisin correccional in its maximum period to prisin mayor
in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin
mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be. x x x
In contrast, Romero, De Carlos, and Salazar involved violations of Article 315 of the
RPC as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689 44 because: (1) the funds
defrauded were contributed by stockholders or solicited by corporations/associations
from the general public, (2) the amount defrauded was greater than P100,000.00, and
(3) the estafa was not committed by a syndicate. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 provides
Sec. 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed

with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative,
"samahang nayon(s)", or farmers association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty
imposable shall be reclusin temporal to reclusin perpetua if the
amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the prescribed penalty is reclusin temporal to reclusin perpetua, the minimum
terms were taken from prisin mayor, which is the penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty.45 As can be seen, these cases involved a different penalty
structure that does not make use of the incremental penalty rule due to the
amendatory law. Thus, the comparison of these cases with Gabres is improper.
Meanwhile, in Dinglasan, the felony committed was estafa through bouncing checks
which is punishable under Article 315 par. 2(d) of the RPC as amended by Republic
Act (RA) No. 488546
Sec. 1. Section Two, Paragraph (d), Article Three hundred fifteen of Act
Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and fifteen is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
"(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to
cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack
or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act."
and P.D. No. 81847
Sec. 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusin temporal if the amount of the fraud is over
12,000 pesos but not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusin
perpetua; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the prescribed penalty of prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor
minimum was increased to reclusin temporal by the amendatory law. Consequently,
the penalty next lower to reclusin temporal is prisin mayor from which the minimum

term was taken. This is the reason for the higher minimum term in this case as
compared to Gabres. In fact, Dinglasan is consistent with Gabres
Since the face value of Check No. 029021, for which appellant is criminally
liable for estafa, exceeds P22,000, the penalty abovecited must be "imposed in
its maximum period, adding 1 year for each additional P10,000." Pursuant to
People vs. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, Oct. 28, 1999, an indeterminate
sentence shall be imposed on the accused, computed favorably to him. In this
case, the indeterminate sentence should be computed based on the maximum
period of reclusin temporal as maximum, which is from 17 years, 4 months,
and 1 day to 20 years. The minimum period of the sentence should be
within the penalty next lower in degree as provided in the Revised
Penal Code, i.e., prisin mayor, which is from 6 years and 1 day to 12
years imprisonment. Considering that the excess of the fraud committed,
counting from the base of P22,000, is only P4,400, which is less than the
P10,000 stated in P.D. 818, there is no need to add one year to the maximum
penalty abovecited.48 (Emphasis supplied)
As in Gabres, the penalty next lower (i.e., prisin mayor) was determined without
considering in the meantime the effect of the amount defrauded in excess of
P22,000.00 on the prescribed penalty (i.e., reclusin temporal).
Finally, Dela Cruz involved a case for qualified theft. The prescribed penalty for
qualified theft is two degrees higher than simple theft. Incidentally, the penalty
structure for simple theft49 and estafa is similar in that both felonies (1) requires that
the prescribed penalty be imposed in its maximum period when the value of the thing
stolen or the amount defrauded, as the case may be, exceeds P22,000.00, and (2)
provides for an incremental penalty of 1 year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in
excess of P22,000.00. It should be pointed out, however, that the prescribed penalty
for simple theft is prisin mayor minimum and medium while in estafa it is lower at
prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum.
Being two degrees higher, the prescribed penalty for qualified theft is, thus, reclusin
temporal medium and maximum, while the minimum term is taken from the range of
prisin mayor maximum to reclusin temporal minimum, which is the penalty next
lower to reclusin temporal medium and maximum. The penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty is determined without first considering the amount stolen in excess
of P22,000.00 consistent with Gabres. In fact, Dela Cruz expressly cites Gabres
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty shall be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree
to that prescribed for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. Since the
penalty prescribed by law is reclusin temporal medium and maximum, the
penalty next lower would be prisin mayor in its maximum period to reclusin
temporal in its minimum period. Thus, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence shall be anywhere within ten (10) years and one (1) day to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months.
The maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which, taking into
consideration the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the Revised Penal Code. Since the amount involved in the present case
exceeds P22,000.00, this should be taken as analogous to modifying
circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full
indeterminate sentence, not in the initial determination of the
indeterminate penalty. (citing Gabres) Thus, the maximum term of the

indeterminate penalty in this case is the maximum period of reclusin temporal

medium and maximum, which ranges from eighteen (18) years, two (2)
months, and twenty one (21) days to twenty (20) years, as computed pursuant
to Article 65, in relation to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. 50 (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, none of these cases supports the Dissenting Opinions thesis that
the minimum term should be computed based on the maximum term. Quite
the contrary, Dinglasan and Dela Cruz are consistent with Gabres.
IV.
The argument that the incremental penalty rule should not be considered as
analogous to a modifying circumstance stems from the erroneous interpretation that
the "attending circumstances" mentioned in Section 1 of the ISL are limited to those
modifying circumstances falling within the scope of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC.
Section 1 of the ISL is again quoted below
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The plain terms of the ISL show that the legislature did not intend to limit "attending
circumstances" as referring to Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. If the legislature
intended that the "attending circumstances" under the ISL be limited to Articles 13
and 14, then it could have simply so stated. The wording of the law clearly permits
other modifying circumstances outside of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC to be treated
as "attending circumstances" for purposes of the application of the ISL, such as quasirecidivism under Article 16051 of the RPC. Under this provision, "any person who shall
commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to
serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony." This circumstance has
been interpreted by the Court as a special aggravating circumstance where the
penalty actually imposed is taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period
without regard to any generic mitigating circumstances. 52 Since quasi-recidivism is
considered as merely a special aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in
degree is computed based on the prescribed penalty without first considering said
special aggravating circumstance as exemplified in People v. Manalo53 and People v.
Balictar.54
The question whether the incremental penalty rule is covered within the letter and
spirit of "attending circumstances" under the ISL was answered in the affirmative by
the Court in Gabres when it ruled therein that the incremental penalty rule is
analogous to a modifying circumstance.
Article 315 of the RPC pertinently provides
ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prisin correccional in its maximum period to prisin

mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as
the case may be. x x x
Under Gabres, prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum is the
prescribed penalty55 for estafa when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00. An
amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00 is effectively considered as a special
aggravating circumstance in the sense that the penalty actually imposed shall be
taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period without regard to any
generic mitigating circumstances. Consequently, the penalty next lower in degree is
still based on the prescribed penalty without in the meantime considering the effect of
the amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00.
What is unique, however, with the afore-quoted provision is that when the amount
defrauded is P32,000.00 or more, the prescribed penalty is not only imposed in its
maximum period but there is imposed an incremental penalty of 1 year imprisonment
for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. This incremental penalty rule is a special
rule applicable to estafa and theft. In the case of estafa, the incremental penalty is
added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or to anywhere from 6 years,
8 months and 21 days to 8 years) at the discretion of the court, in order to arrive at
the penalty actually imposed (i.e., the maximum term, within the context of the ISL).
This unique characteristic of the incremental penalty rule does not pose any obstacle
to interpreting it as analogous to a modifying circumstance, and, hence, falling within
the letter and spirit of "attending circumstances" for purposes of the application of the
ISL. Under the wording of the ISL, "attending circumstances" may be reasonably
interpreted as referring to such circumstances that are applied in conjunction with
certain rules in the Code in order to determine the penalty to be actually imposed
based on the prescribed penalty of the Code for the offense. The incremental penalty
rule substantially meets this standard. The circumstance is the amount defrauded in
excess of P22,0000.00 and the incremental penalty rule is utilized to fix the penalty
actually imposed. At its core, the incremental penalty rule is merely a mathematical
formula for computing the penalty to be actually imposed using the prescribed
penalty as starting point. Thus, it serves the same function of determining the penalty
actually imposed as the modifying circumstances under Articles 13, 14, and 160 of the
RPC, although the manner by which the former accomplishes this function differs with
the latter. For this reason, the incremental penalty rule may be considered as merely
analogous to modifying circumstances. Besides, in case of doubt as to whether the
incremental penalty rule falls within the scope of "attending circumstances" under the
ISL, the doubt should be resolved in favor of inclusion because this
interpretation is more favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle
that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused.56 Thus, even if the Dissenting Opinions interpretation is gratuitously
conceded as plausible, as between Gabres and the dissents interpretation, Gabres
should be sustained since it is the interpretation more favorable to the accused.
V.

The claim that the maximum term should only be one degree away from the minimum
term does not make sense within the meaning of "degrees" under the RPC
because the minimum and maximum terms consist of single fixed penalties.
At any rate, the point seems to be that the penalty from which the minimum term is
taken should only be one degree away from the penalty from which the maximum
term is taken.
As a general rule, the application of modifying circumstances, the majority being
generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances, does not result to a
maximum term fixed beyond the prescribed penalty. At most, the maximum term is
taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Since the maximum term is
taken from the prescribed penalty and the minimum term is taken from the next lower
penalty, then, in this limited sense, the difference would naturally be only one degree.
Concretely, in the case of homicide with one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the
maximum term is taken from reclusin temporal in its maximum period which is within
the prescribed penalty of reclusin temporal, while the minimum term is taken from
prisin mayor which is the penalty next lower to reclusin temporal; hence, the onedegree difference observed by the dissent.
In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the maximum term can exceed the
prescribed penalty. Indeed, at its extreme, the maximum term can be as high as 20
years of reclusin temporal while the prescribed penalty remains at prisin
correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum, hence, the penalty next lower to
the prescribed penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains at anywhere
within prisin correccional minimum and medium, or from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months. In this sense, the incremental penalty rule deviates from the
afore-stated general rule.57
However, it is one thing to say that, generally, the penalty from which the minimum
term is taken is only one degree away from the penalty from which the maximum
term is taken, and completely another thing to claim that the penalty from which the
minimum term is taken should only be one degree away from the penalty from which
the maximum term is taken.
The one-degree difference is merely the result of a general observation from the
application of generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances in the RPC in
relation to the ISL. Nowhere does the ISL refer to the one-degree difference as an
essential requisite of an "attending circumstance." If the application of the
incremental penalty rule deviates from the one-degree difference, this only means
that the law itself has provided for an exception thereto. Verily, the one-degree
difference is a mere consequence of the generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating
circumstances created by the legislature. The difficulty of the dissent with the
deviation from its so-called one-degree difference rule seems to lie with the inability to
view these "attending circumstances" as mere artifacts or creations of the legislature.
It does not make sense to argue that the legislature cannot formulate "attending
circumstances" that operate differently than these generic mitigating and ordinary
aggravating circumstances, and that, expectedly, leads to a different result from the
one-degree differencefor it would be to say that the creator can only create one
specie of creatures. Further, it should be reasonably assumed that the legislature was
aware of these special circumstances, like the incremental penalty rule or privileged
mitigating circumstances, at the time it enacted the ISL as well as the consequent
effects of such special circumstances on the application of said law. Thus, for as long
as the incremental penalty rule is consistent with the letter and spirit of "attending
circumstances" under the ISL, there is no obstacle to its treatment as such.
VI.

Much has been said about the leniency, absurdity and unjustness of the result under
Gabres; the need to adjust the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty to make it
commensurate to the gravity of the estafa committed; the deterrence effect of a
stiffer imposition of penalties; and a host of other similar reasons to justify the
reversal of Gabres. However, all these relate to policy considerations beyond the
wording of the ISL in relation to the RPC; considerations that if given effect essentially
seek to rewrite the law in order to conform to one notion (out of an infinite number of
such notions) of wisdom and efficacy, and, ultimately, of justice and mercy.
This Court is not the proper forum for this sort of debate. The Constitution forbids it,
and the principle of separation of powers abhors it. The Court applies the law as it
finds it and not as how it thinks the law should be. Not too long ago in the case of
People v. Veneracion,58 this Court spoke about the dangers of allowing ones personal
beliefs to interfere with the duty to uphold the Rule of Law which, over a decade later,
once again assumes much relevance in this case:
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If
judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, the law becomes meaningless. A government
of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by
those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the
Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of
their own personal beliefs.59
VII.
Mr. Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna proposes an interpretation of the incremental penalty rule
based on the phrases "shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as the
case may be" and "for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code" found in the
last sentence of said rule, viz:
ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisin correccional in its maximum period to prisin
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin
mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
While this interpretation is plausible, Gabres should still be sustained because in
construing penal statutes, as between two reasonable 60 but contradictory
constructions, the one more favorable to the accused should be upheld, which in this
case is Gabres. The reason for this rule is elucidated in an eminent treatise on
statutory construction in this wise:
It is an ancient rule of statutory construction that penal statutes should be
strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to enforce

statutory penalties and in favor of the persons on whom penalties are

sought to be imposed. This simply means that words are given their ordinary
meaning and that any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in
favor of anyone subjected to a criminal statute. This canon of
interpretation has been accorded the status of a constitutional rule under
principles of due process, not subject to abrogation by statute.
The rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed has several
justifications based on a concern for the rights and freedoms of accused
individuals. Strict construction can assure fairness when courts understand it to
mean that penal statutes must give a clear and unequivocal warning, in
language people generally understand, about actions that would result in
liability and the nature of potential penalties. A number of courts have said:
the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed is a
fundamental principle which in our judgment will never be altered. Why?
Because the lawmaking body owes the duty to citizens and subjects of
making unmistakably clear those acts for the commission of which the
citizen may lose his life or liberty. Therefore, all the canons of
interpretation which apply to civil statutes apply to criminal statutes, and
in addition there exists the canon [of strict construction] . The burden
lies on the lawmakers, and inasmuch as it is within their power, it is their
duty to relieve the situation of all doubts.
xxxx
Additionally, strict construction protects the individual against arbitrary
discretion by officials and judges. As one judge noted: "the courts should be
particularly careful that the bulwarks of liberty are not overthrown, in order to
reach an offender who is, but perhaps ought not to be, sheltered behind them."
But also, for a court to enforce a penalty where the legislature has not
clearly and unequivocally prescribed it could result in judicial
usurpation of the legislative function. One court has noted that the reason
for the rule is "to guard against the creation, by judicial construction, of criminal
offenses not within the contemplation of the legislature." Thus the rule requires
that before a person can be punished his case must be plainly and
unmistakably within the statute sought to be applied. And, so, where a statute
is open to more than one interpretation, it is strictly construed against the
state. Courts further rationalize this application of the rule of strict construction
on the ground that it was not the defendant in the criminal action who caused
ambiguity in the statute. Along these same lines, courts also assert that since
the state makes the laws, they should be most strongly construed against it. 61
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in one case, where the statute was ambiguous and permitted two reasonable
interpretations, the construction which would impose a less severe penalty was
adopted.62
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED with respect to the
indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the five (5) counts of estafa, to wit:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional as
minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisin mayor as maximum.

(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, the accused
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin
correccional as minimum, to 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisin mayor
as maximum for each of the aforesaid three estafa cases.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional as
minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of reclusin temporal as
maximum.
In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180016

April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated
September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San

Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the
business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had
some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the
same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private
complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following
items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and
another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a
receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the
sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period
expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of
jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised
the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no
avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads
as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after
having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth
P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) twobaht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight
Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the
part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the
same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to
defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying
with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated
demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the
amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the
damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of
not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of
Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of
petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is
engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every
collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he
was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated

May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the
subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised
Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s
to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of
liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR
(4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS
MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in
its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy
the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner
and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004
of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional
P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the
present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND
APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS
EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE
RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE
ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT
[PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO
BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE
TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S

FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD,
OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
ALTHOUGH 1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE
INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD
AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the
following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their
admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the
designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even
more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any
showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are
so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the
opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now
comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting
in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings,
although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule.
However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the
said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by
private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to
raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and
even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a
party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered
in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective
Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the
period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date
when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private
complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the
Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the

matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on
appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money
or property received to the prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of occurrence is
not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the
wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not
make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section
6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the
case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing
rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the
fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering
that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when
the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an
essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify
the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the
said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant should have
delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by
Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant,
therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the
charges proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by
a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods
or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that
there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.8

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the
offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony,
private complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2)
months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the
same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have
been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline
came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the
items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or
full?

a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need
not even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be
used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a
mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be
tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this
kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law
is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be
necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be
interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus,
the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money
entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence
of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon
demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof, such as that
introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove
the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the
pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May
2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold.
There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those
pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of
jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the private
complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by
petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial
court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts,
which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is
even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by
the CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of
their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the
witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case,
the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes
involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the
value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code.
Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since
the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc
for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest
of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that
graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria,

Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en
banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court
finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that
the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on
the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932.
However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would
constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's
decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the
government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy.
It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which
are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court
has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a
case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the
remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the
subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is
not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief
Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The
second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is
already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as
excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the
execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the
court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed.
Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a
legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined
that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it
believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege,"
that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically
provided for by penal statute.

No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it
necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be
entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a
sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality
is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an
amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in their book,
The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that
justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with
the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties
prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or
are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly
differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases
unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of
excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be
addressed to the Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based
on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However, it
would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite
imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if
the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the
penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had
the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same,
instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to
presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject
penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature
intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those
punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in
recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of
those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum
amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to P50,000,000.00.
In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which the AntiMoney Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do
not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding
penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty
shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one
year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the

purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed
200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not
exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not
exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed
under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value
exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions
shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when
the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have
acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision
states that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the
thing stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the
same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one
degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to
maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for
pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for
probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor
in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum period
under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under
the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen
in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between
the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the
proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no
longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the
damage caused:

I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but
the penalties are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,
punished by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1
day to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00,
punished by prision correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum
(2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by
prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by
arresto mayor medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to
2 years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto
mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be
modified but the penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4
years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable
by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1
day to 2 years and 4 months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum
(4 months and 1 day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae,
is that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the
Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on
substantial distinctions as P10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is
not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who
commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however,
this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive
the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the
second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is
limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no
longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the
incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the
thing subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition
poses more questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the
appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their
inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as
unconstitutional because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than
Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty
rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1)
year, did I get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court
cannot fix the amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of TwentyTwo Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the
United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar
Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of
the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be
done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1)
Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2)
Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e.,
whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious
penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime
in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in
Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state
court of South Dakota after it took into account the latters recidivist statute and not
the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum
punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00

fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole under South Dakotas recidivist statute because of his six prior
felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the
present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable
penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a
higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the
crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon
her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the
household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the
employers loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so
repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the
commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent
on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create
serious implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed
depends on the amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation.
Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed
two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but
is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than
twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall
be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal
to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money
due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount
malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now becomes P20,000.00

and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4
months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of
embezzlement of P20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials
punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is
not generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to
15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the
case, because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his
public position to embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things
(inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of
unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief,
where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage
caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value
of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the
penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element
of force employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between
the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery
because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00
(P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with
violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the
crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor
(6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine
despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty
but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty
that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months
and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but
under the proposal, the value of the damage will now become P100,000.00 (1:100),
and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the
value of the damaged property does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor
or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than P200.00,
if the amount involved does not exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the
proposal, P200.00 will now become P20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of
P200.00 under the existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine
under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact
that the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under
Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be
grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court
decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally
feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be
affected by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a
penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the
property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real
property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or
landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor),
Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and
Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other

crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds
against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of
accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public
officer to render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect
crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation
of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting,
gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as
an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the
law, the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the
offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the
offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular
crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned
because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is
in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be
some provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no
position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by
merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present
times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is
empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and
who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the
questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the
times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised
Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court
that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the
Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to
archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic,
and cultural settings were far different from todays conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it
shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the
guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or
give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply
the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when
the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away
from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government;
otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine;
hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil
Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be
at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance
by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the
person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that
was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect.
Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the
penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay
the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to
the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that
is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain
crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some
offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the
suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a
minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not
provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be
changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified
and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages
under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that
can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish
or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in
relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil
indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as
tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being
punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment
is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply
the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation
than that which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios opinions is
that the incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that
the courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of
P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As
suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all
crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum
in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of
the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that

should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis
and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of
criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in
December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is,
arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the
death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346, 41
the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a
"cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the
Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition
of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the intervention of the
Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare
the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in
the present action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State
and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject
matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not
collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched
upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in
respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in
the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like.
Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized
by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms,
it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and
plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community."45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and
adapt it to our modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current
inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into
consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be
accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the
accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated
and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should
be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources,
and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and
surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function
clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this
conclusion, to wit:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of
Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined
utilizing all of those economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the
value to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make
the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the
view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active
duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present
controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three
years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for
inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed
conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity
of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Courts adjustment of
indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light
of current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil
Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my
Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of
being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of
the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court
should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as
elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as
a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same
cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on
the value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to
the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum,
increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be
adjusted in light of current conditions.

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the
ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as
maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of
seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v.
People48 is highly instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in
which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in
the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed,
forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the
maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional
maximum to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of
time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with
Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00,
which exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within
the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor.
Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for
every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall
the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00
ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor
minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed
penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty is 15 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the
estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty
of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers
of making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short
cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on
prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of
petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22,
2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal
Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15)
YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be
furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of
Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1
of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to
Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato
requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a
complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted
benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of

petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegallycut logs in the area. 2
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of
the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint
against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request
to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had
to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the
Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to
personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the
Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his
(Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was
instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing
down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to
proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He
handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms.
Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he
acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." 4
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa
Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left.
When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was
actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station,
Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that
petitioner be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its
evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that
the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his
registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that
no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name
of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his
conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A.
No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of
one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4)
years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties
provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but
modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum
to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence.
He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he
never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according to
him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is
also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he
only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar
Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under
C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the

prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered
name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not
considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law. 5
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a
statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be
construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. 6 The court may consider
the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 7
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was
allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the
law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related
statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and
before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of
Aliases. It provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use
any name different from the one with which he was christened or by
which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as
may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for
authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain
judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be
had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name
and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been,
obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such
authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be
recorded in the proper civil register . . . .
The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August
1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television,
radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the
use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use
any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in
the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the
first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered in the
bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have
been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose
births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have
not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within
which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority
therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial
authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure
such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias
shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name
recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an
alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or

real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The
judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien
immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and
no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real
name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil
registry.
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883,
An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names,
Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its
Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which
was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28
November 1934. 8 The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written
or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or any written or
printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or
printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name
used in connection with his business other than his true name, or keep
conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his
business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign
announcing a firm name or business name or style without first
registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or
style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of
any other person having a joint or common interest with him in such
contract, agreement, business transaction, or business . . . .
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to
curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names
and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice
almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons
could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly,
claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the
act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial
proceedings and recorded in the civil register. 9
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning,
concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when
we ruled
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau
Young" in addition to his real name "Yu Cheng Chiau" would add to more
confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert
Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its
use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by
both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a
customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he
had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government
offices which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the
grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by
simply using and sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau."
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines,
as shown by his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of
the above-mentioned court, argues the more against the grant of his
petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be

no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the
usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well
as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he
believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write
his name following the Occidental method, "he can easily file a petition
for change of name, so that in lieu of the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can,
abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau
Young."
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner
has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the
aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of
Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used
by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real
name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by
which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but
sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as
aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another
person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall
within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at
bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as
"Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have
brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while
merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which
petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an
alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was
intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use
of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he
was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified
himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get
a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could
not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to
inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not
constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he
is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias
law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances
are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A.
No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences
were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the
statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142
is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the
accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which
mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind
cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that
does not clearly penalize the act done by him.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO
URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74259

February 14, 1991

GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court dated February
27,1986, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Generoso Corpuz y Padre, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment
ranging from Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to restitute
to the provincial government of Nueva Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07 which is
the amount misappropriated, and to pay the costs of this suit. Further, the
accused is ordered to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification,
and to pay a fine equal to the amount embezzled.
SO ORDERED.
As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva
Vizcaya, the petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In
this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and
withdrawals pertaining to government accounts.
On April 13, 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and
on April 22, 1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner
and his successor. The Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in the amount of
P72,823.08.1
A letter of demand dated April 22, 1981, required the petitioner to produce the
missing amount but he was able to pay only P10,159,50. The balance was demanded
in another letter dated October 12, 1981. This was subsequently reduced by
P12,067.51 through the payment to the petitioner of temporarily disallowed cash
items and deductions from his salary before his dismissal from the service.2
On September 27, 1982, a final letter of demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07
was sent to the petitioner. The demand not having been met, an information for
malversation of the said amount was filed against him with the respondent court on
October 11, 1983.
The above facts are not denied by the petitioner. 3

He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed
to him was malversed by other persons.
His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage represented the
unliquidated withdrawal made by Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four
separate checks issued and encashed while the petitioner was on official leave of
absence. He avers he was later made to post the amount in his cash book by Acting
Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C. Aluning and he had no choice but to comply
although he had not actually received the said amount.
The four checks drawn from the Philippine National Bank and the corresponding
vouchers dated are described as follows:
1. Provincial Voucher dated December 22, 1980 from the General Fund in the
amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 956637 dated December
22,1980.
2. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in
the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. NS958525 dated
December 23,1980.
3. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the General Fund in the
amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Cheek No. 956639J dated December
22,1980.
4. Provincial Voucher dated December 29, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in
the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 958226 dated December
29,1980.
Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he had liquidated all four checks after
the amounts thereof were disbursed, turning over to the petitioner the corresponding
withdrawal vouchers, paid vouchers, and payrolls, (which were all submitted as
exhibits ). 4
He added that the petitioner was not really absent on the dates in question as alleged
but was in fact the one who prepared the said checks in the morning before attending
to the sick wife in the hospital, returning to the office in the afternoon. He said that
the payroll payments made on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980, were liquidated on
December 29, 1980, after the petitioner came back from the hospital.5
Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez corroborated Pineda's testimony that the
petitioner was not on official leave on the dates in question. He said that although
Check No. 958525 had already been encashed on December 23 1980, the
encashment was not immediately recorded in the petitioner's cashbook, "which (was)
one way of temporarily hiding the early detection of a shortage." It was only in March
1981 that the shortage was discovered and, when confronted with it, the petitioner
had no explanation to offer.6
Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on the petitioner to post the shortage in the
petitioner's cash book. He explained that after receiving the bank statement from the
PNB for December 1980, he discovered that although the amount of P50,000.00
appeared to have been already encashed, the encashment was not reflected in the
petitioner's cash book. As his superior, he required the petitioner to make the proper
entry in the cash book because the amount withdrawn was already part of the latter's
accountability. 7

After considering the evidence of the parties, the Sandiganbayan, through Justice
Amante Q. Alconcel, made the following findings:
The evidence on record is devoid of any explanation from the defense as to the
amount of P595.87. Hence, the accused must be held answerable for the
misappropriation of the said amount.
As to the amount of P50,000.00, We are not disposed to give credence to his
claim that same has not been liquidated by the paymaster, for the following
reasons:
First, Check No. 958525 is only one of four (4) checks issued and encashed for
the same purpose, and that is, to pay salary differentials as well as salaries and
wages of provincial officials and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya
covering the period, January to December, 1980. Issuance and encashment
occurred on December 23, 1980, and in fact, another check (No. 956639) was
also issued and encashed on the same day. The two (2) other checks (Nos.
956637 and 958526) were issued and encashed on December 22 and 29, 1980,
respectively. Except for Check No. 958525, which was only entered in accused's
Cash Book on March 31, 1981, or three (3) months after its issuance and
encashment, all the other three (3) were duly entered. Then Check No. 956639
which, as pointed out above, was issued and encashed on the same day as
Check No. 958525, was duly entered in his Cash Book. Non-entry of the latter
check on time was a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of its
money equivalent.
Secondly, there seems to be no logical reason why Checks Nos. 956639 and
958525, could not have been liquidated together by Diosdado Pineda who used
the proceeds to pay salary differentials of government officials and employees
of the province of Nueva Vizcaya, since these have been issued and encashed
on the same day.
Thirdly, Diosdado Pineda, who was presented as a prosecution witness, swore
that he duly liquidated the proceeds of the four (4) checks as follows:
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:
Q If the payroll is already accomplished, where do you give the payroll?
A I give it back to the cashier with the corresponding voucher to support
the vouchers paid by me or disbursed by me.
ATTY. ESCAREAL:
Q So that your cash advances will be liquidated?
A Yes, Your honor.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q In the absence of the cashier to whom do you give these documents?

A give them to the cashier only, no other person.
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO

Q In his absence, do you keep these documents?

A Yes, Your Honor.
Q For payrolls that you paid for December 22, 23 and 29, when did you
give these payrolls to the cashier?
A On December 29, sir.
ATTY. ESCAREAL:
Q Duly accomplished?
A Duly accomplished, Your Honor.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. ALCONCEL:
Q Where did you see your cashier on the 29th?
A At the office, Your Honor.
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO:
Q At what time?
A In the afternoon, sir.
ATTY. ALCONCEL:
Q Are you not aware that your cashier was absent on that date?
A He was present on that day, sir. He would go out because the wife was
supposedly having a check-up but in the afternoon, he would return.
(t.s.n., March 29, 1985, pp. 1618)
The cashier referred to by the witness is the accused, Generoso P. Corpuz.
And fourthly, We are not impressed by accused's claim that he was absent on
December 22, 23 and 29, 1980. His witness, Diosdado Pineda, declared
otherwise. His Employee's Leave Card (Exhibit J), wherein his earned leaves are
indicated, shows that during the month of December, 1980, he earned 1.25
days vacation leave and 1.25 days sick leave, which is the same number of
days vacation and sick leaves that he earned monthly from July 7, 1976 to
October 1981. Moreover, even if it were true that he was absent on December
23, 1980, the day when Check No. 958525 was issued and encashed, yet, the
other check which was issued and encashed on the same day was duly
liquidated.
The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is
no reason to disturb them, absent any of the exceptional circumstances that will
justify their review and reversal. On the contrary, the Court is convinced that the facts
as established point unmistakably to the petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.

This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that:

Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for the missing P50,000.00 is
negated by the following factors:
First. When he entered the said amount in his cash book in March, 1981, he did
not make any notation that said amount, though entered, was not actually
received.
Second. At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over (Exhibit C), he did not
make any certification that the amount of P50,000.00 should not be charged
against him.
Third. Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez misappropriated the
money, he did not file any case, whether civil, criminal or otherwise, against
either or both.
The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal
omission.1wphi1 That is not a preliminary requirement to the filing of an information
for malversation as long as the prima facie guilt of the suspect has already been
established. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer,
shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use.8 And what determines whether the crime of malversation has been
committed is the presence of the following requirements under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable.
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him
responsible for a crime he has not committed is less than convincing. His attempt to
throw the blame on others for his failure to account for the missing money only shows
it is he who is looking for a scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry"
victimized by the "untouchables" during the Marcos regime is a mere emotional
appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion that the supposed injustice on the
petitioner would be abetted by this Court unless his conviction is reversed must be
rejected as an warrant presumptuousness.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of
the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise
here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by
the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed
innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum
of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His
conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 138962

October 4, 2002

PRESCILLA TUATES and ANDRES DE LA PAZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, as Presiding Judge, Branch 96, RTC Quezon City,
People of the Philippines and I.C. Construction, Inc., respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul the following: (1) Decision dated April 30, 1999 and Resolution dated
June 9, 1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46845; 1 (2) Decision
dated September 10, 1997 and the Order dated January 28, 1998 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-70428
and Q-97-70429;2 and (3) Decision dated December 16, 1996 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 38) in Criminal Cases Nos. 38-0130 and 38-0131. 3
The facts are as follows:
Convicted by the MTC-Quezon City (Branch 38) of the crime of Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law, petitioners Prescilla Tuates and Andres de
la Paz, appealed to the RTC of Quezon City (Branch 96). Their conviction was affirmed

in toto by the RTC in its decision dated September 10, 1997. Pending resolution of
their motion for reconsideration, however, Republic Act No. 8368, "An Act Repealing
Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts"
was enacted.
In its Order, dated January 28, 1998, the RTC ruled that only petitioners criminal
convictions were extinguished by R.A. 8368, and the civil aspect, i.e., the removal of
petitioners illegally constructed house and improvements, shall remain executory
against them.4
On a petition for review, the Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC and
denied due course to the petition per its Decision, dated April 30, 1999. 5 Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its Resolution dated June
9, 1999.6
Hence, the present recourse taken by petitioners, raising the following issues:
"1. That petitioners, being charged with Violation of Presidential Decree No.
772, the express repeal of said decree absolves the petitioners of any criminal
or civil liability;
"2. That public respondent erred in holding that the civil aspect of the
judgment rendered x x x shall be executory against the accused; and
"3. That the Honorable Court of Appeals, in affirming the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96), dated June 9, 1999, grossly erred in
ignoring applicable laws and jurisprudence." 7
Petitioners argue that the repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 carries with it the extinction
of both the criminal and civil aspects of the crime. Private respondent, however,
insists that public respondents were correct in ruling that only the criminal liability was
absolved and the civil liability remains inasmuch as it was not extinguished in
accordance with Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
"ART. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. -- Except in case of extinction of his civil
liability as provided in the next preceding article, the offender shall continue to be
obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him,
notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of
liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of
amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason."
In its Motion to Deny Due Course, private respondent also argues that the petition
should now be denied as its title to the land subject of this case has already been
adjudged in its favor. 8
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondents,
agrees with petitioners that both the criminal and civil liability were rendered extinct
with the repeal of P.D. 772, and recommended that the assailed issuances be reversed
and set aside.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
Republic Act No. 8368, otherwise known as the "Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of
1997," provides:

"SECTION 1. Title. -- This Act shall be known as the Anti-Squatting Law Repeal
Act of 1997.
"SEC. 2. Repeal. -- Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled Penalizing Squatting
and Other Similar Acts is hereby repealed.
"SEC. 3. Effect on Pending Cases. -- All pending cases under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.
"SEC. 4. Effect on Republic Act No. 7279. -- Nothing herein shall be construed to
nullify, eliminate or diminish in any way Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7279 or
any of its provisions relative to sanctions against professional squatters and
squatting syndicates.
"SEC. 5. Effectivity. -- This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its
publication in two (2) newspapers of national circulation.
"Approved, October 27, 1997."9
The repeal of P.D. No. 772 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8368 is explicit, categorical,
definite and absolute. As such, the act that was penalized by P.D. 772, i.e., squatting,
ceases to be criminal under R.A. 8368, and the previous offense is obliterated. 10
In the same vein, the absolute repeal of P.D. 772 has the effect of depriving a court of
its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal.
This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of
rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no
longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. 11 Specially so, as
in the present case where it is unconditionally stated in Section 3 of R.A. No. 8368
that: "(A)ll pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be
dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act." 12 Obviously, it was the clear intent of the
law to decriminalize or do away with the crime of squatting. Hence, there being no
criminal liability, there is likewise no civil liability because the latter is rooted in the
former. Where an act or omission is not a crime, no person can be held liable for such
act or omission. There being no delict, logically, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question. 13
In fact, in People v. Leachon, Jr. 14 we implicitly recognized the unconditional repeal of
P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 when we ordered the dismissal of the petition filed in said case,
without any qualification whatsoever, because of the enactment of R.A. 8368, viz.:
"But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding, the petition
cannot now prosper because on October 27, 1997, Republic Act No. 8368, entitled An
Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772 Entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other
Similar Acts was "enacted. Section 3 of the said Act provides that all pending cases
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the
effectivity of this Act."15
This is not to say, however, that people now have the unbridled license to illegally
occupy lands they do not own. R.A. No. 8368 16 was unanimously approved by the
members of the Senate of the Philippines present on its third reading. 17 The legislature
considered it a major piece of legislation on the countrys anti-poverty program 18 as it
sought to confront the perennial problem of poverty at its root, abolish an otherwise
inutile and oppressive law, and pave the way for a genuine urban housing and land
reform program. Senate records reveal that it is the manifest intent of the authors of

R.A. 8368 to decriminalize squatting but does not encourage or protect acts of
squatting on somebody elses land. 19 The law is not intended to compromise the
property rights of legitimate landowners. 20 Recourse may be had in cases of violation
of their property rights, such as those provided for in Republic Act No. 7279 or the
Urban Development and Housing Act, penalizing professional squatters and squatting
syndicates as defined therein, who commit nefarious and illegal activities 21; the
Revised Penal Code providing for criminal prosecution in cases of Trespass to
Property,22 Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property, 23 and
similar violations, and, cases for Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer under the Rules
of Court,24 as well as civil liability for Damages under the Civil Code.
Considering that prosecution for criminal as well as civil liability under P.D. 772 has
been rendered nugatory with the passage of R.A. 8368, both criminal and civil aspects
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-70428 and Q-97-70429 in the RTC as well as Criminal
Cases Nos. 38-0130 and 38-0131 in the MTC filed against petitioners should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition for review to be with merit, the Decision dated April
30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46845, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered modifying the Decision dated September
10, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in Criminal Cases No.
Q-97-70428 and Q-97-70429 and the Decision dated December 16, 1996 issued by
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 38), to the effect that the dismissal
of the aforementioned criminal cases likewise include the dismissal of the civil aspects
thereof, without prejudice to the filing of civil and/or criminal actions under the
prevailing laws.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125359 September 4, 2001

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision rendered on May 23, 1996, by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35719. CA-G.R. SP No.
35928 had affirmed the order dated September 6, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, Branch 26, insofar as it denied petitioners respective Motions to Quash the
Informations in twenty-five (25) criminal cases for violation of Central Bank Circular
No. 960. Therein included were informations involving: (a) consolidated Criminal Cases
Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883 filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Roberto S.
Benedicto, and Hector T. Rivera; (b) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to
91-101892 filed against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto; and (c) Criminal Cases Nos. 92101959 to 92-101969 also against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto. Note, however, that the
Court of Appeals already dismissed Criminal Case No. 91-101884.
The factual antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were
indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1 relation to Section 342 of the
Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign
exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said
Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange
accounts abroad without prior authorization from the Central Bank. 3 It also required all
residents of the Philippines who habitually earned or received foreign currencies from
invisibles, either locally or abroad, to report such earnings or receipts to the Central
Bank. Violations of the Circular were punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34
of the Central Bank Act.
That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with
the same offense, but involving different accounts, were filed with the Manila RTC,
which docketed these as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. The
accusatory portion of the charge sheet in Criminal Case No. 91-101888 reads:
That from September 1, 1983 up to 1987, both dates inclusive, and for
sometime thereafter, both accused, conspiring and confederating with each
other and with the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residents of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to submit reports in the prescribed
form and/or register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank
within 90 days from October 21, 1983 as required of them being residents
habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or receiving foreign exchange from
whatever source or from invisibles locally or from abroad, despite the fact they
actually earned interests regularly every six (6) months for the first two years
and then quarterly thereafter for their investment of $50-million, later reduced
to $25-million in December 1985, in Philippine-issued dollar denominated
treasury notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the name of Bank
Hofmann, AG, Zuring, Switzerland, for the benefit of Avertina Foundation, their
front organization established for economic advancement purposes with secret
foreign exchange account Category (Rubric) C.A.R. No. 211925-02 in Swiss
Credit Bank (also known as SKA) in Zurich, Switzerland, which earned, acquired
or received for the accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her late husband an

interest of $2,267,892 as of December 16, 1985 which was remitted to Bank

Hofmann, AG, through Citibank, New York, United States of America, for the
credit of said Avertina account on December 19, 1985, aside from the
redemption of $25 million (one-half of the original $50-M) as of December 16,
1985 and outwardly remitted from the Philippines in the amounts of
$7,495,297.49 and $17,489,062.50 on December 18, 1985 for further
investment outside the Philippine without first complying with the Central Bank
reporting/registering requirements.1wphi1.nt
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The other charge sheets were similarly worded except the days of the commission of
the offenses, the name(s) of the alleged dummy or dummies, the amounts in the
foreign exchange accounts maintained, and the names of the foreign banks where
such accounts were held by the accused.
On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of
the same offense, again in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same
court, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. The Informations
were similarly worded as the earlier indictments, save for the details as to the dates of
the violations of Circular No. 960, the identities of the dummies used, the balances
and sources of the earnings, and the names of the foreign banks where these
accounts were maintained.
All of the aforementioned criminal cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the
said trial court.
On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 were filed, the
Central Bank issued Circular No. 13185 which revised the rules governing non-trade
foreign exchange transactions. It took effect on January 20, 1992.
On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank, pursuant to the governments policy of further
liberalizing foreign exchange transactions, came out with Circular No. 1356, 6 which
amended Circular No. 1318. Circular No. 1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central
Bank approval for foreign exchange-funded expenditures obtained from the banking
system.
Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a saving clause, excepting
from their coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of Circular No. 960
and, in the case of Circular No. 1353, violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular
No. 1318.
On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to
return to the Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges
instituted against them, including the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in
the latter cases.
On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both pleaded
not guilty to the charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had
earlier entered a similar plea during her arraignment for the same offense on February
12, 1992.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against
them in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892, and
91-101959 to 91-101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum

shopping, extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960,
prescription, exemption from the Central Banks reporting requirement, and the grant
of absolute immunity as a result of a compromise agreement entered into with the
government.
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion. A similar motion
filed on May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases
against her due to the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the trial
court in its order dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18, 1994.
On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration. The trial court, in its order of November 23, 1994, denied petitioners
motion and set the consolidated cases for trial on January 5, 1995.
Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition, with similar prayers for temporary
restraining orders and/or writs of preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
35719 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35928, were respectively filed by Mrs. Marcos and
petitioners with the Court of Appeals. Finding that both cases involved violations of
Central Bank Circular No. 960, the appellate court consolidated the two cases.
On May 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals disposed of the consolidated cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Judge in denying petitioners respective Motions to Quash, except that with
respect to Criminal Case No. 91-101884, the instant petitions are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as
it denied the Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 91-101884 is hereby nullified
and set aside, and said case is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.7
Dissatisfied with the said decision of the court a quo, except with respect to the
portion ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 91-101884, petitioners filed the
instant petition, attributing the following errors to the appellate court:
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INFORMATIONS/CASES
FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE QUASHABLE BASED ON THE
FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
(A) LACK OF JURISDICTION/FORUM SHOPPING/NO VALID PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
(B) EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1) REPEAL OF CB CIRCULAR NO. 960 BY CB CIRCULAR NO. 153;
2) REPEAL OF R.A. 265 BY R.A. 76538
(C) PRESCRIPTION
(D) EXEMPTION FROM CB REPORTING REQUIREMENT
GRANT OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.9

Simply stated, the issues for our resolution are:

(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to Quash for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, forum shopping by the prosecution,
and absence of a valid preliminary investigation?
(2) Did the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by
Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the
criminal liability of petitioners?
(3) Had the criminal cases in violation of Circular No. 960 already prescribed?
(4) Were petitioners exempted from the application and coverage of Circular No.
960?
(5) Were petitioners alleged violations of Circular No. 960 covered by the
absolute immunity granted in the Compromise Agreement of November 3,
1990?
On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. They
aver that the dollar-salting charges filed against them were violations of the Anti-Graft
Law or Republic Act No. 3019, and the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over their cases.
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined
by the law in force at the time the action is instituted. 10 The 25 cases were filed in
1991-92. The applicable law on jurisdiction then was Presidential Decree 1601. 11
Under P.D. No. 1606, offenses punishable by imprisonment of not more than six years
fall within the jurisdiction of the regular trial courts, not the Sandiganbayan. 12
In the instant case, all the Informations are for violations of Circular No. 960 in relation
to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act and not, as petitioners insist, for transgressions
of Republic Act No. 3019. Pursuant to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, violations of
Circular No. 960 are punishable by imprisonment of not more than five years and a
fine of not more than P20,000.00. Since under P.D. No. 1606 the Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction to try criminal cases where the imposable penalty is less than six years
of imprisonment, the cases against petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960 are,
therefore cognizable by the trial court. No error may thus be charged to the Court of
Appeals when it held that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to hear and try the dollarsalting cases.
Still on the first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the cases for
violations of Circular No. 960 before the RTC of Manila Constitutes forum shopping.
Petitioners argue that the prosecution, in an attempt to seek a favorable verdict from
more than one tribunal, filed separate cases involving virtually the same offenses
before the regular trial courts and the Sandiganbayan. They fault the prosecution with
splitting the cases. Petitioners maintain that while the RTC cases refer only to the
failure to report interest earnings on Treasury Notes, the Sandiganbayan cases seek to
penalize the act of receiving the same interest earnings on Treasury Notes in violation
of the Anti-Graft Laws provisions on prohibited transactions. Petitioners aver that the
violation of Circular No. 960 is but an element of the offense of prohibited transactions
punished under Republic Act No. 3019 and should, thus, be deemed absorbed by the
prohibited transactions cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.

For the charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action
pending in one court and another action pending in one court and another action
before another court: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. 13
Here, we find that the single act of receiving unreported interest earnings on Treasury
Notes held abroad constitutes an offense against two or more distinct and unrelated
laws, Circular No. 960 and R.A. 3019. Said laws define distinct offenses, penalize
different acts, and can be applied independently. 14 Hence, no fault lies at the
prosecutions door for having instituted separate cases before separate tribunals
involving the same subject matter.
With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings violate Circular No.
960 in relation to Republic Act No. 265 because the same was unreported to the
Central Bank. The act to be penalized here is the failure to report the interest earnings
from the foreign exchange accounts to the proper authority. As to the anti-graft cases
before the Sandiganbayan involving the same interest earnings from the same foreign
exchange accounts, the receipt of the interest earnings transgresses Republic Act No.
3019 because the act of receiving such interest is a prohibited transaction prejudicial
to the government. What the State seeks to punish in these anti-graft cases is the
prohibited receipt of the interest earnings. In sum, there is no identity of offenses
charged, and prosecution under one law is not an obstacle to a prosecution under the
other law. There is no forum shopping.
Finally, on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation by the
Department of Justice was invalid and in violation of their rights to due process.
Petitioners argue that governments ban on their travel effectively prevented them
from returning home and personally appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Benedicto and Rivera further point out that the joint preliminary investigation by the
Department of Justice, resulted to the charges in one set of cases before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set before the RTC
for violation of Circular No. 960.
Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the
Constitution.15 It is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof. 16 Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is
personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived, either expressly
or by implication.17 The waiver extends to any irregularity in the preliminary
investigation, where one was conducted.
The petition in the present case contains the following admissions:
1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993 on the
condition that he face the criminal charges pending in courts, petitionerappellant Benedicto, joined by his co-petitioner Rivera, lost no time in attending
to the pending criminal charges by posting bail in the above-mentioned cases.
2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the preliminary
investigation because of their forced absence from the Philippines then,
petitioners-appellants invoked their right to due process thru motions for
preliminary investigation Upon denial of their demands for preliminary
investigation, the petitioners intended to elevate the matter to the Honorable
Court of Appeals and actually caused the filing of a petition for

certiorari/prohibition sometime before their arraignment but immediately

caused the withdrawal thereof in view of the prosecutions willingness to go
to pre-trial wherein petitioner would be allowed access to the records of
preliminary investigation which they could use for purposes of filing a motion to
quash if warranted.
3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department of Justice
respondent Judge set the case for pre-trial in order to afford all the accused
access to the records of prosecution
xxx
5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-appellants
Benedicto and Rivera moved for the quashing of the informations/cases 18
The foregoing admissions lead us to conclude that petitioners have expressly waived
their right to question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary investigation or to
ask for a new preliminary investigation. Petitioners, in the above excerpts from this
petition, admit posting bail immediately following their return to the country, entered
their respective pleas to the charges, and filed various motions and pleadings. By so
doing, without simultaneously demanding a proper preliminary investigation, they
have waived any and all irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. 19
The trial court did not err in denying the motion to quash the informations on the
ground of want of or improperly conducted preliminary investigation. The absence of a
preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the information. 20
On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted for acts
punishable under laws that have already been repealed. They point to the express
repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 by Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 as well as the
express repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653. Petitioners, relying
on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,21 contend that repeal has the effect of
extinguishing the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed under the old
laws.22
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its
authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. 23
This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of
rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no
longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. There are,
however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in the
repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending
actions.24 Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute
and punishes the act previously penalized under the old law. In such instance, the act
committed before the reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute books
and pending cases are not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be
imposed is more favorable to the accused. 25
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960,
Circular No. 1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving
earnings or profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions. 26 Second, even the
most cursory glance at the repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows
that both contain a saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal of Circular No.
960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation of the latter Circular. 27 A
saving clause operates to except from the effect of the repealing law what would
otherwise be lost under the new law. 28 In the present case, the respective saving
clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve the right

of the State to prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the repealed Circular
No. 960, where the cases are either pending or under investigation.
Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265, particularly
Section 34,29 by Republic Act No. 7653, removed the applicability of any special
sanction for violations of any non-trade foreign exchange transactions previously
penalized by Circular No. 960. Petitioners posit that a comparison of the two
provisions shows that Section 36 30 of Republic Act No. 7653 neither retained nor
reinstated Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265. Since, in creating the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, Congress did not include in its charter a clause providing for the
application of Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 to pending cases, petitioners
pending dollar-salting cases are now bereft of statutory penalty, the saving clause in
Circular No. 1353 notwithstanding. In other words, absent a provision in Republic Act
No. 7653 expressly reviving the applicability of any penal sanction for the repealed
mandatory foreign exchange reporting regulations formerly required under Circular
No. 960, violations of aforesaid repealed Circular can no longer be prosecuted
criminally.
A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko Sentrals charter
repealing the former show that in consonance with the general objective of the old law
and the new law "to maintain internal and external monetary stability in the
Philippines and preserve the international value of the peso," 31 both the repealed law
and the repealing statute contain a penal cause which sought to penalize in general,
violations of the law as well as orders, instructions, rules, or regulations issued by the
Monetary Board. In the case of the Bangko Sentral, the scope of the penal clause was
expanded to include violations of "other pertinent banking laws enforced or
implemented by the Bangko Sentral." In the instant case, the acts of petitioners
sought to be penalized are violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary
Board. These acts are proscribed and penalized in the penal clause of the repealed law
and this proviso for proscription and penalty was reenacted in the repealing law. We
find, therefore, that while Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 was repealed, it was
nonetheless, simultaneously reenacted in Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653. Where
a clause or provision or a statute for the matter is simultaneously repealed and
reenacted, there is no effect, upon the rights and liabilities which have accrued under
the original statute, since the reenactment, in effect "neutralizes" the repeal and
continues the law in force without interruption. 32 The rule applies to penal laws and
statutes with penal provisions. Thus, the repeal of a penal law or provision, under
which a person is charged with violation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment
penalizing the same act done by him under the old law, will neither preclude the
accuseds prosecution nor deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear and try his
case.33 As pointed out earlier, the act penalized before the reenactment continues to
remain an offense and pending cases are unaffected. Therefore, the repeal of Republic
Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653 did not extinguish the criminal liability of
petitioners for transgressions of Circular No. 960 and cannot, under the circumstances
of this case, be made a basis for quashing the indictments against petitioners.
Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in reenacting
Section 34 of the old Central Act, increased the penalty for violations of rules and
regulations issued by the Monetary Board. They claim that such increase in the
penalty would give Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto application, violating the
Bill of Rights.34
Is Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 and ex post facto legislation?
An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage
of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2)

aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (3) changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less
or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6)
deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.35
The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution
is: Does the law sought to be applied retroactively take "from an accused any right
that was regarded at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the
protection of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of
the offense charged against him."36
The crucial words in the test are "vital for the protection of life and liberty." 37 We find,
however, the test inapplicable to the penal clause of Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws
and laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining
offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively. 38 Penal
laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the
accused.39 Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular Section 36, is there any
indication that the increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate
retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest earnings subject
of the criminal cases instituted against them were remitted to foreign banks on
various dates between 1983 to 1987. They maintain that given the considerable lapse
of time from the dates of the commission of the offenses to the institution of the
criminal actions in 1991 and 1992, the States right to prosecute them for said
offenses has already prescribed. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in
computing the prescriptive period from February 1986. Petitioners theorize that since
the remittances were made through the Central Bank as a regulatory authority, the
dates of the alleged violations are known, and prescription should thus be counted
from these dates.
In ruling that the dollar-salting cases against petitioners have not yet prescribed, the
court a quo quoted with approval the trial courts finding that:
[T]he alleged violations of law were discovered only after the EDSA Revolution
in 1986 when the dictatorship was toppled down. The date of the discovery of
the offense, therefore, should be the basis in computing the prescriptive period.
Since (the) offenses charged are punishable by imprisonment of not more than
five (5) years, they prescribe in eight (8) years. Thus, only a little more than
four (4) years had elapsed from the date of discovery in 1986 when the cases
were filed in 1991.40
The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by Section 34 of Republic
Act No. 265 "by a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and by
imprisonment of not more than five years." Pursuant to Act No. 3326, which mandates
the periods of prescription for violations of special laws, the prescriptive period for
violations of Circular No. 960 is eight (8) years. 41 The period shall commence "to run
from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment."42 In the instant case, the indictments against
petitioners charged them with having conspired with the late President Ferdinand E.

Marcos in transgressing Circular No. 960. Petitioners contention that the dates of the
commission of the alleged violations were known and prescription should be counted
from these dates must be viewed in the context of the political realities then
prevailing. Petitioners, as close associates of Mrs. Marcos, were not only protected
from investigation by their influence and connections, but also by the power and
authority of a Chief Executive exercising strong-arm rule. This Court has taken judicial
notice of the fact that Mr. Marcos, his family, relations, and close associates "resorted
to all sorts of clever schemes and manipulations to disguise and hide their illicit
acquisitions."43 In the instant case, prescription cannot, therefore, be made to run
from the dates of the commission of those offenses were not known as of those dates.
It was only after the EDSA Revolution of February, 1986, that the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth became a highly prioritized state policy, 44 pursuant to the explicit command of
the Provisional Constitution.45 To ascertain the relevant facts to recover "ill-gotten
properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the (Marcos) regime" 46 various
government agencies were tasked by the Aquino administration to investigate, and as
the evidence on hand may reveal, file and prosecute the proper cases. Applying the
presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed", 47 we are more inclined
to believe that the violations for which petitioners are charged were discovered only
during the post-February 1986 investigations and the tolling of the prescriptive period
should be counted from the dates of discovery of their commission. The criminal
actions against petitioners, which gave rise to the instant case, were filed in 1991 and
1992, or well within the eight-year prescriptive period counted from February 1986.
The fourth issue involves petitioners claim that they incurred no criminal liability for
violations of Circular No. 960 since they were exempted from its coverage.
Petitioners postulate that since the purchases of treasury notes were done through the
Central Banks Securities Servicing Department and payments of the interest were
coursed through its Securities Servicing Department/Foreign Exchange Department,
their filing of reports would be surplusage, since the requisite information were
already with the Central Bank. Furthermore, they contend that the foreign currency
investment accounts in the Swiss banks were subject to absolute confidentiality as
provided for by Republic Act No. 6426, 48 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos.
1035, 1246, and 1453, and fell outside the ambit of the reporting requirements
imposed by Circular No. 960. Petitioners further rely on the exemption from reporting
provided for in Section 10(q), 49 Circular No. 960, and the confidentiality granted to
Swiss bank accounts by the laws of Switzerland.
Petitioners correctly point out that Section 10(q) of Circular No. 960 exempts from the
reporting requirement foreign currency eligible for deposit under the Philippine
Foreign Exchange Currency Deposit System, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended. But, in order to avail of the aforesaid exemption, petitioners must show that
they fall within its scope. Petitioners must satisfy the requirements for eligibility
imposed by Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426. 50 Not only do we find the record bare of
any proof to support petitioners claim of falling within the coverage of Republic Act
No. 6426, we likewise find from a reading of Section 2 of the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act that said law is inapplicable to the foreign currency accounts in question. Section
2, Republic Act No. 6426 speaks of "deposit with such Philippine banks in good
standing, as maybe designated by the Central Bank for the purpose." 51 The criminal
cases filed against petitioners for violation of Circular No. 960 involve foreign currency
accounts maintained in foreign banks, not Philippine banks. By invoking the
confidentiality guarantees provided for by Swiss banking laws, petitioners admit such
reports made. The rule is that exceptions are strictly construed and apply only so far
as their language fairly warrants, with all doubts being resolved in favor of the general
proviso rather than the exception.52 Hence, petitioners may not claim exemption
under Section 10(q).

With respect to the banking laws of Switzerland cited by petitioners, the rule is that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 53 Laws of foreign
jurisdictions must be alleged and proved. 54 Petitioners failed to prove the Swiss law
relied upon, either by: (1) an official publication thereof; or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied by a
certification from the secretary of the Philippine embassy or legation in such country
or by the Philippine consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent stationed in
such country, or by any other authorized officer in the Philippine foreign service
assigned to said country that such officer has custody. 55 Absent such evidence, this
Court cannot take judicial cognizance of the foreign law invoked by Benedicto and
Rivera.
Anent the fifth issue, petitioners insist that the government granted them absolute
immunity under the Compromise Agreement they entered into with the government
on November 3, 1990. Petitioners cite our decision in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 226
SCRA 314 (1993), upholding the validity of the said Agreement and directing the
various government agencies to be consistent with it. Benedicto and Rivera now insist
that the absolute immunity from criminal investigation or prosecution granted to
petitioner Benedicto, his family, as well as to officers and employees of firms owned or
controlled by Benedicto under the aforesaid Agreement covers the suits filed for
violations of Circular No. 960, which gave rise to the present case.
The pertinent provisions of the Compromise Agreement read:
WHEREAS, this Compromise Agreement covers the remaining claims and the
cases of the Philippine Government against Roberto S. Benedicto including his
associates and nominees, namely, Julita C. Benedicto, Hector T. Rivera, x x x
WHEREAS, specifically these claims are the subject matter of the following
cases (stress supplied):
1. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 9
2. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 24
3. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34
4. Tanodbayan (Phil-Asia)
5. PCGG I.S. No. 1.
xxx
WHEREAS, following the termination of the United States and Swiss cases, and
also without admitting the merits of their respective claims and counterclaims
presently involved in uncertain, protracted and expensive litigation, the
Republic of the Philippines, solely motivated by the desire for the immediate
accomplishment of its recovery mission and Mr. Benedicto being interested to
lead a peaceful and normal pursuit of his endeavors, the parties have decided
to withdraw and/or dismiss their mutual claims and counterclaims under the
cases pending in the Philippines, earlier referred to (underscoring supplied);
xxx

II. Lifting of Sequestrations, Extension of Absolute Immunity and Recognition of

the Freedom to Travel
a) The Government hereby lifts the sequestrations over the assets listed in
Annex "C" hereof, the same being within the capacity of Mr. Benedicto to
acquire from the exercise of his profession and conduct of business, as well as
all the haciendas listed in his name in Negro Occidental, all of which were
inherited by him or acquired with income from his inheritanceand all the other
sequestered assets that belong to Benedicto and his corporation/nominees
which are not listed in Annex "A" as ceded or to be ceded to the Government.
Provided, however, (that) any asset(s) not otherwise settled or covered by this
Compromise Agreement, hereinafter found and clearly established with finality
by proper competent court as being held by Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto in trust for
the family of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, shall be returned or surrendered to
the Government for appropriate custody and disposition.
b) The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized under the
pertinent provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, to Benedicto,
the members of his family, officers and employees of his corporations above
mentioned, who are included in past, present and future cases and
investigations of the Philippine Government, such that there shall be no
criminal investigation or prosecution against said persons for acts (or)
omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986, that may be alleged to have
violated any laws, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation
to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned or included in this
Agreement.lawphil.net
x x x56
In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the parties by looking
at the words employed to project their intention. In the instant case, the parties
clearly listed and limited the applicability of the Compromise Agreement to the cases
listed or identified therein. We have ruled in another case involving the same
Compromise Agreement that:
[T]he subject matters of the disputed compromise agreement are
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0009, Civil Case No. 00234, Civil Case No. 0034,
the Phil-Asia case before the Tanodbayan and PCGG I.S. No. 1. The cases arose
from complaints for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, members of his family,
and alleged cronies, one of whom was respondent Roberto S. Benedicto. 57
Nowhere is there a mention of the criminal cases filed against petitioners for violations
of Circular No. 960. Conformably with Article 1370 of the Civil Code, 58 the Agreement
relied upon by petitioners should include only cases specifically mentioned therein.
Applying the parol evidence rule,59 where the parties have reduced their agreement
into writing, the contents of the writing constitute the sole repository of the terms of
the agreement between the parties. 60 Whatever is not found in the text of the
Agreement should thus be construed as waived and abandoned. 61 Scrutiny of the
Compromise Agreement will reveal that it does not include all cases filed by the
government against Benedicto, his family, and associates.
Additionally, the immunity covers only "criminal investigation or prosecution against
said persons for acts (or) omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be
alleged to have violated any penal laws, including but not limited to Republic Act No.

3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned, or included in this
Agreement."62 It is only when the criminal investigation or case involves the
acquisition of any ill-gotten wealth "treated mentioned, or included in this
Agreement"63 that petitioners may invoke immunity. The record is bereft of any
showing that the interest earnings from foreign exchange deposits in banks abroad,
which is the subject matter of the present case, are "treated, mentioned, or included"
in the Compromise Agreement. The phraseology of the grant of absolute immunity in
the Agreement precludes us from applying the same to the criminal charges faced by
petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960. A contract cannot be construed to include
matters distinct from those with respect to which the parties intended to contract. 64
In sum, we find that no reversible error of law may be attributed to the Court of
Appeals in upholding the orders of the trial court denying petitioners Motion to Quash
the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 91101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969. In our view, none of the grounds provided for
in the Rules of Court65 upon which petitioners rely, finds applications in this case.
On final matter. During the pendency of this petition, counsel for petitioner Roberto S.
Benedicto gave formal notice to the Court that said petitioner died on May 15, 2000.
The death of an accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. 66
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed consolidated Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA G.R. SP
No. 35719, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the charges against deceased
petitioner, Roberto S. Benedicto, particularly in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969, pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are ordered dropped and that any criminal
as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in the aforesaid
cases are declared extinguished by reason of his death on May 15, 2000.lawphil.net
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 166401

October 30, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO BON, appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the Court should
affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and
two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces. On that score,
we affirm. As a consequence though, we are ultimately impelled to confront a
question much broader in both scope and import. While the Court had
previously declined to acknowledge the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty through the 1987 Constitution, 1 we now find it necessary to determine
whether the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 resulted in the statutory interdiction
of the death penalty.
The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum term of
reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed on appellant by the Court of Appeals for
the two counts of attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court
prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the
death penalty in the Philippines. The proximate concern as to appellant is whether his
penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should be two
degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape, should be computed from
death or reclusion perpetua.
First, the antecedent facts.
I.
Eight (8) Informations2 were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23
February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against
appellant, charging him with the rape of AAA 3 and BBB,4 the daughters of his older
brother. Appellant was accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G,
6906-G, and 6908-G; while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689G, 6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-G.5 All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes

were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of six (6)
years.
Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as
the man who had raped them. During trial, their respective birth certificates and the
medical certificates executed by the doctor who physically examined them were
entered as documentary evidence.
AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994
in the house appellant had shared with her grandmother. 6 She recounted that the
incident took place when she and appellant were alone in the house. Appellant
touched her thighs and vagina, removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Appellant threatened that she and her parents would be killed should she
disclose the incident to anyone. She thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her
grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in 1997, that she slept in the said
house, yet again she was sexually abused by appellant. She was then nine (9) years
old.7
AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the
third time, again at the house of her grandmother. 8 The following year, when she was
twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth time by appellant. This time, she was raped
in an outdoor clearing9 after having been invited there by appellant to get some
vegetables. While at the clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy spot
and tried to insert his penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant allegedly
stopped.10
It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother, CCC, 11 the
brutish acts appellant had done to her. 12 Her mother thus filed a complaint against her
uncle. AAA identified appellant in open court and presented as documentary evidence
her birth certificate to prove that she was born on 3 September 1988. 13
BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant in 1997 when
she was ten (10) years old, also at the house appellant shared with her grandmother.
While alone in the house, appellant poked a knife at her, removed her clothes and
inserted his penis in her vagina. Despite the pain she felt, she could not resist
appellant as he was holding a knife. She did not report the rape to her parents out of
fear of appellant's threat that he would kill her. 14 BBB further testified that in 1998 and
1999, she was raped again by appellant on several occasions, the rapes occurring
under threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of the time of day. 15
BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000. 16 On that night,
she was sleeping beside her sister AAA in the house of her grandmother when she felt
appellant touching her body. She pushed him away but appellant pulled her three (3)
meters away from AAA towards the door. As appellant was holding a knife, BBB could
not make any noise to alert her sister. Appellant ordered her to remove her clothes
and forced her to lie down. After he took off his clothes, appellant placed himself on
top of BBB and stayed there for three (3) minutes "moving up and down." Thereafter,
she put on her clothes and returned to where her sister was. She added that although
it was dark, she knew it was appellant who had molested her as she was familiar with
his smell. Since then, she never slept in her grandmother's house again. 17
It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother.
Prior to that, however, she had already revealed the sexual abuses she had underwent
to her sister AAA. Upon learning of the same, her mother brought her to the police
station and her statement was taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital to
be examined. Furthermore, BBB explained that she only reported the abuses done to

her on 14 June 2000 or five (5) months after the last rape because she was afraid of
appellant's threat of killing her and her family. 18
The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She testified that she only
knew of the abuses done on her daughters on 15 June 2000. Five months earlier, CCC
became concerned after observing that BBB, on the pretext of preparing clothes for a
game, was packing more than enough clothes. She asked her other daughter, DDD, to
dig into the matter and the latter told her that BBB was planning to leave their house.
Upon learning this, she sent somebody to retrieve BBB. However, it was only five
months after that incident that BBB confided to her mother that she was raped by
appellant. CCC lost no time in reporting the matter to the authorities and had BBB and
AAA examined in the hospital. After examination, it was confirmed that BBB was
indeed sexually molested.19
CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to their daughters
because she was afraid that her husband might kill appellant. It was only after
appellant was arrested that she disclosed such fact to her husband. After the arrest of
appellant, his relatives became angry at CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided talking
to her since then.20
The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the prosecution. Dr. Purita
T. Tullas (Dr. Tullas), medical officer of Gumaca District Hospital, testified that she was
the one who examined BBB and AAA, and thereafter, issued medical certificates for
each child. These medical certificates were presented in court. 21
The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, there were no
external sign of physical injury found on her body. However, Dr. Tullas found that the
labia majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping, her vaginal orifice was admitting
two fingers without resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at "three (3)
o'clock" and "eight (8) o'clock" which might have happened a long time before her
examination. Dr. Tullas concluded that there might have been sexual penetration
caused by a male sex organ for several times.22
AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there were no
external physical injuries apparent on her body. AAA's labia majora and minora were
well coaptated and the hymen was still intact. On direct examination, Dr. Tullas said
that it could happen that the hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration
with a person having an elastic hymen. On the other hand, when asked on crossexamination, she stated that there was also the possibility that no foreign body
touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. 23
Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his defense. He
averred in court that from 1994 to 2000, he lived in the house of his parents which
was about "thirty (30) arm stretches" away from the house of BBB and AAA. He denied
having raped BBB on 15 January 2000 because on said date he was at the house of his
sister, two (2) kilometers away from the house of his parents where the rape occurred,
from 11:30 in the morning and stayed there until early morning of the following day. 24
He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB and AAA. He
claimed that he seldom saw the two minors. He further asserted that prior to the
institution of the criminal case against him he had a smooth relationship with his
nieces and the only reason the case was filed against him was that CCC, his sister-inlaw and the mother of his nieces, harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father,
who would call CCC "lazy" within earshot of other family members. 25

The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. 26 The RTC pronounced
appellant's defense of denial and alibi as unconvincing, citing jurisprudence declaring
denial and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. The RTC concluded that appellant failed
to controvert the clear, candid and straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It further
considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship
of the victims and appellant, the latter being the former's relative by consanguinity
within the third degree.
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the records of the case
were automatically elevated to this Court for review. However, in the aftermath of the
pronouncement of the Court in People v. Mateo27 the present case was transferred to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of the RTC in
regard to six (6) of the eight (8) death sentences imposed on appellant. 28 The
appellate court ratiocinated, thus:
We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find no cogent
reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court except in at least two (2)
cases. The prosecution's case which was anchored mainly on the testimonies of
private complainants [BBB] and [AAA], deserve full faith and credit for being
clear, precise and straightforward. Like the trial court, We find no reason to
disbelieve the private complainants. It was established with certitude that the
accused on several occasions sexually assaulted his nieces. The perpetration of
the crimes and its authorship were proved by the victims' candid and
unwavering testimonies both of whom had the misfortune of sharing the same
fate in the hands of their own uncle. The sincerity of [AAA] was made more
evident when she cried on the witness stand in obvious distress over what their
uncle had done to her and her sister. 29
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and
6908 to attempted rape. In these two (2) cases, it was alleged that appellant had
raped AAA in 1999 and on 11 June 2000, respectively. According to the appellate
court, it could not find evidence beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that
appellant had accomplished the slightest penetration of AAA's vagina to make him
liable for consummated rape. It stressed that there was not even moral certainty that
appellant's penis ever touched the labia of the pudendum, quoting portions of the
transcript of the stenographic notes where AAA was asked if appellant was then
successful in inserting his penis into her vagina and she answered in the negative. 30
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reduced the penalties attached to the two (2) counts
of rape from death for consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.
Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief 31 before this Court, assails the findings of the
Court of Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB as to what really
transpired on 15 January 2000. Particularly, appellant observes that BBB testified on 6
June 2001 as to her rape on 15 January 2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had been
sleeping side by side. However, when BBB again testified on 3 July 2002, this time she
stated that on that night, as she and her sister AAA were sleeping in their room at
their parents' house (and not at her grandmother's), the accused passed through a
window, entered their room and raped her again. 32 Appellant also latches on the
inconsistencies in BBB's testimony as to the length of the duration of her rape on that
day. In BBB's testimony on 6 June 2001, she said that appellant was atop her for three
(3) minutes while in the 3 July 2002 hearing, BBB stated that the rape lasted for only
half a minute.

It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was raped in
2001. Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not
consider material, were elicited while BBB was testifying in open court. Our
observations in People v. Perez33 on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the
testimony of rape victims who happen to be minors are instructive, thus:
We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial, minor,
and insignificant details. They bear no materiality to the commission of
the crime of rape of which accused-appellant was convicted.[34] As
pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief, the seeming
inconsistencies were brought about by confusion and merely represent minor
lapses during the rape victim's direct examination and cannot possibly affect
her credibility. Minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting
details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall. The rape victim was
testifying in open court, in the presence of strangers, on an extremely intimate
matter, which, more often than not, is talked about in hushed tones. Under such
circumstances, it is not surprising that her narration was less than letterperfect.[35] "Moreover, the inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known
fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of testimony and the
manner in which a witness answers questions."[ 36]37
Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why BBB was
confused on some points of her two testimonies. Particularly in the Memorandum for
the People38 filed with the RTC, the public prosecutor creditably explained the
inconsistencies, thus:
[BBB]'s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be contradictory to her first testimony
on June 6, 2001, with respect to the last rape on January 15, 2000, as regards
the place of commissionhouse of her parents or house of accused; and the
length of time he stayed on her top 3 minutes or half-minute. But she
remained consistent in her declaration that on January 15, 2000, her uncle
inserted his penis into her vagina, and he was moving while on her top then she
felt something came out from him. He was able to rape her because he
threatened her with a knife or bladed weapon. Further, the first she took the
witness stand on June 6, 2001, she was made to recall the last rape, the first
rape and many acts of sexual abuses [sic] against her. She was even confused
about her age when she was first raped by her uncle. After she testified on
November 14, 2001, for the separate charges of rapes in 1997, 1998 and 1999,
she was able to recall more clearly the last rape on January 15, 2000, which
happened in her own house. These noted discrepancies as to the exact place of
commission accused's house or victim's house is not an essential element of
the crime of rape and both houses are situated in Brgy. Villa Padua Ilaya,
Gumaca, Quezon, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court. x x x 39
In addition, we share the lower court's disbelief of appellant's proffered defenses of
denial and alibi. These two defenses are inherently the weakest as they are negative
defenses. Mere denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the
positive testimony of the offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the
defendant to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he
must likewise demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time.40
In the case at bar, appellant's alibi that he was at his sister's house barely two (2)
kilometers away when the rape took place on 15 January 2000 cannot be given
credence by this Court. If we are to thread this line of reasoning, appellant could have

easily left his sister's house in the middle of the night, raped BBB, and then returned
to his sister's house without much difficulty and without anybody noticing his absence.
Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of an accused,
without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial. 41 The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant
consideration when the prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence
identifying appellant as the perpetrator. 42 In this case, both BBB and AAA, minors and
relatives of appellant, positively identified him as their rapist in open court. The lower
courts found no issue detracting from the credibility of such identification.
It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the 15 January
2000 rape of BBB. He offers nothing to counteract the accusations against him
involving the seven (7) other specific acts of rape other than the averment that he did
not know anything about the allegations propounded on him, an infinitesimal defense
considering the evidence against him.
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the
grudge of CCC towards his deceased father. It is outrageous to even suggest that a
mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating experience of coming before the
court and narrating their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her
father-in-law as lazy. In addition, CCC's father-in-law had died several years before the
criminal charges against appellant were ever instituted. If CCC truly wanted to
retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-in-law, she could have done so when
the latter was still alive. No member of a rape victim's family would dare encourage
the victim to publicly expose the dishonor of the family, more specifically if such
accusation is against a member of the family, unless the crime was in fact
committed.43
Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule
if she has not in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong
done to her. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit,
since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. 44 The weight of such
testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary, or indubitable
proof that the accused could not have committed the rape, but in the absence of such
countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded utmost value.
The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were properly
appreciated in this case. The minority of the victims and their relationship with
appellant were aptly established
in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the Informations
the ages of the victims when they were raped but the prosecution also presented the
birth certificates of BBB and AAA in court as documentary evidence to prove that they
were both minors when appellant raped them. Appellant, in open court, also admitted
that that he was the uncle of both victims being the brother of the victims' father, and
thus, a relative of the victims within the third degree of consanguinity.
Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is
understandably justified, considering that appellant repeatedly threatened to kill them
and their family should they disclose the incidents to anyone. It has been held time
and again that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a
fabricated charge.45 Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's

perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any
hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces a fear that if the victim
does not yield to the perverse impulses of the accused, something would happen to
her at the moment, or even thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she
would report the incident.46
At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G were not proven beyond reasonable doubt, but
only the two separate incidents of attempted rape.
It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender
commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. 47 In Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show
that there was no penetration or any indication that the penis of appellant touched
the labia of the pudendum of AAA. This was evident in AAA's testimony at the hearing
on 17 October 2001, to wit:
Q Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you when you
were eleven years old?
A Yes, Mam. [sic]
Q What was that?
A He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he inserted also
his penis (into) my vagina. [sic]
Q Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?
A No, Mam. [sic]
Q Why?
A It was painful, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina?
A Many times, Mam.48 [sic]
AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G.
Q I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In Criminal Case No.
6908-G, also for Rape. When was the last time that this sexual abuse was
committed by your Uncle?
A June 11, Mam. [sic]
Q What year?
A June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]

xxxx
Q What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000?
A He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]
Q And after removing your clothes, what did he do to you?
A He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in your vagina?
A Painful, Mam. [sic]
Q And what did you do when you feel painful?
A I cried, Mam. [sic]
Q When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any?
A He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your vagina?
A No, Mam.49 [sic]
In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the penalty, the
CA declared:
It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to consummate rape.
Indeed pain may be deduced from the sexual act but accused cannot be
convicted of rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain. It is well-settled
that complete penetration of the penis into the vagina is not necessary to
convict for consummated rape since the slightest penetration of one into the
other will suffice. However, in People v. Campuhan, the term "slightest
penetration" was clarified to mean that there must be sufficient and convincing
proof of the penis indeed touching at the very least the labias of the female
organ. Mere epidermal contact between the penis and the external layer of the
victim's vagina (the stroking and the grazing of the male organ upon the female
organ or the mons pubis) categorizes the crime as attempted rape or acts of
lasciviousness. There must be positive proof of even the slightest penetration,
more accurately, the touching of the labias by the penis, before rape could be
deemed consummated. We, therefore, take exception to the finding of the trial
court that when the accused was trying to insert his penis into the child's
vagina, the act proved painful to [AAA,] which made the accused stop from
further executing the act. From the testimony of private complainant, [AAA] in
the afore-numbered cases, the prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond any
shadow of doubt that accused-appellant's penis reached the labia of the
pudendum of AAA's vagina. There is no basis then to apply the rule that the
introduction of the penis into the aperture of the female organ (thereby

touching the labia of the pudendum) already consummates the case of rape. x
x x 50
It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt
when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of
rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there
to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating
his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed. 51
The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been
established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape
and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the
appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended.
II.
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the six
(6) counts of rape. The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Section 2 of the law
mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences
imposed by lower courts, but must, if the
guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment when appropriate. Since the passage of Rep. Act No. 9346, the
Court has had occasion to effectuate such reduction in recent cases such as People v.
Tubongbanua52 and People v. Cabalquinto.53
III.
The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2) counts of
attempted rape proves to be the more challenging but interesting question facing the
Court.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape of AAA, to "an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum," for each count of
attempted rape. There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was
meted prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal
Code establishes the penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted
felony:
ART. 51. xxx A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for
the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to
commit a felony.54
What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted
rape? Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which incorporates the amendments
introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the
victim. x x x55
The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have
been under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two
degrees lower than the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of
the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.For the purpose of graduating the
penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of
this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated
or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall
be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible
penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code. 56
xxxx
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention, crucial as
it is to our disposition of this question. The provision reads:
Art. 71. Graduated scales. In the case in which the law prescribes a penalty
lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules
prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is
comprised the given penalty:
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following
graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro

8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine57
xxxx
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death
is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of
three divisible periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." The purpose of
the prescription of minimum and maximum periods under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is to effect the privilege granted under the same law, for prisoners who have
served the minimum penalty to be eligible for parole per the discretion of the Board of
Indiscriminate Sentence.58 Thus, convicts sentenced to suffer death penalty or lifeimprisonment are ineligible under that law, as are persons sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, an indivisible penalty without minimum or maximum periods. 59
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted
rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum
penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No.
9346 had not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without
complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem
concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term
within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With
the elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be
sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest
remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant
would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.
IV.
Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for attempted rape will
affect not only appellant, but several classes of convicts as well. Before we proceed
with the discussion, the Court finds it necessary to make the following qualification.
Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty was imposable under
two different frames of reference. This was especially made clear with the 1993
amendments to the Revised Penal Code through Rep. Act No. 7659, or the Death
Penalty Law. Under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty was
provided for in two ways, namely: as the maximum penalty for "reclusion perpetua to
death," and death itself as an automatic and exclusive penalty. Death as the
automatic penalty was mandated for the crimes of qualified bribery "if it is the public
officer who asks or demands such gift or present;" 60 kidnapping or detention "for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person;" 61 destructive
arson wherein "death results;"62 and rape qualified by any of the several
circumstances enumerated under the law.

On the other hand, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" was imposable on
several crimes, including murder, 63 qualified piracy,64 and treason.65 The imposition of
the death penalty for crimes punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" depended
on the appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally
outlined in Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Reference to those two
provisions was unnecessary if the penalty imposed was death, as opposed to
"reclusion perpetua to death."
There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the penalties
for frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by "reclusion perpetua to
death" if consummated, or on accomplices and accessories to such felonies. Such
situations do not relate to the case of appellant, who was convicted of two (2) counts
of attempted rape, which, if consummated, of course would have carried prior to the
enactment of Rep. Act 9346 the penalty of death, and not "reclusion perpetua to
death."
The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned from "reclusion
perpetua to death" differs from that based on the exclusive penalty of death. For
example, it has been held that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion
perpetua to death" is prision mayor.66 In contrast, the Court has likewise held that for
qualified rape in the attempted stage, "the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than
the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged x x x is reclusion temporal." 67
In People v. Tolentino,68 we ruled that the accused, who had been sentenced to die for
the rape of his nine (9)-year old stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted rape. In
explaining that "reclusion temporal" was the proper penalty, the Court, through then
Chief Justice Davide, explained:
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony
is the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for the rape if it had been
consummated would have been death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since [RT 69] was eight years old and
TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of [RT's] mother. The last paragraph
thereof provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
xxxx
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is the
penalty lower by two degrees than death. However, with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an
indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum shall be within the range
of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range of reclusion
temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code.70
This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code.
Both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two

indivisible penalties the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale."
Hence, in passing sentence on those convicted of attempted felonies which warranted
the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated, the Court has
consistently held that penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is
prision mayor. In contrast, if the penalty for the consummated crime is the single
indivisible penalty of death, as was prescribed for several crimes under Rep. Act No.
7659, Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalty prescribed for
the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale
prescribed in Article 71". Thus, the proper penalty two degrees lower than death is
reclusion temporal.
It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did not similarly
arise after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty subject to its subsequent readoption at the choice of Congress.
Generally, the highest penalty imposed under the Revised Penal Code was "reclusion
perpetua to death," a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. As a result, the
Court had no occasion, after the passage of the 1987 Constitution, to consider the
effect of the charter on penalties downgraded from a single indivisible penalty. It was
under Rep. Act No. 7659, passed in 1993, that some commonly occurring crimes, such
as qualified rape and kidnapping for ransom, were penalized with the single indivisible
penalty of death.
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes, such as
qualified rape as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, for which the
imposable penalty was death alone. Thus, our ruling will bear no direct effect on the
sentencing of accomplices and accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or
frustrated stage of felonies for which the imposable penalty was "reclusion perpetua
to death."
Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the penalty
of death does not refer to the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death."
V.
If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties for
convicts whose sentences had been graduated beginning from death pursuant to
Article 71, the Court would not hesitate to enforce such downgrading based on clear
statutory intent. However, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those
penalties imposed on frustrated or attempted felonies, or on accessories and
accomplices.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A.
No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is
hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A.
No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor, 71 among others, were deemed to have
been amended by virtue of Rep. Act No. 9346, such amendment can be justified under
the ambit of the repealing clause, which reads, "all other laws, executive orders and

decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly." While this clause may, given its breadth, initially impress as the nature of
a general repealing clause, it is in actuality an express repealing clause. Section 1
specifically repeals all laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the
death penalty, and not merely such enactments which are inconsistent with Rep. Act
No. 9346.
Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization of the
particular phrase "insofar as they impose the death penalty." We can entertain two
schools of thought in construing this provision, both of them rooted in literalist
interpretations. First, it can be claimed that the present application of the penalties for
attempted rape of a minor (among many examples) does not "impose the death
penalty," since none of the convicts concerned would face execution through the
application of the penalty for attempted rape. Hence, the statutory provisions
enforced in determining the penalty for attempted rape, or other crimes not
punishable by death, are not amended by Rep. Act No. 9346.
On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for attempted
rape of a minor necessarily calls for the application, if not its literal imposition, of
death as a penalty, in the context of applying the graduated scale of penalties under
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. If we were to construe "impose" as to mean
"apply," then it could be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep. Act No.
9346. After all, the application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape of a
minor call for the actual operation of the death penalty not only in theory, but as a
means of determining the proper graduated penalty.
On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of thinking is enhanced by
its innate conservatism, limiting as it would the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346. It also
can be understood if confronted with the option of employing either a liberal or a
conservative construction, there is a natural tendency to employ the conservative
mode. Further, the reasoning is seemingly consistent with that employed by the Court
in People v. Muoz,72 a decision which will be thoroughly analyzed in the course of this
discussion.
If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the "imposition" of the
death penalty to actual executions, this could have been accomplished with more
clarity. For example, had Section 1 read instead "insofar as they sentence an accused
to death," there would have been no room for doubt that only those statutory
provisions calling for actual executions would have been repealed or amended. The
inability of Congress to shape the repealing clause in so specific a fashion does leave
open the question whether Congress did actually intend to limit the operation of Rep.
Act No. 9346 to actual executions only.
But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the legislative
intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the prohibition of the law to the physical
imposition of the death penalty, without extending any effect to the graduated scale
of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.
VI.
There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative intent, the
interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits its effects only to matters relating to the
physical imposition of the death penalty.
Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous results is in the case
of accomplices. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, kidnapping

for ransom was punishable by death. Let us say X and Y were tried for the crime. X
was charged as a principal for having directly participated in the kidnapping. Y was
charged as an accomplice for having allowed X to use his house to detain the victim,
even though Y was abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had no other
participation therein. Both X and Y were convicted by final judgment. Since X could no
longer be meted the death penalty, he is sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua.
Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty next lower in degree, or
reclusion temporal. Yet following the "conservative" interpretation of Rep. Act No.
9346, the graduation of penalties remains unaffected with the enactment of the new
law. Thus, under Article 71, which would still take into account the death penalty
within the graduated scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, the same penalty as the principal.
It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346, by
retaining the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71, was to equalize the
penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes previously punishable by death. We
do not doubt that the legislature has the theoretical capability to amend the penal law
in such fashion. Yet given the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties for principals
and accomplices, a step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal law, one
could reasonably assume that a legislature truly oriented to enact such change would
have been candid enough to have explicitly stated such intent in the law itself. Of
course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or in the provisions,
explicates the intention to equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices in any
crime at all.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange that the
penalties for principals and accomplices are equalized in some crimes, and not in
others. Let us return to our previous example of X and Y, but this time, assume that
they were charged for simple kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would
have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Since the crime is not punishable
by death, Rep. Act No. 9346 would have no effect in the imposition of the penalty for
simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X would have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua
as the principal, while Y would have been sentenced to reclusion temporal as an
accomplice.
Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for ransom,
the lesser penalties are justified. Since Y was merely an accomplice to the crime of
simple kidnapping, the imposition on him of a lighter penalty than X is in accord with
the Revised Penal Code and established juridical and legal thought. Less justifiable
would be the notion that in kidnapping for ransom, the principal and the accomplice
would receive the same penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the principal suffers a
higher penalty than the accomplice. Frankly, there is no rational explanation for such
a disparity, and no legal justification other than the recognition that Congress has the
power to will it so.
Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to frustrated
and attempted felonies which were punishable by death if consummated. The
consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by
reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would,
under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from
death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same
penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and
frustrated felony. However, the anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we recognize
that those felonies previously punishable by death are improbable of commission in
their frustrated stage, unlike several felonies punishable by "reclusion perpetua to
death,"73 such as murder, which may be frustrated.

Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death are
capable of commission in their attempted stages and that the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is "a penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony." The Court has thus
consistently imposed reclusion temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than death,
as the maximum term for attempted felonies which, if consummated, would have
warranted the death penalty.74 If it were to be insisted that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not
affect at all the penalties for attempted felonies, then those found guilty of the subject
attempted felonies would still be sentenced to reclusion temporal, even though the
"penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated
felony" would now be prision mayor.
It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that would
sanction a penalty for some attempted felonies that is only one degree lower than the
consummated crime would, again, be disharmonious and inconsistent with the
Revised Penal Code and established thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the
legislature has the discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees fit, a regime
that foists a differential theoretical basis for the punishment of different attempted
felonies resulting in discriminatory penalties is not only irrational but also, to say the
least, highly suspect. Considering that physical liberties are at stake, it would be a
most cruel joke if such discriminatory effects ensued not from deliberate legislative
will, but from oversight.
VII.
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties for
accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies, clearly results in illogical,
iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we
construe Rep. Act No. 9346 instead as not having barred the application of the death
penalty even as a means of depreciating penalties other than death. In particular, the
operative amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties for accomplices,
accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks "death"
at the top of the scale for graduated penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in Article 71 will
have the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to
accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies to the level consistent
with the rest of our penal laws. Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted
accomplice in kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty of reclusion
temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the principal X would bear
(reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be consistent with Article 52 of the Revised
Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference to "death."
Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence as the
principal, an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated. Thus, the
same standard would prevail in sentencing principals and accomplices to the crime of
kidnapping in ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having
eliminated the reference to "death" in Article 71 would run across the board in our
penal laws. Consistent with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of
attempted qualified rape would receive the penalty two degrees lower than that
prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.
There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this
"expansive" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute

should be so construed not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with
other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible systema uniform system of jurisprudence. 75 "Interpreting and
harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. x x x x This manner
of construction would provide a complete, consistent and intelligible system to secure
the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasilegislative acts."76 There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the
Revised Penal Code unless the later statute is construed as having downgraded those
penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in
that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties
for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are
strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 77 If the
language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the
defendant than it would if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting
substantial justice.78 The law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual. 79 It is this
philosophy of caution before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty that
animates one of the most fundamental principles in our Bill of Rights, that every
person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction would not have been
necessary had Rep. Act No. 9346 ineluctably stated that the repeal of all laws
imposing the death penalty did not engender the corresponding modification of
penalties other than death, dependent as these are on "death" as a measure under
the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Admittedly, if this were indeed the
intent of Congress, and such intent were unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act No.
9346, the resulting inequities and inconsistencies we had earlier pointed out would
have remained. If that were to be the case, we would have acknowledged, perhaps
tacitly, that such inequities and inconsistencies fell part of the legislative intent. It
does not speak well of a Congress to be deliberately inconsistent with, or ignorant of
its own prior enactments. Yet ultimately, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 is not
expressive of such rash or injudicious notions, as it is susceptible to a reading that
would harmonize its effects with the precepts and practices that pervade our general
penal laws, and in a manner that does not defy the clear will of Congress.
VIII.
One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly amend
any of the penalties other than death in our penal laws would most certainly invoke
our ruling in People v. Muoz,80 decided in 1989. Therein, a divided Court ruled in that
the constitutional bar on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact "a
corresponding modification in the other periods [in penalties]", there being no
expression of "such a requirement in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or
indicat[ion] therein by at least
clear and unmistakable implication." 81 In so concluding, the Court made the oft-cited
pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987 Constitution "which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty." 82
It is time to re-examine Muoz and its continued viability in light of Rep. Act No. 9346.
More precisely, would Muoz as precedent deter the Court from ruling that Rep. Act
No. 9346 consequently downgraded penalties other than death?

It can be recalled that the accused in Muoz were found guilty of murder, which under
the Revised Penal Code, carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. The subject murders therein were not attended by any modifying
circumstance, and thus penalized in the penalty's medium term. Jurisprudence
previous to Muoz held that the proper penalty in such instances should be "the
higher half of reclusion temporal maximum," with reclusion temporal maximum,
divided into two halves for that purpose. Muoz rejected this formulation, holding
instead that the penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Towards this conclusion, the
Court made the above-cited conclusions relating to the constitutional abolition of the
death penalty, and the charter's effects on the other periods. Six justices dissented
from that ruling, and as recently as 1997, a member of the Court felt strongly enough
to publish a view urging the reexamination of Muoz.83
It would be disingenuous to consider Muoz as directly settling the question now
befacing us, as the legal premises behind Muoz are different from those in this case.
Most pertinently, Muoz inquired into the effects of the Constitution on the proper
penalty for murder; while herein, we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346
on the proper penalty for attempted qualified rape. Muoz may have pronounced
that the Constitution did not abolish the death penalty, but that issue no
longer falls into consideration herein, the correct query now being whether
Congress has banned the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346.
Otherwise framed, Muoz does not preclude the Court from concluding that
with the express prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty Congress
has unequivocally banned the same.
Muoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1), Article III, which
provided that "[n]either shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it." Muoz and
its progenies, have interpreted that provision as prohibiting the actual imposition of
the death penalty, as opposed to enacting an amendatory law that eliminates all
references and applications of the death penalty in our statutes. It can also be
understood and appreciated that at the time Muoz was decided, it would have been
polemical to foster an unequivocal pronouncement that Section 19(1), Article III
abolished the death penalty, since the very provision itself acknowledged that
Congress may nonetheless subsequently provide for the penalty "for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes," as Congress very well did just four (4) years after
Muoz. No such language exists in Rep. Act No. 9346. Of course, the legislature has
the inherent and constitutional power to enact laws prescribing penalties for crimes,
and the Constitution will not prohibit Congress from reenacting the death penalty "for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Yet it was that express stipulation in the
Constitution that dissuaded the Court from recognizing the constitutional abolition of
the death penalty; and there is no similar statutory expression in Rep. Act No. 9346,
which could be construed as evocative of intent similar to that of the Constitution.
The doctrine in Muoz that the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of the
death penalty did not enact a corresponding modification of other penalties is
similarly irrelevant to this case, which calls for an examination as to whether such
corresponding modifications of other penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act No.
9346, and not the Constitution.
For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether Rep. Act No. 9346
intended to delete the word "death" as expressly provided for in the graduated scale
of penalties under Article 71. Muoz did not engage in an analogous inquiry in relation
to Article 71 and the Constitution, for what was relevant therein was not the general
graduated scale of penalties, but the range of the penalties for murder. Herein, at bare
minimum, no provision in Rep. Act No. 9346 provides a context within which the

concept of "death penalty" bears retentive legal effect, especially in relation to Article
71. Unlike the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 9346 does expressly stipulate the
amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called for the imposition of the penalty
of death.
The impression left by Muoz was that the use of the word "imposition" in the
Constitution evinced the framer's intent to retain the operation of penalties under the
Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, one might try to construe the use of
"imposition" in Rep. Act No. 9346 as a means employed by Congress to ensure that
the "death penalty", as applied in Article 71, remain extant. If the use of "imposition"
was implemented as a means of retaining "death" under Article 71, it would have
been a most curious, roundabout means indeed. The Court can tolerate to a certain
degree the deliberate vagueness sometimes employed in legislation, yet
constitutional due process demands a higher degree of clarity when infringements on
life or liberty are intended. We have ruled, on due process grounds, as arbitrary and
oppressive a tax assessed on a standard characterized as "nothing but blather in
search of meaning."84 In the matter of statutes that deprive a person of physical
liberty, the demand for a clear standard in sentencing is even more exacting.
Yet in truth, there is no material difference between "imposition" and "application," for
both terms embody the operation in law of the death penalty. Since Article 71
denominates "death" as an element in the graduated scale of penalties, there is no
question that the operation of Article 71 involves the actual application of the death
penalty as a means of determining the extent which a person's liberty is to be
deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346 unequivocally bars the application of the death
penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such statutory provisions requiring the
application of the death penalty, such effect necessarily extends to its relevance to
the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the
operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in our
penal laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not
swaddled in the same restraints appreciated by Muoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The
very Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the imposition of the death
penalty once thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the same
realm of constitutional discretion, Congress has reversed itself. It must be asserted
that today, the legal status of the suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines
has never been more secure than at any time in our political history as a nation.
Following Muoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987 Constitution, might not have
willed the abolition of the death penalty and instead placed it under a suspensive
condition. As such, we affirmed the characterization of the death penalty during the
interregnum between the 1987 Constitution and its reimposition through law as being
"in a state of hibernation." 85 No longer. It reawakened then it died; because the
sovereign people, through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the death penalty. Only by an
Act of Congress can it be reborn. Before that day, the consideration of death as a
penalty is bereft of legal effect, whether as a means of depriving life, or as a means of
depriving liberty.
Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death penalty, we do
not acknowledge that Muoz lacked legal justification when it was decided; that its
application as precedent prior to Rep. Act No. 9346 was erroneous; or that previous
sentences imposed on convicts on the basis of Muoz were wrong. Muoz properly
stood as the governing precedent in the matter of sentences that passed finality prior
to Rep. Act No. 9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts on its doctrines
entrenched its footing in criminal law jurisprudence.

IX.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in the Philippines,
also effectively classified the crimes listed therein as "heinous," within constitutional
contemplation. Such reclassification under Rep. Act No. 7659 was accompanied by
certain legal effects other than the imposition of the death penalty, such as the
increase in imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes. 86 The categorization of
certain crimes as "heinous", constituting as it does official recognition that some
crimes are more odious than others, has also influenced this Court in adjudging the
proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the victims of these crimes. Hence, a
general inclination persists in levying a greater amount of damages on accused found
guilty of heinous crimes.
It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act No.
9346 did not correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as
"heinous". The amendatory effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the application
of the death penalty but not to the definition or classification of crimes. True, the
penalties for heinous crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law.
Still, what remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes, by their
abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by themselves. Accordingly, Rep. Act
No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and other
damages that adhere to heinous crimes.
X.
Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through Rep. Act
No. 9346 and the corresponding modification of penalties other than death through
that statute, we now proceed to discuss the effects of these rulings.
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is
immediate. Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code,
shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example,
in the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be
reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than
reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be
reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the freestanding penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged
penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death," as often used in the Revised Penal Code and
other penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty,
hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we did
earlier observe that both "reclusion perpetua" and death are indivisible penalties.
Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the
crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree
shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the
penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.
Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this new
ruling, favorable as it is to persons previously convicted of crimes which, if
consummated or participated in as a principal, would have warranted the solitary
penalty of death. We see no choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code states that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar
as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal[ 87] x x x x
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been

pronounced and the convict is serving the same." Given that we have ruled that Rep.
Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has
to apply, except as to those persons defined as "habitual criminal[s]." Indeed, Rep. Act
No. 9346 expressly recognized that its enactment would have retroactive beneficial
effects, referring as it did to "persons x x x whose sentences were reduced to
reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act."88
It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code, there may be convicts presently serving their original sentences
whose actual served terms exceed their reduced sentences. It should be
understood that this decision does not make operative the release of such
convicts, especially as there may be other reasons that exist for their
continued detention. There are remedies under law that could be employed to
obtain the release of such prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as the Public Attorney's
Office and non-governmental organizations that frequently assist detainees possess
the capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners who are so
entitled by reason of this ruling.
XI.
We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of Rep. Act
No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding
reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from two
(2) counts consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6)
counts of rape, we downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no
eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of
attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period.
Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum.
Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count
of attempted rape, it being the prevailing rate of indemnity as pronounced in the
recent case of People v. Miranda.89
Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence 90 in awarding to BBB and AAA
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count of consummated rape.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court sentences appellant Alfredo J. Bon to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the six (6) counts
of consummated rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6699, 6902, and
against BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905, and 6907. Appellant is further
ORDERED to indemnify AAA and BBB for the crime of consummated rape, in the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of them.
For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No. 6906 and 6908,
appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) of prision mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape. In addition,
appellant is ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts of attempted

rape in the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages

and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971

MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO
PADUA and PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by petitioners, five in number,
for their release from imprisonment. Meted out life terms for the complex crime of
rebellion with murder and other crimes, they would invoke the People v. Hernandez 1
doctrine, negating the existence of such an offense, a ruling that unfortunately for
them was not handed down until after their convictions had become final. Nor is this
the first instance, a proceeding of this character was instituted, as in Pomeroy v.
Director of Prisons,2 likewise a petition for habeas corpus, a similar question was
presented. The answer given was in the negative. Petitioners plead for a new look on
the matter. They would premise their stand on the denial of equal protection if their
plea would not be granted. Moreover they did invoke the codal provision that judicial
decisions shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines, 3 necessarily resulting
in the conclusion that the Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive
effect under the explicit mandate of the Revised Penal Code as to penal laws having
such character even if at the time of their application a final sentence has been
rendered "and the convict is serving the same." 4 These arguments carry considerable
persuasion. Accordingly we find for petitioners, without going so far as to overrule
Pomeroy.
Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to
suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
robbery, arson and kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and
Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in

decisions rendered, as to the first two, on March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on
December 15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12,
1954 penalized with reclusion perpetua. Each of the petitioners has been since then
imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions. Each of them has served more than 13
years.5
Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez, 6 as above noted, this Court ruled that the
information against the accused in that case for rebellion complexed with murder,
arson and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
there being no such complex offense. 7 In the recently-decided case of People vs.
Lava,8 we expressly reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the plea of
the Solicitor General for the abandonment of such doctrine. It is the contention of
each of the petitioners that he has served, in the light of the above, more than the
maximum penalty that could have been imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to
freedom, his continued detention being illegal. 9
The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their release on a habeas
corpus proceeding prompted petitioners, as had been mentioned, to ask that it be
appraised anew and, if necessary, discarded. We can resolve the present petition
without doing so. The plea there made was unconvincing, there being a failure to
invoke the contentions now pressed vigorously by their counsel, Attorney Jose W.
Diokno, as to the existence of a denial of a constitutional right that would suffice to
raise a serious jurisdictional question and the retroactive effect to be given a judicial
decision favorable to one already sentenced to a final judgment under Art. 22 of the
Revised Penal Code. To repeat, these two grounds carry weight. We have to grant this
petition.
1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas corpus
under the circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of
restraint and detention be avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as
the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of
ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation of physical
freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If
there be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the
period provided for by law. Any deviation from the legal norms call for the termination
of the imprisonment.
Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights
provision" in the fundamental law. 10 Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as
"one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty." 11 For Willoughby, it is "the
greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and illegal
imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered." 12 Burdick
echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most important bulwarks of
liberty." 13 Fraenkel made it unanimous, for to him, "without it much else would be of
no avail." 14 Thereby the rule of law is assured.
A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of
liberty coupled with its limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief
Justices Arellano, 15 Avancea, 16 Abad Santos, 17 Paras, 18 Bengzon, 19 and the present
Chief Justice. 20 It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to emphasize quite a few times
the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, 21 the remedy
came in handy to challenge the validity of the order of the then respondent Mayor of
Manila who, for the best of reasons but without legal justification, ordered the
transportation of more than 150 inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. After
referring to the writ of habeas corpus as having been devised and existing "as a

speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint" the opinion of
Justice Malcolm continued: "The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." 22
The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus petitions even if
presented in pleadings on their face devoid of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v.
Quilen, 23 where this Court, again through Justice Malcolm, stated: "As standing alone
the petition for habeas corpus was fatally defective in its allegations, this court, on its
motion, ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case entitled Thomas
Casey, et al. v. George Ganaway." 24 It is to Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde v.
Rivera, 25 to whom is traceable the doctrine, one that broadens the field of the
operation of the writ, that a disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts
the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus
to
obtain
his
freedom." 26
So it is in the United States. An 1830 decision 27 of Chief Justice Marshall put the
matter thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the
common law, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be
imprisoned without sufficient cause." Then there is this affirmation from an 1869
decision 28 of the then Chief Justice Chase: "The great writ of habeas corpus has been
for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The
passing of the years has only served to confirm its primacy as a weapon on in the
cause of liberty. Only the other year, Justice Fortas spoke for the United States
Supreme Court thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. ... The
scope and flexibility of the writ its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention
its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes have always been
emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the
writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to
insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected." 29
Justice Fortas explicitly made reference to Blackstone, who spoke of it as "the great
and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement." Implicit in his just estimate
of its pre-eminent role is his adoption of Holmes' famous dissent in Frank v. Mangum:
30
"But habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the
structure."
2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been
judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably
narrowed. For if "the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order
of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order," the writ does not lie. 31 That principle dates
back to 1902, 32 when this Court announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where
the person detained was in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or magistrate. This is understandable, as during the time the Philippines was under
American rule, there was necessarily an adherence to authoritative doctrines of
constitutional law there followed.
One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of jurisdictional defect.
As summarized by Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, an 1880 decision: "The only
ground on which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it,
will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of

another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or
some other matter rendering its proceedings void." 33
There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept in mind. Once a
deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the
judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate
remedy to assail the legality of the detention. 34
3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the
denial of equal protection. According to their petition: "In the case at bar, the
petitioners were convicted by Courts of First Instance for the very same rebellion for
which Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were convicted. The law under which they
were convicted is the very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not
and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how
can we, in conscience, allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can
suffer only prision mayor?" 35
They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal protection, people
similarly situated were not similarly dealt with. What is required under this required
constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons
under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
"Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if
not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions
cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 36
The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring. The continued
incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of
imprisonment in accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly
convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection.
That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what
would happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of
the conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person
duly sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different penalties.
Moreover, as noted in the petition before us, after our ruling in People v. Lava,
petitioners who were mere followers would be made to languish in jail for perhaps the
rest of their natural lives when the leaders had been duly considered as having paid
their penalty to society, and freed. Such a deplorable result is to be avoided.
4. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely on Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive
effect. In support of their contention, petitioners cite U.S. v. Macasaet, 37 U.S.
vs.Parrone, 38 U.S. v. Almencion, 39 People v. Moran, 40 and People v. Parel. 41 While
reference in the above provision is made not to judicial decisions but to legislative
acts, petitioners entertain the view that it would be merely an exaltation of the literal
to deny its application to a case like the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation.
As was previously noted, the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the Constitution, as well as legislation, form part of our legal system.
Petitioners would even find support in the well-known dictum of Bishop Hoadley:
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he
who is truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first
thought or spoke them." It is to be admitted that constitutional law scholars, notably
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial review as well as the jurist

John Chipman Gray, were much impressed with the truth and the soundness of the
above observations. We do not have to go that far though. Enough for present
purposes that both the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code allow, if they do not call
for, a retroactive application.
It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a retroactive effect
petitioners had served the full term for which they could have been legally committed,
is habeas corpus the appropriate remedy? The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back
as 1910 the prevailing doctrine was announced in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. 45 Thus:
"The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of
the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of
the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains
the proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the
parts are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge
on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was
valid." 46 There is a reiteration of such a principle in Director v. Director of Prisons 47
where it was explicitly announced by this Court "that the only means of giving
retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused ... is the writ of habeas
corpus." 48 While the above decision speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the
case, insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation
that it is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a
favorable decision holds true. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully sustained the
burden of justifying their release.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is ordered that
petitioners be forthwith set at liberty.

G.R. No. 135981

September 29, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
It is a hornbook rule that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire records to
review. The Court may pass upon all relevant issues, including those factual in nature
and those that may not have been brought before the trial court. This is true
especially in cases involving the imposition of the death penalty, in which the accused
must be allowed to avail themselves of all possible avenues for their defense. Even
novel theories such as the "battered woman syndrome," which is alleged to be
equivalent to self-defense, should be heard, given due consideration and ruled upon
on the merits, not rejected merely on technical or procedural grounds. Criminal
conviction must rest on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Case
For resolution by the Court is an Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by Appellant Marivic
Genosa y Isidro in connection with the automatic review of the September 25, 1998
"Judgment"1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City 2 in Criminal Case No. 50160. The RTC found her guilty of parricide aggravated by treachery and sentenced her to
death.
In an Information3 dated November 14, 1996, Provincial Prosecutor I Rosario D. Beleta
charged appellant-movant with parricide allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality
of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard
deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the
following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blown[ ]up & swollen w/ evident post- mortem lividity. Eyes protruding
from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting
[in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior
surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe
intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the
epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."

After arraignment and trial, the court a quo promulgated its Judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the
accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec.
5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and
none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of
DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."
The Antecedents
Prior to the filing of her Appeal Brief, appellant submitted an Urgent Omnibus Motion, 4
to bring "to the attention of the x x x Court certain facts and circumstances which, if
found valid, could warrant the setting aside of [her] conviction and the imposition of
the death penalty."
Appellant alleges that the trial court grievously erred in concluding that she had lied
about the means she employed in killing her husband. On the contrary, she had
consistently claimed that she had shot her husband. Yet the trial judge simply ruled
that the cause of his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe
intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital bone," which
resulted from her admitted act of "smashing" him with a pipe. Such conclusion was
allegedly unsupported by the evidence on record, which bore no forensic autopsy
report on the body of the victim.
Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe
beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the trial court failed to
appreciate her self-defense theory. She claims that under the surrounding
circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.
Furthermore, she argues that if she "did not lie about how she killed her husband,
then she did not lie about the abuse she suffered at his hands."
She thus prays for the following reliefs: 5
"1. The Honorable Court allow an exhumation of the body of the victim, Ben M.
Genosa, and a re-examination of the cause of death.
2. The Honorable Court submit accused-appellant for examination by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists of the Court to determine her state of mind at
the time of the killing of her spouse, Ben M. Genosa.
3. Thereafter, the Honorable Court allow the reports of the psychologists and
psychiatrists to form part of the records of the case for purposes of the
automatic review or, in the alternative, to allow a partial re-opening of the case
before a lower court in Metro Manila to admit the testimony of said
psychologists and psychiatrists."
On August 22, 2000, the solicitor general, on behalf of the State, filed his Comment, 6
which substantially objected to the Motion on the ground that appellant had not been
"deprived of her right to due process, substantial or procedural."

The Issues
In brief, the issues for our resolution are (1) whether the body of the victim should be
exhumed and reexamined in order to ascertain the cause of his death, and (2)
whether the appellant should be examined by qualified psychologists or psychiatrists
in order to determine her state of mind at the time of the killing.
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants in part the Motion of appellant. We remand the case to the RTC for
the reception of evidence from qualified psychologists or psychiatrists whom the
parties may present to establish her state of mind at the time of the killing.
First Issue: No Need for a Reexamination of Cause of Death
Accused-appellant seeks the exhumation of the victim's body to be able to determine
his exact cause of death, assailing the court a quo's conclusion that he was "smashed
or beaten at the back of his head" rather than shot, as claimed by appellant.
Considering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the
acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head,
the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine
which of said acts actually caused the victim's death. There is no need to exhume the
body at this time and conduct an autopsy thereon for the purpose.
Moreover, the matter of proving the cause of death should have been made before
the trial court. Time and again, we have said that this Court is not a trier of facts.
Neither will it authorize the firsthand reception of evidence, where the opportunity to
offer the same was available to the party during the trial stage. Consistent with this
principle alone, the prayer sought by appellant for the exhumation of the victim's
body cannot be granted.
Second Issue: The Need to Determine Appellant's State of Mind at the Time of the
Killing
In seeking to be "examined and evaluated by psychologists and psychiatrists to bring
into evidence the abuse inflicted upon her; [and] to determine whether such abuse
will support the 'battered woman syndrome'," the appellant brings to the fore a novel
defense theory. Through Counsel Katrina Legarda, she asks the Court to "re-evaluate
the traditional elements" used in determining self-defense and to consider the
"battered woman syndrome" as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense.
Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the woman believes that
the violence was her fault; (2) she has an inability to place the responsibility for the
violence elsewhere; (3) she fears for her life and/or her children's lives; and (4) she
has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient. 7 Living in
constant danger of harm or death, she knows that future beatings are almost certain
to occur and will escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of
her batterer makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it
will seriously threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it
is not unlikely that she would succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive
possible solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized
by fear of an existing or impending lethal aggression and thus would have no
opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less fatal means of
eliminating her sufferings.

Appellant further alleges that the syndrome is already a recognized form of selfdefense in the United States and in Europe. In the US particularly, it is classified as a
post-traumatic stress disorder, rather than a form of mental illness. 8 It has been held
admissible in order to assess a defendant's perception of the danger posed by the
abuser.9
In view of the foregoing, Appellant Genosa pleads that she be allowed to present
evidence to prove that her relationship with her spouse-victim had afflicted her with
the syndrome. Allegedly, an expert can explain how her experiences as a battered
woman had affected her perception of danger and her honest belief in its imminence,
and why she had resorted to force against her batterer.
The records of the case already bear some evidence on domestic violence between
appellant and her deceased husband. A defense witness, Dr. Dino Caing, testified that
she had consulted him at least six (6) times due to injuries related to domestic
violence and twenty-three (23) times for severe hypertension due to emotional
stress.10 Even the victim's brother and mother attested to the spouses' quarrels every
now and then. The court a quo, however, simplistically ruled that since violence had
not immediately preceded the killing, self-defense could not be appreciated.
Indeed, there is legal and jurisprudential lacuna with respect to the so-called "battered
woman syndrome" as a possible modifying circumstance that could affect the criminal
liability or penalty of the accused. The discourse of appellant on the subject in her
Omnibus Motion has convinced the Court that the syndrome deserves serious
consideration, especially in the light of its possible effect on her very life. It could be
that very thin line between death and life or even acquittal. The Court cannot, for
mere technical or procedural objections, deny appellant the opportunity to offer this
defense, for any criminal conviction must be based on proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Accused persons facing the possibility of the death penalty must be
given fair opportunities to proffer all defenses possible that could save them from
capital punishment.
In People v. Parazo,11 after final conviction of appellant therein, this Court granted his
Urgent Omnibus Motion and allowed him to undergo mental, neurologic and
otolaryngologic examination and evaluation to determine whether he was a deafmute. Based on findings that he really was deaf and mute, yet unaided during the trial
by an expert witness who could professionally understand and interpret his actions
and mutterings, the Court granted him re-arraignment and retrial. It justified its action
on the principle that "only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may [the
accused] be consigned to the lethal injection chamber."
More recently in People v. Estrada,12 we likewise nullified the trial proceedings and
remanded the case "to the court a quo for a conduct of a proper mental examination
on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further
proceedings." In that case, the defense counsel had moved to suspend the
arraignment of the accused, who could not properly and intelligently enter a plea
because of his mental defect, and to confine him instead in a psychiatric ward. But the
trial court denied the Motion, after simply propounding questions to the accused and
determining for itself that he could understand and answer them "intelligently." After
trial, he was convicted of murder aggravated by cruelty and thus sentenced to death.
In nullifying the trial proceedings, this Court noted: 13
"The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant.
The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped
with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person's mental health.

To determine the accused-appellant's competency to stand trial, the court, in the

instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant,
especially in the light of the latter's history of mental illness."
It was held that in denying appellant an examination by a competent medical expert,
the trial court practically denied him a fair trial prior to conviction, in violation of his
constitutional rights.
Moreover, proof of insanity could have exempted appellant from criminal liability. If
the accused had not performed the act voluntarily, then he could not have been
criminally liable. The Court, through Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, emphasized:
"The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony
committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly
based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is essentially a moral
creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. When he
commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been
done voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be
adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired."14
In the instant case, it is equally important to determine whether Appellant Genosa had
acted freely, intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her spouse. The Court,
however, cannot properly evaluate her battered-woman-syndrome defense, absent
expert testimony on her mental and emotional state at the time of the killing and the
possible psychological cause and effect of her fatal act. Unlike in Parazo, we cannot
simply refer her for proper psychological or psychiatric examination and thereafter
admit the findings and evaluation as part of the records of the cases for purposes of
automatic review. The prosecution has likewise the right to a fair trial, which includes
the opportunity to cross-examine the defense witnesses and to refute the expert
opinion given. Thus, consistent with the principle of due process, a partial reopening
of the case is apropos, so as to allow the defense the opportunity to present expert
evidence consistent with our foregoing disquisition, as well as the prosecution the
opportunity to cross examine and refute the same.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion of Appellant Marivic Genosa is PARTLY
GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea,
within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court
the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary
evidence, if any, submitted.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135981

January 15, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a
novel theory -- the "battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly constitutes
self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete
exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and
unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a
form of cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and selfcontrol. This "psychological paralysis" she suffered diminished her will power, thereby
entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her
batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with their
child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state,
which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn
child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as
well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be
released from custody on parole, because she has already served the minimum period
of her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0,

finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the
accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored
by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating
circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the
accused with the penalty of DEATH.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and
another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral
damages."2
The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang,
Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate
husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had
provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes
protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the
mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the
head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the
blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura
and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/
shedding of the epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."4
With the assistance of her counsel, 5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her
arraignment on March 3, 1997.6 In due course, she was tried for and convicted of
parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of the
facts in this wise:

"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in
Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at
Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben's younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with
them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban
Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their
two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after
receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading
home. Arturo would pass Ben's house before reaching his. When they arrived at
the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look
for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it,
waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did
not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas'
rented house, he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to which Ben replied
'Why kill me when I am innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive.
Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas' rented house appeared
uninhabited and was always closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and
neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig
because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise
asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who
unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a
bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her
two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her
children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters
behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the
same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant
did not want to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the
foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban
went there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from
the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed
the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through
the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked
it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell
was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the
bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of
his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the
mother of Ben about his son's misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa,
the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned
at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell
at the Genosas' rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr.
Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the
bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with
a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on.
SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe
about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal
pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and

half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at
one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench,
had to be taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem
examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A
municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr.
Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was
already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the
findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She
concluded that the cause of Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary
to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital
[bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on
November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet
might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao,
appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte
but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the
Genosas' house. Ecel went home despite appellant's request for her to sleep in
their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging
her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children
who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction,
Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the
television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to
appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got
hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and
screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because
she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben
allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a
drawer holding her by the neck, and told her 'You might as well be killed so
nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a
gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a threeinch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben
with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then
'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade
and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by
shooting him. She supposedly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and
shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom." 7 (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983.
Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City,
obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was
working, at the time of her husband's death, as a Secretary to the Port
Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl
Pierre and Marie Bianca.

"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were
neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree
cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was
persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness
developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together
with Ben's brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic
and Ben 'lived happily'. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would
quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember
when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled,
generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on
him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife
after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic
left the house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked for Ben's
forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his
father apparently rushed to Ben's aid again and saw blood from Ben's forehead
and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic
had apparently again asked for Ben's forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben
and Marivic married in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.'
She said as the marriage went along, Marivic became 'already very demanding.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic's two sons, there were
'three (3) misunderstandings.' The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a
table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15,
1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead 'using a sharp instrument until
the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear' and her husband
went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had
already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand was
plastered as 'the bone cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical
intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995
'After we collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They
stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they went to 'Uniloks' and drank
beer allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque
and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while
talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait 'for the runner and
the usher of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao
numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can
place my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the
Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one
'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas' testimony on the
root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying 'I will
never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent.'
Basobas thought they were joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa
residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every
Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben 'before when he was

stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa' that he should leave her and that Ben
would always take her back after she would leave him 'so many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time
that they had been quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound' on the right
forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to
her and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her,
sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her
parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and
would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would
seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These
doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports.
Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at
least three times a week.
"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic,
testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas,
testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and
Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw
the spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did
not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the
same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.8)
'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe
Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of
November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is located
beside the Genosa house and saw 'the spouses grappling with each other then
Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic
Genosa'. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter
the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go
fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note
that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were
living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs.
Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years.
He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben
would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went
to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be
pacified 'if somebody would come.' He testified that while Ben was alive 'he
used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he
will say, 'Teody' because that was what he used to call me, 'mokimas ta,' which
means 'let's go and look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben
'would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I
noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a
knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been
injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic,
testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house

and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several
taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied
Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house
'because she might be battered by her husband.' When they got to the Genosa
house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that 'her husband was
already there and was drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was drunk 'because of his
staggering walking and I can also detect his face.' Marivic entered the house
and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same
night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was
not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would
be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when
she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben
arrived because the couple 'were very noisy in the sala and I had heard
something was broken like a vase.' She said Marivic ran into her room and they
locked the door. When Ben couldn't get in he got a chair and a knife and
'showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us.' She said that
Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that
when she left Marivic's house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still
quarreling.
'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were coemployees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times' and
had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from
July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical
injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient
Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of
Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic
on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.'
The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the
consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries
reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not
say whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it
is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of
the patient, 'whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.'
'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas
resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his
office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the
Genosa couple who were experiencing 'family troubles'. He told Marivic to
return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed 'that
they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each
other.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it
was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened
that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would
deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal

Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the
baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband
at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would
reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive
towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend,
Lulu x x x Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that
he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing
their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next
day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented
herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias
'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just
wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San
Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away;
that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash him once';
that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours
after she was 'whirled' by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and dragged her towards the
drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an
investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence.
This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense
witnesses during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of
Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such
was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of
cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist.
She merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called
by the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw
'some police officer and neighbor around.' She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a
blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was
wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving
the skeletal area of the head' which she described as a 'fracture'. And that
based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not
testify as to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa
charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with
treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a
hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.'

"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22
and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22
May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial
date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc
City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of
the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating
circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and,
under date of 24 January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P.
Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a
precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant's Briefs he had prepared for
Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted
the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20
January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G.
Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she
submitted her 'Brief without counsels' to the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by
the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death;
allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband;
and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony
of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun,
then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the
description of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings,
Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly
granted Marivic's URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case 'to the
trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion
on the 'battered woman syndrome' plea, within ninety (90) days from notice,
and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together
with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any,
submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before
the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had
interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews
were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.

"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20)
years with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle
University as a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology
Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology
at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph's College; and was the
counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in
Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical
[Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the
past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a
member of the American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the
International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the
Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling]
Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy,
recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of
families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the
Davide Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has written a
book entitled 'Energy Global Psychology' (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan
Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on
battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the sociodemographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic
violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten
(10) years and discovered that 'there are lots of variables that cause all of this
marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.'
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of
psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and
also sexual abuse.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a
very low opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing
characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when
the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they
were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be
physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that
usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from 'broken
homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a
very low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and
it comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very
angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times
they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become
violent.' The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which
over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see
often how their parents abused each other so 'there is a lot of modeling of
aggression in the family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does
not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the
violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change, the
belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the
children.

xxx

xxx

xxx

"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some
leave the house, or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight
back triggering 'physical violence on both of them.' She said that in a 'normal
marital relationship,' abuses also happen, but these are 'not consistent, not
chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out.' In an 'abnormal marital
relationship,' the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and 'even
would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she
administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered
woman because 'inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at
times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she
sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still
has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even
consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the
time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since
passed away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of
the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry
Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior
to being in private practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial
Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After
that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his
retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General.
He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was
also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City
Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of
Military Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine
Military Academy from the Period 1954 1978' which was presented twice in
international congresses. He also authored 'The Mental Health of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines 2000', which was likewise published internationally and
locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a
Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb
grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the
mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord
enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate
degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.

"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo
had already encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified
in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes
abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days,
the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his
experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the
Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal
abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that
the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability of the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo said that if the
victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the
disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of
the victim is stronger, 'it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the
post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the
'anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming
brutality, trauma.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the
beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at
that time. She thinks 'of nothing but the suffering.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her
emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to
become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her 'selfworld' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual's
illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents.
As to the batterer, he normally 'internalizes what is around him within the
environment.' And it becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is
aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong faade 'but in it
there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the
precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing
of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just
come up in her mind or in his mind.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to
defend themselves, and 'primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any
weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x
because that abound in the household.' He said a victim resorts to weapons

when she has 'reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other
recourse left on her but to act decisively.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he
conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the
psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his
diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the
time she killed her husband Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 'reexperiencing the trauma.' He said 'that we are trying to explain scientifically
that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just
come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when
the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he
interviewed Marivic 'she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x
x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or

the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable
Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated."9

Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the
prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed
sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for
automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this
Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of
his death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists
to determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the
inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of the case for purposes of the
automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower
court to admit the experts' testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's
Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological
and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the
lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to
submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.

Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic
by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan 10 and Alfredo Pajarillo,11
supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their
documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the lower court
before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case. 12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's
consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision
without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa
were legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with
a pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced
from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a
gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding
that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of
Marivic Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila and
her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to
save the life of her unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional
elements in determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in
this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of
parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death." 13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in
self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the
killing of Ben Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral
to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a
high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any
showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked,

misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance

that could affect the outcome of the case.14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible
error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court's
disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged
errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty decision
without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note that in his 17page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the
prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the
documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He
wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the
accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judge's
conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he
failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously hasty"
manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996.
Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the
trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment.
That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken
against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the
dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his
actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation. 15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant
had been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In
People v. Malabago,16 this Court held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim.
In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between
the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a
marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be
considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to."
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant's
deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic. 17 The
defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct
examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to Ben. 18
Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it,
except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a
palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made. 19 Other than merely attacking
the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the
admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased
was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's death
-- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the
Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the
appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape
with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that
exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually
caused the victim's death." Determining which of these admitted acts caused the
death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.

Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was
a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic
review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of "battered woman syndrome," for
which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the
crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of
self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the
surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character,
especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from
appellant's children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal
actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in
whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to
present.20 As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution
prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now
fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic
to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or
are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial
court's appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution of
the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes selfdefense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the
victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear
and convincing evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense
(and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from
the prosecution to the defense.22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman
syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in
foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete selfdefense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the justifiably fearful state of
mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of
time."24
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order
to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle
at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man
once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman."25
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem,
traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional

dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the
batterer's actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve. 26
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called
"cycle of violence,"27 which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. 28
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or
slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to
pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying
out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways
that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the
violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged,
because her "placatory" and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the
right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not
usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses
the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the
persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she
becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive
and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of control"
and leads to an acute battering incident. 29
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as
unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the
batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the
time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually
realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate
her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain,
although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the
face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much
stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to
fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such
that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt. 30
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends.
During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand,
the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows
that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her
forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered
woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that
her partner will change for the better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is
the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional
stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his
well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or
receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him.
Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of
getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most
thoroughly tormented psychologically.

The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's

psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each
other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this
miserable cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness," each partner may believe that
it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent,
capable of functioning without the other. 31
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several
witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
"ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was
cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was
abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested
to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he
pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after
that I go to him and he said 'sorry'.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive
behavior by your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?

A Yes, sir.
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Of course my husband.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[Court] /to the witness

Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted
on your occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the
occurrence?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel
me." 32
Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart" 33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr.
Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the
chart of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the
record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid
and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;

2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and
contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2 o to trauma. Attending
physician: Dr. Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician:
Dr. Canora; and
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy.
Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the
attending physician, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the
patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something
rough substance if force is applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left
breast. So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is
traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q Were you able to talk with the patient?

A Yes, sir.
Q What did she tell you?
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries.
And she told me that it was done to her by her husband.
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?

A Yes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime
in the month of November, 1995 when this incident happened?
A As per record, yes.
Q What was the date?
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
A Yes, sir.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the
patient pregnant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about
her pregnancy or for some other findings?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her
pregnancy.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
A One day.
Q Where?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were
able to examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months
pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension
and I think I have a record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she
had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had
hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment.
She does not response when the medication was given to her, because tension
headache is more or less stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in
nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the
family history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So,
from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in
hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood
pressure of the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous
level of blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus."

34

Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel,
Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on

some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were
inflicted upon her by Ben.35
Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to
sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home
drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened
about ten o'clock at night, because the couple "were very noisy and I heard
something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came running into Ecel's room and
locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a
knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to
find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they
found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to
sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she
heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other
witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling. 37 Marivic relates in detail the following
backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process
a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
"ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the
evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after
office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached
Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his father, then my second
child said, 'he was not home yet'. I was worried because that was payday, I was
anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son
arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?

A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me
at that time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that
he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she
resisted because she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her
because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.

Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else
did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was
just worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to
avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed
because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I
said to him, 'why did you switch off the light when the children were there.' At
that time I was also attending to my children who were doing their
assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went
to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from
watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were
scared and he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying
that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the
bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?

A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for
packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my
neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did
he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag
me.'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?

A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but
he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he
was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the
other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.

Q With the same blade?

A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me."

38

In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness
to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with
Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks,
the former briefly related the latter's ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in
layman's term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she
was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to
emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a
very meager income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of
the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas,
drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very
angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the
experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the husband
even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was
carrying was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time
very depressed because she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or
even hell when it was happening day in and day out." 39
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly
or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you
talked to her about three hours, what was the most relevant information did
you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most
important information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during
her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already
knew of the facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the
facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider
them as substantial.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband
they were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that
were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also
battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel
in Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in
that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered,
it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this
matter. I think that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is
your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it
was really a self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I
also believe that she became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety
reaction because of all the battering that happened and so she became an
abnormal person who had lost she's not during the time and that is why it
happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the
psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes. 40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test,
what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The
purpose of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she
someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I
can trust. That the data that I'm gathering from her are the truth." 41

The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on
his Psychiatric Report,42 which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic
Genosa. The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben,
everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until "Ben
started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially
cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking
sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family,
particularly to his wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional
abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the
viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a painful
ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a
drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than
eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her
husband whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further
quoting from the Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and
well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her.
But incessant battering became more and more frequent and more severe. x x x." 43
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind
that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her
state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely
merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the
events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out
that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common
law partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental state of the
appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why
would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live
with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring
hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her
self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the
reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called 'battered wife
syndrome.'"44
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn
from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person
who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar experience.
Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions
about battered women.45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic
violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on
the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with
the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of
the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latter's "ability to act
decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no
means of escape."46 In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse often

escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of
dying then."47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman
usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and selfsacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think
that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that]
they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to
them."48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not
readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the
latter's belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the
family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for
her spouse to change.49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had
previously testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated
"probably ten to twenty thousand" violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his experience with
domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in
Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to
her loss of consciousness.50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in
posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism." 51
After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons "may believe that they
are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute
battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping
responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim's ability to muster an active
response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to
believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect." 52
A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of
Pennsylvania, found that "even if a person has control over a situation, but believes
that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping
responses rather than trying to escape." He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the
individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as
"learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important
than the individual's set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered
women don't attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to
outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they
believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances." 54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the
violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and
that there is no escape. 55 Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety,
and usually fail to leave the relationship. 56 Unless a shelter is available, she stays with
her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also
because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more. 57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence
establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her
spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman
syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a

conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the
presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the
death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the
cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this
stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In
other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past,
she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute
battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses? What
means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next
(more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or
father's house;58 that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to
change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse?
Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the
sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was
she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them
regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and
thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the
syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the
defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and
scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or
deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her
partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's testimonies, which were culled
from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to
present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to
them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance
must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting
evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as
manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense. 59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to
the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the

offense60 -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and
honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to selfdefense must face a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must
be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense: 62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. 63 It presupposes
actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life
or safety of a person. 64 In the present case, however, according to the testimony of
Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression
of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of
the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still
have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat
upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already
suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the
killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable
pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she
can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" 65
Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering
episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening
behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. 66
Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be
appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant selfdefense.67 In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete
or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. 68 Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not
completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying
circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and
appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a

hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any
issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties. 69
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering
Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative]
provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural selfcontrol. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of
impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at
the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can
only be ended by an act of violence on her part." 70
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of
"repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well
as the severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic
stress disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the
severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the
prolonged commission of the battering and the psychological and constitutional
stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social support available
to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of
severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic
stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually
the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress
disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face,
strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the
individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful
stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because the
woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the
anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or
[atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual
will manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse,
restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be
happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?

A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any

prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to
six (6) months. After this six (6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the
book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the
repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal and then become
normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of
post[t]raumatic stress disorder." 72
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified
further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x
affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated."73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant
resulted in "cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance
and natural self-control," "psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or
impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were
analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power
without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a
resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to
paragraphs 974 and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance
should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. 77 To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an
act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act
is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity. 78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor,
preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while
dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also
be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life
was likewise on that of her fetus.79 His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which
was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced
passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat
to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she
felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she
and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet
drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.

The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no
considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal
equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's testimony 80 that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a
psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming brutality [or] trauma" -- the victim
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being
beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing the whole thing, the most
vicious and the trauma that she suffered." She thinks "of nothing but the suffering."
Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances,
must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and
prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further
be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as
passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the
severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the
repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which
was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without
depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he
had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight
months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her
life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced
passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from
the defense that the offended party might make. 81 In order to qualify an act as
treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing
itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no
place in the appreciation of evidence.82 Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. 83
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the
penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from
the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an "open,
depressed, circular" fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and
when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish
indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events
surrounding his death:
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did
he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)

A And he dragged me towards the door backward.

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag
me'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but
he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he
was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the
other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.

Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I
smashed him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before
when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood
pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood
pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the
witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I took
pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure
and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer." 84

The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no

showing of the victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the shooting.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument
or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because
the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant.85
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific
purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might
be put up by the party attacked. 86 There is no showing, though, that the present
appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband
without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the
contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about
the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any
convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which
she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the
doubt in her favor. 87
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the
penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 88 of
the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable,
considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in
reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were
shown to have attended the commission of the offense. 90 Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is
next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of
the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to
impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one
(1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years
8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the
minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole. 91
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was
neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts in the
present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality.
It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just
and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies
conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and
the distinct personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has
learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant's counsel, Atty.
Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work
within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent
them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom,
may do so.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases
of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute
battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time
of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not
all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby
AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby
imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately
RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole,
unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the
decision* of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty
of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before
they were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No.
04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged,
have been clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as
official counsel for the public respondent, thus:

Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983,
but a did not have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also
had another problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he
lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business
operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation,
approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries
(hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of
which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he
had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng)
referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity)
advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply
the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and
provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty
deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of
equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not
come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a
third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit,
however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in
question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3%
interest (Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT Before or upon delivery of each item of
Equipment, the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums
specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful performance
of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory
completion of the entire period of Lease, subject to the conditions of
clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing
agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner
would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same. After the
documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in
turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the
petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner
requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer
banking with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated
checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four
(4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges
subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of
Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank
Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and
006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861
dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled
out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware

that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his
wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never
came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason
"account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the
accused-petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as
follows:
. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to
imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695
and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected
in subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a
quo, this Court is intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of the cases
which were intended by the parties, the petitioner on the one hand and the private
complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit" equivalent to the 30%
requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng is one of the officers of Mancor,
the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of the high
financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service
equipment, which was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning
of the transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to
30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is
obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was
just paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted
to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the termination of the leasepurchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of the
warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the
transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid
for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the
petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business
failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged
against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not
withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even
make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the
amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation officials and
employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the checks he issued were
turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his
knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is
irregular and immoral per se, hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge
the source of the "warranty deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was
she who "accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the
needed funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is
shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a
scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her
corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at
the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty accommodations

as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting
businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the
deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing
equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme
designed to skim off business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the
penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to
apply the full harshness of the special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia"
doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in
the highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above
in the lease agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases,
were mere accommodation-arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner
did not even attempt to secure the refund of said amount from LS Finance,
notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To argue that after the
termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable in full
to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his
official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to
shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through
manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least
should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions
with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen
who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the
primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and
potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having
actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on
the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount
to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point
in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious
transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is
founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which
are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence
and progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that
morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral
opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means of
emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount
of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note
also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon
the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed
against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt
that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not
to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and
therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in
question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential

wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by

convicting the petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused,
however, by the open admission of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate
beneficiary of the "warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was
convicted, as shown below:
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the
accused to complainant had been extinguished by the termination of the
leasing agreement by the terms of which the warranty deposit
advanced by complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee
and that as the lessor L.S. Finance neither made any liquidation of said
amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may he assumed that
the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these
allegations, even if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant
and established by the evidence, that the four checks were originally
issued on account or for value. And as We have already observed, in
order that there may be a conviction under the from paragraph of
Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 with respect to the element of said offense that
the check should have been made and issued on account or for value
it is sufficient, all the other elements of the offense being present, that
the check must have been drawn and issued in payment of an obligation.
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the
issuance of the checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the
checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case at bar
beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is
no satisfactory proof that there was such an extinguishment in the
present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not adduced
any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the
complainant to cover the warranty deposit must already have been
returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal
rule that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. On the contrary, the same court even expected the petitioner-appellant to
adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime charged. But how can be
produce documents showing that the warranty deposit has already been taken back
by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest in the transaction,
besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may
have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting
from the petitioner since she had in her possession the checks that "bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of
the warranty deposit is evident from the following pronouncement:
And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused
violated BP Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law, violations of which
are mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases of mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated,
proof of criminal intent not being necessary for the conviction of the
accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy and the
defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in
prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)

The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks
by the petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for
value", as required under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the following
definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated
checks were issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime could not have been
committed by petitioner:
a) Warranty A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that
certain facts are truly as they are represented to be and that they will
remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
Fitness for Particular Purpose:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an implied warranty that
the goods shall be fit for such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)
b) Deposit: Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for
the performance of some contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in
his undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment and to that extent
may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate.
To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safekeeping or as a pledge to intrust to the care of another.
The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or
convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules
and regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit
which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly
accepted and generally understood among bankers and by the public,
includes not only deposits payable on demand and for which certificates,
whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable on demand, or
on certain notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason . . .
is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact
that he did not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a
matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey
Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different
if this predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding
the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance Management.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142396

February 11, 2003

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against
petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation"
conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an
Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been
seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo
who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On
08 January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the
two accused.
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have
been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC
detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to the
Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the
regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies
in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by
Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to
stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the
Philippines.
"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his
house and introduced to him by a certain Jose Iigo, an informer of the Intelligence
Unit of the military. Jose Iigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of
Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of
the anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines.
"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction of
Jose Iigo, the defendant expressed his interest in buying caviar. As a matter of fact,
he bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar,
aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was his
business after the Khomeini government cut his pension of over $3,000.00 per month.
During their introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his calling
card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a

special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the

United States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the back of the card
appears a telephone number in defendants own handwriting, the number of which he
can also be contacted.
"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US
Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman named Abbas Torabian. The defendant
told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their
conversation, however, was more concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar.
Thereafter, the defendant promised to see plaintiff again.
"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter for dinner at
Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200 grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought
the merchandize but for the reason that the defendant was not yet there, he
requested the restaurant people to x x x place the same in the refrigerator.
Defendant, however, came and plaintiff gave him the caviar for which he was paid.
Then their conversation was again focused on politics and business.
"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18
years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff
valued at $27,900.00. After some haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason
that defendant did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come
back the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with his $24,000.00,
which he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of
carpets.1awphi1.nt
"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back again to
plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the latter's bedroom, where the latter and
his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the
bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee
in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told him that he would be leaving
the Philippines very soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while so
that he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and
without putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the
defendant where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise,
an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun. He was in the
company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans, all armed. He was
handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the street, he was brought inside the house
by the defendant. He was made to sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant
was inside his bedroom. The defendant came out of the bedroom and out from
defendant's attach case, he took something and placed it on the table in front of the
plaintiff. They also took plaintiff's wife who was at that time at the boutique near his
house and likewise arrested Torabian, who was playing chess with him in the bedroom
and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he was being
handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his bedroom was invaded by
defendant. He was not allowed to use the telephone. In fact, his telephone was
unplugged. He asked for any warrant, but the defendant told him to `shut up. He was
nevertheless told that he would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him.
"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come out to
meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant
paid for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together
with a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also
discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian carpets, valued
at $65,000.00, a painting he bought for P30,000.00 together with his TV and betamax

sets. He claimed that when he was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his
wallet. There was, therefore, nothing left in his house.
"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized throughout the
world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in
the Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. x x
x
In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only in the
Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said places informed
him that they saw him on TV with said news.
"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp Crame
handcuffed together, where they were detained for three days without food and
water."1
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special appearance for
Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an answer pending a supposed advice
from the United States Department of State and Department of Justice on the
defenses to be raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo
filed another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground that he, not
being a resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam, was beyond
the processes of the court. The motion was denied by the court, in its order of 13
December 1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to
file an answer to the complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of
summons which could likewise be construed a waiver of the requirement of formal
notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration of the court order, contending that a
motion for an extension of time to file an answer was not a voluntary appearance
equivalent to service of summons since it did not seek an affirmative relief. Scalzo
argued that in cases involving the United States government, as well as its agencies
and officials, a motion for extension was peculiarly unavoidable due to the need (1) for
both the Department of State and the Department of Justice to agree on the defenses
to be raised and (2) to refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to
first review the case. The court a quo denied the motion for reconsideration in its
order of 15 October 1989.
Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. No.
17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated 06 October 1989, the appellate court
denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then elevated the
incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this Court.
The petition, however, was denied for its failure to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88; in
any event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed to show that the appellate court was in
error in its questioned judgment.
Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a)
declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file a responsive pleading (answer) and (b)
setting the case for the reception of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a
motion to set aside the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint.
Granting the motion, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo
denied the material allegations of the complaint and raised the affirmative defenses
(a) of Minuchers failure to state a cause of action in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo
had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo
interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys' fees and expenses
of litigation.

Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case,
Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special
agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to
diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United
States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs
of the Philippines and a Certification, dated 11 June 1990, of Vice Consul Donna
Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. In an order
of 25 June 1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this Court,
docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo,
et al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered dismissed. The
case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per
this Courts resolution of 07 August 1990. On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering
the dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with
this Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the Honorable
Court of Appeals, et. al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the judgment of the Court
of Appeals. In a decision, dated 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and
remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The remand was ordered on the theses
(a) that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack
of jurisdiction over his person without even considering the issue of the authenticity of
Diplomatic Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint contained sufficient allegations to
the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and
outside the scope of his official duties and, absent any evidence to the contrary, the
issue on Scalzos diplomatic immunity could not be taken up.
The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November 1995,
the trial court reached a decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully established his claim by sufficient
evidence, against the defendant in the manner following:
"`Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of
P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the
sum of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.
`The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the lien of the
Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid docket fees considering that the
plaintiff in this case instituted this action as a pauper litigant." 2
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented
by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he,
nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of committed
outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with
diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal
and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna
Convention.
Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a two-fold
issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, following the
decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of

Appeals from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely different manner, and (2)
whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata, would
require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties on the part of the court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the
merits, and 4) an identity of the parties, subject matter and causes of action. 3 Even
while one of the issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 - "whether or not public
respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a
diplomat immune from civil suit conformably with the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations" - is also a pivotal question raised in the instant petition, the
ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not resolved that point with finality. Indeed, the
Court there has made this observation "It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial
Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he would present documentary
evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff
and on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved
his right to present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the
alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to
dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the
issue of diplomatic immunity."4
Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the
Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his
functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting
surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the
source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained the
target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual
arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a number of documents 1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;
2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June
1990;
3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991;
4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and
5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.
6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser,
Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note
No. 414 to the Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);
7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh.
'3'); and
8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol,
Department of Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez,
addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court. 5
The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy
accordingly advised the Executive Department of the Philippine Government that

Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission
from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August
1988; (2) that the United States Government was firm from the very beginning in
asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant to the
provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United
States Embassy repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take
appropriate action to inform the trial court of Scalzos diplomatic immunity. The other
documentary exhibits were presented to indicate that: (1) the Philippine government
itself, through its Executive Department, recognizing and respecting the diplomatic
status of Scalzo, formally advised the "Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status
and his entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna
Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated Diplomatic
Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his
reports of investigation on the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the
certification of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department
of Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned to the Philippines at all times
relevant to the complaint, and the special power of attorney executed by him in favor
of his previous counsel6 to show (a) that the United States Embassy, affirmed by its
Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the
United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985
until his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation of
the Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as member
of the mission, he investigated Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug,
and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs itself recognized that Scalzo
during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was
listed as being an Assistant Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and
accredited with diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines. In his Exhibit
12, Scalzo described the functions of the overseas office of the United States Drugs
Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative expertise and
assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on narcotic and drug control programs
upon the request of the host country, 2) to establish and maintain liaison with the host
country and counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct complex
criminal investigations involving international criminal conspiracies which affect the
interests of the United States.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old
customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had
long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the peoples of
the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the
states of India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person of the
diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held sacrosanct. 7 By the end of the
16th century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the
inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established as a rule of customary
international law.8 Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states
was undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent embodiment of
the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the official usually entrusted with
the external affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to have a more prominent
diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a
diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the
diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of the
sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. 9
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a)
ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, 10 (b) envoys,11 ministers or
internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs 12 accredited
to the ministers of foreign affairs.13 Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission"

are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff.
Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the
members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are
accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so,
nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only
"diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket
diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic
agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly
withholding the same privileges from all others. It might bear stressing that even
consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and
navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the
issuance of passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of
oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges
accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of
representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination
of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.
Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant
Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the
Philippine Government. An attach belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic
establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial
affairs. There could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or
departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who
are detailed by their respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as
the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches,
or the like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively
under him, but their main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and
developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their
own ministries or departments in the home government.14 These officials are not
generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally
designated as having diplomatic rank.
In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos.
414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25
October 1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate
the Court's initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz:
"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the basis of an
erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, the private
respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of
jurisdiction over his person.
"x x x x x x x x x
"And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private
respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of authenticity raised by the
petitioner and the doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact that it took
private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the
time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking
for a first extension of time to file the Answer because the Departments of State and
Justice of the United States of America were studying the case for the purpose of
determining his defenses, before he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US
Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the sake of argument that such note is

authentic, the complaint for damages filed by petitioner cannot be peremptorily

dismissed.
"x x x x x x x x x
"There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were
done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the socalled Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent then should have sustained the
trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most
proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the selfserving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose
authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court
yielded to the private respondent's claim is arbitrary."
A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November 1992,
issued by the Office of Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by
Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the records of the
Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the
Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as an Assistant
Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited
diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines." No certified true copy of such
"records," the supposed bases for the belated issuance, was presented in evidence.
Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the
executive branch of the government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 15 the
Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied.
Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to
gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the Philippine
government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect,
that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances.
It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the
law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity
from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. 16 The government of the United States
itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its standards for
recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State Department policy is to only concede
diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and
"performs duties of diplomatic nature." 17 Supplementary criteria for accreditation are
the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue such
passports, a diplomatic note formally representing the intention to assign the person
to diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years
of age, and performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time basis. 18
Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job
title to that which currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol
would then assign each individual to the appropriate functional category. 19
But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was
sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug
activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be
ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he
committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be
resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a
long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the
personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit 20 and, with the emergence of

democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his
representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. 21 If the
acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent,
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the
complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without
its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the
state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the
State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. 22
The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would
require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit
must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.23
In United States of America vs. Guinto, 24 involving officers of the United States Air
Force and special officers of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators charged with
the duty of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this
Court has ruled "While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state
for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x x x. It cannot
for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity
when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for
discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly
impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be
sued. x x x As they have acted on behalf of the government, and within the scope of
their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, [who were]
responsible for their acts." 25
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of
Appeals26 elaborates:
"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as
such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly
set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs.
Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its
officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State,
and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded
or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State
within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said
that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or
invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act
or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the
State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
"x x x x x x x x x
"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed
the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises

where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction." 27
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit
but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic
courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and
personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement
between the governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to
send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug
dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to
the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned
from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of
communication between agencies of the government of the two countries,
certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the
United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine
Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of
Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic
status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government
has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of
agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of
Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after
having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be
expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later
acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to
have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to
conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is
entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-44896

July 31, 1936

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine
Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance
of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try
him. His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition
with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance
of the criminal action filed against him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First
Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for
the reason that under Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the
Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the
courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines
original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is
not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is
subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte
Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal
prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. (U. S. vs.
Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The
substantial question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction.
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the
Constitution of the United States governs this case. We do not deem it
necessary to discuss the question whether the constitutional provision relied
upon by the petitioner extended ex propio vigore over the Philippines. Suffice it
to say that the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on November 15,

1935, has brought about a fundamental change in the political and legal status
of the Philippines. On the date mentioned the Constitution of the Philippines
went into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
Not only the members of this court but all other officers, legislative, executive
and judicial, of the Government of the Commonwealth, are bound by oath to
support the Constitution. (Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes its own
existence to the great instrument, and derives all its powers therefrom. In the
exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of
the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this
court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls." In deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond this
constitutional provision.
2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon
this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, is exclusive. The Constitution does not define the
jurisdiction of this court in specific terms, but merely provides that "the
Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be
possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the
original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls."
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises
whether the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive.
The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from
section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads as follows: The Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil
Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in
other cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus was also conferred on the Courts of First
Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and
525.) It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was not
exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance. Inasmuch as this
is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and made to
include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, it follows
that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in the
pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution of the
United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this
constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original
jurisdiction thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not
exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent
Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the
subordinate courts of the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S.,
252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth
conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal cases

to which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one
hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included
the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated,
consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or
ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside. By
Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until the
inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless
inconsistent with the Constitution until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
National Assembly. The original jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to
try criminal cases was not made exclusively by any, law in force prior to the
inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that the
jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction, the
laws in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of
First Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and
must be deemed to remain operative and in force, subject to the power of the
National Assembly to amend alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. vs.
Insular Collector of Customs, U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No.
12, pp. 620, 623.)
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try
the petitioner, an that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied. So ordered.

G.R. No. 125865

March 26, 2001

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated January 28,
2000, denying the petition for review.
The Motion is anchored on the following arguments:
1) THE DFA'S DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE
MADE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND IS CONCLUSIVE
UPON THE COURTS.
2) THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS ABSOLUTE.
3) THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
(ADB).

4) DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE COMPLAINANT TO REBUT THE DFA
PROTOCOL.
5) THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000 ERRONEOUSLY MADE A FINDING OF
FACT ON THE MERITS, NAMELY, THE SLANDERING OF A PERSON WHICH
PREJUDGED PETITIONER'S CASE BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
(MTC)-MANDALUYONG.
6) THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
THIS CASE.
This case has its origin in two criminal Informations 1 for grave oral defamation filed
against petitioner, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28
and January 31, 1994, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal,
a member of the clerical staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign
Affairs that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal
Informations against him. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the
People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside the
order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases. 2
Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. On January 28, 2000, we
rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for review. We ruled, in essence,
that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited
to acts performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, we held that the immunity
cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the
name of official duty.
On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were heard. This Court also
granted the Motion for Intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter,
the parties were directed to submit their respective memorandum.
For the most part, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration deals with the diplomatic
immunity of the ADB, its officials and staff, from legal and judicial processes in the
Philippines, as well as the constitutional and political bases thereof. It should be made
clear that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even
remotely. The issue in this case, rather, boils down to whether or not the statements
allegedly made by petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official
functions, in order for this case to fall squarely under the provisions of Section 45 (a)
of the "Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development
Bank," to wit:
Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts
and consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the following
privileges and immunities:
(a) Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them
in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioner's and intervenor's
Motions for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of
January 28, 2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch,
cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB

officers and personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging
the criminal case for oral defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not.
What we merely stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an
act performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioner's
utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner and intervenor Department of Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan and Pardo, JJ ., concur.

G.R. No. L-18924

October 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the
information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having
illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality
while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of
the city.

The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held
and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is
erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has
no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime,
like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based
on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which,
crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of
the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one
that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence
prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is
now a territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.],
116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be
obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to
continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or
merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable
to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime
committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country,
but when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the headlands,
which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters,
and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law
[Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La
Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of
the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by
that sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and
Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb
only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by
the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public
peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the
proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to
determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs.
Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular
case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local

jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in
the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels
being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not
apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed
from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the
laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the
penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other
than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to
renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as
England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was
committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page
625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all
the territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of
commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty
freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places,
ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are
permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any
parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and
warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants
and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete
protection and security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and
statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation
Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit
was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of
our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without
being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that
our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a
disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at
anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are
impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no
unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come
into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on
board.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to
costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 163267

May 5, 2010

TEOFILO EVANGELISTA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
To be guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, one does
not have to be in actual physical possession thereof. The law does not punish physical
possession alone but possession in general, which includes constructive possession or
the subjection of the thing to the owners control. 1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 assails the October 15, 2003 Decision 3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 21805 which affirmed the January 23, 1998
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 convicting
petitioner Teofilo Evangelista for violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1866,5 as amended, as well as the April 16, 2004 Resolution which denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
In an Information6 dated January 31, 1996, petitioner was charged with violation of
Section 1 of PD 1866 allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of January 1996, at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport, Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, custody and control the following items:
1. One (1) Unit 9mm Jericho Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283 with one (1)
magazine;
2. One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel Submachine gun with SN 931864 with two
(2) magazines;
3. Nineteen (19) 9mm bullets.
without the corresponding permit or license from competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After posting his bail, petitioner filed on February 14, 1996 an Urgent Motion for (a)
Suspension of Proceedings and (b) the Holding of A Preliminary Investigation. 7 The RTC
granted the motion and, accordingly, the State Prosecutor conducted the preliminary
investigation.
In a Resolution8 dated March 6, 1996, the State Prosecutor found no probable cause to
indict petitioner and thus recommended the reversal of the resolution finding probable
cause and the dismissal of the complaint. Thereafter, a Motion to Withdraw
Information9 was filed but it was denied by the trial court in an Order 10 dated March
26, 1996, viz:
Acting on the "Motion to Withdraw Information" filed by State Prosecutor Aida
Macapagal on the ground that [there exists] no probable cause to indict the accused,

the Information having been already filed in Court, the matter should be left to the
discretion of the Court to assess the evidence, hence, for lack of merit, the same is
hereby denied. Let the arraignment of the accused proceed.
When arraigned on March 26, 1996, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
In the morning of January 30, 1996, Maximo Acierto, Jr. (Acierto), a Customs Police
assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) District Command, was
informed by his superior that a certain passenger of Philippine Airlines (PAL) Flight No.
657 would be arriving from Dubai bringing with him firearms and ammunitions. Shortly
after lunch, Acierto, together with Agents Cuymo and Fuentabella, proceeded to the
tube area where they were met by a crewmember who introduced to them herein
petitioner. Acierto asked petitioner if he brought firearms with him and the latter
answered in the affirmative adding that the same were bought in Angola. Thereupon,
Acierto was summoned to the cockpit by the pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata (Capt.
Nadurata), where the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to him. Petitioner
was then escorted to the arrival area to get his luggage and thereafter proceeded to
the examination room where the luggage was examined and petitioner was
investigated. In open court, Acierto identified the firearms and ammunitions.
During the investigation, petitioner admitted before Special Agent Apolonio Bustos
(Bustos) that he bought the subject items in Angola but the same were confiscated by
the Dubai authorities, which turned over the same to a PAL personnel in Dubai. Upon
inquiry, the Firearms and Explosive Office (FEO) in Camp Crame certified that
petitioner is neither registered with said office 11 nor licensed holder of aforesaid
firearms and ammunitions. Bustos likewise verified from the Bureau of Customs, but
his effort yielded no record to show that the firearms were legally purchased. Among
the documents Bustos had gathered during his investigation were the Arrival
Endorsement Form12 and Customs Declaration Form.13 A referral letter14 was prepared
endorsing the matter to the Department of Justice. Bustos admitted that petitioner
was not assisted by counsel when the latter admitted that he bought the firearms in
Angola.
SPO4 Federico Bondoc, Jr. (SPO4 Bondoc), a member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and representative of the FEO, upon verification, found that petitioner is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder. His office issued a certification 15 to that effect
which he identified in court as Exhibit "A".
After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner, with leave of court, filed his Demurrer
to Evidence,16 the resolution of which was deferred pending submission of petitioners
evidence.17
Version of the Defense
The defense presented Capt. Nadurata whose brief but candid and straightforward
narration of the event was synthesized by the CA as follows:
x x x On January 30, 1996, he was approached by the PAL Station Manager in Dubai,
who informed him that a Filipino contract worker from Angola who is listed as a
passenger of PAL flight from Dubai to Manila, was being detained as he was found in
possession of firearms; that if said passenger will not be able to board the airplane, he
would be imprisoned in Dubai; and that the Arabs will only release the passenger if

the Captain of PAL would accept custody of the passenger [herein petitioner] and the
firearms. Capt. Nadurata agreed to take custody of the firearms and the passenger,
herein appellant, so that the latter could leave Dubai. The firearms were deposited by
the Arabs in the cockpit of the airplane and allowed the appellant to board the
airplane. Upon arrival in Manila, Capt. Nadurata surrendered the firearms to the
airport authorities.
Meanwhile, in view of the unavailability of the defenses intended witness, Nilo
Umayaw (Umayaw), the PAL Station Manager in Dubai, the prosecution and the
defense agreed and stipulated on the following points:
1. That PAL Station Manager Mr. Nilo Umayaw was told by a Dubai Police that
firearms and ammunitions were found in the luggage of a Filipino passenger
coming from Angola going to the Philippines;
2. That he was the one who turned over the subject firearms to Captain Edwin
Nadurata, the Pilot in command of PAL Flight 657;
3. That the subject firearms [were] turned over at Dubai;
4. That the said firearms and ammunitions were confiscated from the accused
Teofilo Evangelista and the same [were] given to the PAL Station Manager who
in turn submitted [them] to the PAL Pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata who has already
testified;
5. That [these are] the same firearms involved in this case. 18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions: (One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel
submachine gun with SN-931864 with two (2) magazines and nineteen (19) 9mm
bullets) and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Seventeen (17) Years and Four
(4) Months to Twenty (20) Years.
The above-mentioned firearms are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government and is ordered transmitted to the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila
for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.19
On April 4, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial 20 which the RTC granted.21
Forthwith, petitioner took the witness stand narrating his own version of the incident
as follows:
On January 28, 1996, he was at Dubai International Airport waiting for his flight to the
Philippines. He came from Luwanda, Angola where he was employed as a seaman at
Oil International Limited. While at the airport in Dubai, Arab policemen suddenly
accosted him and brought him to their headquarters where he saw guns on top of a
table. The Arabs maltreated him and forced him to admit ownership of the guns. At
this point, PAL Station Manager Umayaw came and talked to the policemen in Arabian

dialect. Umayaw told him that he will only be released if he admits ownership of the
guns. When he denied ownership of the same, Umayaw reiterated that he (petitioner)
will be released only if he will bring the guns with him to the Philippines. He declined
and insisted that the guns are not his. Upon the request of Umayaw, petitioner was
brought to the Duty Free area for his flight going to the Philippines. When he was
inside the plane, he saw the Arab policemen handing the guns to the pilot. Upon
arrival at the NAIA, he was arrested by the Customs police and brought to the arrival
area where his passport was stamped and he was made to sign a Customs Declaration
Form without reading its contents. Thereafter, he was brought to a room at the ground
floor of the NAIA where he was investigated. During the investigation, he was not
represented by counsel and was forced to accept ownership of the guns. He denied
ownership of the guns and the fact that he admitted having bought the same in
Angola.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After new trial, the RTC still found petitioner liable for the offense charged but
modified the penalty of imprisonment. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated
January 23, 1998 reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions: One (1) Unit 9mm Jerico Pistol, Israel with
SN F-36283 with one (1) magazine; One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel submachine gun
with SN-931864 with two (2) magazines and nineteen (19) 9mm bullets and hereby
sentences him to imprisonment of Six (6) Years and One (1) Day to Eight (8) Years and
a fine of P30,000.00.
The above-mentioned firearms are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government and [are] ordered transmitted to the National Bureau of Investigation,
Manila for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.22
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court in its Decision dated October
15, 2003. It ruled that the stipulations during the trial are binding on petitioner. As
regards possession of subject firearms, the appellate court ruled that Capt. Naduratas
custody during the flight from Dubai to Manila was for and on behalf of petitioner.
Thus, there was constructive possession.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration 23 but it was denied by the appellate court in its
April 16, 2004 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
a. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not acquitting Evangelista from the
charge of Presidential Decree No. 1866, Illegal Possession of Firearms.

b. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that Evangelista was never
in possession of any firearm or ammunition within Philippine jurisdiction and he
therefore could not have committed the crime charged against him.
c. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that Evangelista committed a
continuing crime.
d. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the results of the
preliminary investigation.24
We find the appeal devoid of merit.
At the outset, we emphasize that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for
review on certiorari shall only raise questions of law considering that the findings of
fact of the CA are, as a general rule, conclusive upon and binding on the Supreme
Court.25 In this recourse, petitioner indulges us to calibrate once again the evidence
adduced by the parties and to re-evaluate the credibility of their witnesses. On this
ground alone, the instant petition deserves to be denied outright. However, as the
liberty of petitioner is at stake and following the principle that an appeal in a criminal
case throws the whole case wide open for review, we are inclined to delve into the
merits of the present petition.
In his bid for acquittal, petitioner argues that he could not have committed the crime
imputed against him for he was never in custody and possession of any firearm or
ammunition when he arrived in the Philippines. Thus, the conclusion of the appellate
court that he was in constructive possession of the subject firearms and ammunitions
is erroneous.
We are not persuaded. As correctly found by the CA:
Appellants argument that he was never found in possession of the subject firearms
and ammunitions within Philippine jurisdiction is specious. It is worthy to note that at
the hearing of the case before the court a quo on October 8, 1996, the defense
counsel stipulated that the subject firearms and ammunitions were confiscated from
appellant and the same were given to PAL Station Manager Nilo Umayaw who, in turn,
turned over the same to Capt. Edwin Nadurata. Such stipulation of fact is binding on
appellant, for the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client.
Granting that Nilo Umayaw was merely told by the Dubai authorities that the firearms
and ammunitions were found in the luggage of appellant and that Umayaw had no
personal knowledge thereof, however, appellants signature on the Customs
Declaration Form, which contains the entry "2 PISTOL guns SENT SURRENDER TO
PHILIPPINE AIRLINE," proves that he was the one who brought the guns to Manila.
While appellant claims that he signed the Customs Declaration Form without reading it
because of his excitement, however, he does not claim that he was coerced or
persuaded in affixing his signature thereon. The preparation of the Customs
Declaration Form is a requirement for all arriving passengers in an international flight.
Moreover, it cannot be said that appellant had already been arrested when he signed
the Customs Declaration Form. He was merely escorted by Special Agent Acierto to
the arrival area of the NAIA. In fact, appellant admitted that it was only after he signed
the Customs Declaration Form that he was brought to the ground floor of NAIA for
investigation. Consequently, appellant was in constructive possession of the subject
firearms. As held in People v. Dela Rosa, the kind of possession punishable under PD
1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively
with animus possidendi or intention to possess the same. Animus possidendi is a state
of mind. As such, what goes on into the mind of the accused, as his real intent, could

be determined solely based on his prior and coetaneous acts and the surrounding
circumstances explaining how the subject firearm came to his possession.
Appellants witness, Capt. Nadurata, the PAL pilot of Flight No. PR 657 from Dubai to
Manila on January 30, 1996, testified that he accepted custody of the firearms and of
appellant in order that the latter, who was being detained in Dubai for having been
found in possession of firearms, would be released from custody. In other words, Capt.
Naduratas possession of the firearm during the flight from Dubai to Manila was for
and on behalf of appellant. 26
We find no cogent reason to deviate from the above findings, especially considering
petitioners admission during the clarificatory questioning by the trial court:
Court: So, it is clear now in the mind of the Court, that the firearms and ammunitions
will also be with you on your flight to Manila, is that correct?
A: Yes, your honor.
Court: [You] made mention of that condition, that the Dubai police agreed to
release you provided that you will bring the guns and ammunitions with you? Is
that the condition of the Dubai Police?
A: Yes, your honor.
Court: The condition of his release was that he will have to bring the guns and
ammunitions to the Philippines and this arrangement was made by the PAL
Supervisor at Dubai and it was Mr. Umayaw the PAL Supervisor, who interceded
in his behalf with the Dubai Police for his flight in the Philippines. 27
To us, this constitutes judicial admission of his possession of the subject firearms and
ammunitions. This admission, the veracity of which requires no further proof, may be
controverted only upon a clear showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no admission was made.28 No such controversion is extant on record.
Moreover, we cannot ignore the Customs Declaration Form wherein it appeared that
petitioner brought the firearms with him upon his arrival in the Philippines. While there
was no showing that he was forced to sign the form, petitioner can only come up with
the excuse that he was excited. Hardly can we accept such pretension.
We are likewise not swayed by petitioners contention that the lower court erroneously
relied on the Customs Declaration Form since it is not admissible in evidence because
it was accomplished without the benefit of counsel while he was under police custody.
The accomplishment of the Customs Declaration Form was not elicited through
custodial investigation. It is a customs requirement which petitioner had a clear
obligation to comply. As correctly observed by the CA, the preparation of the Customs
Declaration Form is a requirement for all arriving passengers in an international flight.
Petitioner was among those passengers. Compliance with the constitutional procedure
on custodial investigation is, therefore, not applicable in this case. Moreover, it is
improbable that the customs police were the ones who filled out the declaration form.
As will be noted, it provides details that only petitioner could have possibly known or
supplied. Even assuming that there was prior accomplishment of the form which
contains incriminating details, petitioner could have easily taken precautionary
measures by not affixing his signature thereto. Or he could have registered his

objection thereto especially when no life threatening acts were being employed
against him upon his arrival in the country.
Obviously, it was not only the Customs Declaration Form from which the courts below
based their conclusion that petitioner was in constructive possession of subject
firearms and ammunitions. Emphasis was also given on the stipulations and
admissions made during the trial. These pieces of evidence are enough to show that
he was the owner and possessor of these items.
Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case filed against
him. He claims that his alleged possession of the subject firearms transpired while he
was at the Dubai Airport and his possession thereof has ceased when he left for the
Philippines. He insists that since Dubai is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines and his situation is not one of the exceptions provided in Article 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, our criminal laws are not applicable. In short, he had not
committed a crime within the Philippines.1avvphi1
Indeed it is fundamental that the place where the crime was committed determines
not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. 29 In order
for the courts to acquire jurisdiction in criminal cases, the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. If the evidence adduced during the trial shows that
the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction.30
Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was
committed in the Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs
Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was
already in possession of the subject firearms in the Philippines.
And more than mere possession, the prosecution was able to ascertain that he has no
license or authority to possess said firearms. It bears to stress that the essence of the
crime penalized under PD 1866, as amended, is primarily the accuseds lack of license
to possess the firearm. The fact of lack or absence of license constitutes an essential
ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Since it has been shown that
petitioner was already in the Philippines when he was found in possession of the
subject firearms and determined to be without any authority to possess them, an
essential ingredient of the offense, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was
perpetrated and completed in no other place except the Philippines.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. In this case, the information specifically
and categorically alleged that on or about January 30, 1996 petitioner was in
possession, custody and control of the subject firearms at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport, Pasay City, Philippines, certainly a territory within the jurisdiction
of the trial court.
In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that
the present charge happened in Dubai. It may be well to recall that while in Dubai,
petitioner, even in a situation between life and death, firmly denied possession and
ownership of the firearms. Furthermore, there is no record of any criminal case having
been filed against petitioner in Dubai in connection with the discovered firearms.
Since there is no pending criminal case when he left Dubai, it stands to reason that
there was no crime committed in Dubai. The age-old but familiar rule that he who
alleges must prove his allegation applies. 31

Petitioner finally laments the trial courts denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information
filed by the investigating prosecutor due to the latters finding of lack of probable
cause to indict him. He argues that such denial effectively deprived him of his
substantive right to a preliminary investigation.
Still, petitioners argument fails to persuade. There is nothing procedurally improper
on the part of the trial court in disregarding the result of the preliminary investigation
it itself ordered. Judicial action on the motion rests in the sound exercise of judicial
discretion. In denying the motion, the trial court just followed the jurisprudential rule
laid down in Crespo v. Judge Mogul32 that once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests on the sound discretion of the court. The court is not dutifully bound
by such finding of the investigating prosecutor. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc v.
Judge How33 we held:
It bears stressing that the court is however not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess
the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine prima
facie case.
Consequently, petitioner has no valid basis to insist on the trial court to respect the
result of the preliminary investigation it ordered to be conducted.
In fine, we find no reason not to uphold petitioners conviction. The records
substantiate the RTC and CAs finding that petitioner possessed, albeit constructively,
the subject firearms and ammunition when he arrived in the Philippines on January 30,
1996. Moreover, no significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been
overlooked or disregarded which if considered would have altered the outcome of the
case.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the
Court has reiterated the essential elements in People v. Eling34 to wit: (1) the
existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or
owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of
the crime. The existence of the subject firearms and the ammunition were established
through the testimony of Acierto. Their existence was likewise admitted by petitioner
when he entered into stipulation and through his subsequent judicial admission.
Concerning petitioners lack of authority to possess the firearms, SPO4 Bondoc, Jr.
testified that upon verification, it was ascertained that the name of petitioner does not
appear in the list of registered firearm holders or a registered owner thereof. As proof,
he submitted a certification to that effect and identified the same in court. The
testimony of SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. or the certification from the FEO would suffice to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element. 35
A final point. Republic Act (RA) No. 8294 36 took effect on June 6, 1997 or after the
commission of the crime on January 30, 1996. However, since it is advantageous to
the petitioner, it should be given retrospective application insofar as the penalty is
concerned.
Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294 provides:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. x x x
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered
firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9
millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but
considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and
other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three:
Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
Prision mayor in its minimum period ranges from six years and one day to eight years.
Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC as affirmed by the CA is proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21805 affirming the January 23, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated January 23, 1998, convicting petitioner Teofilo
Evangelista of violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six years and one day to eight
years and to pay a fine of P30,000.00 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111709

August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.

INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court
for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned
ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600
barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of
P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second
Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the
use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older
brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accusedappellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38
caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the
vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint
over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the
vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then
painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was
forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC
that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the
vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air
Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded
negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and
cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed to
arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991,
arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18
nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride"
anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the
vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong
supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an
interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the
transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel
remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three
batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities for
a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first
batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by
accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to
Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in
proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accusedappellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places
in Metro Manila.

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew,
called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The
crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident
was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and
members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were
present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance,
accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hiway by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to
evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the
lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accusedappellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA,
CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine
(9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed
as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991,
both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then
manning a motor launch and armed with high powered guns, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize
while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with
petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members,
employing violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes
were unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10,
1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon
arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon
ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some
inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991,
maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of
any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their

own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2, 1991,
while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto
Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the seashore.
Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were
told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month
with additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They agreed even
though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel,
prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone to
Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the
morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen
days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their addresses.
There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at
home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio
Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence
that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and
later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on
board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain.
The company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including shipoil,
bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. It owned four
vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and
his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section
of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone
operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker,
who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore
dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the
latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to
the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon
his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship
transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by
Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was
given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together
with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a
vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the
transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities
before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance
upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the
brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through the immigration.
The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers
then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of
the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T
Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong
claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's
personal card.

Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi
Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which
"Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the
payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of
March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by
the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first
transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks,
including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer
took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the
transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels
and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or
ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to
discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer,
this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was
scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha
Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A
person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco
himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco,
Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI
agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the
crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals,
of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential
Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said
crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said
crime is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987
Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each
meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of
the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no
longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly
and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of
P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6%
per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the
accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex
Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no
longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby
condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value
of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus
interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused Cheong San Hiong
has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.

All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the
National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency
of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly
with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau
of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.

(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants
may be summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial
court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were
being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of
their constitutional right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his
appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or
on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of
the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven
witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend
that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were
forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to read the contents of
the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in
violation of their constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of
qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who
totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accusedappellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the
crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is
lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge
that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or
that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3)
the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified
piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery
Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an
accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside
of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold
him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual
conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are
contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting
him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was

charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus violating his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not
prove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy.
He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T
Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware
that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information
with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which
refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts
done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction,
the act must have been committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal
effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants
during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of
counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that
the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants
committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the
crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant
Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the
acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and
territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was
executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February
11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were
represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation
during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with
the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as
represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accusedappellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject
manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They
also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February
11, 1992, pp. 7-59).
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself
in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).
This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial.
However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a
third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be
allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he
can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but
without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is
amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly
protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will
show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a
valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it

was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a
bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo,
274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation
may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth
to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning
during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more
stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of
counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of
the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the
Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated
Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase
minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United
States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source (the
"tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the
principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other
evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case,
the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid
waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived
therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is
sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with
the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and

"UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and
confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now Justice
Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and
members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed
to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T
Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang
Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and
the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse,
about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to
the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the
"M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00
(American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were
on board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up
to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of
doubt in the mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could
and did see and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately
after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba
and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to
and identified the said Accused as some of the pirates.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3)
Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the
evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its
destination, which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.

(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial
is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is
given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses
than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime
(People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three
complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian
Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with
one another along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on
board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said
accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of
time without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their
destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a
long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human
experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon,
Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in
the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5)
cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."

Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14
and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in
Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a
weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v.
Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and
difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence
that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have
been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise
unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is
accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain
witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or
need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of
the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when conspirators are
assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but
in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the
"M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to
fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan,
Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew
and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their
way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco
need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he
performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another.
Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka
Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping
Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are
approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are close.
Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents were
neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife
is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco
had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo
of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin
Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of
piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a],
respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective
January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly
superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No.
532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy
committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws,
the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must
be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are

members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No.
7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or
passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. The penalty of
reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas,
shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a
passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Italics supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine
waters. The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person
who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or,
not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole
or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.

(Italics ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. The following shall mean and be understood,
as follows:
d. Piracy. Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the
whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by
any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel
in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided
that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its
complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659,
the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed
"in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in
1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger
or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger
or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws.
There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the
law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping
with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes

against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of

Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the
Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine
waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in
Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to
Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential
Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be
committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its
cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such,
it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies
even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy
under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which
penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be
applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent
piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise,
well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible
crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that
he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of
said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the
attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was
indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was
indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the
disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which
provides:
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or
highway robbery brigandage. Any person who knowingly and in any manner
aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them
information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the
government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands
or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or
indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage,
shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished
in accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this
Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of
complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as
principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation
of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser
responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA
792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided in
said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case
at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he
knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by
such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of
the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi
Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services,
Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the
quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in
falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer
went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied, the pirates with
food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992,
pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and
Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine
Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore
Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the
Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took
place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in Singapore.
Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not
have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accusedappellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows:
that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride,"
one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the
firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port
authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for
departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and
"8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10
o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of
the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and transfer
1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with Emilio
Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor
prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo
transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was
not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the
word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did
not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one;
and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on March
29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was
made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high

seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric
tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as
discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his
end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his
superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and
nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second,
considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any
participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under
which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a
purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered
to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee";
he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first
time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66
nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm
did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan
involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not even
aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also
be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than
US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time).
Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant
Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go
to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation only to sell
at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to the act
of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that
the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the
orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to
an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the
means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal
Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua
Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law.
Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the
means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port
and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to
consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court
was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These
circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of the
order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to
conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not
do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on
record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.

G.R. No. 116688 August 30, 1996

WENEFREDO CALME, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, former 10th Division with HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ
as chairman and HON. CANCIO C. GARCIA and HON. RAMON MABUTAS as
members, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:p
Petitioner Wenefredo Calme appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 28883 dated 10 December 1993 and its resolution dated 14 July 1994
upholding the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Oroquieta City over
the information for murder filed against him (Calme).
Petitioner and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by allegedly
throwing him overboard the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland passenger ship owned and
operated by William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu
City on the night of 12 May 1991. Petitioner impugned the Oroquieta RTC's jurisdiction
over the offense charged through a motion to quash which, however, was denied by
Judge Celso Conol of RTC, Branch 12, Oroquieta City. Petitioner Calme's petition for
certiorari and prohibition was denied due course and dismissed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision dated 10 December 1993. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of said decision was denied in the Court of Appeals's resolution 14 July
1994. Hence, the present appeal wherein the only issue for resolution is whether or
not the Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner.
Petitioner asserts that, although the alleged crime took place while the vessel was in
transit, the general rule laid down in par. (a) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Court is the applicable provision in determining the proper venue
and jurisdiction and not Sec. 15(c) (now Section 14) thereof since the exact location
where the alleged crime occurred was known. 1
Petitioner thus claims that the proper venue is Siquijor because, according to the
Marine Protest filed by the vessel's captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0 miles
off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when he (Capt. Magallanes) received the report
that "a passenger jumped overboard." 2

Petitioner's contention is unmeritorious. The exact location where the alleged offense
was committed was not duly established. The Marine protest simply adverted that the
vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the captain was informed 3 of the
incident, which does not necessarily prove that the alleged murder took place in the
same area. In any case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial since it
is undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was in transit. "In transit" simply means
"on the way or passage; while passing from one person or place to another. In the
course of transportation." 4 Hence, undoubtedly, the applicable provision is par. (c) of
Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 which provides that "(w)here an offense is
committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be
instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality
or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the
generally accepted principles of international law."
Petitioner further contends that even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 governs, Oroquieta City
would still be excluded as a proper venue because the reckoning point for determining
the venue under the aforementioned paragraph is the first port of entry or the
municipalities/territories through which the ship passed after the discovery of the
crime, relying on Act No. 400. 5
We disagree. Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court in that under the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to the
CFI of any province into which the ship or water craft upon which the crime or offense
was committed shall come after the commission thereof, while the present rule
provides that jurisdiction is vested "in the proper court of the first port of entry or of
any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such
voyage . . . ." This is the applicable provision and since it does not contain any
qualification, we do not qualify the same. We fully concur with the findings of the
Court of Appeals, thus:
To support his arguments, petitioner relies on Act 400, which according to
him is the spirit behind the present Sec. 15(c), Rule 110. The said Act
specifically provides, among other things, that for crimes committed
within the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship
or water craft of Philippine registry, jurisdiction may be exercised by the
Court of First Instance in any province in which the vessel shall come
after the commission of the crime.
Petitioner's reliance on Act 400 is erroneous. The provision of said Act
vesting jurisdiction in the province where the vessel shall come after the
commission of the crime is not carried in the present Rule.
xxx xxx xxx
It is a basic rule in statutory construction that where the provisions of the
law or rule is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined
from the language employed. It must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corp. vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA [7]01; Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA
561).
The words of Sec. 15(c) being clear, there is no reason to rely on Act 400
in determining its true meaning, regardless of whether said Act was
indeed the moving spirit behind it. In fact, it does not seem that
the provision of Act 400 was carried into the present rule, as it is now
worded. 6

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24170

December 16, 1968

ILLUH ASAALI, HATIB ABDURASID, INGKOH BANTALA, BASOK INGKIN, and

MOHAMMAD
BANTALLA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The policy relentlessly adhered to and unhesitatingly pursued to minimize, if not to do
away entirely, with the evil and corruption that smuggling brings in its wake would be
frustrated and set at naught if the action taken by respondent Commissioner of
Customs in this case, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals, were to be set aside
and this appeal from the decision of the latter were to succeed. Fortunately, the
controlling principles of law do not call for a contrary conclusion. It cannot be
otherwise if the legitimate authority vested in the government were not to be reduced
to futility and impotence in the face of an admittedly serious malady, that at times
has assumed epidemic proportions.
The principal question raised by petitioners, owners of five sailing vessels and the
cargo loaded therein declared forfeited by respondent Commissioner of Customs for
smuggling, is the validity of their interception and seizure by customs officials on the
high seas, the contention being raised that importation had not yet begun and that
the seizure was effected outside our territorial waters..
Why such a plea could not be given the least credence without doing violence to
common sense and placing the law in disrepute would be apparent from a statement
of the case and the findings of facts as set forth in the decision now under review, of

the Court of Tax Appeals, dated November 19, 1964, the opinion being penned by the
late Associate Judge Augusto M. Luciano.
His opinion starts thus: "This is an appeal from the decision of the Acting
Commissioner of Customs in Customs Case No. 113, dated September 26, 1961, (Jolo
Seizure Identification Cases Nos. 38, 39, 40, 41 & 42) decreeing the forfeiture of five
(5) sailing vessels (kumpits) named 'Iroc-Iroc,' 'Lahat-lahat,' 'Liberal Wing III,' 'Sulu
Area Command,' and 'Business,' with their respective cargoes of blue seal cigarettes
and rattan chairs for violation of Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code
and Section 20 of Republic Act No. 426 in relation with Section 1363(f) of the Revised
Administrative Code."1
The facts according to the above opinion "are not controverted." Thus: "It appears that
on September 10, 1950, at about noon time, a customs patrol team on board Patrol
Boat ST-23 intercepted the five (5) sailing vessels in question on the high seas,
between British North Borneo and Sulu while they were heading towards Tawi-tawi,
Sulu. After ordering the vessels to stop, the customs officers boarded and found on
board, 181 cases of 'Herald' cigarettes, 9 cases of 'Camel' cigarettes, and some pieces
of rattan chairs. The sailing vessels are all of Philippine registry, owned and manned
by Filipino residents of Sulu, and of less than thirty (30) tons burden. They came from
Sandakan, British North Borneo, but did not possess any permit from the
Commissioner of Customs to engage in the importation of merchandise into any port
of the Sulu sea, as required by Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code.
Their cargoes were not covered by the required import license under Republic Act No.
426, otherwise known as the Import Control Law." 2
Respondent Commissioner of Customs, as noted at the outset, affirmed the decision
rendered by the Collector of Customs of Jolo, who found cause for forfeiture under the
law of the vessels and the cargo contained therein. He was, as also already made
known, sustained by the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence this petition for review.
The first two errors assigned by petitioners would impugn the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs to institute seizure proceedings and thereafter to declare the
forfeiture of the vessels in question and their cargo. They would justify their stand
thus: "In the light of the fact that the vessels involved with the articles laden therein
were apprehended and seized on the high seas, beyond the territorial waters of the
Philippines, the said vessels could not have touched any place or port in the
Philippines, whether a port or place of entry or not, consequently, the said vessels
could not have been engaged in the importation of the articles laden therein into any
Philippine port or place, whether a port or place of entry or not, to have incurred the
liability of forfeiture under Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code." 3
Such a contention was advanced by petitioners before the Court of Tax Appeals. It met
the repudiation that it deserved. Thus: "We perfectly see the point of the petitioners
but considering the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of the vessels in
question, we believe that Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code should
be applied to the case at bar. It has been established that the five vessels came from
Sandakan, British North Borneo, a foreign port, and when intercepted, all of them were
heading towards Tawi-tawi, a domestic port within the Sulu sea. Laden with foreign
manufactured cigarettes, they did not possess the import license required by Republic
Act No. 426, nor did they carry a permit from the Commissioner of Customs to engage
in importation into any port in the Sulu sea. Their course announced loudly their
intention not merely to skirt along the territorial boundary of the Philippines but to
come within our limits and land somewhere in Tawi-tawi towards which their prows
were pointed. As a matter of fact, they were about to cross our aquatic boundary but

for the intervention of a customs patrol which, from all appearances, was more than
eager to accomplish its mission."4
The sense of realism and the vigorous language employed by the late Judge Luciano in
rejecting such a plea deserve to be quoted. Thus: "To entertain even for a moment the
thought that these vessels were probably not bound for a Philippine port would be too
much a concession even for a simpleton or a perennial optimist. It is quite irrational
for Filipino sailors manning five Philippine vessels to sneak out of the Philippines and
go to British North Borneo, and come a long way back laden with highly taxable goods
only to turn about upon reaching the brink of our territorial waters and head for
another foreign port."5
1. We find no plausible reason not to accept in its entirety such a conclusion reached
by the Court of Tax Appeals. Nor, even if the persuasive element in the above view
were not so overwhelming, could we alter the decisive facts as found by it. For it is
now beyond question that its finding, if supported by substantial evidence, binds us,
only questions of law being for us to resolve. Where the issue raised belongs to the
former category, we lack the power of review. 6
Moreover, for understandable reasons, we feel extreme reluctance to substitute our
own discretion for that of the Court of Tax Appeals in its appreciation of the relevant
facts and its appraisal of their significance. As we had occasion to state in a relatively
recent decision: "Nor as a matter of principle is it advisable for this Court to set aside
the conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax Appeals which is, by the
very nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax
problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, ..., there has
been an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority." 7
2. We thus could rest our decision affirming that of the Court of Tax Appeals on the
above consideration.
It might not be amiss however to devote some degree of attention to the legal points
raised in the above two assignment of errors, discussed jointly by petitionersappellants, alleging the absence of jurisdiction, the deprivation of property without
due process of law and the abatement of liability consequent upon the repeal of
Republic Act No. 426. Not one of the principles of law relied upon suffices to call for
reversal of the action taken by the respondent Commissioner of Customs, even if the
facts presented a situation less conclusive against the pretension of petitionersappellants.
From the apprehension and seizure of the vessels in question on the high seas beyond
the territorial waters of the Philippines, the absence of jurisdiction of Commissioner of
Customs is predicated. Such contention of petitioners-appellants is without merit.
It is unquestioned that all vessels seized are of Philippine registry. The Revised Penal
Code leaves no doubt as to its applicability and enforceability not only within the
Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction
against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship ... 8 The principle of law
that sustains the validity of such a provision equally supplies a firm foundation for the
seizure of the five sailing vessels found thereafter to have violated the applicable
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. 9
Moreover, it is a well settled doctrine of International Law that goes back to Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Church v. Hubbart, 10 an 1804 decision, that a state has
the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but
extending to the high seas. In the language of Chief Justice Marshall: "The authority of

a nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. The seizure of a vessel
within the range of its cannon by a foreign force is an invasion of that territory, and is
a hostile act which it is its duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from injury may
certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory."
The question asked in the brief of petitioners-appellants as to whether the seizure of
the vessels in question and the cargoes on the high seas and thus beyond the
territorial waters of the Philippines was legal must be answered in the affirmative.
4. The next question raised is the alleged denial of due process arising from such
forfeiture and seizure. The argument on the alleged lack of validity of the action taken
by the Commissioner of Customs is made to rest on the fact that the alleged offense
imputed to petitioners-appellants is a violation of Section 1363(a) and not Section
1363(f). The title of Section 1363 is clear, "Property subject to forfeiture under
customs laws." The first subsection thereof, (a) cover any vessel including cargo
unlawfully engaged in the importation of merchandise except a port of entry.
Subsection (f) speaks of any merchandise of any prohibited importation, the
importation of which is effected or attempted contrary to law and all other
merchandise which in the opinion of the Collector of Customs have been used are or
were intended to be used as instrument in the importation or exportation of the
former.
From the above recital of the legal provisions relied upon, it would appear most clearly
that the due process question raised is insubstantial. Certainly, the facts on which the
seizure was based were not unknown to petitioners-appellants. On those facts the
liability of the vessels and merchandise under the above terms of the statute would
appear to be undeniable. The action taken then by the Commissioner of Customs was
in accordance with law.
How could there be a denial of due process? There was nothing arbitrary about the
manner in which such seizure and forfeiture were effected. The right to a hearing of
petitioners-appellants was respected. They could not have been unaware of what they
were doing. It would be an affront to reason if under the above circumstances they
could be allowed to raise in all seriousness a due process question. Such a
constitutional guaranty, basic and fundamental, certainly should not be allowed to
lend itself as an instrument for escaping a liability arising from one's own nefarious
acts.
5. Petitioners-appellants would further assail the validity of the action taken by the
respondent Commissioner of Customs by the plea that the repeal of Republic Act No.
426 abated whatever liability could have been incurred thereunder. This argument
raised before the Court of Tax Appeals was correctly held devoid of any persuasive
force. The decision under review cited our opinion in Golay-Buchel & Cie v.
Commissioner of Customs11 to the effect that the expiration of the Import Control Law
"did not produce the effect of declaring legal the importation of goods which were
illegally imported and the seizure and forfeiture thereof as ordered by the Collector of
Customs illegal or null and void."
Roxas v. Sayoc 12 announced that principle earlier. Thus: "Herein, we are concerned
with the effect of the expiration of a law, not with the abrogation of a law, and we hold
the view that once the Commissioner of Customs has acquired jurisdiction over the
case, the mere expiration of Republic Act No. 650 will not divest him of his jurisdiction
thereon duly acquired while said law was still in force. In other words, we believe that
despite the expiration of Republic Act No. 650 the Commissioner of Customs retained
his jurisdiction over the case and could continue to take cognizance thereof until its
final determination, for the main question brought in by the appeal from the decision

of the Collector of Customs was the legality or illegality of the decision of the Collector
of Customs, and that question could not have been abated by the mere expiration of
Republic Act No. 650. We firmly believe that the expiration of Republic Act No. 650
could not have produced the effect (1) of declaring legal the importation of the cotton
counterpanes which were illegally imported, and (2) of declaring the seizure and
forfeiture ordered by the Collector of Customs illegal or null and void; in other words it
could not have the effect of annulling or setting aside the decision of the Collector of
Customs which was rendered while the law was in force and which should stand until
it is revoked by the appellate tribunal."
As late as 1965, in Bombay Dept. Store v. Commissioner of Customs, 13 we had
occasion to reaffirm the doctrine in the above two decisions, the present Chief Justice,
speaking for the Court, stating that such expiration of the period of effectivity of
Republic Act No. 650 "did not have the effect of depriving the Commissioner of
Customs of the jurisdiction, acquired by him prior thereto, to act on cases of forfeiture
pending before him, which are in the nature of proceeding in rem...."
It is thus most evident that the Court of Tax Appeals had not in any wise refused to
adhere faithfully to controlling legal principles when it sustained the action taken by
respondent Commissioner of Customs. It would be a reproach and a reflection on the
law if on the facts as they had been shown to exist, the seizure and forfeiture of the
vessels and cargo in question were to be characterized as outside the legal
competence of our government and violative of the constitutional rights of petitionersappellants. Fortunately, as had been made clear above, that would be an undeserved
reflection and an unwarranted reproach. The vigor of the war against smuggling must
not be hampered by a misreading of international law concepts and a misplaced
reliance on a constitutional guaranty that has not in any wise been infringed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 19, 1964,
is affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.

G.R. No. 117033

February 15, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL AVECILLA y MOBIDO, accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of
Firearm, committed as follows:
That on or about December 24, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, not being allowed or authorized by law to keep, possess and carry a
firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and knowingly have in his
possession, control and custody a firearm, to with:
One (1) .38 Caliber Revolver Colt (Paltik)
marked made in USA
without first obtaining the necessary license and/or permit to carry and possess
the same and in connection and by reason of such possession, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, fire and shoot one
Macario Afable, Jr. y Canqui, thus inflicting upon the latter mortal gunshots and
injuries which caused the death of the latter as a consequence. 1
It appears from the records that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening of December
24, 1991, accused-appellant arrived at the basketball court located on Dapo Street,
Pandacan, Manila, and, for no apparent reason, suddenly fired a gun in the air. He then
went to a nearby alley and, minutes later, proceeded to the closed store about four (4)
meters away from the basketball court. There, he initiated an argument with the
group of Boy Manalaysay, Jimmy Tolentino and Macario Afable, Jr. Afable tried to pacify
accused-appellant, whereupon, the latter placed his left arm around Afable's neck and
shot him pointblank on the abdomen. Afable ran toward the alley and accusedappellant ran after him. Another shot rang out, so one of the bystanders, Carlos
Taganas, went to the alley and there, he saw accused-appellant and Afable grappling
for possession of the gun. The Chief Barangay Tanod arrived and was able to wrest the
gun away from accused-appellant, who immediately fled from the scene of the
incident. Afable was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital, where he eventually
expired.1wphi1.nt
On June 21, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, rendered judgment
convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
indemnify and pay damages to the victim's heirs. 2 Hence, this appeal filed by
accused-appellant.
The records and the evidence show that the elements of the offense of qualified illegal
possession of firearms, defined in the second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential
Decree No. 1866, are present in this case. Specifically, there are:
1. there must be a firearm;
2. the gun was possessed by the accused;

3. the accused had no license from the government; and

4. homicide or murder was committed by the accused with the use of said
firearm.3
The prosecution sufficiently established by evidence that accused-appellant had in his
custody and possession the following firearms and ammunitions:
1. One (1) .38 cal. Rev., Colt "paltik" without serial number, nickel plated with
brown handle, two and one half inches barrel and marked "BC";
2. Three (3) .38 Caliber cartridge cases marked BC-1, BC-2, BC-3;
3. Two (2) .38 cal. Ammo. (used for test);
4. One (1) .38 cal. Slug (deformed) marked "F" from Medico legal. 4
Likewise, per Certification of the Firearms and Explosives Office dated September 1,
1992,5 it was proved that accused-appellant was not a licensed or registered firearm
holder of any kind and caliber.
Finally, there was an eyewitness account positively asserting that accused-appellant
had the subject firearm in his possession and used it in shooting the victim. 6 The
medical examination on the victim disclosed that the gunshot wounds he sustained
were caused by the same unlicensed firearm in accused-appellant's possession, and
that the same were the direct cause of the death of the victim. The ballistics report
established that the deformed .38 caliber slugs found in the victim's body were fired
from the subject firearm. 7 The victim's cause of death was determined as "cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound, left
antero-lateral thorax."8
However, the law on illegal possession of firearms has been amended by Republic Act
No. 8294, which took effect on July 6, 1994. The pertinent provision of the said law
provides:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession
of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part
of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, that no other
crime was committed.
xxx

xxx

xxx

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such

use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat,

such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or

insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat. (Underscoring provided)
It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide results from the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal possession, but murder or
homicide, as the case may be. In such a case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not
considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating
circumstance. In view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294 to
Presidential Decree NO. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal
possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to
be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide case. 9
Thus, in People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.,10 we stated:
But, pursuant to the amendment, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the
commission of murder or homicide is treated as an aggravating circumstance.
There, the illegal possession or use of the unlicensed firearm is no longer
separately punished. This Court emphatically said so in People v. Bergante (286
SCRA 629 [1998]), thus:
The violation of P.D. No. 1866 should have been punished separately
conformably with our ruling in People v. Quijada. Nevertheless,
fortunately for appellant Rex Bergante, P.D. No. 1866 was recently
amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, otherwise known as "An Act
Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as Amended."
The third paragraph of Section 1 of said Act provides that "if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance." In short, only one offense should be punished, viz., either
homicide or murder, and the use of the unlicensed firearm should only be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. Being favorable to Rex
Bergante, this provision may be given retroactive effect pursuant to
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, he not being a habitual criminal.
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is committed only where
the unlicensed firearm is not used to commit any of the crimes of murder, homicide,
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat. Otherwise, the use of
unlicensed firearm would be treated either: (1) as an essential ingredient in the crimes
of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat; or (2) as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide.
With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of
firearms under P. D. No. 1866, it was held in the case of People vs. Molina (292
SCRA 742) and reiterated in the recent case of People vs. Ronaldo Valdez (G.R.
NO. 127663, March 11, 1999, 304 SCRA 611), that in cases where murder or
homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no
separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No.
1866 in view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294.
Thereunder, the use of unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is simply
considered as an aggravating circumstance in the murder or homicide and no
longer as a separate offense. Furthermore, the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms shall be imposed provided that no other crime is committed (Section 1
of R.A. No. 8294). In other words, where murder or homicide was committed,
the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it
becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance (People v. Molina, supra, at
p. 782).

It bears stressing, however, that the dismissal of the present case for illegal
possession of firearm should not be misinterpreted to mean that there can be
longer be any prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms. In
general, all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearms should
continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly provided in
R.A. No. 8294 are involved (murder or homicide, under Section 1, and rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d' etat, under Section 3) (People v.
Valdez, supra).11
Inasmuch as the amendatory law is favorable to accused-appellant in this case, the
same may be retroactively applied. This new law applies even to violations that
occurred prior to its effectivity as it may be given retroactive effect under Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code.12
R.A. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997. The crime involved in the case at bench
was committed on May 5, 1991. As a general rule, penal laws will generally
have prospective application except where the new law will be advantageous to
the accused. In this case R.A. 8294 will spare accused-appellant from a
separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. Accordingly,
said law should be given retroactive application. 13
Neither can accused-appellant be charged with simple illegal possession. As stated
above, the same may only done where no other crime is committed. 14
With more reason, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of homicide or murder with
"the use of the unlicensed firearm as aggravating," inasmuch as said felonies are not
charged in the information but merely mentioned as the result of the use of the
unlicensed firearm. Accused-appellant was not arraigned for homicide or murder.
Hence, he cannot be convicted of any of these crimes without violating his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, not to mention his
right to due process.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is REVERSED. Criminal
Case No. 92-105691, for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85481-82 October 18, 1990

WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE TAN, petitioners,
vs.
HERNANI T. BARRIOS, in his capacity as State Prosecutor, Department of
Justice, THE CITY FISCAL OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, THE HONORABLE
LEONARDO N. DEMECILLO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Cagayan De Oro City, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
On the basis of Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order No. 8 dated September 27, 1972, authorized
the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them."
In General Order No. 21 dated September 30, 1972, the military tribunals, "exclusive
of the civil courts," were vested with jurisdiction among others, over violations of the
law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to the quelling of
rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security of the Republic.
In General Order No. 12-b dated November 7, 1972, "crimes against persons . . . as
defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added to the jurisdiction of
military tribunals/commissions.
Subsequently, General Order No. 49, dated October 11, 1974, redefined the
jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. The enumeration of offenses cognizable by such
tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised
Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over
such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of G.O. No. 49, Section 2 of the same
general order provided that "the President may, in the public interest, refer to a
Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts" and
vice versa.
On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners, with twelve (12) others, were arrested and
charged in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Luis Tan

alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc, et al." before the Military Commission No. 1, for the
crimes of:
(1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally possessed firearm, penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General
Order No. 49, for the killing on August 25, 1973 of Florentino Lim of tile wealthy Lim
Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City; and
(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-1283521 with
ammunition, in violation of General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential
Decree No. 9.
The accused were:
1. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc
2. Ang Tiat Chuan alias Chuana
3. Mariano Velez, Jr.
4. Antonio Occaciones
5. Leopoldo Nicolas
6. Enrique Labita
7. Oscar Yaun
8. Joaquin Tan Leh alias Go Bon Huat alias Taowie
9. Eusebio Tan alias Go Bon Ping
10. Vicente Tan alias Go Bon Beng alias Donge
11. Alfonso Tan alias Go Bon Tiak
12. Go E Kuan alias Kunga
13. William Tan alias Go Bon Ho
14. Marciano Benemerito alias Marcing alias Dodong
15. Manuel Beleta, and
16. John Doe (Annex A, Petition).
(Names italicized are the petitioners herein.)
Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President Marcos,
pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his
earlier order (issued in response to the requests of the defendants' lawyers) to
transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the military court
(Annexes A to C of Supplemental/Amended Petition, pp. 72-88, Rollo). All the accused
were detained without bail in the P.C. Stockade in Camp Crame.

Upon arraignment on May 6, 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta
was discharged to be used as a state witness. He was released from detention on May
5, 1975 (p. 4, Rollo).
Almost daily trials were held for more than thirteen (13) months. The testimonies of
45 prosecution witnesses and 35 defense witnesses filled up twenty-one (21) volumes
of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages (p. 75, Rollo).
On June 10, 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by
the Military Commission finding five (5) of the accused namely:
1. Luis Tan
2. Ang Tiat Chuan
3. Mariano Velez, Jr.
4. Antonio Occaciones, and
5. Leopoldo Nicolas
guilty of MURDER. Each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of from seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and twenty-one (21) days, to twenty
(20) years.
A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both MURDER and ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARM, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by
electrocution (Annex B, Petition).
Eight (8) of the accused, namely:
1. Oscar Yaun
2. Enrique Labita
3. Eusebio Tan
4. Alfonso Tan
5. Go E Kuan
6. William Tan (petitioner herein)
7. Joaquin Tan Leh (petitioner herein) and
8. Vicente Tan (petitioner herein)
were acquitted of the charges, and released on June 11, 1976 (p. 8, Rollo).
On January 17, 1981, Proclamation No. 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the
military tribunals and commissions.
On May 22, 1987, this Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military
Commission No. 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on

December 4, 1984 by Military Commission No. 34 against Olaguer, et al. and declaring
that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of
martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil
courts, as long as those courts are open and functioning as they did during the period
of martial law. This Court declared unconstitutional the creation of the military
commissions to try civilians, and annulled all their proceedings as follows:
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions
(where the accused stands to lose either his life or his
liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a
trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of
the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a
trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process,
Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they
are called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial
system. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive
Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the
legislature for the President as Commander in-Chief to aid
him in properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or
those of his authorized military representatives. Following
the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing
constitutional organization of the Government of the
Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws
(as when an individual should be considered to have
violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is
not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive
Department, through the military authorities. And as long as
the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly
functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the
period of martial law in the country, military tribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
offenses committed by them and which are properly
cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be
a violation of the constitutional right to due process of the
civilian concerned. (Olaguer, et al. vs. Military Commission
No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, 158-160.)
In October 1986, several months after the EDSA revolution, six (6) habeas corpus
petitions were filed in this Court by some 217 prisoners 1 in the national penitentiary,
who had been tried for common crimes and convicted by the military commissions
during the nine-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 7959979600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister
Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700). The petitioners asked the Court to declare
unconstitutional General Order No. 8 creating the military tribunals, annul the
proceedings against them before these bodies, and grant them a retrial in the civil
courts where their right to due process may be accorded respect.
Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, this Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700),
nullified the proceedings leading to the conviction of non-political detainees who

should have been brought before the courts of justice as their offenses were totally
unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule.
The Court
(1) granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of those of some
who had fully served their sentences, or had been acquitted, or had been granted
amnesty;
(2) dismissed the petitions of those who were military personnel; and
(3) nullified the proceedings against those who were convicted and still serving the
sentences meted to them by the military courts, but, without ordering their release,
directed the Department of Justice to file the necessary informations against them in
the proper civil courts. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
Wherefore the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as
petitioners Virgilio Alejandrino, 2 Domingo Reyes, Antonio
Pumar, Teodoro Patono, Andres Parado, Daniel Campus, 3
Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos, 4 are
concerned. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is hereby
ordered to effect the immediate release of the
abovementioned petitioners, unless there are other legal
causes that may warrant their detention.
The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio Cacho,
William Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino, Getulio G. Braga, Jr.,
Tomas C. Amarte, Rogelio L. Caricungan, Ernesto Baradiel,
Isabelo Narne, Eric F. Pichay, Pablo Callejo, Russel A. Paulino,
Laurel Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera, Edulino
Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz, Elpidio Urbano, Sofronio
Galo, Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando Tudin
Rosendo I. Ramos Pacifico Batacan, Edilberto Liberato,
Jimmy C. Realis. Democrito Lorana who are all military
personnel.
As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is
hereby DIRECTED TO FILE the necessary informations
against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the
offenses involved, within one hundred eighty (180) days
from notice of this decision, without prejudice to the
reproduction of the evidence submitted by the parties and
admitted by the Military Commission. If eventually
convicted, the period of the petitioners' detention shall be
credited in their favor.
The Courts wherein the necessary informations are filed are
DIRECTED TO CONDUCT with dispatch the necessary
proceedings inclusive of those for the grant of bail which
may be initiated by the accused. (Cruz, et al. vs. Enrile, et
al., 160 SCRA 700, 711-712.)
On September 15, 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez issued Department
Order No. 226 designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the
City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case

No. MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of
competent jurisdiction" (Annex C, Petition). On November 15, 1988, State Prosecutor
Barrios was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in hell of the regular
fiscal who inhibited himself (p. 66, Rollo).
Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on December
9, 1988, in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2) informations for:
1. Illegal Possession of Firearm docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-824; and
2. Murder docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-825 against all the 15 original defendants in
Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 including those who had already died 5 (Annexes D and E,
Petition)
The State Prosecutor incorrectly certified in the informations that:
this case is filed in accordance with the Supreme Court
Order in the case of Cruz, et al. vs. Ponce Enrile in G.R. Nos.
75983, 79077, 79599, 79600, 79862 and 80565 as all
accused are detained 6 except those that are already dead.
(p. 7, Rollo.)
He recommended bail of P50,000 for each of the accused in the two cases (p. 8,
Rollo). Later, he increased the recommended bail to P140,000 for each accused in the
firearm case (Crim. Case No. 88-824). In the murder case (Crim. Case No. 88-825), he
recommended that the bail be increased to P250,000 for each of the accused, except
Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan, and Mariano Velez, Jr., for whom he recommended no bail.
Still later, on October 28, 1988, he recommended no bail for all the accused (pp. 8-9,
Rollo) because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances; (1) prize or reward;
and (2) use of a motor vehicle (p. 65, Rollo).
Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were
assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before issuing
warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo issued an order on October 26,
1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified copies of "the supporting
affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are now," and of the Supreme Court
order "which is the basis of filing the above-entitled cases, within five (5) days from
receipt" of his said order (Annex F, Petition). The State Prosecutor has not complied
with that order for, as a matter of fact, there is no Supreme Court order to re-file the
criminal cases against the herein petitioners and their twelve (12) coaccused in Crim.
Case No. MC-1-67 of the now defunct Military Commission No. 1, because none of
them, except Antonio Occaciones, were parties in the Cruz vs. Enrile habeas corpus
cases (160 SCRA 700).
On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed this petition
for certiorari and prohibition praying that the informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 88-824
and 88-825, and the order of respondent Judge dated October 26, 1988 be annulled,
and that the public respondents or any other prosecution officer "be permanently
enjoined from indicting, prosecuting and trying them anew for the offenses charged
therein because they had already been acquitted of the same by Military Commission
No. 1 in Crim. Case No. MC-1-67" (p. 23, Rollo).
On November 23, 1988, the First Division of this Court dismissed the petition for being
premature as:

... the petitioners have not yet filed a motion to quash the
allegedly invalid informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824
and 88825 (Annexes D and E) whose annulment they seek
from this Court (Sec. 3, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure). The filing in the lower court of such motion is
the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of the petitioners.
The existence of that remedy (which they have not yet
availed of) bars their recourse to the special civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition in this Court (Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules
of Court (p. 41, Rollo.)
Upon the petitioners' filing a motion for reconsideration informing this Court that the
lower court had issued warrants for their arrest (p. 48, Rollo), we issued a temporary
restraining order on January 16, 1989 enjoining the respondents from implementing
the orders of arrest and ordering them to comment on the petition (p. 50, Rollo).
The petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Barrios exceeded his jurisdiction and
gravely abused his discretion in reprosecuting them upon the supposed authority of
Cruz vs. Enrile for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not in fact direct the filing of informations by
the Secretary of Justice against THOSE who, like the petitioners, WERE ACQUITTED
after court martial proceedings during the period of martial law.
2. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not apply to the petitioners who were not
parties in that case, who were not heard, and over whom the court did not acquire
jurisdiction.
3. The reprosecution of the petitioners would violate their right to protection against
double jeopardy.
4. The State is estopped from reprosecuting the petitioners after they had been
acquitted by the military tribunal which the State itself had clothed with jurisdiction to
try and decide the criminal cases against them. The State may not retroactively divest
of jurisdiction the military tribunal that tried and acquitted them (pp. 14-15, Petition).
5. The retroactive invalidation of the jurisdiction of the military court that acquitted
the petitioners would amount to an ex post facto ruling (p. 81, Rollo, Supplemental
Petition).
6. The information against the petitioners in Crim. Case No. 88-825 is null and void
because it was filed without a prior preliminary investigation, nor a finding of probable
cause, nor the written approval of the Chief State Prosecutor (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 112,
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
In his Comment dated February 1, 1985 (should be 1989), Fiscal Barrios disclosed that
the information in Criminal Case No. 88-824 for illegal possession of firearm was
"already withdrawn by the prosecution at a hearing on January 27, 1988" (should be
1989?) (pp. 66-68, Rollo). The reason for dropping the charge is not stated. It may be
because Benemerito, the gunman who was convicted of this felony and sentenced to
death by the Military Commission, is already dead-possibly executed. Hence, only the
information for murder (Crim. Case No. 88-825) against the petitioners and twelve
(12) others, including those already dead, is pending in the lower court (p. 37, Rollo).
He defended the reprosecution of the petitioners on the ground that it will not
constitute double jeopardy because the nullity of the jurisdiction of the military

tribunal that acquitted them prevented the first jeopardy from attaching, thereby
nullifying their acquittal. For the same reason, res judicata is not applicable. Neither
prescription, because "it had been interrupted by the filing of the earlier charge sheets
with the Military Commission" (p. 67, Rollo).
The Solicitor General, in his separate comment, argued that the proceedings involving
civilians before a military commission were null and void because we ruled in Olaguer
that military tribunals are bereft of jurisdiction over civilians, hence, their decisions,
whether of conviction or acquittal, do not bar re-prosecution for the same crime
before a civil court (p. 102, Rollo).
The petition is meritorious. The public respondents gravely abused their discretion and
acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction in misconstruing the third paragraph of
the dispositive portion of this Court's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority to
refile in the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners who had been tried and
acquitted by Military Commission No. 1 during the period of martial law. It is an
unreasonable application of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decision therein will be searched in
vain for such authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever faced a court
martial, much less those who had been acquitted by such bodies more than a decade
ago like the petitioners Tan, et al. herein.
The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile would be an instrument of oppression and injustice
unless given a limited application only to the parties/petitioners therein who sought
the annulment of the court martial proceedings against themselves and prayed for a
retrial in the civil courts of the criminal cases against them. They alone are affected by
the judgment in Cruz vs. Enrile, not all and sundry who at one time or another had
been tried and sentenced by a court martial during the period of martial law.
Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt. "Matters adjudged in a
cause do not prejudice those who were not parties to it." (54 C.J. 719.) It is a cardinal
rule of procedure that a court's judgment or order in a case shall not adversely affect
persons who were not parties to the self same case (Icasiano vs. Tan, 84 Phil. 860).
Hence, this court's pronouncement in Cruz vs. Enrile nullifying the proceedings in
military courts against the civilian petitioners therein and ordering the refiling of
informations against them in the proper civil courts, may not affect the rights of
persons who were not parties in that case and who, not having submitted to the
court's jurisdiction, did not have their day in court (Busacay vs. Buenaventura, 94 Phil,
1033). Their reprosecution, based on the decision in Cruz vs. Enrile in which they took
no part and were not heard, would be violative of their right to due process, the same
right of the petitioners in Cruz vs. Enrile that this Court endeavored to protect when it
nullified the proceedings against them in the military tribunals by applying the
Olaguer doctrine that the trial of civilians by military process was not due process. 7
There is, however, a perceptible lack of consistency in the application of the Olaguer
doctrine to Cruz vs. Enrile which needs to be rectified. For, although the Court nullified
the proceedings against the civilians-petitioners who were still serving their sentences
after conviction by the military courts and commissions, and we directed the
Secretary of Justice to file the necessary informations against them in the proper civil
courts, we did not nullify the court martial proceedings against the other civilians
petitioners who: (1) had finished serving their sentences; (2) had been granted
amnesty; or (3) had been acquitted by the military courts. We did not order their
reprosecution, retrial, and resentencing by the proper civil courts. We set them free.
In effect, the Court applied one rule for those civilians who were convicted by the
military courts and were still serving their sentences, and another rule for those who
were acquitted, or pardoned, or had finished the service of their sentences. The Court

applied a rule of retroactive invalidity to the first group (whom the Court ordered to be
reprosecuted before the proper civil courts) and another of prospective invalidity for
the others (whom the Court ordered to be released from custody).
In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be
applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when
that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of
final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against
civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should
not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or
the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the
accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based
on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer
doctrine. If a retrial, is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the
judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and
denial of due process.
It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a court martial which sentenced him
to death without receiving evidence in his defense. It would be a cruel distortion of the
Olaguer decision to use it as authority for reprosecuting civilians regardless of
whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial and regardless of whether
they have already been acquitted and released, or have accepted the sentences
imposed on them and commenced serving the same. Not everybody who was
convicted by a military court, much less those who were acquitted and released,
desires to undergo the ordeal of a second trial for the same offense, albeit in a civil
court. Indeed, why should one who has accepted the justness of the verdict of a
military court, who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing to serve
his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing in a civil court
to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty? Even if
there is a chance of being acquitted the second time around, it would be small
comfort for the accused if he is held without bail pending the completion of his second
trial which may take as long as, if not longer than, the sentence he has been serving
or already served.
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals and
commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were
created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The belated
declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did
not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision in
Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit
of its logic. Thus, did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA
533, where the question arose as to whether the declaration of nullity of the creation
of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government
thus abolished:
In Norton vs. Shelby Count, Mr. Justice Field said: 'An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though
it had never been passed.' Accordingly, he held that bonds
issued by a board of commissioners created under an
invalid statute were unenforceable.
Executive Order 386 'created no office.' This is not to say,
however, that the acts done by the municipality of

Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a

nullity because the executive order is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed.' For the existence of Executive Order 386 is 'an
operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.' As Chief
Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter State Bank:
'The courts below have proceeded on the
theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no
basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I.
& L. Ry. Co. vs. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is
quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination
of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous
application,
demand
examination.
These
questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal, and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity, cannot be justified.
There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension
that the invalidation of the executive order creating
Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act
done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that
municipality. (Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA
533)
The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners
and their co-accused before Military Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute
invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed
to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of the petitioners, the
proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of their constitutional right
to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and
decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed

by this Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the
Olaguer case arose and came before us.
Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against
the petitioners would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in
constitutional logic.
The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the strong
arm of the State:
The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A
single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. It
protects an accused from harassment, enables him to treat
what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to
exult in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty is
imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself
time-consuming and expense-producing for the state as
well. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.'
The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once,
not whenever it pleases the state to do so. (Fernando, The
Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Ed., pp. 722-723.)
Furthermore, depriving the petitioners of the protection of the judgment of acquittal
rendered by the military commission in their particular case by retroactively divesting
the military commission of the jurisdiction it had exercised over them would amount
to an ex post facto law or ruling, again, in sharp reality if not in strict constitutional
theory. An ex-post facto law or rule, is one which
1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which
was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less
or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense;
5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful; and,
6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (In re: Kay Villegas
Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428, 431)
Article IV, Section 22, of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the enactment of an ex post
facto law or bill of attainder.
We need not discuss the petitioners' final argument that the information against them
is invalid because there was no preliminary investigation, no finding of probable cause

by the investigating fiscal and no prior approval of the information by the City Fiscal
before it was filed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. Respondent State
Prosecutor and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, at Cagayan
de Oro City, are hereby ordered to discharge the petitioners from the information in
Criminal Case No. 88-825. The temporary restraining order which we issued on
January 16, 1989 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93485 June 27, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO CEDENIO Y RASONABLE, FELIPE ANTIPOLO Y MISA, and JURITO
AMARGA Y BAHI-AN, accused-appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The silence of the slumbering night was suddenly shattered by wailing cries for help. A
sheet of fire raged, its crimson brightness overwhelming the velvet darkness
enshrouding the sleepy barangay as it enveloped the lair of a mandadaut, 1 the flames
only fading away with the first blush of dawn. As the smoke thinned and the ashes
settled, the debris yielded five (5) fatalities among them a 22-day old female infant.
Unlike the other victims, she did not sustain any stab or hack wound. She could have
died of suffocation if not of burning.
Bonifacio Palomas recounts that on 26 November 1986, at about ten-thirty in the
evening, he was roused from his sleep by bangs and slams and what sounded like
womens desperate cries for help coming from the direction of a neighbors house
some thirty (30) meters away. It was Hilario Dorios house on fire. Peeping through his
window, Palomas saw around seven (7) persons, among them appellants Pedro
Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe Antipolo, emerge from the house of Dorio that was
afire. The blaze was so bright he was able to recognize them. They were wielding
unsheathed bolos. Afraid, Palomas remained home. The following morning, he
narrated to Romeo, son of Hilario Dorio, what he witnessed the night before. Then he
went with the younger Dorio to the rubble and saw the charred bodies of his father,

Hilario Dorio, his mother Flora, his sister Maria, his niece Dioscora, and his maternal
grandmother Nicanora Tabanao, said to be a family of sorcerers in the village. 2
Policarpio Apostadero was resting at around ten-thirty that fateful evening when he
heard dogs barking. Thinking that a carabao may have gone astray, he went out of his
house and headed for the cornfield. On his way, he noticed some thirty (30) meters
away that the house of Hilario Dorio was on fire. From where he stood, he also saw
people running out of the burning house. As the fierce fire illumed the surroundings,
he recognized three (3) of them as his neighbors Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and
Felipe Antipolo. When they drew nearer, he saw them holding bolos stained with blood
so he retreated home. The next morning, he went to the burned house, joined the
people already milling around, and saw the seared bodies of the five (5) members of
the Dorio household. 3
Albino Calunod, Sr., Barangay Captain of Gandingan, Pangantucan, Bukidnon, also
narrated that on 27 November 1986, at around seven oclock in the morning, he was
informed by Cristituto Gajo that the Dorio residence was gutted by fire the night
before and that five (5) members of the Dorio family then occupying the house were
burned to death. He thus proceeded to the scene and found the house razed to the
ground. The five (5) bodies retrieved from the site were those of Hilario Dorio with
wounds on the head and chest, Flora Dorio with a wound on the leg and head almost
severed; Maria Dorio with wounds in the neck and left nipple; Nicanora Tabanao with a
wound in the stomach; and, infant Dioscora Dorio with no wounds at all but charred to
the bone. 4
Perfecto Antifuesto implicated Pedro Cedenio to the heinous crime. Antifuesto said
that on 26 November 1986, at around seven oclock in the evening, he was awakened
by Cedenio who borrowed his bolo. At around three oclock the following morning, Pito
Panla-an woke him up to return the bolo earlier borrowed by Cedenio. It was placed in
its scabbard and left leaning against the wall below the window. When Panla-an left,
Antifuesto got his bolo and found bloodstains on its handle. Upon unsheathing it, he
discovered fresh blood on its blade. Thirty (30) minutes later, Cedenio arrived and
appeased him, ". . . do not worry, if this incident reaches the court I will answer (for)
everything." 5
Although it appears that around nine (9) persons were involved in the commission of
the felony, 6 only three (3) were convicted by the trial court. 7 Thus on 16 March 1990,
it found Pedro Cedenio, Felipe Antipolo and Jurito Amarga guilty of "Arson with Multiple
Murder as defined and penalized under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613
(amending the law on Arson)" 8 and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. On 4 April
1990, they filed their notice of appeal.
Appellants now argue that there is no direct and positive evidence showing that they
killed the victims and burned their house. The fact that prosecution witnesses saw
them coming out of the burning house cannot by itself sustain the conviction as this
lone circumstance is capable of several interpretations. If witnesses indeed saw them
there, that must be the time when they (appellants) were trying to save the burning
house and its occupants. They likewise contend that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are contrary to human experience and should not inspire
credence. Thus the claim of witness Antifuesto that his bolo was borrowed and later
returned with bloodstains is highly improbable for it is unnatural for criminals to
openly bare the instruments used in perpetrating a crime.
Finally, appellants maintain that their denial and alibi should prevail over the
insufficient evidence of the prosecution. In asserting their innocence, they allege that
they were in the area because of their moral obligation to save life and property.

Hence, appellant Cedenio claimed that he cut up banana trunks and hurled them into
the fire while appellant Antipolo gathered soil and threw it into the blaze. While
witnesses might have indeed seen them (appellants) coming out of the burning house,
that was probably after they (appellants) checked on and tried to save the occupants
of the house.
We are far from persuaded. While we cannot affirm the findings of the trial court that
accused-appellants are guilty of "Arson with Multiple Murder as defined and penalized
under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613" as there is no such offense, we
nevertheless find them guilty of as many crimes as are alleged in the Information and
proven by the evidence.
It is settled that there is no complex crime of arson with homicide. The late Mr. Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites Groizard
. . . when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may
be in a house and that objective is attained by burning the house, the
crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing
committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be
purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder
without a design to take life. In other words, if the main object of the
offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main
objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be
absorbed by the crime of arson. 9
. . . in the classification of crimes committed by fire, attention must be
given to the intention of the author. When fire is used with intent to kill
a . . . person who may be in shelter, and that objective is secured, the
crime is . . . murder. Murder or homicide in a juridical sense would exist if
the killing were the objective of the malefactor and the burning of the
building was resorted only as the means of accomplishing his purpose.
The rule is otherwise when arson is itself the end and death is a mere
consequence. The crime in such a case would be arson only, absorbing
the homicide. 10
Except for the imposable penalty, the rule has not changed. Accordingly, if death
results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson although the
imposable penalty as provided in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1613, which expressly repealed
Arts. 320 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code, is now reclusion perpetua to death. If
the objective of the offender is to kill and arson is resorted to as the means to
accomplish the crime, the offender can be charged with murder only. But if the
objective is to killand in fact the offender has already done soand arson is resorted
to as a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of two separate
crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson.
Consequently, in (People v. Paterno) 11 where the defendants killed a Japanese spy and
his wife, and thereafter set the victims house afire with their lifeless bodies inside and
their three-day old infant who perished in the fire, we found the accused guilty of
murder for the killing and of arson for burning the house with the resulting death to
the infant. In (People v. Basay) 12 we said that where the house was burned to conceal
the stabbing and hacking, separate crimes of murder and arson were committed.
The Information in this case however, although erroneously charging the crime of
"Arson with Multiple Murder," clearly charges appellants with six (6) distinct criminal
acts. It accuses them of "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack(ing), assault(ing)
and stab(bing) Hilario G. Dorio, Nicanora G. Tabanao, Maria T. Dorio, Dioscora T. Dorio

and Flora T. Dorio, inflicting on their persons multiple mortal wounds . . . (and)
set(ting) on fire and burn(ing) the house of the victims . . ." 13 Since appellants failed
to move to quash the information on the ground of multiplicity of charges or object
thereto at any other time, the defect has been waived, and thus the trial court may
validly render judgment against them for as many crimes as were alleged. 14 In order
to sustain a conviction for as many offenses as are alleged, it is elementary that all
the allegations must be proven with moral certainty. Hence, considering that the
Information alleges that appellants burned the house of the victims and killed them
with treachery and (evident) premeditation, both the arson and the multiple murder
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
We accord credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We see no
reason to depart from the conclusion of the trial court that it was "morally convinced
that the three accused are all guilty . . . . 15 The court a quo had the opportunity to
observe the witnesses thus its findings are given great weight and respect.
Palomas, Apostadero and Antifuesto are disinterested witnesses and there is not a
shiver of evidence to indicate that they are suborned witnesses. In fact, the records
show that witness Antifuesto even lent his bolo to appellant Cedenio so that the
former could not have had a grudge against the latter, otherwise, he would not have
lent his bolo. 16 Absent the most compelling reason or motive, it is inconceivable why
the prosecution witnesses would openly and publicly lie or concoct a story which
would send three innocent men to jail. 17 Where the defense failed to show any evil or
improper motive on the part of prosecution witnesses, the presumption is that their
testimonies are true and thus entitled to full faith and credence. 18
While the prosecution witnesses did not see the actual killing of the victims and the
burning of the house, we have repeatedly ruled that guilt may be established through
circumstantial evidence provided that (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 19 Thus
in (People v. Adriano) 20 and (People v. Galendez) 21 we ruled that there can be a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proven form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime.
This is another lucid illustration of a case where a conviction can be sustained on the
basis of circumstantial evidence. First, appellant Cedenio borrowed the bolo of witness
Antifuesto at around seven oclock in the evening. Second, Cedenio together with
appellants Antipolo and Amarga were positively identified as brandishing their
bloodstained bolos while rushing out of the victims burning house around ten-thirty
that same evening. Third, Antifuestos bolo was returned to him at around three
oclock the following morning after appellants were seen outside the victims burning
house. Fourth, the bolo had bloodstains when it was returned. Fifth, Cedenio called on
Antifuesto at three-thirty that same morning to appease the latter and assure him not
to worry because " . . . if this incident reaches the court, I will answer (for)
everything." 22 Sixth, when retrieved from the burned house, the bodies of the victims
bore stab and hack wounds. For sure, these circumstances "form an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the
perpetrators of the crime." 23
We disagree with appellants submission that the testimony of prosecution witness
Antifuesto is not in accord with human nature. On the contrary, his testimony that the
bolo was returned to him with bloodstains is worthy of belief. Appellants never thought
that Antifuesto would testify against them. Thus, appellant Cedenio borrowed
Antifuestos bolo and after its return even mollified him.

In fine, we believe that when appellants were seen in the vicinity of the burning
house, they were not there to save lives and property but rather to escape from the
locus criminis and avoid being made to answer for the consequences of their wicked
act. In other words, they were not there to save the lives and valuables of the victims
but to save their own. We are convinced that appellants conspired to inflict fatal blows
on the victims which cost their lives and thereafter set their house on fire to conceal
the dastardly deed. 24 Conspiracy, as we said, may be inferred from the acts of the
accused when such acts point to a joint purpose or design. 25
From the evidence adduced, it is evident that after the victims were hacked and
stabbed to death, appellants set the house afire to hide their gruesome act. This is the
only logical conclusion for the burning of the house. For, appellants and some six (6)
others, all bolo-wielding, have already inflicted fatal wounds on the victims, save for
the 22-day old infant. If their objective was merely to kill the victims then there would
be no reason for them to burn the victims abode. On the other hand, if their objective
was merely arson, they would not have attacked the victims with their bolos.
We however cannot consider the qualifying circumstance of treachery. For treachery to
be appreciated, there must be proof that at the time of the attack, the victims were
not in a position to defend themselves and that the offenders consciously and
deliberately adopted particular means, method or form of attack which they employed
to ensure the accomplishment of their purpose with impunity. 26 There is no proof of
such fact in the instant case; neither is there any testimony on how the attack was
actually carried out. Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the
aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victims began
and developed, it can in no way be established from mere suppositions that the killing
was perpetrated by treachery. 27 For, the rule is settled that treachery cannot be
presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the
killing itself. 28 Hence, when the manner of the attack is not proven, the accused
should be given the benefit of the doubt and the crime should be considered homicide
only, 29 absent any other circumstance which would qualify the killing.
Nevertheless, we qualify the killing to murder on account of evident premeditation.
For evident premeditation to be considered, it must affirmatively appear from the
overt acts of the accused that they definitely resolved to commit the offense; that
they coolly and dispassionately reflected on the means of carrying their resolution into
execution and on the consequences of their criminal design; and, that an appreciable
length of time elapsed as to expect an aroused conscience to otherwise relent and
desist from the accomplishment of the intended crime. 30 These, the prosecution
established.
The fact alone that appellants burned the victims house after inflicting fatal wounds
on them already suggests that they clung to their determination to commit the crime.
The circumstance that appellant Cedenio borrowed the bolo of witness Antifuesto and
later placated the latter when his bolo was returned to him already bloodstained
strongly indicates that appellants pondered on the means of executing the crime and
on the consequences of their criminal design. Since appellant Cedenio borrowed the
bolo at around seven oclock in the evening and the crime was committed around ten
oclock that same evening, certainly, there was sufficient interval of time within which
to reflect upon the consequences of the crime they planned to commit.
The death certificates of victims Hilario Dorio, Flora Dorio, Maria Dorio and Nicanora
Tabanao state as cause of death "incised wounds" which could definitely be caused by
a bolo, while the infants death was due to "burns." Hence, appellants should be held
responsible only for the murder of the four (4) victims who sustained fatal hack and
stab wounds. They cannot be convicted of homicide for the death of the infant who

died presumably of suffocation or incineration but of arson resulting in death, as

defined in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1613.
Considering that the prosecution was able to show with moral certainty that the killing
of the four (4) victims was attended with evident premeditation and the burning was
done to disguise the murder, appellants are guilty of arson and four (4) counts of
murder, each count aggravated by dwelling which, while not alleged in the
Information, was sufficiently proven during the trial.
The penalty prescribed by law for murder if committed with evident premeditation is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, 31 while for arson where death
results, it is reclusion perpetua to death. 32 Since the murder was attended by the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, with no mitigating circumstance, the imposable
penalty against appellants is death for each of the four (4) counts of murder they
committed. However, considering that the death penalty was prescribed at the time
appellants committed the crime, their sentence should be reduced to four (4) terms of
reclusion perpetua. For the arson where death resulted, appellants should be
sentenced to a separate term of reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, it appearing from the records that the heirs of the deceased did not
waive nor reserve their right to institute a civil action, nor did they institute a civil
action prior to the criminal action, the civil action prior to the criminal action, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the instant criminal
action. 33 Consistently therefore with prevailing jurisprudence, appellants are jointly
and severally liable to the heirs of the victims in the amount of P50,000.00 for every
death even without proof of pecuniary loss.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED. Appellants PEDRO CEDENIO,
FELIPE ANTIPOLO and JURITO AMARGA are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
four (4) counts of murder and another crime of arson. Consequently, appellants are
sentenced each to four (4) terms of reclusion perpetua for the murder of Hilario Dorio,
Flora Dorio, Maria Dorio and Nicanora Tabanao, and another reclusion perpetua for
arson for the burning of the house which resulted in the death of infant Dioscora
Dorio, to be served successively in accordance with Art. 70 of The Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellants are jointly and severally held liable to the heirs in the amount
of P50,000.00 for the death of each victim.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133527-28 December 13, 1999

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JEANETTE (GINETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS, POL. COL. NICOLAS TORRES, POL.
INSP. ADONIS ABETO, POL. OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ,
DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R.
FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA,
CHARLES DUMANCAS (Acquitted), POL. OFFICER JOSE PAHAYUPAN
(Acquitted), VICENTE CANUDAY, JR. (Acquitted), accused, JEANETTE
(GINETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS, POL. COL. NICOLAS TORRES, POL. INSP.
ADONIS ABETO, POL. OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, DOMINADOR
GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN
DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellants were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder under two
Informations which pertinently read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562
The undersigned hereby accuses JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS,
CHARLES DUMANCAS, (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION), POLICE
COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECT
AND/OR INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION), POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C.
ABETO, POLICE OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN,
VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME
GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY
DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY PARTICIPATION, CESAR PECHA, and
EDGAR HILADO, BOTH AS ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM WITH MURDER, committed as follows:
That during the period beginning in the late morning of August 6, 1992
and ending the late evening of the following day in Sitio Pedrosa,
Barangay Alijes, Bacolod City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and concurring in a common criminal intent and execution
thereof with one another, save for the accessories, for the purpose of
extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, to wit:
Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and
Charles Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and undue influence,
exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, taking advantage of his position as
the Station Commander of the Philippine National Police, Bacolod City
Station, with the direct participation and cooperation of Police Inspector
Adonis C. Abeto, other police officers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose
Pahayupan, Mario Lamis, civilian (police) agents Rolando R. Fernandez,
Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime Gargallano, also taking
advantage of their respective positions, and Dominador Geroche,

concurring and affirming in the said criminal design, with the use of
motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and detain one RUFINO GARGAR, JR. and
shortly thereafter at around 11 o'clock in the evening of August 7, 1993
(1992), failing in their aforesaid common purpose to extort money and in
furtherance of said conspiracy, with evident premeditation and treachery
nocturnity and the use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill
the said victim, while being handcuffed and blindfolded; that accused
Cesar Pecha and Edgar Hilado, with knowledge that said Gargar was
victim of violence, did then and there secretly bury the corpse in a
makeshift shallow grave or the purpose of concealing the crime of
murder in order to prevent its discovery for a fee of P500.00 each;
aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and prejudice to the heirs of
said victim, to wit:
P50,000.00 as indemnity for death;
50,000.00 actual damages;
300,000.00 compensatory damages (lost
income);
100,000.00 moral damages;
50,000.00 exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp.
1-3
Record Vol
I)
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563
The undersigned hereby accused JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS,
CHARLES DUMANCAS (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION), POLICE COL.
NICOLAS M. TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECTION
AND/OR INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION), POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C.
ABETO, POLICE OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN,
VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME
GARGALLANO, ROLANDO B. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY
DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY PARTICIPATION, CESAR PECHA and
EDGAR HILADO, BOTH AS ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM WITH MURDER, committed as follows:
That during the period beginning in the late morning of August 6, 1992
and ending the late evening of the following day in Sitio Pedrosa,
Barangay Alijes, Bacolod City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and concurring in a common criminal intent and execution thereof with
one another, save for the accessories, for the purpose of extracting or
extorting the sum of P353,000.00, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, to wit:
Acting upon the inducement of spouse Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and
Charles Dumancas, under the direction, cooperation and undue

influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, taking advantage of his

position as the Station Commander of the Philippine National Police,
Bacolod City Station, with the direct participation and cooperation of
Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto, other police officers Vicente Canuday,
Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario Lamis, civilian (police) agents Rolando R.
Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime Gargallano, also
taking advantage of their respective positions, and Dominador Geroche,
concurring and affirming in the said criminal design, with the use of
motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and detain one DANILO LUMANGYAO and
shortly thereafter at around 11 o'clock in the evening of August 7, 1993
(1992), failing in their aforesaid common purpose to extort money and in
furtherance of said conspiracy, with evident premeditation and treachery
nocturnity and the use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill
the said victim, while being handcuffed and blindfolded, that accused
CESAR PECHA and EDGAR HILADO, with knowledge that said Lumangyao
was victim of violence, did then and there secretly bury the corpse in a
makeshift shallow grave for the purpose of concealing the crime of
murder in order to prevent its discovery for a fee of P500.00 each;
aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and prejudice to the heirs of
said victim, to wit:
P150,000.00 as indemnity for death;
50,000.00 actual damages;
300,000.00 compensatory damages
(lost income);
100,000.00 moral damages;
P50,000.00 exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p
p.
13,
R
e
c
or
d
V
ol
.
IA)
All thirteen accused (excluding Edgar Hilado, who was then still at large) entered pleas
of NOT GUILTY upon arraignment conducted on February 14, 1994 (per Certificates of
Arraignment, Record Vol. I-A, pp. 372-384). After a joint trial (excluding accused Edgar
Hilado, who upon arraignment on April 11, 1994, pleaded NOT GUILTY [Record, Vol. II,
p. 866], was tried separately), judgment was rendered acquitting Charles Dumancas,
Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr., but convicting the rest of the
accused for the crime charged, to wit:

Wherefore, finding the first nine (9) Accused herein

1. JEANNETTE (GINNETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS
2. POL. COL. NICOLAS TORRES
3. POL. INSP. ADONIS ABETO
4. POL. OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ
5. DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY
6. JAIME GARGALLANO
7. ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ
8. EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA
9. TEODY DELGADO and
10. CESAR PECHA
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS PRINCIPALS and CESAR PECHA
as accessory in the two (2) informations filed in these cases, JUDGMENT
is hereby rendered against them, as follows:
1. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562, each of the Accused charged as
principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessories of the law; to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the Heirs of Rufino Gargar Jr. in the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for death; P25,000.00 as actual damages; P300,000.00 for
compensatory damages (lost income); P100,000.00 in moral damages
and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the cost. Accused
CESAR PECHA who is charged as an accessory is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years four (4) months and
one (1) day of Prision Correccional as minimum to eight years and one
day of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay one-tenth of the cost;
2. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563, each of the Accused charged as
principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,
with all the accessories of the law, indemnify jointly and severally, the
Heirs of DANILO LUMANGYAO in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity
for death; P25,000.00 as actual damages; P100,000.00 as compensatory
damages (lost income); P100,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and to pay the cost. Accused CESAR PECHA who is
charged as an accessory is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as maximum and to pay one-tenth of the cost.
Accused CHARLES DUMANCAS, Police Officers JOSE PAHAYUPAN and
VICENTE CANUDAY JR. are hereby Acquitted of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
with cost de officio.

SO ORDERED.
992
Jeanette Yanson Dumancas was swindled in a fake gold bar transaction
losing P352,000 to Danilo Lumangyao and his cohort.
10:30 A.M. August 5, 1992 present in the house of Rolando Fernandez
were:
a) Dominador Geroche
b) Rolando Fernandez
c) Jaime Gargallano
d) Edwin Divinagracia
e) Teody Delgado
f) Mario Lamis and
g) Moises Grandeza
On this occasion Mario Lamis brought out the plan to abduct Danilo
Lumangyao and Rufino Gargar, Jr. because they swindled the Dumancas
family.
4:30 P.M. August 5, 1992
The group of:
a) Dominador Geroche
b) Mario Lamis
c) Rolando Fernandez
d) Jaime Gargallano
e) Edwin Divinagracia
f) Teody Delgado
g) Moises Grandeza
went to the office of Col. Nicolas Torres at PNP Headquarters where they
met the colonel who told them that if you find these two people (referring
to Lumangyao and Gargar) to bring and hide them at Dragon Lodge
Motel.
8:30 A.M., August 6, 1992

State witness Moises Grandeza went to the house of Helen Tortocion to

invite Danilo Lumangyao and Rufino Gargar Jr. to "Tinolahan Eatery" at
Shopping Center Terminal but found only Gargar Jr., as Lumangyao went
to the house of a certain Bardot at BBB Avenue, this City.
Moises Grandeza together with Gargar Jr. proceeded to the house of
Bardot where they found Lumangyao and thereafter the three of them
went to "Tinolahan Eatery".
9:00-10:00 A.M. August 6, 1992
The three arrived at "Tinulahan Eatery". Waiting for them were:
a) Dominador Geroche
b) Jaime Gargallano
c) Edwin Divinagracia
d) Rolando Fernandez
e) Teody Delgado; and
f) Mario Lamis
Then a) Fernandez b) Geroche and c) Lamis entered "Tinulahan" and
handcuffed Lumangyao and Gargar.
Waiting in the red Toyota Land Cruiser (Plate No. 689) were:
a) Gargallano
b) Divinagracia; and
c) Delgado
10:30 A.M. August 6, 1992
Lumangyao and Gargar were brought to the Office of Jeanette at Ceres
Compound on board red toyota land cruiser by:
a) Moises Grandeza
b) Gargallano
c) Lamis
d) Geroche
e) Divinagracia
f) Delgado, and
g) Fernandez

It was there that a) Divinagracia and, b) Fernandez manhandled

Lumangyao and Gargar. Jeanette then investigated the two victims on
the whereabouts of the money that they swindled from her and the two
answered that it was already spent.
It was then that Jeanette ordered Doming (Geroche) to take care of the
two (Lumangyao and Gargar).
3:00 P.M. August 6, 1992
From Ceres Compound and while the group, together with the two
victims, were already at Dragon Lodge Motel, thereafter,
a) Abeto
b) Pahayupan, and
c) Canuday
arrived and investigated the two victims regarding the whereabouts of
the gold bar and the two replied that it was with Helen Tortocion.
4:00 P.M. August 6, 1992
a) Moises Grandeza
b) Fernandez, and
c) Geroche
went to the office of Col. Torres to inform him that Lumangyao and
Gargar were already captured. So Col. Torres ordered them to keep the
two victims so that nobody would see them. After receiving this
instructions they went back to Dragon Lodge. Meanwhile, Geroche again
interrogated the victims on where the money was if there was still any
let and Geroche received the same negative reply.
Past 6:00 p.m. August 6, 1992
The group, with the two captives transferred to D'Hacienda Motel.
9:00 P.M. August 6, 1992
At D'Hacienda Motel, Jeanette and Charles Dumancas, together with Rose
Ines arrived. Jeanette and Rose Ines investigated the victims where they
kept the money that they swindled and the two gave the same reply that
it was already gone. Jeanette then reiterated her order to Geroche to take
care of the two.
9:30 P.M. August 6, 1992
The group transferred to Moonlight Inn Motel.
3:00 A.M. August 7, 1992

The group transferred again to Casamel Lodge Motel.

10:00 A.M. August 7, 1992
The group returned to D'Hacienda Motel and it was there that the plan
was pursued to liquidate the two victims at 12:00 midnight.
The persons who conceived of this plan were:
a) Geroche, and
b) Fernandez
4:30 P.M. August 7, 1992
1) Canuday
2) Abeto
3) Dudero
4) Lesaca, and
5) Arollado
searched the residence of Helen Tortocion for the gold dust and
simulated gold bar per search warrant 014-92 (Exh. "D") but the search
was fruitless.
7:30 P.M. August 7, 1992
The group, including the victims, partook of supper which was charged to
Roy Yanson.
Then a) Abeto
b) Canuday, and
c) Pahayupan
entered the room and asked Fernandez what they are going to do with
the two victims to which Fernandez, replied that he will be responsible for
the two.
11:00 P.M. August 7, 1992
a) Geroche
b) Lamis
c) Fernandez, and
d) Moises Grandeza

rode on the red Toyota Land Cruiser to conduct Geroche to his house. The
victims were left behind.
From his house Geroche took an armalite rifle and the group then went
back to D'Hacienda Motel.
12:00 P.M. August 7, 1992
a) Fernandez, and
b) Lamis
blindfolded and handcuffed Lumangyao and Gargar (Exh. "A" and "A-1")
and have them board a vehicle, with
a) Gargallano the driver
b) Geroche sitting in front, and with
c) Moises Grandeza also seated inside.
From D'Hacienda Motel, the group rode on the red toyota land cruiser.
They proceeded to Hda. Pedrosa in Brgy. Alijis. When they arrived there
the two victims were ordered to alight and sit by the side of the road.
Geroche then asked Moises Grandeza to hold the hands of Lumangyao
and then Gargar behind their backs. After that
a) Gargallano was the first to shoot. He shot Gargar at the back of his
head (Exh. K) using a baby armalite. Then
b) Geroche followed suit by shooting Lumangyao with a .45 cal. Pistol at
his right lower jaw (Exh. L).
Thereafter, the two dead bodies were loaded on board the land cruiser
and brought to Hda. Siason where Pecha and Hilado buried them in the
shallow grave they dug.
August 8, 1992
In Sitio Cabalagnan were recovered
a) Three (3) empty shells of armalite rifle and one .45 cal. Empty shell
(Exh. "G", "G-2")
In Hda. Siason were recovered
a) the dead bodies of Rufino Gargar, Jr. and Danilo Lumangyao
b) Both of the two victims hands were handcuffed (Exh. "A" and "A-1").
August 9, 1992
The same group again went to see Col. Torres in his office and reported
the extermination of the two and Col. Torres promptly gave the

instruction that "you who are here inside, nobody knows what you have
done but you have to hide because the NBI are after you.
August 10, 1992
a) Lamis
b) Geroche
c) Fernandez
d) Divinagracia
e) Gargallano
f) Delgado, and
g) Moises Grandeza
went back to the office of Col. Torres and this time he told the group "to
hide because the NBI are now investigating".
4:00 P.M. August 12, 1992
The same group that liquidated Lumangyao and Gargar again went back
to the office of Col. Torres where they were asked by Col. Torres to escort
him to Ceres Compound because he would like to borrow money from
Ricardo Yanson as Col. Torres said that he has huge debts to pay. Col.
Torres was able on this occasion, to meet Ricardo Yanson.
On this same day,
a) Moises Grandeza
b) Lamis, and
c) Geroche
were picked up in a land cruiser by the driver of the Yansons' to go to the
house of Fernandez where Geroche will give the money to the group.
Each member of the group, after the check, which was drawn by Yanson,
was encashed were given the amount of P1,700.00 each.
August 13, 1992
Nenita Bello went to the office of Col. Torres to plead for his help in
regard to the death of her relatives Lumangyao and Gargar but was
promptly turned down by Colonel Torres with the curt remark that her
case was very difficult because it involves the "military" and some "big
times".
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bacolod City also passed, on this day,
Resolution No. 328, series of 1992 urging the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation on the death of "salvage

victims" Danilo Lumangyao and Rufino Gargar, Jr. as soon as possible

(Exh. "I").
September 24, 1992
The bodies of Rufino Gargar Jr. and Danilo Lumangyao were exhumed at
Brgy. Buenavista Cemetery, Balintawak, Escalante, Negros Occidental
and autopsies were conducted (Exhs. "M" and "N") by Dr. Ricardo
Jaboneta, Medico Legal Officer of the NBI.
a) Found on the body of Rufino Gargar, Jr. (per examination report, Exh.
"M") among others, were ligature marks, wrist joint, right side (Exh. "M2"), and
b) Gunshot wound (Exh. "M-1")
As to Danilo Lumangyao, the exhumation report (Exh. "N" disclose
a) Ligature marks, right wrist (Exh. "N-2") and among others, and
b) Gunshot wound (Exh. "N-1")
After the National Bureau of Investigation, Bacolod Office, conducted its
investigation, the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice took
over and the result were the filing of these two criminal cases of
Kidnapping with Murder against the above-named accused.
(pp. 73-85, Decision;
pp. 202-214, Rollo.)
After a thorough review of the factual findings of the trial court vis--vis the evidence
on record, we find ourselves unable to agree with the conclusions arrived at by the
trial court convicting all 10 accused-appellants; rather, we concur in the suggestion of
the Solicitor General, that accused-appellants Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Police
Inspector Adonis Abeto should be acquitted. Too, by reason of his supervening death,
accused-appellant Police Col. Nicolas Torres is acquitted. The judgment of conviction of
the rest of the accused-appellants is to be affirmed.
A. Jeanette (Ginette) Yanson-Dumancas
On the case of accused-appellant Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas (Jeanette, for short), the
information charged her of the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder as
principal by induction together with her husband, Charles, who was found by the trial
court not guilty of the crime.
Art. 17, Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it.
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.

What the Court now has to examine is whether or not sufficient evidence was adduced
by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed
any of the following acts: (a) directly forcing the killers to commit the crime, or (b)
directly inducing them to commit the crime.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by using
irresistible force, or (ii) by causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony of
all the witnesses of the prosecution, we find nothing to conclude that Jeanette used
irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear upon the other accused-appellants.
From the factual findings of the trial court, it is patent that the plan to abduct and
liquidate the victims was hatched on August 5, 1992 (10:30 A.M.) without Jeanette's
involvement or participation whatsoever (p. 202, Rollo). The record is entirely bereft of
any evidence to show that Jeanette directly forced the participants of the said meeting
to come up with such plan, by either using irresistible force or causing uncontrollable
fear. The only basis relied upon by the trial court in arriving at its conclusion that
Jeanette is guilty of the crime as principal by inducement, is the supposed
"commands" or order given by her to accused-appellant Dominador Geroche on two
occasions (one inside the Ceres Compound: p. 205, Rollo, and the other in D'Hacienda
Motel: p. 207, Rollo). By no stretch of the imagination may these so-called
"commands", standing alone, be considered as constituting irresistible force or
causing uncontrollable fear.
Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime, namely: (i)
by giving a price, or offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of command.
The Court finds no evidence, as did the trial court, to show that Jeanette offered any
price, reward, or promise to the rest of accused-appellants should they abduct and
later kill the victims in this case. If at all, the prosecution witness mentioned the name
of Ricardo Yanson as having lent money to accused-appellant Col. Torres to be used for
paying the latter's debts or obligations. But definitely, no money ever came from
Jeanette herself. The trial court's surmise that the money delivered by Ricardo Yanson
to the group was with the knowledge and approval of Jeanette in completely baseless.
The only matter left for consideration is whether the order supposedly given by
Jeanette to accused-appellant Geroche "to take care of the two" constitutes words of
command which may be considered sufficient basis to convict Jeanette as principal by
inducement.
In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following
must be present: (1) the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime, and (2) such inducement be the determining cause of the
commission by the material executor (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 [1913]). To
constitute inducement, there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive
resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime,
together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of
temptation to commit the crime.
By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to "take care of the two" does not
constitute the command required by law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a
principal by inducement. As we held in U.S. vs. Indanan, supra, "a chance word spoken
without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a
thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to crime in the
mind of one for some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who
spoke the word or performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion
would be followed or any real intention that it produce the result. In such case, while
the expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he (the one

who spoke the word or performed the act) would not be guilty of the crime
committed" (p. 219).
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of inducement, should
precede the commission of the crime itself (People vs. Castillo, July 26, [1966]). In the
case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element of the crime charged
(kidnapping for ransom with murder) has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly
told accused-appellant Geroche to "take care of the two." Said utterance could,
therefore, not have been the inducement to commit the crime charged in this case.
Most importantly, it was duly proven by no less than the prosecution witness himself,
Moises Grandeza, that the intention of Jeanette was but to allow the law to its course,
when in his cross-examination, the following transpired:
ATTY. PARREO:
Q. And according to your testimony this morning, Jeanette
Dumancas said, what more can we do that swindling
transpired four months ago, definitely that money could
nowhere be around. Would you confirm that you testified
that this morning before this Court? Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Witness, this is very important. Please make a vivid
recall. When Danilo Lumangyao made that answer that the
money was not around and Jeanette Dumancas said what's
the use, the money is now nowhere to be found as four
months have already transpired, did not Jeanette Dumancas
tell Doming: "Doming, bring these two to the PC or police
and I will call Atty. Geocadin so that proper cases could be
filed against them?" Kindly make a recall on that.
A. Yes, sir.
(pp. 5455, tsn
Feb. 14,
1994)
Thus, even the veracity of the allegation that Jeanette uttered the words: "take care of
the two" is put to some reasonable doubt by the prosecution witness himself. The
remark, if made at all, cannot by any stretch of the imagination, be basis for the
conviction of Jeanette.
People vs. Manambit (271 SCRA 344 [1997]) finds apt application, to wit:
In criminal law, the quantum of evidence for conviction is that which
produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, But, if the evidence is susceptible of two
interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted.
(p. 385)

B. Police Inspector Adonis Abeto

With respect to accused-appellant Abeto, we quote with approval the observations of
the Solicitor General as follows:
Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto's appeal is meritorious. Be it
remembered that Abeto's only participation was to serve the search
warrant on Helen Tortocion's residence and the subsequent interrogation
of the two victims at the Hacienda Motel. He was never part of the
conspiracy to abduct and liquidate the two victims. He is similarly
situated as that of Canuday and Pahayupan.
The trial court, in acquitting Canuday and Pahayupan had this to say:
The evidence against Officer CANUDAY, JR. shows that in the
afternoon of August 6, 1992, together with Officers ABETO
and PAHAYUPAN, they went to Dragon Lodge Motel to
investigate LUMANGYAO and GARGAR, JR. as to the
whereabouts of the gold (fake) bar used in swindling
JEANE'TTE. The two captives answered that it is with HELEN
TORTOCION. A subsequent search of Tortocion's house led
by Officer ABETO yielded no fake gold bar. Meanwhile, in the
evening of August 7, 1992, Officers ABETO, CANUDAY, JR.,
and PAHAYUPAN showed up at D'Hacienda Motel to inquire
from FERNANDEZ what he is going to do with the two.
Like Officer Pahayupan, his being in the company of Officers
Abeto, on the two occasions can not give rise, to without
proof of previous agreement, a conspiracy. Thus, being
present at the scene of the crime is not by itself sufficient to
establish conspiracy, as already averted to previously. So
does mere companionship.

(p. 17201721,
Rollo.)
After due consideration of accused-appellant Abeto's constitutional right to the
presumption of innocence, coupled with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official functions having simply followed the order of his superior
officers, much is left to be desired before the Court can sustain the trial court's
conviction of accused-appellant Abeto. The two presumptions negate the inadequate
proof adduced against accused-appellant Abeto, who must perforce be acquitted, in
much the same manner that accused Canuday, Jr. and Pahayupan, who being similarly
situated, were cleared and absolved.
C. Police Col. Nicolas M. Torres
As for accused-appellant Col. Torres, who passed away during the pendency of this
appeal, the following rule laid down by this Court in People vs. Bayotas (236 SCRA 239
[1994]) applies:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused

prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx xxx xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator of the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right
to file a separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on possible privation of right by prescription.-256)
With the application of the above set of rules to accused-appellant Torres, we hold that
his death extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability solely based thereon.
Accordingly, the appeal of accused-appellant Torres is forthwith dismissed, such
dismissal having the force and effect of an acquittal.
D. Pol. Officer Mario Lamis y Fernandez, Dominador Geroche y Mahusay,
Jaime Gargallano, Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody
Delgado, and Cesar Pecha
Now, in regard to the other accused-appellants, after a careful review of the evidence,
we find the same sufficient to affirm their conviction.
These accused-appellants assail the credence given by the trial court to the
eyewitness account of Moises Grandeza. Even after a thorough perusal of their main
appellants' brief (pp. 327-498, Rollo), plus the separate briefs of accused-appellants
Geroche (pp. 1453-1627) and Pecha (pp. 828-1009, Rollo), we find no cogent reason
to depart from the well settled rule that when it comes to the issue of credibility of
witnesses, the factual findings of the trial court is generally accorded great weight. In

People vs. Taedo (266 SCRA 34 [1997]) the Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling
that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses
command great respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while
they testified in court. The briefs of accused-appellants Lamis, et al. are replete with
generalities and legal principles relating to the issue, but are utterly wanting in
relevant particulars which may be the basis to rule that indeed, the trial court erred in
lending full credence to the testimony of witness Grandeza on the matter. As held in
People vs. Ramirez 266 SCRA 335 [1997]), unless the trial judge plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case, his assessment on credibility must be respected.
In an attempt to buttress the contention that witness Grandeza's testimony should not
have been given credence by the court a quo, accused-appellants referred to
supposed inconsistencies between Grandeza's sworn statements before investigators
vis--vis his testimony in court (pp. 349-359, Rollo; and 1465-1468, Rollo). The Court,
however, is not impressed. This will not be the first occasion for us to hold that
discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by
him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex-parte affidavits are
generally incomplete affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open
court declarations (People vs. Padao, 267 SCRA 64 [1997]). A contradiction between a
witness' affidavit and his testimony in open court may almost be explained by the fact
that, being taken ex parte, an affidavit is often incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes
from partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries
(Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). Grandeza's perceived failure
to mention anything in his 3 affidavits pertaining to the supposed meetings where the
criminal plot was hatched, does not necessarily render his testimony in court
unworthy of credit.
In his brief, accused-appellant Geroche cites Grandeza's failure to identify one of their
co-accused, Charles Dumancas, in open court, and the variance on the alleged
instructions given by Jeanette, and the failure by Grandeza to mention the supposed
meetings in his previous affidavits, as grounds to totally disregard Grandeza's entire
testimony for being unworthy of credence (pp. 1461-1469, Rollo). Indirectly, accusedappellant Geroche wants this Court to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus. In this regard, we held in People vs. Pacis (130 SCRA 540 [1984]):
The maxim of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus," however, is not a positive
rule of law. Neither is it an inflexible one of universal application. If a part
of a witness' testimony is found true, it cannot be disregarded entirely.
The testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in
part. 6)
Also in People vs. Li Bun Juan (17 SCRA 934 [1966]) we ruled:
. . . In this connection it must be borne in mind that the
principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute
one, and that it is perfectly reasonable to believe the
testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and
disbelieve it with respect to other facts. In People vs. Keller,
46 O.G. No. 7, pp. 3222-3223, the following was quoted with
approval by the Court of Appeals from 1 Moore on Facts, p.
23:
18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected.
Trier of facts are not bound to believe all that any witness
has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony

and reject other portions, according to what seems to them,

upon other facts and circumstances to be the truth . . . Even
when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in
some material particulars, the jury are not required to reject
the whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but may credit
such portions as they deem worthy of belief.

(p.
9
grounds
upon by ac
appellant
Geroche d
therefore,
constitute
reasons
discredit
testimony
eyewitness
Grandeza
entirety.
As regards accused-appellant Geroche's defense of alibi, it is settled that alibi cannot
prevail over positive identification (People vs. Garma, 271 SCRA 517 [1997]). Being
easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, alibi cannot prevail over and is worthless in
the face of the positive identification of the accused-appellant (People vs. Datun, 272
SCRA 380 [1997]). Besides, the record is bereft of strong and convincing evidence that
accused-appellant could not have been at the scene of the crime because the
certification proffered in support thereof stated that he was in Mt. Calandog only after
the commission of the crime. And, as aptly stated by the Solicitor General in the
People's brief, "the trial court expressed puzzlement why this supposed fact was not
mentioned in his July 3, 1993 affidavit . . . The first impulse of an innocent man when
accused of a wrongdoing is to express his innocence at the first opportune time. The
People can only conclude that Geroche's defense of alibi is but an afterthought" (p.
1723, Rollo).
As to accused-appellant Cesar Pecha's case, the Court finds it difficult to believe that
he had no knowledge that the 2 victims he was burying were victims of violence. The
deceased were surely bloodied from their gunshot wounds and were in fact still
handcuffed when exhumed from their shallow grave. It becomes almost impossible for
accused-appellant Pecha not to at least, entertain doubts as to the absence of foul
play in this case. He is thus guilty as an accessory to the crime committed under
Paragraph 2, Article 19, of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having knowledge of
the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein,
either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime;
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery;
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of
the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions

or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide,

murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known
to habitually guilty of some other crime.
All told, there are only reasons to affirm, and none to reverse, the trial court's
conviction of accused-appellants Pol. Officer Mario Lamis y Fernandez, Dominador
Geroche y Mahusay, Jaime Gargallano, Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, and
Teody Delgado as principals by direct participation of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom with murder, and that of Cesar Pecha as accessory thereto.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, when the crime of kidnapping is
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victims, the penalty is death.
However, since the crime was committed before the re-imposition of the death
penalty, only reclusion perpetua is imposable upon all the accused-appellant found
guilty of the crime as principals. Accused-appellant Pecha's penalty, as accessory is 2
degrees lower, which is prision mayor. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the
penalty to be imposed is 6 months and 1 day (the minimum of prision correccional),
as minimum, up to 8 years (within the minimum period of prision mayor), as the
maximum.
On the civil liabilities, accused-appellants who are herein convicted of the crime as
principals are held solidarily liable for the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of each of
the victims, as indemnity for their death. The amount of P50,000.00, each, by way
moral damages and P25,000.00, each, as exemplary damages are already deemed
sufficient. Accused-appellant Cesar Pecha is held liable for one-tenth of the above
amounts. The appealed judgment is silent as to any justification for the other
damages awarded and can therefore not be sustained on appeal.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellants JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS and ADONIS ABETO
are hereby ACQUITTED and forthwith ordered released from detention unless there
may be reason for their further detention on other criminal cases. The case and
appeal of NICOLAS TORRES is DISMISSED by reason of his death. The convictions of all
the other accused-appellants for each case filed are AFFIRMED except for the
modification that accused-appellant CESAR PECHA is sentenced for each case to an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum up to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Joint and several civil
liability for the accused-appellants found guilty as principals, is reduced to P50,000.00
for each case, as indemnity for the death of each victim, P50,000.00 for each case, by
way moral damages, and P25,000.00 for each case, by way of exemplary damages.
The civil liability of accused-appellant Cesar Pecha is maintained at one-tenth of the
above amount.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.