On the other hand, petitioner maintained in its position paper that respondent had never been its employee.

Attached as annexes to
its position paper are photocopies of cash vouchers it issued to drama producers, as well as letters of employment captioned
Employment for a Specific Undertaking, wherein respondent was appointed by different drama directors as spinner/narrator for
specific radio programs.[25]

In his Order, the Regional Director merely made a passing remark on petitioners claim of lack of employer-employee
relationshipa token paragraphand proceeded to a detailed recitation of respondents allegations. The documents
introduced by petitioner in its position paper and even those presented during the inspection were not given an iota of
credibility. Instead, full recognition and acceptance was accorded to the claims of respondentfrom the hours of work to his
monthly salary, to his alleged actual duties, as well as to his alleged evidence. In fact, the findings are anchored almost
verbatim on the self-serving allegations of respondent.

Furthermore, respondents pieces of evidencethe identification card and the certification issued by petitioners
Greman Solante are not even determinative of an employer-employee relationship. The certification, issued upon the request
of respondent, specifically stated that MR. JANDELEON JUEZAN is a program employee of PEOPLES BROADCASTING
SERVICES, INC. (DYMF- Bombo Radyo Cebu), it is not therefore crystal clear that complainant is a station employee rather
than a program employee hence entitled to all the benefits appurtenant thereto, [26] as found by the DOLE Regional
Director. Respondent should be bound by his own evidence. Moreover, the classification as to whether one is a station
employee and program employee, as lifted from Policy Instruction No. 40, [27] dividing the workers in the broadcast industry
into only two groups is not binding on this Court, especially when the classification has no basis either in law or in fact. [28]

Even the identification card purportedly issued by petitioner is not proof of employer-employee relationship since it only
identified respondent as an Authorized Representative of Bombo Radyo, and not as an employee. The phrase gains
significance when compared vis a vis the following notation in the sample identification cards presented by petitioner in its
motion for reconsideration:
1.
2.

This is to certify that the person whose picture and signature appear hereon is an employee of
Bombo Radio Philippines.
This ID must be worn at all times within Bombo Radyo Philippines premises for proper
identification and security. Furthermore, this is the property of Bombo Radyo Philippines and must
be surrendered upon separation from the company.
HUMAN RESOURCE DEPARMENT
(Signed)
JENALIN D. PALER
HRD HEAD

Respondent tried to address the discrepancy between his identification card

and the standard identification cards

issued by petitioner to its employees by arguing that what he annexed to his position paper was the old identification card issued
to him by petitioner. He then presented a photocopy of another old identification card, this time purportedly issued to one of
the employees who was issued the new identification card presented by petitioner.[29] Respondents argument does not convince.
If it were true that he is an employee of petitioner, he would have been issued a new identification card similar to the ones
presented by petitioner, and he should have presented a copy of such new identification card. His failure to show a new
identification card merely demonstrates that what he has is only his Media ID, which does not constitute proof of his
employment with petitioner.

It has long been established that in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, substantial evidence is sufficient as a
basis for judgment on the existence of employer-employee relationship. Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof
required in labor cases, is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.[30] No particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any
competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. [31] Hence, while no particular form of evidence is
required, a finding that such relationship exists must still rest on some substantial evidence. Moreover, the substantiality of the
evidence depends on its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects.[32]

In the instant case, save for respondents self-serving allegations and self-defeating evidence, there is no substantial
basis to warrant the Regional Directors finding that respondent is an employee of petitioner. Interestingly, the Order of the
Secretary of Labor denying petitioners appeal dated 27 January 2005, as well as the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing
the petition for certiorari, are silent on the issue of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, which further suggests
that no real and proper determination the existence of such relationship was ever made by these tribunals. Even the dissent
skirted away from the issue of the existence of employer-employee relationship and conveniently ignored the dearth of evidence
presented by respondent.

Although substantial evidence is not a function of quantity but rather of quality, the peculiar environmental circumstances
of the instant case demand that something more should have been proffered. [33] Had there been other proofs of employment, such
as respondents inclusion in petitioners payroll, or a clear exercise of control, the Court would have affirmed the finding of
employer-employee relationship. The Regional Director, therefore, committed grievous error in ordering petitioner to answer for
respondents claims. Moreover, with the conclusion that no employer-employee relationship has ever existed between petitioner
and respondent, it is crystal-clear that the DOLE Regional Director had no jurisdiction over respondents complaint. Thus, the
improvident exercise of power by the Secretary of Labor and the Regional Director behooves the court to subject their actions
for review and to invalidate all the subsequent orders they issued.

IV.

The records show that petitioners appeal was denied because it had allegedly failed to post a cash or surety bond. What it
attached instead to its appeal was the Letter Agreement[34] executed by petitioner and its bank, the cash voucher, [35] and the Deed
of Assignment of Bank Deposits.[36] According to the DOLE, these documents do not constitute the cash or surety bond
contemplated by law; thus, it is as if no cash or surety bond was posted when it filed its appeal.

The Court does not agree.

The provision on appeals from the DOLE Regional Offices to the DOLE Secretary is in the last paragraph of Art. 128 (b)
of the Labor Code, which reads:
An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal
by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent
to the monetary award in the order appealed from. (emphasis supplied)

While the requirements for perfecting an appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business, the law does admit exceptions when
warranted by the circumstances. Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the
rights and obligations of the parties. [37] Thus, in some cases, the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards had
been relaxed, such as when (i) there was substantial compliance with the Rules; (ii) the surrounding facts and circumstances
constitute meritorious ground to reduce the bond; (iii) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve
the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits; or (iv) the appellants, at the very least exhibited their willingness
and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period. [38]

A review of the documents submitted by petitioner is called for to determine whether they should have been admitted as or
in lieu of the surety or cash bond to sustain the appeal and serve the ends of substantial justice.

The Deed of Assignment reads:

DEED OF ASSIGNMENT OF BANK DEPOSIT
WITH SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, GREMAN B. SOLANTE in my capacity as Station Manager of DYMF Cebu
City, PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC., a corporation duly authorized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, for and in consideration of the sum of PESOS: TWO
HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY SIX PESOS & 30/100 ONLY
(P203,726.30) Phil. Currency, as CASH BOND GUARANTEE for the monetary award in favor to the
Plaintiff in the Labor Case docketed as LSED Case No. R0700-2003-09-CI-09, now pending appeal.
That Respondent-Appellant do hereby undertake to guarantee available and sufficient funds
covered by Platinum Savings Deposit (PSD) No. 010-8-00038-4 of PEOPLES BROADCASTING
SERVICES, INC. in the amount of PESOS: TWO HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED TWENTY SIX PESOS & 30/100 ONLY (P203,726.30) payable to PlaintiffAppellee/Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office VII at Queen City Development Bank,
Cebu Branch, Sanciangko St. Cebu City.
It is understood that the said bank has the full control of Platinum Savings Deposit (PSD) No. 0108-00038-4 from and after this date and that said sum cannot be withdrawn by the Plaintiff-Appellee/
Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office VII until such time that a Writ of Execution shall
be ordered by the Appellate Office.
FURTHER, this Deed of Assignment is limited to the principal amount of PESOS: TWO
HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY SIX PESOS & 30/100 ONLY

(P203,726.30) Phil. Currency, therefore, any interest to be earned from the said Deposit will be for the
account holder.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 18 th day if June, 2004, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines.
PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC.
By:
(Signed)
GREMAN B. SOLANTE
Station Manager

As priorly mentioned, the Deed of Assignment was accompanied by a Letter Agreement between Queen City
Development Bank and petitioner concerning Platinum Savings Deposit (PSD) No. 010-8-00038-4, [39] and a Cash Voucher issued
by petitioner showing the amount of P203,726.30 deposited at the said bank.

Casting aside the technical imprecision and inaptness of words that mark the three documents, a liberal reading reveals
the documents petitioner did assign, as cash bond for the monetary award in favor of respondent in LSED Case NO. RO7002003-CI-09, the amount of P203,726.30 covered by petitioners PSD Account No. 010-8-00038-4 with the Queen City
Development Bank at Sanciangko St. Cebu City, with the depositary bank authorized to remit the amount to, and upon
withdrawal by respondent and or the Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office VII, on the basis of the proper writ
of execution. The Court finds that the Deed of Assignment constitutes substantial compliance with the bond requirement.

The purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or
diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees under the judgment if subsequently affirmed. [40] The Deed of Assignment in the
instant case, like a cash or surety bond, serves the same purpose. First, the Deed of Assignment constitutes not just a partial
amount, but rather the entire award in the appealed Order. Second, it is clear from the Deed of Assignment that the entire amount
is under the full control of the bank, and not of petitioner, and is in fact payable to the DOLE Regional Office, to be
withdrawn by the same office after it had issued a writ of execution. For all intents and purposes, the Deed of Assignment in
tandem with the Letter Agreement and Cash Voucher is as good as cash. Third, the Court finds that the execution of the Deed of
Assignment, the Letter Agreement and the Cash Voucher were made in good faith, and constituted clear manifestation of
petitioners willingness to pay the judgment amount.

The Deed of Assignment must be distinguished from the type of bank certification submitted by appellants in Cordova v.
Keysas Boutique,[41] wherein this Court found that such bank certification did not come close to the cash or surety bond required
by law. The bank certification in Cordova merely stated that the employer maintains a depository account with a balance
of P23,008.19, and that the certification was issued upon the depositors request for whatever legal purposes it may
serve. There was no indication that the said deposit was made specifically for the pending appeal, as in the instant case. Thus,
the Court ruled that the bank certification had not in any way ensured that the award would be paid should the appeal fail. Neither
was the appellee in the case prevented from making withdrawals from the savings account. Finally, the amount deposited was
measly compared to the total monetary award in the judgment. [42]

V.

Another question of technicality was posed against the instant petition in the hope that it would not be given due
course. Respondent asserts that petitioner pursued the wrong mode of appeal and thus the instant petition must be
dismissed. Once more, the Court is not convinced.

A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy, and adequate remedy at law. There is grave abuse of discretion when
respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. [43]

Respondent may have a point in asserting that in this case a Rule 65 petition is a wrong mode of appeal, as indeed the
writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, and certiorari jurisdiction is not to be equated with appellate
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is settled, as a general proposition, that the availability of an appeal does not foreclose recourse to
the extraordinary remedies, such as certiorari and prohibition, where appeal is not adequate or equally beneficial, speedy and
sufficient, as where the orders of the trial court were issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or there is need to promptly
relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal, e.g., the court has authorized
execution of the judgment. [44] This Court has even recognized that a recourse to certiorari is proper not only where there is a
clear deprivation of petitioners fundamental right to due process, but so also where other special circumstances warrant
immediate and more direct action.[45]

In one case, it was held that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie if it is satisfactorily established that the
tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to or even decisive of the controversy, [46] and if
it is shown that the refusal to allow a Rule 65 petition would result in the infliction of an injustice on a party by a judgment that
evidently was rendered whimsically and capriciously, ignoring and disregarding uncontroverted facts and familiar legal principles
without any valid cause whatsoever.[47]

It must be remembered that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in certiorari proceedings. [48] The Court
has not too infrequently given due course to a petition for certiorari, even when the proper remedy would have been an appeal,
where valid and compelling considerations would warrant such a recourse. [49] Moreover, the Court allowed a Rule 65 petition,
despite the availability of plain, speedy or adequate remedy, in view of the

importance of the issues raised

therein.[50] The rules were also relaxed by the Court after considering the public interest involved in the case; [51] when public
welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; when the broader interest of justice so requires; when the writs issued are
null and void; or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[52]

The peculiar circumstances of this case warrant, as we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504, 524, the
exercise once more of our exclusive prerogative to suspend our own rules or to exempt a particular case from its operation as in
x x Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., (83 SCRA 453, 478-480 [1978]), thus: x x The Rules have been
drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. As a corollary, if their applications and
operation tend to subvert and defeat instead of promote and enhance it, their suspension is justified. [53]

The Regional Director fully relied on the self-serving allegations of respondent and misinterpreted the documents
presented as evidence by respondent. To make matters worse, DOLE denied petitioners appeal based solely on petitioners
alleged failure to file a cash or surety bond, without any discussion on the merits of the case. Since the petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals sought the reversal of the two aforesaid orders, the appellate court necessarily had to
examine the evidence anew to determine whether the conclusions of the DOLE were supported by the evidence presented. It
appears, however, that the Court of Appeals did not even review the assailed orders and focused instead on a general discussion
of due process and the jurisdiction of the Regional Director. Had the appellate court truly reviewed the records of the case, it
would have seen that there existed valid and sufficient grounds for finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOLE
Secretary as well the Regional Director. In ruling and acting as it did, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals may be properly
subjected

to

its certiorari jurisdiction. After

all, this

Court

has

previously

ruled

that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie if it is satisfactorily

established that the tribunal had acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to or even decisive of
the controversy.[54]

The most important consideration for the allowance of the instant petition is the opportunity for the Court not only
to set the demarcation between the NLRCs jurisdiction and the DOLEs prerogative but also the procedure when the
case involves the fundamental challenge on the DOLEs prerogative based on lack of employer-employee relationship.
As exhaustively discussed here, the DOLEs prerogative hinges on the existence of employer-employee relationship, the
issue is which is at the very heart of this case. And the evidence clearly indicates private respondent has never been
petitioners employee. But the DOLE did not address, while the Court of Appeals glossed over, the issue. The peremptory
dismissal of the instant petition on a technicality would deprive the Court of the opportunity to resolve the novel
controversy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 26 October 2006 and the Resolution dated 26 June
2007 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CEB-SP No. 00855 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the then Acting
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment dated 27 January 2005 denying petitioners
appeal, and the Orders of the Director, DOLE Regional Office No. VII, dated 24 May 2004 and 27 February 2004, respectively,
are ANNULLED. The complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.