Cause and Effect of Negative Stability

BSMT 2-D
PARONG, ANTONIO III D.
SEAM 2B MWF 1900-2100
RM 404

MV Hoegh Osaka
On
3
January
2015 Hoegh
Osaka was
loaded
at Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom with a ro-ro cargo of buses,
construction equipment and Range Rover cars. This was in addition to some
cargo she was carrying on arrival at Southampton. She departed from
Southampton for Bremerhaven, Germany, where more cargo was to be
loaded. The intention was that she would then sail to Hamburg, Germany to
load the rest of her cargo and be refueled. This was a change from her
normal route of Hamburg, Bremerhaven, then Southampton.
A pilot was embarked at 19:30 and the ship departed at 20:06.
At 20:59, she made a starboard turn and entered the Thorn Channel.
She was travelling at 10 knots (19 km/h). After entering the
channel, her speed was increased to 12 knots (22 km/h). At
21:09, Hoegh Osaka made a port turn at the West Bramble Buoy and
developed a severe list. The pilot gave the order to stop engines at
21:10, and expressed doubts in respect of the metacentric
height (GM) of the vessel. As the list increased, the ship's propeller
and rudder came clear of the water. The ship grounded on the
Bramble Bank off the Isle of Wight at 21:15, and settled with a list
that would eventually reach 52. According to the owners she was
beached intentionally on the Bramble Bank in the Solent,
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch opened an investigation into
the accident. Its report into the incident was published on 17 March 2016.
The investigation found that plans for the loading of the cargo had not
been changed despite the change in itinerary. No calculation of the
vessel's stability had been made, a practice found to be common across
many operators' fleets. The weight of cargo on board was
underestimated, the actual weight being 265 tonnes greater than
that calculated to be on board. The investigation found that the cargo
had shifted as a result of the ship listing; it was not the cause of the
list. The ship's ballast water system was not fully serviceable, with
all but one of the gauges for each ballast tank being unserviceable,
a situation that had existed since at least July 2014. It was possible to

take manual readings of the amount of water in each ballast tank. The chief
officer was in the habit of calculating how much water was transferred
between tanks by timing the pumps and using their capacity of 7 tonnes per
minute. Some of the straps used to secure the cargo to the deck
were found not to meet regulations in force at the time, only being
half as strong as they should have been.

MS Bulk Jupiter
The Bahama-flagged Bulk Jupiter was carrying 46,400 tonnes of
bauxite when it sank about 150 nautical miles off the coast of Vung Tau,
Vietnam, with 18 fatalities and only one survivor.
The marine safety investigation into the loss of the Bulk Jupiter has
uncovered evidence to suggest liquefaction of cargo led to loss of
stability. Liquefaction occurs when a cargo (which may not appear
visibly wet) has a level of moisture in between particles. During a
voyage, the ship movement may cause the cargo to liquefy and
become viscous and fluid, which can lead to cargo flowing with the
roll of the ship and potentially causing a dangerous list and sudden
capsize of the vessel.
IMOs Sub-Committee on Carriage of Containers and Cargoes
(CCC) established a correspondence group to evaluate the properties of
bauxite and coal (some types of coal may liquefy) and consider any
necessary amendments to the IMSBC Code.
A circular approved by CCC has warned ship Masters not to accept bauxite
for carriage unless:

the moisture limit for the specific cargo is certified as less than
the indicative moisture limit of 10% and the particle size
distribution as is detailed in the individual schedule for bauxite
in the IMSBC Code; or

the cargo is declared as Group A (cargoes that may liquefy)

and the shipper declares the transportable moisture limit
(TML) and moisture content; or

the cargo has been assessed as not presenting Group A

properties.

The circular notes that while bauxite is currently classified as a Group C

cargo (cargoes that do not liquefy or possess a chemical hazard) under the
International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMSBC) Code, there is a need to
raise awareness of the possible dangers of liquefaction associated with
bauxite. If a Group A cargo (cargo which may liquefy) is shipped with
moisture content in excess of its transportable moisture limit (TML), there is
a risk of cargo shift, which may result in capsizing, according to IMO.

The mandatory IMSBC Code requires Group A cargoes to be tested, before

loading, to determine their TML and their actual moisture content. The
testing should confirm the cargo is below the maximum moisture content
considered safe for carriage.

MOL Comfort
On 17 June 2013, MOL Comfort suffered a crack amidships in bad weather
about 200 nautical miles (370 km; 230 mi) off the coast of Yemen and eventually
broke into two. The vessel was underway from Singapore to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
with a cargo of 4,382 containers equivalent to 7,041 TEU. The crew of 2611
Russians, one Ukrainian and 14 Filipinosabandoned the ship and were rescued
from two life rafts and a lifeboat by the German-flagged container ship Yantian
Express, one of three vessels diverted to the site of incident by ICG Mumbai. After
the structural failure, both sections remained afloat with the majority of the cargo
intact and began drifting in an east-northeast direction. Smit Salvage Singapore was
contracted to tow the sections to safety.
The ship had seven cargo holds in front of the engine room and two cargo
holds aft of the engine room. The ship was the sixth in a series of large container
ships built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd, Nagasaki Shipyard & Machinery
Works. At the time of the accident the vessel was carrying a cargo of 4,382
containers equivalent to 7,041 TEU and was sailing at approximately 17knots. The
significant wave height at the time was estimated to be 5.5m with a Beaufort force
7 south-westerly wind
The fracture originated in the bottom of the shell plates of No.6
Cargo hold. At about 07:45hours (GMT +5 hours) water ingress was first
detected by the water ingress alarm in the duct keel located near the
centre line of the double bottom of the ship. Approximately two minutes
later, further water ingress was detected in No.6 Cargo hold located on the
double bottom amidships. The crack then progressed up the side shell
plating of the ship with the upper deck area being the last part to
fracture.
Following the accident, the Japanese Maritime Bureau established a
committee to investigate Large Container Ship Safety. Despite the Committees
interim report being published in December 2013 the exact cause of the accident
remains undetermined. The investigation quickly excluded out grounding and/or
collision, fire and/or explosion originating inside the ship and brittle fracture
originating from the upper deck. The Committees investigation concentrated on
two potential causes of the accident:

Buckling of the bottom shell plating due to hull girder loads

exceeding the hull girder strength
Fatigue cracking of welded structure

MV SEWOL
As of 17 April 2014, the ROK Coast Guard concluded that an
"unreasonably sudden turn" to starboard, made between 8:48 and
8:49 a.m. (KST), was the cause of the capsizing. According to the Coast
Guard, the sudden turn caused the cargo to shift to port, causing the ship to
list and to eventually become unmanageable for the crew. The existence of
the sudden turn has been confirmed by the analysis of the ship's Automatic
Identification System data. The crew of the ferry has agreed that the main
cause was the sudden turn. Experts such as Lee Sang-yun, a professor and
head of the environment/maritime technology institute of the Pukyong
National University, have also agreed.
Overloading and improperly secured cargo are also being seen as
direct causes. The MV Sewol was carrying 3,608 tons of cargo, more than
three times the limit of 987 tons. It is estimated that the actual cargo on the
day of the accident weighed 2,215 tons, including 920 tons of trucks, cars
and heavy equipment, 131 tons of containers and 1,164 tons of general
goods. the cargo included building materials destined for naval bases on the
island of Jeju.
The overloading was also previously noted by an off-duty
captain and the first mate. Lee Sang-yun also proposed overloading
as a cause. According to the off-duty captain of the Sewol, the ship
owners ignored his warning that the ship should not carry so much
cargo because she would not be stable.
The Sewol was carrying only 580 tons of ballast water, much
less than the recommended 2,030 tons; this would make the vessel
more prone to list and capsize. South Korean Newspaper The

Chosun Ilbo argued that the discharging of ballast water was a

cause of the incident. The crew had reportedly pumped out
hundreds of tons of ballast water from the bottom of the ship in
order to accommodate the additional cargo.
Secondary causes have also affected the capsizing of the ferry by
decreasing the restoring force. The crew of the ferry stated that the lack of
restoring force was a cause of the disaster. The Prosecution/Police Coalition
Investigations Headquarters is currently investigating secondary causes
which could have lessened the ship's restoring force.
Renovations which added extra passenger cabins have been proposed as a
main secondary cause by Kim Gill-soo, a professor in the maritime transport
technological department at the Korea Maritime University. This possible
cause has also been supported by the captain, as well as Lee Sang-yun.

MV Angeln
While departing from the port of Vieux-Fort on the Caribbean Islands of
St Lucia on the 21 February 2010 the six-year-old 657TEU container
ship Angeln capsized and founded. Fortunately, the crew of 15 all survived
and were unharmed. The weather at the time was fair with only a little wind
and marginal swell. The ship did not touch ground and a collision did not take
place.
The cargo loading proceeded without incident until towards the end of
the loading. The ships cranes were being used to help speed up the loading
operation and during one such container movement the vessel listed
excessively to starboard and operations were temporarily stopped and the
vessel eventually settles upright. There was a dispute between the Chief
mate and the Captain regarding the loading pattern and there was a refusal
to load some apparently too heavy containers. Further loading using the
vessels crane was stopped at about 16.00 hours.
The vessel was fitted with ballast tanks, comprising of double bottoms,
side tank arrangement, fore peak and aft peak tanks. The vessel was fitted
with a fully automatic anti-heeling system for continuous and effective
loading and unloading cargo operations while in port. The ballast condition of
the vessel was to some extent unclear. The fore peak was empty and No.2
double bottom tank was not in use due to an apparently defective valve.

From the total of 79 containers loaded in Vieux Fort only 8

were stowed under deck in the cargo holds. The remaining 71 were
stowed on deck primarily into upper tiers. This stowage will have
impacted the vessels stability. It is likely that the Angeln developed
a negative GM. Both the list that developed while using the ships
crane in port and the side to side list experienced out at sea and
while maneuvering are symptomatic of an unstable equilibrium.
The vessel departed the docks at 21.50 hours with the vessel lying on
an even keel. After leaving the container pier the pilot started a turn to port
with engines running dead slow ahead and with bow thrusters pushing to
port and the wheel hard over to port. The master noted the ship
handling was a little strange and the vessel developed a slight list
to starboard. The vessel made the necessary turn and headed out to sea.
The pilot then left but while on the pilot gangway realized that the vessel had
started to list even more to starboard.
The master then instructed the chief officer to go with the bosun and
sound the tanks and holds to ascertain if the vessel was taking water. The
Master also tried to position the vessel more head to the sea and swell but
the vessel was reluctant to comply even when the bow thrusters were used.
The master also used the heeling tanks to try and rectify the list. The
details of his actions remain unclear but it was noted that the list
was reduced after which the vessel went to port and then back to
starboard list. The master then ordered all crew to report to their
abandon ship station. Shortly after which the vessel listed even
further and the order to abandon ship was given and the free fall
lifeboat launched. At 22.00 hours the vessel capsized.

References:

http://www.genre.com/knowledge/blog/maritime-disasters-related-to-vesselinstability.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Hoegh_Osaka

http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/172059/imo-bauxite-liquefaction-sank-bulkjupiter/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MOL_Comfort

http://www.rina.org.uk/mol_comfort_accident.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinking_of_MV_Sewol#Causes

http://www.rina.org.uk/Angeln_Accident.html