G.R. No.

192268, January 27, 2016 - DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS REGIONAL

DIRECTOR, Petitioner, v. DELFINA C. CASIBANG, ANGELINA C. CANAPI, ERLINDA C. BAJAN, LORNA G.
GUMABAY, DION1SIA C. ALONZO, MARIA C. BANGAYAN AND DIGNA C. BINAYUG, Respondents.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192268, January 27, 2016
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS REGIONAL DIRECTOR, Petitioner, v.DELFINA
C. CASIBANG, ANGELINA C. CANAPI, ERLINDA C. BAJAN, LORNA G. GUMABAY, DION1SIA C.
ALONZO, MARIA C. BANGAYAN AND DIGNA C. BINAYUG, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari, dated June 18, 2010, of petitioner
Department of Education (DepEd), represented by its Regional Director seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated April 29, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the Decision2 dated January 10, 2008
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 5, declaring the respondents the
owners of property in controversy and ordering the DepFd to pay the value of the property.
The antecedents follow:
The property in controversy is a seven thousand five hundred thirty-two (7,532) square meter portion of Lot
115 covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-627 registered under the name of Juan Cepeda, the
respondents' late father.3
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 1965, upon the request of the then Mayor Justo Cesar Caronan, Cepeda allowed the
construction and operation of a school on the western portion of his property. The school is now known as
Solana North Central School, operating under the control and supervision of the petitioner DepEd. 4
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Despite Cepeda's death in 1983, the herein respondents and other descendants of Cepeda continued to
tolerate the use and possession of the property by the school. 5
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Sometime between October 31, 2000 and November 2, 2000, the respondents entered and occupied a
portion of the property. Upon discovery of the said occupation, the teachers of the school brought the matter
to the attention of the barangay captain. The school officials demanded the respondents to vacate the
property.6 However, the respondents refused to vacate the property, and asserted Cepeda's ownership of the
lot.7
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On June 21, 2001, the DepEd filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry and Damages against respondents before
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Solana-Enrile. The MCTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and
directed respondents to vacate the premises.8 On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC. 9
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Thereafter, respondents demanded the petitioner to either pay rent, purchase the area occupied, or vacate
the premises. DepEd did not heed the demand and refused to recognize the ownership of the respondents
over the property.10
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On March 16, 2004, the respondents filed an action for Recovery of Possession and/or Sum of Money against
the DepEd.11 Respondents averred that since their late father did not have any immediate need of the land in
1965, he consented to the building of the temporary structure and allowed the conduct of classes in the

premises. They claimed that they have been deprived of the use and the enjoyment of the portion of the
land occupied by the school, thus, they are entitled to just compensation and reasonable rent for the use of
property.12
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

In its Answer, the DepEd alleged that it owned the subject property because it was purchased by civicminded residents of Solana, Cagayan from Cepeda. It further alleged that contrary to respondents' claim
that the occupation is by mere tolerance, the property has always been occupied and used adversely,
peacefully, continuously and in the concept of owner for almost forty (40) years. 13 It insisted that the
respondents had lost whatever right they had over the property through laches. 14
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

During the trial, respondents presented, inter alia, the OCT No. O-627 registered in the name of Juan
Cepeda; Tax Declarations also in his name and the tax receipts showing that they had been paying real
property taxes on the property since 1965.15 They also presented the Technical Description of the lot by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Land Management Services showing that the subject
property was surveyed in the name of Cepeda and a certification from the Municipal Trial Court of Solana,
Cagayan declaring that Lot 115 was the subject of Cad Case No. N-13 in LRC Cad. Record No. N-200 which
was adjudicated to Cepeda.16
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the other hand, despite notice and reset of hearing, the DepEd failed to present its evidence or witness
to substantiate its defense.17
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Consequently, the RTC considered the case submitted for decision and rendered a Decision dated January
10, 2008, finding that the respondents are the owners of the subject property, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.
1.

Declaring plaintiffs as the owner of Lot 115 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0627.

2.

Ordering the reconveyance of the portion of the subject property occupied by the Solana
North Central School, Solana, Cagayan. However, since restoration of possession of said
portion by the defendant Department of Education is no longer feasible or convenient
because it is now used for the school premises, the only relief available is for the
government to pay due compensation which should have [been] done years ago.
2.1 To determine due compensation for the Solana North Central School the basis should be
the price or value of the property at the time of taking.

3.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.18

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The DepEd, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the case before the CA. In its
appeal, the DepEd insisted that the respondents have lost their right over the subject property for their
failure to assert the same for more than thirty (30) years, starting in 1965, when the Mayor placed the
school in possession thereof.19
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The CA then affirmed the decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED, and the Decision dated 10 January 2008, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 5, Tuguegarao, Cagayan in Civil Case No. 6336 for Recovery of Possession and/or Sum of Money,
declaring plaintiffs as the owners of the property in controversy, and ordering the Department of Education
to pay them the value of the property taken is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.20

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Aggrieved, the DepEd, through the OSG, filed before this Court the present petition based on the sole
ground that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT THE RESPONDENTS'
RIGHT TO RECOVER THE POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
AND/OR LACHES.21
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This Court finds the petition without merit.

Laches, in a general sense, is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 22
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot work to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. 23
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. 24 The
following elements, as prescribed in the case of Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al.,25 must be present to
constitute laches:
x x x (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that
the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. 26
chanroble slaw

To refute the respondents' claim that its possession of the subject lot was merely tolerated, the DepEd
averred that it owned the subject property because the land was purchased by the civic-minded residents of
Solana.27 It further alleged that since it was the then Mayor who convinced Cepeda to allow the school to
occupy the property and use the same, it believed in good faith that the ownership of the property was
already transferred to it.28
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

However, the DepEd did not present, in addition to the deed of sale, a duly-registered certificate of title in
proving the alleged transfer or sale of the property. Aside from its allegation, the DepEd did not adduce any
evidence to the transfer of ownership of the lot, or that Cepeda received any. consideration for the purported
sale.
On the other hand, to support their claim of ownership of the subject lot, respondents presented the
following: (1) the OCT No. 0-627 registered in the name of Juan Cepeda; 29 (2) Tax Declarations in the name
of Cepeda and the tax receipts showing the payment of the real property taxes on the property since
1965;30 (3) Technical Description of the lot by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Land
Management Services, surveyed in the name of Cepeda; 31 and (4) Certification from the Municipal Trial
Court of Solana, Cagayan declaring that Lot 115 was adjudicated to Cepeda. 32
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

After a scrutiny of the records, this Court finds that the above were sufficient to resolve the issue on who
had better right of possession. That being the case, it is the burden of the DepEd to prove otherwise.
Unfortunately, the DepEd failed to present any evidence to support its claim that the disputed land was
indeed purchased by the residents. By the DepEd's admission, it was the fact that the then Mayor of Solana,
Cagayan convinced Cepeda to allow the school to occupy the property for its school site that made it believe
that the ownership of the property was already transferred to it. We are not swayed by the DepEd's
arguments. As against the DepEd's unsubstantiated self-serving claim that it acquired the property by virtue
of a sale, the Torrens title of respondents must prevail.
It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by OCT No. O-627, registered in the name of the Juan
Cepeda.33 A fundamental principle in land registration under the Torrens system is that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein.34 Thus, the certificate of title becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of
land.35
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

As registered owners of the lots in question, the respondents have a right to eject any person illegally
occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the

petitioner's occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners
have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized
or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches. 36
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Case law teaches that those who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the
property upon demand.37
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

In the case of Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,38] this Court described what tolerated acts mean, in this
language:
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are "those which by reason of
neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the
property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one's property can give to another
without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy." x x
x. and, Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired
by prescription." x x x39
chanrobleslaw

It was out of respect and courtesy to the then Mayor who was a distant relative that Cepeda consented to
the building of the school.40 The occupancy of the subject property by the DepEd to conduct classes therein
arose from what Professor Arturo Tolentino refers to as the sense of "neighborliness or familiarity" of Cepeda
to the then Mayor that he allowed the said occupation and use of his property.
Professor Tolentino, as cited in the Sarona case, adds that tolerated acts are acts of little disturbances which
a person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as
passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well. 41 In tolerated acts, the said
permission of the owner for the acts done in his property arises from an "impulse of sense of neighborliness
or good familiarity with persons"42 or out of "friendship or courtesy,"43 and not out of duty or obligation. By
virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission, or license, acts of possession are
realized or performed.44
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Thus, in light of the DepEd's admission that it was the then Mayor who convinced Cepeda to allow its use of
his property and in the absence of evidence that the same was indeed sold to it, the occupation and use as
school site of the subject lot by the DepEd upon Cepeda's permission is considered a tolerated act. Cepeda
allowed the use of his property out of his respect, courtesy and familiarity with the then Mayor who
convinced him to allow the use of his property as a school site.
Considering that the occupation of the subject lot is by mere tolerance or permission of the respondents, the
DepEd, without any contract between them, is bound by an implied promise that it will vacate the same
upon demand. Hence, until such demand to vacate was communicated by the respondents to the DepEd,
respondents are not required to do any act to recover the subject land, precisely because they knew of the
nature of the DepEd's possession which is by mere tolerance.
Therefore, respondents are not guilty of failure or neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time. The
nature of that possession by the DepEd has never changed from 1965 until the filing of the complaint for
forcible entry against the respondents on June 21, 2001. It was only then that the respondents had
knowledge of the adverse claim of the DepEd over the property. The respondents filed the action for
recovery of possession on March 16, 2004 after they lost their appeal in the forcible entry case and upon the
continued refusal of the DepEd to pay rent, purchase the lot or vacate the premises. 45
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Lastly, the DepEd maintains that the respondents' inaction for more than 30 years reduced their right to
recover the subject property into a stale demand. It cited the case of Eduarte v. CA,46Catholic Bishop of
Balanga v. CA,47 Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v. Heirs of Marcelina L. Sero, et
al.48 and DepEd Division of Alb ay v. Oate49 to bolster its claim that a registered owner may lose his right to
recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches. It alleged that the fact that the
respondents possess the certificate of title of the property is of no moment since a registered landowner, like
the respondents, lost their right to recover the possession of the registered property by reason of laches.
In the Eduarte case, the respondents therein knew of Eduarte's adverse possession of the subject lot as
evidenced by their Joint Affidavit dated March 18, 1959. In the case of Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. CA, the
petitioner, by its own admission, was aware of private respondent's occupation in the concept of owner of
the lot donated in its behalf to private respondent's predecessor-in-interest in 1936. The subject lot in the

case of Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority was obtained through expropriation proceedings and
registered in the name of the petitioner. In the Onate case, no evidence was presented to show that the
respondent or his predecessor-in-interest protested against the adverse possession of the disputed lot by
the Municipality of Daraga and, subsequently, by the petitioner.
Unlike the cases cited by the DepEd, there was no solid evidentiary basis to establish that laches existed in
the instant case. The DepEd failed to substantiate its claim of possession in the concept of an owner from
the time it occupied the lot after Cepeda allowed it to use the same for a school site in 1965. The possession
by the DepEd of the subject lot was clearly by mere tolerance, since it was not proven that it laid an adverse
claim over the property by virtue of the purported sale.
Moreover, the trial court ruled that the DepEd is a builder in good faith. To be deemed a builder in good
faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e., that he be a possessor in
the concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it.50 However, there are cases where Article 448 of the Civil Code was applied beyond the
recognized and limited definition of good faith, e.g., cases wherein the builder has constructed
improvements on the land of another with the consent of the owner.51 The Court ruled therein that the
structures were built in good faith in those cases that the owners knew and approved of the construction of
improvements on the property.52
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Despite being a possessor by mere tolerance, the DepEd is considered a builder in good faith, since Cepeda
permitted the construction of building and improvements to conduct classes on his property. Hence, Article
448 may be applied in the case at bar.
Article 448, in relation to Article 546 of the Civil Code, provides for the rights of respondents as landowners
as against the DepEd, a builder in good faith. The provisions respectively read:
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing, or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if
its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses
or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
In the case of Bernardo v. Bataclan,53 the Court explicated that Article 448 provides a just and equitable
solution to the impracticability of creating "forced co-ownership" by giving the owner of the land the option
to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay
for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent.54 The owner of the land is allowed to exercise the said
options because his right is older and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership
of the accessory thing.55
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Thus, the two options available to the respondents as landowners are: (a) they may appropriate the
improvements, after payment of indemnity representing the value of the improvements introduced and the
necessary and useful expenses defrayed on the subject lots; or (b) they may oblige the DepEd to pay the
price of the land. However, it is also provided under Article 448 that the builder cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the improvements and buildings. If that is the case, the
DepEd is not duty-bound to pay the price of the land should the value of the same be considerably higher
than the value of the improvement introduced by the DepEd on the subject property. In which case, the law
provides that the parties shall agree on the terms of the lease and, in case of disagreement, the court shall
fix the terms thereof.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, ruled that the option of the landowner to appropriate after payment of the
indemnity representing the value of the improvements introduced and the necessary and useful expenses
defrayed on the subject lots is no longer feasible or convenient because it is now being used as school
premises. Considering that the appropriation of improvements upon payment of indemnity pursuant to
Article 546 by the respondents of the buildings being used by the school is no longer practicable and
feasible, the respondents are thus left with the second option of obliging the DepEd to pay the price of the
land or to require the DepEd to pay reasonable rent if the value of the land is considerably more than the
value of the buildings and improvements.
Since the determination of the value of the subject property is factual in nature, this Court finds a need to
remand the case to the trial court to determine its value. In case the trial court determines that the value of
the land is considerably more than that of the buildings and improvements introduced, the DepEd may not
be compelled to pay the value of the land, instead it shall pay reasonable rent upon agreement by the
parties of the terms of the lease. In the event of a disagreement between the parties, the trial court shall fix
the terms of lease.
Lastly, the RTC ruled that the basis of due compensation for the respondents should be the price or value of
the property at the time of the taking. In the case of Ballatan v. CA,56 the Court has settled that the time of
taking is determinative of just compensation in expropriation proceedings but not in a case where a
landowner has been deprived of the use of a portion of this land for years due to the encroachment of
another.57
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In such instances, the case of Vda. de Roxas v. Our Lady's Foundation, Inc.58 is instructive. The Court
elucidated therein that the computation of the value of the property should be fixed at the prevailing market
value.59 The reckoning period for valuing the property in case the landowner exercised his rights in
accordance with Article 448 shall be at the time the landowner elected his choice. 60Therefore, the basis for
the computation of the value of the subject property in the instant case should be its present or current fair
market value.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari, dated June 18, 2010, of petitioner Department of
Education, represented by its Regional Director, is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 29,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90633, affirming the Decision dated January 10, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 5, which declared the respondents the owners of
property in controversy, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to the court of origin to determine the value of the subject property. If
the value of the property is less than the value of the buildings and improvements, the Department of
Education is ordered to pay such amount. If the value of the property is greater than the value of the
buildings and improvements, the DepEd is ordered to pay reasonable rent in accordance with the agreement
of the parties. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the amount of reasonable rent.
SO ORDERED.

cralawla wlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

cralawla wlibrary

G.R. No. 199537, February 10, 2016 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ANDREA TAN,
Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199537, February 10, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ANDREA TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) from the May 29,
2009 decision1 and October 18, 2011 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702.
The CA denied the Republic's appeal from LRC Case No. N-1443 wherein the Municipal Trial Court in
Consolacion, Cebu, granted respondent Andrea Tan's application for land title registration.
Antecedents
On October 2, 2002, Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No. 4080, Cad. 545-D
(new) situated in Casili, Consolacion, Cebu (the subject lot). She alleged that she is the absolute owner in
fee simple of the said 7,807 square-meter parcel of residential land she purchased from a certain Julian
Gonzaga on September 17, 1992. Her application was docketed as LRC Case No. N-144.
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the land registration court issued an order of general
default, excepting the State which was duly represented by the Solicitor General.
During the trial, Tan proved the following facts:
1.

The subject lot is within Block 1, Project No. 28, per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu;

2.

The subject lot was declared alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965, pursuant to Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063;

3.

Luciano Gonzaga who was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 01465 in 1965 and 02983 in 1972 initially
possessed the subject lot.

4.

After Luciano's death, Julian Gonzaga inherited the subject lot;

5.

Andrea Tan purchased the subject lot from Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992;

6.

She, through her predecessors, had been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.

On 28 April 2004, the land registration court granted Tan's application. The court confirmed her title over the
subject lot and ordered its registration.
The Republic appealed the case to the CA, arguing that Tan failed to prove that she is a Filipino citizen who
has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot, in the
concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of her application. The
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702.

On May 29, 2009, the CA denied the appeal. The CA observed that under the Public Land Act, there are two
kinds of applicants for original registration: (1) those who had possessed the land since June 12, 1945; and
(2) those who already acquired the property through prescription. The respondent's application fell under
the second category.
The CA noted that before land of the public domain can be acquired by prescription, it must have been
declared alienable and disposable agricultural land. The CA pointed to the certification issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) as evidence that the subject was classified
as alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965, pursuant to Land Classification Project No. 28. The CA
concluded that Tan had already acquired the subject lot by prescription.
On July 2, 2009, the Republic moved for reconsideration. Citing Republic v. Herbieto,4 it argued that an
applicant for judicial confirmation of title must have been in possession and occupation of the subject land
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and that the subject land has been likewise already declared alienable and
disposable since June 12, 1945, or earlier.5
On October 18, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration citing the then recent case ofHeirs of
Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the Philippines6 which abandoned the ruling in Herbieto. Malabanan declared
that our law does not require that the property should have been declared alienable and disposable since
June 12, 1945, as long as the declaration was made before the application for registration is filed. 7
On January 5, 2012, the Republic filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Petition
The Republic argues: (1) that the CA misapplied the doctrine in Malabanan; and (2) that the CENRO
certification and tax declarations presented were insufficient to prove that the subject lot was no longer
intended for public use.
Meanwhile, the respondent insists that she has already proven her title over the subject lot. She maintains
that the classification of the subject lot as alienable and disposable public land by the DENR on September 1,
1965, per Land Classification Project No. 28, converted it into patrimonial property of the State.
From the submissions, the lone issue is whether a declaration that Government-owned land has become
alienable and disposable sufficiently converts it into patrimonial property of the State, making it susceptible
to acquisitive prescription.
Our Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State. It is the fountain from which springs any asserted right of
ownership over land. Accordingly, the State owns all lands that are not clearly within private ownership. This
is the Regalian Doctrine which has been incorporated in all of our Constitutions and repeatedly embraced in
jurisprudence.8 Under the present Constitution, lands of the public domain are not alienable except
for agricultural lands.9
The Public Land Act10 (PLA) governs the classification, grant, and disposition of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. It is the primary substantive law on this matter. Section 11 thereof recognizes
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles as a mode of disposition of alienable public lands. 11 Relative thereto,
Section 48(b) of the PLA identifies who are entitled to judicial confirmation of their title:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by PD 1073.)
The Property Registration Decree12 (PRD) complements the PLA by prescribing how registrable lands,

including alienable public lands, are brought within the coverage of the Torrens system. Section 14 of the
PRD enumerates the qualified applicants for original registration of title:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,1945, or earlier;
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws;
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws;
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law. 13

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The PRD also recognizes prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. 14Nevertheless,
prescription under Section 14(2) must not be confused with judicial confirmation of title under Section
14(1). Judicial confirmation of title requires:
1.

That the applicant is a Filipino citizen;15

2.

That the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since June 12,
1945;16

3.

That the property had been declared alienable and disposable as of the filing of the application.17

Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is outside the commerce
of man.18 It cannot be the object of prescription19 because prescription does not run against the State in its
sovereign capacity.20 However, when property of public dominion is no longer intended for public use or for
public service, it becomes part of the patrimonial property of the State. 21 When this happens, the property is
withdrawn from public dominion and becomes property of private ownership, albeit still owned by the
State.22 The property is now brought within the commerce of man and becomes susceptible to the concepts
of legal possession and prescription.
In the present case, respondent Tan's application is not anchored on judicial confirmation of an imperfect
title because she does not claim to have possessed the subject lot since June 12, 1945. Her application is
based on acquisitive prescription on the claim that: (1) the property was declared alienable and disposable
on September 1, 1965; and (2) she had been in open continuous, public, and notorious possession of the
subject lot in the concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.
In our 2009 decision and 2013 resolution23 in Malabanan, we already held en banc that a declaration that
property of the public dominion is alienable and disposable does not ipso facto convert it into patrimonial
property. We said:
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and
thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.24
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in an application
for judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not suffice for the purpose of
prescription under the Civil Code.25 Before prescription can even begin to run against the State, the following
conditions must concur to convert the subject into patrimonial property:
1.

The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of
Article XII of the Constitution;

2.

The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable; 26

3.

There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is no longer intended
for public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property.

Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public and peaceful possession of the subject
lot in the concept of an owner.
In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been declared alienable and
disposable, the property has not been withdrawn from public use or public service. Without this, prescription
cannot begin to run because the property has not yet been converted into patrimonial property of the State.
It remains outside the commerce of man and the respondent's physical possession and occupation thereof
do not produce any legal effect. In the eyes of the law, the respondent has never acquired legal possession
of the property and her physical possession thereof, no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.
chanroble slaw

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The May 29, 2009 decision and October 18, 2011 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent's
application for Land Registration is DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

cralawla wlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Endnotes:

Rollo, pp. 37-44. Penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino and concurred in by Associate Justices
Stephen C. Cruz and Rodil V. Zalameda.
1

Id. at 31-35. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles and concurred in by Associate Justices Parnpio
A. Abarintos and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
2

Id. at 45-48. Through Presiding Judge Jocelyn G. Uy-Po.

G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183, 186.

Rollo, p. 52.

605 Phil. 244 (2009).

Id. at 269, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144507, 17 January 2005 448 SCRA 442.

La Bugal-B 'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 866 (2004);Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. No. 167707, 8 October 2008, 568 SCRA 164, 200; Republic
v. Ching, G.R. No. 186166, 20 October 2010, 634 SCRA 415.
8

Art. XII, Section 2, 3, Phil. Const.

10

Commonwealth Act No. 141 (as amended), [The Public Land Act], (1936).

11

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows:
1.

For homestead settlement;

2.

By sale;

3.

By lease; and

4.

By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:

(a) By judicial legalization
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent)

12

Presidential Decree No. 1529, [PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE] (1978).

13

Section 14, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE.

14

See CIVIL CODE, Arts. 712 and 1106.

15

Section 48 (b), PUBLIC LAND ACT.

16

Section 48 (b), PUBLIC LAND ACT; Section 14(1), PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE.

Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 561, 581 (2013);Republic v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 7.
17

18

Art. 1113, CIVIL CODE.

19

Art. 1113, CIVIL CODE.

20

Art. 1108, CIVIL CODE.

21

Art. 422, CIVIL CODE.

22

Art. 425, CIVIL CODE.

23

Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, supra note 17.

24

Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the Philippines, supra note 7.

cralawre d

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession often years.
25

Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
26

Sec. 6, Public Land act.

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I concur in the result.

Respectfully, I disagree with the ponencia's statement that "the State owns all lands that are not clearly
within private ownership."1 This statement is an offshoot of the idea that our Constitution embraces the
Regalian Doctrine as the most basic principle in our policies involving lands.
The Regalian Doctrine has not been incorporated in our Constitution. Pertinent portion of the Constitution
provides:
SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State[.]2
Thus, there is no basis for the presumption that all lands belong to the state. The Constitution limits state
ownership of lands to "lands of the public domain[.]" 3 Lands that are in private possession in the concept of
an owner since time immemorial are considered never to have been public. 4 They were never owned by the
state.
In Cario v. Insular Government:5
The [Organic Act of July 1, 1902] made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and,
like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that "no law shall be enacted in said
islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws." 5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted
from 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that.. . it
meant by "property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of
the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom
and by long association, one of the profoundest factors in human thought, regarded as their own.
....
... It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes,
the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been
held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. 6
Hence, documents of title issued for such lands are not to be considered as a state grant of ownership. They
serve as confirmation of property rights already held by persons. They are mere evidence of ownership. 7 The
recognition of private rights over properties that have long been held as private is consistent with our
constitutional duty to uphold due process. 8
The state cannot, on the sole basis of the land's "unclear" private character, always successfully oppose
applications for registration of titles, especially when the land involved has long been privately held and
historically regarded by private persons as their own.9
This case can be resolved without resort to the fiction of the Regalian Doctrine.
Respondent Andrea Tan's application for registration was granted by the land registration court. 10 The Court
of Appeals affirmed the land registration court's Decision based on the certification issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that the land was already classified as alienable and
disposable.11
By submitting the CENRO's certification, therefore, respondent applicant admitted that prior to her
possession, the land was part of the public domain. However, she failed to clearly show that the land was
classified as alienable and disposable public land.
In several cases, we have clearly ruled that the CENRO's certificate is not sufficient.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur that the Petition should be GRANTED.

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary