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I.

CONCEPT OF TORTS, HISTORY AND


DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE LAW
ON TORTS
1. SANGCO pp. XXXI to XLV, pp 110
2. Aquino pp 1-10
II. THE CONCEPT OF QUASI DELICT
A. Elements:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
1. Barredo vs Garcia
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936,
Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa
thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino
Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal
suit against Fontanilla and reserved their
right to file a separate civil suit.
Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After
the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit
against Barredo the owner of the taxi
(employer of Fontanilla). The suit was
based on Article 1903 of the civil code
(negligence of employers in the selection
of their employees). Barredo assailed the
suit arguing that his liability is only
subsidiary and that the separate civil suit
should have been filed against Fontanilla
primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just
subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under
Article 1903 which is a separate civil
action against negligent employers.
Garcia is well within his rights in suing
Barredo. He reserved his right to file a
separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the
SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving

his sentence and has no property. It was


also proven that Barredo is negligent in
hiring his employees because it was
shown that Fontanilla had had multiple
traffic infractions already before he hired
him something he failed to overcome
during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved
his right to file a separate civil action,
Barredo
would
have
only
been
subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not
being sued for damages arising from a
criminal act (his drivers negligence) but
rather for his own negligence in selecting
his employee (Article 1903).
2. Elcano vs Hill
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death
of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a
criminal case against Reginald but
Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent
coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed
a civil action against Reginald and his
dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued
that the civil action is barred by his sons
acquittal in the criminal case; and that if
ever, his civil liability as a parent has
been extinguished by the fact that his
son is already an emancipated minor by
reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be
held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case does not bar the filing
of a separate civil action. A separate civil
action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if accused is actually
charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the

Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil


liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary
and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is
terminated upon emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place by
the marriage of the minor child, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of
the minor is not really full or absolute.
Thus Emancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the childs
person. It shall enable the minor to
administer his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow
money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father
or mother, or guardian. He can sue and
be sued in court only with the assistance
of his father, mother or guardian.
Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to
Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since
at the time of the decision, Reginald is
already of age, Marvins liability should
be subsidiary only as a matter of equity.
3. Cinco vs Canonoy
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City
Court for recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving
his car and a jeepney driven by
respondent Romeo Hilot and operated by
respondents Valeriana Pepito and Carlos
Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed
against the driver. At the pre-trial of the
civil case counsel for the respondents
moved for the suspension of the civil
action pending determination of the
criminal case invoking Section 3(b), Rule

111 of the Rules of Court. The City Court


granted the motion and ordered the
suspension of the civil case. Petitioner
elevated the matter on certiorari to the
Court of First
Instance, alleging that the City Judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being
contrary to law and jurisprudence. The
Court of First Instance dismissed the
petition; hence, this petition to review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be an
independent civil action for damages to
property during the pendency of the
criminal action.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action
for damages based on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the New Civil Code is quasidelictual in character which can be
prosecuted independently of the criminal
action. Where the plaintiff made essential
averments in the complaint that it was
the driver's fault or negligence in the
operation of the jeepney which caused
the collision between his automobile and
said jeepney; that plaintiff sustained
damages because of the collision; that a
direct causal connection exists between
the damage he suffered and the fault or
negligence of the defendant-driver and
where the defendant-operator in their
answer, contended, among others, that
they observed due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their
employees, a defense peculiar to actions
based on quasi-delict , such action is
principally predicated on Articles 32176
and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is
quasi-delictual in nature
and character. Liability being predicated
on quasi-delict , the civil case may
proceed as a separate and independent
court action as specifically provided for in
Article 2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of

the Rules of Court refers to "other civil


actions arising from cases not included in
Section 2 of the same rule" in which,
"once the criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising from
the same offense can be prosecuted and
the same shall be suspended in whatever
stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has
been rendered". The civil action referred
to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the
Rules of Court which should be
suspended after the criminal action has
been instituted is that arising from the
criminal offense and not the civil action
based on quasi delict.
The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so
broad that it includes not only injuries to
persons but also damage to property. It
makes no distinction between "damage
to persons" on the one hand and
"damage to property" on the other. The
word "damage" is used in two concepts:
the "harm" done and "reparation" for the
harm done. And with respect to "harm" it
is plain that it includes both injuries to
person and property since "harm" is not
limited to personal but also to property
injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the
law itself which includes damage to
property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil
Code which holds proprietors responsible
for damages caused by excessive smoke
which may be harmful "to person or
property". Respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in upholding the
decision of the city court suspending the
civil action based on quasi-delict until
after the criminal action is finally
terminated.
4. Gashem Shokat Baksh vs CA
FACTS:
Private respondent Marilou
Gonzales filed a complaint for damages
against Gasheem Shookat, an Iranian
Citizen, of breach of promise to marry.
She said that both of them agreed to
marry after the end of the school

semester and the petitioner asked the


approval of her parents. She stated that
the petitioner forced to live with him in
his apartments. Respondent was a virgin
before she was forced to live with the
Iranian (petitioner). A week before she
filed
her
complaint,
petitioner
maltreated, assaulted and asked not to
live with him anymore and; the petitioner
is already married to someone living in
Bacolod City.
On the petitioners
counterclaim, he said that he never
proposed marriage with the private
respondent; he neither forced her to live
with him and he did not maltreat her but
only told her to stop from coming into his
apartment because he discovered that
she had deceived him by stealing his
money and passport. He insisted that he
must be awarded for damages for he
suffered
mental
anxiety
and
a
besmirched reputation due to the
complaint of the private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is to
be held liable for damages for breach of
promise to marry.
HELD: A breach of promise to marry per
se is not an actionable wrong. This court
held that where a mans promise to
marry is in fact the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that
promise
thereafter
becomes
the
proximate cause of the giving of herself
in a sexual congress, proof that he had,
in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain
her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of fraud and deceit
and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter.
Such act done by the petitioner is
contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.

Petitioner even committed deplorable


acts in disregard of the laws of the
country. The court ordered that the
petition be denied with costs against the
petitioner
5. Dulay vs CA
FACTS:
December 7, 1988: Due to a heated
argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security
guard on duty at Big Bang Sa Alabang
carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay
Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the
deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own
behalf and in behalf of her minor children
filed an action for damages against
Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless
discharge of the firearm and Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc.,
(Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security
Corp. (Superguard) as employers for
negligence having failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in
the supervision and control of its
employee to avoid the injury
Superguard:
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was
beyond the scope of his duties, and was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo),
the civil liability therefor is governed by
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty
of a felony. Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
civil liability under Article 2176 applies
only to quasi-offenses under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code
CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of
Dulay
ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard
commited an actionable breach and can
be civilly liable even if Benigno Torzuela
is already being prosecuted for homicide
HELD: YES.
Petition for Review is
Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the
merits

Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal


Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless
the offended party waives the civil action
, reserves his right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action
Such civil action includes recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34,
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused
Contrary to the theory of private
respondents, there is no justification for
limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the
Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting
from negligence. Well-entrenched is the
doctrine that article 2176 covers not only
acts committed with negligence, but also
acts which are voluntary and intentional.
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal
in character; whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary
extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused

It is enough that the complaint alleged


that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon
Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that
the shooting occurred while Torzuela was
on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD
and/or
SAFEGUARD
was
Torzuela's
employer and responsible for his acts.
6. Garcia vs Florido
FACTS:
August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief
of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his
wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester
Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital,
hired and boarded a PU car owned and
operated by Marcelino Inesin, and driven
by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a
round-trip from Oroquieta City to
Zamboanga City for the purpose of
attending a conference
August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU
car was negotiating a slight curve on the
national highway at 21 km, it collided
with an oncoming passenger bus owned
and operated by the Mactan Transit Co.,
Inc. and driven by Pedro Tumala
Garcia et al. sustained various physical
injuries which necessitated their medical
treatment and hospitalization
Garcia et al. filed an action for damages
against both drivers and their owners for
driving in a reckless, grossly negligent
and imprudent manner in gross violation
of traffic rules and without due regard to
the safety of the passengers aboard the
PU car
RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not
quasi-delict because there is a violation
of law or traffic rules or regulations for
excessive speeding
ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a
civil action for quasi-delict despite having
a criminal action.
HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed
and set aside, and the court a quo is
directed to proceed with the trial of the
case

essential averments for a quasi-delictual


action under Articles 2176-2194 of the
New Civil Code are present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private
respondents
b) presence of fault or negligence or the
lack of due care in the operation of the
passenger bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala
resulting in the collision of the bus with
the passenger car
c) physical injuries and other damages
sustained by as a result of the collision
d) existence of direct causal connection
between the damage or prejudice and
the fault or negligence of private
respondents
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual
relations between the parties
violation of traffic rules is merely
descriptive of the failure of said driver to
observe for the protection of the interests
of others, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, which failure resulted in
the injury on petitioners
petitioners never intervened in the
criminal action instituted by the Chief of
Police against respondent Pedro Tumala,
much less has the said criminal action
been terminated either by conviction or
acquittal of said accused
It is, therefore, evident that by the
institution of the present civil action for
damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery
for damages in the criminal case, and
have opted instead to recover them in
the present civil case
petitioners have thereby foreclosed their
right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need
not be made, for the reason that the law
itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already
makes the reservation and the failure of
the offended party to do so does not bar
him from bringing the action, under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, We
find no legal justification for respondent
court's order of dismissal
7. Andamo vs IAC

Doctrine: It must be stressed that the use


of ones property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that the owner of a thing
cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third
person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM
NON LAEDAS.
Facts: Petitioner spouses Andamo owned
a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang,
Cavite which is adjacent to that of private
respondent corporation, Missionaries of
Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the
land of the latter, waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake,
were
constructed,
which
allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners land,
caused a young man to drown,
damagaed petitioners crops and plants,
washed away costly fences, endangered
the
livesofthepetitioners
and
their
laborers and some other destructions.
This prompted petitioner spouses to file a
criminal action for destruction by means
of inundation under Article 324 of the
RPC and a civil action for damages.
Issue: Whether
petitioner spouses
Andamo
can
claim
damages
for
destruction caused by respondents
waterpaths and contrivances on the basis
of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts.
Held: Yes. A careful examination of the
aforequoted complaint shows that the
civil action is one under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict
are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered
by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of
the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff. 11

Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the


waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to
have inundated the land of petitioners.
There is therefore, an assertion of a
causal connection between the act of
building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such
action if proven constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for
the recovery of damages.
It must be stressed that the use of ones
property is not without limitations. Article
431 of the Civil Code provides that the
owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such a manner as to injure the
rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO
UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover,
adjoining landowners have mutual and
reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable
manner so as not to infringe upon the
rights and interests of others. Although
we recognize the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so
that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand
the usual and expected forces of nature.
If the structures cause injury or damage
to an adjoining landowner or a third
person,
the
latter
can
claim
indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.
8. Taylor vs Manila Electric Company
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who
spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was
also able to learn some principles of
mechanical engineering and mechanical
drawing from his dads office (his dad
was a mechanical engineer); he was also
employed as a mechanical draftsman
earning P2.50 a day all said, Taylor was
mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy
entered into the premises of Manila

Electric power plant where they found


20-30 blasting caps which they took
home. In an effort to explode the said
caps, Taylor experimented until he
succeeded in opening the caps and then
he lighted it using a match which
resulted to the explosion of the caps
causing severe injuries to his companion
and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that
because the company left the caps
exposed to children, they are liable for
damages
due
to
the
companys
negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is
liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated
elements of quasi delict as follows:

the

sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn


P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman
thirty days after the injury was incurred;
and the record discloses throughout that
he was exceptionally well qualified to
take care. The evidence of record leaves
no room for doubt that he well knew the
explosive character of the cap with which
he was amusing himself. The series of
experiments made by him in his attempt
to produce an explosion admit of no
other explanation. His attempt to
discharge the cap by the use of
electricity, followed by his efforts to
explode it with a stone or a hammer, and
the final success of his endeavors
brought about by the applications of a
match to the contents of the cap, show
clearly that he knew what he was about.
Nor can there be any reasonable doubt
that he had reason to anticipate that the
explosion might be dangerous.

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.


(2) Negligence by act or omission of
which defendant personally, or some
person for whose acts it must respond,
was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect
between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila
Electric has been negligent in disposing
off the caps which they used for the
power plant, and that said caps caused
damages to Taylor. However, the causal
connection between the companys
negligence and the injuries sustained by
Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct
acts of Taylor which led to the explosion
of the caps as he even, in various
experiments and in multiple attempts,
tried to explode the caps. It is from said
acts that led to the explosion and hence
the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was
well-grown youth of 15, more mature
both mentally and physically than the
average boy of his age; he had been to

The just thing is that a man should


suffer the damage which comes to him
through his own fault, and that he cannot
demand
reparation
therefor
from
another.
9. Tayag vs Alcantara
FACTS:
September 2, 1974 a.m.: Philippine
Rabbit Bus bump Pedro Tayag Sr. was
riding on a bicycle along MacArthur
Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac driven
by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he
sustained injuries which caused his
instantaneous death
Judge
granted
the
motion,
and
consequently, suspended the hearing of
Civil Case while criminal case is pending
judgment
RTC: acquitting the Romeo Villa of the
crime of homicide on the ground of
reasonable doubt
subsequently,
the
civil
case
was
dismissed
ISSUE: W/N the civil case based on quasidelict should be barred by the acquittal in
a criminal case

HELD: NO. order of dismissal should be,


as it is hereby set aside
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on
an obligation not arising from the act or
commission complained of as a felony.
such
civil
action
may
proceed
independently
of
the
criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result
of the latter.
All the essential averments for a quasi
delictual action are present, namely: (1)
an act or omission constituting fault or
negligence on the part of private
respondent; (2) damage caused by the
said act or commission; (3) direct causal
relation between the damage and the act
or commission; and (4) no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties
B. Distinctions
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence.
Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it
would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a
light felony, the penalty of arresto menor
in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence
or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a
less serious felony, the penalty of arresto

mayor in its minimum period shall be


imposed.
When the execution of the act covered
by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be
less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos
and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong
which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the
court
shall
exercise
their
sound
discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article
shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the
offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of
this article, in which case the court shall
impose the penalty next lower in degree
than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to
apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence
and with violation of the Automobile Law,
to death of a person shall be caused, in
which case the defendant shall be
punished by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.
Reckless
imprudence
consists
in
voluntary, but without malice, doing or
falling to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing of failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other

circumstances regarding persons, time


and place.

should have been filed against Fontanilla


primarily and not him.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of


precaution displayed in those cases in
which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger
clearly manifest.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just


subsidiarily liable.

The penalty next higher in degree to


those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to
lend on the spot to the injured parties
such help as may be in this hand to give.
(As amended by R.A. 1790, approved
June 21, 1957).
10. Barredo vs Garcia (Case #1)
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936,
Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa
thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino
Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal
suit against Fontanilla and reserved their
right to file a separate civil suit.
Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After
the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit
against Barredo the owner of the taxi
(employer of Fontanilla). The suit was
based on Article 1903 of the civil code
(negligence of employers in the selection
of their employees). Barredo assailed the
suit arguing that his liability is only
subsidiary and that the separate civil suit

HELD: No. He is primarily liable under


Article 1903 which is a separate civil
action against negligent employers.
Garcia is well within his rights in suing
Barredo. He reserved his right to file a
separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the
SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving
his sentence and has no property. It was
also proven that Barredo is negligent in
hiring his employees because it was
shown that Fontanilla had had multiple
traffic infractions already before he hired
him something he failed to overcome
during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved
his right to file a separate civil action,
Barredo
would
have
only
been
subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not
being sued for damages arising from a
criminal act (his drivers negligence) but
rather for his own negligence in selecting
his employee (Article 1903).

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