DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE LAW ON TORTS 1. SANGCO pp. XXXI to XLV, pp 110 2. Aquino pp 1-10 II. THE CONCEPT OF QUASI DELICT A. Elements: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) 1. Barredo vs Garcia At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him. ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable. HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving
his sentence and has no property. It was
also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903). 2. Elcano vs Hill Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180. HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity. 3. Cinco vs Canonoy FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by respondent Romeo Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At the pre-trial of the civil case counsel for the respondents moved for the suspension of the civil action pending determination of the criminal case invoking Section 3(b), Rule
111 of the Rules of Court. The City Court
granted the motion and ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property during the pendency of the criminal action. HELD: The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code is quasidelictual in character which can be prosecuted independently of the criminal action. Where the plaintiff made essential averments in the complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the jeepney which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection exists between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-driver and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among others, that they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such action is principally predicated on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided for in Article 2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court refers to "other civil
actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which, "once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered". The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict. The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the decision of the city court suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal action is finally terminated. 4. Gashem Shokat Baksh vs CA FACTS: Private respondent Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Gasheem Shookat, an Iranian Citizen, of breach of promise to marry. She said that both of them agreed to marry after the end of the school
semester and the petitioner asked the
approval of her parents. She stated that the petitioner forced to live with him in his apartments. Respondent was a virgin before she was forced to live with the Iranian (petitioner). A week before she filed her complaint, petitioner maltreated, assaulted and asked not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. On the petitioners counterclaim, he said that he never proposed marriage with the private respondent; he neither forced her to live with him and he did not maltreat her but only told her to stop from coming into his apartment because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. He insisted that he must be awarded for damages for he suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation due to the complaint of the private respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is to be held liable for damages for breach of promise to marry. HELD: A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This court held that where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of fraud and deceit and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. Such act done by the petitioner is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Petitioner even committed deplorable
acts in disregard of the laws of the country. The court ordered that the petition be denied with costs against the petitioner 5. Dulay vs CA FACTS: December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at Big Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security Corp. (Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury Superguard: Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and can be civilly liable even if Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the merits
Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides: Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused
It is enough that the complaint alleged
that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. 6. Garcia vs Florido FACTS: August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City for the purpose of attending a conference August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at 21 km, it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro Tumala Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers and their owners for driving in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is a violation of law or traffic rules or regulations for excessive speeding ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite having a criminal action. HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case
essential averments for a quasi-delictual
action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the collision d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal 7. Andamo vs IAC
Doctrine: It must be stressed that the use
of ones property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Facts: Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of the latter, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners land, caused a young man to drown, damagaed petitioners crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the livesofthepetitioners and their laborers and some other destructions. This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages. Issue: Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by respondents waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. Held: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the
waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. 8. Taylor vs Manila Electric Company David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dads office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age. One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila
Electric power plant where they found
20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye. Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the companys negligence. ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages. HELD: No. The SC reiterated elements of quasi delict as follows:
the
sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn
P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the companys negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries. Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to
The just thing is that a man should
suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot demand reparation therefor from another. 9. Tayag vs Alcantara FACTS: September 2, 1974 a.m.: Philippine Rabbit Bus bump Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac driven by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his instantaneous death Judge granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil Case while criminal case is pending judgment RTC: acquitting the Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt subsequently, the civil case was dismissed ISSUE: W/N the civil case based on quasidelict should be barred by the acquittal in a criminal case
HELD: NO. order of dismissal should be,
as it is hereby set aside Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or commission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties B. Distinctions Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed. When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos. A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time
and place.
should have been filed against Fontanilla
primarily and not him.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of
precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just
subsidiarily liable.
The penalty next higher in degree to
those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957). 10. Barredo vs Garcia (Case #1) At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under
Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).
Ergo, Since The Driver Died During The Pendency of The Criminal Action, The Sine Qua Non Condition For Their Subsidiary Liability Was Not Fulfilled, Hence The of Lack of Cause of