F.

Particular Latin Rules

(1) MENS LEGISLATORIS
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for PlaintiffAppellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN

HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF
MARRIAGE;
PROHIBITION
AGAINST
DONATION
BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE
TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of
the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between
the
spouses
during
the
marriage",
policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well
as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition
should
apply
to
a common-law
relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision
Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting
a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks
unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L.
Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of
the other consort and his descendants because of
fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el
uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,
[according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV),
reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem
spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat,
inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to
apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to
such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks
greater influence of one party over the other, so that
the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already
pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr.
1), it would not be just that such donations should

subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt

should turn out to be better. So long as marriage
remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason
and morality alike demand that the disabilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION;
SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER
SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. The lack of validity of
the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant
Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in
plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She
is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code,
she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in
this litigation. We are called upon to decide whether
the ban on a donation between the spouses during a
marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1
The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a
sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains
that a donation made while he was living maritally
without benefit of marriage to defendant, now
appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant
would uphold its validity. The lower court, after
noting that it was made at a time before defendant
was married to the donor, sustained the latters
stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is
novel in character, this Court not having had as yet
the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the
Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the
then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this
Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate
response that should be given. The conclusion
reached therein is that a donation between commonlaw spouses falls within the prohibition and is "null
and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view
merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The
decision
must
be
reversed.

In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower

court, after stating that in plaintiffs complaint
alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in
question, she specifically raised the question that the
donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant
Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the
aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant
on the other hand did assert ownership precisely
because such a donation was made in 1956 and her
marriage to the deceased did not take place until
1962, noted that when the case was called for trial
on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts
which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the
defendant assisted by their respective counsels,
jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased
Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2)
That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of
Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila
Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on
February 20, 1956, which same donation was
accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of the
land to the defendant which took effect immediately
was made during the common law relationship as
husband and wife between the defendant-done and
the now deceased donor and later said donor and
done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the
deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on
September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the
property by reason of being the only sister and
nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue
of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in
1962 and had the land declared in her name and
paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts
was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A
donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil
Code is void if made between the spouses during the
marriage. When the donation was made by Felix
Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20,
1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were
not yet married. At that time they were not spouses.
They became spouses only when they married on
March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation
had
been
executed."
6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the
Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the
spouses during the marriage," policy considerations
of the most exigent character as well as the dictates
of morality require that the same prohibition should
apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.

1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954

Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista,
7 interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code
8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in
the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L.
Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of
the other consort and his descendants because of
fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el
uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according
to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating
the
rationale
Ne
mutuato
amore
invicem
spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat,
inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to
apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to
such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks
greater influence of one party over the other, so that
the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already
pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr.
1), it would not be just that such donations should
subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt
should turn out to be better. So long as marriage
remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason
and morality alike demand that the disabilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage."
9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the
absence of the above pronouncement, any other
conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would
be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure
to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its
essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is
at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which
embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and
what is right would be nullified if such irregular
relationship instead of being visited with disabilities
would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal
norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If
there is ever any occasion where the principle of
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of
the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this
is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such
codal provision would not be attained. Whatever
omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely
literal of the language used must be remedied by an
adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of

Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser

la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin
de
sus
disposiciones.
10

civil case was based was culled from a tape recording

of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The
transcript reads as follows:

3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the

deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to
the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the
defendant was legitimated by their marriage on
March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As
provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to onehalf of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the
surviving
sister,
to
the
other
half.
11

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good

Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang
nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka
napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka
kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong
binalikan, sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung
(sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m.,
kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang
babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka
sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification
mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon icocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union
kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own
makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na
kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon
ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka
pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko
naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang
nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka
kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito
kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo,
makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina"
sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo
ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa
loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok,
okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November

23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is
reversed. The questioned donation is declared void,
with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro
indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized.
The case is remanded to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the above
opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs

(2) UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT, NEC NOC

DISTINGUERE DEBERMUS
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.
GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro
D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia,
in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and
furious mood" and in a manner offensive to
petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a
verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to
costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the
trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the

CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga

Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong
kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako.
Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil
tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi
kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako
makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong
ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and
alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An
Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and
other purposes." An information charging petitioner
of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is
quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses
Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No.
4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in
Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by
Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation
with said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape
recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of
the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO
Asst. City Fiscal

M.

CUNETA

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a

Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May
3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash,
agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do
not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that
2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the
taping of a communication by a personother than a
participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of
June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and
holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that
the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court
of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19,
1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and
principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision merely
refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in
the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information,
otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that
R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and
that consequently, her act of secretly taping her

conversation with private respondent was not illegal

under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from
the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb
or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit
and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought
to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy
to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records,
moreover,
supports
the
respondent
court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized
tape
recording
of private conversations
or

communications taken either by

themselves or by third persons. Thus:

the

parties

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or
recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to
be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording
is not made by all the parties but by some parties
and involved not criminal cases that would be
mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for
example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a
recording is made not necessarily by all the parties
but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent
of the parties because the actuation of the parties
prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract
or the act may be indicative of their intention.
Suppose there is such a recording, would you say,
Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the
purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of
this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not
in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be
used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban
on tape recorded conversations taken without the
authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your
Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it
is not sporting to record the observation of one
without his knowing it and then using it against
him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the
purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that
the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of
recorders.

Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say

that in meetings of the board of directors where a
tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if
all the parties know. It is but fair that the people
whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take
statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed
that whatever you say here may be used against
you." That is fairness and that is what we demand.
Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more. But if you are going to take a
recording of the observations and remarks of a
person without him knowing that it is being taped or
recorded, without him knowing that what is being
recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March
12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that
under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party
secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is
public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill. It is the communication
between one person and another person not
between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March
12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the
provision, taken together
deliberations from the
therefore plainly supports

express words of the

with the above-quoted
Congressional Record,
the view held by the

respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize

even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial
to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing,
intercepting
or
recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation
that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section
1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in
his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere
(in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the
conversation, as well as its communication to a third
person should be professed."14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase
"private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes
from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share
or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or
signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts
are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to
include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are
likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange,
on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any
doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the
phrase "private communication" are, furthermore,
put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation"
and "communication" were interchangeably used by
Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill
quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to
fear from their conversations being overheard. But
this
statement
ignores
the
usual
nature

of conversations as well the undeniable fact that

most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of
their lives they do not wish to expose.
Freeconversations are
often
characterized
by
exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and
the expression of anti-social desires of views not
intended to be taken seriously. The right to
the privacy of communication, among others, has
expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless
to state here, the framers of our Constitution must
have
recognized
the
nature
of conversations between
individuals
and
the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They must have known that part
of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be
found in the unaudited, and free exchange
of communication between individuals free from
every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case
which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping,
we held that the use of a telephone extension for the
purpose of overhearing a private conversation
without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200
because a telephone extension devise was neither
among
those
"device(s)
or
arrangement(s)"
enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of
the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different
note, because the applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions
the
unauthorized
"recording"
of
private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case
at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us
with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

(3) EJUSDEM GENERIS When do we apply

this rule?

AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.
Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation of his right to free speech by
petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this
special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity
of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections
enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign
purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering
the conceded absence of any express power granted
to respondent by the Constitutional Convention Act
to so require and the bar to any such implication
arising from any provision found therein, if deference
be paid to the principle that a statute is to be
construed consistently with the fundamental law,
which accords the utmost priority to freedom of
expression, much more so when utilized for electoral
purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same day
the case was orally argued, five days after its filing,
with the election barely a week away, we issued a
minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition
prayed for. This opinion is intended to explain more
fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on
October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his
being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his
candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent
Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him
five days previously, informed him that his certificate
of candidacy was given due course but prohibited
him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped
with sound systems and loud speakers, an order
which, according to him, is "violative of [his]
constitutional right ... to freedom of speech." 1 There
being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
according to petitioner, he would seek a writ of
prohibition, at the same time praying for a
preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this
Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent
Commission on Elections to file an answer not later
than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the
case for hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970. No
preliminary injunction was issued. There was no

denial in the answer filed by respondent on

November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth
in the petition, but the justification for the prohibition
was premised on a provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act, 2which made it unlawful for
candidates "to purchase, produce, request or
distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever
nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes,
and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin." 3It was its contention that the jingle proposed
to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped
voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material, under the above statute
subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be
denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on
November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his
behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing in
behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account
the need for urgency, the election being barely a
week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day,
a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition,
setting forth the absence of statutory authority on
the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the
light of the doctrine ofejusdem generis as well as the
principle that the construction placed on the statute
by respondent Commission on Elections would raise
serious doubts about its validity, considering the
infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner.
Its concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly,
as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is
permanently
restrained
and
prohibited
from
enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance
with its aforesaid order banning the use of political
jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately
executory." 4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3,
1970, the question before us was one of power.
Respondent Commission on Elections was called
upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on
petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted
by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend,
however, that one of its provisions referred to above
makes unlawful the distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens,
lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and

cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the

like." 5 For respondent Commission, the last three
words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the
matter differently. What was done cannot merit our
approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem
generis,
the
general
words
following
any
enumeration being applicable only to things of the
same kind or class as those specifically referred
to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated
in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution.

directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its

action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would
not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by
himself or through others, to use his mobile
loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee
is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker
having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered
by him through tape or other mechanical
contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent
Commission, then the effect would hardly be
distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot
be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the
Constitution in express terms assures. 10

The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of

respondent Commission was its failure to manifest
fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a
statute should be interpreted to assure its being in
consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
constitutional command or prescription. 7 Thus,
certain Administrative Code provisions were given a
"construction which should be more in harmony with
the tenets of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability
of removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional
infirmity from legislative enactments has always
commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the
ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision
between what a statute provides and what the
Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an
interpretation rendering it free from constitutional
defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all
possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only
that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon
that score. 9

3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as

the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding
from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is
a postulate of our system of government. That is to
manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority
accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in
the legal hierarchy. The three departments of
government in the discharge of the functions with
which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed. Congress in the
enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the
restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or
formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the
execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard
what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the
facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is
called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by
the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial
review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the
coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a
logical corollary of this basic principle that the
Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its
mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being
the supreme law.

2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the

controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to such
a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if
the above provision of the Constitutional Convention
Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the
taped jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge
of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For,
in unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits
an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has
been our constant holding that this preferred
freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect
when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally
vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission
did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner,
an evil against which this constitutional right is

To be more specific, the competence entrusted to

respondent Commission was aptly summed up by the
present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of
the executive department although independent
of the President to which the Constitution has
given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is
limited to purely 'administrative questions.'" 11 It has

been the constant holding of this Court, as it could

not have been
otherwise, that respondent
Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict
with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law
than the Constitution. 12 Our decisions which liberally
construe its powers are precisely inspired by the
thought that only thus may its responsibility under
the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest
elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no
justification then for lending approval to any ruling or
order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect
of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional
right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as was
obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid
footing.
WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of
November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is
permanently
restrained
and
prohibited
from
enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance
with its aforesaid order banning the use of political
taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.

(4) EXPRESSIO
ALTERIUS

UNIUS

EST

EXCLUSION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines and The
Director of Lands seek the review of the decision
dated July 22, 1972 of the respondent Judge in Cad.
Case No. 27, GLRO Rec. No. 1714, Lot No. 4273,
Ormoc Cadastre entitled, "The Director of Lands,
petitioner, versus Tiburcio, Florencia, Fabian and
Gonzala, all surnamed Aotes, claimants-movants",
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated
September 28, 1940, declaring Lot No. 4273 Public
Land is set aside and said Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc
Cadastre is hereby adjudicated in favor of herein
movants in undivided interests and in equal share of
each to GONZALA AOTES, married to Victorino
Gormanes; TIBURCIO AOTES, married to Epefania

Maglasang; FLORENCIA AOTES, married to Basilio

Barabad; and FABIAN AOTES, married to Dulcisima
Barabad; all adjudicatees are Filipinos, of legal ages,
the first named is residing in Can-adiong, Ormoc City,
Philippines; and as soon as this decision shall have
become final, let the Commissioner of Land
Registration Commission, Quezon City, issue the
corresponding decree of aforesaid parcel of land in
the names of herein adjudicatees, subject to the
liability and claims of creditors, Hens, or other
persons for the full period of two (2) years after their
distribution as imposed by Section 4 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court. 1
The following facts are undisputed in the instant
case:
In a decision dated September 28, 1940 by the
Cadastral Court, Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre
was declared public land.
On February 23, 1972, private respondents Aotes
filed with the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch
V, Ormoc City, presided by the respondent Judge a
petition to reopen the aforesaid decision dated
September 28, 1940 under Rep. Act 931 as amended
by Rep. Act 6236 claiming to be the owners and
possessors of Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre by
virtue of hereditary succession but, due to their nonappearance on the date of the hearing of the
Cadastral Case because of ignorance and excusable
neglect, said land was declared public land and that
they had been in adverse, peaceful and notorious
possession of the said parcel of land since the time
immemorial, paying all the taxes, interests and
penalties. They pray that the decision of the
Cadastral Court affecting Lot No. 4273, Ormoc
Cadastre be reopened, and that they be allowed to
file their cadastral answer.
On March 16, 1972, petitioners filed an opposition to
the aforesaid petition on the ground that such
petition is barred by the expiration of the period for
reopening cadastral proceedings under Rep. Act 931
which expired on December 31, 1968 and this period
has not been extended under the provisions of Rep.
Act 6236 because the latter applies only to the
extensions of time limit for the filing of applications

for free patent and for judicial confirmation of

imperfect or incomplete titles.
Respondent Judge in its order dated May 9, 1972,
denied the opposition for lack of sufficient merit and
set the case for hearing on June 24, 1972.
On July 22, 1972, respondent judge rendered
decision setting aside the decision of the cadastral
court dated September 28, 1940 declaring Lot No.
4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of
the private respondents in undivided interest in equal
share of one-fourth (1/4) each.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court,
petitioners filed this instant petition assigning only
one error to writ: The trial court erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the petition for reopening of
Cadastral Proceedings.
In the Brief, 2 petitioners argue that the lower court
has no jurisdiction over the proceedings for
reopening of the cadastral case because under the
provision of Rep. Act 931, the period for reopening of
cadastral proceedings expired on December 31,
1968, and that period has not been extended by Rep.
Act 6236 which applies only to the extension of the
time limit for the filing of applications for free patent
and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral
proceedings.
In
the
Manifestation
and
Motion, 3 respondents Aotes claim that considering
the time limit for firing applications for free patents
and for judicial confirmation of incomplete and
imperfect titles has been extended up to December
31, 1980, the reopening of cadastral cases should
also be extended until December 31, 1980 in fairness
and justice to them.
The sole issue to be resolved, considering the above
facts, is whether or not Rep. Act 6236 which provides
for the extension of the time limit to file applications
for free patent and for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1976
applies also to the reopening of cadastral
proceedings on certain lands which were declared
public lands.
There is merit in the petition.

By way of background, Rep. Act 931, which was

approved on June 20, 1953, is an act to authorize the
filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of
certain claims of title to parcels of land that have
been declared public land, by virtue of judicial
decisions rendered within the forty years next
preceding the approval of this act. Under this
aforesaid act, all persons claiming title to parcels of
land that have been the object of cadastral
proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in
actual possession of the same but for some
justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim
in the proper court during the time limit established
by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of
their failure to file such claims, have been, or are
about to be declared land of the public domain, by
virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the
forty years next preceding the approval of this act,
are granted the right within five years after the date
on which this act shall take effect, to petition for a
reopening of the judicial proceedings under the
provisions of Act 2259. Rep. Act 2061, which took
effect on June 13, 1958, refers to an act setting a
new time limit for the filing of applications for free
patents, for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles, and for the reopening of judicial
proceedings on certain lands which were declared
public lands. Under this act the time for filing
applications shall not extend beyond December 31,
1968. Rep. Act 6236, approved on June 19, 1971,
however, extended the time limit for the filing of
applications for free patents and for the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles not to
extend beyond December 31, 1976. In resume, Rep.
Act 931 granted a right within 5 years from June 20,
1953 to petition for a reopening of cadastral
proceedings. Rep. Act 2061 fixed a new time limit
which is up to December 31, 1968 to file applications
for free patents, for the judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles and for the reopening
of judicial proceedings on certain lands which were
declared public land. Rep. Act 6236 extended the
time limit which is up to December 31, 1976 for the
filing of applications for free patents and for the
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
Respondent Aotes filed on February 23, 1972 a
petition to reopen the decision of the Cadastral Court

under Rep. Act 931 as amended by Rep. Act 6236.

Respondents Aotes claim that since the time limit for
filing applications for free patents and applications
for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect
titles have been extended up to December 31, 1980,
the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended
until December 31, 1980. Rep. Act 6236, the very law
on which respondents Aotes bases his petition to
reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply any
basis for respondents' contention. It will be noted
that while Rep. Act 2061 fixed the time to reopen
cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond
December 31, 1968, no similar provision is found in
Rep. Act 6236 expressly 'extending the time limit for
the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of
land declared public land. As correctly pointed out by
petitioners, the extension as provided for by the Rep.
Act 6236 makes no reference to reopening of
cadastral cases as the earlier law, Rep. Act 2061,
expressly did. Under the legal maxim of statutory
construction, expressio unius
est
exclusio
alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion), the
express mention of one thing in a law, as a general
rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly
mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable
legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and
the natural workings of the human mind. 4 If Rep. Act
6236 had intended that the extension it provided for
applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would
have so provided in the same way that it provided
the extension of time to file applications for free
patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title. The intention to exclude the
reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands
which were declared public land in Rep. Act 6236 is
made clearer by reference to Rep. Act 2061 which
includes the reopening of cadastral cases, but not so
included in Rep. Act 6236.
We hold, therefore, that the extension provided for
by Rep. Act 6236 which is the sole basis for filing the
respondents Aotes' petition to reopen the cadastral
proceedings applies only to the filing of applications
for free patent and for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of
cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a
proceeding entirely different from "filing an

application for a free patent or for judicial

confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles."
Parenthetically, in setting aside the decision dated
September 28, 1940, the respondent Judge has
concluded that Rep. Act 6236 is applicable also to
reopening of cadastral proceedings, thereby, altering
Rep. Act 6236. That cannot be done by the judiciary.
That is a function that properly pertains to the
legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga vs.
Court of Appeals: 5 "It has been repeated time and
again that where the statutory norm speaks
unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do
except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to
the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our
decisions
have
consistently
been
to
that
effect. 6 Likewise, it is a cardinal rule of statutory
construction that where the terms of the statute are
clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is called
for, and the law is applied as written, 7 for application
is the first duty of courts, and interpretation, only
were literal application is impossible or inadequate. 8
More importantly, the lower court has no longer
jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by
respondents for reopening the cadastral proceedings
because the latter, as we have noted, did not file the
aforesaid petition within the period fixed by the
applicable laws to wit: Rep. Act 931 and 2061.
Consequently, the decision dated September 30,
1940 of the Cadastral Court declaring the land in
question a public land has become final and
conclusive. It has also acquired the status of res
judicata. It must be remembered that generally, the
fundamental principle of res judicata applies to all
cases and proceedings, including land registration or
cadastral
proceedings.9 The
doctrine
of res
judicata precludes parties from relitigating issues
actually litigated and determined by a prior and final
judgment. It is well-settled that a prior judgment is
conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same
parties on the subject matter, and on the same cause
of action, not only as to matters which were decided
in the first action, but also as to every other matter
which the parties could have properly set up in the
prior suit. 10 Indeed, settled is the rule that a
cadastral case is a judicial proceeding in rem, which,
as such binds the whole world. 11 The final judgment
rendered therein is deemed to have settled the

status of the land subject thereof, if not noted

thereon, like those of the petitioner, are deemed
barred under the principle of res judicata. 12 In the
case of Cano vs. De Camacho, this Court held:
Although the title of Jesus Vao over said Lot 1-B is
not as yet indefeasible, no decree having been
issued in his favor, all rights, interests or claims
existing before said date are deemed barred by said
decision, under the principle of res judicata, once the
decision become final, upon expiration of the thirtyday period to appeal therefrom. 13
By reiterating its ruling, this Court once more
stresses and emphasizes that Rep. Act 6236 does not
apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings and
as a consequence, the respondent Judge has no
jurisdiction over the petition of the respondents
Aotes to reopen the cadastral proceedings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting
aside the decisions dated July 22, 1972 of the
respondent Judge and reiterating that of the
Cadastral Court dated September 28, 1940. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
(5) CASUS OMISSUS Casus Ominus pro

omisso habendus est (restrictive rule)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the
order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
dismissing the information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and
the facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant,
is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently,
here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of that
Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was
charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised

Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted

by said court resulted in the finding a probable cause
that the crime charged as committed by defendant.
Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant's plea of
not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that as justice of the
peace the defendant is one of the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss
holding that a justice of the peace is within the
purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by
defense counsel who cited in support thereof the
decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs.
Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp.
1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the
peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54
of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this second
motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the
reply of the defense, and the opposition of the
prosecution, the lower court dismissed the
information against the accused upon the authority
of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the
determination of this single question of law: Is a
justice the peace included in the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any
province, no officer or employee of the Army, no
member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or
rural police force and no classified civil service officer
or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any
influence in any manner in a election or take part
therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the
peace is not comprehended among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. He submits the aforecited section was taken
from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing
elections. No judge of the First Instance, justice of
the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any

province and no officer or employee of the Philippine

Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or
exert influence in any manner in any election or take
part therein otherwise than exercising the right to
vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election
Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," the
omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to
exclude justices of the peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental
fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was
modified or qualified by the phrase "of First
instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code, no such modification exists. In other
words, justices of the peace were expressly included
in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code
because the kinds of judges therein were specified,
i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the
peace. In Section 54, however, there was no
necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in
the enumeration because the legislature had availed
itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge."
It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and
was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like
judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the
courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of
Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is
sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It
is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A
"judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office,
is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25
Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier Law
Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully
appointed to decide litigated questions according to
law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all
officers appointed to decide litigated questions while
acting in that capacity, including justices of the
peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of
facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code
will help to justify and clarify the above conclusion.

The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582

enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, and
which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709,
1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however,
only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of
the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No.
1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later
on incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative
Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several
amendments were made through the passage of Acts
Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3
amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the
case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of
the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed
Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted
Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law
enforced until June 1947, when the Revised Election
Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions
are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233,
357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code was further
amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and
again, during the session of Congress in 1960,
amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the
history of our election law, the following should be
noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for
elections, nor shall he be eligible during the time that
he holds said public office to election at any
municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for
reelection to the position which he may be holding,
and no judge of the First Instance, justice of the
peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the
Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education
shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or
take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly
election under the penalty of being deprived of his
office and being disqualified to hold any public office
whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide, however,
That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to
deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to
vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took
effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:

. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the

peace provincial fiscal or officer or employee of the
Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education
shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner to
take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly
election. Any person violating the provisions of this
section shall be deprived of his office or employment
and shall be disqualified to hold any public office or
employment whatever for a term of 5 years,
Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall
not be construed to deprive any person otherwise
qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted
on August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15,
1907.)

Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357

was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law provided
in Section 48:

Again, when the existing election laws were

incorporated in the Administrative Code on March 10,
1917, the provisions in question read:

This last law was the legislation from which Section

54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing

elections. No judge of the First Instance, justice of
the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
province and no officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or
exert influence in any manner in any election or take
part therein otherwise than exercising the right to
vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent
legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with
the election. Any judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of
any province, any officer or employee of the
Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any
municipality, or any officer or employee of any
Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any
candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of
this section or takes part in any election otherwise by
exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a
fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than
P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2
months nor more than 2 years, and in all cases by
disqualification from public office and deprivation of
the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years.
(Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)

SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and

Employees. No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or
assessor of any province, no officer or employee of
the Army, the Constabulary of the national,
provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified
civil service officer or employee shall aid any
candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any
election nor take part therein, except to vote, if
entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is
a peace officer.

It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration

of the legislative development or history of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code that the first
omission of the word "justice of the peace" was
effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357
and not in the present code as averred by defendantappellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two
instances when the words "justice of the peace" were
omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180),
the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration
did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance."
In other words, whenever the word "judge" was
qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the
words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if
the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the
peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional
phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion
that when the legislature omitted the words "justice
of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to
exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it
had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World
War had destroyed congressional records which
might have offered some explanation of the
discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as
indicated above, has eliminated for the first time the
words "justice of the peace." Having been completely

10

destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional

clarifications from these records proved futile.
Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the
historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is
sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be
among the officers enumerated in Section 54
inasmuch as under that said section, the word
"judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any
province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant
submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace
since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a
municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained.
If it is true that the phrase "of any province"
necessarily removes justices of the peace from the
enumeration for the reason that they are municipal
and not provincial officials, then the same thing may
be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of
the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet,
can there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme
Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in
the prohibition? The more sensible and logical
interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies
fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally
known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est"
is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under
the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present,
then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to
have been intentionally and deliberately exempted
from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The
maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if
and when the omission has been clearly established.
In the case under consideration, it has already been
shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit
justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another
term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised

Election Code, justices of the peace were just called

"judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus
omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites
authorities to the effect that the said rule, being
restrictive in nature, has more particular application
to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is
pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly
construed against the government since proceedings
under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence
is settled that penal statutes should be strictly
interpreted against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict
interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts
that the spirit of fair play and due process demand
such strict construction in order to give "fair warning
of what the law intends to do, if a certain line is
passed, in language that the common world will
understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283
U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does
not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or thing has
been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the
present case, and for reasons already mentioned,
there has been no such omission. There has only
been a substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict
construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of
penal laws. This has been recognized time and again
by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will
frequently be found enunciating the principle that the
intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet,
215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict
construction should not be permitted to defeat the
policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v.
U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider the spirit
and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance,
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear

purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation

of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in
the U.S. has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not
mean such construction of it as to deprive it of the
meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed
in the sense which best harmonizes with their intent
and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56,
cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United
States, the language of criminal statutes, frequently,
has been narrowed where the letter includes
situations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S.
v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen,
Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J.
129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached
herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute is to
enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various
judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations,
etc., who were not included in the prohibition under
the old statute, are now within its encompass. If such
were the evident purpose, can the legislature intend
to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit?
Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief
of the Solicitor General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated
the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and justice of
the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu
thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the
scope of the term not just one class of judges but all
judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace
or special courts, such as judges of the Court of
Industrial Relations. . . . .
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice
of the peace court, and to so construe the law as to
allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political
activities would weaken rather than strengthen the
judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent
reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why
justices of the peace should be prohibited from

11

electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate

courts and judges of the Court of First Instance, they
are given authority and jurisdiction over certain
election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123).
Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and
decided inclusion and exclusion cases, and if they are
permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective
office the impartiality of their decisions in election
cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not
believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code, intended to create such an
unfortunate situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached
herein is the fact that the administrative or executive
department has regarded justices of the peace within
the purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary,
the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this
Court did not give due course to the petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against the respondents, for not setting aside, among
others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March
31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines,
dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of
Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that one of the
causes of the separation of the petitioner was the
fact that he was found guilty in engaging in
electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the
Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court
to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on January
25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section
56, justices of the peace are already expressly
included among the officers enjoined from active
political participation. The argument is that with the
filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly
acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit
justices of the peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House
Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to Rep. Act
No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of
said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No.
2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing
election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides,

the proposed amendment, until it has become a law,

cannot be considered to contain or manifest any
legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the
reasons expressed by the individual members of the
legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken
into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a
statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213,
pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a
mere draft of a bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendantappellee's contention that justices of the peace are
not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be
rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy
so clearly and emphatically laid down by the
legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited
justices of the peace from participating in partisan
politics. They were prohibited under the old Election
Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709).
Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised
Administrative Code. Another which expressed the
prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later,
Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals
and the trial court applied the rule of "expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the
conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered
by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway,
guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known
as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not
be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention
of omitting the term "justice of the peace from
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had
intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the
purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the
Court of Appeals has given the reason for the
exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the
alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius
est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the
operation of its provisions to particular persons or
things by enumerating them, but no reason exists

why other persons or things not so enumerated

should not have been included, and manifest
injustice will follow by not so including them, the
maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should
not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22
Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal
entered by the trial court should be set aside and this
case is remanded for trial on the merits.

(6) DURA LEX SED LEX

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having

secured the necessary license or permit therefor
from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September
3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that
the accused was found in possession of the gun
involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or
license to possess the same and that we can submit
the same on a question of law whether or not an
agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a
permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After
counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he
would not question the authenticity of his exhibits,
the understanding being that only a question of law
would be submitted for decision, he explicitly
specified such question to be "whether or not a
secret agent is not required to get a license for his
firearm."

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of

conviction by the lower court is whether or not the
appointment to and holding of the position of a
secret agent to the provincial governor would
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for
the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. We hold that it does not.

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should

examine the document so that he could pass on their
authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question:
"Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22
revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in
the information was found in his possession on
August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first
having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The
accused, now the appellant, answered categorically:
"Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made
a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his
counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."

The accused in this case was indicted for the above

offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO
MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in
connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act
No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the
13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and
under his custody and control one home-made
revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing

to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits
consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the
Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas,
dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused
directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and
Quezon City on a confidential mission; 2the oath of
office of the accused as such secret agent, 3 a
certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that
the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.
Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,
Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor
O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:

12

with the presentation of the above exhibits he was

"willing to submit the case on the question of
whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and
qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt
from the requirement of having a license of firearm."
The exhibits were admitted and the parties were
given
time
to
file
their
respective
memoranda.1wph1.t
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court
rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and
one day to two years and to pay the costs. The
firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are
forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was
taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter
specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of
firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument
or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition."5 The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors,
lieutenant
governors,
provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not
covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties." 6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made
for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our
task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty
of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the
accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused
however
would
rely
on People
v.
Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted
on appeal on the assumption that the appointment
"of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police expressly covered by
section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not
within the power of this Court to set aside the clear
and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the
extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what
was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer
speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendantappellant.
CONCEPCION, JR., J:
Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found
guilty of the crime of illegal possesion of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
(1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay
the costs.
The essential facts are not in dispute. On February
19, 1962, accused Jesus Santayana, was appointed
as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C.
Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a
Memorandum Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in
the name of the accused regarding one pistol Melior
SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col.
Maristela likewise issued an undated certification 3 to
the effect that the accused was an accredited
member of the CIS and the pistol described in the
said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by
virtue of his appointment as special agent and that
he was authorized to carry and possess the same in
the performance of his official duty and for his
personal protection. On October 29, 1962, the
accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of
the above-described pistol with four rounds of

13

ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess

them. An investigation was conducted and
thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed
against the accused. The case underwent trial after
which the accused was convicted of the crime
charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the
case was appealed to US and the accused assigned
three errors allegedly committed by the trial court in
disposing of this case.
Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed
are whether or not the present subject matter falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal
court pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and
whether or not the appointment of the appellant as
special agent of the CIS which apparently authorizes
him to carry and posses firearms exempts him from
securing a license or permit corresponding thereto.
Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt
that under Section 87 of Republic Act No. 286, as
amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice over
cases of illegal possession of firearms. But equally
the Court of First Instance of Manila, which took
cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over the
offense charged because under Section 44 of
Republic Act No. 296, Court of First Instance have
original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the
penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more
than six (6) months, or a fine of more than two
hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense charged
in the information is punishable by imprisonment for
a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day
nor more than five (5) years, or both such
imprisonment and a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases in which
the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not
more than six (6) months or fine of not more than
two hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such
imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original to
said courts. But considering that the offense of illegal
possession of firearms with which the appellant was
charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of
not less than one (1) year and one (1) day or more
than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a

fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos

or more than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos
(Republic Act No. 4), the offense, therefore, does not
fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court. The Court of First Instance has
concurrent jurisdiction over the same.
As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no
question that appellant was appointed as CIS secret
agent with the authority to carry and possess
firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm in
the performance of his official duties and for his
personal protection. 5 It also appears that appellant
was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not
necessary for him to apply for a license or to register
the said firearm because it was government property
and therefore could not legally be registered or
licensed in appellant's name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M.
Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm
also informed the latter that no permit to carry the
pistol was necessary "because you are already
appointed as CIS agent."
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine
then prevailing is enunciated in the case of People
vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the
appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in
the maintenace of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the
category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police expressly covered by
Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked
the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August
30, 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore
obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment as
secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the pistol in question.
Wherefore,
and
conformably
with
the
recommendation of the Solicitor General, the
decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby
acquitted. The bond for his provisional release is
cancelled. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

DURA LEX SED LEX - (ii) Premissive Rule

RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Petitioner appellant Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. is
appealing from a resolution of the Court of Tax
Appeals dismissing its appeal from a decision of the
Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, assessing
additional fees on petitioner for a certain importation
of wire netting. The facts are simple and undisputed.
Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from
Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs
assessed the corresponding customs duties on the
importation on the basis of consular and supplies
invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the
shipments were released. Subsequently, however,
and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the
reassessment, additional customs duties in the
amount of P1,966.59 were levied and imposed upon
petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the
reassessment and levy of additional customs duties,
Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals.
Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by
the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolution of May
23, 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground that it
had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of
Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court. From
said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed
to us, seeking a reversal of said resolution of
dismissal.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing
section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125 relied upon by the
Tax Court and the Solicitor General, as well as
Section 11 of the same Act invoked by the petitioner:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals shall
exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal, as herein provided
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in
cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the National Internal Revenue

14

Code or other law or part of law administered by the

Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in
cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or
other money charges, seizure, detention or release of
property affected; fines, forfeitures or other penalties
imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the Customs Law or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or city Board of
Assessment
Appeals
in
case
involving
the
assessment and taxation of real property or other
matters arising under the assessment Law, including
rules and regulations relative thereto.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. Any

person, association or corporation adversely by a
decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial
or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an
appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days
after the receipt of such decision or ruling.
No appeal taken to the Court of Tax Appeals from the
decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue or the
Collector of the Customs shall suspend the payment,
levy, distraint, and/or sale of any property of the
taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax liability as
provided by existing law: Provided, however, that
when in the opinion of the Court the collection by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of
Customs may jeopardize the interests of the
Government and/or the taxpayer the Court at any
stage of the proceeding may suspend the said
collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit
the amount claimed or to file a surety bond for not
more than double the amount with the Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
There is really a discrepancy between Sections 7 and
11 above reproduced. Section 7 provides that the
Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, decisions
of
the Commissioner of Customs and decisions of

provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals on

cases mentioned in said section. On the other hand,
section 11 of the same Republic Act in listing and
enumerating the persons and entities who may
appeal as well as the effect of said appeal, mentions
those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector
of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any
provincial or City Board of Assessment Appeals, and
fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs. Taken
literally, a person affected by a decision of the
Collector of Customs may appeal to the Court of Tax
Appeals; and since no mention is made about
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, a person
affected by said decision may not appeal to the Court
of Tax Appeals. However, section 7 of the Act above
reproduced specially provides that the Court of Tax
Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions
of the Commissioner of Customs. That legal provision
conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Tax
Appeals to review decisions of the Commissioner of
Customs would be empty, meaningless, and
unenforceable because under Section 11, no person
affected by the decision of the Commissioner of
customs may appeal to the Tax Court. These two
meaningless, and unenforceable because under
Section 11, should be harmonized and reconciled if
possible, in order to give effect to the whole Act.
We are in entire accord with the Tax Court and the
Solicitor General that a clerical error was committed
in section 11, mentioning therein the Collector of
Customs. It should be, as it was meant to be, the
Commissioner of Customs. There are several reasons
in support of this view. Under the Customs Law,
found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Commissioner of Customs
(Insular Collector of Customs) is the Chief of the
Bureau of Customs and has jurisdiction over the
whole country as regards the enforcement of the
Customs Law, whereas, there are about sixteen
Collectors of Customs for the sixteen collection
districts and principal parts of entry into which the
Philippines has been divided. These Collectors of
Customs are subordinates of the Commissioner of
Customs over whom he has supervision and control
(section 1152, Revised Administrative Code).
Pursuant to said supervision and control, under
section 1405 of the Revised Administrative Code,

when any new or unsettled question shall be

determined by the Collector of Customs, he shall, if
matter is not otherwise carried upon for review in
ordinary course, notify the Commissioner of his
decision, submitting an adequate statement of acts
involved. What is more important is the provision of
section 1380, which reproduce below:
SEC. 1380. Review by Commissioner. The person
aggrieved by the decision of the Collector of Customs
in any matter presented upon protest or by his action
in any case of seizure may, within fifteen days after
notification in writing by the collector of his action or
decision, give written notice to the collector
signifying his desore to have the matter reviewed by
the Commissioner.
Thereupon, the Collector of Customs shall forthwith
transmit all the papers in the cause to the
Commissioner, who shall approve, modify, or reverse
the action of his subordinate and shall take such
steps and make such order or orders as may be
necessary to give effect to his decision.
Under this section, any person affected or aggrieved
by the decision of the Collector of Customs may
appeal the decision to the Commissioner of Customs.
From all this, it is clear if we followed the literal
meaning and wording of section 11 of Republic Act
No. 1125, in the sense that persons affected by a
decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal
directly tot he Court of Tax Appeals, then the
supervision and control of the Commissioner of
Customs over his Collector of Customs, and his right
to review their decisions upon appeal to him by the
persons affected by said decision would, not only be
gravely affected, but even destroyed. We cannot
believe that was the intention of the Legislature in
passing Republic Act No. 1125. It is more reasonable
and logical to hold that in Section 11 of the Act, the
Legislature meant and intended to say, the
Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of
Customs in the first paragraph and the first part of
the second paragraph of said section. In thus
holding, the Court are not exactly indulging in judicial
legislation. They are merely endeavoring to rectify
and correct a clearly clerical error in the wording of a
statute, in order to give due course and carry out the
evident intention of the Legislature. This the Courts

15

should and can validly do. Under the rules of

statutory construction, it is not the letter but rather
the spirit of the law and intention of the Legislature
that is important and which matters. When the
interpretation of a statute according to the exact and
literal import of its words would lead to absurd or
mischievous results, or would contravene the clear
purposes of the Legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far
as necessary, the latter of the law. Statutes may be
extended to cover cases not within the literal
meaning of the terms, for that which is clearly within
the intention of the Legislature in enacting the law is
as much within the statute as if it were within the
latter. Here the error (clerical and misprint) is plain
and obvious. It is within the province of the courts to
correct said error. This is not to correct the act of the
Legislature, but rather to carry out and give due
course to the true intention of said Legislature. (Black
on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd edition, pp. 66-67;
157-158.).
Furthermore, section 11 of Republic Act 1125 may
well be regarded as a mere complement or
implementation of section 7. Since section 7 provides
that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review by
appeal, decisions of the Collector of Internal
Revenue. decisions of the Commissioner of Customs,
and decisions of provincial or city Boards of
Assessment Appeals, so section 11 naturally provides
that persons adversely affected by said decisions
may appeal to the Tax Court. However, in
enumerating the governmental bodies or agencies
rendering said decisions that may be appealed, it
erroneously listed the Collector instead of the
Commissioner, of Customs. The error is plain.
As a matter of fact, the Court of Tax Appeals in its
resolution of dismissal of May 23, 1955 cites in
support thereof a resolution promulgated by it on
January 22, 1955 in C.T.A. Case No. 17, entitled
"Acting Collector of Customsvs. Acting Commissioner
of Customs", wherein it said:
The phrase "Collector of Customs" appearing in the
above-mentioned provision (section 11) of Republic
Act No. 1125 is clearly an oversight on the part of
Congress. It should read "Commissioner of Customs"
to make the provision conform with section 7 of the

said Republic Act section 1380 of the Revised

Administrative Code.

jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner

of Customs.

Petitioner contends that the literal meaning of

Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 should be
adopted in the sense that the Court of Tax Appeals
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Commissioner of
Customs over Appeals from decisions of Collectors of
Customs, so that a person adversely affected by a
decision of a Collector of Customs is given the choice
of appealing the said decision either to the
Commissioner of Customs or to the Courts of Tax
Appeals. We find contention unteable. In the first
place, the two remedies suggested are entirely
different, one from the other; an appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative,
whereas, appeal to the Court of Tax Appeal is
manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before
one resorts to the Courts, the administrative remedy
provided by law should first be exhausted. In the
second place, the two remedies suggested by the
petitioner would result in confusion because a person
adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of
Customs could not be sure where to seek the
remedy, whether with the Commissioner of Customs
or with the Court of Tax Appeals, and it might even
be difficult for him to decide because, if he took the
appeal directly to the Tax Court, that would ordinarily
cut off his remedy before the Commissioner of
Customs for the reason that, should the Court of Tax
Appeals decide against him, he may not appeal said
decision to the Commissioner of Customs because
the Commissioner as an administrative officer may
not review the decision of the Court. On the other
hand, if the person affected by a decision of a
Collector of Customs took his appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs, and there receives an
adverse decision, he may yet appeal therefrom to
the Court of Tax Appeals. In the third place, even if
the person affected by an adverse ruling of the
Collector of Customs took his appeal to the Court of
Tax Appeals, as advocated by counsel for the
petitioner, under the literal meaning of section 11,
the Tax Court may refuse to entertain said appeal, as
was done in the present case, on the ground that
under section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, it had no
jurisdiction to review a decision of the Collector of
Customs, section 7 clearly limiting its appellate

In view of the foregoing, we hold that under the law,

particularly, the Customs Law and Republic Act No.
1125, the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to
review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of
Customs. The appealed order of dismissal is hereby
affirmed, with costs.

(7) NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

NAPOLEON E. SANCIANGCO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JOSE A. ROO Minister,
Ministry of Local Government;, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The sole issue for determination in this Petition for
Certiorari,
Prohibition
and
mandamus
with
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order is
whether or not an appointive member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, who ran for the position of
Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14,
1984, should be considered as resigned or on forced
leave of absence upon the filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy. The resolution of the controversy hinges
on the construction to be given to Section 13 of
Batas Pambansa Blg, 697, which provides as follows:
Sec. 13. Effects of filing of certificate of candidacy.
(1) Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active officers and members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Integrated National Police, as well as officials and
employees of government-owned and governmentcontrolled corporations and their subsidiaries,shall
ipso facto cease in office or position as of the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, however,
that the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister,
the Members of the Cabinet, and the Deputy
Ministers shall continue in the offices they presently
hold notwithstanding the filing of their certificates of
candidacy.

16

(2) Governors, mayors, members of the various

sanggunians or barangay officials shall, upon filing
certificate of candidacy be considered on forced
leave of absence from office. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay
Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the May 17, 1982 Barangay
elections. Later, he was elected President of the
Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz
City by the Board of Directors of the said Association.
As the President of the Association, petitioner was
appointed by the President of the Philippines as a
member of the City's Sangguniang Panlungsod.
On March 27, 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa
elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of
the Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in the
said election.
Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 697 (supra), petitioner informed respondent
Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming
his duties as member of that body. The matter was
elevated to respondent Minister of Local Government
Jose A. Rono who ruled that since petitioner is an
appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned
from his appointive position upon the filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy.
Petitioner impugns said ruling on the ground
since Section 13(2) of Batasan Pambansa Blg.
makes no distinction between elective
appointive officials, the legislative intent is clear
even appointive Barangay officials are deemed
covered by the said provision.

that
697
and
that
also

There is no question that petitioner holds a public

appointive position. He was appointed by the
President as a member of the City's Sangguniang
Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected
President of the Association of Barangay Councils.
This was pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 1 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 51 (An Act Providing for the elective
or Appointive Positions in Various Local Governments
and for Other Purposes), which provides that:

Sec. 3. Cities. There shall be in each city such

elective local officials as provided in their respective
charters, including the city mayor, the city vicemayor,
and
the elective
members
of
the
sangguniang panglungsod, all of whom shall be
elected by the qualified voters in the city. In addition
thereto, there shall be appointive sangguniang
panglungsod members consisting of the president of
the city association of barangay councils, the
president of the city federation of the kabataang
barangay, and one representative each from the
agricultural and industrial labor sectors who shall be
appointed
by,
the
president (Prime
Minister)
whenever, as determined by the sangguniang
panglungsod, said sectors are of sufficient number in
the city to warrant representation. (emphasis
supplied)
The appointive character of petitioner's position was
reiterated in Section 173 of the Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337), reading as follows:
Sec 173. Composition and Compensation. (1) the
sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of
the city, shall be composed of the vice-mayor, as
presiding
officer,
the
elected
sangguniang
panlungsod members, and the members who may be
appointed by the President of the Philippines
consisting of the presidents of the Katipunan
panglungsod ng mga barangay and the Kabataang
barangay, city federation. (Emphasis supplied)
Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz
City, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be
such member when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections.
Petitioner avers, however, that the fact that he is
merely an appointive member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ozamiz City "is really of no moment
since subsection 2, Section 13. B.P. 697, makes no
distinction between elective and appointive officials,
and at any rate, legislative intent makes clear that
appointive officials are deemed covered by the
provision.
Although it may be that Section 13(2), B.P. Blg. 697,
admits of more than one construction, taking into

consideration the nature of the positions of the

officials enumerated therein, namely, governors,
mayors, members of the various sanggunians or
barangay officials, the legislative intent to distinguish
between elective positions in section 13(2), as
contrasted to appointive positions in section 13(l)
under the all-encompassing clause reading "any
person holding public appointive office or position," is
clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that "when
the language of a particular section of a statute
admits of more than one construction, that
construction which gives effect to the evident
purpose and object sought to be attained by the
enactment of the statute as a whole, must be
followed." 1
A statute's clauses and phrases should not be taken
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part thereof must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts. 2
The legislative intent to cover public appointive
officials in subsection (1), and officials mentioned in
subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to
local elective officials, can be gleaned from the
proceedings of the Batasan Pambansa recorded as
follows:
Mr. Valdez: ... May I go to paragraph 2 of Sec. 16, Mr.
Speaker which says:
Any local elective officials, including an elected
barangay official shall ipso facto cease in his office or
position as at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy, unless otherwise provided by law. (later
amended and is now Subsection 2 of sec. 13)
Now, do the words 'local elective official' refer to the
office or to an incumbent who has been elected, not
appointed?
Mr. Albano. Paragraph 2 covers elective official;
paragraph I covers appointive officials. So, if he is an
appointive local official he would fall under
paragraph (1) because it says: 'Any person holding
appointive office or position.' It does not distinguish if
it is appointive or elective position.
Mr. Valdez. In other words, Mr. Speaker, do I get the
distinguished sponsor correctly that an appointed

17

mayor but holding an elective position is not within

the comprehension of this section or this paragraph?
Mr. Albano. No, Mr. Speaker, that would refer to
paragraph 2. What maybe the Gentleman's
contemplation is: Suppose a person is appointed to
the position of a mayor, will he be covered under
paragraph 1 and should be cease to hold office upon
filing his Certificate of Candidacy?
Mr. Valdez. Yes.
Mr. Albano. I would say, yes, he would fall under
paragraph 1. But if he is an elective local official he
would fall under paragraph 2.
Mr. Valdez. In other words, this is a description of the
mode and manner by which the occupant is brought
to the office.
Mr. Albano. Yes.
Mr. Valdez. ... not the description of the office itself.
Mr. Albano. No, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Valdez. I see. Now we come to the other portion
which refers to elected barangay official. Why is it
that the provision isolates the nature of the official of
the barangay who had been elected, not appointed,
is he supposed to be within the purview of paragraph
2?
Mr. Albano. No. Mr. Speaker, I will call the
Gentleman's attention to paragraph 1: Any person
holding a public appointive office or position ... I
presume and I assume that the office in the
barangay council is still contemplated in the words
'appointive office.'
Mr. Valdez. Under paragraph l?
Mr. Albano. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

(Emphasis supplied)

Nor do we perceive any violation of the equal

protection clause, as petitioner contends, since
Section 13 of B.P. Blg. 697 applies alike to all persons
subject to such legislation under like circumstances
and conditions. Neither can petitioner justifiably
contend that he was removed from office without due
process of law since it was of his own choice that he

ran for a seat in the Batasan Pambansa. The

consequence that followed his unsuccessful attempt
at the elections arose from law.
It goes without saying that although petitioner, by
filing his certificate of candidacy for the Batasan
Pambansa ceased, ipso facto, to be an appointive
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, he remains
an elective Barangay Captain from which position he
may be considered as having been on "forced leave
of absence." He also continues as President of the
Association of Barangay Councils but will need a
reappointment by the President, as member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City as the law
speaks of "members who may be appointed by the
President."
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent officials, the Writs prayed for
are denied, and this Petition is hereby ordered
dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE
POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid
the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated
to drum up patronage for its oil products.
Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls
for participants therein to estimate the actual
number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex
station will dispense during a specified period.
Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers
and its advertising agency, and their immediate
families excepted, participation is to be open
indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or
licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no
fee or consideration is required to be paid, no
purchase of Caltex products required to be made.
Entry forms are to be made available upon request at

each Caltex station where a sealed can will be

provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any

officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:

A
three-staged
winner
selection
system
is
envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer
Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to
the actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded
pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the
next closest, the second; and the next, the third.
Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene
stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac
hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnetlite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for
third. The first-prize winner in each station will then
be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven
different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified
contestants in each region will be deposited in a
sealed can from which the first-prize, second-prize
and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn.
The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to
make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to
Manila, accompanied by their respective Caltex
dealers, in order to take part in the "National
Contest". The regional second-prize and third-prize
winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300,
respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the
seven regional first-prize winners will be placed
inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the
final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners
will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this
final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second;
Pl,500 for third; and P650 as consolation prize for
each of the remaining four participants.

Written or printed matter in any form advertising,

describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or
conveying or purporting to convey any information
concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar
scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or
chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for
obtaining any money or property of any kind by
means
of
false
or
fraudulent
pretenses,
representations, or promises.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as

amongst the media for publicizing the contest but
also for the transmission of communications relative
thereto, representations were made by Caltex with
the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a),
1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter.
No matter belonging to any of the following classes,
whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be
imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to
be deposited in or carried by the mails of the

18

"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory

evidence that any person or company is engaged in
conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for
the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or
that any person or company is conducting any
scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or
property of any kind through the mails by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any
postmaster or other officer or employee of the
Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same
in the mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly
written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof,
any mail matter of whatever class mailed by or
addressed to such person or company or the
representative or agent of such person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order
system and telegraphic transfer service.The
Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to
him that any person or company is engaged in
conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for
the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or
that any person or company is conducting any
scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or
property of any kind through the mails by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promise, forbid the issue or payment by any
postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic
transfer to said person or company or to the agent of
any such person or company, whether such agent is
acting as an individual or as a firm, bank,
corporation, or association of any kind, and may
provide by regulation for the return to the remitters

of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic

transfers drawn in favor of such person or company
or its agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the
Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in
which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of
the contest rules and endeavored to justify its
position that the contest does not violate the antilottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the
then Acting Postmaster General opined that the
scheme falls within the purview of the provisions
aforesaid and declined to grant the requested
clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7,
1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the
foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved
no consideration in the part of any contestant, the
contest was not, under controlling authorities,
condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an
opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an
unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217,
Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained
his view that the contest involves consideration, or
that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift
enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal
Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only
denied the use of the mails for purposes of the
proposed contest but as well threatened that if the
contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be
issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by
filing the present petition for declaratory relief
against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying
"that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the
Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow
petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to
the attention of the public". After issues were joined
and upon the respective memoranda of the parties,
the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest' announced to be conducted by the
petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the
petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the
respondent has no right to bar the public distribution
of said rules by the mails.

The respondent appealed.

The parties are now before us, arrayed against each
other upon two basic issues: first, whether the
petition states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal
Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the
old Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal
basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked,
declaratory relief is available to any person "whose
rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the .
. . statute and for a declaration of his rights
thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of
Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to
established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down
certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe
for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of
Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28,
1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines,
50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs.
Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The
gravamen of the appellant's stand being that the
petition herein states no sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual
bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that
generated the present controversy, a number of
significant points stand out in bold relief. The
appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some
consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right
to exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all
appropriate media to advertise and stimulate
increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the
appellant, as the authority charged with the
enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the
power and the duty to suppress transgressions
thereof particularly thru the issuance of fraud
orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable

19

schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the

appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion
scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible
difficulties in the dissemination of information
thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was
found expedient to request the appellant for an
advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by
virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and
construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law,
the appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed
scheme and accordingly declined the request. A
point of difference as to the correct construction to
be given to the applicable statute was thus reached.
Communications in which the parties expounded on
their respective theories were exchanged. The
confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its
position was matched only by the obstinacy with
which the appellant stood his ground. And this
impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open
warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest
was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued
against it and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for
the remedy prayed for. The appellee's insistent
assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its
proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and
consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege
demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy.
The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid.
There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right on one side and a denial thereof on the other,
concerning a real not a mere theoretical
question or issue. The contenders are as real as their
interests are substantial. To the appellee, the
uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views
on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its
freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant,
the suppression of the appellee's proposed contest
believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold
and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the
appellee's bent to hold the contest and the
appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if
carried out, the contenders are confronted by the
ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable
litigation unless their differences are settled and
stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y
Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-

6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the

insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past
when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's
"desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the
fears of others" which admittedly does not confer
a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has
ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the
case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of
right which is actually contested (III Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters,
36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's
pretense that there is here no question of
construction because the said appellant "simply
applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set
of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest",
hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The
infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds
from the assumption that, if the circumstances here
presented, the construction of the legal provisions
can be divorced from the matter of their application
to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible.
Construction, verily, is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the
fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for
in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is
precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme
proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of
the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this
is as much a question of construction or
interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates,
that a pronouncement on the matter at hand can
amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the
handing down of which is anathema to a declaratory
relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law
has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement
over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous
or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape,
presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of
immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in

a manner of speaking, the propriety nay, the

necessity of setting the dispute at rest before it
accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity,
passion and violence of a full-blown battle which
looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but
be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin
vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800,
383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to
deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the
situation into which it has been cast, would be to
force it to choose between undesirable alternatives.
If it cannot obtain a final and definitive
pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery
provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed
contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it
launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes
thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually
threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud
order with its concomitant stigma which may attach
even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it
abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed
censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a
virtual fiat of previous censorship which is
constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these
considerations in one equation and in the spirit of
liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be
interpreted in order to promote their object (section
1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) which, in the
instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and
duties under a law we can see in the present case
any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or
prematurity in our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force
and binding effect of the ruling we hand down in this
case if he believes that it will not have the final and
pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is
calculated to subserve. At the very least, the
appellant will be bound. But more than this, he
obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of
the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume
the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to
the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which

20

must control the actuations not only of those called

upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty
bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we
entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this
case will terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the
conclusion we have herein just reached is not without
precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J.,
399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in
promotional advertising was advised by the county
prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan
had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such
sales promotion were conducted, the corporation
would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held
that the corporation was entitled to maintain a
declaratory relief action against the county
prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales
promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs.
Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d.,
435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs.
Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a
case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised
Administrative
Code,
using
almost
identical
terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983
thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable,
and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud
orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the
facilities of the postal service to, any information
concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme
for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any
kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the
second issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial
path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs.
Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly
dwelt on the power of the postal authorities under
the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law,
this Court declared that
While countless definitions of lottery have been
attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction
is that of the United States Supreme Court, in

analogous cases having to do with the power of the

United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term
"lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution
of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift
exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and
various forms of gambling. The three essential
elements of a lottery are: First, consideration;
second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs. States
[1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs.
Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and
Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and
Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919],
39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company
vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that
the elements of prize and chance are too obvious in
the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention.
Consequently as the appellant himself concedes, the
field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of
the element of consideration therein. Respecting this
matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch
as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid
down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms
In respect to the last element of consideration, the
law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, if no consideration is derived
directly or indirectly from the party receiving the
chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in
which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid
directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we
are struck by the clarity of the language in which the
invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers,
labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy anything?
Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex
gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex
dealer will dispense from to , and win valuable
prizes . . . ." .

for the entry form which is available on demand, and

accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of
the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside
out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look
beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to
unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies
which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate",
Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our
appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to be,
but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property
by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that
non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex products
simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly
paying a consideration for the privilege to join the
contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the
purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any
Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation.
But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs reiterating,
does not have to buy anything or to give anything of
value.1awphl.nt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme,
being admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally
benefit the sponsor in the way of increased
patronage by those who will be encouraged to prefer
Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a
prize by securing entry blanks". The required
element of consideration does not consist of the
benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The
true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d.,
99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the
participant pays a valuable consideration for the
chance, and not whether those conducting the
enterprise receive something of value in return for
the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly
oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that
matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled
from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter
at rest:

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that

any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any
service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be
given for the privilege to participate. A prospective
contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request

21

The fact that the holder of the drawing expects

thereby to receive, or in fact does receive, some
benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a
result of the drawing; does not supply the element of
consideration.Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan,
Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring
that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by
the appellee is not a lottery that may be
administratively and adversely dealt with under the
Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money,
or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed?
Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to
have concentrated on the issue of consideration, this
aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy
here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as
an instrument of both curative and preventive
justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was
predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217,
Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined
in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want
of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift
enterprise in which that element is not essential, the
determination of whether or not the proposed
contest wanting in consideration as we have found
it to be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be
passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift
enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words,
there appears to be a consensus among
lexicographers and standard authorities that the
term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of
under which goods are sold for their market value
but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a
chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur.,
654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817;
Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd
ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of
Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13;
Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell
vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As
thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the
scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of

anything to which the chance offered is attached as

an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open
to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or
not they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the
appellee's contest can be encompassed within the
broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is
capable of being extended, we think that the
appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As
stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are
indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an
award by chance, even in default of the element of
consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is
prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178
So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga.
154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great
Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698,
114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin.
Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a
lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive
statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of
prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs.
People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio
vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People
vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of
Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7
L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851,
citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga.
App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained
by the fact that the specific statutory provisions
relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as
pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and
"gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs.
People, supra); in others, the necessity for the
element of consideration or chance has been

specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352,

citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford
vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The
lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent
jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be
resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the
term in question is used in association with the word
"lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and
consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217
aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as
the element of chance is concerned it is only
logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it
involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is
not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to
eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift
enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief
sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the
determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic
aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is
axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the
mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters
which on grounds of public policy are declared nonmailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and
similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized
necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the
gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com.
vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in
gambling it is inherent that something of value be

22

hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it

follows ineluctably that where no consideration is
paid by the contestant to participate, the reason
behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it
has been held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance
does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as
a device to evade the law and no consideration is
derived, directly or indirectly, from the party
receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being
cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs.
Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and
Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a
gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold
that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal
Law which we have heretofore examined, gift
enterprises
and
similar
schemes
therein
contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries,
they involve the element of consideration. Finding
none in the contest here in question, we rule that the
appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for
purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein
states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as
described in the rules submitted by the appellee
does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the
affirmed. No costs.

judgment

appealed

from

is