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tary institution around which the Sultans organized their state, diplomacy served the cause in a
minor way. The Sultans, supported by an invincible army, customarily regulated the Empire's
foreign relations by the simple technique of issuing
a pronouncement of their will.
But by the end of the 17th century, the Empire
had reached the verge of collapse. With their
Research was done in London, Paris, and Istanbul between 1957-1961 with the aid of grants from the Ford
Foundation and the American University in Cairo.
2 After the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 1783,
above all, to restore the Empire to its former greatness. He was intelligent enough to realize that to
accomplish his mission he must emulate the technical progress of Europe, and so he attempted to
order and modernize some of his state's basic institutions after the pattern of the European powers.
The primary objective of his reform program was
to regenerate the military might of his Empire.
Consequently, it must be emphasized that all other
reforms, including those in the sphere of diplomacy, were intended in one way or another to contribute to the attainment of that goal.
However, Selim was aware that "like the wheels
of a watch" the affairs of government were interconnected, and reform must be comprehensive if it
were to be successful.3 Given such awareness, and
the fact that diplomacy had, by Selim's reign,
become one of the vital branches of the Ottoman
government, the diplomatic establishment occupied
a large place in the remedial schemes of the Sultan
and his advisers. While it was neither his intention nor his wish, Selim's reforms in the Ottoman
military and diplomatic systems opened channels
through which the thought and techniques of
Revolutionary Europe first penetrated the Empire.
The process of change was carried out with the
help of European instructors; Ottomans found it
necessary to learn European languages and, in
consequence, began moderately to delve into various lbranches of European literature: In this way,
western ideas gradually began to overcome the
barriers of Muslim prejudice against all things
Christian, and the evolution toward the modern
nation-state of Turkey had begun.
Although Selim's military reforms were significant in the evolution of modern Turkey, it is the
role of his diplomatic reforms in that transforma-
295
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that they form the starting point for any systematic study of 19th century Ottoman diplomacy.
their progress.
diplomacy, as in all matters of government, derived from the Muslim concept of the state, which
was rooted in the Sharita (Holy Law); traditionally, the Sharita provided for all the exigencies of
life and government, thus making the Muslim
state, in theory, self-sufficient. In this sense, the
Ottoman Empire was pre-eminently a Sharita
state.5 The Ottomans clung stubbornly to the illusion of Islam's innate moral and cultural superiority over Christian Europe. They expressed this
belief in their ideas of self-sufficiency and in their
practice of non-reciprocal diplomacy. The Muslim
prejudice that whatever was western was tainted
prevented the Ottomans from wholly accepting or
imitating western ways. Thus, despite its enduring
presence in Europe, the Empire remained, at the
outset of the 19th century, essentially a medieval
Islamic state in objectives, organization and mentality. This fact explains why, even after nearly
half a millennium of constant, though one-sided
Jeis iil-Kiittab: The management of the Ottoman Empire's foreign relations was, in this period,
under the supervision of the Reis il-Kiittab, or
Reis Efendi (chief of the secretaries). The position had evolved from the office of Director of the
Secretariat, in which capacity the Reis had been
responsible for drawing up the communications
from the Grand Vizir to the Sultan and supervising the secretarial activities of the various
governmental departments. When the first European ambassadors took up residence in Istanbul,
the negotiations involved were carried out by the
Grand Vizir, with the Reis merely keeping a
record of the exchanges, as he did of all other
viziral business. Diplomacy did not begin to occupy him significantly until the latter part of the
17th century. As the Grand Vizir gradually
assumed the greater part of the Sultan's responsibilities in the affairs of state, he in turn delegated
to the Reis greater responsibilities in foreign
affairs, which, owing to their growing complexities,
demanded constant attention.7
,'For economy's sake, certain aspects of Ottoman
diplomacy, such as audiences, gifts, residence, etc., have
been omitted in the following discussion; these are
features which pertain mainly to the conduct of relations between the European embassies in Istanbul and
the Sublime Porte. Several published Turkish and
western works provide information about such matters;
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abreast of events everywhere. But he lacked efficient means to collect and evaluate information,
even if his sources and lines of communication had
been adequate. Consequently, many of Selim's
notations are peevish because of the Reis's failure
to keep him informed.
The Reis also supervised negotiations or conducted them himself, generally with the assistance
of a dragoman and two other officials, often the
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19 Emergence, 62.
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posts in Europe. ialet Efendi, Ottoman ambassador in Paris, 1802-1806, reported in one of his
dispatches that Napoleon insisted only his own
private interpreter be present at a particular inter-
24 Tarih, I, 129-30.
25 The total number of berats allotted each embassy
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Empire in Europe), and at times cut off the capital by land for weeks. When they were isolated,
the Ottomans had to rely for news on the dragomans and on a secondary source, which was often
useful although biased-the European envoys.
The Reis Efendi might tap them directly or, frequently, the envoys themselves volunteered information, which was usually shaded to suit their
political objectives.28
edge, and sciences useful to the servants of the 80 Cevdet, Tarih, VI, 88-89; Uzunqar?lt, " Ondokuzuncu
28 For examples of the Beys' reports, see CH 890, 891,collection of documents on Ottoman-English relations
3479; Cevdet, Tarih, VI, 257; Karal, Selim III, 163-64, from the 16th to the 19th century).
s1 Ainslie to Grenville, July 10, 1793, F078/14.
Fransa-Mlsfr ve Osmani' Imparatorliuu 1797-1802
82 Cevdet, Tarih, VI, 89, 257-60; Karal, Sejim III, 169(Istanbul, 1938), 113, and " Yunan Adalariiln Fransiziar tarafindan iegall ve Osmanli-Rus miinasebatl 76, 190-98 (both the latter record Ainslie's conference
1797-8," Tarih Semineri Dergisi, I (1937), 103; on the accurately except that they both date it erroneously as
situation in Rumeli and the activities of Pasvan Oglu, July 13); Uzunqarl!, "Tiirk-Ingiliz Miinasebatfi," op.
see the Grand Vizir's report, Sept. 21, 1804, HH 1474, cit., 584-89, for Agah Efendi's letter of credence and the
and Cevdet, Tarih, III-VII passim, Asim, Tarih, passim; gifts he took to London; his first report is in Cevdet,
the Polish ambassador's note to the Reis Efendi, May Tarih, VI, appendix 8, 377-85, and Karal, Selim III, 176-
the
Emergence, 61; Karal, Selim III, 79, 163-67; d'Ohsson,
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In assigning the permanent missions to European capitals, the Sultan left a glaring omission.
No embassy was delegated to Russia. The last
Ottoman ambassador to St. Petersburg had been
Rasih Efendi, who went in 1792 in accordance
with the Treaty of Jassy, which called for an
exchange of missions; Rasih's counterpart from
Russia was General Kutuzov. The Sublime Porte
was determined to dazzle the Russians by the
splendor of its mission and spent lavishly in the
endeavor, providing a notable instance of political
considerations over-riding the distressed condition
of the Porte's finances.35
While at St. Petersburg, Rasih was treated
uncivilly over the matter of Russian captives who
had embraced Islam; as a result he cut short his
mission and departed, after rebuffing overtures
for an alliance and refusing to cement closer re-
lations with Russia.6 The fact that Rasih's mission broke down just at the time when Selim was
beginning his diplomatic reforms and posting
embassies abroad must in large measure account
for his failure to include Russia in the scheme.
Furthermore, Russia was the Empire's perennial
enemy, whom the Ottomans feared and hated.
departed for London.33
Selim was pledged to restore the Crimea to the
Yusuf Agah's embassy set the pattern for subEmpire,
and the Porte obviously regarded the
sequent missions in many ways, including the
Treaty of Jassy as little more than an armistice.
number of personnel; in general the missions were
All these factors must have convinced the Ottomodest in size. A new ambassador was accommans
that the opening of a permanent embassy in
panied by a first secretary, a principal and second
Russia
interpreter, someone who acted as attache or consul at that juncture would have been unwise.37
34 This is clear from the Turkish documents, particularly those concerning the pay and allowances of the
embassy staffs in the CH collection.
point of view is in Marquis de la Campe to Delacroix, 35 On estimate from the available documents, Rasih's
Apr. 20, 1797, AET/196; CH 4714 is a private letter ofmission cost over 600,000 kuru?, plus an unstipulated
amount authorized for credits for the purpose of gaining
Agah Efendi describing his journey, and CH 4250 is his
ve General Kutuzof elgilikleri) ," Ankara Cnito Grenville, Apr. 10, 1797, F078/18, and VentureEfendi
to
Dil ve Tarih-Cojrafya FakUltesi Dergisi, IV
Delacroix, Mar. 23, 1797, AET/196; Knobelsdorf's versitesi
dis(1946), 195-202; and F. Clement-Simon, "Ambassadeur
patches Apr. 10 and 25, 1797 in Zinkeisen, op. cit., VIII,
Extraordinaire Russe a Constantinople," Revue d'His18; Cevdet, Tarih, VI, 231-32; Karal, Selim III, 167,
toire
177, who errs in saying the first missions were sent
to Diplomatique, Paris, 1946, 25-39; Ainslie to Grenville, May 23, 1792, and Feb. 9, July 10, 1793, F078/13
Vienna and Berlin. On Aziz Efendi, who knew French
and some German, see Lewis, Emergence, 53, andand
A. 14; Cevdet, Tarih, VI, 89; and Tahsin oz, "Ruzname," op. cit., 192.
Tietze, "Aziz Efendis Muhayyelat," Oriens, I (1948),
248-329, and "Ali Aziz," El2.
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oneinnovations
of Ali's reports that he noted in the margin,
Recruitment: Selim attempted by
no
"What an ass the fellow is! " 38
with respect to the problem of recruiting and
government.
8000 kuru?
the reconquest of the Crimea, see Nuri Pasa, Netaic,
IV, plus 4000 kuru?, the interpreters 6000 plus
kuru? each, and the Christian subject 2500 and
97, and Lewis, Emergence, 49. In a letter to the2500
Prus1500
kuru?-Cevdet, Tarih, VI, 89, 257-60 and Karal,
sian king in 1790, Selim pledged not to make peace
with
Selim III, 169-76.
Russia until the Crimea was retaken, CH 301. (The
40 CH 8778 and HH 7217e.
document is erroneously dated Dec. 1789.)
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dence.42
42 This feature of Ottoman diplomacy can be reconstructed in detail from the voluminous memoranda, petitions, registers and treasury orders in the CH collection.
41 HH 5843 for the irregularity of budgeting; CHNumbers 1836, 2106, 2108, 2187, 2392, 2800, 3263, 3566,
4250, 9189 on beginning and termination of salaries and4230, 4539, 4820, 6035, and 6170, provide a good samallowances; CH 8984 and 6397 for ambassadorial sala-pling of the wide range of the allowances and the variety
ries and for the discrepancies in ambassadors' allow-of expenditures including salaries, maintenance, rent,
etc. In this selection of documents the living allowances
ances; and CH 4707, 6748, 9295 on disproportion of pay
varied from the handsome sum of 5800 kurue per month
among lesser officials. A detailed structure of Ottoman
for the Prussian ambassador in 1789 to 225 kurus per
financing for diplomacy can almost be built from the
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the delusion of inherent Islamic superiority continued to influence the Ottomans in the matter;
the habit of subvention had become for them, in
part, a psychological crutch, for the Europeans,
a sign of Ottoman subservience.
However, the experience of Yusuf Agah's embassy caused the Sublime Porte to attempt another
significant break with past diplomatic practices.
ney. The value of the credit receipts could then
In 1794 it was decided to abandon the burdenlater be deducted from the official's tax obligations
some practice of defraying traveling expenses of
to the treasury.48
foreign ambassadors and of subsidizing the costs
The Ottomans discharged not only the major
of their embassies in Istanbul. There is evidence
financial obligations of the European embassies
that the Ottomans intended to move gradually
in Istanbul, but, when they could no longer dicin this matter, but when it was seen that Agah
tate peace treaties to their enemies and were
Efendi had not been treated reciprocally on his
forced to negotiate, they also underwrote the costs
arrival in England, the Porte made it an occasion
of the negotiations. They indemnified the enemy's
for dropping the practice altogether and at once.
plenipotentiaries and met the expenses of any
On June 11, 1794 Selim III introduced the new
mediators who might be involved in the negotiapolicy by an imperial rescript. The action protions. At times, the Sublime Porte was lavish in
duced much chagrin among the European envoys,
rewarding the latter if the Sultan was pleased with
who had in the past often complained that the Ottothe outcome of the exchanges. For example, the
mans were not liberal enough in their allowances.
bonuses awarded the Prussian ambassador and his
The British and Dutch ambassadors, who arrived
staff, for mediating the Treaty of Sistova with just after the new policy went into effect, claimed
Austria in 1790, included a grant from the Sultan
the act was a direct insult to their governments.
of 25,000 gold kurus, 4000 gold nuggets wrought
Pressure from the European embassies to revert
into hazel-nuts, and an additional 500 nuggets for
to the old practice continued until 1796, when the
his secretary.44
the4' CH 1660; for Selim's edict, Cevdet, Tarih, VI, 12829; Karal, Selim III, 185; and d'Ohsson, Tableau, VII,
486-88.
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ambassadors.49
charge d'affaires.48
too."
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in any wrangles, owing to his religious significance. But with respect to the Austrian
ambassador, he must insist on precedence and in
general follow the examples set by Seyyid Ali
(which were of little value). However, the Reis
Efendi qualified,
. . .although you must strive to uphold the dignity of
Islam and the Padigah's government in those quarters,
you ought not to precipitate a controversy over the
question of precedence. Avoid giving rise to agitation
and gossip; be courteous and cautious. There is no way
to instruct you clearly in the matter. You must manage
by means of your own wisdom and understanding in the
circumstances. Such is the will of the Padiah."
Turkey precedence.
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experimenting with the principle of western alliances, Selim III was ahead of most of his ministers; it required the French assault on Egypt to
awaken them to the necessity.54
For decades it had been apparent that the Ottoinvolvement in the Polish Question (the compleximans were incapable of defending themselves
ties of which confused him thoroughly), could
without foreign assistance. But the only source
not support him in all matters against Russia
of effective military support was Europe. Yet theand Austria; and when Sweden, contrary to her
myopic Islamic view toward Europe, and the
agreement with the Sultan, unilaterally came to
political rivalries of the European powers themterms with Russia, Selim wrote to the Kaymalcam
selves, inhibited the Sublime Porte from involving itself in Europe's alliance systems. However,
Selim realized he could not preserve his domain
by continuing such unrealistic attitudes. Thus,
shortly after his accession, even before he embarked upon his reforms, Selim deviated from
traditional Ottoman unilateralism by entering
into separate defensive alliances with Sweden and
Prussia, who, in 1790, were also at war with
taken during Selim's reign which drew the Ottoman government a little out of its Islamic mould
and closer to the European bi-lateral system of
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way.58
tion that the Islamic rationale of Ottoman diplomacy was being breached by western thought.
Finally, yet another new element entered the
workings of Ottoman diplomacy in Selim's reignthe element of public opinion. The idea of de-
arguing, "Why should the recognition of Bonaparte's title dissolve the treaty [of 1799] ? The
only circumstances in which the Ottoman government can go to war would be if the security
and the territorial integrity of the Empire are
threatened. How can it be explained to the public
that the government has gone to war for the sake
of a treaty? How can the. people be told they will
have to fight a war for the sake of one simple
word [emperor] ? " 57
While the Reis's statement that the Porte could
56 HH 1725 (dated only 1214/1799). There are, of
course, other examples in the documents.
57 HH 1480 (dated only 1219/1804). Here, the Reis
Efendi was obviously using public opinion as an excuse.
Ottoman foreign policy in Selim's reign, see the memorandum of AtIf Reis Efendi in Cevdet, Tarih, cited
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firmly entrenched was the office of the Reis idiKiittab. Little was done to improve the security
of the office or its efficiency. (It goes without
saying that this criticism applies to most of the
cardinal positions of the Ottoman government,
particularly to the Grand VTizir.) True, Selim
was fortunate in having available several men of
ability whom he appointed as Reis-Rancid, Atif,
Because the office of the Reis iil-Kiittab remained within the purview of the Grand Vizir's
functions, the factors which handicapped the
Grand Vizir and made his position insecure, also
applied to the Reis Efendi. The insecurity of
both their offices made the Porte's efforts to con-
front its enemies with a sustained and well-administered foreign policy all the more difficult
to achieve. An able Reis was often deprived of
the use of his influence and initiative when they
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results.
From among the men who had previous diplomatic experience or who held posts in the Sublime
Porte, the Grand Vizir suggested Seyyid Ali
Efendi, former ambassador to France, Ibrahim
Efendi and Ismail Ferruh, who had served respec-
" most of them . . . learned little about the countries to which they were sent, and were not greatly
impressed by what they did learn." 63 The embassies gradually fell under the direction of lesser
officials, who were mostly Greeks.64
The reports of most of Selim's ambassadors
reflected their incompetence as observers and information gatherers. These deficiencies, combined
with the Porte's failure to create effective lines
of postal communications and the continued
anarchy in the. provinces adjacent to the capital,
beggared the Ottoman government of news. Although sea communications remained open, they
were, on the whole, longer than overland routes,
and quarantines restricted the quick passage of
information by that means. Spencer Smith complained in February 1799 that " the Sublime
Porte remains the worst informed government in
all of Europe. It learns of events only weeks
after their occurrence and thus remains most of
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prehend the forces against which he was contending or the magnitude of his task. His optimism,
and inventions were introduced, and his oppocomments appear in Koehler to Grenville, June 30, 1799,
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that the results of Selim's labors were all negative. Western innovations and particularly western ideas, did not end with Selim's reign. They
found in the decayed Ottoman Empire a rich soil
in which they eventually took root. Selim's diplo-
Westward-looking minority among the bureaucratic hierarchy, similar to that created among
the officers by the military and naval reforms." 69
taries of the Palace and the Sublime Porte "; also Nuri,
BROWN UNIVERSITY
1. INTRODUCTION
The notion of cyclicly recurrent cosmic disasters, a catastrophe by flood alternating with one
by fire, both accompanying conjunctions of all
planets at the zero point of the zodiac, has been
traced from ancient Babylonia and Iran through
Pythagorean and Stoic philosophy, thence into the
medieval world.' Because of its essential connection with astronomy, the concept of the world-year
is of interest and utility to historians of science.
Its ramifications provide clues elucidating the role
of Sasanian Iran in the origin and transmission of
1 See van der Waerden, B. L., " Das grosse Jahr und
die ewige Wiederkehr," Hermes 80 (1952), pp. 129-155.
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