JURISDICTION

UVAIs Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation
and application of UVAIs by-laws, specifically its construction rules.
Therefore, the HIGC assuming the SECs original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases involving controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership
relation but with advent of Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers and
responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners associations, were
transferred to the HLURB.
On the second issue, UVAI are not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction and is
different from the case of Tijam VS Sibonghanoy. As found by the CA, respondents
appearance before the RTC was pursuant to a subpoena issued by that court in
connection with Eristingcols application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception to the general rule that an
objection to the courts jurisdiction over a case may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, as the lack of jurisdiction affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of a case. In the case at bar, fifteen days after UVAI and Eristingcol
entered into a temporary undertaking, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss.
Certainly, this successive and continuous chain of events cannot be characterized as
laches as would bar defendants from questioning the RTCs jurisdiction.

1. G.R. No. 167702

LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL, Petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RANDOLPH C. LIMJOCO, Respondents.
NATURE: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which assails the Court of Appeals RTC for lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS: Petitioner Eristingcol is an owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village. On
the other hand, respondents Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre are members of the board of
Urdaneta Village Association Inc. (UVAI), which is an association of homeowners at
Urdaneta Village.
UVAI through respondents imposed a penalty upon the petitioner amounting to
P400,000.00 and barred her workers and contractors from entering the village and
working on her property for constructing a house on her lot with "concrete canopy
directly above the main door and highway" which is in violation of the Construction
Rules and Regulations.
Petitioner Eristingcols filed an action against the respondents on the allegations that
petitioner has complied with the National Building Code and UVAIs approved of her
building plans and acceptance of the construction bond and architects fee. Stating
further that the Construction Rules and Regulations is contrary to law and that the
penalty is unwarranted and excessive.
A day after the filing of the complaint, the parties reached a temporary settlement
whereby UVAI through respondents executed an undertaking which allowed
Eristingcols workers, contractors and suppliers to leave and enter the village,
subject only to normal security regulations of UVAI.
Later on, UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. They argued that it is the Home
Insurance Guaranty Corporation which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes
involving homeowners associations.
Opposing the motion, Eristingcol alleged, UVAI are estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC after they voluntarily appeared therein and embraced its
authority by agreeing to sign an Undertaking.
RTC then now rendered a decision denying both motions filed and stating that UVAI
through respondents may not assail its jurisdiction after they voluntarily entered
their appearance, sought reliefs therein, and embraced its authority by agreeing to
sign an undertaking. In so ruling, it applied the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy.
UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre elevated the dispute before CA via a petition for
certiorari alleging that the RTC acted without jurisdiction.
The CA issued a decision reversing the RTC Order and dismissing Eristingcols
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Hence, this appeal.

2.G.R. No. 131282

GABRIELL. DUERO, petitioner,
vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL, respondents.
NATURE: The action of the case is for the recovery of possession or title to the
property.
FACTS: Respondent Eradel entered and occupied the lot of petitioner. Despite
petitioners demands, respondent Eradel refused to vacate the lands. Petitioner
Duero then filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership with damages and attorneys fees against Eradel and two others
respondent namely Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. The Ruenas asked for an
extension of time to file an answer. Meanwhile, the Ruenas and the petitioner came
to a compromise agreement to the effect that the Ruenas recognized and bound
themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Petitioner. Eradel, however,
was not part of the agreement and was declared in default for failure to file his
answer. An ex-parte judgment by the RTC was rendered in favor of the petitioner
Duero.
Respondent Eradel then filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been
occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958 explaining that
he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the belief that as
landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any
adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion.
Respondernt Eradel filed a Motion for Relief of Judgment reiterating the allegations in
his Motion for New Trial which was then again denied. A Motion for Reconsideration
was then filed by Eradel alleging that RTC has no jurisdiction since the value of the
land was only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial
court. The RTC, for the third time, denied the motion.

ISSUE:
Which court has jurisdiction over the case.
WON respondents are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC after
they voluntarily appeared and agreeing to sign an Undertaking.
HELD:
On the first issue, it is well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in determining
which body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider not only the status or
relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question that is the subject of
their controversy. To determine the nature of an action and which court has
jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of the complaint or petition and the
essence of the relief prayed for.
A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint reveals that the
nature of the question subject of this controversy only delves into the validity of

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Execution which was granted by the RTC
while Eradel filed his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that private
respondent is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE

Petitioner appeals stating that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion on the
issue on:
WON THE LOWER COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE CASE
b) WON RESPONDENT ERADEL IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT EVEN AFTER IT SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF.
HELD:
On the first issue, the MTC has jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner annexed
documents and stated that the said the zonal value at the time the complaint was
filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal
court and within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. However, the SC finds
that the annexes are xerox copies and therefore without evidentiary weight or value.

Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenly identified Lot No.
18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent, through its
general manager, informed petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to
buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises. Thus, petitioners continued
with the construction of their house. However, petitioners defaulted in the
payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was
foreclosed by SSS and petitioners certificate of title was cancelled and a new
one was issued in the name of SSS. After Lot No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners
offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from private respondent that
their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed with
respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house was built therein. However,
private respondent refused. This prompted petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996,
an action for reformation of contract and damages with the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City, Branch 36, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17115.

Recalling that Petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent
believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act
7691, amending BP 129 had become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs
not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment.

On January 15, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit and ordering herein petitioners to pay private
respondent the amount of P10,000 as moral damages and another P10,000 as
attorneys fees.

a)

On the second issue, Eradel was not estopped. Defendant is a farmer and as such,
he could not be expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction and related issues. This
farmer, ought not to be penalized when he claims that he made an honest mistake
when he initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before he realized that the
controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but within the jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to
foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case.

On June 22, 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Thus, on
September 17, 1998, petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of
execution, alleging that the court a quo had no jurisdiction to try the case as it
was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to
PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree).
Conformably, petitioners filed a new complaint against private respondent with
the HLURB. Likewise, on June 30, 1999, petitioner-spouses filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment, premised on the ground
that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide Civil Case No. 17115.

For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and
intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

In a decision rendered on December 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied

the petition for annulment of judgment, relying mainly on the jurisprudential
doctrine of estoppel as laid down in the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.

The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action
cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or
even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the
court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The
appellate court reiterated the doctrine that estoppel must be applied only in
exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition by

applying the principle of estoppel, even if the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of
Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to decide Civil Case No. 17115.

Here, we find that petitioner, who claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed his
complaint before a court without appropriate jurisdiction. Any judgment made by a
court without jurisdiction is VOID and without effect.

HELD:At the outset, it should be stressed that petitioners are seeking from us
the annulment of a trial court judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. Because it
is not an appeal, the correctness of the judgment is not in issue here.
Accordingly, there is no need to delve into the propriety of the decision
rendered by the trial court.

3. SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, Second Division, Manila, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, Judge,
RTC, Branch 36, Sixth Judicial Region, Iloilo City, and LUCKY HOMES,
INC., represented by WILSON JESENA, JR..(G.R. No. 144025. December
27, 2002)
Corona, J.:

Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned
the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. We do not agree. In countless
decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an order or decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage,
active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or
decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction.

FACTS: The records disclose that, sometime in 1970, petitioner-spouses

purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc., situated
in Iloilo and containing an area of 240 square meters. Said lot was specifically
denominated as Lot No. 19 under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28254
and was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as security for their
housing loan. Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on

In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of
the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract against
private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court,

petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once
did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire
proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court
rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did
petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction and it was only because said
decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right
to question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.

on February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the
order of suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive
suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC denied the motion
on March 9, 1994. Trial thereafter proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case.
The petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. On July 20, 1994,
he filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v.
Asuncion, et al., he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance
of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. On
October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss. On
July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner
committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function.
On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued an Order reversing
and setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It declared that based on the
petitioners evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It
concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto.
It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in her complaint before the
PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting happened.

Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to
profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private
respondent. This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment but only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.
4. ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA,
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez,
Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz
N. Nueca, respondents.

The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to
allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the
performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably
to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete
records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan.

(G.R. No. 124644. February 5, 2004)

Callejo, Sr. J.:

On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the

Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of
Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It
reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, the RTC
retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner had a salary
grade of 23. Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the
petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule
on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and
render judgment therein after trial.

FACTS: The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a

member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary,
as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16,
1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at
the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City. He
somehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one
Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was filed
with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-3184
charging the petitioner and a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias Jun Bombita
with murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a

grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.

On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the
petitioner from the service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by
P.D. No. 1847. When apprised of the said order, the General Headquarters of the
PNP issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91, preventively suspending the
petitioner from the service until the case was terminated.

HELD:
The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of
this Court when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations
in the Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the
commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the
Information. Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case
continues until the case is terminated.

When arraigned on April 9, 1991, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the petitioner
filed a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that as mandated by
Commonwealth Act No. 408, in relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree No.
1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested
the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975,
his suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he
should now be reinstated.
On September 23, 1993, the PNP Region V
Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting information on whether he
issued an order lifting the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus,

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:

(1 Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

Accordingly, pending resolution on the merits, a Temporary Restraining Order be

issued enjoining Respondents, their officers, agents, successors or representatives
or persons or entities acting on their behalf from negotiating, re-bidding, awarding or
otherwise entering into any concession contract with PIATCO and other third parties
for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III Project.
ISSUE:
WON the petition of AEDC is already barred by res judicata
HELD:
In the case of Agan, it was noted that on 16 April 1997, the AEDC instituted before
the RTC of Pasig City Civil Case No. 66213, a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of
the Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction, against the DOTC Secretary and the
PBAC Chairman and members.
Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 66213, the DOTC issued the notice of award
for the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO on 9 July 1997. The DOTC and PIATCO also
executed on 12 July 1997 the 1997 Concession Agreement.
AEDC then alleges that on September 3, 1998, then Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
convened a meeting with the members of the Board of Petitioner AEDC to convey his
"desire" for the dismissal of the mandamus case filed by Petition AEDC and in fact
urged AEDC to immediately withdraw said case.
Further, it alleges that the President's direct intervention in the disposition of this
mandamus case was a clear imposition that Petitioner AEDC had not choice but to
accept. To do otherwise was to take a confrontational stance against the most
powerful man in the country then under the risk of catching his ire, which could have
led to untold consequences upon the business interests of the stakeholders in AEDC.
Thus, Petitioner AEDC was constrained to agree to the signing of a Joint Motion to
Dismiss and to the filing of the same in court.

(2 Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in

relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment
for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the
said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is
essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the
offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information.
It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was
committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a
conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the
petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between
his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over
the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment
of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed
the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation
of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975
amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to
his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below 27, the
proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police
Senior Inspector, with salary grade 23. He was charged with homicide
punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over
the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

On 30 April 1999, the RTC of Pasig City issued an Order dismissing with prejudice
Civil Case No. 66213 upon the execution by the parties of a Joint Motion to Dismiss.
AEDC, however, invokes the purported pressure exerted upon it by then President
Joseph E. Estrada, the alleged fraud committed by the DOTC, and paragraph 2 in the
afore-quoted Joint Motion to Dismiss to justify the non-application of the doctrine of
res judicata to its present Petition.
The elements of res judicata, in its concept as a bar by former judgment, are as
follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or
order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action. All of the elements are present herein so as to
bar the present Petition.
First, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City, dismissing Civil Case No. 66213, was issued
on 30 April 1999. The Joint Motion to Dismiss, deemed a compromise agreement,
once approved by the court is immediately executory and not appealable.
Second, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing Civil Case No. 66213 pursuant
to the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties constitutes a judgment on the
merits.
The Joint Motion to Dismiss stated that the parties were willing to settle the case
amicably and, consequently, moved for the dismissal thereof. It also contained a
provision in which the parties released and forever discharged each other from any
and all liabilities, whether criminal or civil, arising in connection with the case. It is
undisputable that the parties entered into a compromise agreement. Essentially, it is
a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of
the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute
the contract. Once an agreement is stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more
than a mere contract binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and

The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively
has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive
procedural law which may be applied retroactively.

5. ASIAS EMERGING DRAGON VS DOTC GR 169914

18 April 2008
FACTS:
Banking on this Court's declaration in the case of Agan that the award of the NAIA
IPT III Project to PIATCO is null and void, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC)
filed before this Court the present Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition (with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order), praying of this Court that:
It prayed that judgment be rendered commanding the Respondents, their officers,
agents, successors, representatives or persons or entities acting on their behalf, to
formally award the NAIA-APT [sic] III PROJECT to Petitioner AEDC and to execute and
formalize with Petitioner AEDC the approved Draft Concession Agreement
embodying the agreed terms and conditions for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III
Project and directing Respondents to cease and desist from awarding the NAIA-IPT
Project to third parties or negotiating into any concession contract with third parties.

entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any
other judgment. Article 2037 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that a compromise
has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata.
Because of the compromise agreement among the parties, there was accordingly a
judicial settlement of the controversy, and the Order, dated 30 April 1999, of the RTC
of Pasig City was no less a judgment on the merits which may be annulled only upon
the ground of extrinsic fraud. Thus, the RTC of Pasig City, in the same Order,
correctly granted the dismissal of Civil Case No. 66213 with prejudice.
Third, there is no question as to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City over the
subject matter and parties in Civil Case No. 66213. The RTC can exercise original
jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.51 To recall, the Petition of
AEDC before the RTC of Pasig City was for the declaration of nullity of proceedings,
mandamus and injunction. The RTC of Pasig City likewise had jurisdiction over the
parties, with the voluntary submission by AEDC and proper service of summons on
the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and members.
Lastly, there is, between Civil Case No. 66213 before the RTC of Pasig City and the
Petition now pending before this Court, an identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of causes of action.
There is an identity of parties. In both petitions, the AEDC is the petitioner. The
respondents in Civil Case No. 66213 are the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman
and members. The respondents in the instant Petition are the DOTC, the DOTC
Secretary, and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). While it may be
conceded that MIAA was not a respondent and did not participate in Civil Case No.

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE - CIVIL LAW

6. AGAN, JR. v. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.
(PIATCO) G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 & 155661, 05 May 2003, En Banc
(Puno, J.)
FACTS:
Considering that at the pre-qualification stage, the maximum amounts which the
Paircargo Consortium may invest in the project fell short of the minimum amounts
prescribed by the PBAC, Paircargo Consortium was not a qualified bidder. Thus the
award of the contract to the Paircargo Consortium is null and void. While a winning
bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions of the
contract bidded upon, such changes must not constitute substantial or material
amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would
constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms.
On October 5, 1994, Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited
proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer
arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law). Acting on the
proposal, the DOTC constituted the Pre-qualification Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC) for the project and submitted with its endorsement the proposal to the
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), which approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily
newspapers of an invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDCs
unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air Cargo and
Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and
Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted
their competitive proposal to the PBAC. On the following day, September 24, 1996,
the PBAC pre-qualified the Paircargo Consortium. Two days later, AEDC informed the
PBAC in writing of its reservations as regards the Paircargo Consortium, which
includes, inter alia: the lack of financial capability of PAIRCARGO and the prohibition
imposed by RA 337, the General Banking Act, on the amount that Security Bank
could legally invest in the project.
On October 16, 1996, the PBAC opened the envelope submitted by AEDC and the
Paircargo Consortium containing their respective financial proposals. Both
proponents offered to build the NAIA Passenger Terminal III for at least $350 million
at no cost to the government. In addition, AEDC offered to pay the government a
total of P135 million as guaranteed payment for 27 years while Paircargo Consortium
offered to pay the government a total of P17.75 billion for the same period.
Thus, the PBAC formally informed AEDC that it had accepted the price proposal
submitted by the Paircargo Consortium, and gave AEDC 30 working days within
which to match the said bid, otherwise, the project would be awarded to Paircargo.
As AEDC failed to match the proposal, then DOTC Secretary Lagdameo, issued a
notice to Paircargo Consortium regarding AEDCs failure to
match the proposal.
On February 27, 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine
International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and
reiterated its objections as regards the pre-qualification of PIATCO. AEDC then filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the
Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction against the Secretary of the DOTC, the
Chairman of the PBAC, the voting members of the PBAC and Pantaleon D. Alvarez, in
his capacity as Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee.
On July 9, 1997, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the project to PIATCO.

66213, it may be considered a successor-in-interest of the PBAC. When Civil Case

No. 66213 was initiated, PBAC was then in charge of the NAIA IPT III Project, and had
the authority to evaluate the bids and award the project to the one offering the
lowest or most advantageous bid. Since the bidding is already over, and the
structures comprising NAIA IPT III are now built, then MIAA has taken charge thereof.
Furthermore, it is clear that it has been the intention of the AEDC to name as
respondents in their two Petitions the government agency/ies and official/s who, at
the moment each Petition was filed, had authority over the NAIA IPT III Project.
There is an identity of subject matter because the two Petitions involve none other
than the award and implementation of the NAIA IPT III Project.
There is an identity of cause of action because, in both Petitions, AEDC is asserting
the violation of its right to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project as the original
proponent in the absence of any other qualified bidders. As early as in Civil Case No.
66213, AEDC already sought a declaration by the court of the absence of any other
qualified proponent submitting a competitive bid for the NAIA IPT III Project, which,
ultimately, would result in the award of the said project to it.
AEDC attempts to evade the effects of its compromise agreement by alleging that it
was compelled to enter into such an agreement when former President Joseph E.
Estrada asserted his influence and intervened in Civil Case No. 66213. This
allegation deserves scant consideration. Without any proof that such events did take
place, such statements remain mere allegations that cannot be given weight. One
who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid consent to a contract must establish the
same by full, clear and convincing evidence, not merely by preponderance
thereof.52 And, even assuming arguendo, that the consent of AEDC to the
compromise agreement was indeed vitiated, then President Estrada was removed
from office in January 2001. AEDC filed the present Petition only on 20 October 2005.
The four-year prescriptive period, within which an action to annul a voidable contract
may be brought, had already expired.53
For the foregoing substantive and procedural reasons, the instant Petition of AEDC
should be dismissed.

On July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Enrile, and PIATCO,
through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the Concession Agreement for the BuildOperate-and- Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement).
On November 26, 1998, the Government and PIATCO signed an Amended and
Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA). Subsequently, the Government and PIATCO
also signed three Supplements to the ARCA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WhetherornotPIATCOwasaqualifiedbidder.
2. Whether or not the 1997 concession agreement is valid.
3. Whether or not a direct government guarantee is contrary to the law.
4.
WhetherornotPIATCOcanobligatethegovernmenttopayforthecostofthereasonable
use of the terminal in the exercise of its power to temporarily takeover a business
affected with public interest.
5. Whether or not the exclusive right to operate the terminal granted to piatco is
subject to the regulation and supervision by the government.
HELD:
Under the BOT Law, the contract shall be awarded to the bidder who, having
satisfied the minimum financial, technical, organizational and legal standards
required by the law, has submitted the lowest bid and most favorable terms of the
project. Paircargo consortium or any challenger to the unsolicited proposal of AEDC
has to show that it possesses the requisite financial capability to undertake the
project in the minimum amount of 30% of the project cost. PAGS Audited Financial
Statements as of 1995 indicate that it has approximately P26,735,700.00 to invest
as its equity for the
project. Security Banks Audited Financial Statements as of 1995 show that it has a
net worth equivalent to its capital funds in the amount of P3,523,504,377.00. The
Court agrees with public respondents that with respect to Security Bank, the entire
amount of its net worth could not be invested in a single undertaking in view of the
provisions of the General Banking Act. Thus, the maximum amount that Security
Bank could validly invest in the Paircargo Consortium is only P528,525,656.55,
representing 15% of its entire net worth. The total net worth therefore of the
Paircargo Consortium, after considering the maximum amounts that may be validly
invested by each of its members is P558,384,871.55 or only 6.08% of the project
cost, an amount substantially less than the prescribed minimum equity investment
required for the project in the amount of P2,755,095,000.00 or 30% of the project
cost. Considering that at the pre-qualification stage, the maximum amounts which
the Paircargo Consortium may invest in the project fell short of the minimum
amounts prescribed by the PBAC, we hold that Paircargo Consortium (later
incorporated to PIATCO) was not a qualified bidder. Thus the award of the contract to
the Paircargo Consortium is null and void.
An essential element of a publicly bidded contract is that all bidders must be on
equal footing. Not simply in terms of application of the procedural rules and
regulations imposed by the relevant government agency, but more importantly, on
the contract bidded upon. While a winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or
amending certain provisions of the contract bidded upon, such changes must not
constitute substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic
parameters of the contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the
opportunity to bid on the same terms. A close comparison of the draft Concession
Agreement attached to the Bid Documents and the 1997 Concession Agreement
reveals that the documents differ in at least two material respects: a.) Modification
on the Public Utility Revenues and Non-Public Utility Revenues that may be collected
by PIATCO and b.) Assumption by the Government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the
event of the latters default thereof. The changes under the 1997 Concession
Agreement with respect to reduction in the types of fees that are subject to MIAA

regulation and the relaxation of such regulation with respect to other fees clearly
gives PIATCO more favorable terms than what was available to other bidders at the
time the contract was bidded out. Also, the assumption by the government of the
liabilities of PIATCO in the event of latters default grants PIATCO a financial
advantage or benefit which was not previously made available during the bidding
process. The fact that substantial amendments were made on the 1997 Concession
Agreement renders the same null and void for being contrary to public policy. These
amendments convert the 1997 Concession Agreement to an entirely different
agreement from the contract bidded out or the draft Concession Agreement.
The provisions of the 1997 Concession Agreement constitute a direct government
guarantee which is prohibited by law. The fact that the ARCA superseded the 1997
Concession Agreement did not cure this fatal defect. It is clear that the ARCA
provides for a direct guarantee by the government to pay PIATCOs loans not only to
its Senior Lenders but all other entities who provided PIATCO funds or services upon
PIATCOs default in its loan obligation with its Senior Lenders. The proscription
against government guarantee in any form is one of the policy considerations behind
the BOT Law. To declare the PIATCO contracts valid despite the clear statutory
prohibition against a direct government guarantee would not only make a mockery
of what the BOT Law seeks to prevent -- which is to expose the government to the
risk of incurring a monetary obligation resulting from a contract of loan between the
project proponent and its lenders and to which the Government is not a party to -but would also render the BOT Law useless for what it seeks to achieve - to make
use of the resources of the private sector in the financing, operation and
maintenance of infrastructure and development projects which are necessary for
national growth and development but which the government, unfortunately, could
ill-afford to finance at this point in time.
PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation (Article V, Section 5.10 (c) of the
1997 Concession Agreement), contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary
government takeover and obligate the government to pay reasonable cost for the
use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex. Article XII, section 17 of the 1987
Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the times necessitate
the government to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest. It is the welfare and
interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in determining whether
or not to temporarily take over a particular business. Clearly, the State in effecting
the temporary takeover is exercising its police power. Thus, requiring the
government to pay reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the property
pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.
PIATCO, under the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA, is granted the
exclusive right to operate a commercial international passenger terminal within the
Island of Luzon at the NAIA IPT III. In entering into a BuildOperate-and-Transfer
contract for the construction, operation and maintenance of NAIA IPT III, the
government has determined that public interest would be served better if private
sector resources were used in its construction and an exclusive right to operate be
granted to the private entity undertaking the said project, in this case PIATCO.
Nonetheless, the privilege given to PIATCO is subject to reasonable regulation and
supervision by the Government through the MIAA, which is the government agency
authorized to operate the NAIA complex, as well as DOTC, the department to which
MIAA is attached. This is in accord with the Constitutional mandate (Article XII,
Section 19 of the 1987 Constitution) that a monopoly which is not prohibited must
be regulated. The right granted to the public utility may be exclusive but the
exercise of the right cannot run riot. Thus, while PIATCO may be authorized to
exclusively operate NAIA IPT III as an international passenger terminal, the
Government, through the MIAA, has the right and the duty to ensure that it is done
in accord with public interest. PIATCOs right to operate NAIA IPT III cannot also
violate the rights of third parties.

instant petition. While Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, grants original
jurisdiction over cases of this nature to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the exigency
of the present petition, however, calls for the relaxation of this rule. Section 496
(should be Section 491) of the Local Government Code of 1991 primarily intended
that the Liga ng mga Barangay determine the representation of the Liga in the
sanggunians for the immediate ventilation, articulation, and crystallization of issues
affecting barangay government administration. Thus, the immediate resolution of
this petition is a must.

***di na kailangan basahin ang naka italic, for additional infos only
7. THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, petitioner, vs. THE CITY MAYOR
OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA,
respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National (Liga for brevity) is the national
organization of all the barangays in the Philippines, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code of 1991, constitutes the duly elected presidents of highlyurbanized cities, provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and
metropolitan political subdivision chapters.

The respondents defend the validity of the assailed ordinance and executive order
and pray for the dismissal of the present petition on the following grounds: (1)
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is unavailing; (2) the petition should
not be entertained by this Court in view of the pendency before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila of two actions or petitions questioning the subject ordinance and
executive order; (3) the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; and (4) the act sought
to be enjoined is fait accompli.

On 16 March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws
to govern its internal organization. Section 1, third paragraph, Article XI of said
Constitution and By-Laws states:
All other election matters not covered in this Article shall be governed by the "Liga
Election Code" or such other rules as may be promulgated by the National Liga
Executive Board in conformity with the provisions of existing laws.

The respondents also asseverate that the petitioner cannot claim that it has no
other recourse in addressing its grievance other than this petition for certiorari. As a
matter of fact, there are two cases pending before Branches 33 and 51 of the RTC of
Manila (one is for mandamus; the other, for declaratory relief) and three in the Court
of Appeals (one is for prohibition; the two other cases, for quo warranto), which are
all akin to the present petition in the sense that the relief being sought therein is the
declaration of the invalidity of the subject ordinance. Clearly, the petitioner may ask
the RTC or the Court of Appeals the relief being prayed for before this Court.
Moreover, the petitioner failed to prove discernible compelling reasons attending the
present petition that would warrant cognizance of the present petition by this Court.

By virtue of the above-cited provision, the Liga adopted and ratified its own
Election Code.
Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002,
providing, among other things, for the election of representatives of the District
Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters
thirty days after the barangay elections.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioners disregarded the hierarchy of courts by filing the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Honorable Supreme Court.
HELD:
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this petition for
certiorari.

In July 2002, upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to the
Office of the City Mayor, the Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter
requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon,
or even assumed, the functions of the Liga through legislation, a function which was
clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Respondent Mayor, however, signed and approved the assailed city ordinance to
implement the ordinance.

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

In support of its petition, the Liga argues that City Ordinance No. 8039, and
Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002, contradict the Liga Election Code and are
therefore invalid. The subject ordinance is an ultra vires act of the respondents and,
as such, should be declared null and void.
In September 2002, Barangay Chairman Arnel Pea, in his capacity as a member of
the Liga ng mga Barangay in the City Chapter of Manila, filed a Complaint in
Intervention with Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction.

Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur:
(1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.

The assailed ordinance prescribing for an "indirect manner of election" amended, in

effect, the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides for the
election of the Liga officers at large. It also violated and curtailed the rights of the
petitioner and intervenor, as well as the other 896 Barangay Chairmen in the City of
Manila, to vote and be voted upon in a direct election.

Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in

essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality
of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a

The issue of non-observance by the petitioners of the hierarchy-of-courts

rule, the OSG posits that technical rules of procedure should be relaxed in the

petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved.

that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

Third, even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary
writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special
and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been
adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should
be allowed.

FACTS: Petitioner was a senior student of UP-Cebu as a government scholar. She

was appointed by then Pres. Estrada on Dec. 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to
serve a 1 yr. term starting Jan. 1, 2000 and ending on Dec. 31, 2000.

In the instant petition, and as admitted by the respondents, the parties in this case
and in the alleged other pending cases are different individuals or entities; thus,
forum-shopping cannot be said to exist. Moreover, even assuming that those five
petitions are indeed pending before the RTC of Manila and the Court of Appeals, we
can only guess the causes of action and issues raised before those courts,
considering that the respondents failed to furnish this Court with copies of the said
petitions.
8. HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with Pres. Estrada the renovation of
Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. On Sept. 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and
relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSRFI).

We have held that this Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as
well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is
not exclusive, but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals in certain cases.

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. Pres.
Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of
the President.

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties

seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an]
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student
regent consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property
with the Office of the Ombudsman.
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to
indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed in the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan
does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her
capacity as UP student regent.

The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts

in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt
for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court;
and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in
the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred
to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.

Petitioner claimed that R.A. No. 3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa. It only
has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes
Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the RPC. Estafa falling under Title X,
Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia
to exist, the following requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as are representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;
and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such

She also argued that it was Pres. Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even
assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada,
not from the coffers of the government.
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her
person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely
represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an

ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive
any salary as a student regent.

ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by law for the support of the
university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the
government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary
to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3)xxxxxx

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or
funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it
was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to
receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official
functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case
of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its
board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The
board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the BOR of UP is performing functions similar to those
of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion
that being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the
category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive
jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified as
Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.

The Ombudsman opposed the motion. It disputed petitioners interpretation of the

law. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to
office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner.
In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a
matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner was a public officer. As a member of the
BOR, she had the general powers of administration and exercised the corporate
powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public office, petitioners stance
that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous.
Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation
has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was
compensated.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the P15 Million was
received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government,
is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on the
merits of this case.
On Nov. 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied with finality in a Resolution dated Feb. 4, 2004.

In a Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. It

ratiocinated:
xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxx-As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides
that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by
public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is
no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed
by a public official in relation to his office.

ISSUE: W/n the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in not quashing the information and dismising the
case notwithstanding that is has no jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
information.
The petitioners argument: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b)
petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees;
(c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office.

Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the

student body, she was never a public officer since she never received any
compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of
the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

HELD:
A.
We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. We note that petitioner refers to Section 4
of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to
quash before the Sandiganbayan. She repeats the reference in the instant petition
for certiorari and in her memorandum of authorities.
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606(Creation of the Sandiganbayan), as
amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019(Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as
amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative
history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan
was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then Pres. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It
was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public
officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original
exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in
subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial
consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities
and functions.

As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of UP reveals that the BOR, to which
accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration
and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the
definition of a public officer. The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public
officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes
and jurisprudence.
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact,
a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the
salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
In Geduspan v. People, we held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only
officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but
who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by
express provision of law.

(a)xxxxx;
(b) xxxxx;
(c) xxxxxx;
(d) xxxxxx;
(e) xxxxxxx;
(f) xxxxx;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or

controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.
(2) xxxx;
(3) xxxxxxxx;
(4)xxxxxxxxxxx; and
(5) xxxxxxxx.

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out,
the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

B. xxxxxxxx
C. xxxxxxxx.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960.
The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Pursuant to Section
10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with
the Sandiganbayan.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of

public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.
C.
Petitioner argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan
would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in
relation to her office.

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited
by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individuals.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of
the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her
to contract with then Pres. Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the
governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private
capacity and not in relation to public office.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft
and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among
those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this
argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606,
without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.

More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by
defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.
Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of
defendant or respondent.
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner,
being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of
her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government x x x."

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by

public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the
twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office.

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan
when it did not quash the information based on this ground.
9. G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011

B.

10

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175482
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

OF

THE

For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of Eastern
Samar and the sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was
arrested while they were attending a wedding in Sulat, Eastern Samar, on
September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White, she sought the alternative custody of
Gov. Ambil, Jr. after Provincial Warden and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to
guarantee the mayors safety.

FACTS: Two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari were filed by petitioner
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr. assailing the Decision
promulgated on September 16, 2005 and Resolution dated November 8, 2006 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892.

Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar.
He confirmed his arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a murder case filed
against him in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim
confirmed Atty. Whites account. Adalim admitted staying at Ambil, Jr.s residence for
almost three months before he posted bail after the charge against him was
downgraded to homicide.

The present controversy arose from a letter of Atty. David B. Loste, President of
the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the
Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of
then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder,
from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then
Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report dated January 4, 1999, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal charges against
petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. On
September 22, 1999, the new President of the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed
the Ombudsman that the IBP is no longer interested in pursuing the case against
petitioners.
Thus, he recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
petitioners.

Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern
Samar. He recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at
home to assist in the arrest of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting
the legality of Mayor Adalims arrest and arguing with the jail guards against booking
him for detention. At the provincial jail, petitioner was confronted by Atty. White
who informed him that he was under the governor, in the latters capacity as a
provincial jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he submitted to the
governors order to relinquish custody of Adalim. Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr.
described the physical condition of the jail to be dilapidated and undermanned.

Nonetheless, in an Information dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr.

and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of
the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum dated August 4, 2000, recommending the
dismissal of the complaint as regards Balano and the amendment of the Information
to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 156 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused.

On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the

assailed Decision finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The court ruled that in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have
conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable
quarters with access to television and other privileges that other detainees do not
enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by legal process
shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is
admitted to bail.

On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.

At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason,
however, that Adalims transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon
his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According
to petitioners, Adalims sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous
prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.

The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners defense that Adalims transfer was
made to ensure his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally
verify any actual threat on Adalims life but relied simply on the advice of Adalims
lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and
nipa huts within the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of the jail which could have been
used to separate Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.s
failure to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of
the Department of Interior and Local Government.

Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and rested its
case after the admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence with Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of
Denial but the same was denied.

Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an

indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr.,
the court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of obedience to a
superior order and sentenced him to imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1)
month to nine (9) years and eight (8) months. Hence, the present petitions.

At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana
A. Adalim-White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998
to 2001. According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalims lawyers that he
directed the transfer of Adalims detention to his home. He cites poor security in the
provincial jail as the primary reason for taking personal custody of Adalim
considering that the latter would be in the company of inmates who were put away
by his sister and guards identified with his political opponents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of
the 2 accused has a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.
HELD: There is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging official
functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of

11

the Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law
is provided under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
8249. The pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as
follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department
heads[;]
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding
to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

2nd Petition- for certiorari, seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005
Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss and/or quash Civil Case No. 0196, another forfeiture
case involving the same parties but for different properties.
FACTS:
1.To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of
PhP 143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner
Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had
allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 1379,3 filed with the
Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those
properties.
This petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually raffled to the Fourth
Division of the anti-graft court.
2.Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture
case, docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds and properties
amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be raffled
also to the Fourth Division of the SB. (Civil Case No. 0193 shall hereinafter be also
referred to as Forfeiture I and Civil Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II).
3.Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the
OMB charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under
an Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the value of the property and funds
plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, the
Information was raffled off to the Second Division of the SB. The plunder charge, as
the parties pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties
identified in both forfeiture cases.
4.After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the
case:
(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his
place of detention. Per the Sheriffs Return4 dated November 2, 2005, the summons
were duly served on respondent Garcias. Earlier, or on October 29, 2004, the SB
issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic, an issuance which Gen. Garcia
challenged before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165835.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SBs
lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB countered with
a motion to expunge and to declare the Garcias in default. To the OMBs motion, the
Garcias interposed an opposition in which they manifested that they have
meanwhile repaired to the Court on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 165835 to nullify
the writ of attachment SB issued in which case the SB should defer action on the
forfeiture case as a matter of judicial courtesy.
5. (2) By Resolution of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss;
declared the same motion as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the
period to answer. The same resolution declared the Garcias in default.
Another resolution denied the Garcias motion for reconsideration and/or to admit
answer, and set a date for the ex-parte presentation of the Republics evidence.
A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005, pursuant
to the prohibited pleading rule.
6. (3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and
consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively pending
in different divisions of the SB, contending that such consolidation is mandatory
under RA 8249.7

Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond
question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a
Certification from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO shows
that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless,
it is only when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade 27 or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here,
petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over
whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly
tried jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original
jurisdiction over them the Sandiganbayan.

10. CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner

versus
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
THIRD DIVISION, VELASCO JR.
CASE: These two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by
petitioner Clarita D. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief.
1ST Petition- mandamus and/or certiorari, petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside
the August 5, 2005 Order,1 as reiterated in another Order dated August 26, 2005,
both issued by the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, which effectively denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a suit for
forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the Philippines against the petitioner and
her immediate family.

12

On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the
forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the criminal case of plunder.
7. (4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash
Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case
ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the
consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements.
ISSUES:
A.Whether or not SB 4th Division has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Forfeitures I and II.
B. Whether or not the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner and her three sons for that matter.
C. Whether or not special appearance to question a courts jurisdiction is not
voluntary appearance.
HELD:
Partly meritorious.
A. Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb the Forfeiture Cases in Civil
Case Nos. 0193 and 0196

made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention
Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being
irregular and defective.
2. it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made on
petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not
comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted
service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied
with as the substituted service was made not at petitioners house or residence but
in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is
of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was
made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the
party voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative
relief.25 In the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from
questioning improper service of summons since the improvident service of summons
in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children)
voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various
pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture hearings.
We cannot subscribe to the Republics views.
C. Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary
Appearance.
1. The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of
other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
2. Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not
deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary
appearancethe first sentence of the above-quoted rulemeans is that the
voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which
case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person
due to improper service of summons.
3. The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however,
do not show that she voluntarily appeared without qualification
4. the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special appearance with
the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her
three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through
improvident substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II.
5. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and
defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in
the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear
before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.
6. Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals26 applies to the
instant case. Said case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special
appearance before the courtchallenging its jurisdiction over the person through a
motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other groundsis not tantamount to
estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person;
and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
7. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared
before the SB to cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are,
therefore, not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their

1. Petitioners contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in

some of her pleadings, let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over
actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in
nature.
2. Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the jurisdiction
over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate
family and business associates, authorizes under its Sec. 317 the filing of forfeiture
suits under RA 1379 which will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings.
The Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, interpreted this provision as empowering
the Presidential Commission on Good Government to file independent civil actions
separate from the criminal actions.
3. Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder
case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is
flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the
forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution, the
civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal
offense.
B. Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over the Persons of Petitioner and Her
Children
1. Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for
the requirements of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service
may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be
bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode
authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires
jurisdiction over a person.22
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served
personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention
Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also
undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were

13

persons nor are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction.
Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of summons made, the SB
did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children.
8. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner
and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus,
the order declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as
petitioner and her three children are concerned. For the forfeiture case to proceed
against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias
summons on the petitioner and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction
over their persons.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner
Clarita D. Garcia and her three children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and
0196 before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner
and her three children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.

Civil Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in his docket and
decide it as a separate case.

11. PLATINUM TOURS AND TRAVEL, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. JOSE M.

PANLILIO, respondent.
FACTS:
1. Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum of money
with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president Nelida
G. Galvez to collect payment for the airline tickets which PATC bought from it. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1634.

HELD:
1. No, jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred by
law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the time he files
his complaint; while jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by his
voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive
power of legal processes exerted over his person.

2. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, rendered a judgment[3] by default
in favor of Platinum and ordered PATC and Nelida G. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum
actual damages

2. Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does not
depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the
correctness of its decisions.

3. Writ of execution was issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila
Polo Club Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Nelida G.
Galvez was levied upon and sold for P479,888.48 to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo.

3. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case docketed as
Civil Case No. 96-365 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62.
The fact that the Court of Appeals subsequently annulled Judge Dioknos order
granting the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634, did
not affect the jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order.

9. Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, praying that Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled
to another RTC Branch of Makati. However, the motion was denied by the CA.
10. Platinum insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62, has no jurisdiction to try Civil
Case No. 96-365. It argues that, when Judge Dioknos order allowing the
consolidation of the two cases was annulled and set aside, RTC Branch 62s basis for
acquiring jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 96-365 was likewise extinguished.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court's jurisdiction over the civil case 96-365 was
extinguished.

4. Jose M. Panlilio filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634. Panlilio
claimed that, in October 1992, Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage
over her shares of stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan and
that Galvez had already delivered to him the stock certificates valued at P5 million.

4. Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision
rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the person and
the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all questions arising from
the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit
in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect
its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over
the case.

5. The court denied his motion.

6. Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of
preliminary attachment of the disputed Manila Polo Club shares, docketed as Civil
Case No. 96-365. The case was raffled to Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. In the meantime, Panlilio again attempted to intervene in Civil Case No.
94-1634, this time by incorporating in his complaint a motion to consolidate Civil
Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634.

5. We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it left to Judge
Diokno of Branch 62 the discretion on whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to
Branch 146 or to decide the same as a separate case in his own sala.

7. Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the motion for consolidation on
condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62, who was trying Civil Case No. 941634, would not object thereto. Judge Diokno later issued an order allowing the
consolidation of the two cases and setting for hearing Panlilios application for a writ
of preliminary attachment.

12.MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
EDDY NG KOK WEI, respondent.

8. Platinum, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the order of
Judge Diokno but its motion was denied. On its petition before the CA, the latter
annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to return

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated March
26, 1999 and Resolution[2] dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

14

CV No. 40504, entitled Eddy Ng Kok Wei vs. Manila Bankers Life Insurance
Corporation.
FACTS:
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
Eddy Ng Kok Wei, respondent, is a Singaporean businessman who ventured into
investing in the Philippines. On November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent
addressed to Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation, petitioner, expressed his
intention to purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces.
Subsequently or on December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee
of P50,000.00 for the purchase of a 46-square meter condominium unit (Unit 703)
valued at P860,922.00. On January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the purchase
price in the sum of P729,830.00.
Consequently, petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio G. Puyat, executed a
Contract to Sell in favor of the respondent. The contract expressly states that the
subject condominium unit shall substantially be completed and delivered to the
respondent within fifteen (15) months from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990,
and that (S)hould there be no substantial completion and fail(ure) to deliver the
unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by respondent)
shall be charged against (petitioner).
Considering that the stipulated 15-month period was at hand, respondent returned
to the Philippines sometime in April, 1990.
On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his
condominium unit was still unlivable. Exasperated, he was constrained to send
petitioner a letter dated November 21, 1990 demanding payment for the damages
he sustained. But petitioner ignored such demand, prompting respondent to file
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150, Makati City, a complaint against the
former for specific performance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-3440.
On December 18, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision[3] finding the petitioner
liable for payment of damages due to the delay in the performance of its obligation
to the respondent. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant, ordering Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation to pay plaintiff Eddy
Ng Kok Wei the following:
1.
One percent (1%) of the total amount plaintiff paid defendant;
2.
P100,000.00 as moral damages;
3.
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4.
P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and
Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 26, 1999, affirmed in
toto the trial courts award of damages in favor of the respondent.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the
Appellate Court in a Resolution dated August 5, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the instant case. On petitioners contention that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the instant case, Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree
No. 1344, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB)][4]shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
xxx
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

x x x.
Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the
instant case. We have consistently held that complaints for specific performance
with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.[5]
While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case,
petitioners active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such
lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in
the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.[6]
Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and
the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial courts
jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer
question the trial courts jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 26, 1999
and Resolution dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED
IN TOTO.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
13. G.R. No. 155206 October 28, 2003
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO M. SANTIAGO, substituted by his widow ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ
VDA. DE SANTIAGO, respondent.
FACTS
Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various loans from
defendant GSIS for (the) period September, 1956 to October, 1957 in the total
amount of P3,117,000.00 secured by real estate mortgages over parcels of land. The
Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to defendant GSIS and the latter foreclosed the
real estate mortgages dated September 25, 1956, March 6, 1957, April 4, 1957 and
October 15, 1957.
On August 14, 1974, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction by
defendant GSIS submitting a bid price of P5,229,927.84. Not all lots covered by the
mortgaged titles, however, were sold. Ninety-one (91) lots were expressly excluded
from the auction since the lots were sufficient to pay for all the mortgage debts.
On November 25, 1975, an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership was executed by
defendant GSIS over Zuluetas lots, including the lots, which as earlier stated, were
already excluded from the foreclosure.
On March 6, 1980, defendant GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown
Development Corporation which sale was disapproved by the Office of the President
of the Philippines. The sold properties were returned to defendant GSIS.
After defendant GSIS had re-acquired the properties sold to Yorkstown Development
Corporation, it began disposing the foreclosed lots including the excluded ones.
On April 7, 1990, representative Eduardo Santiago and then plaintiff Antonio Vic
Zulueta executed an agreement whereby Zulueta transferred all his rights and
interests over the excluded lots. Plaintiff Eduardo Santiagos lawyer, Atty. Wenceslao
B. Trinidad, wrote a demand letter dated May 11, 1989 to defendant GSIS asking for
the return of the eighty-one (81) excluded lots.
Subsequently, the petitioner, as defendant therein, filed its answer alleging inter alia
that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and/or laches and that the
complaint stated no cause of action. Subsequently, Zulueta was substituted by
Santiago as the plaintiff in the complaint a quo. Upon the death of Santiago on
March 6, 1996, he was substituted by his widow, Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago,
as the plaintiff.

15

The RTC rendered judgment against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey to the
respondent, Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago, in substitution of her deceased
husband Eduardo, the seventy-eight lots excluded from the foreclosure
sale.1awphi1.nt The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
The petitioner elevated the case to the CA which rendered the assailed decision
affirming that of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Decision of December 17, 1997 of Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City is hereby AFFIRMED
The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid decision but the same
was denied in the assailed CA Resolution of September 5, 2002. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner maintains that it did not act in bad faith when it erroneously included
in its certificate of sale, and subsequently consolidated the titles in its name over the
seventy-eight lots ("subject lots") that were excluded from the foreclosure sale.
There was no proof of bad faith nor could fraud or malice be attributed to the
petitioner when it erroneously caused the issuance of certificates of title over the
subject lots despite the fact that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure
sale.
The petitioner asserts that the action for reconveyance instituted by the respondent
had already prescribed after the lapse of ten years from November 25, 1975 when
the petitioner consolidated its ownership over the subject lots. According to the
petitioner, an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent
registration of the property. In this case, when the action was instituted on May 7,
1990, more than fourteen years had already lapsed. Thus, the petitioner contends
that the same was already barred by prescription as well as laches.
ISSUE
W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT A)
PETITIONER WAS GUILTY OF BAD FAITH WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, THERE WAS
NO SUFFICIENT GROUND TO SUPPORT SUCH CONCLUSION; AND B) THERE WAS NO
PRESCRIPTION IN THIS CASE
HELD
A)The petitioners arguments fail to persuade.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is limited to
reviewing only errors of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. Case law has it that the
findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the CA are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. Although there are exceptions to the said rule, we find
no reason to deviate therefrom.6 By assailing the findings of facts of the trial court
as affirmed by the CA, that it acted in bad faith, the petitioner thereby raised
questions of facts in its petition.
Nonetheless, even if we indulged the petition and delved into the factual issues, we
find the petition barren of merit.
That the petitioner acted in bad faith in consolidating ownership and causing the
issuance of titles in its name over the subject lots, notwithstanding that these were
expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale was the uniform ruling of the trial court
and appellate court. As declared by the CA:
The acts of defendant-appellant GSIS in concealing from the Zuluetas [the
respondents predecessors-in-interest] the existence of these lots, in failing to notify
or apprise the spouses Zulueta about the excluded lots from the time it consolidated
its titles on their foreclosed properties in 1975, in failing to inform them when it
entered into a contract of sale of the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown
Development Corporation in 1980 as well as when the said sale was revoked by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos during the same year demonstrated a clear effort on
its part to defraud the spouses Zulueta and appropriate for itself the subject
properties. Even if titles over the lots had been issued in the name of the defendant-

appellant, still it could not legally claim ownership and absolute dominion over them
because indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system does not attach to titles
secured by fraud or misrepresentation. The fraud committed by defendant-appellant
in the form of concealment of the existence of said lots and failure to return the
same to the real owners after their exclusion from the foreclosure sale made
defendant-appellant holders in bad faith. It is well-settled that a holder in bad faith
of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot
be used as a shield for fraud.
B)The petitioners defense of prescription is untenable. As held by the CA, the
general rule that the discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place upon the
registration of real property because it is "considered a constructive notice to all
persons" does not apply in this case. The CA correctly cited the cases of Adille v.
Court of Appeals14 and Samonte v. Court of Appeals,15 where this Court reckoned
the prescriptive period for the filing of the action for reconveyance based on implied
trust from the actual discovery of fraud. . In this case, as established by the CA, the
respondent actually discovered the fraudulent act of the petitioner only in 1989:
... [T]he prescriptive period of the action is to be reckoned from the time plaintiffappellee (then Eduardo M. Santiago) had actually discovered the fraudulent act of
defendant-appellant which was, as borne out by the records, only in 1989. Plaintiffappellee Eduardo M. Santiago categorically testified (TSN of July 11, 1995, pp. 1415) that he came to know that there were 91 excluded lots in Antonio Village which
were foreclosed by the GSIS and included in its consolidation of ownership in 1975
when, in 1989, he and Antonio Vic Zulueta discussed it and he was given by Zulueta
a special power of attorney to represent him to recover the subject properties from
GSIS. The complaint for reconveyance was filed barely a year from the discovery of
the fraud.
Following the Courts pronouncements in Adille and Samonte, the institution of the
action for reconveyance in the court a quo in 1990 was thus well within the
prescriptive period. Having acted in bad faith in securing titles over the subject lots,
the petitioner is a holder in bad faith of certificates of title over the subject lots. The
petitioner is not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a
shield for frauds.18
Contrary to its claim, the petitioner unarguably had the legal duty to return the
subject lots to the Zuluetas. The petitioners attempts to justify its omission by
insisting that it had no such duty under the mortgage contract is obviously clutching
at straw. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "every person who,
through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.1a\^/phi1.net The assailed
Decision dated February 22, 2002 and Resolution dated September 5, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62309 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the
petitioner.

14. KATON V. PALANCA 437 SCRA

FACTS:
Petitioner caused the inspection investigation and survey of lands located in
Sombrero Island in Palawan for the purpose of its re-classification from forest to
agricultural land and, thereafter for him to apply for a homestead patent. In 1965,
the Director of Lands favourably declared the land as agricultural land.
"Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a
homestead patent application for a portion of the island comprising 8.5 hectares.

16

Records also reveal that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application
on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No.
145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 19775 with an area of 6.84 hectares of
Sombrero Island.
In 1999, Petitioner filed an action seeking to nullify the homestead patents and
original certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents covering certain
portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in
his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application
for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its
conversion from forest land to agricultural land.
Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend
his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the
deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in
its Order dated July 29, 1999. A MR was filed but was denied , for being a third and
prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was
his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. The CA
dismissed the complaint because of prescription invoking its residual prerogative.
Hence, this petition.

approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending

appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been
based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of
dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties,
pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual
prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action
motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 114 of the same rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the
Complaint motu proprio "on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower
courts lack of jurisdiction"15 and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the
action.

ISSUE:
Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an
issue not raised in the Petition?

FACTS:
Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the Municipality
of Magalang, Province of Pampanga. Cunanan was proclaimed the winning
candidate, garnering a total of 12,592 votes as against Pecson's 12,531, or a margin
of 61 votes. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang.
Soon thereafter, Pecson filed an election protest.
The RTC rendered a Decision in Pecson's favor. Cunanan filed a Notice of Appeal. The
RTC issued an Order noting the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of
appeal fee and directing the transmittal of the records of the case to the Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC. Pecson, on the other
hand, filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal, claiming that
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts
Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials2 (Rules) allows this remedy.

(Note: the action was more of an action for reversion and not annulment of title nor
reconveyance; dismissal was proper because, the action being one for reversion, it is
only the Sol Gen who can bring said action, thus, the complaint states cause of
action)
15. PECSON V. COMELEC 575 SCRA

HELD:
Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except
when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res
judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on
record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim
or action. In Gumabon v. Larin11 we explained thus:
"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances
when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the
plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order
of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount
to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and
expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court,
the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change.
Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from
the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations. x x x."12 (Italics supplied)

The RTC granted Pecson's motion for execution pending appeal via a Special Order.
Expectedly, Cunanan moved to reconsider the Order, arguing that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that there were good reasons to issue a writ of
execution pending appeal; and (2) in entertaining and subsequently granting the
motion for execution pending appeal despite the issuance of an order transmitting
the records of the case.
Thereupon, Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of Preliminary
Injunction with Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
with Prayer for Immediate Raffle. The Second Division of the COMELEC issued on
January 4, 2008 a 60-day TRO but eventually denied Cunanans petition. It ruled that
the resolution of the motion for execution pending appeal is part of the residual
jurisdiction of the RTC to settle pending incidents.
On Cunanan's motion, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution reversing
the ruling of the Second Division insofar as it affirmed the RTC's findings of good
reasons to execute the decision pending appeal. It affirmed the authority of the RTC
to order execution pending appeal; it however nullified the March 11, 2008 writ of
execution on the ground that the RTC could no longer issue the writ because it had
lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal of the records and the perfection of

On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the

Rules of Court. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in
which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the
subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of
the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to
the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal.13 In either instance,
the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders,

17

the appeals of both Cunanan and Pecson (to be accurate, the lapse of Pecson's
period to appeal).

provision of the Rules which does not require the issuance of the implementing writ
within the above limited jurisdictional period.
The RTC cannot legally issue the implementing writ within this limited period for two
reasons: (1) the cited twenty-day waiting period under Section 11(b); and (2) the
mandatory immediate transmittal of the records to the ECAD of the COMELEC under
Section 10 of the Rules.
Also, we reiterate here our consistent ruling that decisions of the courts in election
protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots and after
full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given similar worth and
recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers.11 This is especially true when
attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness
of the term of the contested elective office, of the case.
In light of all these considerations, we conclude that the COMELEC erred in nullifying
the RTC's Special Order in a manner sufficiently gross to affect its exercise of
jurisdiction. Specifically, it committed grave abuse of discretion when it looked at
wrong considerations and when it acted outside of the contemplation of the law in
nullifying the Special Order.

The case was elevated to the SC via petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation
to Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc correctly nullified the writ of execution on the
ground that the RTC could no longer issue the writ because it had lost jurisdiction
over the case after transmittal of the records and the perfection of the appeals?
HELD:
No. Another legal reality is that the COMELEC is wrong in its ruling that the RTC could
no longer actually issue the writ on March 11, 2008 because it no longer had
jurisdiction to do so after the appeal period lapsed and after the records were
transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC. That the RTC is still in possession of the records
and that the period to appeal (of both contending parties) must have not lapsed are
important for jurisdictional purposes if the issue is the authority of the RTC to grant a
Special Order allowing execution pending appeal; they are requisite elements for the
exercise by the RTC of its residual jurisdiction to validly order an execution pending
appeal, not for the issuance of the writ itself. This is clearly evident from the cited

18