Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Connecticut
381 U.S. 479 ll June 7, 1965 ll Douglas, J.
Petitioners:
Respondent:
FACTS:
Appellants Griswold, an
Executive
Director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut and Buxton, a licensed physician
were arrested tried, convicted and fined $100
for violating provisions of the General Statutes
of Connecticut sections 53-32 and 54-196. They
provided medical advice to a married couple
that wanted to be informed on contraception
methods
and
subsequently
prescribed
contraceptive devices and materials for the
wife's use.
Section 53-32 provides that the use of any
drug, medicinal article or instrument to prevent
conception is punishable by fine or mandatory
jail time. Section 54-196 provides that any
accessory to such crime is punished as if they
were the principal offender.
Intermediate appellate court and the
State's highest court affirmed the judgment.
151 Connecticut 544, 200 A.2d 479
Appellants asserted that their conviction
pursuant to the statute is in violation of their
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus they
believe that Connecticut is unconstitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Appellants have standing, in so far as
that they assert that the crimes for which they
were charged is, constitutionally, not a crime.
Yes. While the right to privacy is not
explicitly included in the Bill of Rights, the right
of married couples to decide on reproductive
choices and to be assisted in doing so is
protected by peripheral rights or the
"penumbra" of other rights provided by the
First Amendment (right to teach, as in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, supra; and Meyer v.
Nebraska; right to association, NAACP v.
Alabama), the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
and the Ninth amendment.
Court
reversed
Connecticut
ISSUES:
Whether appellants have standing to assert
right of married couples to privacy?
Whether their conviction as accessories due
to enforcement of said Connecticut statute
violated appellants Fourteenth Amendment
rights?
Dilag
332
Eisenstadt v. Baird
405 U.S. 438 ll March 22, 1972 ll Brennan, J.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS:
William Baird [Appellee]
was convicted
at a bench trial in the
Massachusetts Superior Court under the Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c.272, 21
and 21A for (1) exhibiting contraceptive articles in the course of delivering a lecture on
contraception and (2) giving a woman Emko vaginal foam (contraceptive foam) at the end
of the lecture.
(Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746) The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: (1)
unanimously decided to set aside the conviction for exhibiting contraceptives but (2) by a
4-3 vote, sustained the conviction for giving away the contraceptive foam. Baird filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. The District Court dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal and remanded the actions to remand the action
with directions to grant the writ to Baird.
ISSUES AND RATIO:
1. Whether Baird has standing to
contraceptives:
Appellant: Eisenstadt
Bairds conviction rests on the
restriction that he is not a
doctor or a physician. Baird is
also no t a single person
denied
access
to
Contraceptives. Thus, Baird
should have no standing in
court.
HELD: Baird is now in a position to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to
contraceptives
2. Whether the Massachusetts statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment:
a. The deterrence of fornication cannot be taken as the purpose of the ban on distribution
of contraceptives.
b. The Massachusetts statute on restricting access to non-married persons does not
serve any health purpose. If that were the case, then the restriction should also
apply to married persons.
c. If the r ight to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
HELD: The Massachusetts statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Dilag
332
Geluz v. CA
G.R. No. L-16439 ll Jul. 20, 1961 ll Reyes, J.
PETITIONER:
Antonio Geluz
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Oscar Lazo
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva aborted her pregnancy by
her husband, Oscar Lazo, on three occasions:
once before their marriage and twice during its
course. On all three instances, she sought the
services of Antonio Geluz, a doctor.
Oscar Lazo claimed that he did not know of,
nor gave his consent to, the abortion, and thus,
citing the last abortion as his basis, he filed a
complaint with the trial court, asking the court
to compel Geluz to indemnify him. His
complaint and plea for indemnity was granted
by the trial court and further affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, on the basis of the provisions
on the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Hence, Antonio Geluz came to the Supreme
Court to appeal his case.
ISSUES:
Can the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, recover
damages from a physician who caused the
same?
HELD:
No. The court ruled that indemnity cannot
be had as an unborn fetus has no juridical
personality, and thus, no action can be brought
before the court on its behalf, and nor can any
right that may arise from an injury caused to it
Cadorna
332
Joaquin v. Navarro
G.R. No. L-5426 ll May 29, 1953 ll Tuason, J.
PETITIONER: Ramon Joaquin
RESPONDENT: Antonio Navarro
FACTS:
During the Japanese invasion, the Navarro
family, consisted of Joaquin Navarro Sr., 70;
Angela Joaquin de Navarro, ~67; Joaquin
Navarro Jr., ~30; and sisters Pilar, ~33;
Concepcion, ~23; and Natividad, ~25, were
killed in various orders. The established fact is
that the three sisters, Pilar, Concepcion and
Natividad, were the first ones to get killed,
while their father, Joaquin Navarro Sr., was the
last. The disputed order of death however
concerns that of Angela Joaquin de Navarro and
Joaquin Navarro Jr., because no clear evidence
shows that at the time when Joaquin Navarro
Jr. got shot on the head, Angela Joaquin had
already been dead or was still alive.
It is important to solve the mystery because
it has a bearing on the rights to succession of
Ramon Joaquin, herein referred to as Petitioner,
who is the biological son of Angela Joaquin to a
previous relationship, as well as the legally
adopted child of Joaquin Navarro Sr., and
Antonio Navarro, herein referred to as
Respondent, who is the biological son of
Joaquin Navarro Sr. to a previous marriage.
ISSUES:
Between the mother and son, who died
first?
In answering this question, must the
presumption of survivorship in Rule 131,
Section 3 (jj) of the Rules of Court or
simultaneous death in Section 43 of the Civil
Code be applied?
HELD:
Based on the preponderance of evidence
provided by Francisco Lopezs testimony, the
court ruled that it is most probable that Joaquin
Navarro Jr. died before her mother. The
contrary position is merely speculative, and is
thus trumped by the formers circumstantial
FACTS.
Thus, there is no need to use the
presumption of survivorship in Rule 131,
Section 3 (jj) of the Rules of Court, or the
presumption of simultaneity of death in Section
43. These two provisions only apply when the
FACTS are unknown and unknowable, which is
not true for the case at hand.
The Court affirmed the trial courts finding that
Angela
outlived
her
son.
Cadorna
332
Mercado v. Espiritu
FACTS:
Petitioners Domingo and Josefa Mercado
brought suit against Luis Espiritu (but now
directed against the administrator, Jose
Espiritu, since Luis died), alleging that they and
their sisters are the sole heirs of Margarita
Espiritu, their mother and the sister of the
defendant. Petitioners claim that in 1910, Luis,
by means of cajolery, induced and fraudulently
succeeded in getting the petitioners to sign a
deed of the land left by their mother for P400,
notwithstanding the fact that said land,
according to its assessment, was valued at
P3,795. They therefore ask that the sale be
rendered null & void and that defendant be
ordered to deliver and restore to petitioners the
shares of the land, together with its products.
The defendant answers this by saying that
Margarita, with due authorization of her
husband and petitioners father Wenceslao,
sold to Luis a portion of the land (15 cavanes of
seed) for P2,000. To cover his childrens needs,
Wenceslao subsequently pledged or mortgaged
to Luis the remainder of said land (6 cavanes of
seed) at P375. With this amount being
insufficient, he additionally borrowed other
sums of money aggregating a total of P600.
After their fathers death, the petitioners then
declared themselves to be of legal age and
executed, together with their sisters, the
notarial instrument ratifying the previous
contracts and selling absolutely and in
perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400
as an increase of the previous purchase price,
the property that had belonged to their mother.
ISSUE:
WON the sale can be annulled on the
grounds that petitioners were minors without
legal capacity to contract on the date of its
execution, and that the defendant availed
himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining
petitioners consent.
HELD:
No, the sale cannot be annulled.
First, the evidence adduced at the trial
Falcone
332
Hermosisima
332
Bambalan v. Maramba
G.R. No. L-27710 ll Jan. 30, 1928 ll Romualdez, J.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS:
Isidro Bambalan
German Maramba and Genoveva Muerong
FACTS:
Isidro Bambalan, the plaintiff, executed a
deed of sale involving a piece of land to
Genoveva Muerong, one of the defendants. At
the time he signed and executed said deed,
Isidro was a minor, and made no
misrepresentation that he was of legal age. In
fact, Genoneva was aware that Isidro was still a
minor, as she was the one who purchased his
first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the
document. The plaintiff now wishes to
invalidate said sale.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the sale was invalid because the
plaintiff who executed the same was a minor
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the lower court.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The doctrine laid down in the case of
Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu, where the
minor was held to be estopped from contesting
the contract executed by him pretending to be
of age, is not applicable in this case, since the
plaintiff did not pretend to be of age and since
his minority was well known to the purchaser.
Cadorna
332
RULING:
The Court held Rosarios liability but only
made the sons liable to the extent that they
benefitted from the loan.
RATIO DECIDENDI
NO. Mere failure to disclose minors age
does not constitute fraud, hence the minors
cannot be held liable. There is no juridical duty
on their part to disclose their incapacity on the
basis of their minority. Misrepresentation of
age, for it to be fraudulent, must be active and
not passive; that is, the minors actually have to
lie about their age and not just fail to disclose it.
Meanwhile, the minors are nonetheless
required to make restitution insofar as they
have benefited from the money they received.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the minors were liable to
pay since they failed to disclose their being
minors
Cadorna
332
Martinez v. Martinez
G.R. No. 445 ll Mar. 31, 1902 ll Cooper, J.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Pedro Martinez
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Francisco Martinez
FACTS:
Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the
compulsory legal heir of Francisco Martinez
Garcia, brought a suit to declare his father
prodigal. He accused his father of squandering
his estate by making donations to his second
wife and her family. On the other hand,
Francisco stated that gave his son a general
power of attorney to administer his estate, but
that the revoked the same due to his sons
mismanagement.
ISSUES:
WON Francisco should be declared prodigal
RULING:
The Court affirmed the CAs decision and
ruled in favor of not declaring Francisco
prodigal.
RATIO DECIDENDI
NO. This is based on the Courts own
understanding of prodigality as acts that must
show a morbid state of mind and a disposition
to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such
an extent as is likely to expose the family to
want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs
of their undisposable part of the estate. Pedros
testimony was insufficient to allege prodigality
on his fathers part, and neither is there any
evidence that his father has been transferring
properties to diminish his estate. The Court
found that the father is far from being prodigal
and still exercises his full mental faculties and
possesses ability to manage his estate wisely.
On the other hand, it was the son who has
exhibited tendencies to be prodigal.
Cadorna
332
Wassmer v. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089 ll Dec. 26, 1964
FACTS:
On August 23, 1954, Francisco Velez and
Beatriz Wassmer applied for a license to
contract marriage. In preparation for their
wedding on Sept. 4, invitations were distributed
and apparel were purchased. On Sept. 2, Velez
left a note for Wassmer to the effect that the
wedding will have to be postponed due to the
opposition thereto of his mother. The day after,
he sent a telegram assuring her of his return.
Alas, he never did. Velez was declared in default
after failure to answer Wassmers suit for
damages, and was ordered to indemnify
plaintiff. Velez filed a petition for relief from
judgment on the ground of excusable
negligence, as well as a motion for new trial and
reconsideration on the ground that there is no
provision of the Civil Code authorizing an action
for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUES:
(1) WON defendants petition for relief on
the ground of excusable negligence is
valid;
(2) WON mere breach of a promise to
marry is an actionable wrong;
(3) WON defendant must be held
answerable in damages;
(4) WON the damages awarded were
excessive.
HELD AND RATIO DECIDENDI:
(1) Defendants petition was NOT VALID
because it wasnt supported by an
affidavit of merits based on FACTS. The
contention that his failure to marry
Ordoyo
10
332
Tanjanco v. CA
G.R. No. L-18630 ll Dec. 17, 1966 ll J.B.L Reyes, J.
PETITIONER:
APOLONIO TANJANCO
RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS
FACTS:
From
December,
1957,
petitioner
APOLONIO TANJANCO courted the respondent,
ARACELI SANTOS, both being of legal age.
Tanjanco expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for Santos who
eventually reciprocated such feelings. With
Tanjancos promise of marriage in mind,
Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal
knowledge sometime in July, 1958. For one
year, Tanjanco had carnal access to Santos
which eventually led to Santos getting
pregnant. As a result of her pregnancy,
Santos had to resign from her job as secretar
y in IBM Philippines, Inc. In her state of
unemployment Santos became unable to
support herself and her baby, and because
Tanjanco did not fulfill his promise of
marriage she suffered mental anguish, a
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos
prayed to the court that Tanjanco be
compelled to recognize the unborn child she
was bearing, and pay her for support and
damages.
Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which
the court granted for failure to state cause of
action. Santos appealed the case to the Court
of Appeals and the latter decided the case,
stating that no cause of action was shown to
compel recognition of the unborn child nor for
its support, but a cause of action was present
for damages, under Article 21 of the Civil
Code. Tanjanco appealed such decision
pleading that actions for breach of a promise
to marry are
jurisdiction.
not
permissible
in
this
ISSUES:
WON Tanjanco is compelled to pay for
damages to Santos for breach of his promise
to marry her
HELD:
In its decision, Court of Appeals relied
upon the memorandum submitted by the
Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to
support the original draft of the Civil Code. In
the example set forth by the memorandum,
Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it
refers to a tort upon a minor who has been
seduced. Seduction connotes the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse
of confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman has yielded. That definition
of seduction is not consistent with the
position of Santos, who was of legal age, and
granted carnal access to Tanjanco and had
sexual relations with him for one whole year.
Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited
mutual passion to Tanjanco which is
incompatible with the premise behind the idea
of seduction.
Decision of Court of Appeals is reversed, and
that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed.
Complaint of Santos is dismissed for failure to
state cause of action
Pagdanganan
11
332
De Jesus v. Syquia
G.R. No. L-39110 ll Nov. 28, 1933
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: CESAR SYQUIA
FACTS:
Plaintiff Antonia Loanco-De Jesus worked as
a cashier for a barber shop of which defendant
Cesar Syquia, an unmarried man from a
prominent family, was accustomed to get his
haircut. The two became acquainted and
developed an amorous relationship which
resulted to Antonia getting pregnant and giving
birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931.
During the early months of Antonias
pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor at
her home, and in February 1931, he handed
Antonia a letter which was addressed to the
priest who was to christen the baby
acknowledging that the baby is his and that it
be christened in his name.
Defendant showed paternal interest in the
situation that even when he was abroad, he
continued to write to Antonia cautioning her to
take care of herself so that junior would be
strong.
After giving birth, Syquia took Antonia and
the child in his house where they lived together
in regular family style with all household
expenses paid for by Syquia. When Antonia
showed signs of a second pregnancy, Syquia left
her and thereafter married another woman.
During the christening of the child, the
defendant caused the child to be given the
name Ismael Loanco instead of the originally
planned Cesar Syquia, Jr.
ISSUES:
WON the breach of promise to marry is
actionable.
WON the letters made by defendant prove
sufficiency of acknowledgment of paternity.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the trial court in refusing to give damages to
Antonia for breach of promise to marry. The
action has no standing in civil law, apart from
the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. This case exhibits none of the features
necessary to maintain such an action.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the
defendant to recognize the second child, Pacita
Loanco.
The sufficiency of acknowledgement of
paternity is satisfied by the production of one or
more documents, of indubitable authenticity,
written by the recognizing father, as
contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of
the Civil Code. The admission of paternity is
contained in the note to the priest and the
other letters addressed to Antonia during her
pregnancy.
Perez
12
332
Piccininni v. Hajus
FACTS:
The petitioner, Piccininni, claims that the
defendant, Hajus, made him believe that they
would get married and live at her house.
Because of this, Piccininni spent $40,000 to
renovate and improve her house.
Hajus claimed that she cant be charged
with fraud and that what she committed was a
breach of promise to marry. Therefore, no
action can be brought upon her because of the
Heart Balm Act.
The Heart Balm Act states no action shall
be brought upon any cause from alienation of
affections or from breach of promise to marry.
Trial court ruled that the Heart Balm Act
bars Piccininni from charging Hajus. Case
brought to SC.
ISSUE:
WON Piccinnini can recover his property in
light of the Heart Balm Act
HELD:
Yes. Piccininni is not asking for damages
because of a broken heart or a mortified spirit.
He is asking for the return of things which he
gave to Hajus because of her fraudulent
representations. Picininni does not assert that
Hajus wronged him in failing to marry him. He
just asserted that she wronged him in
fraudulently inducing him to transfer property
to her. His complaint is based on what she did,
and not on what she refused to do.
Hence, trial courts judgment was reverse.
Poblador
13
332
Loving v. Virginia
Warren, CJ.
FACTS:
In Virginia, there is a comprehensive
statutory scheme prohibiting and punishing
interracial marriages. Residents Mildred Jeter, a
Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white
man, were married in the District of Columbia.
After their marriage, they established their
marital abode in Caroline County in Virginia.
They were convicted for violating Section 2058 which states that any white person and
colored person shall go out of this State for the
purpose of being married, and with the
intention of returning and be married out of it,
and afterwards return to and reside in it,
cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be guilty
of a felony and imprisoned for not less than one
nor more than five years. The central feature of
this act is the absolute prohibition of a white
person marrying other than another white
person. The couple instituted an action to
nullify the ruling of the Court as a violation of
their 14th amendment.
ISSUE:
WON the statutory scheme adopted by
Virginia preventing marriages between two
persons solely on the basis of racial
classifications violates the Equal Protection and
Due Process clauses?
HELD:
Tiangco
14
332
Zablocki v. Redhail
FACTS:
Wisconsin statute: members of a certain
class of Wisconsin residents may not marry,
within the State or elsewhere, without first
obtaining a court order granting permission to
marry. The class is defined to include any
Wisconsin resident having minor ISSUE not in
his custody and which he is under obligation to
support by any court order or judgment. Court
permission cannot be granted unless the
marriage applicant submits proof of compliance
with the support obligation and, in addition,
demonstrates that the children covered by the
support order are not then and are not likely
thereafter to become public charges.
Redhail was denied a marriage license
because of his failure to comply with the
statute. It was found that Redhail had a
paternity action instituted against him, alleging
that he was the father of a baby girl born out of
wedlock. He was adjudged to pay $109/mo as
support for the child until she reached 18 years
of age.
When Redhail applied for a marriage
license, Zablocki did not ISSUE the license for
violating the statute on the grounds that: (1) he
had not satisfied his support obligations to his
illegitimate child and; (2) the child had been a
public charge since her birth, receiving benefits
under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Program.
ISSUE:
WON the Wisconsin statute is constitutional
[NO]
On privacy: Right to marry is of
fundamental importance, and since the
classification at ISSUE here significantly
interferes with the exercise of that right, a
critical examination of the state interests
advanced in support of the classification is
required.
The decision to marry has been placed on
the same level of importance as decisions
relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing,
and family relationships. It would make little
Sevilla
15
332
Graham v. Graham
33 F.Supp. 936 ll Jul. 15, 1940 ll District Judge Tuttle
PLAINTIFF:
DEFENDANT:
Sidney Graham
Margrethe Graham
FACTS:
Sidney Graham sues his former wife based
on an agreement they had when they were still
married. Said agreement stipulated that
Margrethe is to pay Sidney a sum of $300 per
month until they no longer want said
agreement to continue. Sidney alleges that the
reason for said agreement was Margrethes
plea to have him quit his work in a hotel so he
could accompany her in all her travels.
Margrethe denies Sidneys allegations and
asserts, among others, that the contract was
not within the power of a married woman
under Michigan law to make.
ISSUES:
WON the contract is valid and binding
RULING:
The judge ruled that the contract is void.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Regardless of WON the woman is
competent to enter into the alleged contract
Cadorna
16
332
Bradwell v. Illinois
FACTS:
The statute of Illinois on the subject of
admissions to the bar enacts that no person
shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or
counsellor-at-law without having previously
obtained a license for that purpose from some
two of the justices of the Supreme Court.
Mrs. Myra Bradwell applied to the judges of
the Supreme Court of Illinois for a license to
practice law. With this petition are a certificate
from an inferior court of her good character,
and that on due examination she had been
found to possess the requisite qualifications.
Pending this application, she also filed an
affidavit, stating that she was born in the State
of Vermont; that she was (had been) a citizen of
the State; that she is now a citizen of the United
States, and has been for many years past a
resident of the city of Chicago, in the State of
Illinois. She also filed a paper asserting that she
was entitled to the license prayed for by virtue
of the second section of the fourth article of the
Constitution of the United States, and that of
the 14th article of amendment of that
instrument.
Her application was denied, and it was
stated as a sufficient reason that under the
decisions of the SC of Illinois, the applicantas
a married woman would be bound neither by
her express contracts nor by those implied
contracts which it is the policy of the law to
create between attorney and client. The
decision also states that admitting women
would mean that the courts would be exercising
the authority conferred upon them in a manner
that was never contemplated by the legislature.
Plus, God designed the sexes to occupy
different spheres of action, and that it belonged
to men to make, apply, and execute the laws.
ISSUE:
WON the decision violates a provision of
the Federal Constitution.
HELD:
No--the decision of the Illinois court upheld,
and Mrs. Bradwell still cannot practice law.
There are privileges and immunities
belonging to citizens of the United States, and
that it is these and these alone which a State is
forbidden to abridge. However, the right to
admission to practice in the courts of a State is
not one of them. The SC here, referring to the
opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, says that
the power of a State to prescribe the
qualifications for admission to the bar of its
own courts is unaffected by the 14th
amendment, and that they cannot inquire into
the reasonableness or propriety of the rules it
may prescribe.
The Supreme Court also dismissed any
claim under the privileges and immunities
clause of the unamended ConstitutionArticle
IV, Section 2, Clause 1. Bradwell argued that
because she had been born in Vermont but
later moved to Illinois, Illinois' denial of a law
license was inter-state discrimination. But the
Court noted that under the recently-enacted
Fourteenth Amendment, "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they
reside." Because Bradwell had been a resident
of Illinois for several years, she was now a
citizen of Illinois, and the interstate provision of
Article IV did not apply.
Falcone
17
332
Dunn v. Palermo
522 S.W.2d 679 ll Jul. 7, 1975 ll Henry, J.
APPELLANTS:
APPELLEE:
FACTS:
Rosary Palermo, a Nashville lawyer, married
Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She
has continued to use and enjoy her maiden
name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for
all purposes. Subsequent to her marriage, she
lodged with the Registrar a change of address
form listing her name as Palermo. She was
advised that she was required to register anew
under the surname of her husband, or have her
name purged from the registration records.
Upon her refusal to so register, her name was
purged from the registration list. Thus this
action, wherein appellee seeks a declaratory
judgment declaring that the defendants'
interpretation of Sec. 2-206, is erroneous, or in
the alternative that this statute be declared
violative of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and of the Nineteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
ISSUES:
WON it is mandatory for a married woman
to assume the name of her husband repute
RULING:
The Court ruled in favour of the appellee.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
There is no constitutional question that
needs to be answered as regards the Texas
statute as it does not mandate any change of
name by a woman upon marriage. It merely
recognizes the prevalence of the virtually
universal custom under which a woman
normally adopts the surname of her husband.
We hold that in this jurisdiction a woman, upon
marriage, has a freedom of choice; she may
elect to retain her own surname or she may
adopt the surname of her husband. So long as a
person's name remains constant and consistent,
and unless and until changed in the prescribed
manner, and absent any fraudulent or legally
impermissible intent, the State has no
legitimate concern.
Cadorna
18
332
In Re: Santiago
A.C. No. 932 ll Jun. 21, 1940 ll Laurel, J.
PETITIONER-COMPLAINANT:
RESPONDENT:
OSG
Roque Santiago
FACTS:
Ernesto Baniquit, then living separately
from his wife Soledad Colares for some nine
consecutive years and was bent on contracting
a second marriage, sought the legal advice of
the respondent, who was at the time a
practicing and notary public in the Province of
Occidental Negros. The respondent, after
hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the
latter that he could secure a separation from his
wife and marry again. He made Baniquit and his
wife sign a document, in which it was
stipulated, among other things, that the
contracting parties, who are husband and wife
authorized each other to marry again, at the
same time renouncing or waiving whatever
right of action one might have against the party
so marrying. The respondent assured the
spouses that they were single and as such,
could contract another and subsequent
marriage, hence on June 11, 1939, Ernesto
contracted a second marriage with Trinidad
Aurelio. Upon realizing his mistake, which came
from his idea that seven years separation of
husband and wife would entitle either of them
to contract a second marriage, respondent
immediately sent for the contracting parties
who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and
Cadorna
19
332
Selanova v. Mendoza
A.M. No. 804-CJ ll May. 19, 1975 ll Aquino, J.
COMPLAINANT: Saturnino Selanova
RESPONDENT: Judge Alejandro Mendoza
FACTS:
Saturnino
Selanova
charged
Judge
Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with
gross ignorance of the law for having prepared
and ratified a document extrajudicially
liquidating the conjugal partnership of the
complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. One
condition of the liquidation was that either
spouse (as the case may be) would withdraw
the complaint for adultery or concubinage
which each had filed against the other and that
they waived their "right to prosecute each other
for whatever acts of infidelity" either one would
commit against the other. Judge Mendoza
claimed that he was aware of the invalidity of
the agreement but he nevertheless ratified it on
the assurance of the spouses that they would
ask the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental to approve the agreement. He said that
he relied on the provision that "the husband
and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191,
Civil Code).
ISSUES:
WON the document of extrajudicial
liquidation of conjugal partnership ratified by
the respondent is void.
RULING:
The respondent is severely censured but
not disbarred due to the attending
circumstances.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The agreement in question is void because
it contravenes the Art 221 of the Civil Code
which makes void any (1) any contract for
personal separation between husband and wife;
and (2) every extrajudicial agreement, during
marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and
wife. They also cited that Judge Mendozas
reliance on Art. 191 Par.4 of the Civil Code was
misplaced and that the Court had already ruled
in an earlier case that judicial sanction for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
the marriage should be secured beforehand
before it can be ratified. Meanwhile, in regard
to the other main stipulation of the contract in
question, which waives the right of either
spouse to file a complaint against any
adulterous offense the other may commit, was
also cited to be "contrary to law, morals and
public order, and as a consequence not
judicially recognizable" They held that while
while adultery and concubinage are private
crimes, they still remain crimes and a contract
legalizing their commission is therefore void.
Cadorna
20
332
Jones v. Hallahan
501 S.W.2d 588 ll Nov. 9, 1973 ll Commissioner Vance
APPELLANTS:
APPELLEE:
FACTS:
The appellants, each of whom is a female
person, seek review of a judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court which held that they
were not entitled to have ISSUEd to them a
license to marry each other. Appellants contend
that the failure of the clerk to ISSUE the license
deprived them of three basic constitutional
rights, namely, the right to marry; the right of
association; and the right to free exercise of
religion. They also contend that the refusal
subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment.
ISSUES:
WON in refusing to ISSUE a marriage
license to the appellants, the appellee violated
the formers constitutional rights.
RULING:
The CA affirmed the judgment of the lower
court.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. The Court found that there was no
constitutional violation since there is no
Cadorna
21
332
Reyes, G.
22
332
Silverio v. Republic
FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio underwent
sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.
The doctor ISSUEd a medical certificate proving
the same.
Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate. In his
birth certificate, it is indicated that his name is
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio and his sex
was registered as male. He alleges that he is a
male transsexual. He seeks to have his name
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely and
his sex from male to female
PROCEDURAL:
Trial Court: Grant petition in consonance
with the principles of justice and equity.
Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans
body is not his own doing and should not be in
any way taken against him.
CA: Reverse No law allowing the change
of either name or sex in the certificate of birth
on the ground of sex reassignment through
surgery.
ISSUES:
WON a persons first name can be changed
on the ground of sex reassignment [NO]
The state has an interest in the names
borne by individuals and entities for purposes
of identification. A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.
Art. 376 (NCC) No person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority.
RA 9048 amended the provision. Section 1
of RA 9048 provides Authority to Correct
Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname.
No entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order, except for
clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname which can be corrected
or changed
Sec 4: Grounds for Change of First Name
(1) the petitioner finds the first name to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (2) the new first
name has been habitually and continuously
Cadorna
23
332
Silverio v. Republic
COURTS FINAL REMARKS:
Petitioner pleads that the unfortunates are
also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment
and the realization of their dreams. No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that
there are people whose preferences and
orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
Cadorna
24
332
Republic v. Cagandahan
G.R. No. 166676 ll Sep. 12, 2008 ll Quisumbing, J.
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Jennifer Cagandahan
FACTS:
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate before the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna.
She asserted that she was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while
growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), which is
a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics.
Tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she
has no breast or menstrual development; she
has become a male person. In her petition with
the RTC to have her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff, her physician
testified on her condition by presenting a
medical certificate to back her alleged
condition. The RTC granted her petition,
recognizing her proven medical condition. Thus
(OSG) filed this petition seeking areversal of the
abovementioned ruling based on (1) violations
on Rule 108 of the Rules of Court regarding (a)
Cagandahans failure to implead the local civil
registrar in her petition with the RTC and (b) her
plea to have her gender changed in the birth
certificate (OSG believes her condition does not
make her male; and (2) a violation on Rule 103
of the Rules of Court, in which Cagandahan
failed to state that respondent is a bona fide
resident of the province where the petition was
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date
of such filing. The court dismissed the two
procedural ISSUES on Rules 108 and 103, and
decided on the substantive merit regarding the
change of gender in Cagandahans records due
to her medical condition.
ISSUES:
WON the trial court erred in ordering the
correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her name and gender, on
the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH
RULING:
The Republics petition is denied.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. The respondents condition, CAH, is one
of many conditions involving intersexuality,
which apply to human beings who cannot be
classified as either male or female. Here, the
rule of determining a persons gender at birth
cannot apply because the sexual development
in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive.
Instead, it is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Thus,
the Court is of the view that where the person
is biologically or naturally intersex, the
determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. In the case of
respondent, his having ordered his life to that of
a male is backed by preponderant biological
bases. Unlike in the case of individuals who
underwent sexual reassignment, respondent
here has simply let nature take its course and
has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. In the
absence of a law on such an unusual matter, the
Court will not dictate on respondent concerning
a matter so innately private as ones sexuality
and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether
or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse
the male tendency due to CAH.
Cadorna
25
332
People v. Santiago
G.R. No. L-27972 ll Oct. 31, 1927 ll Street, J.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
DOCTRINE:
In relation with the course syllabus topic
from which the case is filed under, the marriage
between Santiago and Masilang cannot be
considered as valid because it lacked the
essential (marriage) requisite of consent freely
given
NATURE:
This is an appeal brought to the Supreme
Court to reverse the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija
finding the appellant guilty of rape and
sentencing him to undergo imprisonment,
reclusion temporal; requiring him to endow the
offended party; requiring him to recognize and
maintain the offspring, if there should be any,
as consequence of the rape; and requiring him
to pay further costs.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage of the appellant and the
victim is considered valid to exempt him from
criminal liability. NO.
FACTS:
Felicita Masilang (victim), aged 18, was
Felipe Santiagos (appellant) niece by marriage.
On November 23, 1926, the appellant asked
the victim to accompany him to cross the river
and from there he led her to a place far from
the highway with tall grass hiding them from
public view. The appellant manifested a desire
to have sexual intercourse with the girl but she
RATIO:
The court found that the offense of rape
has indeed been committed, but the marriage
ceremony was only a mere ruse of the
appellant to escape from criminal liability. The
actions of Santiago before and after the
marriage would prove that he really had no
intention to marry Masilang other than for the
aforementioned reason. Furthermore, because
the victim was under duress, the marriage is
void for lack of consent. Consequently, the
appellant is not exempt from criminal liability.
The judgment appealed from is in accordance
with law, and will be affirmed. Costs against
the appellant.
Yumol
26
332
RULING:
The judgment appealed from is deemed to
be in accordance with law, and is thus affirmed.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO. The plaintiff's allegation that he had
not suspected the pregnancy of the defendant
when he married her is highly improbable, given
her obvious advanced pregnancy. Therefore it is
unnecessary to consider the appellants
allegation of fraud. He also argued that it is not
uncommon to find people with big stomachs,
but we find this argument too puerile to even
consider, especially since the appellant is a
freshman in law school.
Marriage is a most sacred institution: it is
the cement, the very foundation, on which
society rests. For annulment to proceed, it is
entirely necessary that the pieces of evidence
provided be clear and reliable. No such
evidence can be found in this case.
Cadorna
27
332
Eigenmann v. Guerra
FACTS:
Eduardo Eigenmann [who represented
himself as of legal age] and Maryden Guerra got
married before Judge Prudencio Encomienda as
solemnizing officer and 4 witnesses, including
Eduardos mother. After living together for
quite a time, Eduardo filed an action for the
annulment of his marriage to Maryden Guerra
on the grounds of his age and lack of parental
consent, his consent not freely given [use of
force, intimidation by Froilan Guerra, wifes
father], and lack of legal authority of the one
who administered the oath [councillor of
Quezon City] making the marriage void ab initio.
ISSUES:
WON his lack of statutory age and lack of
parental consent may be grounds for
annulment of marriage
WON his consent being not freely given
may render the marriage void
WON the marriage is void ab ignition
because of the lack of legal authority by the
officer who administered the oath
HELD:
No. He is estopped because of his
misrepresentation of his age [claimed to be
25yrs,8mos] when he applied for marriage
license. With regards to the consent of his
mother, the fact that the mother was a witness
to the marriage and did not object to the
marriage implies consent. Consent may be
given in any form [written,oral or implied] A
written consent under oath is not necessary.
No. There was no factual or legal for the
claim.The Court did not see any reasonable or
well-grounded fear of an imminent danger and
grave evil upon Eigenmanns person or property
that would arise from the statement of Froilan
Guerra [Balita ko lumiligaw ka sa aking anak.
Pag niloko mo iyan, mag-ingat ka.] The
statement for the court was only an admonition
natural for a father and not a threat.
No. What is declared null and void by the
law are marriages solemnized w/o a marriage
license. A marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained. The local civil registrar and
the solemnizing officer are not required to
inquire about the authority of the officer
administering the oath.
Bayona
28
332
Navarro v. Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 ll Jul. 19, 1996 ll Romero, J.
COMPLAINANT: Rodolfo Navarro
RESPONDENT: Judge Hernando Domagtoy
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodolfo G. Navarro submitted
evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which,
he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well
as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the
law:
1.) Respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F.
Borga, despite the knowledge that the
groom is merely separated from his first
wife. (In violation of Art. 41 of the FC)
2.) Respondent judge performed a marriage
ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma G. del Rosario at the
respondent judges residence in the
Municipal of Dapa, which does not fall
within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos.
(In violation of Art. 7 Par. 1 of the FC)2
In response, Judge Domagtoy claimed that
his act of solemnizing the marriage between
Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from
his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga was predicated on
an affidavit supposedly ISSUEd by the Municipal
Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact
that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not
seen each other for almost seven years. With
respect to the second charge, he maintains that
in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo
and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7 Par.
1 of the Family Code, and that he merely
worked within the ambit of Art. 8 of the same
code, which provides for other possible venues
to solemnize a marriage.
ISSUES:
WON
respondent
exhibited
misconduct and ignorance of the law.
gross
RULING:
Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy
is SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and
given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
YES. Judge Domagtoys gross ignorance of
very basic legal principles enshrined in the
Family Code resulted to a bigamous and
therefore void marriage for the first marriage
he solemnized, and to the second, a lack of the
necessary authority of the solemnizing officer,
since he solemnized the marriage outside of his
jurisdiction.
Judge Domagtoys reliance on the said
affidavit of Tagadans 7-year separation with his
former wife, which said affidavit was proven to
have not been ISSUEd by the MTC Judge of
Basey, Samar but only sworn before him, is
insufficient justification for his having
solemnized Tagadans second marriage on the
basis of his wifes presumptive death.
Regardless of whether Tagadan had a wellfounded belief that his wife, who had not been
heard of for almost 7 years, was dead, it was
still necessary for him to have undergone a
summary proceeding officially declaring his
former wifes presumptive death. Absent such
mandatory proceeding, the subsequent
marriage is considered bigamous, and
therefore, void.
Art. 7 Par. 1 of the Family Code provides
that marriage may be solemnized by, among
others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction. For members of
the Appellate and Supreme courts, this
jurisdiction extends throughout the Philippines
Cadorna
29
332
Navarro v. Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 ll Jul. 19, 1996 ll Romero, J.
(ie. CA and SC judges/justices can solemnize
marriages regardless of venue, so long as the
requisites are met). The same cannot be said,
however, for judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions (eg. MTC judges); they may
only officiate weddings within their areas; they
lack the authority to solemnize weddings in
areas beyond their jurisdiction. While this may
not affect the validity of the marriage, it
nonetheless results to an irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, namely,
the authority of the solemnizing officer, which,
as a result, may subject the officiating official to
Cadorna
30
332
Araes v. Occiano
Apr. 2, 2002
PETITIONER:
Merceditas Mata Aranes,
RESPONDENT: Judge Salvador M. Occiano,
FACTS:
Aranes charged respondent Occiano,
Presiding Judge of the MTC of Batalan,
Camarines Sur with gross ignorance of the law
for solemnizing her marriage with late
Dominador Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Aranes and Orobia lived as husband and wife
until the death of Orobia. Then Aranes
discovered that she cannot inherit the
properties of Orobia, nor get his pension as a
retired Navy Commodore because their
marriage was a nullity.
In his comment, Occiano averred that he
was requested to solemnize the wedding in
Nabua, due to Orobias difficulty in walking. He
examined the documents before the ceremony
and upon discovering the absence of a marriage
license he refused to solemnize the marriage.
However, the couple assured him that they will
deliver the license to him immediately after.
The
petitioner
filed
an
Affidavit
of
Cristobal
31
332
ISSUE:
WON the certification of due search and
inability to find marriage license presented as
evidence is sufficient to render the marriage
void.
HELD:
Yes. Unaccompanied by any circumstance
of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court3, a certificate of "due
3
Cruz
32
332
Alcantara v. Alcantara
Aug. 28, 2007
HUSBAND: Restituto Alcantara
WIFE: Rosita Alcantara
FACTS:
Restituto filed a petition for annulment
against Rosita on the following grounds:
(1) The wedding was performed without
first securing a marriage license
Even though the couple was
married twice (first at the stairs in
Manila City Hall before a certain
Minister Aquilino Navarro through a
fixer and second at San Jose de
Manuguit Church in Tondo), the
ceremonies
were
celebrated
without the parties securing a
marriage license.
(2) The alleged ML, procured in Carmona,
Cavite, appearing on the marriage
contract, is a sham, as neither party was
a resident of Carmona, and they never
went to Carmona to apply for a license
with the local civil registrar of the said
place.
(3) The certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona states the ML
number of 7054133 but the marriage
contract bears the ML number
7054033.
The couple has 2 children, but on the side,
Restituto has a mistress with whom he has 3
children. It appeared that he was filing for an
annulment with the intent to evade prosecution
for concubinage.
ISSUE:
WON the irregularities relating to the ML
are sufficient to render the marriage void.
HELD:
No. The petition was dismissed for lack of
merit.
RATIO:
To be considered void on the ground of
absence of a ML, the law requires that the
absence of such ML must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such ML was issued to the
Dolot
33
332
Alcantara v. Alcantara
Aug. 28, 2007
effectivity of the Family Code, will be assessed
on its validity based on the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time
of its celebration.
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless
ALL these requisites are complied with: (a) Legal
capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Their consent, freely given;
(c) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(d) A marriage license, except in a marriage
of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage
license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general
public
is
interested.
Dolot
34
332
Vda. De Jacob v. CA
Aug. 19, 1999
PETITIONER:
TomasaVda.DeJacobasSpecialadministratixoftheIntestateEstateof
DeceasedAlfredoEJacob
RESPONDENTS: CA, PedroPilapil,ProvinceofCamSur,JuanTrivino
NATURE:
Petitionforreviewoncertiorariofade
cision of CA
RULING:
PetitionisGRANTEDandtheassailedde
cisionoftheCAisRESVERSEDandSETASI
DE.MarriagebetweenpetitionerandAlfred
oJacobisherebyrecognizedanddeclared
VALID
FACTS:
TomasaVda.DeJacobclaimstobethe
survivingspouseofDrAlfredoJacob, and
wasappointedSpecialAdministratrixofhis
estatesbyvirtueofareconstructedmarriag
econtractbetweenthem
PedroPilapil,thedoctorsallegedadopt
edson,claimsthatthemarriagebetweenT
omasaandDrJacobwasvoidforhavingn
omarriagelicenseandonlya
reconstructedmarriagecontract,plusnoma
rriageceremony
ISSUE:
WONTomasasmarriagetoDr.Jacobw
asvalid
RATIO:
It
hasbeenestablishedthatTomasaandDrJ
acoblivedtogetherashusband
andwifeforatleastfiveyears
(affidavitwasexecuted).Marriage
is
exceptionalincharacteranddidntrequire
marriagelicense
Secondaryevidence:trialandCAcommi
ttederrorswhentheyexcludedtestimonies
ofAdelaPilapilandMsgrFlorencioYllana.
Also,therewerephotosoftheweddingcer
emony
DueexecutionwasestablishedbyAdela
Pilapilwhowaspresentatmarriagecerem
ony
Subsequentlossofthedocumentwass
hownbytestimonyofYllana
Giventhattheylivedtogetherashusba
ndandwife,presumptionofmarriageisgiv
en
Hermosisima
35
332
Sevilla v. Cardenas
G.R. No. 167684 ll Jul. 31, 2006
FACTS:
The petitioner wishes to appeal the
decision of the CA. Sevilla wishes for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Cardenas, such that his consent was given
because of intimidation of the retired Colonel
father of Cardenas. Cardenas claims that they
were both married civilly and also had a
religious ceremony. The couple has been
living as husband and wife for 25 years
already, before Sevilla filed the case. Sevilla
claims that the marriage license used in their
contract is non-existent because he never
applied for a license. The Local Civil Registrar
affirmed this that they cannot locate the said
logbook containing the record for the
marriage license, but it can be inferred that it
is due to an overload of problems in their
office, and that they belatedly admitted that
they couldnt find the book because the
officer in charge of it had already retired.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage can be declared null
Macariola
36
332
People v. Mendoza
G.R. No. L-5877 ll Sep. 28, 1954 ll Paras, CJ.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:
People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANT: Arturo Mendoza
FACTS:
The defendant-appellant married Jovita de
Asis in 1941. Without said married being
annulled or declared void, and no pretense
made as to defendant-appellants belief that
Jovita had been missing and not heard of from
seven years which could give rise to the
presumption of her death, he entered a second
marriage with Olga Lema in 1941. In 1943, his
first wife, Jovita de Asis died. Then, in 1949, he
contracted a third marriage with Carmencita
Panlilio, which said third marriage gave rise to
his prosecution for and conviction of the crime
of bigamy.
The defendant-appellant then contends
that his marriage with Olga Lema in 1941 is null
and void and, therefore, non-existent, having
been contracted while his first marriage with
Jovita de Asis was still in effect, while his third
marriage with Carmencita Panlilio cannot be the
basis of a charge for bigamy because it took
place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The
Solicitor General, however, argues that, even
assuming that appellant's second marriage to
Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from
criminal liability, since there was no previous
judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage.
Cadorna
37
332
Tolentino v. Paras
G.R. No. L-43905 ll May 30, 1983 ll Melencio-Herrera, J.
PETITIONER:
Serafia Tolentino
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Edgardo L. Paras, Maria Clemente and the Local Civil
FACTS:
Amado Tolentino, petitioners late husband,
contracted a second marriage with private
respondent Maria Clemente while his first
marriage with the petitioner was still subsisting.
Petitioner charged him with Bigamy in a
criminal case, where the Court, upon Amado's
guilty plea, sentenced him to suffer the
corresponding penalty. After Amado had served
the prison sentence imposed on him, he
continued to live with private respondent until
his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate
carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse
Maria Clemente."
Thereafter, petitioner sought to correct the
name of the surviving spouse in her husbands
death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to her
name in a Special Proceeding for Correction of
Entry, which the lower Court dismissed "for lack
of the proper requisites under the law." Thus,
petitioner filed a case against private
respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of
Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the
lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of
the death certificate of Amado, which said case
was dismissed by the respondent Court for
three reasons: (1) the correction of the entry in
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the
proper remedy because the ISSUE involved is
marital relationship; (2) the Court has not
acquired proper jurisdiction because as there is
a lack of the required publication prescribed
under Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of
the Civil Code; and (3) the subject matter of the
case has been aptly discussed in Special
Proceeding No. 1587-M, which the Court has
already dismissed, for lack of the proper
requisites under the law. The petitioner then
filed current petition to assail said judgment by
the respondent Court.
ISSUES:
Cadorna
38
332
Tolentino v. Paras
G.R. No. L-43905 ll May 30, 1983 ll Melencio-Herrera, J.
judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage. It can be safely
concluded, then, without need of further proof
nor remand to the Court below, that the private
respondent is not the surviving spouse of the
Cadorna
39
332
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy
G.R. No. L-53703 ll Aug. 19, 1986 ll Paras, J.
PETITIONER: Lilia Oliva Wiegel
RESPONDENTS: Honorable Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and Karl Heinz Wiegel
FACTS:
In an action filed before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City,
herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the
ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to
one Eduardo A. Maxion that has been subsisting
when she married the respondent. Lilia, while
admitting the existence of said prior subsisting
marriage claimed that said marriage was null
and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter
said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued,
the ISSUE agreed upon by both parties was
whether the first marriage, assuming the
presence of force exerted against both parties,
was void or merely voidable.
Contesting the validity of the pre-trial
order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an
opportunity to present evidence showing that
(1) the first marriage was vitiated by force
exercised upon both her and the first husband;
and (2) the first husband was at the time of the
marriage already married to someone else.
Respondent
judge
ruled
against
the
presentation of evidence because the existence
of force exerted on both parties of the first
marriage had already been agreed upon as the
set of facts on which judgment will be based.
Hence, the petitioner filed this present case.
ISSUES:
WON the marriage between respondent
and petitioner was valid based on the
respondents first marriage being void.
RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed
judgment and acquitted the defendantappellant
RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. Even if the petitioner proves that her
first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against her and her first husband, the marriage
would still be valid until annulled since it was
merely voidable and not void. Since no
annulment was made, it is clear that when she
married respondent, she was still validly
married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent is VOID. There is
likewise no need for evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a
marriage, though void, still needs, according to
this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact.
Hence, she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with the respondent, with such marriage being
void ab initio.
Cadorna
40
332
Terre v. Terre
A.M. No. 2349 ll Jul. 3, 1992 ll Paras, J.
PETITIONER: Dorothy Terre
RESPONDENT: Atty. Jordan Terre
FACTS:
Dorothy and Jordan Terre met each other
while they were in high school, during such
time, Dorothy was already married to another
man who was allegedly her first cousin, while
Jordan was single. Jordan courted her and
continued doing so through his pursuance of
law studies, to which she decided that it was
futile but was nonetheless convinced by the
former that they could marry since her first
marriage with her first cousin, it being contrary
to public policy and morals, was void ab initio.
The two eventually got married with Jordan
convincing Dorothy that she was single and
could marry, and that there was no need for her
first marriage to be declared void by the Court.
During their relationship as spouses, Dorothy
had been supporting him through law school.
Ultimately, she conceived his child and it was
during this time when Jordan suddenly
disappeared for no apparent reason. She soon
found out that he had married another woman,
prompting her to file a case of abandonment
and bigamy, as well as an administrative case,
against her husband.
In his defense, Jordan contended that he
married Dorothy on the belief that she was
single; that when he found out about her
previous marriage, she drove him out of their
home; that the child Dorothy was carrying was
not his but her former husbands; and that he
contracted a second marriage believing in good
faith that his marriage with Dorothy was void ab
initio, she having been married already when
they contracted their marriage.
ISSUES:
WON the respondent
contracting a second marriage
is
liable
for
RULING:
The Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent
Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from
the Roll of Attorneys.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes. When the second marriage was
entered into, respondent's prior marriage with
complainant was subsisting, no judicial action
having been initiated or any judicial declaration
obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage
of respondent with complainant. Respondent
Jordan Terres defense of having believed in
good faith that his prior marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre was null, and void
ab initio and that no action for a judicial
declaration of nullity was necessary is spurious,
considering that (1) he did not rebut
complainant's evidence as to the basic facts
underscoring his bad faith; and (2) it was the
same argument he used to inveigle complainant
into believing that her prior marriage, being
incestuous and void ab initio, made her free to
contract a second marriage with him.
Respondent, being a lawyer, knew or should
have known that such an argument ran counter
to the prevailing case law of this Court which
holds that for purposes of determining whether
a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
Furthermore, even if respondents argument
about the lack of need for the judicial
declaration of marriage nullity were to be
accepted, thus rendering his first marriage to
complainant valid, it would still result to him
being criminally liable for bigamy since he
contracted his second marriage with the first
one still subsisting. This, and other
circumstances showing his flawed moral
character, are enough grounds to adjudge him
unfit to remain as a member of the Bar, as well
as inadequate to uphold the purpose and
responsibility of his gender in support of
marriage as a basic social institution.
Cadorna
41
332
Atienza v. Brillantes
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 ll Mar. 29, 1995 ll Quiason, J.
COMPLAINANT: Lupo Almodiel Atienza
RESPONDENTS: Judge Francisco Brillantes
FACTS:
Lupo A. Atienza filed a complaint against
Judge Francisco Brillantes for Gross Immorality
and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant
alleges that the respondent is cohabiting with
one Yolanda De Castro, with whom complainant
has two children. Further, complainant claims
that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has five children. For his
part, respondent alleges that complainant was
not married to De Castro, and moreover, he
denies having been married to Ongkiko,
although he admits having five children with
her. He alleges that the lack of a marriage
license in both his first and second marriage
ceremonies with Ongkiko made the same void
ab initio, and that because of it, he believed in
good faith, that when he married De Castro in
civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he
was single. Finally, respondent argues that the
provision of Article 40 of the Family Code,
which provides that a judicial declaration of
nullity was needed for remarriage, does not
apply to him considering that his first marriage
took place in 1965 and was governed by the
Civil Code of the Philippines, while the second
took place in 1991 and is governed by the
Family Code.
ISSUES:
WON respondents second marriage was
valid considering that lack of judicial declaration
of absolute nullity on his first marriage that was
contracted without a marriage license.
RULING:
The Court dismissed the respondent from
service and forfeited all his leave and
retirement benefits, and with prejudice to
reappointment in any branch, instrumentality,
or agency of the government, including
government-owned
corporations.
and
controlled
RATIO DECIDENDI
No. Under Art. 40 of the Family Code, there
must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage before a party thereto can
enter into a second one. Said Article applies to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, regardless
of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under
Art. 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired upon the application of Art.
40 to his case. Neither can he invoke good faith
as regards his belief of being single when he
married De Castro since he, being a lawyer,
should know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. He had a
chance to correct the flaw of his marriage with
Ongkiko upon their second wedding ceremony.
His failure to secure a marriage license on two
occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad
faith. Thus, it is evident that respondent failed
to meet the standard of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession. While the
deceit employed by respondent existed prior to
his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge,
his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De
Castro began and continued when he was
already in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial
Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties but also as to his behavior as a private
individual. As there is no duality of morality, a
public figure is also judged by his private life.
Cadorna
42
332
RULING:
The Court adopted the recommendation of
the Court Administrator with an increased fine
of 20,000 imposed upon the respondent Judge.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes. Respondent Judge knew or ought to
know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in
his comment, he stated that had he known that
the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another
marriage. Likewise, respondent Judge cannot
deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos
subsisting previous marriage, as the same was
clearly stated in their separate affidavits which
were subscribed and sworn to before him. The
fact that Manzano and Payao had been living
apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial, as such does not
dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize
the parties to remarry. This holds true all the
more when the separation is merely de facto, as
in the case at bar. Further, respondent Judge
cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating
that they had been cohabiting as husband and
wife for seven years. Just like separation, free
and voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least five years does not severe the tie of
a subsisting previous marriage; it is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license. It
could not serve as a justification for respondent
Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.
Clearly,
respondent
Judge
demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when
he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Cadorna
43
332
Apiag v. Cantero
Panganiban., J.
COMPLAINANTS/PLAINTIFFS: Maria Apiag, Teresita Securom, Glicerio Cantero
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT:
Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero
ANTECEDENT FACTS:
According to Maria Apiag, she and Judge
Cantero were married after living together as
husband and wife. They had 2 children, Teresita
and Glicerio. Judge Cantero then disappeared
without any apparent cause and left Maria to
raise their children alone. They suffered from
his abandonment and didn't hear from him for
many years, until they found out that he was in
Hinundayan, Southern Leyte. They asked for his
support in a letter but were ignored.
Afterwards, they found out he was already
married to Nieves Ygay and that all the public
documents required of the defendant had the
latter's name instead of Maria's as his wife.
(1993) In a letter complaint, Maria Apiag,
along with her children, Teresita and Glicerio,
charged Judge Cantero (MTC of Pinamungajan
Aloquinsan, Cebu) with Gross Misconduct for
allegedly having committed bigamy and
falsification of public documents. The Court
referred this case for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
(1994) Teresita, on behalf of her mother,
and Judge Cantero had a compromise
agreement. In it, the parties settled the case
amicably, by letting Teresita and Glicerio
receive 1/4 of the retirement money that Judge
Cantero would get, and that they would be in
included as beneficiaries of the First
Party in case of death, inherit properties
from the First party, and that Teresita is
authorized to receive and collect 4000php
monthly out of the 2nd check salary of Judge
Cantero. Also in the agreement, it was agreed
upon that there would be a voluntary
withdrawal of the case, and if this were not
done, the agreement would be void.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the first marriage with Maria Apiag is
void.
44
332
Apiag v. Cantero
Panganiban., J.
marriage is considered VALID. The Falsification
charge also does not prosper because it is based
on the Bigamy charge, which Judge Cantero was
not found guilty of.
(4) NO. Gross misconduct cannot be applicable
in this case because the acts pertain to Judge
Cantero's personal life, and have no direct
relation to his judicial function. Other than this
Quiambao
45
332
Antone v. Beronilla
G.R. No. 183824 ll Dec. 8, 2010
FACTS:
March, 12 2007: Myrna Antone,
executed an affidavit-complaint for
Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla, alleging
that her marriage with respondent in 1978
had not yet been legally dissolved when
Beronilla contracted a second marriage
with Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
Beronilla moved to quash the
information on the grounds that the
facts charged do not constitute an
offense
He declared that his marriage with
Antone was null and void by the RTC
branch 16, Nacal, Biliran on April 26
2007, and it was final and executory.
Given that it was null and void from
the beginning, there was no first
marriage and the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute the
crime of bigamy.
Prosecution pointed out that the first
marriage on Nov 18 78 has not been
severed when he contracted the second
marriage on Feb 16 91 which means that
bigamy has been executed prior to the
declaration that the 1st marriage was null
and void on April 27 2007
March 26 2008: Petitioner alleged to
the CA that the Pasay City Trial court acted
without or in excess of its jurisdictions or
with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the case of bigamy and denied
her motion for reconsideration
July 18 2008: CA denied the
respondents motion for reconsideration for
the lack of merit
ISSUE:
Quilala
46
332
Llave v. Tamano
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review on certiorari
assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CV
No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution
dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner
Estrellita
Juliano-Llaves
(Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J.
Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
FACTS:
REASON:
The marriage between the late Sen.
Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim
rites. The only law in force governing
marriage relationships between Muslim
sand non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code
of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time.
Under the marriage provisions of the Civil
Code, divorce is not recognized except
during the effectivity of Republic Act No.
394 which was not availed of during its
effectivity. As far as Estrellita is concerned,
Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda
has been severed by way of divorce under
PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim
personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1)
thereof provides that the law applies to
marriage and divorce wherein both parties
are Muslims, or wherein only the male
party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law
or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not
provide for a situation where the parties
were married both in civil and Muslim
rites.
HOLDING:
The petition is DENIED.
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage
of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083.
Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
marriage
between
Ramos
47
332
48
332
Reposar
49
332
HELD:
50
332
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
children;
(7) Interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church, and
(8) The trial must order the fiscal and the
Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels
for the State.
The
petition,
assailed
marriage
Molina
Cadorna
51
332
Reyes, N
52
332
Choa v. Choa
G.R. No. 1473376 ll Nov. 26, 2002
FACTS:
Cadorna
53
332
Antonio v. Reyes
G.R. No. 155800 ll Mar. 10, 2006 ll Tinga., J.
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do
- Tinga (2006)
PETITION:
Review on Certiorari assailing the decision
of CA. [Reversing the RTC decision: nullity of
marriage of Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne
F. Reyes]
3.
4.
5.
DECISION:
Reverse CA and affirm RTC Antonio and
Reyes marriage is null and void.
6.
FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes met in 1989 and were
married in 1990. Upon the unbearable
psychological incapacity of Reyes, Antonio left
her almost a year after. Antonio filed a petition
to declare his marriage null and void alleging
Reyes as psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of
marriage (Art 36 of FC). Antonio alleges that
Reyes persistently lied about her life, her
company, her occupation, income and
education. The acts undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust,
and respect. Both Antonio and Reyes brought in
experts to prove their individual claims. Reyes
witness used a Comprehensive PsychPathological Rating Scale, showing results that
Reyes is not psychologically incapacitated; yet
Antonios witness claims that the test is not
reliable.
TOOL OF ANALYSIS: Molina Guidelines
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage belongs to the plaintiff
2. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
7.
ISSUE:
WON Reyes conditions and actions are
bases for psychological incapacity, thus
nullifying the marriage
HELD:
(1) Antonio sufficiently proved that Reyes is
psychologically incapacitated through his
testimony and two expert witnesses who (2)
identified Reyes constant lying as pathological.
The court held that pathological jealousy and
repeated lying undermines the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses that is based on
love, trust and respect. (3) The psychological
incapacity was established on or even before
the celebration of marriage when Reyes
fabricated the existence of friends. (4) The
Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the
Catholic Church (in reference to Molina [7])
already annulled the marriage. (5) The
psychological incapacity is indeed incurable.
Antonio came back to Reyes as an attempt to
make the marriage work. Seeing that Reyes
never changed proves the incurability.
Sevilla
54
332
Dimayuga Laurena v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Darlene, filed for annulment due
to psychological incapacity of her husband due
to the following reasons:
Infidelity
Physical abuse (for having hit her face)
Abandonment of conjugal home
Stopped support for children
Trial court and CA denied petition on
grounds of insufficient evidence to declare
husband as psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE:
WON husband can be declared as
psychologically
incapacitated
therefore
rendering the marriage voidable
HELD: NO
RATIO:
Court held that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by:
1. Gravity it must be grave and serious
such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out ordinary duties required
in a marriage. (there is no evidence
there is incapacity of husband to the
assumption of marriage is due to
psychological incapacity and not merely
Tan de Guzman
55 332
Te v. Te
Feb. 13, 2009
PETITIONER:
Edward Kenneth Te
RESPONDENT: Rowena Yu-Te
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married
then separated. Petitioner filed for annulment
of marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity.
Clinical
psychologist
found
petitioner to be afflicted with Dependent
Personality Disorder (insecure, weak, gullible,
no direction in life, unable to decide without
advice), while respondent has Antisocial
Personality Disorder (disregard for others
rights, abusive, controlling without remorse,
tendency
to
blame others). Clinical
psychologist recommended annulment.
ISSUE, HOLDING, RATIO
WON personality disorders of both parties
are sufficient grounds for declaring marriage
void YES. Void ab initio per FC Art 36. Courts
must consider expert opinion as decisive
evidence. Personality disorders with their
respective features incapacitate both parties to
fulfil essential marital obligations.
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED; marriage is declared
VOID AB INITIO.
NOTES
Ordoyo
56
332
Ting v. Velez-Ting
Mar. 31, 2009 ll Nachura., J.
FACTS:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez Ting met
in medschool, fell in love, and got married. Ben
worked as an anesthesiologist in a hospital
owned by Carmen s family. They had 6 kids.
After 18 years of marriage, Carmen filed for a
petition asking for the nullity of their marriage.
According to her, Ben has psychological
incapacity because his chronic alcoholism,
violence (hurting Carmen and forcing her to
have sex), compulsive gambling habit,
irresponsibility in the failure to give regular
financial support to his family.
Dr. Pureza Trinidad Oate (psychiatrist)
compulsive gambling, physical abuse of
respondent are clear indications that husband is
suffering from a personality disorder.
Dr. Obra refuting Oate s opinion:
(stenographic notes, psychiatric evaluation of
interview with Bens brothers) nothing wrong
with petitioner s personality, considering the
latter s good relationship with his fellow doctors
and good record as anesthesiologist.
RTC nullified the marriage, saying that his
compulsive gambling, habitual alcoholism,
violence, etc, are grounds for psychological
incapacity. CA reversed the decision.
ISSUES:
1. WON CA decision violated stare decisis of
Molina and Santos cases
2. WON requirement for declaration of the
nullity of marriage has been liberalized
3. WON
petitioner
is
psychologically
incapacitated
HELD:
1. (Discussion on stare decisis, its definition
etc. similar to Legmeth. No need, and is
only procedural, not the main issue of the
case) Interpretation or construction of a law
by courts constitutes a part of the law as of
the date the statute is enacted.
2. Molina doctrine, not abandoned. In
previous cases, the set of rules evaluating
the psychological incapacity should not be
rigidly applied because no two cases are
similar. We must give weight to the
authority of the expert opinion, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability.
TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE IS ENOUGH, to
sustain a finding, not only on the factors
provided above.
3. Marriage VALID, Reversed CA ruling.
Petitioner failed to prove the pre-existing
psychological defect prior marriage, there
are two conflicting expert opinions but
more weight is given to Dr. Obra s findings
because of the extent of his evaluation
(used a report from a third psychiatrist from
South Africa). Semper praesumitur promatrimonio. Presumption is always in favor
of the validity of marriage. Totality of
evidence is inadequate to declare him
psychologically unfit. Although the Court
condones the behavior or the husband for
no rational explanation could be made. He
owes love, respect and fidelity to his wife,
as much as the latter owes the same to him.
Tiangco
57
332
Suazo v. Suazo
Mar. 10, 2010
PETITIONER:
RESPONDENT:
Jocelyn M. Suazo
Angelito Suazo and Republic of the Philippines
DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity as a ground for
void marriages (FC, Article 36): The mere
testimony of the spouse is not sufficient
evidence to prove the psychological incapacity
of the other spouse and to render their
marriage void ab initio.
NATURE OF PETITION:
On July 14, 2004, petitioner filed an
appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals that reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 119, Pasay City
on January 29, 1999. The reversed RTC decision
nullified the petitioners marriage with the
respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
FACTS:
On June 1985, Jocelyn (petitioner) and
Angelito (respondent) met for the first time
in Bian, Laguna when the both of them were
only 16 years of age.
After months of courtship, Jocelyn went
with Angelito and his friends to their trip to
Manila. They stayed there for three days.
Upon being gone for three days, their parents
went to look for them and when the former
found them, they were brought back to
Laguna.
Not long after that incident, their
marriage was arranged. They were married on
March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the
Mayor of Bian.
The two were forced to stop schooling.
And because they had no means to support
their new family, the couple lived with
Angelitos parents first.
Jocelyn was the one who supported the
family. She worked as a household helper for
the relatives of Angelito. The husband, on the
other hand, refused to work and became a
drunkard instead. Whenever Jocelyn will urge
Angelito to find work, the latter will only be
infuriated and their discussion will lead to a
violent quarrel.
Yumol
58
332
Suazo v. Suazo
Mar. 10, 2010
Her aunts testimony
- Corroborated
testimony
parts
of
Jocelyn's
Yumol
59
332
Suazo v. Suazo
Mar. 10, 2010
not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality
are convenient excuses of parties to separate
and divorce.
Jocelyn filed another petition for the
reversal of the CA ruling and it included
the following arguments:
The Court of Appeals went beyond
what the law says, as it totally disregarded
the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the
marriage null and void.
Article 36 of the Family Code did not
define psychological incapacity; this omission
was intentional to give the courts a wider
discretion to interpret the term.
ISSUE:
WON there is a basis to nullify their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
NO.
RATIO:
The Court finds Jocelyns evidence
insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological
incapacity to perform essential marital
obligations.
Expert Opinion Evidence: Both the
psychologists testimony and the psychological
report did not conclusively show the root
cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos
alleged
psychological
condition.
The
psychologist
evaluated
Angelitos
psychological condition only from the
testimony of Jocelyn.
It is not mandated that a personal
examination must be done because there are
times when this is not entirely possible;
however, there are other measures on how a
Yumol
60
332
Marable v. Marable
PETITIONER:
Rosalino Marable
RESPONDENT: Myrna Marable
FACTS:
Petitioner and Respondent met while the
Petitioner was still in college, courted
(notwithstanding petitioner already having a
girlfriend at the time) and eventually eloped
and were married in civil rites in Tanay, Rizal,
followed by a church wedding. They had five
children. However, after a few years, they
began to argue incessantly, the frequency of
their fights being exacerbated by the
petitioners extra-marital affair and failed
business ventures. Eventually, the petitioner
left the family home and stayed with his sister
in Antipolo. He gave up all his property to his
wife and children and converted to Islam after
dating several women. Eventually, Petitioner
filed for nullity of marriage on grounds of
psychological incapacity to fulfill essential
obligations of marriage; he cited his
underprivileged background and the influence
of a father who was a womanizer and a
gambler; he alleged feelings of misery and
lonelinss throughout his life from childhood to
college. In his petition, he cited the
psychological report of Dr. Tayug which stated
he had Anti- Social Personality Disorder,
rooted in deep feeling of rejection from family
to peers, and leading to experiences of selfabsorbed need for attention. Dr. Tayags
report concluded that the petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations.
Trial Court ruled for the nullity of the
marriage, based on Dr. Tayugs report.
OSG filed for an appeal, and the Appellate
Court reversed the Trial Courts decision based
on a lack of legal and factual bases: it ruled
that the petitioner failed to establish the
existence of psychological incapacity, that the
Alampay
61
332
Marable v. Marable
Code, there must be a severe psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the
marriage has been celebrated; a mental
incapacity rendering the party incapable of
giving meaning and significance to the
marriage he or she has contractedthe party
must be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Among the guidelines laid down by
Republic vs. CA for psychological incapacity are
the ff.:
i. Burden of proof rests on the plaintiff; any
doubt is to be resolved in favor of the
continuation of marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity
ii. Root cause of psychological incapacity
must be: a) medically/clinically identified,
b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently
proven by experts and d) clearly explained
in the decision
iii. Incapacity must be proven to be existing
at the time of the celebration of the
marriage
iv. Such incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or
incurable
v. Such illness should be grave enough to
bring about disability of the party to
assume essential obligations of marriage
vi. Essential martial obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 6871 of the Family
Code as regards husband and wife, as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the Code as
regards parents and their children
vii. Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
neither controlling nor decisive, should be
given great respect
viii. Trial Court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
Alampay
62
332
63
332
* ISSUE on prescription by CA in
passing: while action to declare the nullity
of a marriage considered void from the
beginning does not prescribe, the law
nonetheless requires that the same action
must be filed by the proper party
Bayona
64
332
Ninal v. Badayog
G.R. No. 133778 ll Mar. 14, 2000 ll Ynares-Santiago., J.
PETITIONERS: Engrace Nial for Herself and as Guardian of the minors Babyline Nial, Ingrid Nial,
Archie Nial and Pepito Nial, Jr.
RESPONDENT: Norma Badayog
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa
Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie,
petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito
to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985. 1
year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage
license. Instead, they instituted an affidavit
stating that they had lived together for at least
5 years, therefore exempting them from
securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a
car accident on February 19, 1977. After his
death, petitioners filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between
Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage
was void for lack of marriage license.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the charge on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an
action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
WON the second marriage of Pepito was
void for a lack of a marriage license
WON the heirs of the deceased may file
for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos
marriage after his death
RULING:
The petition is GRANTED, and the assailed
Order of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
YES. They cannot be exempted even
though they instituted an affidavit and
claimed that they have cohabited for at least
5 years, since their cohabitation was not the
type contemplated by law, he having been
still married to his first wife when he started
cohabiting with Norma. The five-year period
of cohabitation that exempts couples from
acquiring a marriage license should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In their case, since a legal
impediment was existing, they cannot be
deemed to have been exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license, which lack
thereof resulted to the status of the second
marriage as void ab initio.
Cadorna
65
332
Domingo v. CA
G.R. No. 104818 ll Sep. 17, 1993 ll Romero., J.
PETITIONER:
RESPONDENTS:
Roberto Domingo
Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad Avera, represented by her Attorney-inFact Moises R. Avera
FACTS:
than remarriage.
HELD:
Cristobal
66
332
Cruz
67
332
Dio v. Dio
G.R. No. 178044 ll Carpio., J.
DOCTRINE:
Void marriages under Art 36 have coownership as their property regime.
FACTS:
Alain and Caridad were childhood
sweethearts who started living together in
1984 until they decided to separate in 1994.
They decided to live together again and in
98 they got married. Alain filed for the
nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Their marriage was
declared void ab initio and their properties
dissolved.
(However, Caridad was in US and filed and
granted a divorce even before the filing of the
case in CFI. She was already married to
another man.)
ISSUE:
WON there was an error in the order that
the absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties under Art 147
HELD:
NO. The property regime of void
marriages falls under Art 147 and 148. The
relationship of the parties can be
Dantes
68
332
Moe v. Dinkins
533 F.Supp. 623 (1981), 669 F.2d 67 (1982)
FACTS:
Raoul (who was 18) wanted to marry Maria
(who was 15). They lived together and had a
child (Ricardo). However, in order to get a
marriage license, they needed parental consent,
which Maria's mother would not give. Maria's
mother wanted to continue getting welfare
benefits from her minor child, and would lose
the benefits if Maria married.
Raoul, Maria, and Ricardo sued (in Federal
Court) to have the New York parental consent
requirement declared and unconstitutional
violation of due process.
In New York, parental consent was required
for those under 18.
Another underage couple (Pedro (17) and
Cristina (15 and pregnant)) intervened to turn
this into a class action suit.
ISSUE:
WON The New York parental consent
requirement violates due process.
HELD: DISMISSED.
RATIO:
The Trial Court found that while minors do
have constitutional rights, courts have long
recognized the government's power to make
adjustments to the constitutional rights of
minors. For example, children can't get driver's
licenses or buy alcohol.
De Castro
69
332
Katipunan v. Tenorio
O.G. No. 43442 ll Sep. 29, 1937
ISSUE:
HELD:
1. NO
2. NO
- Principles of declaration of insanity
o Generally insanity admitted, or
once proved, is presumed to
continue, the burden to prove
the allegation is on the person
making it
o Once insanity has existed, it is
sought to be proved that a
subsequent act of its subject
was done in a lucid interval
- Admittance of plaintiff that during
the nuptial ceremony, he did not
Dilag
70
332
Dolot
71
332
Aquino v. Delizo
G.R. No. L-15853 ll Jul. 27, 1960
FACTS:
Enad
72
332
Anaya v. Palaroan
G.R. No. L- 27390 ll Nov. 26, 1970
Espaola
73
332
Ruiz v. Atienza
FACTS:
Jose Ruiz, the plaintiff, and Pelagia Atienza,
the defendant, were sweethearts in 1938. Nine
months later, they had a baby outside of
marriage which resulted in Pelagias father,
cousin-in-law and three other persons visiting
Ruiz in his boarding house and convincing him
into marrying Pelagia. After some discussion,
they including Pelagiasecured a marriage
license and solemnized their wedding at an
Aglipayan church.
Four days later, Ruiz brought suit trying to
annul the marriage by saying that he has been
forced into wedlock. He said he only went with
them that afternoon because he was
convinced due to the following reasons: he
was threatened by Pelagias father with a
balisong; her cousin-in-law told him that if he
doesnt marry Pelagia, he would have trouble in
the bar exams because many were rejected on
the ground of immorality; and he would be
physically safe if he goes with them.
ISSUE:
WON being forced into marriage (due to
threats and intimidation) is enough reason to
annul their marriage.
HELD:
No, their marriage cannot be annulled.
First, the Court reviewed his arguments:
- The threats from the father only came after
he said that he cannot marry Pelagia due to
the fact that he was already married. This
made Mr. Atienza grab him by his necktie,
exclaiming So you mean to fool my
daughter!
Flares
of
anger
are
understandable and also, it wasnt
sufficiently established that the father
displayed any balisong or made any threat
against the life of Ruiz.
As to the threat to obstruct his admission to
the Bar, it is not considered such duress as
to constitute an annulment of marriage.
(and where a man marries under the
threat of, or constraint from, a lawful
prosecution for seduction or bastardy, he
cannot avoid the marriage on the ground of
duress - 38 C.J., sec. 70, p. 1305)
Promise of him being safe was only said
to make him feel secure since he was afraid
of the possible bodily harm he might endure
in retaliation for the dishonor he inflicted
upon her family.
Falcone
74
332
HELD:
FACTS:
Hermosisima
75
332
Sarao v. Guevara
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE:
B. Sarao
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT: Pilar Guevara
FACTS:
o Plaintiff and defendant were married and
on the same day, plaintiff tried to have
carnal knowledge of defendant. The later
showed reluctance and begged him to
wait until evening. Although he found the
orifice of her vagina sufficiently large for
his organ, she complained of pains in her
private part later that night. Plaintiff also
noticed oozing of some purulent matter
offensive to the smell coming from
defendants vagina.
o Every attempt to have carnal access to his
wife proved to be futile because she always
complained of pains in her genital organs.
o Upon the advice of the physician,
defendants uterus and ovaries were,
with consent of the plaintiff removed due
to the presence of a tumor. The removal of
said organs rendered defendant incapable
of procreation.
o Plaintiff declared that from the time he
witnessed the operation, he lost all desire
to have access with his wife and thus filed
this complaint for annulment of marriage
on the ground of impotency.
ISSUE:
WON their marriage can be annulled on the
ground of physical impotency.
HELD:
No. Judgment of the Court of First Instance
affirmed.
RD:
o Plaintiff wants to construe the phrase
physically incapable of entering into the
married state as with the capacity to
procreate. Impotency is not the ability
to procreate but the ability to copulate.
Defect must be one of copulation and not
of reproduction. Bareness will not
invalidate the marriage.
o The removal of the organs rendered her
sterile but it by no means made her unfit
for sexual intercourse. It would appear that
it was the memory of this first unpleasant
experience with her that made him gave up
the idea of having carnal knowledge of her.
o Defendant was not impotent at the time
she married the plaintiff for the existence
of tumor did not necessarily render her
incapable of copulation.
o Plaintiff also contends that his consent of
the marriage was procured through fraud
in that the defendant did not reveal to him
that she was afflicted with a disease in her
sex organs. According to the Court, this
contention in untenable since fraud is not
alleged in the complaint and has not been
proved at the trial.
Macariola
76
332
SSS v. De Bailon
Mar. 6, 1937
FACTS: (Im narrating it in a more chronological
way than found in the courts description)
ISSUE:
WON the marriage between Escano and
Hortiguela is void.
HELD:
The validity of the second marriage was
upheld by the court. According to the court, the
7- year requirement should be counted from
the last known sighting of the spouse absent,
not from the courts official declaration.
Therefore, Jones should have counted from
the 10 th of January
1918 which was the last sighting of her
father. Court pointed out that both Escano and
Angelita believed Arthur Jones to be dead as
proven by the fact that she grew up recognizing
Hortiguela as her stepfather.
(There was also a brief discussion regarding the
fact that the marriage between Hortiguela and
Escano was not present in the civil register.
Court held that the marrying parties are not to
be held liable, nor the marriage invalidated, for
the failure of the solemnizing official to
transmit the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary. Just in case maam
touches on this issue)
** also note: For the purposes of the civil
marriage law, it is not required to have the
former spouse judicially declared absent. Such
declaration is only required for the
administration of the estate of the absentee.
Marin
77
332
SSS v. De Bailon
FACTS:
In 1955, Clemente Bailon contracted
marriage with Alice P. Diaz in Barcelona,
Sorsogon. After 15 years Bailon filed beofre the
Court of First Instance a petition to declare Alice
presumptively dead. The CFI granted the
petition. After 13 years from the granting of the
petition Bailon contracted another marriage
with Teresita Jarque.
Bailon died soon after and since he was a
member of the SSS, Teresita filed a claim for
funeral benefits and was granted P 12.000.
Siblings Cecilia and Norma who claimed to be
daughters of Bailon and a certain Elisa Jayona
contested the release of funeral benefits,
submitting an affidavit stating that Alice was
very much alive. A certain Hermes Diaz who was
the brother of Alice likewise filed an affidavit
claiming the same.
The SSS then cancelled the payment of the
funeral expenses and death pension, ordering
Teresita to return the P 12,000. Their ground
was that the granted petition to declare Alice
presumptively dead was not final, and that
Bailon who deserted his wife in bad faith made
the subsequent marriage bigamous and
therefore void.
Alice herself also reappeared, asserting that
she was the lawful wife of Bailon, and that she
was not really absent since she just lived with
her parents in the same town of Barcelona. The
SSC then found Teresita as a common-law wife
and therefore not entitled to Bailon's benefits.
In a petition brought about by the
respondent before the Court of Appeals, the
appellate court sided with the respondent,
saying that the SSS wrongly declared the
Nuez
78
332
Yu v. Yu
G.R. No. 164915 ll Mar. 10, 2006 ll Carpio-Morales., J.
PETITIONER:
ERIC JONATHAN YU
RESPONDENT: CAROLINE T. YU
FACTS:
Eric Jonathan Yu (petitioner) filed a petition
for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals
alleging that his estranged wife Caroline
Tanchay-Yu (respondent) unlawfully withheld
from him the custody of their minor child
Bianca.
Subsequently, respondent filed a petition
against petitioner before the Pasig Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for declaration of nullity of
marriage and dissolution of the absolute
community of property. The petition included a
prayer for the award to her of the sole custody
of Bianca and for the fixing of schedule of
petitioners visiting rights subject only to the
final and executory judgment of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68460.
Appellate court thereafter awarded
petitioner full custody of Bianca during the
pendency of the habeas corpus case. Appellate
court later on also ordered respondent to
amend her petition before the Pasig RTC which
she did. However, citing a change in address
and constraints on resources, respondent
dismissed her petition in the Pasig RTC.
Respondent filed her own petition for
habeas corpus for the custody of Bianca this
time in the Pasay City RTC.
ISSUES:
WON question of custody over Bianca
should be held before the Pasay RTC, if not the
Pasig RTC
WON writ of habeas corpus is available to
determine the custodial right of parents over
their children
HELD:
NO. Pasig RTC has jurisdiction over the
Pagdanganan
79
332
HELD:
YES. Adultery is a crime of result and not of
tendency. Each time you have sex constitutes a
crime of adultery. The two parties may be the
same, but this does not argue against the
commission of the crime.
There is no constitutional or legal provision
that bars the filing of as many complaints for
adultery as there were adulterous acts
committed, each constituting one crime.
Two reasons why there is no double
jeopardy in this case:
1) A continuous crime exists if there is unity of
criminal intent or purpose. In this case this
does not apply. Basically, the times they
had sex after the filing of the first complaint
are separate and distinct crimes.
2) Another reason why there was no double
jeopardy in this case is because after the
first complaint, Bondoc does not have the
defense that he did know the wife was
married anymore. If this were double
jeopardy and the second complaint
quashed, Bondoc would go unpunished.
Poblador
80
332
ISSUES:
Whether the maltreatments that the
appellant suffered at the hands of the
respondent after their separation of dwelling,
which allegedly occurred in Dec. 1950 or Jan.
1951 and September 1951, furnish ground for
legal separation applied for under Art. 97(2) CC. > NO
HELD:
Decision appealed from is affirmed.
RATIO:
In the case at hand, we only look at the
alleged maltreatments that occurred after the
separation as the ones previous couldn't have
amounted to attempts on the life of the wife
because she didn't institute any action for legal
separation then.
Art. 97 NCC states that:
A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife
and for concubinage on the part of the
husband as defined in the Penal Code; or
(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life
of the other.
An attempt on the life of another requires
the intention to kill. Without proof of such, a
person cannot be convicted of attempted or
frustrated murder. According to RPC 2nd Ed.
Bk. 2 part 1 of Dean Francisco, "it is absolutely
necessary that the homicidal intent be
evidenced by adequate acts to produce the
death of the victim."
We see here that the respondent only
used are his bare fists at most and desisted
from giving further chastisement after the
first blows were given at the spur of the
impulse.
**The Court points out that this being a civil
case, only preponderance of evidence is
necessary, however, the petitioner should
have filed a case against her husband for
attempted parricide and have him prosecuted
Quiambao
81
332
Quiambao
82
332
Gandionco v. Pearanda
PETITIONER: Froilan Gandionco
RESPONDENT: Hon. Seven Penaranda and Teresita Gandionco
This is a special civil action for certiorari, with
application for injunction, to annul the Order of
the respondent Judge ordering Froilan to pay
support pendente lite to Teresita and their
child, and the Order of the same respondent
Judge, dated 5 August 1987, denying
petitioner's motion to suspend hearings in the
action for legal separation filed against him by
private respondent as well as his motion to
inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing
and trying the case.
FACTS:
29 May 1986: Teresita filed with the RTC of
Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, presided
over by respondent Judge, a complaint against
petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage.
13 October 1986: Teresita also filed a
criminal case to the MTC of General Santos City,
a complaint against petitioner for concubinage.
Froilan claims that the civil action for legal
separation and the application for support
pendente lite, should be suspended in view of
the criminal case for concubinage filed against
him the private respondent
He cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure:
- SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from
offenses. Whenever the offended
party shall have instituted the civil
action to enforce the civil liability
arising
from
the
offense.
as
contemplated in the first Section 1
hereof, the following rules shall be
observed: (a) After a criminal action has
been commenced the pending civil
action arising from the same offense
shall be suspended, in whatever stage it
may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been
rendered.
ISSUE:
Quilala
83
332
Gandionco v. Pearanda
legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary. DISMISSED
Quilala
84
332
Lapuz v. Eufemio
FACTS:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for
legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio
(married civilly and canonically) from 1934 to
1943 until her husband abandoned her. They
had no child; however, acquired properties
during their marriage.
She discovered her husband cohabiting with
a Chinese woman named Go Hiok.
She prayed for an issuance for a decree of
legal separation. (Also, that the defendant
Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his
share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio S. Eufemio counter-claimed for the
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage
with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy on the ground of his
prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok.
Trial commenced but before it could be
completed, Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular
accident.
Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for
legal separation" on two (2) grounds
- Petition for legal separation was filed
beyond the one-year period provided
for in Article 102 of the Civil Code
- Death of Carmen abated the action for
legal separation
Counsel for petitioner substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
Lapuz. Eufemio opposed the motion.
Court dismissed the case. Plaintiffs cause of
action did not survive.
Eufemio acquiesced with the dismissal of
his counterclaims by praying for the affirmance
of the order that dismissed not only the
petition for legal separation but also his
counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz
marriage to be null and void ab initio.
ISSUE:
MAIN - WON the death of the plaintiff
before a final decree in an action for legal
separation abates the action
SUB(?) - WON it will also apply if the action
involved property rights
HELD:
An action for legal separation which
involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses is purely personal. It
is recognized in Article 100 of the Civil Code
where only the innocent spouse has the right
to claim for legal separation. On the other
hand, Article 108 provides the spouses to stop
or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered
through reconciliation. Since it is personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party
to the action causes the death of the action
itself
- Death has settled the question of
separation beyond all controversy and
deprived the court of jurisdiction
Further, an action for legal separation is
abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved. These rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical
and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would
necessarily
remain
unborn.
Ramos
85
332
HELD
NO. The Court held that the defendant is
not guilty of abandonment of his wife nor abuse
of his administrative powers. To entitle the
plaintiff to any of the remedies she asks for,
under article 178, there must be real
abandonment, and not mere separation. The
abandonment must not only be physical
estrangement but also amount to financial and
moral desertion. The Court believes that the
defendant did not intend to leave his family
permanently. The facts show that he continued
to give support in his absence, thus he was not
guilty of abandonment as it was held in People
v Schelske where abandonment meant an act of
separation with intent that it shall be perpetual,
since contributing to their support negatived
such intent.
The Court also believed that there was
insufficient evidence to prove that the
defendant had married and was living with a
concubine.
The Court believed that the defendants
refusal to inform the plaintiff of the progress
and status of their family businesses does not
constitute abuse. Abuse connotes willful and
utter disregard of the interest of the
partnership, evidenced by a repetition of
deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to
the latter, which is not the case for the
defendant.
Courts must need exercise judicial restraint
and reasoned hesitance in ordering a separation
of conjugal properties because the basic policy
of the law is homiletic, to promote healthy
family life and to preserve the union of the
spouses, in person, in spirit and in property.
Consistent with its policy of discouraging a
regime of separation as not in harmony with
the unity of the family and the mutual affection
and help expected of the spouses, the Civil
Code (both old and new) requires that
separation of property shall not prevail unless
expressly stipulated in marriage settlements
before the union is solemnized or by formal
judicial decree during the existence of the
Reposar
86
332
Reposar
87
332
Reyes, G.
88
332
People v. Sensano
G.R. No. 37720 ll Mar. 7, 1933
FACTS:
ISSUE:
NO.
The husband was assuming a mere pose
when he signed the complaint as the
offended spouse.
Based on the evidence and his conduct,
he CONSENTED to the adulterous
relations of his wife and her lover;
therefore he is unauthorized to institute
the criminal proceeding.
o Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as
follows:
"Prosecution of the crimes of
adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The crimes of
adultery and concubinage shall not
be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended
spouse.
"The offended party cannot
institute
criminal
prosecution
without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor,
in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the
offenders."
Reyes, N.
89
332
Ocampo v. Florenciano
FACTS:
Jose De Ocampo was married to Serafina
Florenciano in 1938.
After several years of marriage, Jose
learned of Serafinas illicit relations with many
men, including a Jose Arcalas. He then sent her
to Manila as student of Beauty Culture.
Until in 1955, after having been
abandoned by Serafina, Luis caught her in the
act of having illicit relations with one Nelson
Orzame.
Thereafter, he filed a petition for legal
separation on the ground of adultery.
Serafina did not answer the suit and
when interviewed by the fiscal, (Art. 101
NCC) she admitted to having sexual relations
with several men.
Believing there was confession of
judgment on the part of Serafina, condonation
or consent to the adultery and prescription,
since it was in 1951 when Luis learned of the
illicit relations but only filed the case in 1955,
the court of first instance of Nueva Ecija and the
Court of Appeals dismissed the case on the
grounds of Article 101 of the NCC.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court?
HELD: Yes.
NOTE: the case deals with the adultery of
the wife with Orzame (1955), as the adultery
committed by her with Arcalas (1951) has
prescribed when this case was filed in 1955,
4 years too late. (Art 102 NCC)
Roa
90
332
Sargent v. Sargent
COMPLAINT:
Donald Sargent is filing for divorce with
Frances Sargent because of an allegation of
adultery.
RULING: No adultery took place.
FACTS:
Donald and Frances Sargent are married
since September 22, 1909. Donald filed a
petition charging Frances of committing
adultery (1) on various days in November
1917 with an unknown man; (2) at an
unknown time and place where she contracted
gonorrhea; (3) based on her relationship with
Charles Simmons. In order to prove the
occurrence of adultery, he did not come home
on two occasions and facilitated a scenario
framing Frances committing adulterous acts
with Charles. Donald gathered the help of
servants in his household to provide
testimonies of Frances alleged adulterous acts
such as:
[Ida Lewis] that Frances discussed the
issue of the possibility of interracial
marriage (which was considered against
morals at that time)
[Charlotte Lunford] that Charles is
always at Frances room, sometimes even
going there three times a day.
[Viola Jones] that Frances and Charles
drink and laugh together from time to time
[Mack Jetter] that Frances invited
Charles to her room dressed in her
nightgown, pulling Charles toward her.
Donald also hired detectives Tienken and
Wilsdon to listen to the conversations between
Frances and Charles through a dictograph which
both claim that Frances called Charles as
Dearie.
(Not surprisingly), Frances and Charles
Sevilla
91
332
Brown v. Yambao
FACTS:
1955 Brown filed for legal separation from
his wife Yambao due to adultery while he was in
the internment camp during the Japanese
invasion his wife had a baby with another man,
which he learned on 1945 upon his release. The
wife failed to answer and was held in default.
The City Fiscal conducted an investigation and
found that Brown also lived martially with
another woman and had a child with her after
his release.
ISSUE:
WON prosecuting officer is limited to
finding out if there is collusion
HELD: NO
RATIO:
Court held that according to CC ART. 100.
The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation or of consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, legal separation cannot be claimed
by either of them. Collusion between the
parties to obtain legal separation shall cause
the dismissal of the petition.
Tan de Guzman
92
332
Bugayong v. Ginez
G.R. No. L-10033 ll Dec. 28, 1956
PETITION:
Petition for appeal of the dismissal of the
CA on the legal separation case of the
petitioner, on the grounds of adultery
ISSUE:
WON the act of sleeping with his wife
constitutes condonation of the act of adultery,
thus being a valid defense for legal separation
FACTS:
Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy,
married Ginez on 1949
After some time, when husband went
back to the US again, he began receiving
letters from Valeriana Polangco, his sisterin-law, and some anonymous writers,
alleging acts of infidelity of his wife (1951)
A letter from his wife, which he said that he
destroyed, said that a certain 'Eliong' kissed her
(1952) he went to Pangasinan and stayed
with his wife for 2 nights & 1 day
He tried to verify from his wife the
veracity of the info, but she just packed
hear things and left.
Despite the answer, he kept on looking
for her, and upon failing to do so, went to
igloos Norte "to soothe his wounded
feelings"
(1952) husband filed a case of legal
separation at the CFI of Pangasinan, but was
dismissed on the issue of condonation of
husband of the acts of the wife
HELD:
YES it is an act of condonation
Defined as the forgiveness of a marital
offense constituting a ground for legal
separation;
conditional
forgiveness
or
remission of a matrimonial offense
We are assuming that plaintiff's line
of conduct that he really believed his
wife guilty of adultery, as the issue on
the letters are not on question
According to American jurisprudence, any
cohabitation with the guilty party, after the
commission of the offense, and the
knowledge of such by the injured party, will
amount
to
conclusive
evidence
of
condonation, but this presumption may be
rebutted by evidence.
Even a singular voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties ordinarily is
sufficient to constitute condonation, and if they
lived in the same house, it is presumed that
they live on matrimonial cohabitation
Art. 100 of the civil code states that legal
separation may be claimed by the innocent
spouse provided that there had been no
condonation or consent.
Tiangco
93
332
Matubis v. Praxedes
Oct. 25, 1960 ll Paredes, J.
Plaintiff-Appellant: Socorro Matubis
Defendant-Appellee: Zoilo Praxedes
DOCTRINE:
Consent: Under Article 100 of the Civil
Code, legal separation may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse, provided that there is no
condonation of the adultery or concubinage.
This condonation may be express or implied;
Prescription: Under Article 102 of the new Civil
Code, an action for legal separation cannot be
filed except within one year from and after the
date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of
the cause.
NATURE OF PETITION:
Plaintiff-appellant appealed from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur dismissing her complaint for
legal separation and change of surname based
on the alleged abandonment and concubinage
of the defendant-appellee. Her reasons for the
appeal are: (1) the lower Court erred in having
considered that the period to bring action had
already elapsed, and (2) that there was consent
on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage.
FACTS:
In January 1943, Socorro Matibus (plaintiff)
and Zoilo Praxedes (defendant) legally married
at Iriga, Camarines Sur.
In May 1944, the couple agreed to live from
each other because they could not agree on
how to live as husband and wife.
In April 1948, plaintiff and defendant
entered into an agreement, with the significant
portion (to the case) provided below:
(b) That both without any interference
by any of us, nor either of us can
prosecute the other for adultery or
concubinage or any other crime or suit
arising from our separation.
In January 1955, defendant began
cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado and they
deported themselves as husband and wife. In
September of the same year, their common
RATIO:
(1) Based on their interpretation by the
Court of Article 102 of the new Civil
Code, the complaint was indeed filed
outside the periods provided for in the
Article. By the very admission of
plaintiff, she came to know the
concubinage in January, 1955, but she
only instituted the complaint only on
April 24, 1956.
(2) Condonation and consent on the part of
plaintiff are necessarily the quoted
Yumol
94
332
Matubis v. Praxedes
Oct. 25, 1960 ll Paredes, J.
paragraph of the agreement. The
condonation and consent here are not
only implied but expressed.
As a matter of fact, the counsel of the
plaintiff does agree with the courts decision
that the complaint should be dismissed;
however, it does not agree that it should be
dismissed based on the grounds laid out by the
lower Court. They argue that it should be based
on the fact that the couple have already been
Yumol
95
332
Contreras v. Macaraig
Petitioner: Elena Contreras
Respondent: Cesar Macaraig
FACTS:
Contreras and Macaraig were married in
1952, and had three children.
1958: couple acquired rights, as lessee and
purchaser under a conditional sale agreement,
to own a house and lot in Philamlife Homes in
QC, where they transferred. Installments paid
by wifes father. Spouses own no other conjugal
property.
Shortly before 1961 election: Macaraig,
manager
of
wifes
fathers
printing
establishment MICO offset, met Lily Ann Alcala,
who places orders with said company for
progpaganda materials for Sergio Osmena, vicepresidential candidate; after elections, husband
resigned from MICO offset to be a special agent
at Malacanang. He began to be away from
home often and to come home very late; when
wife asked why, husband explained busy with
series of confidential missions.
Sept 1962: Avelino Lubos, family driver, told
wife that husband was living in singalong with
Lily Ann Alcala.
Oct 1962: upon husbands return to
conjugal home, wife refrained from verifying
Lubos report in her desire not to anger/drive
husband away.
April 1963: wife heard rumors husband was
seen with a woman on dasmarinas st
May 1963: wife desisted from discussing
matter with husband; did not want to
precipitate quarrel
Husband would come home for a few days;
would be gone for about a month
After receiving reports that Lily Ann Alcala
had given birth to baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima
Antioquia, her fathers employee, to verify the
reports. Family drove Antioquia to the singalong
house where she saw husband carrying a baby
in his arms. She went to the Singalong parish
priest and inquired about the child of Cesar
Macaraig and Lily Ann Alcala, and was given a
copy of the baptismal certificate of Maria Vivien
Mageline Macaraig which she gave to wife in
Oct, 1963.
Alampay
96
332
Contreras v. Macaraig
Requirement of law on one-year period
after cognizance by plaintiff of cause is not of
prescriptive nature, but is of essence of the
cause of action, based on principle of marriage
as an inviolable social institution
Lower court has to find wife became
cognizant of husbands infidelity in Sept. 1962;
wife made attempts to induce husband to
amend his erring ways but failed; her desire to
bring him back to connubial fold and preserve
family solidarity deterred her from taking timely
legal action
ISSUES:
Whether one-year period from timely legal
action pursuant to Art. 102 of the Civil Code
should be counted from Sept 1962 (drivers
report) or from Dec. 1963 (filing for complaint)
RULING:
SC set aside appealed decision and hold
wife entitled to legal separation, remanding
case to lower court for appropriate
proceedings.
five years from after date when such cause
occurred is not involved
Sept 1962: wife had knowledge of
husbands infidelity based solely on family
driver; she thought it best not to go deeper into
the matter in the hopes, notwithstanding
husbands obvious neglect, that he would
return; when her husband did return in
October, she refrained from bringing up the
matter of marital infidelity
Alampay
97
332
Bayona
98
332
De La Via v. Villareal
G.R. No. L- 13982 ll Jul. 31, 1920 ll Johnson, J.
PETITIONER:
Diego De La Vina
RESPONDENTS: Judge Antonio Villareal and Narcisa Geopano
FACTS:
Narcissa Geopan filed a complaint of
divorce in RTC Iloilo against her husband, Diego
de la Vina, on the ground of concubinage. Due
to said illicit relationship between her husband
and one Ana Calog, she was ejected from the
conjugal home in Guijulngan, Negros
Occidental, and thereafter forced to establish
her habitual residence in the city of Iloilo, with
no means to support herself other than through
the expense of one of her daughters. Thus, she
prayed for a decree of divorce, partition of
conjugal property, and alimony pendente. After
filing the complaint, she presented a motion for
preliminary injunction to restrain her husband,
who was the sole administrator of their
conjugal property, from alienating or
encumbering the same. Respondent Judge
Villareal granted the motion, prompting the
husband to file this present case of petition for
certiorari on the ground that the judge had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and
that exceeded his power and authority in
issuing the preliminary injunction.
ISSUES:
WON the wife validly acquired a residence
or domicile separate from that of her husband
during the subsistence of their marriage
WON in an action for divorce, where
conjugal property is concerned, a preliminary
injunction may be ISSUEd to restrain a spouse
from alienating/encumbering conjugal property
during the pendency of the action
Cadorna
99
332
Cristobal
100 332
Baez v. Baez
G.R. No. 132592 & 133628 ll Jan. 23, 2002
PETITIONER: AIDA P. BAEZ
RESPONDENT: GABRIEL B. BAEZ
FACTS:
On September 23, 1996, Cebu RTC made
the following decisions:
The legal separation of Aida Baez and
Gabriel Baez on the ground husbands
sexual infidelity
The dissolution of their conjugal property
relations and the division of the net
conjugal assets
The forfeiture of husbands one-half share
in the net conjugal assets in favor of the
common children
The payment to wifes counsel of the sum of
P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken
from her share in the net assets
The surrender by husband of the use and
possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and
the smaller residential house located at
Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to wife
and the common children within 15 days
from receipt of the decision
Aida then filed an urgent ex-parte motion to
modify the decision, specifically on the payment
attorneys fees, which was granted by the RTC.
She also filed a motion for moral and exemplary
damages, which was denied by the court, and
another motion for execution pending appeal
regarding the husbands expulsion from the
conjugal residential house and the surrender of
the Mazda vehicle, which was granted by the
court.
Gabriel elevated the case to the CA, which
set aside RTCs ruling on the execution of
judgment pending appeal of the assets and
denied Aidas motion for reconsideration, which
gave rise to the instant petitions.
ISSUES:
(1) WON execution of judgment pending
appeal was justified
(2) WON multiple appeals are allowed in an
action for legal separation
RULING:
Petitions denied for lack of merit. Affirmed
CAs decision (to set aside execution of
judgment pending appeal)
RATIO:
(1) No. Based on the courts prior ruling in the
case Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, execution
pending appeal is allowed when superior
circumstances
demanding
urgency
outweigh the damages that may result from
the issuance of the writ. In this case, court
sees that there is no superior or urgent
circumstance that outweighs the damage
which Gabriel would suffer if he were
ordered to vacate the house, as Aida has,
according to the husband, two houses and
lots in the US where she is a permanent
resident.
(2) No. Legal separation is not subject to
multiple appeals. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live
separately, dissolution and liquidation of
the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, and custody of the minor
children, follow from the decree of legal
separation. They are mere incidents of legal
separation, not separate or distinct matters
that may be resolved by the court.
Cruz
101 332
La Rue v. La Rue
May 25, 1983
APPELLANT:
APPELLEE:
Betty La Rue
Walter La Rue
FACTS:
The parties were married in 1950. The
husband exclusively handled the financial affairs
while the appellant wife worked for 7 years,
earning $51,000, and then, having been
encouraged by the husband, was a homemaker
for the rest of the marriage, raising their two
children and caring for the house.
The trial court granted their divorce in
March 1980, stating that the husbands abusive
conduct far outweighed the wifes. The divorce
order granted her alimony and health
allowance, but did not provide for the
distribution of marital assets.
She petitioned the Ohio circuit court for:
interest of all of husbands personal
property
Undivided interest of all of husbands
real property
Conveyance to her of all real & personal
property in the name of and under
husbands control
Reservation for dower interest in real
property owned by husband
The court dismissed her petition for failure
to prove the existence of a contract where their
marital assets were equally owned, or that any
of her earnings were invested in any of her
husbands properties. It did not find any ground
to establish constructive trust for the wife.
Before this said petition, she also filed a
separate suit (which she lost) concerning a
house originally named to her but signed over
to the husband around the time the marriage
began to deteriorate.
ISSUE:
WON trial court erred in ruling that wife
was not entitled to equitable distribution of
marital assets.
HELD:
Yes. The Ohio circuit courts judgment was
reversed; the case is remanded for further
consideration
Equitable distribution of marital property
began when the courts equitable powers are
applied to secure equitable rights for one
spouse in the property held by the other due to
constructive trust impressed on said property.
In Patterson v. Patterson, where the wifes
interest in property toward which she had
made a material economic contribution was
secured, constructive trust, particularly on
property acquired through joint funds or efforts
but in the name of only one spouse, is a redress
against unjust enrichment (as it is unfair to
permit the possessing spouse to keep the entire
interest where the other supposedly has a
material contribution to the acquisition of said
property). This was used as a special equity
doctrine.
South Carolina has applied this doctrine,
which is, as defined in the Burgess case, the
wife is entitled to a special equity in the
husband's property acquired during coverture
where the wife has made a material
contribution to the acquisition of the property.
The court cited cases, as well as the
situation in other states, to justify that
homemaking services may be a consideration in
the distribution of assets, while rejecting the
part in Patterson which excludes it.
Homemaking services posted a problem
since, to an extent, it is merely a part of the
traditional obligation of the husband to support
his wife upon which the theory of alimony is
based, but there has been an increasing
recognition as of late that homemaking services
is no longer viewed as a mere adjunct of the
husbands obligation.
In assessing the value of homemaking
services, the court said that it may not depend
on a mechanical formula, but that she has
contributed to the economic wellbeing of the
family unit through the performance of the
myriad of household and childrearing tasks.
The length of the marriage, as well as fault on
the part of the wife, is factors in determining its
value. Its value must be considered in relation
Dantes
102 332
La Rue v. La Rue
May 25, 1983
to the net assets at the time of the divorce, and
also in light of the alimony award.
However, there is still a difference between
equitable distribution based on homemaking
services and those based on economic
contributions, since the former still has some
correlation to alimony and has the
characteristic of a judgment. Thus, equitable
distribution based on homemaking services
cannot lead to transfers made of legal title to a
real estate.
Dantes
103 332
Matute v. Macadaeg
FACTS:
Rosario Matute was found guilty of adultery in
an action for legal separation filed by her husband,
Armando Medel, on Nov. 6, 1952. Armando was
awarded the custody of their four children, ages 4,
8, 10 and 12. Armando then left for the US, leaving
the care of his children to his sister in Davao City.
Rosario came to live with them so she could be
with her children.
Armando came back in 1954, and in Mar 1955
the children joined him in Cebu. With Armando's
consent on the condition that they will return in 2
weeks, Rosario brought the children to Manila for
her father's funeral in April 1955. She didn't return.
She subsequently filed a prayer asking for
the court to:
(1) Award her the custody of her children
because her children, three of whom
were already above 10 years old,
preferred to be with her and that she
was not unfit to take charge of them
by reason of moral depravity, habitual
drunkenness, incapacity or poverty (in
deference to Sec 6, Rule 100, Rules of
Court) and
(2) For Armando to pay for support for the
children's schooling.
On June 29, 1955 Judge Macadaeg
denied her prayer and ordered he r to return
the custody of the children to Armando
within 24 hours.
She then filed an action for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
arguing that Judge Macadaeg had issued the
decision with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUES:
WON There was grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the Judge.
De Castro
104 332
Laperal v. Republic
G.R. No. L-18008 ll Oct. 30, 1962 ll Barrera, J.
Legal Basis: Art. 372 When legal separation
has been granted, the wife shall continue
using her name and surname employed before
the legal separation.
FACTS:
Elisea Santamaria petitioned for the use of
her maiden name Elisea Laperal after
obtaining legal separation from her husband.
She also supported said petition on the fact
that she has ceased to live with him for many
years.
Prior to the decree of legal separation, she
has been using her married name, Elisea
Santamaria.
The lower court used Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court, Change of Name, and granted the
petition.
The rationale of the lower court was that
to continue using her married name would
give rise to confusion in her finances and the
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets
ISSUE:
WON the Court may use Rule 103 despite
the specific stipulations in Art. 372 of the Civil
Code
HELD / RATIO:
No. Elisea should retain her married name.
Dolot
105 332
HELD / RATIO:
1. Yes. It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either; otherwise,
it would create a ridiculous situation where
the foreigner husband is no longer married
to the Filipina wife but the latter is still tied
to the marriage.
2. No. He is estopped by his own
representation previously that there is no
community of property was to be
adjudicated by the court in Nevada.
Besides, the wife should not discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.
Karichi note: Philippine laws apply to
Filipinos, ergo, foreigners cannot use our
laws against our citizens.
Dolot
106 332
HELD:
YES. The provision states: If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases. There is
no controversy as to the children, but the
controversy lies as to who is the legitimate
surviving spouse of Arturo. In Quitas comment
on her entitlement to inherit despite their
divorce, she says that Arturo was a Filipino, and
so they remained legally married. From this, the
SC interpreted that Quita was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce
should have prompted the trial court to conduct
a hearing establishing Quitas citizenship. Her
citizenship is important to determine, in light of
the ruling in Van Dorn v Romillo Jr. Trial court
based citizenship solely to the time of their
marriage as the trial court was not supplied
with a basis to determine petitioners
citizenship at the time of divorce.
Quita became an American citizen in 1954,
the same year final judgment of divorce was
obtained. If proven that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen, she will lose her right to inherit.
SC emphasizes that the question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited
only to the right of Quita to inherit from Arturo
as his surviving spouse, since Dandans claim
has already been resolved (bigamous marriage).
Petition denied. CAs direction to remand the
case for further proceedings affirmed.
Emphasis on question of hereditary rights of
petitioner.
Enad
107 332
Llorente v. CA
G.R. No. 124371 ll Nov. 23, 2000
PETITIONER:
RESPONDENTS:
Paula T. Llorente
Court of Appeals and Alicia F. Llorente
FACTS:
Lorenzo N. Llorente was a serviceman in
the United States Navy, who married
petitioner Paula in church rites in Camarines
Sur in 1937.
Lorenzo left for the US before World War
II broke out, leaving Paula behind in the
conjugal home.
In 1943, Lorenzo was granted US
citizenship, as well as leave to visit his wife
after the Philippine liberation. Upon his
return in 1945, he discovered that she was
pregnant, and had been having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino.
Lorenzo refused to live with Paula, and in
1946 executed with her a written agreement
wherein they decided that support from
Lorenzo would be suspended, their marital
union would be dissolved according to judicial
proceedings, and that Paula will not be
prosecuted for adultery, given she voluntarily
admitted fault and peacefully agreed to
separation.
Upon returning to the US, Lorenzo filed
for and obtained a divorce in San Diego
County, California. He traveled back to the
Philippines, where he married respondent
Alicia F. Llorente.
They lived together as husband and wife
for 25 years and had three children. During
such time, Lorenzo also executed a last will
and testament, in which he bequeathed all
his property to Alicia and their three children,
further designating her as sole executor of
said will. Lorenzo died in June 1985.
In September of the same year, Paula
filed for letters of administration over
Lorenzo's estate in her favor, contending that
she was the surviving spouse, and the
property disposed of in the will were acquired
during their marriage.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in her
favor, holding that the divorce decree granted
to Lorenzo is void and not applicable in the
Espaola
108 332
Garcia v. Recio
responsibility of determining the intrinsic
validity of the will and successional rights
of the parties.
Falcone
109 332
Garcia v. Recio
FACTS:
March 1987 Respondent Rederick Recio,
a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon Rizal
May 1989 Australian family court
decreed a divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage
January 1994 He married petitioner
Grace Garcia-Recio in Cabanatuan City.
In their application for marriage license, he
declared himself as single and Filipino
Starting October 22, 1995 he and
petitioner started living separately without
prior judicial dissolution of marriage.
March 1998 petitioner Grace Garcia filed
a petition for a Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy, saying that when they got
married, Rederick still had a subsisting
marriage. She said she only learned of this in
1997.
Respondent claims that his first marriage
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia, making him legally
capacitated to marry petitioner back in 1994.
July 1998 While the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending, Rederick
secured a divorce decree from a family court in
Sydney
because
the marriage
had
irretrievably broken down
Trial court declared the marriage dissolved
on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines, NOT due to his alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry.
HELD:
1. YES.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it. It is
Falcone
110 332
Garcia v. Recio
2. NO.
Respondent claims that the Australian
divorce decree, validly admitted in
evidence, adequately establishes his
legal capacity to marry under
Australian Law.
BUT there are types of divorces: 1)
Absolute (terminates the marriage)
and 2) Limited (suspends the marriage
and leaves the bond in full force)
There is no showing which type of
divorce was procured by him
The Australian divorce decree contains
a restriction that reads: A party to a
marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy
This shows that the divorce he
obtained MAY be restricted.
Falcone
111 332
Republic v Obrecido
NATURE:
Petition for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the RTC
RULING:
Petition by RP GRANTED. Assailed decision
set aside
FACTS:
Orbecido married Lady Villanueva 1981.
1986 wife left for the US. A few years later his
wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen
2000 Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and married
an Innocent Stanley
Cipriano filed w/ trial court petition to
remarry invoking Par 2 Art 36 of the Family
Code--> Court granted
OSG says that par 2 article 26 covers
marriages between a Filipino and an alien.
Proper remedy they say should be annulment
or legal separation. A matter of legislation
ISSUE:
Could Paragraph 2 Article 26 be construed
to include Filipinos who have naturalized?
HELD:
Records of family code deliberations
showed that intent of par 2 of art 26 is to avoid
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Does same principle apply to this case?
Cites Quita v CA. The Court therein hinted, by
Hermosisima
112 332
HELD:
NO. The alien spouse can claim no right
under Art. 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
FILIPINO SPOUSE.
RD:
Art. 26, Sec. 2 was included in the law to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative
intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, Art. 26, Sec. 2 provided
the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have
his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry. Without Art. 26, Sec. 2, the
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue
in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our
laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond.
An action based on Art. 26, Sec. 2 is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. However, no Philippine court can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse,
whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.
Article 26 (par. 2) of the Family Code:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)
Macariola
113 332
Marin
114 332
Perez v. CA
Petitioner Nerissa wants to reverse an earlier
decision by the CA, which awarded custody
of her child Ray Perez II to her estranged
husband Dr. Ray Perez.
FACTS:
After six miscarriages, two operations and
a high-risk pregnancy, Ray and Nerissa Perez
finally had a child they named Ray II. Nerissa
was working as a nurse in the US and was
able to finance a house in Mandaue City.
She was a permanent resident in the US
since 1992. Ray was a doctor and worked as
a general practitioner. They stayed in the US
during her pregnancy.
After she gave birth they returned to
Cebu but Nerissa went back to the US
supposedly to wrap up everything there and
return to Cebu to settle down. When she
returned she and her hubby were no longer
on good terms and eventually became
estranged despite efforts to reconcile. She
then filed a petition for habeas corpus at the
RTC, which it granted citing Art. 213 of the
Family Code. The CA reversed the ruling
saying that there are compelling reasons to
deny Nerissa custody of the child.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WoN Ray II is better off with Mum or Dad
considering their circumstances?
HELD:
When the parents of the child are
separated, the applicable law is Article 213
of the Family code. It does not qualify
"separation" so it applies to both legal
separation and separation in fact.
The reason in mandating that a child
under seven years be given to the mother is
the belief that a child has a basic need for
the mother's loving care.
However,
consideration must be first and foremost the
wishes and best interests of the child.
The CA, in deciding that Nerissas
workload in the US casts doubts in her
capability to take care of the child is
unreasonable. She can adjust her schedule
and manage her time or place the child
under the care of someone competent. In
fact, this has been the practice in the country
where kids are taken care of by yayas.
Ray's work schedule was not presented
as evidence in the trial and therefore has no
bearing. CA's reasoning that Ray was more
flexible is not well founded. In fact, he has
more work than his wife.
The mother's role in the life of her child
is irreplaceable. The depth of a mother's love
has been immortalized in prose and poetry
and finds its justification not in fantasy but in
reality.
Petition granted and the
reversed and set aside.
Nuez
CA decision
115 332
Narag v. Narag
A.C. No. 3405 ll Jun. 29, 1998
COMPLAINANT: JULIETA B. NARAG
RESPONDENT: ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG
FACTS:
On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag,
complainant, filed an administrative complaint
for disbarment against her husband, Atty.
Dominador M. Narag, respondent, for having
violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Ethics of Lawyers. Complainant claims that
respondent has abandoned their family to live
with his former student. On June 26 1990,
complainant sought the dismissal of her
administrative complaint stating that she
fabricated her allegations and such actions
were out of confusion arising from her extreme
jealousy. IBP Board of Governors dismissed
complaint for failure to prosecute.
However, on November 25, 1991, the
Supreme Court received another letter of
complaint from complainant again appealing
for the disbarment of her husband, claiming
that she dropped previous complaint because
of threats against her by her husband.
Respondent prayed for the affirmation of the
Boards dismissal of the complaint, and even
professed his love for his wife and their family.
On August 24, 1992, the Supreme Court
issued another resolution referring the
comment of the respondent to the IBP, and in
the hearing before the IBP, the respondent
alleged among others that, 1) He loved his
family dearly and gave them sustenance, a
comfortable home, companionship and a good
name, 2) He was abused physically, mentally,
and emotionally by the complainant making
their marriage a nightmare (and in the process
made him filed a petition for annulment), and
that 3) His wife had a propensity to file false
charges against him, listing down several
complaints she had filed against him and Gina
Espita (the paramour).
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer
recommended the indefinite suspension of the
respondent from the practice of law. IBP
subsequently approved the adoption of such
suspension on August 23, 1997. Complainant
sought the disbarment of her husband through
a complaint filed on October 20, 1997. IBP
Pagdanganan
116 332
Narag v. Narag
A.C. No. 3405 ll Jun. 29, 1998
mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render
help and support. Respondent admitted that he
was away from home because of work but the
evidence showed that he was only away
because he spent time with his paramour. The
resentful testimony of his two sons showed the
impact of his actions on his family. His son
Jervis would not bear to forgive him while
another son, Dominador, mentioned the
trauma he went through which led to the
dissolving of his own marriage. Respondent
Pagdanganan
117 332
Poblador
118 332
Warren v. State
Smith, J.
APPELLANT:
APPELLEE:
Joseph Roblins
Lewis Slaton (District Attorney) and Joseph Drolet (Asst. District Attorney)
FACTS:
Daniel Steven Warren was indicted for the
rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife but
because they are married, he says that he is
exempted from being convicted for the same.
ISSUE:
WON there is an implicit marital exclusion
in the rape and aggravated sodomy statutes
HELD:
No. There is no marital exemption in rape
or aggravated sodomy because the same
would go against what the Constitution stands
for.
RATIO:
The Defendant argued that:
(1) There exists within the rape statute an
implicit marital exclusion that makes it
legally impossible for a husband to be
guilty of raping his wife.
Rape is committed when a person has carnal
knowledge of a female forcibly and against
her will.
a) Lord Hale's contractual theory: "but a
husband cannot be guilty of a rape
committed by himself upon his lawful
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial
consent and contract the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her
husband which she cannot retreat."
b) Medieval time: the wife is the
husband's chattel/property and thus,
rape was nothing more than a man
making use of his own property
c) Unity in marriage/Unity of Person
theory: A woman's legal existence is
suspended
or
incorporated/consolidated into that of
her husband's and therefore, them
Quiambao
119 332
Quilala
120 332
Quilala
121 332
People v. Liberta
FACTS:
Mario and Denise were married in 1978.
Shortly after the birth of their son, in October of
that year, Mario began to beat Denise.
April 30, 1980: the Family Court issued
temporary order of protection to her.
Mario was ordered to move out and remain
away from the family home, and stay away
from Denise. Mario could visit his son once each
weekend.
March 24, 1981: Mario called Denise to ask
if he could visit his son, but Denise would not
allow him to come to her house. Instead, she
agreed to allow him to pick up their son and her
and take them both back to his motel provided
that a friend of his would be with them at all
times.
Alone at the Motel room, Mario attacked
Denise, threatened to kill her, and forced her to
perform fellatio on him and to engage in sexual
intercourse with him. Mario forced Denise to
tell their son to watch what the defendant was
doing to her.
Denise went to the police station and swore
out a felony complaint against the defendant.
On July 15, 1981 the defendant was
indicted for rape in the first degree and sodomy
in the first degree
Appellate Division Affirmed this.
Mario argues that:
He was within the marital exemption to
rape and sodomy and could not be
prosecuted for either crime
Both rape and sodomy statutes contravene
the Equal Protection Clause by burdening
only men and not women
ISSUE:
1. WON Mario was falsely charged for 1st
degree rape and sodomy in lieu of the
marital exemption
2. WON the statutes violate the Equal
Protection Clause
HELD:
1. NOPE
Section 130.35 of the Penal Law states:
Ramos
122 332
People v. Liberta
Ramos
123 332
Tenchavez v. Escano
FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were
secretly married. They planned to elope
immediately after their marriage but Vicentas
mother got wind of what was going on and thus
prevented their plans. The Escanos were
surprised and disgusted at the clandestine
nature of the marriage and the scandal it would
bring so they sought priestly advice in the form
of a recelebration of marriage but that too,
never materialized because of a letter that says
Tenchavez was having an amorous relationship
with Pacita Noel, their matchmaker. The
newlyweds still had contact with each other
however the love between them grew colder
and they eventually became estranged. When
Vicenta went to Misamis Occidental to escape
the scandal, she had a lawyer file a petition for
the annulment of her marriage. She did not sign
it and it was dismissed due to her nonappearance at the hearing. She then left for the
United States and filed a divorce on the grounds
of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character. Her parents, on their part, sought
papal dispensation of her marriage. Vicenta
then got married to an American, Leo Moran
and acquired American Citizenship on Aug
1958.
Tenchavez, initiated the proceedings at bar
on July 1955. He charged the Escanos with
having discouraged their daughter from joining
her husband and alienating her affections, and
against the Roman Catholic Church, for having,
through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages.
ISSUES:
WON The divorce is valid and WON the
Court may compel Escano to cohabit with
Tenchavez
HELD:
The Divorce is invalid because a foreign
divorce decree cannot be recognized in the
Philippines especially if it was granted by a
court of the place which was not the parties
bona fide domicile and on a ground not
recognized by our law, which does not allow
Reposar
124 332
Tenchavez v. Escano
of his wife, the deceased Mena Escano, P5,000
by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Reposar
125 332
Garcia v. Santiago
G.R. No. L-28904 ll Dec. 29, 1928
FACTS:
April 8, 1910 - Cipriana married to Isabelo;
they lived together as husband and wife
February 3, 1925 - continued family
dissentions compelled her to leave the conjugal
dwelling
Alejo (son of Isabelo by his first wife)
seduced Prisca Aurelio (daughter of Cipriana
by her first husband) and Prisca gave birth to a
child
Isabelo did not require his son to marry
Ciprianas daughter, thus seemingly tolerating
their illicit relationship
Isabelo has been conveying, and is
attempting to convey to his son lands,
producing around 4,500 cavanes of palay at
P4 per cavan annually, belonging to their
conjugal partnership to the prejudice of his
wife
Isabelo continually refused to provide for
her support. Moreover, he just answered
Ciprianas allegations by a general denial.
ISSUES AND RDS:
WON Ciprianas separation from Isabelo is
unjustified.
NO. The spouses led a rather stormy life
subsequent to the dishonor of the plaintiffs
daughter; Isabelo ordered her to leave his
house and threatened to maltreat her if she
returned.
Also, keeping the two young people under
the same roof with the opportunity to continue
their illicit relations would create a very
embarrassing situation for the girls mother.
To compel the plaintiff to cohabit with
her husband can only lead to further
quarrels, thus the separation therefore seems
necessary.
WON the court should restrain Isabelo
from conveying properties of the conjugal
partnership and WON he is unfit to administer
the property of the CP (due to his public illicit
relations with Geronima Yap)
NO. Cipriana failed to prove that the property
conveyed is community property. In fact, it is
shown by documentary evidence that the land
was acquired by Isabelo before his marriage to
Cipriana.
There is NO reason to deprive the husband
of his right to administer the CP
WON the Cipriana is entitled to a monthly
pension of P500
YES, but the sum requested is too large, an
allowance of P50 per month is enough at
present.
Reyes
126 332
McGuire v. McGuire
PLAINTIFF APELLEE:
Lydia McGuire
DEFENDANT APPELLANT: Charles McGuire
As long as the home is maintained and the
parties are living as husband and wife it
may be said that the husband is legally
supporting his wife and the purpose of the
marriage relation is being carried out.
PETITION:
Recover
suitable
maintenance
and
support money. Procedural history district
court ruled in favor of plaintiff.
RULING:
Reverse the district courts decision.
FACTS:
Lydia McGuire married Charles McGuire on
August 11, 1919. At the time of marriage,
Charles was a bachelor of 46 or 47 years of age
and had a reputation of extreme frugality, of
which Lydia was aware. Lydia had been
previously married and had inherited a onethird interest in 80 acres of land from her
previous husband. She brought an action
against her husband to recover suitable
maintenance and support money. She testified
that her husband was a poor companion and
that he would give her only small amounts
of money on request. She worked the fields and
did chores. For several years she had raised
chickens and sold poultry and eggs to buy
Sevilla
127 332
Pelayo v. Lauron
FACTS:
Physician Pelayo was called to Laurons
house on the night the defendants daughter in
law to help her give birth. The birthing was
difficult and fetus was remove by means of
forceps wherein Pelayo had done till morning
and he visited the patient several times. Pelayo
is asking for 500 Php as equitable payment
which defendants do not want to pay.
Defendants contend that their daughter in
law died. Even when she was alive, she lived
independently of them and it was only
fortuitous circumstance that she gave birth in
their house. They held that they are not liable
for the complaint.
ISSUE:
WON the parents are liable for services
rendered to Pelayo. NO
RATIO:
The rendering of medical assistance in case
of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by
way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)
Court held that within the meaning of the
law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers
with respect to the obligation that devolves
upon the husband to provide support, among
which is the furnishing of medical assistance to
his wife at the time of her confinement.
Tejano
128 332
Young v. Hector
FACTS:
The parties were married in New Mexico in
February 1982 and had two daughters. The
father was a successful architect with several
business ventures until the stock market
crashed. The mother is an attorney whose
income sustained the family when the husband
failed to find work. When they moved to Miami
for the Alices work, Robert stayed in New
Mexico to finish his business ventures. He later
returned there for a treasure hunting while the
wife accepted a shareholder position in one of
the largest law firms in Florida. When he
returned to his family, they were already
separated but lived in the same house. The
mother leaves early in the morning and return
late at night, working for 12-14 hours a day,
and 6-7 days a week. The father was active in
school and extra-curricular activities of the
children. He was unemployed for six years
because he was computer illiterate and failed to
meet the demands of the architectural firms.
Alice hired a housekeeper to do the cleaning,
cooking and taking care of the kids while she
was at work. When Alice applied for divorce,
the Court awarded her primary residential
custody of the children with frequent and
continuing contact with the father.
ISSUE:
WON a parents financial resources should
be a determinative factor in child custody?
HELD:
No, it is only one of the factors balanced
with the caretaking roles and other statutory
factors. It is the best interest of the children for
the preservation and continuation of the
caretaking roles that the parties established.
According to the Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations,
the court should allocate custody based on the
parents past caretaking laws. Financial
resources SHOULD NOT be a determinative
factor. The separation of the father from his
children should not be a factor because he has
been the primary caretaker of the children. His
alimony should also be increased, distribution
Tiangco
129 332
Silva v. Peralta
Nov. 29, 1960 ll J.B.L. Reyes, J.
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS:
DEFENDANT-APELLEE:
DOCTRINE:
Use of surname; Art. 370 of the CC; a
married woman is authorized by law to use the
surname of her husband; impliedly, it also
excludes others from doing likewise
NATURE OF PETITION:
This is an appeal on both questions of fact
and law from the decision of the Court of First
Instance favoring the defendant commenced by
the Silva spouses against Esther Peralta, seeking
to: (1) enjoin the latter from representing
herself as Mrs. Esther Peralta Silva; (2) order
defendant to pay Elenita Silva the sum of
P250,000.00 as moral, nominal and exemplary
damages [allegedly suffered by reason of such
misrepresentation]; and (3) pay an additional
amount of P10,000.00 byway of the attorney's
fees.
FACTS:
In June 1942, defendant Esther Peralta
came to live with her sister, Mrs. Pedro Pia,
after abandoning her studies as a student nurse
during the outbreak of the war in 1941. During
the same time, Saturnino Silva, an American
citizen and an officer of the United States Army,
was assigned to the Philippines to aid in the
countrys fight for freedom.
TAKE NOTE: Saturnino was married to a
certain Prescilla Isabel of Australia
In
1944,
Saturnino
became
the
commanding officer of the 130th Regiment,
with their headquarters located in Magugpo,
Tagum, Davao.
During that same year also, Esther
accompanied her younger sister Florence in the
latters arrest and investigation in Anibongan
and later to the general headquarters in
Magugpo. This was the time when Saturnino
first met Esther.
Yumol
130 332
Silva v. Peralta
Nov. 29, 1960 ll J.B.L. Reyes, J.
ISSUES:
(1) WoN it is proper for the defendant to
represent herself as the wife of Saturnino
(Mrs. Silva). NO.
(2) WoN plaintiff can claim for moral, nominal
and exemplary damages allegedly suffered
by reason of such misrepresentation. NO.
(3) WoN defendant can claim for actual
damages and fees due to harassment and
moral damages caused by the deceit of
Saturnino, and his consequent refusal to
acknowledge their child. YES.
RATIO:
(1) As mentioned earlier, there was no
printed evidence that could ascertain the
validity of the marriage between Saturnino and
Esther. The only evidence that could be
presented was the testimony given by the
defendant herself and of her own counsel, Atty.
Juan Quijano. Despite having convincing proof
that Saturnino and Esther have lived together as
common-law husband and wife, the testimonies
presented contained many inconsistencies
which rendered it unconvincing. Also, there are
some documentary requirements presented
that prove that Esther has represented herself
as single even after her alleged marriage with
Saturnino.
In the face of the evidence, the
presumption of the marriage cannot be upheld
and it is safe to conclude that no marriage had
really taken place. Aside from the evidence that
were discussed in the previous paragraph,
another argument that strongly contradicts the
validity of their marriage is the fact that at the
time of the alleged marriage on, Saturnino was
still married to the Australian Priscilla Isabel.
In view of the non-existence of appellee's
marriage with Saturnino Silva, and the latter's
actual marriage to plaintiff Ledesma, it is not
proper for Esther to continue representing
herself as the wife of Saturnino. Article 370 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines authorizes a
married woman to use the surname of her
Yumol
131 332
Tolentino v. CA
PETITIONER: Constancia Tolentino
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Contancia Tolentino is the present legal
wife of Arturo Tolentino; they were married in
April 1945
Consuelo David was legally married to
Arturo in Feb. 1931, they had children, but the
marriage was terminated pursuant to law
during the Japanese occupation in September
1943, by decree of absolute divorce granted by
Court of First Instance of Manila
Divorce on ground of desertion and
abandonment by the wife, on finding that
Arturo was abandoned by Consuelo David for at
least three continuous years
Arturo married again: first a Pilar Adorable,
who passed, then Constancia in April 1945
Consuelo kept using the surname Tolentino
after divorce and up to the time of the
complaint
Third party defendant (Arturo) admitted
that the use of the surname Tolentino by
Consuelo was with his familys consent.
Constancia Tolentino filed complaint
against Consuelo David to enjoin her by
injunction from using the surname Tolentino
Consuelo file an answer: admitted to using
the surname and stated she will continue to use
the surname
Trial Court granted Constancias action for a
writ of preliminary injunction: Consuelo David
was enjoined from using/employing/applying in
any manner the surname TOLENTINO
Consuelo David filed a motion for leave to
file a third party complaint against her former
husband; it was granted, and Arturo Tolentino,
third party defendant, filed his answer
Trial Court then confirmed the preliminary
injunction in making the same permanent and
perpetual-restraining and enjoined Consuelo
David from using the surname Tolentino
Consuleo appealed to the CA on the
following
grounds:
plaintiff
Constancia
Tolentinos cause of action had prescribed and
the absence of the monopolistic proprietary
right of Constancia to the use of the surname
Tolentino
Alampay
132 332
Tolentino v. CA
Whatever the period, the action has long
prescribed whether the cause accrued on April
1945, when Constancia and Arturo were
married, or August 1959 when the present Civil
Code took effect or in 1951 when Constancia
came to know of the fact that Consuelo David
was still using the surname Tolentino It is the
legal possibility of bringing the action, which
determines the starting point for the
computation of the period of prescription
Constancia should have brought legal action
immediately against Consuelo David after
gaining knowledge of the use of the latter of the
surname of her former husband
Action was brought only on Nov. 1971, after
twenty years
CA: where plaintiff fails to go to Court
within the prescriptive period, he loses his
cause, not because the defendant acquired
ownership by adverse possession over his name
but because the plaintifs cause of action had
lapsed thru the statute of limitations
Constancia MAY NOT exclude Consuelo
from using the name of her former husband,
from whom she was divorced.
To sustain Consuelos use of the surname
does not contradict Articles. 370 and 371 of the
Civil Code.
Senator Tolentinos commentary on Art. 370 of
the Civil Code:
the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to
use the husbands surname. She cannot be
prevented from using it; but neither can she
restrain others from using it.
Arr. 371: not applicable because it speaks of
annulment while the case at bar refers to
absolute divorce where there is a severance of
valid marriage ties.
Effect of divorce is more akin to the death
of the spouse where the deceased woman
continues to be referred to as the Mrs. of the
husband, even if the latter has remarried rather
than to annulment, as if there had been no
marriage at all
Consuelo David MAY NOT be enjoined by
her former husbands present wife from using
his surname.
Alampay
133 332
Tolentino v. CA
Petition dismissed for lack of merit. CA
decision affirmed. Writs of preliminary and
Alampay
134 332
2.
3.
PERTINENT PROVISIONS:
RA 1401
SEC. 38AProvision of the Judiciary Act to
the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following cases after the effectivity
of this Act:
(b) Cases involving custody, guardianship,
adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
(d) proceedings brought under the
provisions of Articles one hundred sixteen,
two hundred twenty-five, two hundred fifty,
two and three hundred thirty-one of the Civil
Code.
Art. 116
When one of the spouses neglects his or
her duties to the conjugal union or brings
danger, dishonour or material injury upon the
other, the injured party may apply to the court
for relief.
The court may counsel the offended party
to comply with his or her duties, and take such
measures
as
may
be
proper
Bayona
135 332
Cadorna
136 332
CIR v. Fisher
G.R. No. L-11622 ll Jan. 28, 1961 ll Barrera, J.
PETITIONER:
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE
RESPONDENTS: DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS
FACTS
British Walter G. Stevenson and Beatrice
Mauricia Stevenson were married in Manila in
1909. Walter died on Feb. 22, 1951 in California
where the couple established their permanent
residence since 1945. This case is on the
determination and settlement of his hereditary
estate.
In his will, Walter instituted Beatrice as
his sole heiress to real and personal
properties they acquired while residing in
the Philippines amounting to P130k.
ISSUE RELEVANT TO US
WON in determining the taxable net
estate of the decedent, one-half () of the
net estate should be deducted therefrom as
the share of the surviving spouse.
HELD & RD
YES. The SC held that in determining the
taxable net estate of the decedent, of the
net estate should be deducted as the share of
the surviving spouse in accordance with our
law on CPG. Thus, only the one-half share of
Walter in the conjugal partnership property
constituted his hereditary estate subject to
estate and inheritance taxes.
Under the old CC, where one spouse is a
foreigner and there is no ante-nuptial
agreement, it is the national law of the
husband that becomes the dominant law in
determining property relations. Since both are
British citizens, British laws should apply;
however, in the absence of proof of what
English law is, court is justified to indulge in
processual presumption" in presuming that
the law of England is the same as our law.
Cristobal
137 332
Domalagan v. Bolifer
PLAINTIFF:
DEFENDANT:
Jorge Domalagan
Carlos Bolifer
FACTS:
In November 1909, Domalagan and Bolifer
entered into a verbal contract wherein
Domalagan was to pay Bolifer P500 upon the
marriage of their children (son Cipriano
Domalagan and daughter Bonifacia Bolifer). In
August 1910, plaintiff paid P500, together with
the further sum of P16 "as hansel or token of
future marriage." Despite the said agreement,
Bonifacia Bolifer married Laureano Sisi and
upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan
demanded that Bolifer return the P516 he gave
earlier, together with the interest and payment
for damages which he suffered after being
obliged to sell certain real property in order to
fulfill the said contract.
Plaintiff then filed a complaint against
defendant in the Court of First Instance in
Misamis. The defendant presented a general
denial and alleged that there was no cause of
action. The lower court ruled in favor of
Domalagan and ordered Bolifer to return the
sum of P516 with an interest of 6% from Dec.
17, 1910. Defendant then appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
WoN contract was valid and effective
despite being against the provision stated under
paragraph 3, Section 335 of the Code of
Procedure in Civil Action that a contract should
be reduced to writing?
RULING:
Judgment of lower court affirmed.
RATIO:
Yes. The provision does not render oral
contracts invalid. It simply provides the method
by which the contract mentioned may be
proven. A contract may be a perfectly valid
contract even though it is not clothed with the
necessary form. If the parties to an action,
during the trial of the cause, make no objection
to the admissibility of oral evidence to support
contracts like the one in this case and permit
the contract to be proved by evidence other
than in writing, it will be just as binding upon
the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
In this case, the lower court found that a large
preponderance of the evidence showed that the
plaintiff had delivered to the defendant the sum
of P516 in substantially the manner alleged in
the complaint, thus proving the existence and
validity of the said contract.
Cruz
138 332
Serrano v. Solomon
G.R. No. L- 12093 ll Jun. 29, 1959
FACTS:
Melchor Solomon married Alejandria
Feliciano on June 21, 1948. On the same day,
but before the marriage ceremony, he executed
a Deed of Donation where he donated all his
exclusive properties as basic capital for their
conjugal and family life. The donation further
provides in the case that they begot no children
that, should he die before his wife, that his
brothers and sisters will be heirs to of his
property (including those acquired in the
conjugal union) and if the wife dies before him,
that Estanislao Serrano will be heirs to the same
half.
Less than nine months after the
marriage, the wife died. Then, Serrano
commenced the action to enforce the terms
of the donation. Solomon filed a motion for
dismissal and was granted by the trial court,
who ruled that the said donation cannot be
counted as donation propter nuptias because it
was not made in consideration of the marriage
and that the donation was made not to either
of the parties but to a third person. Serrano
appealed the decision.
ISSUE:
WON the donation can be validly
considered as a donation propter nuptias
WON the donation may be held valid and
effective as a donation other than donation
propter nuptias
HELD:
No. The court agrees fully with the trial
court, citing in support Article 1327 of the Civil
Code on donation proper nuptias, which was
reproduced for Article 126 of the New Civil
Code1. Whether the Old Civil Code (as the
marriage was contracted in 1948) or the New
Civil Code will apply, the result will be the same.
The court questioned whether the
donation was made in consideration of their
marriage or in consideration of the death of
either of them in the absence of children. The
court ruled that marriage in itself was not the
only consideration or condition; it must be a
childless marriage and either spouse must die
before for the donation to operate.
Even granting that it is in consideration of
the marriage, the donation was not in favor of
the wife but of Serrano. Citing Manresas
commentary, the court said that donations
granted to persons other than the spouses even
If founded on the marriage are among those
excluded from those excluded from Art. 1327.
No. It cannot be considered a donation
inter vivos because it was never accepted by
the donee either in the same instrument or
donation or in a separate document as required
by law.
Neither can it be considered a donation
mortis causa because the donor is still alive,
and time and occasion have not arrived for
considering its operation and implementation,
and, as it will be counted equivalent to a last
will, it must conform to the strict requisites and
provisions for executing wills, which the
donation does not.
Dantes
139 332
Solis v. Barroso
G.R. No. L- 27939 ll Avancena, J.
DOCTRINE:
Donations Propter Nuptias are covered by
Title II Book III of CC (Arts618-656). Under Art
633 CC, a donation of real property is valid only
if it is made in a public instrument.
FACTS:
The spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima
Barroso made a donation propter nuptias in
favour of their son Alejo and his fiance
Fortunata
One of the conditions of the donation is
that in case of the death of one of the
donees, one-half () of the lands donated
would revert to the donors.
2 months after the marriage, Alejo died.
Juan, the father, died in the same year.
Maxima Barroso, the mother, recovered
possession of the donated lands, for which
Fortunata, Alejos wife, filed an action
demanding the execution of the proper
deed of donation
The lower court ruled in Fortunatas
favour, basing the judgement on Art 1279
CC (relating to contracts).
Hence this appeal by the Barrosos.
ISSUES:
WON the donation propter nuptias in this
case is valid
WON the same is cov ered by A r t 1 2 7 9
CC relating to contracts.
HOLDING & RATIO:
The donation is NOT VALID and it DOES
De Castro
140 332
Mateo v. Lagua
G.R. No. L- 26270 ll Oct. 30, 1969 ll J.B.L. Reyes, J.
PETITIONERS:
RESPONDENTS:
FACTS:
Cipriano Lagua = owner of the 3 parcels of
land
Cipriano Lagua and Alejandro Dumlao are
the parents of Alejandro Lagua
Alejandro Lagua was to be married to
Bonifacia Mateo
Cipriano Lagua, in a public instrument,
donated 2 out of the 3 lots to his son in
consideration of the latters marriage
The newlyweds took possession of the
properties but the Certificate of Title
remained in the donors name
o 6 years later, Alejandro Lagua died, his
wife and daughter stayed with Cipriano
Lagua
Cipriano Lagua undertook the farming of the
donated lots
o At start, he was giving the owners share
o After 3 years, he refused to deliver the
share
o Mateo filed a case for possession and
damages = GRANTED
Cipriano Lagua executed a deed of sale of
the same 2 parcels in favor of his younger
son, Gervasio Lagua
o Share of the proceeds of the land were
still being given to Mateo until 1965
o On the stopping of the share, she found
out about the sale
o She filed for recovery of possession of
the properties = GRANTED
Gervasio Lagua filed for annulment of the
donation of the 2 lots
o ARGUMENT: When Cipriano donated the
lots (which were allegedly the only
properties he owned), he neglected
leaving something for his own support
and for Gervasios legitime as forced heir.
o Cipriano Lagua died while case was
pending
ISSUE:
WON inofficious donations can be reduced
HELD:
YES
DPN properties may be reduced for being
inofficious
DPN are without onerous consideration (no
obligation burdening the done), the
marriage being merely the occasion or
motive for the donation, not its causa.
o They are subjection to reduction if they
should infringe the legitime of a forced
heir
Steps to consider in determining legal share of
compulsory heirs
1) Net estate = Value of properties at the time
of death LESS payable obligations and
charges
2) Net Estate + all donations subject to
collation
3) Determination of legitimes per heir
DISMISSED
Dilag
141 332
Nazareno v. Birog
FACTS:
Andrea Rodriguez and Juan Aben were
married and had a daughter named Alberta
Aben. Their daughter Alberta later got
married to Mariano Meleno Nazareno and
had a child named Bonifacio Nazareno. When
Juan Aben died, Andrea got married to Cirilo
Braganza. Andrea and her second husband
Cirilo had no offspring.
In March 1917, Cirilo executed a deed of
donation of land to his then six-year old stepgrandson Bonifacio. The donation was
accepted in the same deed by Alberta and
Mariano, parents of Bonifacio. Cirilo
continued to possess and enjoy the land.
Begin ning in 1930, Cirilo sold portions of the
land:
1930
1933
1934
ISSUE:
WON Nazareno, may recover title and
possession of a parcels of land described? NO
HELD/ RATIO:
Not only did Nazareno lose ownership of
the two portions of the land that the
Birogs and Ariolas possess, he signed a
deed in favor of Ariola on the third and
last portion; therefore, he is estopped
from claiming the land.
More importantly, appeal must be
dismissed since Nazareno has no cause
of action under Art.1335 OCC. The
donation was made by the husband to
a grandchild of his wife by a previous
marriage. When the donation was
made, the spouses were already
married hence it falls under the
prohibition provided by law. Donations
from the spouse to the children, as
well as grandchildren, of the other by a
previous marriage are void.
Neither has the plaintiff acquired the
land by prescription for there is no
evidence that he ever possessed it or
claimed it against his grandfather (as
evident in deed in favor of Ariola,
signed by Nazareno as witness).
NOTE:
This is a wrong decision since the doctrine
cannot be applied to all cases. For example,
when the grandchildren already have children
of their own, the spouse of the original owner
can no longer benefit from the donation since
he/she will cease to be a compul sory heir of the
grandchild.
Dolot
142 332
Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L- 28771 ll Mar. 31, 1971 ll Fernando, J.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:
CORNELIA MATABUENA,
PETRONILA CERVANTES
FACTS:
Plaintiff seeks to reverse the lower court
decision declaring the donation of his deceased
brother to defendant as valid, even though it
was done when they were in a common-law
relationship. She claims that a donation made by
her brother while living martially without the
benefit of marriage to defendant was void.
There was stipulation of FACTS which both sides
agreed upon, which are:
HELD:
YES. The court explained that although Art.
133 of CC considers donations between the
spouses during marriage as void, policy
considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality require that the
same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. The Court cited a 1954 CA decision,
Buenaventura v. Bautista1, holding that
donations between common-law spouses fall
within the prohibition and is null and void as
contrary to public policy. The CA decision
further states that: assent to such irregular
connection for 30 years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that
the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased, and also: so long as
marriage remains the cornerstone of our family
law, reason and morality alike demand that the
disabilities attached to marriage should likewise
attach to concubinage.
The court further stated that even without
the precedent, any other conclusion cannot
stand the test of scrutiny, bec. it would be to
indict the framers of the CC for a failure to apply
a laudable rule to a situation w/c in its essentials
cannot be distinguished. If there is ever any
occasion where the principle of StatCon that
what is within the spirit of the law is as much a
part of it as what is written, this is it. Whatever
omission may be apparent in an interpretation
purely literal of the language used must be
remedied by an adherence to its avowed
objective.
However, the court stated that the lack of
ISSUE:
WON the ban on a donation between the
spouses during a marriage applies to commonlaw relationships.
Enad
143 332
Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L- 28771 ll Mar. 31, 1971 ll Fernando, J.
validity of the donation does not necessarily
result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the
disputed property. After all, her brother and the
defendant were legally married; w/c makes the
defendant her brothers widow. As provided for
in the CC, defendant is entitled to of the
inheritance, and the plaintiff, as surviving sister,
to the other half.
Enad
144 332
Espaola
145 332
Sumbad v. CA
FACTS:
After the death of his wife Agata B. Tait,
George K. Tait, Sr. lived a common-lawrelationship with Maria F. Tait to whom, in
1974, he donated a certain parcel of
unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc. After
he passed away in 1977, Maria sold lots
including the Sum-at property. She died in 1988.
A year after, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and
Beatrice Tait, daughters of George Tait with
Agata Tait, brought an action for quieting of
title, nullification of deeds of sale and recovery
of possession with damages against private
respondents (those who bought the land from
Maria). Petitioners contend that the Deed of
Donation is void because:
According to their witness, it is forged by a
certain Raquel Tait, their fathers ward
It was made in violation of Art 133 of the
Civil Code, now Art 87 of the Family Code
It was notarized by a person who had no
authority to act as a notary public
Maria had no authority to sell the Sum-at
property, making the sales in favour of the
private respondents null and void
Since they only learned of the sales in 1988,
when Maria became seriously ill, they are
not barred from bringing the present
action.
ISSUES:
1) WON the donation executed by George Tait
in favour of Maria Tait is valid and effective
2) WON laches barred the claim of the
plaintiffs.
HELD:
1) Donation is VALID.
The Court ruled that their witnesss
testimony of the forgery was incredible,
vague, and grossly unconvincing since
the statements doesnt ring true and
appear to have been rehearsed. Forgery
should be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. The petitioners
shouldve
presented
handwriting
experts to support their claim.
They also claim that the deed of
Falcone
146 332
Sumbad v. CA
remaining common-law-relations. The
only testimony that they have to that
effect is that in 1941, Maria became
their stepmother. There was no
evidence presented that their father
and Maria were still together until
1974, when the donation was made.
Falcone
147 332
Ching v. Goyanko
Nature:
Petition for review on certiorari of a
decision of the CA
RULING:
Petition denied for lack of merit
FACTS:
Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz
married bore Joseph Evely Jerry Imelda etc
1961, parents acquired 661 sqm property in
Cebu but as they were chinese citizens,
property was registeredin the name of aunt,
Sulpicia Vetura
May 1993, Sulpicia executed a deed of sale
over property in favor of father Goyanko. That
same year, October, a deed of sale over the
property in favor of his common-law wife Maria
Ching was executed
After death of father on 1996, respondents
discovered that ownership had already been
transferred. They had the signature verified and
PNP Crime Lab found the signature to be a
forgery. Filed for nullification of deed of sale
Petitioner claimed that she is the actual
owner of the property as it was she who
provided its purchase price. Presented notary
public who testified Goyanko appeared and
signed document in his presence
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, finding that
the signature was genuine and that the
transaction undertaken was only temporary and
transitory on the part of Joseph Goyanko. Said
court also said that Torrens title is not subject
to collateral attack
Upon appeal to the CA, Ca ruled in reverse,
saying that the property having been acquired
during existence of a valid marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
and that no evidence has been shown that
there was a judicial decree of dissolution of
marriage.
CA also ruled that the fact that Joseph
Goyangko and Maria Ching were living a
common-law relationship, Art 1352 of the Civil
Code provides that the contract of sale, for
Hermosisima
148 332
Onas v. Javillo
FACTS:
Crispulo Javillo contracted two marriages.
His first marriage was with Ramona Levis where
they had 5 children [petitioners-appellees]. Ater
Ramonas death, he married Rosario Onas
[oppositor-appellant] where four children were
born. During the first marriage, 11 parcels of
land were acquired while 20 parcels of land
were acquired during the 2nd marriage.
Crispulo Javillo died intestate on the 18th of
May, 1927 and Santiago Andrada was named
administrator of his estate. He submitted two
projects of partition, the first disapproved by
the lower court and second partition is the one
now on appeal in this case. Partition was made
on the claim that the properties of the 2nd
marriage were products of the first marriage.
Appellant now alleges that the lower court
committed the following errors:
1. All the properties acquired during the
second marriage were acquired with the
properties of the first marriage.
2. Lower court erred in approving the partition
dated Sept. 9, 1931 notwithstanding that
the same did not include all of the
properties of the deceased, Crispulo Javillo.
ISSUES:
1) WON the community partnership shall
continue to exist between the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the deceased
spouse.
2) WON the properties of the second marriage
can be claimed as products of the
properties of the first marriage.
3) WON the partition that was approved by
the lower court is valid.
HELD:
Judgment of the lower court is reversed and
case REMANDED for further proceedings.
RD:
1. NO. Gutierrez adopting the view of
Matienzo states that: When the marriage is
dissolved, the cause that brought about the
community ceases, for the principle of an
ordinary partnership are not applicable to
this community, which is governed by
special rules. Provisions of law governing
the subject should cease to have any effect
for the community of property is admissible
and proper in so far as it conforms to unity
of life, to the mutual affection between
husband and wife, and serve as a
recompense for the care of preserving and
increasing the property; all of which
terminates by the death of one of the
partners.
Community terminates when the
marriage is dissolved or annuled or when
during the marriage an agreement is
entered into to divide the conjugal
property. The conjugal partnership does not
exist as long as the spouses are united.
2. NO. Whatever is acquired by the surviving
spouse on the dissolution if the partnership
by death or presumption of death whether
the acquisition be made by his or her
lucrative title, it forms part of his or her
own capital, in which the other consort, or
his or her heirs, can claim no share.
3. NO. The project of partition approved the
lower court is based on the absurd claim
that it does not appear that there was
liquidation of the partnership of property of
the first marriage nor does it appear that
they asked for such liquidation. Partition
was based on the erroneous assumption
that the properties of the second marriage
were produced by the properties of the first
marriage. Partition is not in conformity with
the law.
Macariola
149 332
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the lands
composing the Caanawan properties could not
have been the properties of the first marriage
because they were public lands before
becoming homesteads. According to the law, it
was only after 5 years of cultivation that lands
from the public domain would be given to the
occupant. The court also held that possession of
these lands was not established during the start
of the occupation but at the precise time that
the occupants were given ownership. However,
although the first marriage did not technically
own any lands and imparted to its heirs only
inchoate rights, the Court held that justice and
equity demanded that the rights to the
properties by apportioned in proportion to the
extent to which the requirements of the public
land laws had been complied with during the
existence of each conjugal partnership. Since
the capital of either marriage could not be
determined with mathematical precision, the
Court divided the total mass of the properties in
proportion to the duration of each partnership.
Thus the second conjugal partnership had 46/64
of the total mass of properties and the first
18/64. Of these Nicolas is entitled to half;
32/64. Dorotea and her heirs are entitled to
23/64 while Rosa Villasfers share would be
9/64. Each of the kids of the first marriage are
entitled to 142/1664 of the entire estate while
the children of the second marriage are entitled
to 64/1664 of the all the properties.
ISSUE:
How much were each of the heirs of Nicolas
Delizo entitled to given the fact that properties
acquired during his first and second marriages
could not be divided with mathematical
precision?
Marin
150 332
Lim v. Garcia
FACTS:
Hilario Lim died intestate in 1903. The trial
court ruled that the entire estate had been
conjugal property except a house and a sum of
10,000 pesos. The children of the deceased filed
an appeal against the widow to reverse the
decision.
ISSUE:
WoN the estate was really conjugal
property considering that the widow brought
nothing to the conjugal partnership as it was
alleged?
HELD:
Yes, the properties are conjugal. It is
presumed that all the estate of the married
couple will be considered conjugal partnership
property unless proven that it is a part of the
separate estate of the husband and wife.
The buildings in question were constructed
out of partnership funds - the building erected
during the coverture on land belonging to one
of the married couple will be considered as
conjugal partnership property.
Nuez
151 332
Rodriguez v. De La Cruz
G.R. No. L- 3629
FACTS:
Matea Rodriguez (plaintiff) filed a complaint
in the CFI Albay against the children of her
husband from his first marriage (defendants) for
the purpose of recovering certain parcels of
lands. Plaintiff claims that:
1. She acquired said lands during her first
marriage from her deceased father
2. She had permission from Hilarion to
commence this action in her own name
against his children
3. Hilarion had been administering said lands
during the entire period of his marriage to
her.
However, CFI Albay dismissed the case in
favor Hilarions children through his first
marriage and found from evidence during trials,
that said lands described were acquired by
Hilarion during his marriage to his first wife, one
Andrea de Leon and that said lands were not
acquired by plaintiff from her father. The lands
in question were granted to the children of
Hilarion from his first marriage. Rodriguez
appealed to the SC.
Ordoyo
152 332
Pagdanganan
153 332
Pagdanganan
154 332
Poblador
155 332
Castro v. Miat
TOPIC: Exclusive Property
HELD: No. The property involved is part
of the conjugal properties of the spouses
because it was acquired during the
marriage. CC provisions apply in this
case.
FACTS:
Moises and Condordia acquired 2 parcels
of land during their marriage. Then
Concordia died. The balance for the Paco
property was paid for after her death, and
the property was registered under Moises'
name. The 2 properties were promised to
their sons, however, Moises asked his sons if
he could keep one of the properties, and they
agreed. The same was witnessed by other
family members. In the end, Moises handed
the owner's duplicate of the Paco property
title to Romeo. The 2 sons (Romeo and
Alexander) shared the Paco property.
Alexander sold his half to his brother (who
gave him 6k as downpayment). Later, Romeo
found out that their father mortgaged the
property for 30k to the Castros.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Paco property was conjugal or
capital
2. WON there was a valid oral partition
covering said property
3. WON the Castro spouses were buyers in
bad faith
HELD:
(1) The Paco property is conjugal. The
same was acquired during the marriage even
though the balance for it was only paid for
after the death of Concordia. Since the couple
was married before the FC, the CC applies.
According to Article 153(1) of the New Civil
Code:
Art. 153(1)
The following
property:
are
conjugal
partnership
Quiambao
156 332
Jocson v. CA
As interpreted by this Court, the party who
invokes this presumption must first prove that
the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
FACTS:
Emilio Jocson was married to Alejandra
Poblete, who had two surviving children,
Moises and Agustina.
There are three documents by sale to
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez that covers almost all
of Emilios properties, including his one-third
(1/3) share in the estate of his wife.
Moises Jocson assails the documents and
prays that they be declared null and void and
the properties subject matter therein be
partitioned between him and Agustina as the
only heirs of their deceased parents. These
documents of sale are:
Six (6) parcels of land, all located at
Naic, Cavite, for the sum of P10,000.00
pesos
Two rice mills and a camarin for P5,000
pesos
Extrajudicial partition of the unsettled
estate of Alejandra Poblete, dividing the
same into three parts, one-third (1/3)
each for the heirs of the wife, wherein
Emilio sold his share to Agustina for
P8,000 pesos.
Moises claimed that the properties
mentioned, except the extrajudicial partition
are the unliquidated conjugal properties of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, which the
former, therefore, cannot validly sell. (This is
the main contention of Moises pertinent to our
class)
ISSUE:
WON
conjugal
the
properties
are
considered
HELD:
NO
Moises invoked Art 160 of the CC which
state:
All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
The party who invokes this presumption
must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage
Proof of acquisition during the coverture is
a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership.
The fact that the properties were registered
in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the
properties were acquired during the spouses'
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts
The certificates of title show that the
properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the
registered owner. This is so because the words
"married to' preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are
merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio
Jocson
There being no showing also that the
camarin and the two ricemills, which are the
subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of
the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as
the
exclusive
properties
of
Emilio.
Quilala
157 332
Francisco v. CA
DOCTRINES:
All property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
> Burden of proving that property is exclusive or
conjugal rests upon the party asserting it.
> Names in titles or in deeds are just indications
do not automatically rebut the above
presumption.
FACTS:
Teresita Francisco alleges that since her
marriage on February 10, 1962 with Eusebio,
she and her husband have acquired the
following:
(1) A sari-sari store, a residential house and lot,
and an apartment house,
(2) A house and lot at Barrio San Isidro,
Rodriguez, Rizal.
She further avers that these properties
were administered by Eusebio until he was
invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart
disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him
unfit to administer them. She also claims that
his children his first marriage succeeded in
convincing their father to sign a general power
of attorney which authorized Conchita
Evangelista (daughter) to administer the house
and lot together with the apartments situated
in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit
for damages and for annulment of said general
power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its
enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be
declared as the administratrix of the properties
in dispute.
However, trial court eventually favored the
respondents for it found that the Teresita failed
to adduce proof that said properties were
acquired during the existence of the second
conjugal partnership, or that they pertained
exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the court
ruled that those properties belong exclusively
to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to
administer them. CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUES:
WON said properties were part of their
conjugal property
HELD:
NO, it was not a part of their conjugal
property. Petitioner lacks merit.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides
that all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. However, the party
who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. Needless to say, the
presumption refers only to the property
acquired during the marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce
ample evidence to show that the properties
which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired
during her marriage with Eusebio.
With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite,
Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to refute the
testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the
same from his parents. Interestingly, petitioner
even admitted that Eusebio brought into their
marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of
a possessor only as it was not yet registered in
his name.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property
prior or subsequent to his second marriage is
inconsequential. The property should be
regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of
law, pursuant to Article 148 of the New Civil
Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a
spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to
the marriage, is considered his or her separate
property. Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to
properties acquired gratuitously and include
those acquired by either spouse during the
marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or
donation (hence, it is still a separate property
even if obtained during marriage).
Ramos
158 332
Francisco v. CA
As regards the house, apartment and sarisari store, private respondents aver that these
properties were either constructed or
established by their father during his first
marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists
that the said assets belong to conjugal
partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner
relied on the building permits for the house and
the apartment, with her as the applicant
although in the name of Eusebio. She also
invoked the business license for the sari-sari
store issued in her name alone. However, the
aforementioned documents in no way prove
that the improvements were acquired during
the second marriage. And the fact that one is
the applicant or licensee is not determinative
of the issue as to whether or not the property
is conjugal or not.
Ramos
159 332
Dewara v. Alvero
DOCTRINES:
1. There is a presumption of the conjugal
nature of property and thus the burden of
proof rests on the party asserting
otherwise. (From Art 116 FC)
2. If one of the spouses has no exclusive
property incurs fines and indemnities, the
responsibilities enumerated in Art 161 of
the CC must be first accomplished before
fines and indemnities can be charged to the
conjugal partnership. (From Art 163 CC)
FACTS:
Eduardo and Elenita Dewara were married
before the enactment of the FC. Ed hit Ronnie
Lamela while driving a private jeep. Ed has
no property in his name to pay for the civil
indemnity he incurred. Lamela asked to levy a
certain lot in the name of Elenita to pay for the
indemnity. Petitioner claimed that the levy on
execution of the lot was illegal because the said
property was her paraphernal or exclusive
property and could not be made to answer for
the personal liability of her husband.
Respondent spouses contend that the lot was
conjugal property of the petitioners.
The RTC gave credence to Elenitas account
that it was sold to her by her father and aunt in
order to help her build capital. RTC ruled that it
was in essence, a gratuitous donation and
therefore it was paraphernal property that
could not be used to pay for Eduardos civil
liability.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC, it
ruled that Elenita and Eduardo acquired the
property by onerous title during their marriage
through their common fund. Thus, it belonged
to the conjugal partnership of gains and might
be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities
adjudged against Eduardo. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
The sole issue for resolution is whether the
subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive
property of Elenita or the conjugal property of
spouses Elenita and Eduardo.
Reposar
160 332
Dewara v. Alvero
shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary
indemnities imposed upon them be charged to
the partnership.
However, the payment of debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before the marriage,
and that of fines and indemnities imposed upon
them, may be enforced against the partnership
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 161 have been covered, if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property
Reposar
161 332
Zulueta v. Pan Am
G.R. No. 28589 ll Jan. 8, 1973 ll Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Zulueta, his wife and daughter
were passengers aboard defendants plane
from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake
Island the passengers were advised that they
could disembark for a stopover for about 30
minutes. Plaintiff went to the toilet at the
terminal building but finding it full walked 200
yards away. Upon returning he told an
employee of the defendant that they almost
made him miss the flight because of a defective
announcing system. He had a discussion with
either the plan captain or the terminal
manager. He was told that they would open his
bags which here fused and he warned them of
the consequences. Just the same they opened
his bags and found nothing prohibited. They
forced him to go out of the plane and left him at
Wake Island. His wife had to send him money
and he was able to leave Wake Island and
return to Manila thru Honolulu and Tokyo after
two days. This action was to recover damages
from the defendant.
ISSUE:
WON moral damages may be recovered.
HELD:
The records amply establish plaintiffs
right to recover both moral and exemplary
damages. Indeed, the rude and rough reception
plaintiff received at the hands of Sitton or
Captain Zentner when the latter met him at the
ramp (What in the hell do you think you are?
Reyes, G.
162 332
Mendoza v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-31618 ll Aug. 17, 1983
Doctrine:
Art 177: CP property - those acquired by
onerous title at the expense of common
fund
Properties acquired during marriage are
presumed to be conjugal in character.
o This is not destroyed by the fact that
the registration of the property is in the
name of only one of the spouses.
FACTS:
Ponciano filed a complaint with CFI of Rizal
for the annulment of the deed of sale of
two parcels of land with their
improvements, executed by his wife, Julia
as vendor and the Mendozas as vendees
o He averred that said properties were
conjugal properties of himself and his
wife and that she had sold them to
petitioners "all by herself" and without
his knowledge or consent
The properties in question were bought on
an installment basis from Gregorio Araneta,
Inc. (representative of J. M. Tuason & Co.).
The spouses were always in arrears in the
payment of the installments due to lack of
money so they had to borrow money from
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC) to pay the balance of the properties
in question.
In the deed of absolute sale executed by
Araneta, the vendee named is 'Julia de
Reyes'. Her signature appears over the
caption 'vendee' and those of Ponciano
under the phrase: 'with my marital
consent.'
o The Transfer Certificates of Title were
thus issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, in the name of 'JULIA
REYES married to PONCIANO REYES.'
The mortgage contracts executed by
the spouses in favor of the RFC were
duly registered and annotated on the
back of the said TCTs.
As promised to the RFC, the spouses built a
house and later a camarin on the two lots
which was leased as a school building for 2
years. And when the school was transferred
to another place, the camarin was leased on
Reyes, N.
163 332
Mendoza v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-31618 ll Aug. 17, 1983
Reyes, N.
164 332
Castillo v. Pasco
G.R. No. L-16857 ll May 29, 1964
PROVISION:
Art 118. Property bought on installment
paid partly from exclusive funds of either or
both spouses and partly from conjugal funds
belongs to the buyer/s if full ownership was
vested before the marriage and to the conjugal
partnership if such ownership was vested
during the marriage. In either case, any amount
advanced by the partnership or by either or
both spouses shall be reimbursed by the
owner/s upon liquidation of the partnership.
PETITION:
Review and reversal of the decision of CA
declaring the fishpond in San Roque as the
exclusive paraphernal property of Macaria
Pasco.
RULING:
CA decision revoked and set aside, case
remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
FACTS:
Macaria Pasco is married to Marcelo
Castillo, Sr. During the marriage, Gabriel and
Purificacion Gonzales executed a deed of sale to
the spouses for the fishpond in question. The
fishpond was payable in three installments:
P1000 upon the execution of the deed. This
installment was paid from Pascos own
account.
P2000 paid with the proceeds of the loan
from Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, who later assigned
his interest to Dr. Antonio Pasco.
P3000 paid from a loan secured by a
mortgage on 2 parcels of land assessed in
the name of Macaria Pasco.
ISSUE:
WON the 2nd and 3rd payment came from
the CPG
HELD:
Yes, the loans become obligations of the
CPG.
Using the ruling in Palanca v. Smith Bell that
if money borrowed by the husband alone on
the security of his wifes property is conjugal in
character, a fortiori should it be conjugal when
borrowed by both spouses. The reason
obviously is that the loan becomes an obligation
of the conjugal partnership which is the one
primarily bound for its repayment.
Deeds show that the loans indicate that
Castillo, Sr. and Pasco are joint borrowers of the
Jacinto and Gonzales loans. The loans thus
became obligations of the conjugal partnership
of both debtor spouses, and the money loaned
is logically conjugal property.
Since the fishpond is undivided property of
Pasco and the conjugal partnership with
Castillo, Sr. his heirs are entitled to ask for its
partition and liquidation. The ultimate interest
of each party must be resolved after due
hearing, taking into account:
a) Pascos 1/6 direct share
b) Her half of the community property
c) Her successional rights to a part of Castillo,
Sr.s share pursuant to the governing law of
succession when he died
d) Her right to reimbursement for any amount
advance by her in paying the mortgage
debt.
Sevilla
165 332
Lorenzo v. Nicolas
FACTS:
Lorenzo and Clemente got married
Lorenzos
children
(petitioners)
v.
Clementes grandchildren (respondent)
Petitioners claim that the 2 lands are
conjugal properties and cannot be sold to the
respondents.
Lot 6: she paid P169.16 before her marriage
to Manuel. The P833.32 balance was payable in
installment
Lot 5: she paid P116.84 before her marriage
with Manuel. The P850.32 balance was payable
by installment of P52.32 on the 1 and P42 on
each succeeding year.
ISSUE:
WON 2 lots are conjugal properties
HELD:
NO.
The fact that all receipts for installments
paid even during the lifetime of the late
Tan de Guzman
166 332
Ordoyo
167 332
DBP v. Adil
May 11, 1989
DOCTRINE:
(1) Those who have the right to alienate
property can be waived or renounced* the
right to prescription but not the right to
prescribe in the future. (Art. 1112 CC)
(2) Under Art 165 CC, the husband is the
administrator of CPG. All debts contracted
by him for the benefit of the CPG are
chargeable to the partnership.
FACTS:
Defendant spouses Patricio Confessor and
Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan
(P2,000) from Agricultural and Industrial Bank
(now DBP) to be paid in ten equal yearly
amortizations. However, they failed to pay the
first time so the husband executed another
promissory note to pay the outstanding
balance, otherwise, the foreclosure of the
Tiangco
168 332
NATURE OF PETITION:
This is a petition for review of a decision of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the lower court that the conjugal
partnership could not be held liable on an
indemnity agreement executed by the husband
since there was no benefits that accrued to the
conjugal partnership.
ISSUES:
(1) WON a conjugal partnership, in the
absence of any showing benefits received, could
be held liable on an indemnity agreement
executed by the husband to accommodate a
third party in favor of a surety company. NO.
FACTS:
The husband, Vicente Garcia signed an
indemnity agreement, as one of the guarantors
in a surety bond of Ladislao Chavez and the
petitioner in this case in favor of Philippine
National Bank (PNB) to guarantee a crop loan,
wherein he bound himself, jointly and severally,
to indemnify petitioner charges and expenses of
whatsoever kind that the petitioner might incur
at any time as guarantor of the said bond. It
also included the payment of interest fees and
litigation fees.
RATIO:
(1) SC ruled that the CA adjudicated the
matter in accordance with law. They affirmed
the decision of the CA and of the trial court.
Even though the husband was the
designated administrator of their properties,
the only obligations that he incurred that can be
charged upon the conjugal partnership are
those that promote the advancement of his
profession or career with the belief that it can
accrue benefits to the family. This is not true in
the case at hand since the act of Vicente in
signing as a guarantor was not for the benefit of
the family. No proof was shown that he
Yumol
169 332
Yumol
170 332
Ayala Investment v. CA
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills obtained loan
from Ayala Investment, and Husband-Ching, VP
of PBM, executed acted as surety for loan.
PBM failed to pay loan; AIDC filed case
against PBM and Alfredo-Ching to pay loan,
with interest.
Court of First Instance, Pasig, held that
accord. to Art. 121 of the Family Code:
Conjugal Partnership shall be liable for (2) all
debts and obligations contracted during
marriages by administrator spouse for benefit
of the family.
for benefit of the family does NOT
include husband acting as surety for a
corporate loan
AIDC may NOT enforce payment of loan
against spouses-Chings CPG Court of
Appeals: upheld CFI ruling
AIDC filed for appeal
ISSUE:
W/N Husband-Ching, acting as surety for
PBM, falls under the for the benefit of the
family condition that makes CPG liable for the
loan/debt to AIDC
HELD:
NO. Supreme Court upholds decision of the
CA and CFI in ruling that the CPG is not liable for
the PBM debt.
Art. 121 of Family Code:
CPG liable for debts and obligations
contracted
during
marriage
by
administrator spouse for benefit of the
family.
Alampay
171 332
Carlos v. Abelardo
G.R. No. 146504 ll Apr. 9, 2002
TOPIC: Charges upon the CPG [FC Art. 121
(2)(3)]
Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be
liable for:
(2) All debts and obligations contracted
during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership of gains, or by
both spouses or by one of them with
the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by
either spouse without the consent of
the other to the extent that the family
may have been benefited;
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to
cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall
be solidarily liable for th e unpaid balance with
their separate properties.
QUICK GUIDE:
Petitioner issued US$25,000 as a loan to his
daughter and son-in-law for the spouses
conjugal home [house and lot]. The loan is
liability of CPG even if the husband denies
giving consent by not signing the
acknowledgement executed by his wife to such
because the loan redounded to the benefit of
the family.
FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against
Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of
the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and
lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989
when the petitioner issued a check worth as
such to assist the spouses in conducting their
married life independently. The seller of the
property acknowledged receipt of the full
payment. The petitioner tried to collect the
money but was met w/ threats so he made a
Bayona
172 332
Cadorna
173 332
Ros v. PNB
G.R. No. 170166 ll Apr. 6, 2011
Husband obtained loan from PNB and
mortgaged land by forging wifes signature.
Contract VALID because H cannot come to court
with unclean hands and loan was automatically
assumed to have benefited the family because
it was obtained for family business.
FACTS
Ros obtained a loan of P115,000 from PNB
Laoag on Oct. 14, 1974 and mortgaged a parcel
of land as security. PNB foreclosed on the
property and bought it in an auction. The land
was then registered in the name of PNB in 1978.
Aguete claimed that she had no knowledge
of the loan obtained by her husband without
her consent and filed to annul the mortgage,
sale and consolidation of the property, alleging
that her signatures were forged and that the
loan did not redound to the benefit of the
family.
ISSUES
1. WON the wife did not consent to the
mortgage executed by the husband,
thereby making the contract void.
2. WON the loan from PNB redounded to the
conjugal partnership
HELD & RD:
1. NO. The Court held that the Civil Code
was in effect at the time of the mortgage, thus
the property is considered part of the CPG. Art.
173 of the CC (The wife may, during the
Cristobal
174 332
Tinitigan v. Tinitigan
Oct. 30, 1980
FACTS:
Teofista Payumo Tinitigan leased a
residential house in Pasay to copetitioner
Pentel Co. without permission from her
husband, Severino Tinitigan Sr., who filed a
complaint before Rizal CFI Branch II. He later
sought, and was given, court approval to sell
the Pasay property to Quintin Lim, general
manager of Pentel Co. The wife filed a petition
for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal
partnership in another court, which appointed
her administrator of the conjugal properties
subject to conditions (one of them being that
the disposition of the Pasay property is subject
to the decision of CFI Branch II.
Meanwhile, the husband sold the Pasay
property not to Lim, but to Chiu Chin Siong. The
wife protested but was denied because he
supposedly has the right under Art. 171 CC,
further justified because it will relieve the
conjugal properties from foreclosure due to
mortgage obligations.
She brought the case to the CA but it
affirmed the assailed decision, hence the
petition.
ISSUES:
- WON the husband was the administrator of
the conjugal partnership
- WON the sale was valid.
HELD:
Dantes
175 332
Guiang v. CA
G.R. No. 125172 ll Panganiban, J.
DOCTRINE:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the
consent of both the husband and the wife. The
absence of the consent of one renders the sale
null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes
it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can
ratification cure the defect.
FACTS:
The wife went to Manila.
The husband sold half of the conjugal
property without her consent.
When she came back, she found her
children living in separate households, so she
gathered them and they lived in the house the
husband sold.
The buyers sued her for trespassing.
They later made an amicable settlement,
which is still pending in the RTC.
The wife sought for the declaration of the
dead of sale as null and void because it was sold
without her consent.
The buyers contend that the contract was
merely voidable, and that it was ratified by the
De Castro
176 332
Relucio v. Lopez
G.R. No. 138497 ll Jan. 16, 2001 ll Pardo, J.
PETITIONER: Imelda Relucio
RESPONDENT: Angelina Mejia Lopez
DOCTRINE:
3rd Parties or Strangers to the marriage do
not have cause of action when one spouse
petitions for appointment as the sole
administrator of the properties.
HELD:
1. NO
o A cause of action is an act or omission
of one party (defendant) in violation of
the legal right of the other (plaintiff).
o Elements:
A right in favour of the plaintiff
An obligation on the part of the
defendant
An act/omission on the part of
defendant that violated the rights
of the plaintiff / breach of
obligation that gives rise to an
action for recovery of damages
o The complaint is by an aggrieved wife
against the husband
Cause of action arises only between
the husband and the wife who have
rights and obligations to each other.
o Petitioner is a complete stranger to the
marriage and to the cause of action
Administration is between the
married couple only
o Wifes petition for forfeiture is on the
share of the husbands share of the
properties co-owned by him and
petitioner
It does not involve the issue of
validity of the co- ownership
o Seeking of support by wife is from the
husband, also not from the stranger
FACTS:
In 1968, Husband left Wife and 4 legitimate
children
He arrogated unto himself full and exclusive
control and administration of the conjugal
properties
Spent and used for sole gain and benefit
and excluded the wife and children
VALID during that time, as husband was
sole admin
In 1976, Husband got into an illicit
relationship and cohabited with the
Petitioner/Paramour
Started to build up a fortune consisting of
stockholdings in Lopez- owned or controlled
corporations,
and
other
properties
(buildings, vehicles, lots, jewelry, etc.)
o Came from actual contribution of
properties and money (which were
conjugal) of Husband
o Concealed these from the original
family, entered into using his name or
his paramours name or both
o In 1993, Petition of Wife to be sole
administratix of properties, forfeiture,
etc. against husband and petitioner
o A motion to dismiss the petition filed by
Petitioner on the ground that wife has
no action against her
DENIED: as she was impleaded as a
necessary or indispensable party
because some of the properties
were registered in her name.
ISSUES:
1. WON wifes petition for appointment as
sole administratix establish a cause of
action against petitioner
2. NO
o An indispensable party is one without
whom there can be no final
determination of an action
o A real party in interest is an
indispensable party, who stands to be
benefited/injured by the judgement of
the suit
Since petitioner would not be
affected in any way, she is not a
real party in interest, and is not an
indispensable party to the suit.
Dilag
177 332
Dolot
178 332
Villanueva v. Chiong
G.R. No. 159889 ll Jun. 5, 2008 ll Quisumbing, J.
PETITIONERS: WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA
RESPONDENTS: FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA CHIONG
DOCTRINE:
Sale of conjugal property without consent
of other spouse when marriage governed by CC
is only voidable, not void ab initio.
FACTS:
Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married
in 1960, but were already separated in fact in
1975. During their marriage they acquired a lot,
which Florentino sold the one-half western
portion to the Petitioners for 8,000 Pesos,
payable in instalments. When they finally paid
in full, they demanded for the deed of sale.
Elisera, however, refused to sign the deed.
Elisera filed for Quieting of Titles at the RTC,
while Florentino executed the Deed of Absolute
Sale in favour of the petitioners. RTC ruled in
favour of Elisera, and declared the sale null and
void.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the subject lot is part of the exclusive
property of Florentino;
2. WoN the sale of land was valid.
HELD:
No. Petitioners claim that it is exclusive
property because the Chiongs were already
separated in fact. This cannot be, because the
separation in fact between husband and wife
without judicial approval does not affect the
conjugal partnership. Elisera both showed the
certificate of title and a real property tax
declaration showing that it was part of their
conjugal property, and Florentino also admitted
the conjugal nature of the lot.
Yes. It is not void ab initio, but only
voidable, because they were married before the
Family Code and so governed by the provisions
of the Civil Code, specifically Articles 1666 and
Enad
179 332
Flores v. Lindo
G.R. No. 183984 ll Apr. 13, 2011
PETITIONER:
Arturo Sarte Flores
RESPONDENTS: Spouses Enrico L. Lindo, Jr. and Edna C. Lindo
owner-spouses acceptance. The execution of
DOCTRINE:
the Special Power of Attorney by Enrico in
When the power of administration is given
Ednas favor perfected the contract as binding,
to one spouse, this does not include the power
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage valid.
to encumber or dispose of the property without
written consent of the owner-spouse. However,
if the owner-spouse gives his or her consent
after such transaction, it shall be perfected as a
binding contract.*
FACTS:
Edna Lindo borrowed P400,000 from Arturo
Flores, and executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage to secure the loan. The deed
covered property in her name and her
husbands, Enrico Lindo, Jr. She signed the
deed, as well as a Promissory Note, for herself
and her husband, as his attorney-in-fact.
When she failed to pay the loan, Flores filed
an action to foreclose the property. However,
Edna alleged that Enrico had not been a party
to the loan, because she had contracted it
without his signature.
The Regional Trial Court had ruled that
petitioner was not entitled to foreclosure, upon
finding that the Deed had been executed on 31
Oct. 1995, but the Special Power of Attorney by
Enrico in his wifes favor was only dated 4 Nov.
1995.
ISSUE:
Whether Edna had validly mortgaged their
property.
RATIO:
The Court held that she had. An
administrator does not have the powers of
disposition or encumbrance without the ownerspouses written consent, and any transaction
done without the consent shall be void.
However, paragraph 2 of Art. 1248 provides
for the perfection of the contract upon the
8
Espaola
180 332
Go v. Go
FACTS:
Jesus Gaviola sold two parcels of land to
Protacio Go Jr. 23 years later, 1999, he executed
an affidavit of renunciation and waiver,
whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his
father, Protacio Sr, not h, who had purchased
the property
On November 1987, Marta Go, wife of Sr
and mother of petitioners died
On December 1999, Protacio Sr and his son
Rito sold a portion of the property to Ester
Servacio
On March 2001, petitioners demand the
return of the property but Servacio refused to
heed their demand
Petitioners averred that following Protacio
Jr's renunciation, property became conjugal
property; and sale of property to Servacio w/o
prior liquidation of the community property
between Sr and Marta was null and void
RTC declared property was conjugal
property, because there were 3 vendors who
were heirs of Marta (also, presumption of
conjugal property) BUT affirmed the validity of
the sale saying that as long as the portion sold
will not be allotted to other heirs in the final
partition of the property....as long as the
portion sold does not encroach upon the
legitimate of other heirs, it is valid
ISSUE:
Must the subject property be liquidated
first before being sold?
HELD:
Art 130 Family Code
Upon the termination of the marriage by
death, the conjugal partnership property shall
be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
Hermosisima
181 332
Garcia v. Manzano
DOCTRINE:
In the system established by the Civil Code,
the wife does not administer the CPG unless
with the consent of the husband, or by decree
of court under its supervision. Legally, the wife
cannot mismanage the conjugal partnership
unless the husband tolerates it.
FACTS:
Plaintiff and respondent are husband and
wife but they have been living separately from
each other since 1948, all attempts at
reconciliation between them having failed.
As a result of their joint efforts, plaintiff and
defendant acquired and accumulated real and
personal properties. And upon the sepaRATIOn
of the spouses, the defendant (wife) assumed
the
complete
management
and
administRATIOn of the conjugal partnership
properties.
Husband alleged that his wife has been
enjoying said property, as well as its fruits to
the exclusion, has fictitiously transferred or
alienated majority of said properties, has
neglected to file any income tax returns and has
failed to turn over his rightful share.
As a result, petitioner prayed for 1)
complete accounting of CPG and its fruits and
that 2) his rightful share be given pursuant to
law.
Defendant filed to dismiss the petition on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action
under Article 191 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
1) WON husband has cause of action under
Article 191 of the NCC
If none, WON he is entitled to some relief
under the allegations of his complaints
HELD:
DISMISSED. Complaint is not under the
provisions of Articles 190 and 191 of NCC and
complaint does not establish a case for
separation of property.
RD:
Article 191 cannot be availed by the
husband where the administration of the CPG
has been forcibly taken from him by his wife
and she abuses the management thereof.
Consistent with its policy of discouraging a
regime of separation and not in harmony with
the unity of the family and mutual affection
expected of the spouses, the old and new Civil
Codes require that separation of property shall
not prevail unless expressly stipulated in 1)
marriage settlements, 2) or by formal judicial
decree during the existence of marriage (Art.
190, NCC)
Under Article 191, the only grounds for
separation of properties are 1) spouse has been
sentenced to a penalty which carries civil
interdiction 2) spouse has been declared absent
or 3) when legal separation has been granted.
This enumeration must be regarded as
limitative, in view of the Codes restrictive
policy.
Article 167 of the CC grants cause of action
exclusively to the wife in cases of
mismanagement and maladministration by the
husband (since CC grants administration of CPG
to husband). In the system established by the
Civil Code, the wife does not administer the
CPG unless with the consent of the husband, or
by decree of court under its supervision.
Legally, therefore, the wife cannot mismanage
the CPG unless the husband or courts tolerate
it.
In the event of such maladministration by
the wife, the remedy of the husband does not
lie in a judicial separation of property but in
revoking the power granted to the wife and
assume administration of the community and
the conduct of the affairs of the conjugal
partnership.
The articles above quoted contemplate
exclusively the remedies available to the wife
against the abuses of her husband because
normally only the latter can commit such
abuses.
Macariola
182 332
Partosa-Jo v. CA
Dec. 18, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo filed two cases
against the respondent Jose Jo for judicial
separation of property and for support. The
cases were consolidated and tried jointly. The
holding of the lower court addressed the claim
for support but did not make any explicit
commentary with regard to the request for
separation. Jose Jo elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the
dispensation of support made by the lower
court but dismissed the claim for judicial
separation of property because it interpreted
the separation between the petitioner and
respondent was something both agreed upon.
As a result, it was not covered by Article 178 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
WON, given the circumstances, the judicial
separation of property could be granted
WON the Supreme Court may re-interpret
the decision of the lower court because of
possible inconsistencies between the body and
dispositive portion of its decision
HELD:
YES TO BOTH.
The Supreme Court reiterated the principle
that where there is an ambiguity caused by an
omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of
a decision, it (the Supreme Court) may amend
the decision for the sake of clarity even after
the judgment has become final. In the case at
bar, it was clear that, given the facts and
findings, the trial court should have rendered a
decision regarding the petition for judicial
separation of property. In particular, the
petitioner pointed to the penultimate
paragraph of the decision as proof that the
lower court had ruled in favor of the judicial
Marin
183 332
ISSUE:
WoN the separation of the defendant
constituted abandonment, a legal ground for
judicial separation of property?
HELD:
NO. Defendant is not guilty of
abandonment. To entitle her (plaintiff), to any
of these remedies... there must be real
abandonment and not mere separation. The
abandonment must not be only be physical
estrangement but also amount to financial and
moral desertion.
Record showed that he continued to give
support to his family. The wife and kids were
not living in want. In fact, the wife seems to
have the money to play mahjong.
There is no mismanagement because the
husband was able to expand the conjugal
property. There is no abuse since he has not
done acts to prejudice the wife.
THE COURT HOWEVER, DOES NOT
CONDONE THE HUSBAND BUT MERELY POINTS
OUT THE LACK OF THE WIFE'S CAUSE FOR
ACTION. The courts must be hesitant in
ordering judicial separation because the basic
policy is to preserve the unity of spouses in
person, in spirit and in property.
Judgment where there has been no real
abandonment may slam shut the door for
possible reconciliation.
Nuez
184 332
Ordoyo
185 332
HELD:
YES.
The
settlement/compromise
agreement between the two spouses is valid
with respect to the separation of property and
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. (See
doctrine aforementioned) Judicial sanction was
obtained upon the CFIs approval of the
separation of their property as well as the
dissolution of the conjugal property. Moreover,
the propriety of severing the spouses financial
interests is manifest given that they have been
separated in fact for at least five years already
and at the same time the court had no power to
compel the spouses to live together. However,
the approval of separation of property and the
dissolution of the CPG does not mean the court
legalizes/recognizes the separation in fact of
the spouses.
As to the custody of the children, the Court
held that the CFI erred in depriving the mother
of the custody of the two older children, citing
Art 363 of the CC which commands that no
mother shall be separated from her child under
seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure. When
the settlement was approved by the CFI, the
two older children were then 6 and 5 years old
respectively and the court did not have any
compelling reasons to grant their custody to the
father other than to rely on the mutual
agreement of the spouses in their settlement.
The courts, in determining which parent
custody of the child should be granted, should
take into account where the child can best be
assured of the rights granted to him by law.
Decision of the CA declaring null and void the
settlement/compromise judgment in so far as
it relates to the custody and right of visitation
over the two elder children is affirmed.
Pagdanganan
186 332
Maquilan v. Maquilan
TOPIC: Voluntary separation of property
DOCTRINE:
Art. 134 - The separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place
except by judicial order. Such judicial separation
of property may either be voluntary or for
sufficient cause.
FACTS:
Spouses married with one son. However,
their relationship soured when husband found
out wife was cheating on him.
He filed a case of adultery against wife =
both wife and her paramour found guilty.
Wife then filed for nullity of marriage,
dissolution of CPG, and damages on the
grounds that husband was psychologically
incapacitated.
During this case, spouses entered into a
Compromise Agreement to partially divide their
CPG.
However, husband filed an Omnibus Motion
praying for the repudiation of the agreement,
stating that his lawyer did not inform him of the
consequences of it. This was denied so he
appealed to the CA >> also denied husband
hence this case.
The husband argues that:
1. The Compromise Agreement should not
have been deemed valid since it is
against law and public policy (wife was
guilty of adultery hence cant get share
of property)
2. That the proceedings where it was
approved is null and void, there being
no appearance and participation of the
Solicitor General or the Provincial
Prosecutor
3. That the respondent, having been
convicted of adultery, is therefore
disqualified from sharing in the conjugal
property.
Poblador
187 332
Maquilan v. Maquilan
a. P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the
bank jointly in the name of the spouses
shall be withdrawn and deposited in favor
and in trust of their common child, Neil
Maquilan, with the deposit in the joint
account of the parties.
b. The store that is now being occupied by the
plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the
bodega shall be for the defendant. The
defendant shall be paid the sum of
P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the
store in full settlement thereof.
c. The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the
bodega until the time the owner of the lot
on which it stands shall construct a building
thereon;
Poblador
188 332
Yaptinchay v. Torres
DOCTRINE:
Common law spouses MAY claim coownership of their spouse's properties ONLY IF
there is a clear showing that he/she has
contributed to the acquisition of the property
involved.
RELATED ARTICLE:
Art. 148 FC (but before, Art 144 CC was used)
In cases of cohabitation not falling under
the preceding Article9, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article. The
foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith.
FACTS:
Teresita Yaptinchay filed a case at the Ct. of
First Instance(CFI) of Rizal, Pasay City, wherein
she sought to be appointed as both Special and
Regular administratix of the estates of Isidro
Yaptinchay (who she allegedly cohabited with
for 19 years), when the latter passed away
without a will. However, the same had been
granted to Virginia Yaptinchay, daughter of the
Quiambao
189 332
Yaptinchay v. Torres
of her common law relationship with the
deceased
HELD:
Petition for certiorari dismissed, Writ of
preliminary injunction set aside. (No errors as to
orders of respondent judge.)
(1) No. Although the long standing rule is that
injunction is not to be granted for the purpose
of taking property out of possession and/or
control of a party and placing it in that of
another whose title thereto has not been
clearly established, the same rests upon the
sound discretion of the Court. Teresita wasn't
able to clearly establish that the loans she
contracted during the construction of the house
were made for the same. On the contrary, it
was evident that the loans were made for
purposes other than the construction of the
Forbes home. Also, the unsupported assertion
Quiambao
190 332
Juaniza v. Jose
DOCTRINE:
Co-ownership contemplated in Art 144,
requires that the man and woman living
together must not be incapacitated to contract
marriage
FACTS:
Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro
Ramos but had been cohabiting with, Rosalia
Arroyo, for sixteen 16 years in a relationship like
husband and wife.
Eugenio Jose, an owner and operator of a
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of
collision with a freight train of the Philippine
National Railways which resulted in the death
to seven 7 and physical injuries to five 5 of its
passengers.
The CFI charged damages to Eugenio and
Rosalia jointly and severally to pay:
Plaintiff Victor Juaniza the sum of
P1,600.00 plus legal interest from date
of complaint until fully paid and costs of
suit.
Pay the respective heirs of the
deceased Josefa P. Leus, Fausto Retrita,
Nestor del Rosario Aonuevo and Arceli
de la Cueva in the sum of P12,000.00
for the life of each of said deceased,
with legal interest from date of
complaint, and costs of suit.
Rosalia filed for a motion for consideration
to exempt her from paying damages jointly and
severally with Eugenio
RTC denied the motion pursuant to Art 144
of the CC:
When a man and woman living together
as husband and wife, but they are not
Quilala
191 332
Ramos
192 332
Ramos
193 332
Maxey v. CA
FACTS:
Maxey and Morales lived as common-law
spouses from 1903 to 1918. Their first marriage
in 1903 was void because it was a military
wedding which was not yet recognized during
that time. They were also able to acquire
parcels of land. They eventually validly married
in 1919 however Morales, who was a housewife
all those years, died shortly after. Their children
filed this case praying for the annulment of sale
for their parents properties executed by their
father without their knowledge and consent.
ISSUE:
WON the said properties were exclusive to
their father or if they were actually common
properties co-owned by their mother because
they were acquired from their joint efforts and
industry.
HELD:
The said properties were common
properties co-owned by the spouses Maxey and
Morales.
The rules of co-ownership apply to this
case, as stated in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Based on the article, it would be unjust if a
woman who is a wife in all aspects except for a
valid marriage will be required to earn a living
or engage in business before the rules on coownership would apply. Morales ran the
household and held the family purse. The
Filipino woman traditionally holds the purse
and runs the household.
The real contribution to the acquisition of
property mentioned in Yaptinchay includes not
only the earnings of a woman from a
profession, occupation, or business. It also
includes her contribution to the familys
material and spiritual goods through caring for
the children, administering the household,
conserving scarce resources, freeing her
husband from household tasks, and otherwise
performing the traditional duties of a
housewife.
Relevant articles:
Art 144 CC:
When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
Art 147 FC:
When a man and a woman who are capacitated
to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of
this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other,
until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage
is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation. (144a)
Reposar
194 332
Valdez v. RTC
G.R. No. 122749 ll Jul. 31, 1996 ll Vitug, J.
FACTS:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were
married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during
the marriage were 5 children.
June 22, 1992: Valdes sought the
declaRATIOn of nullity of the marriage pursuant
to Art 36 of the Family Code.
RTC held that:
1. Marriage of the spouses are declared null
and void under Art 36 on the ground of
their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital
obligations.
2. The 3 older children, Carlos Enrique III,
Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall
choose which parent they would want to
stay with. While Stella Eloisa and Joaquin
Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their
mother: Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The Petitioner shall have visitation rights
over the children who are in the custody of
the other.
3. The petitioner and respondent are directed
to start proceedings on the LIQUIDATION of
Reyes, G.
195 332
Cario v. Cario
G.R. No. 132529 ll Feb. 2, 2001
DOCTRINE:
Art 147 (Live-in partners w/o impediments):
wages and salaries shall be owned in equal
shares; rules on co-ownership governs the
properties
they
acquired
thru
their
work/industry
Art 148 (Property regime of bigamous
marriages): properties acquired thru their
ACTUAL contributions shall be owned by them
in common; do not include wages and salaries
Art 40: to contract a subsequent marriage, a
judicial declaration of nullity is needed to
render the previous marriage void
FACTS:
June 20, 1969: SPO4 Santiago Cario
married Susan Nicdao (had 2 offsprings)
Nov 10, 1992: Cario married Susan Yee
(cohabited since 1982; didnt have children)
1988: Cario became ill and bedridden due
to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. But he passed away on Nov 23,
1992 (13 days after the wedding HAHA) under
the care of Susan Yee, who is also the one who
spent for his medical and burial expenses
Both Susans claimed for benefits and
insurance pertaining to Cario from various
govt agencies. Nicdao collected: Php 146,000
from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM
& Pag-ibig. Yee collected: Php 21,000 from GSIS
Life, and Burial (GSIS and SSS)
Dec 14, 1993: Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao
praying that she be ordered to return to her at
least one-half of Php 146,000.00 death
benefits. The trial court, as affirmed in toto by
the CA, granted Yees petition since the 1st
marriage was void ab initio due to the lack of
marriage license (as depicted in the marriage
certificate and Local Civil Registrar of San Juans
certification which states that they do not have
a record of the marriage license)
ISSUE + RD:
WON Yee is entitled to of the death
benefits, thus Nicdao should give her the said
amount
196 332
Cario v. Cario
G.R. No. 132529 ll Feb. 2, 2001
the legal wife of the deceased is not
one of them.
Apply Art 147 for Nicdao: Wages and salaries
earned by either party during the cohabitation
shall be owned by the parties in equal shares
and will be divided equally between them, even
if only one party earned the wages and the
other did not contribute thereto.
Conformably, even if the disputed death
benefits were earned by the deceased
Reyes, N.
197 332
Sevilla
198 332
Saguid v. CA
DOCTRINE:
Share in the common property shall be
determined by the each of the parties actual
contribution in the absence of proof, it is
presumed that Gina and Jacintos actual
contributions are of equal amount
FACTS:
17 old Gina S. Rey was married but
separated in fact from her husband.
She met Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, in
July 1987.
Gina and Saguid decided to cohabit as
husband and wife in a house built on a lot
owned by Jacintos father
Jacinto made a living as the patron of their
fishing vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina, on the
other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but
decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from
1992 to 1994 when her relationship with
Jacintos relatives turned sour.
They separated after 9 years of cohabiting
with each other
Gina filed a complaint for Partition and
Recovery
of
Personal
Property
with
Receivership, alleging that from her salary as
entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their
unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings
as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able
to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of
furniture and household effects, with a total
value of P111,375.00.
RTC and CA decided in favor or Gina and
stated that both Gina and Jacinto contributed to
HELD:
Given that Gina and Jacinto are not
capacitated to marry (Gina having a subsisting
marriage) Art. 148 of the Family Code must
govern which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state
of concubinage, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, and
multiple alliances of the same married man
...only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their
respective contributions ...
Even if the marriage commenced in 1987,
which is before the date of the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148
thereof applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code (As seen in Sempio-Dy).
While there is no question that both parties
contributed in their joint account deposit, there
is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact
amount of their respective shares therein
Stated in Article 148 of the Family Code, in
the absence of proof of extent of the parties
respective contribution, their share shall be
presumed to be equal.
ISSUES:
WON the prior courts had basis to grant all
alleged properties and contributions to GINA
Tan de Guzman
199 332
Ordoyo
200 332
Yumol
201 332
Yumol
202 332
Yumol
203 332
Mendoza v. CA
PETITONER:
Ceclio Mendoza (husband)
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals, and Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza (wife)
DOCTRINE:
Art. 222, Civil Code: No suit shall be filed
between members of the family (case at bar:
between spouses) unless it should appear
that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in Art. 2035.
Art. 2035, Civil Code: NO COMPROMISE
upon the following questions shall be valid:
(2) validity of a marriage or a legal separation,
and (4) future support.
FACTS:
Spouses-Mendoza were married in 1954,
then husband-Mendoza moved to the States
for further studies and to practice his
profession. Wife-Mendoza filed a complaint,
alleging husband-Mendoza had deliberately
abandoned her without justifiable cause and
refuses to provide maintenance and support
for the wife who is allegedly pregnant, and
without a source of revenue.
Wife-Mendoza wants maintenance and
support since husband-Mendoza is employed
in a hospital in the U.S., earning an average of
200 USD monthly.
Husband-Mendoza moved to dismiss
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper
venue. Motion denied.
Husband-Mendozas second motion to
dismiss on grounds of Art. 222, Civil Code:
No suit shall be filed or maintained
between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the
Alampay
204 332
Mendez v. Bionson
PETITIONERS:
ZOILA MENDEZ, RAFAEL MENDEZ, and MATILDE BIONSON
RESPONDENTS: MAXIMO, EUGENIA JUANA, FORTUNATA, PRUDENCIA, ROMAN, ANECITA and MARIA,
all surnamed BIONSON and HON. ALFREDO C. LAYA, Judge, Court of First of Cebu,
Branch XII,
DOCTRINE:
Collateral relatives who are not brothers
and sisters are not included in the term family
relations used in Art. 150 [FC].
FACTS:
Three cases involved:
1. 1st case [CFI] Zoila et al filed for action
against Maximo et. al for partition of 2
parcels of land; CFI decided in favour of
Maximo et. al but failed to include in the
dispositive that Zoila et al should vacate the
said lands
2. 2nd case [CFI] Maximo et. al filed an
action for recovery of possession and
ownership for a portion of the land w/c
Zoila et. al refuse to deliver to them; CFI in a
summary judgement ordered Zoila et. al to
vacate the said land
- Zoila et. al filed a petition but was
dismissed by CFI
3. 3rd case [SC] Zoila et. al assails the
summary judgement assigning errors on the
interpretation of the decision in the first
case
ISSUES/RATIO:
WON decision in first case denied
respondents [Maximo] claim of ownership. - NO
It is clear that Maximo et. al were declared
owners of the land in question. Documentary
evidence [tax declarations & official tax] in
support of Maximos testimonial evidence
shows that they are owners. Dismissal of
counterclaim of respondents cannot affect their
rights on 2 parcels of land in question bec it
only referred to moral damages, rentals
&attorneys fees. Respondents are the owners
& thus they have a right to possession of land &
right of action against holder & possessor of
such in order to recover land.
10
Bayona
205 332
Guerrero v. RTC
G.R. No. 109068 ll Jan. 10, 1994 ll Bellosillo, J.
PETITIONER: Gaudencio Guerrero
RESPONDENTS: Regional Trial Court Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr. and Pedro Hernando
FACTS:
An action was filed by petitioner Guerrero
against private respondent Hernando regarding
ownership of real property. The two are
brothers-in-law, they being married to halfsisters. During the pre-trial conference,
respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., noted the
relationship between them and on the basis
thereof, he gave the petitioner five (5) days "to
file his motion and amended complaint" to
allege that the parties were very close relatives,
their respective wives being sisters, and that the
complaint to be maintained should allege that
earnest efforts towards a compromise were
exerted but failed. Guerrero moved to
reconsider said order, claiming that since
brothers by affinity are not members of the
same family, he was not required to exert
efforts towards a compromise. He also argued
that Hernando was precluded from raising this
issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss
nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in
his answer.
Said motion was denied by the judge who
reiterated the 5-day deadline for Guerrero to
amend his complaint. However, the 5-day
period expired without Guerrero following the
order; thus, the respondent Judge dismissed the
case.
ISSUES:
WON brothers by affinity are considered
members of the same family contemplated in
Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil
Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of
the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts
towards acompromise before a suit between
them may be instituted and maintained
Cadorna
206 332
Hontiveros v. RTC
G.R. No. 125465 ll Jun. 29, 1999
PETITIONERS:
Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros
RESPONDENTS: Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Iloilo City; Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson
DOCTRINE:
Members of the same family are the
following: husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and
brothers and sisters, whether full or half blood.
FACTS:
Respondents Gregorio Hontiveros had filed
to register a parcel of land in Capiz, which
petitioners
Augusto, Gregorios brother, and Maria,
Augustos wife, protested. The spouses
Hontiveros claimed that they were the owners
of the land, and they had been deprived both of
its possession and income.
Respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and
Teodora Ayson denied that they were married,
alleging that
Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was
single. The respondents also claim that the
petitioners had failed to allege that earnest
efforts toward compromise had been made
pursuant to Art. 15111 since Gregorio and
Augusto were brothers. Thus, they prayed that
the subject land be reconveyed to them.
The trial court dismissed the petitioners
case on the ground that, though efforts toward
compromise had been alleged, they had not
been verified.
ISSUES
A. Procedural: Whether the lack of verification
required by Art. 151 is sufficient ground for
dismissal.
B. Whether Art. 151 is applicable.
RATIO
11
Espaola
207 332
Lacson v. Lacson
G.R. No. 150644 ll Aug. 28, 2006
PETITIONER:
RESPONDENTS:
Edward V. Lacson
Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson, represented by their mother
and guardian ad litem Lea Daban Lacson
DOCTRINES:
Art.203, FC - The obligation to give support
shall be demandable from the time the person
who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except
from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand.
Art.207, FC - When the person obliged to
support another unjustly refuses or fails to give
support when urgently needed by the latter,
any third person may furnish support to the
needy individual, with right of reimbursement
from the person obliged to give support.
FACTS:
Edward Lacson is married to Lea Daban and
they have two daughters, Maowee and
Maonaa. Not long after the birth of their second
child in 1976, Edward left the conjugal home in
Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and
children to seek shelter and financial assistance
elsewhere. For a month, they stayed with Leas
mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her
mother and then with her brother Noel Daban.
From 1976 to 1994 (18 years), they transferred
from one dwelling place to another not their
own. Lea did not badger Edward for support,
holding on to her husbands promise of doing so
on his letter dated December 10, 1975, which
he failed to comply with. He, however,
occasionally gave meager amounts for the
childrens school expenses. Edwards mother
also contributed to help in the childrens
schooling, but it was Leas brother, Noel Daban,
who lent a large sum to the family (between
P400,000-600,000). Lea, in behalf of her
daughters, then filed a complaint against
Edward for support before the Iloilo RTC in
1995.
In his answer, Edward alleged giving to
Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet
their needs. He explained, however, that his
lack of regular income and the unproductivity of
the land he inherited, not his neglect,
accounted for his failure at times to give regular
support.
The RTC ruled in favor of the sisters and
their mother and ordered Edward to pay them
18 months worth of support in arrears,
amounting to around P2.5 million. Edward
appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTCs
decision, which led to this petition for review to
the SC. He contends that he should not be
made to pay for support in arrears from 19761994 since there was no previous extrajudicial
or judicial demand from the respondents, citing
Art.203 of the Family Code. The computation
for support should just start from 1995 as that
was the date when the sisters formally asked
for support by lodging the complaint.
ISSUES:
1. WoN Edward should pay for the support in
arrears from 1976-1994 despite the
absence of an extrajudicial or judicial
demand
3. WoN Noel Daban is subject to
reimbursements for loans he provided for
the familys sustenance
4. WoN the sale by Lea of half of what Edward
claims to be his exclusive or capital
property, amounting to P5 million, can be
considered as payment for his support in
arrears to his daughters
RULING:
Petition denied. RTC & CAs decision
affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Yes. Edward overlooked the fact that he
abandoned his children at their tender
years and as such could not demand for
support since he was also difficult to get in
touch with. It also appeared that Lea made
an extrajudicial demand sometime in 1976
when she came to her mother-in-laws
house asking for financial support, as also
embodied in Edwards note dated
December 10, 1975. Thus, RTC was correct
Cruz
208 332
Lacson v. Lacson
G.R. No. 150644 ll Aug. 28, 2006
in computing arrears from 1976.
2. Yes. Under Art.207, FC, he is entitled to
reimbursements as Edward, the person
obliged to pay support, failed or refused to
do so. It was also worth noting that the setup constitutes as a quasi-contract given the
juridical relationship between Edward and
Noel (brother-in-law), which is attached
with an equitable principle enjoining one
from unjustly enriching himself at the
expense of another.
Cruz
209 332
Modequillo v. Modequillo
G.R. No. 86355 ll May 31, 1990
FACTS:
On January 29, 1988, the CA rendered
judgment on a civil case regarding a vehicular
accident in March
1976 ordering Modequillo and Malubay to
pay tens of thousands of pesos worth for
compensation and loss of earnings from death,
burial expenses, hospitalization, moral damages
and attorneys fees, to be taken from their
goods and chattels.
Hence, on July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on
a parcel of residential land as well as a parcel of
agricultural land registered in Modequillos
name. He filed a motion to quash the levy on
the residential land since it is where the family
home was built since 1969 and falls under such
category, and under Art. 1523 FC, is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment
except for liabilities in Art. 155. Modequillo
believes that the said judgment debt is not one
of those falling under Art. 155.
The trial court denied the motion, saying
that it was only deemed as a family home upon
the Family
Codes effectivity on August 4, 1988, hence
Dantes
210 332
De Castro
211 332
Veneracion v. Mancilla
G.R. No. 158238 ll Jul. 20, 2006 ll Callejo, Sr., J.
PETITIONERS:
Mary Grace M. Veneracion, Daisy and Richard Veneracion (minors)
RESPONDENTS: Charlie Mancilla (represented by heirs), Giar Cheng Linda, Caitlin, Erica, Tiffany
Mancilla, Hon. Judge Adoracion H. Angeles (RTC Caloocan City) Sheriff Jovinal Salayon,
Register of Deeds of Paraaque City
DOCTRINE:
3rd Parties or Strangers to the marriage do
not have cause of action when one spouse
petitions for appointment as the sole
administrator of the properties
NATURE OF PETITION:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court of the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition for
partial annulment of judgement filed by
Petitioner under Rule 47 of Rules of Court
FACTS:
- 1995 (Feb. 14)
o Elizabeth
Mendinueta
(wife
of
Geronimo Veneracion) secured a loan
from Charlie Mancilla.
Php 1.2 M Through a
promissory note to pay on
August 14, 1995, at 5% monthly
interest. This is with a real
estate mortgage over the
residential lot located at Better
Living Subdivision in Paraaque
(it was indicated that she was
single),
including
the
residential
house situated
thereon.
- 1995 (Oct. 11)
o Elizabeth defaulted on the loan, and
Charlie filed for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage.
o Charlie died during the pendency of the
case.
- 1996 (Oct. 18)
o Pre-trial findings:
Elizabeth was able to secure a
Php 1.2M loan from the Banco
Filipino Savings Mortgage Bank,
to be used to pay Charlie.
Elizabeth asked for reduction of
the monthly interest from 5%
to 3%
ISSUE:
WON the family home is exempted from
forced sale as it was the family home and
conjugal in nature
HELD: NO
- Petitioners failed to include in their petition
copies of the receipts for the instalment
payments that their father allegedly made
- Also, they were not able to attach any proof
that the said property was indeed their
family home and part of the conjugal
property of their parents.
o Not even the records from the RTC was
attached
- Their mother also never alleged in her
petition that the said property was conjugal
in nature and was being used as the family
home
Dilag
212 332
Veneracion v. Mancilla
G.R. No. 158238 ll Jul. 20, 2006 ll Callejo, Sr., J.
o
-
PETITION IS DENIED.
COSTS AGAINST THE
Dilag
PETITIONERS.
213 332
Arriola v. Arriola
DOCTRINE:
Although the house, as accessory to the
land, forms part of the estate of the deceased
which has passed by succession to the coownership of the heirs, the family home
continues to be as such for a period of 10 years
after the death of the head of the family. As
such, the house and the land on which it stands
cannot be immediately partitioned under Art.
159 of FC. This is to avert the disintegration of
the family unit following the death of its head.
FACTS:
Fidel Arriola had 2 marriages. After his
death, his sons from both marriages partitioned
his estate through public auction.
ISSUE:
W/N the house (family home) can be
included in the sale
HELD: No.
RATIO:
Article 159. The family home shall continue
despite the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family for a period of
ten years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the
disintegration of the family unit following the
death of its head. To this end, it preserves the
family home as the physical symbol of family
love, security and unity by imposing the
following restrictions on its partition: first, that
the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a
period of 10 years from the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family, or for a longer period, if there is still a
minor beneficiary residing therein; and second,
that the heirs cannot judicially partition it
during the aforesaid periods unless the court
Dolot
214 332
Enad
215 332
Josef v. Santos
G.R. No. 165060 ll Nov. 7, 2008
PETITIONER: Albino Josef
RESPONDENT: Otelio Santos
DOCTRINE:
The fact of a property being a family home
must be properly determined by the court
(according to the procedure below).
FACTS:
Petitioner Josef had bought shoe materials on
credit from respondent Otelio Santos, who, upon
Josefs failure to pay, brought a case for collection
before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The
RTC ruled that Josef was liable to Santos for
P404,836.50, with a 12% per annum interest.
As a result, some of Josefs personal properties
were auctioned off, including a real property in
Marikina, for which Santos was the winning
bidder.
Josef questioned the sale of the personal and
real properties, claiming that he was insolvent and
had no property to answer for the judgment. He
further claimed that the personal properties
belonged not to him but to his children, and that
the house and lot was his family home, thus
exempt from execution.
ISSUE:
Whether Santos could validly seize the real
property claimed to be a family home.
RATIO
The Court held that the trial court failed to
determine the truth to petitioner Josefs
allegations. The court must adhere to the
following procedure:
1. Determine if petitioners obligation to
respondent falls under either of the
exceptions under Art. 15512 of the Family
12
Code;
2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of
petitioners claim that the property
was his family home through:
- Ocular inspection of the premises
- Examination of the title
- Interview of members of community
where alleged family home is located,
to determine whether petitioner
actually resided within its premises
- Order that photographs of the
premises,
depositions
and/or
affidavits of proper individuals /
parties be submitted, or conduct a
solemn examination of petitioner,
his children and other witnesses.
The respondent must be given the opportunity
to cross-examine and present contrary
evidence.
3. If the property is found to be the petitioners
family home, the court should determine:
a. If the obligation sued upon was
contracted or incurred prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code;
b. If the petitioners spouse is still alive,
and if there are other beneficiaries of
the family home;
c. If the petitioner has more than one
residence, in order to determine which
of them, if any, is his family home;
d. Its actual location and value, in order to
apply Arts. 15713 and 16014.
service or furnished material for the construction of the
building.
13 ART. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not
exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the
three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two
hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as
may hereafter be fixed by law.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the
adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the
constitution of a family home shall be the basis of
evaluation.
For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to
include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual
Espaola
216 332
Josef v. Santos
G.R. No. 165060 ll Nov. 7, 2008
Thus, the writs of execution issued in
respondent Santoss favor, as well as the titles
obtained through them, were declared void.
The trial court was directed to conduct an
inquiry into whether the real property was
Josefs family home. Santos was ordered to hold
the properties and their proceeds in abeyance
while waiting for the outcome of the inquiry.
Espaola
217 332
Hermosisima
218 332
Perido v. Perido
PROOF OF FILATION:
Marriage of Lucio and his second wife,
Marcelina. Since the marriage of Lucio and
Marcelina was presumed to be valid in the
absence of proof to the contrary, their children
were considered legitimate.
FACTS:
Lucio married twice during his lifetime. He
begot three children with his first wife. After his
first wife died, Lucio married Marcelina with
whom he had five children. Lucio died in 1942,
while his second wife died in 1943.
On August 1960, the children and
grandchildren of the first and second
marriages of Lucio executed a document
denominated as Declaration of Hiership and
Extra-Judicial Partition, portioning among
themselves certain properties.
The children belonging to the first
marriage had second thoughts about the
partition praying for the annulment of the said
document alleging that the five children of
Lucio and Marcelina were all illegitimate and
therefore had no successional rights to Lucios
estate. On the theory that the five children
were born out of wedlock and were not
recognized by their parents before or after their
marriage.
RTC: Annulled the declaration but the five
children of Marcelina were included in the
partition in view of the findings that they
were legitimate. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage of Lucio and Marcelina
was valid.
Which would answer WON their children are
legitimate children.
HELD: Yes.
CA decision affirmed. Five children of Lucio
and Marcelina were born
during
their
marriage, and, therefore, legitimate. They
acquired successional rights to their fathers
estate.
RD:
CA found that there was evidence to show
that Lucios first wife died during the Spanish
regime. This finding is conclusive upon the
Court and beyond their power of review. Under
the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal
impediment to marry Marcelina before the
birth of their first child.
CA correctly held that the testimony of
Leonora (Lucios grandchildren of
first
marriage) saying that Lucio was not actually
married to Marcelina was not conclusive. She
was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony. It
is weak and insufficient to rebut the
presumption that persons living together as
husband and wife are married to each other.
This presumption, especially where legitimacy
of the issue is involved, may be overcome only
by cogent proof on the part of those who allege
the illegitimacy.
MINOR ISSUES:
WON some lands questioned are part of
Lucios exclusive properties.
- Lands were all declared in the name of
Lucio. Then there is evidence showing that
the lands were inherited by Lucio from his
grandmother. In other words, they were
exclusive properties of Lucio which he
brought into the first and second marriages.
WON some properties questioned are part
of the conjugal properties of Lucio and
Marcelina.
- It is expressly stated in the certificate of
title that Lucio, the registered owner, was
married to Marcelina unlike in the previous
land titles. If the law presumes a property
registered in the name of only one of the
spouses to be conjugal, the presumption
becomes stronger when the document
recites that the spouse in whose name the
land is registered is married to somebody
else. Legal presumption that said properties
belonged to conjugal partnership had not
been overcome by clear proofs to the
contrary.
Macariola
219 332
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner may be recognized as
William Liyaos illegitimate child based on the
evidence he presented
HELD:
NO. The presumption is always in favor of
the legitimacy of the child. The petitioner may
not impugn his possible legitimacy without
strong and conclusive pieces of evidence.
According to the New Civil Code a child born
and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate. As Ramon and
Corazon Yulo were not legally separated nor
was their marriage annulled, then William
Liyao Jr. is presumed to be the legitimate fruit
of that marriage.
The Court held that the fact that the fact
that Corazon cohabited with William Liyao for
10 years was immaterial because only the
husband or his heirs may impugn the
legitimacy of a child. The fact that Corazon
Yulo claims his illegitimacy with another man
as a result of adulterous relations has no
bearing if the Ramon Yulo does not impugn
the legitimacy of the child in question. Lastly,
the Court held that even if the petition was
coursed through the children of Ramon Yulo
(note: the legitimacy of a child may only be
impugned in a direct action by the proper
party) who might be in a position to impugn
his legitimacy as his heirs, they could not be
certain that Ramon Yulo was already dead.
As
such,
the
petition is
denied.
Marin
220 332
SSS v. Aguas
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate
child is buttressed by her birth certificate
bearing Pablo's signature. A birth certificate
signed by the father is a competent evidence
of paternity.
FACTS:
Upon the death of Pablo Aguas, the spouse
Rosanna wanted to claim SSS benefits for her
and her children as beneficiaries and
dependents. SSS, upon the submission of
evidence by Pablo's sister, denied the claims,
stating that the wife Rosanna abandoned the
home and therefore was not entitled to
support and the children Jeylnn and Janet were
not children of Pablo but of Rosanna's
paramour.
Rosanna submitted birth certificates of the
two girls in the SSC hearings but was still
denied. She appealed the case to CA, which
ruled in her favor stating questions pertaining
to the children's legitimacy may only be
decided by the courts. SSS now seeks reversal
from the SC.
ISSUE:
WoN Jeylnn and Janet were dependents of
Pablo
HELD:
Jeylnn - Yes, she is. The birth certificate
submitted was signed by Pablo Aguas which
indicated that she was a legitimate child born
before Rosanna left the conjugal home. As for
conflicting baptismal certificates of Jeylnn
(signed by Pablo Aguas) and a certain Jennelyn
(signed by paramour), the Court concluded
that they were the same person, corroborated
by account of a scandal during the baptismal
ceremony. It was impossible for Rosanna to
give birth to two consecutive children in 3
months.
Janet - No, she isn't. Her birth certificate
was merely prima facie evidence, being only a
photocopy.
Consistent
testimonies
by
neighbors stated that she was only adopted
when the couple wasnt lucky in having kids.
There being no adoption papers, she was not a
legitimate child of Pablo.
Nuez
221 332
In Re: Baby M
109 N.J. 396
FACTS:
The Sterns entered into a surrogacy
agreement with Mary Beth Whitehead in
which she agreed to bear the child of Mr.
Stern (through artificial insemination) in
exchange for costs plus $10,000 and to
terminate her rights as a mother (before
the baby was even conceived). Upon the
birth of the baby (Melissa) and the
subsequent handover to the Sterns as
agreed, Mrs. Whitehead "became deeply
disturbed, disconsolate, stricken with
unbearable sadness." She persuaded the
Sterns to give her one last week with the
child by telling them that she was suicidal
(so they handed their child over to a
suicidal woman) and she fled to Florida
with her husband and the baby. There,
they took evasive maneuvers to avoid
detection before being ordered to turn
over the child. The Sterns filed suit,
seeking ultimate custody of the child and
enforcement of the surrogacy contract (in
which the child would be placed
permanently in their custody and Mrs.
Whitehead's parental rights would be
permanently
terminated).
After a
lengthy trial, the court ordered that Mrs.
Whitehead's
parental
rights
be
terminated and that sole custody of the
child be granted to Mr. Stern. The court
also entered an order allowing the
adoption of Melissa by Mrs. Stern, all in
accordance with the surrogacy contract.
Mrs. Whitehead appealed.
WHITEHEAD
ARGUES:
Surrogacy
contract is invalid because:
1. It conflicts with public policy since it
guarantees that the child will not have
the nurturing of both natural
parents, presumably New Jersey's
goal for families.
2. It deprives the mother of her
constitutional
right
to
the
companionship of her child.
4. It conflicts with statutes concerning
termination of parental rights and
adoption.
Ordoyo
222 332
In Re: Baby M
109 N.J. 396
RATIO:
Adoption through private placement
is "very much disfavored" in New Jersey
law.
The use of money for the purpose of
adoption through private placement is
illegal and perhaps criminal.
A contract under which the mother,
before the baby is born, agrees to
surrender all parental rights to the child
is coercive.
In a case such as this, the best
interests of the child become secondary to
the market concerns of facilitating an
adoption: the child is "sold" without regard
for whether the purchasers will be
suitable parents; the natural mother
does not receive the benefit of counseling
and guidance; and the monetary incentive
to sell may, in some circumstances, make
her decision less voluntary.
The adoptive parents may not be fully
informed of the surrogate's medical
history.
Statues provide that a surrender of
parental rights can only occur where
there has been a voluntary surrender of a
child to an approved agency or to the
state, accompanied by a formal document
acknowledging termination of parental
rights or where there has been a showing
of parental abandonment or unfitness.
Ordoyo
223 332
Johnson v. Calvert
851 P.2d 776 ll May 20, 1993
DOCTRINE:
Under California law, she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own is the natural
mother.
PROOF GIVEN:
For the Calverts; Evidence of blood tests
showing that Crispina is genetically related to
the child
FACTS:
Mark and Crispina Calvert are married but
unable to have a child. Anna Johnson offered to
serve as surrogate mother. The two parties
enter into a contract where Anna serves as
surrogate, while the Calverts pay her $10,000 in
installments as well as purchase a life insurance
policy for Johnson. The relationship between
the two sides soured, with Anna demanding the
payment of the balance or else she would
refuse to give up the child. The Calverts
responded with a lawsuit seeking a declaration
that they were the legal parents of the child.
Upon the birth of the child, it was proven
through blood tests that Anna was NOT the
genetic mother of the child. The trial court ruled
that 1) the Calverts were the genetic, biological
and natural parents of the child, 2) Anna had no
parental rights to the child, and 3) the surrogacy
contract was legal and enforceable against
Annas claims, all of which were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
- WON Anna can claim custody of the child
- WON the surrogate contract violates public
policy
HELD:
NO. Because undisputed evidence shows
that Anna gave birth to the child and that only
Crispina is genetically related to such child, and
no clear legislative preference is given between
blood tests and gestation as means of
establishing a mother and child relationship,
then the case can only be decided by looking at
the intent of both parties as manifested by the
surrogacy agreement. Basing it on such
agreement, it is clear then that the parties aim
was to bring the Calverts child into the world,
and not for them to donate the zygote to Anna.
From the outset, Crispina intended to be the
mother of the child. Annas act of carrying the
child may have been indispensible for
eventually giving birth to him, but she would
not have been able to do so had she manifested
her intent to keep the child as her own prior to
the implantation of the zygote. Although the
Uniform Parentage Act, which bases parent and
child rights on the existence of a parent and
child relationship, recognizes both genetic
consanguinity and giving birth as means of
establishing a mother and child relationship,
when the two means do not coincide in one
woman, she who intended to procreate the
child is the natural mother under California law.
NO. Gestational surrogacy is completely
different from adoption, and as such, should
not be subject to adoption statutes. Both
parties voluntarily agreed to participate in in
vitro fertilization before the child was
conceived.
Moreover,
the
financial
considerations given to Anna ($10,000 and the
purchase of an insurance policy) were NOT for
her giving up her parental rights over the child
but rather for carrying the child and undergoing
labor.
Pagdanganan
224 332
ISSUE:
WON first husbands consent is needed for
the adoption of his child given that he is not the
natural father.
HELD:
Yes. A child born of consensual AID during a
valid marriage is a legitimate child; therefore
the father of such child is the parent whose
consent is required to the adoption of such
child. The determinative factor is whether the
legal relationship of the father and child exists.
A child conceived through AID does not have a
natural father, but does have a lawful father.
In response to claims that AID constitutes
adultery of the mother, the court found that in
the absence of legislation prohibiting artificial
insemination, the child was lawfully begotten
and not the product of an illicit or adulterous
relationship. Since there is consent by the
husband, there is no marital infidelity.
OTHER NOTES:
New York has a strong policy in favor of
legitimacy, so it is absurd to hold illegitimate a
child born during a valid marriage, of parents
desiring but unable to conceive a child, and
both consenting and agreeing to the
impregnation of the mother by a medically
selected anonymous donor. This policy is for the
protection of the child, not the parents.
Poblador
225 332
Andal v. Macaraig
DOCTRINE:
Children born after the one hundred and
eighty days next following that of the
celebration of marriage or within the three
hundred days next following its dissolution or
the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate. The presumption
may only be rebutted if there is proof that it
was physically impossible for the husband to
have access to his wife during the first 120 days
of the 300 next preceding the birth of the
child.15
FACTS:
Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas were a
married couple. Emiliano however, became sick
of tuberculosis and his brother, Felix, lived with
the couple in order to help out in the farm.
Emiliano's illness gradually worsened until it
came to the point where he was bedridden. On
Sept. 10, 1942, Maria and Felix eloped and went
to live with Maria's father. On January 1 1943,
Emiliano died w/o the presence of his wife who
didn't even turn up at his funeral. On June 17,
1943, Maria gave birth to Mariano. Now,
Mariano and his mother as guardian ad litem,
brought an action in the CFI of Camarines Sur
for recovery of the ownership and possession of
a parcel of land owned by Emiliano which had
been given to him by his mother, Eduvigis
Macaraig, by way of donation propter nuptias in
favor of his marriage to Maria.
ISSUE:
WON Mariano Andal is the legitimate son of
the spouses Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas
HELD:
Yes. Mariano is the legitimate child of the
spouses. Art 108 CC provides:
15
Quiambao
226 332
Jao v. CA
DOCTRINE:
If it can be proved by blood tests that the
child and the supposed father belong to
different blood groups, the cohabitation by
itself cannot be a ground for recognition.
FACTS:
Arlene Salgado and Perico Jao lived
together as husband and wife
Salgado gave birth to Janice
Salgado, filed for recognition and support
from Jao.
Jao denied paternity
Blood grouping test of NBI established that
Jao was not the father
Salgado claims that probative value was
given to blood tests only in cases where they
tended to establish paternity
ISSUE:
WON the admissibility and conclusiveness
of the result of blood grouping tests can prove
non-paternity
HELD: YES
If it can be proved by blood tests that the
child and the supposed father belong to
different blood groups, the cohabitation by
itself cannot be a ground for recognition.
Quilala
227 332
Macadangdang v. CA
FACTS:
Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married
woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw. She
allegedly had intercourse with petitioner
Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March,
1967. Due to their affair, she and her husband
separated.
On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days
following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to
a baby boy who was named Rolando
Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on
December 24, 1967.
Respondent (Elizabeth Mejias) filed a
complaint for recognition and support against
petitioner, which the latter opposed by filing a
petition for dismissal.
The lower court in a pre-trial conference,
issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain
stipulations, admissions and factual issues on
which both parties agreed.
Lower court eventually dismissed the
complaint. Plaintiff appealed to the CA. CA
reversed the LC's decision, declaring minor
Rolando to be the illegitimate child of Rolando
Macadangdang.
Respondent appealed through a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied it.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the child Rolando is
conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of
the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin
Anahaw
HELD:
Crucial Point: Respondent's initial illicit
affair with petitioner occurred sometime in
March, 1967 which caused her separation with
the husband (according to her)
BUT!
The finding of the Court of Appeals that
respondent and her husband were separated in
1965 cannot be considered conclusive and
binding on this Court. It is based solely on the
testimony of respondent which is self-serving.
Nothing in the records shows that her
statement was confirmed or corroborated by
another witness and the same cannot be
Ramos
228 332
Macadangdang v. CA
seven months after their first illicit intercourse
and consequently the separation between the
husband and the wife (if in fact they did). Note,
the couple had been already married years
before such date (with 4 children).
HENCE:
After 180 days following marriage: Check!
Before 300 days following (alleged) separation:
Check
NOTE: Child had no birth certificate of baptism.
If indeed March 1967 was the time they had
sex and child was born October 1967, then it
would be just 7 months. But it was shown that
the baby was born normally (full term; it was
not premature). Yaya took care of him, which if
it was just 7 months he should be in the
incubator! How can he be the child of Antonio
Macadangdang?
*JUST TO NOTE:
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been
more definite in its pronouncements on the
value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that
while baptismal and marriage certificates may
be considered public documents, they are
evidence only to prove the administration of
the sacraments on the dates therein specified
but not the veracity of the states or
declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of
Fortus vs. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331
Ramos
229 332
Reposar
230 332
Reyes, G.
231 332
Republic v. Labrador
G.R. No. 132980 ll Mar. 25, 1999
DOCTRINE:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and Art 412
CC: may be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry. Substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is
observed.
FACTS:
Sept 26, 1997: Gladys C. Labrador filed a
Petition for the correction of entries in the
record of birth of Sarah Zita Erasmo (her niece)
in RTC-Cebu. Change of name of SARAH ZITA C.
ERASMO to SARAH ZITA CAON
She alleges that her sister only had a
common law relationship with Degoberto
Erasmo; hence Sarah Zita is illegitimate and she
shall use her mothers surname pursuant to Art.
176 FC.
The mother is now living in US with her
foreigner husband.
Change of the name of petitioners sister
which was erroneously written as ROSEMARIE
CAON instead of MARIA ROSARIO CAON
Gladys reported that she was the one who
erroneously gave Rosemarie as the name of
the childs mother to the Civil Registrar since
she was more familiarly known as such
RTC-Cebu granted her petition. Solicitor-
Reyes, N.
232 332
Tan v. Trocio
A.C. No. 2115 ll Nov. 27, 1990 ll Melencio-Herrera, J.
PROOF OF PATERNITY USED:
Birth Certificate of Jewel Tan in the name of
Felicidad and her husband, Tan Le Pok
DOCTRINE:
Presumption should be in favor of
legitimacy unless physical access between the
couple was impossible.
NATURE OF COMPLAINT:
Disbarment of Trocio for immoral conduct.
RULING:
Complaint dismissed.
FACTS:
Tan is an owner and directress of the Harlyn
Vocational School. She alleges that sometime in
April 1971, the legal counsel of the school, Atty.
Trocio, raped her.
On February 1972, she begot a son who she
named Jewel.
Trocio replied by saying that it is true that
he is the legal counsel of the vocational school,
that he assisted Tan in collecting money
from insurance companies. However, he
Sevilla
233 332
People v. Tumimpad
DOCTRINE:
Science has demonstrated that by the
analysis of blood samples of the mother, the
child and the alleged father, it can be
established conclusively that the man is not the
father of a particular child. (Prieto not father)
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L.
Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C.
Prieto were charged with the crime of rape
committed against a 15 year old Mongoloid
child (Sandra).
The Salcedo family, composed of Col.
Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander and
wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a twostorey officers' quarters
Four security men were assigned to
Salcedo, two of whom were accused Constable
Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno
Tumimpad.
Sandra complained of constipation,
irritability and moodiness.
Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out
from the kitchen and told her mother, "Mama,
patayin mo 'yan, bastos."
Sandra was brought to the hospital and was
confirmed pregnant, 9 months later she gave
ISSUE:
WON the accused committed the crime of
rape
HELD:
Accused held that he was always with Col.
Salcedo, but this was proven to be untrue, and
the mom testified that there were times that
Sandra was left alone with accused.
Accused simplistically and quite erroneously
argues that his conviction was based on the
medical finding that he and the victim have the
same blood type "O".
Accused-appellants'
culpability
was
established mainly by testimonial evidence
given by the victim herself and her relatives.
The blood test was adduced as evidence only to
show that the alleged father or any one of many
others of the same blood type may have been
the father of the child.
Tan de Guzman
234 332
Benitez Badua v. CA
G.R. No. 105625 ll Jan. 24, 1994
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian were owners of various properties
located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his
husband died in 1989. Vicentes sister and
nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of
letters of administration of Vicentes estate in
favor of the nephew, herein private respondent.
The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was
raised and cared by the deceased spouses since
childhood, though not related to them by
blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to prove
that she is the only legitimate child of the
spouses submitted documents such as her
certificate of live birth where the spouses name
were reflected as her parents. She even
testified that said spouses continuously treated
her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said
spouses were unable to physically procreate
hence the petitioner cannot be the biological
child. Trial court decided in favor of the
petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole
heir of the spouses.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners certificate of live birth will
suffice to establish her legitimacy.
HELD:
The Court dismissed the case for lack of
merit. The mere registration of a child in his or
her birth certificate as the child of the supposed
parents is not a valid adoption. It does not
confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of
his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and
brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
latter. In the notarized document, they stated
that they were the sole heirs of the deceased
because she died without descendants and
ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live
Birth of the petitioner where it appeared that
he
was
the
petitioners
father.
Tejano
235 332
De Aparicio v. Paraguya
May. 29, 1987 ll Gancayco, J.
FACTS:
Trinidad
Montilde
had
an
affair
with
a
priest,
Rev.
Fr.
Felipe
Lumain
and
conceived
a
child
thereafter. To avoid scandal, she married
Anastacio Mamburao in
her
fourth
month of pregnancy. They never lived
together as husband and wife. 192
days after
the
marriage, Consolacion
Lumain was born. When her father
(Rev. Lumain) died, he executed a will
granting her as sole and universal heir
of all his property rights and interests.
ISSUE:
(1) WON Consolacion is the
child of Fr. Lumain?
(2) WON she is entitled to
heir?
natural
be his
HELD:
(1) Yes.
Although
there
is
the
presumption that the plaintiff is the
daughter of the spouses Anastacio and
Trinidad, this was revoked by the
account of the
plaintiffs
mother.
Bearing in mind the date of the
birth of her child (192 days after
the marriage), it is evident that the
moher was still single at the time
she was conceived. Under Art 265
of the civil code,
filiation of a
legitimate child
is
proven by the
OTHER ISSUES:
Respondent was also arguing that he
bought the land from a third person
but upon
closer look
of the court,
the land he was talking about was
outside the property
of the Lumains.
The land was left to Felipe and
Macario by there parents. Since there
is a probated of Felipe, who died
before
Macario,
the latter
could
not inherit from the former. There
is
co-ownership
between Consolacion
and Macario
Tiangco
236 332
Constantino v. Mendez
G.R. No. 57227 ll May. 14, 1992 ll Bidin, J.
DOCTRINE:
ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE
The evidence presented by the woman was
the time that she and the man had sexual
intercourse; however, this declaration was not
considered as clear and convincing evidence by
the Court. The date was very crucial to the
determination if Michael was indeed conceived
during the time the woman and man were
having sexual relations. There was also no proof
that the woman did not have any sexual
encounter with other men.
FACTS:
Amelita Constantino was a waitress at
Tonys restaurant in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and there
she met Ivan Mendez sometime in August 1974.
The next day, she was invited by Ivan to dine
with him at Hotel Enrico and courted her. Ivan
brought Amelita inside his hotel room and
through a promise of marriage succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her. He later on
confessed that he is a married man. Despite
this, they repeated their sexual contact in the
months of September and November, 1974 and
as a result, Amelita got pregnant. She asked for
support but Ivan refused to attend to her.
Amelita claimed that she had no sexual
relations with any other man except Ivan. As
relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the
unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's
restaurant but denied having carnal knowledge
her. He prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of cause of action. After
giving birth to Michael, Amelita filed an
amended complaint. The trial court ruled in
favor of Amelita and ordered Mendez to pay
Yumol
237 332
Mendoza v. Mella
DOCTRINE:
Although a birth certificate is by nature a
public document, there must be a CLEAR
STATEMENT in the document that the parent
recognizes the child as his or her own. Without
such, voluntary recognition of filiation has no
basis.
FACTS:
Litigated property was donated by Paciano
Pareja to son Gavino in 1939. Gavino
disappeared in 1943 (he died that year accord.
to CA), leaving common-law wife Mendoza and
son Rodolfo (petitioners).
1948: Paciano sold lot to Mella
(respondent), who notified petitioners in 1952
to vacate lot. Petitioners ignored notice. Mella
commenced action in 1955 on basis of deed of
sale by Paciano.
Petitioners claim ownership of contested
land for Rodolfo on grounds of succession from
Gavino and by adverse possession for more
than 10 yrs.
The issue of adverse possession for
more than yearsis not well taken because it was
raised for the first time with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N Rodolfo may be considered
acknowledged as natural child, entitled to
successional rights, with a birth certificate as
proof of filliation.
CA:
NO, for 2 reasons:
i) Only evidence is Rodolfos birth certificate,
which is NOT proof of acknowledgment,
because the old Civil Code was never
Alampay
238 332
Lim v. CA
DOCTRINE:
Marriage certificate does not satisfy the
required solemnity of a public document as
proof of filiation.
FACTS:
Felisa Lim and Francisco Uy claimed they
inherited, to the exclusion of the other, a house
and lot in Sta. Cruz Manila as sole heir of Susana
Lim.
Felisa Lims pieces of evidence: certificate of
baptism [stating that Felisa is natural daughter
of Susana] and marriage certificate [stating that
Susana gave consent to Felisas marriage]
Francisco Uys pieces of evidence:
application of alien registration, order
cancelling alien reg and identification certificate
all issued by Bureau of Immigration [Uys
Filipino citizenship by derivation from mom
Susana Lim]
TC: Felisa Lim sole heir
CA: neither is entitled to inheritance
because neither of them had been recognized
by Susana Lim as her child by any of the means
provided for by law; and neither had either of
them been declared in a judicial proceeding to
be a child of Susana Lim."
ISSUES:
1. WON Felisas marriage certificate is enough
proof of filiation
2. WON Fransisco is entitled to the property
because he purchased it w/ his money
Bayona
239 332
Cadorna
240 332
Cadorna
241 332
Cristobal
242 332
De Asis v. CA
PETITIONER:
Manuel De Asis
RESPONDENTS: CA, Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy and Glen Camil Andres De Asis, represented by
mother/guardian Vircel De Asis
Doctrine:
The right to receive support cannot be
renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third
person; neither can it be compensated with
what the recipient owes the obligator (Art. 301,
FC). Furthermore, the right to support cannot
be waived or transferred to third parties and
future support cannot be the subject of
compromise (Art. 2035, FC).
FACTS:
In 1988, Vircel De Asis, on behalf of her
child Glen Camil, filed an action for
maintenance and support from Manual De Asis
alleging that he is the father of the child and the
he refused and/or failed to provide for the
maintenance of the child, despite repeated
demands. Manuel denied his paternity of the
said minor and that he cannot therefore be
required to provide support. Both parties
though agreed to dismiss the complaint.
In 1995, another complaint for maintenance
and support was again filed by same parties
against Manuel, which was granted by the
Kalookan RTC and ordered Manuel to pay for
support and allowance. Manuel moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata, alleging that present suit is barred by
the prior judgment. RTC ruled that res judicata
is inapplicable in an action for support for the
reason that renunciation or waiver of future
support is prohibited by law. He then filed a
petition for certiorari to CA, which was
dismissed under the same grounds and which
led to current petition in SC.
ISSUE:
WoN respondent courts acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
Cruz
243 332
Rodriguez v. CA
G.R. No. 85723 ll Jun. 19, 1995
FACTS:
On October 15, 1986, Clarito Agbulos
brought an action for compulsory recognition
against Bienvenido Rodriguez. Agbulos brought
her mother as first witness. She identified the
plaintiffs father, but the opposing counsel
objected, on the basisof Art. 280 CC16.
The trial court sustained it but CA, which is
of the opinion that the testimony may be
allowed, reversed the order. Rodriguez filed a
petition for certiorari to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the mothers testimony identifying
the putative father of Agbulos may be accepted.
HELD:
Yes. By tracing the counterpart provisions
from the Spanish Civil Code, New Civil Code and
the Family Code, the Court concluded that Art.
280 referred to voluntary recognition and not to
be applied for compulsory recognition.
The Court noted that the respondent relied
on Art. 283 CC and Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court17
to defend the
admissibility of her mothers testimony. Article
172 FC has adopted Art. 283 CC, particularly
paragraph 4, where filiation may be proven by
any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
Furthermore, the Court also noted that Art.
280 CC was not just repealed; it no longer has a
counterpart prohibition in the Family Code,
which undoubtedly discloses the intention of
the legislative authority to uphold the Code
Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity of illegitimate
children.
16
Dantes
244 332
Mariategui v CA
G.R. No. L-57062 ll Bidin, J.
DOCTRINE:
Filiation can be proven using a Birth
Certificate. Without it, the continuous
enjoyment of the status as a child is still
sufficient proof of filiation. This case is simply
an illustration of Art 172 FC.
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui had 3 wives (and 3 sets of
children) during his lifetime.
(1) The first, Eusebia, died in 1904 and left
him 4 children. (hereinafter First set)
(2) The second, Flaviana, he married in
1910, and with whom they had 1
daughter. (hereinafter Second set)
(3) The third, Felipa, he married sometime
in 1930, and with whom they had 3
children (Jacinto, Paulina, Julian). Felipa
died in 1941. (hereinafter Third set)
Lupo died in 1953.
In 1973, his descendants by his first and
second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition wherein they adjudicated
for themselves a piece of land in Muntinglupa.18
The third set of children filed a complaint
alleging that the extrajudicial partition deprived
them of their respective shares.
The first set argued that
The complaint was one for the
recognition of natural children (wherein
Art 27819 and 28520 CC shall apply with
18
De Castro
245 332
Mariategui v CA
G.R. No. L-57062 ll Bidin, J.
proof of filiation of legitimate children
as per Art 172 FC22
Even if Julian and Paulina could not
present
any
evidence,
they
continuously enjoyed the status of
children of Lupo which is still sufficient
proof to establish filiation of legitimate
children in Art 172.
Prescription does not run against the third
set of children
So long as they have not expressly
or impliedly repudiated the coownership.
In other words, a co-owner cannot
acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners without a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly
communicated to the other co-owners.
The execution of the extrajudicial
partition and registration of the
properties in their own names (First set)
cannot be considered as repudiation of
the co-ownership because it was not
duly communicated to the third set of
children who were their legitimate coheirs
22
De Castro
246 332
Aruego, Jr. v. CA
PETITIONERS:
Jose E. Aruego, Jr., Simeona San Juan Aruego, Ma. Immaculada T. Alanon, Roberto A.
Torres, Cristina A. Torres, Justo Jose Torres and Agustin Torres
RESPONDENTS: The Hon. Court of Appeals, 13th Division and Antonia Aruego
DOCTRINE:
Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect insofar as it prejudices the vested right of
persons under the Civil Code
FACTS:
In 1983 (Mar. 7), a Complaint for Compulsory
Recognition and Enforcement of Successional
Rights was filed by Private respondent and her
sister (Antonia and Evelyn Aruego), represented
by their mother (Luz Fabian)
The respondents allege that:
The late Jose Aruego, a married man,
had an amorous relationship with Luz
Fabian
Antonia and Evelyn was born out of this
relationship
They are thus illegitimate children of
Jose Aruego
BASIS OF ACTION: Open and continuous
possession of the status as illegitimate children
(Art. 285 CC)
Regular support and educational
expenses
Allowance to use his surname
Payment of maternal bills and
baptismal expenses
Taking them out to restaurants and
departments stores on occasions of
family rejoicing
Attendance to school problems
Introducing them as such children to
family friends
Art. 285 (CC)
The action for the recognition of natural
children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the
minority of the child, in which case the latter
may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority.
Petitioners contend that:
Dilag
247 332
Aruego, Jr. v. CA
Code or other laws.
ISSUE:
WON the provisions of the Family Code be
applied in the instant case
WON the application of the Family Code in
this case prejudice or impair any vested right of
the private respondent such that it should not
be given retroactive effect in this particular case
HELD:
NO
Vested / Acquired Rights = not defined by
the Family Code
Left it to the courts to determine what
it means as each particular issue is
submitted to them
In the ruling in Tayag v. Court of Appeals:
Right of action of the minor child has
been vested by the filing of the
complaint in court under the regime of
the Civil Code, prior to the effectivity of
PETITION IS DENIED
DECISION OF CA AFFIRMED
Dilag
248 332
Jison v. CA
G.R. No. 124853 ll Feb. 4, 1998
DOCTRINE:
Testimonial evidence was more than
sufficient to establish her open and continuous
possession of status as an illegitimate child.
However, she cannot rely on her birth and
baptismal certificates since it was not shown
that the putative father had anything to do with
the filing of said certificates.
FACTS:
Private
respondent,
Monina
Jison,
instituted a complaint against petitioner,
Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate
child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years
after her mothers death and when she was
already 39 years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison
since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he
impregnated Esperanza Amolar (a nanny),
Moninas mother. Monina alleged that since
childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous,
implied recognition as the illegitimate child of
petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It
was likewise alleged that petitioner supported
her and spent for her education such that she
became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank
Examiner. Monina was able to present total of
11 witnesses.
ISSUE:
WON the evidence can prove filiation
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code,
illegitimate filiation may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as that of
legitimate children.
Article 172 thereof
provides the various forms of evidence by
which legitimate filiation is established.
To prove open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child, there must
be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to
Dolot
249 332
Alberto v. CA
G.R. No. 86639 ll Jun. 2, 1994
PETITIONER:
RESPONDENTS:
FACTS:
Sweethearts Aurora Reniva and Governor
Juan M. Alberto had a daughter, Ma. Theresa
Alberto. Juan married Yolanda Reyes after
Albertos birth.
On Theresas 14th birthday, the governor
was on his way to visit her. He was assassinated
and died intestate.
Juans widow Yolanda petitioned for the
administration of his estate and was appointed
administratrix.
Theresa motioned to intervene as oppositor
and re-open the proceedings, praying that she
be declared as having acquired the status of a
natural child, and thus being entitled to share in
Juans estate.
The trial court decided in her favor and
compelled Juans heirs and estate to recognize
her as a natural daughter. However, the Court
of Appeals reversed this decision.
ISSUES
May recognition of the child be ordered
upon the estate and heirs of the deceased
parent, based on evidence that the child has
been in continuous possession of natural
status?
RATIO
Yes. The Court granted the petition, which
reversed the Court of Appeals ruling and
affirmed that of the trial court.
The following was established by the trial
court, and was deemed to have sufficiently
proven that Juan recognized Theresa as his
daughter:
- Theresa used Alberto as her surname in
all her school records, and Juan was known
to be her father by the school personnel.
- Juan paid for Theresas education.
- She was recognized as Juans daughter by
his relatives and friends, and was regarded
Espaola
250 332
Guy v. CA
G.R. No. 163707 ll Sep. 15, 2006 ll Ynares-Santiago, J.
PETITIONER:
MICHAEL C. GUY
RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch
138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI,
represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES
FACTS:
Respondent minors Karen & Kamille Oanes
Wei, represented by their mother Remedios
Oanes, filed a petition for letters of
administration, claiming that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei,
who died intestate in Makati in 1992, leaving an
estate valued at P10M consisting of real and
personal properties. Sima Weis known heirs
are his spouse Shirley Guy and their children all
surnamed Guy. Respondents prayed that
Michael Guy (Petitioner) be appointed as
Special Administrator of the estate. Michael, on
the other hand, prayed for the dismissal of the
petition, arguing that respondents should have
established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei, pursuant to Art.
175 of FC.
In a supplement to their (Michael and coheirs) Joint Motion to Dismiss, petitioners claim
that respondents claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason
of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver
of Claim stating that in exchange for the
financial and educational assistance received
from petitioner, respondents discharge the
estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
RTC denied motion to dismiss, because
Remedios has not been established as the duly
constituted guardian of her minor daughters
no renunciation of right occurred. (For 1st issue,
respondents issued a certificate of non-forum
shopping signed by their counsel only, not
including their siggies.)
ISSUES:
(1) WoN Respondents petition should be
dismissed for failure to comply with the
rules on certification of non-forum
shopping;
(2) WoN the Release and Waiver of Claim
precludes respondents from claiming
their successional rights;
(3) WoN respondents are barred by
Enad
251 332
Guy v. CA
G.R. No. 163707 ll Sep. 15, 2006 ll Ynares-Santiago, J.
(3) No. To rule as such would be premature,
because respondents have yet to present
evidence. Illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect
and whose putative parent died during their
minority are given the right to seek recognition
for a period of up to four years from attaining
majority age. Under the Family Code, when
filiation of an illegitimate child is established by
a record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned, the
action for recognition may be brought by the
child during his or her lifetime. However, if the
action is based upon open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
or any other means allowed by the rules or
special laws, it may only be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear
Enad
252 332
ISSUES:
1) WON CA erred in not declaring Joanne as
the legitimate child of Hasegawa and Jinky
2) WON DNA Analysis is still feasible
notwithstanding the death of Rogelio
HELD:
1) Though there is a reasonable presumption
in favor of legitimacy for a child born in a
marriage, this is not conclusive. This can be
overthrown by evidence like:
- impossibility for the parents to conceive the
child on said date
- impotence of the husband
- record of birth appearing in the civil
registrar admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by parent concerned etc
2) New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the
conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio
or upon application of any person who has
a legal interest in the matter of ligitation
Sec 4 provides that DNA testing can push
through if a biological sample exists
- Even if Rogelio already died, any of
biological samples (saliva, tissues, hairs, and
bones) can be used for DNA Testing. (Any
physical residue of the long dead parent can be
resorted to)
CA ruling affirmed
Hermosisima
253 332
Uyguangco v. CA
DOCTRINE:
If the action to establish illegitimate filiation
is based on the second paragraph of Article 172
(secondary evidence), the action may only be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
PROOF OF FILIATION:
Open and continuous possession of status
as illegitimate children (lived with his father
from 1967 until 1973, receiving of support, use
of fathers surname, shared profits of a family
business, directorship in a family corporation)
FACTS:
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in
1975, leaving his wife and four children
(petitioners) and considerable properties which
they divided among themselves. Claiming to be
an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario,
and having been left out in the extrajudicial
settlement of his estate, Graciano Uyguangco
(respondent) filed a complaint against the
petitioners.
To prove his filiation, Graciano alleged that
at the age of 15, he moved to his fathers
hometown, he received support from his father
while he was studying and he was assigned by
his father as storekeeper at the Uyguangco
store. (SEE OTHER PROOF MENTIONED ABOVE).
However, he admit that he had none of the
documents mentioned in Article 278 (record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record on in any authentic writing) to show that
he was the illegitimate son of the deceased.
Petitioners: Respondent could no longer
prove his alleged filiation under the applicable
provisions of the Civil Code as the only evidence
allowed under Article 278 CC to prove the claim
was not available to himself.
RTC: Graciano could prove his alleged filiation.
CA affirmed.
NOTE:
Since the case was decided in 1989, the
Court already applied the Family Code
provisions as the Civil Code provisions the
petitioners invoke has been superseded, or
Macariola
254 332
Uyguangco v. CA
filiation but the parents themselves? But
suppose the child claiming the illegitimate child
of a certain person is not really the child of the
latter? The putative parent should thus be given
Macariola
255 332
David v. CA
Nov. 16, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Daisie T. David and respondent
Ramon R. Villar had an intimate relationship
that resulted in the birth of Christopher J.
respondent Villar was married at the time that
the said intimate relationship took place. In
1991, Villar took Christopher on a family
vacation to Boracay with the consent of the
petitioner. After the said trip, Villar refused to
return custody of Christopher to David.
In response to his refusal to return custody
of the child, David filed a petition for habeas
corpus on behalf of her son with the RTC of
Angeles City. The RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioner and ordered the respondent to
return custody to David and furnish their
children with support. The respondent
subsequently raised the issue before the Court
of Appeals that ruled in his favor, stating that
the petition for habeas corpus was not
appropriate because the parental authority of
the mother over illegitimate children was
express under the provisions of law. As such,
questions regarding custody and support could
be raised in a single petition. Taking into
consideration that the respondent was
financially better off compared to the
petitioner, the CA awarded custody to Villar.
Petitioner then raised the issue to the level of
the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
- WON the mother of an illegitimate child
could petition for habeas corpus in order to
regain custody of her child
- WON the financial and material superiority
of the husband compared with the mother
may grant him custody of their illegitimate
child
HELD:
NO. The Court cited Rule 102, sec. 1 of the
Marin
256 332
People v. Namayan
The crime of rape committed by the accused
carries with it, among others, the obligations to
acknowledge the offspring if the character of its
origin does not prevent it and to support the
same.
FACTS:
Margie Pagaygay, a mental retardate, was
raped three times by defendant
Namayan.
Her mother noticed that her stomach was
bulging and upon medical examination, she was
found to be four to five months pregnant.
Namayan was convicted for rape, but
appealed his decision saying that it was
impossible for him to have intercourse since he
was jailed during the time of the alleged rapes
and that victim's testimony betrays behavior of
Nuez
257 332
Republic v. Abadilla
FACTS:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino
have been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
They begot two children, Emerson and
Rafael, whose respective birth certificates
indicated inter alia the following information:
Surname:
Abadilla
Fathers name: Herson (instead of Gerson)
Abadilla
Date of marriage of parents:
June 19, 1987
Place of marriage of parents: Dingras, Ilocos
Norte
in spite of the fact that no marriage
occurred between the parents.
In 1997, the parents and their children
filed before the RTC of Laoag City an
Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation
of Entries, seeking to have the following
corrections made in the birth certificates of
Emerson and Rafael:
1. Ordering that the date and place of
marriage be deleted;
2. Ordering that Herson be corrected as
Gerson.
23
Ordoyo
258 332
Gan v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-145527 ll May. 28, 2002 ll Bellosiollo, J.
KEYWORDS: Support pendente lite
FACTS:
- Bernadette Pondevida instituted in behalf
of her daughter a complaint against
petitioner for support with prayer for
support pendente lite.
- Motion to dismiss by petitioner was denied
and the trial court ordered him to recognize
private respondent Francheska Joy S.
Pondevida as his illegitimate child and pay
her support every month, among others.
- Private respondent moved for execution of
judgment of support which trial court
granted by issuing a writ of execution.
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the CA imputing grave
abuse of discretion by the trial court for
granting said writ. CA dismissed petition.
- Petitioner argues that action for support
cannot be granted right away because: 1)
judgment for support which is under appeal
cannot be executed without a good reason
for its immediate execution; 2) writ was
invalid because it was done in violation of
his right to notice and hearing; and 3) his
claim of adultery on the part of private
respondent should be heard by the court
because such defense would lead to the
denial of the claim of support.
ISSUE:
WON support for the respondent can be
immediately executed by the court
RULING:
Petition denied. CA decision dismissing
petition for certiorari by petitioner and the trial
Pagdanganan
259 332
De Guzman v. Perez
G.R. No. 156013 ll Jul. 25, 2006 ll Corona, J.
KEYWORDS:
Child neglect by wealthy dad
FACTS:
- Roberto and Shirley were sweethearts while
studying law in UST. This led to Shirley
getting pregnant, giving birth to Robby.
However, Roberto and Shirley never got
married. Roberto ended up marrying
another woman.
- Roberto only sent support Robbys
schooling twice, and sent medical support
only when Robby fell seriously ill. Other
than these, he never provided any financial
support for his son.
- Shirley got a job as a factory worker in
Taiwan, but this was not enough to provide
for Robby. Roberto on the other hand, lived
a luxurious lifestyle.
- This led to Shirley demanding support from
Roberto. This was ignored, which forced
Shirley to file a criminal case for
abandonment and neglect under Art.59 of
PD 603.
- Shirley presented a notarized copy of the
General Information Sheet of the RNCD
Development Corporation showing that
Roberto owner P750,000 worth of
corporate shares.
- The City prosecutor ruled in favour of
Shirley, stating that her proof constituted
circumstantial evidence of his ample
financial resources.
- Robert argues that his wealth was just his
dads and that one can only be charged with
neglect if one has the means but fails to
provide. Second, he argues that Robby was
not a neglected child because Shirley and
Poblador
260 332
Zepeda v. Zepeda
41 Ill. App. 2d 240 ll Apr. 3, 1963 ll Dempsey, J.
KEYWORDS:
Action for damages to redress wrongful life
caused by being a bastard
FACTS:
- Petitioner alleges that he is the
illegitimate child of the defendant
and that he was the result of his
parents sexual relations that arose
from a marriage promise by the
defendant. The
marriage
however,
did not follow through.
- The plaintiff now seeks damages
for deprivation of his right to be
a
legitimate
child,
to
have
a
normal home, to have a legal
father, to inherit from his father,
to
inherit
from
his
paternal
ancestors, and for being stigmatized
as a bastard.
ISSUE:
(1) WON
the
fraudulent act
of the
defendant is considered
to be a
tortious act (tort)
(2) WON a tort can be inflicted upon a
being
simultaneously
with
its
conception
(3) WON the plaintiff has a cause of
action
RULING:
While
the
cause for action for
wrongful life may qualify as a tort,
it
is
not actionable considering its farreaching legal implications that proscribes the
court from engaging in law making.
RATIO:
Yes. The defendant hid the fact
that he was a married man and
couldnt
actually fulfill his
promise
to
marry the plaintiffs mother. It was
not only a moral wrong but was, under
the
aggravated
circumstance
of this
case, tortious in nature.
Quiambao
261 332
Republic v. Capote
G.R. No. 157043 ll Feb. 2, 2007 ll Corona, J.
KEYWORDS:
Illegitimate child asking for change of surname
from his dads to his moms
FACTS:
- Minor Giovanni N. Gallamaso is the
illegitimate natural child of Corazon P.
Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. He used
the surname of his natural father despite
the absence of marriage between his
parents.
- His birth certificate registered at the Local
Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte
indicates Gallamaso as his surname.
- He seeks to change his surname to his
moms.
- His mother might eventually petition for
Giovanni to join her in the US, and
continued use of the surname Gallamaso
may complicate his status as a natural child.
- Respondent prayed for an order directing
the local civil registrar to effect the change
of name on Giovannis birth certificate.
- The Republic contends that the CA erred in
affirming the TCs decision granting the
petition for change of name despite the
non-joinder of indispensable parties.
ISSUE:
WON Giovanni can change his surname
RULING:
Petition denied. CA affirmed.
RATIO:
Quilala
262 332
Dolina v. Vallecera
G.R. No. 182367 ll Dec. 15, 2010 ll Abad, J.
KEYWORDS: Legal support; woman and child
abuse; temporary protection
FACTS:
- Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary protection
order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera for
alleged woman and child abuse under Republic
Act (R.A.) 9262.
- In her complaint, she added a handwritten
prayer for financial support from Vallecera for
their supposed child. She used the child's
Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as
the child's father.
- Vallecera opposed, and claims that her
petition was essentially one for financial
support rather than for protection against
woman and child abuses and that he was not
the child's father given that the signature in the
Certificate of Live Birth was not his.
- RTC dismissed petition. She filed for a motion
for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
case.
ISSUE:
WON RTC correctly dismissed Dolina's action for
temporary protection and denied her
application for temporary support for her child
RULING:
Petition is denied.
RATIO:
- Yes. She filed the wrong action to obtain
support. RA 9262 is for protection women and
children from from abuse.
Ramos
263 332
Ramirez v. Gmur
G.R. No. L-11796 ll Aug. 5, 1918 ll Street, J.
KEYWORDS: Legitimacy of 2 sets of children
dependent on mothers legitimacy and her 2nd
marriages validity
FACTS:
- Samuel Bischoff died, with a will leaving his
widow Ana Ramirez as executrix of his estate.
- According to the will, Bischoff bore no children
with Ramirez and was therefore devoid of
forced heirs.
- This fact is being contested by two sets of
children from his natural (legitimate) daughter,
Leona Castro (deceased already), who he had
with Felisa Castro in his first marriage. The
entitlement of the 2 sets of children rests on
whether Leona was a legitimate child of
Bischoff.
- Leona Castro married Frederick von Kauffman
and had three children (the first set of children).
- Kauffman eventually sought a divorce from
Castro in Paris which was granted. Leona then
married Dr. Ernest Mory and had a daughter
before the celebration of their marriage. During
the marriage they had 2 additional daughters.
ISSUE:
1. WON Leona Castro is a legitimate child of
Bischoff.
2. WON the Mory children are legitimate
children and therefore entitled to inherit shares
from Bischoff's testate.
RULING:
Judgment affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that Leona Castro is a
natural (legitimate) child of Bischoff, whether
by Law 11 of Toro (turned Law 1, title 5, book
10 of the Novisima Recopilacion) which was the
law at that time or under article 131 of the Civil
Code. Tacit recognition was sufficient in either
case.
- There was sufficient proof that Bischoff
recognized her as such, ranging from the
memorandum issued by the priest for her
record of birth and a document executed by
Bischoff recognizing her as his daughter.
- Ramirez contests that only children by persons
free to marry are considered natural
(legitimate). The Court held that there was no
proof that Leona's mother was committing
adultery when she married Bischoff.
- The presumption is that persons are free to
marry and the burden of proof rests heavily on
the one contesting it.
2. No. The divorce decree obtained by Kauffman
in Paris was not recognized by Philippine courts.
There was conclusive evidence that shows that
neither Kauffman nor Leona was domiciled in
Paris. The divorce was apparently their only
intent for going there.
- Courts of a country where neither spouses are
domiciled in have no jurisdiction to determine
their matrimonial status.
- Leona's marriage with Mory was therefore
void and the children born from it are
illegitimate. The Mory children's claim to
inheritance must therefore be rejected.
Reposar
264 332
Reyes
265 332
Reyes
266 332
Sevilla
267 332
Republic v. Toledano
G.R. No. 94147 ll Jun. 8, 1994 ll Puno, J.
KEYWORDS: American couple adopting brother
of naturalized US citizen (wife)
FACTS:
- Respondent spouses Clouse sought to adopt
the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger
brother of respondent Evelyn A. Clouse.
- Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the
United States of America. On August 19, 1988,
Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the
United States of America in Guam.
- His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise
consented to the adoption due to poverty and
inability to support and educate her son.
- Lower court granted the adoption.
- Solgen contended that lower court erred
because BECAUSE THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT
QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
ISSUE:
WON Solomon can be adopted by the Spouses
Clouse
RULING:
Petition granted.
RATIO:
- No. Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive
Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the
persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen
who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is
Tan de Guzman
268 332
Republic v. Miller
G.R. No. 125932 ll Apr. 21, 1999 ll Pardo, J.
KEYWORDS: FC retroactivity; foreign couple
qualified to adopt before FC; vested right
FACTS:
- Two American citizens adopted a child.
- Natural parents were in poverty and had no
visible means of livelihood.
- The Family Code, which was effective on
August 3, 1988, generally prohibits aliens from
adopting Filipino children.
- Adoption, in the case at bar, was filed July 29,
1988, when the Child and Youth Welfare Code
was still in full effect. Under said Code, aliens in
the case at bar were qualified to adopt.
ISSUE:
WON aliens can adopt a Filipino child before the
effectivity of the general prohibition in the FC
RULING:
RTC decision affirmed.
RATIO:
- Yes. FC cannot retroact against a vested right.
In this case, the vested right is the right to
adopt per qualification under the Child and
Youth Welfare Code.
- A vested right is one whose existence,
effectivity, and extent does not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder.
Tejano
269 332
Tiangco
270 332
Lazatin v. Campos
G.R. No. L-43955-56 ll Jul. 30, 1979 ll Teehankee, J.
KEYWORDS: The will in the safety deposit box;
when secondary evidence of adoption admitted
FACTS:
- January 13, 1974: Dr. Lazatin died intestate.
He was survived by his wife, Margarita, and his
adopted twin daughters, Nora (de Leon) and
Irma (Veloso).
- February 1974: Margarita commenced an
intestate proceeding. [Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio
and Yvonne intervened claiming to be admitted
illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr. Lazatin.
One Lily also intervened claiming to be another
admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.]
- April 11, 1974: Margarita also died, leaving a
written will, providing for: a legacy of cash,
jewelry, and stocks to Arlene de Leon, a
granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo
Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of
education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner
Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.
- During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a
safety deposit box at the People's Bank and
Trust Company that only she and Nora could
open.
- April (16), 1974: Nora, accompanied by her
husband, Bernardo, opened the safety deposit
box and removed its contents: (a) shares of
stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her
sister, Irma; and (c) jewelry belonging to her
and to her mother. Her sole reason for opening
the box was to get her stock certificates and
other small items deposited therein. When she
was to close the deposit box, the bank
personnel informed her that she needed an
authority from the court to do so, in view of her
mother's death and so, she removed everything
from the box.
- June 3, 1974: Private respondents filed a
petition to probate the will of the late
Margarita,
Days after having learned that Nora had opened
the safety deposit box: Ramon, son of Renato,
filed a motion claiming that the deceased had
executed a will subsequent to that submitted
for probate and demanding its production. He
likewise prayed for the opening of the safety
deposit box. Nora admitted that she opened the
Yumol
271 332
Lazatin v. Campos
G.R. No. L-43955-56 ll Jul. 30, 1979 ll Teehankee, J.
- March 4, 1976: Respondent court barred the
introduction of petitioner's evidence since they
would not prove or tend to prove the fact of
their adoption but rather of a recognized
natural child.
- March 16, 1976: Renato then filed, in both
cases, a motion to declare as established the
fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora's
refusal to comply with the orders of respondent
court to deposit the items she had removed
from the safety deposit box of Margarita.
Private respondents opposed the motion.
- March 26, 1976: Respondent court denied
Renato's motion.
- June 3,1976: Respondent court, ruling on
petitioners motion for reconsideration,
declared that Renato has failed to establish his
status as an adopted child.
- Hence, the petition at bar.
ISSUE:
WON Renato was an adopted child (Upon the
determination of this issue, it can also be
determined if he can intervene in the petitionsNO)
RULING:
Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
- The Supreme Court finds the ruling of the
respondent court to be in conformity with law
and jurisprudence. Renato was not able to
establish his status as an adopted child.
- The evidence presented by Renato does not
lead the Court to any link to the existence of a
court degree of his judicial adoption. Petitioner
merely proceeds from an assumption that he
was judicially adopted between the years 1928
and 1932. No judicial records of such adoption
or copies thereof decreed by a competent court
are presented or attempted to be presented.
- Furthermore, no witnesses were cited to that
adoption proceeding or to the adoption decree.
Even though Renato secured a certification
from the CFI of Manila which reported that
their records have been burned and that the
record of Renatos adoption was not one of the
salvaged documents, it does not furnish any
Yumol
272 332
Lazatin v. Campos
G.R. No. L-43955-56 ll Jul. 30, 1979 ll Teehankee, J.
would be benefited as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor.
Notes:
- Nature of adoption proceedings: The fact of
adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively proved by the person claiming its
existence. Where, under the provisions of the
statute, an adoption is effected by a court
order, the records of such court constitute the
Yumol
273 332
Santos v. Aranzanso
G.R. No. L-23828 ll Feb. 28, 1966 ll Bengzon, J.
KEYWORDS: Adoption collaterally attacked in
settlement proceedings of adoptive moms
estate
FACTS:
- Spouses Santos filed a petition in 1949 for the
adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos
(Petitioners), aged 17 and 8 yrs old respectively.
- Guardian appointed by the Court gave her
written consent to the petition, as did Paulina,
who was above 14 yrs old.
- Spouses Santos stated in their petition that
Paulina and Aurora had lived with them since
they were 3 months old and 15 days old,
respectively, and although efforts had
been made to find their natural parents, the
natural parents could not be located.
- After due publication of the petition in the
National Weekly, a newspaper of general
circulation, once a week for three consecutive
weeks, the case was set for trial and the
Adoption Court granted the petition of spouses
Santos in accordance with Rule 100 of the Rules
of Court in the Philippines, and Paulina and
Aurora were children of the spouses Santos for
all legal intents and purposes from Aug. 1949.
- Eight years later, wife-Santos passed away
intestate. Husband-Santos filed a petition with
the Court of First Instance Mnaila for
settlement of intestate estate, stating wifeSantos surviving heirs to be himself and
Paulina and Aurora, 27 and 17 yrs old
respectively. He also asked to be appointed
administratior of the estate.
- Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura
(Respondents) filed opposition to the petition
for appointment of administrator, both claiming
to be first cousins of deceased-wife-Santos;
Gregoria alleged the marriage between the
spouses-Santos was bigamous and void, and
that adoption of Paulina and Aurora were
likewise void for want of written consent of
their natural parents, who were alive and had
not abandoned them. Demetria added that she
is the mother of the child Paulina.
- CFI: validity of the adoption could not be
assailed collaterally in intestate proceedings.
- CA: reversed CFI ruling; said adoption was void
due to absence of consent of childrens natural
Alampay
274 332
Santos v. Aranzanso
G.R. No. L-23828 ll Feb. 28, 1966 ll Bengzon, J.
suffices. It is not accurate to say that the
adoption court had not made a determination
of the fact of abandonment, when they had
indeed determined that the spouses-Santos
were married for 27 yrs., that adoptees had
been living with them since the elder was 3
months and the younger 15 days, and that
attempts to locate the parents had failed.
- ABANDONMENT is any conduct of the parent
to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over the child.
- While the CFI did not use the term
abandonment, its findings contain facts and
circumstances which constitute such fact. An
ADOPTION ORDER implies a finding of
necessary facts; the burden of proof is on the
party attacking it; an adoption order can
therefore NOT BE VOID merely because fact
needed to show compliance is obscure.
- Judicial determination of a particular fact (e.g.
abandonment of an adoptee by his next of kin)
is essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to
enter an order of adoption, but it does not
make said fact determine the jurisdictional
validity of a decree once issued. A mere error of
fact cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
determination must stand until reversed on
appeal; it CANNOT be collaterally
attacked.
- Rationale: Otherwise, status of adopted
children would always be uncertain, since
evidence might not be the same at all
investigations and be different with each
tribunal.
- Mere error in the fact does not affect the
jurisdiction; if jurisdiction be obtained to
determine a fact, its determination of a wrong
or insufficient fact based on improper evidence
is IMMATERIAL to the question of a legal right
to proceed judicially to the next stem.
- A judicial determination may be
contrary to evidence, or legal evidence, or
without any evidence, but it cannot be
impeached for want of jurisdiction.
Alampay
275 332
DSWD v. Belen
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 ll Jul. 18, 1997 ll Regalado, J.
KEYWORDS: Admin case against judge who
approved petition for adoption without DSWD
study report
FACTS:
- Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora
Bernardo-Soriano, both naturalized American
citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of
their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea.
- Judge Belen granted the petition finding the
spouses highly qualified to adopt based on the
findings and recommendation of the DSWD that
the adopting parents and the adoptee have
already developed love and emotional
attachment and that parenting rules have been
demonstrated the minor. Judge says that the
DSWD findings and recommendations are
contained in the Adoptive Home Study Report
and Child Study Report prepared by the local
office of the DSWD through social welfare
officer Vedana.
- It turned out however that DSWD didnt have
any record in its files regarding the adoption
and that there was no order from the judge for
the DSWD to conduct a Home and Child Study
Report. Neither was there a directive from the
judge for the social welfare officer to
coordinate w/ DSWD re the minors adoption.
-Thus, Admin complaint was filed against Judge
Antonio Belen and social welfare officer of
lower court ElmaVedana for violating Art. 33 of
PD 603 [Child Welfare Code] and SC Circular No.
12.
ISSUE:
WON approval from the DSWD is necessary for
the home and case study reports (and WON a
judge may decide based on such report)
RULING:
Belen definitely rendered the adoption decree
in derogation of the provisions of Art. 33 and
Circular No. 12 and Vedaa should have
coordinated with the DSWD in connection with
the preparation of the home and case study
reports. However, only stern warning was given
because of good faith.
RATIO:
- No. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper
course that respondent judge should have
taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset
about the commencement of the Special
Proceeding so that the corresponding case
study could have been accordingly conducted
by said department.
- DSWD has the necessary competence, more
than that possessed by the court social welfare
officer, to make the proper recommendation.
- Belen should never have merely presumed
that it was routinary for the social welfare
officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding
the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to
exercise caution and to see to it that such
coordination was observed in the adoption
proceedings, together with all the other
requirements of the law.
- Belen may well have wittingly or unwittingly
placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the
child whose adoption was under consideration.
Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal
device by which a better future may be
accorded
an
unfortunate
child.
Bayona
276 332
Duncan v. CFI
G.R. No. L-30576 ll Feb. 10, 1976 ll Esguerra, J.
KEYWORDS: Adoption through consent of
Attorney who was given by her client authority
to have the latters child adopted
FACTS:
- Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and
Maria Lucy Christensen are husband and wife
who filed for a petition for adoption of minor
Colin Berry Christensen Duncan with the Court
of First Instance.
- Colin, then only 3 days old was given to
petitioners for them to adopt by Atty. Corazon
de Leon Velasquez, who received the infant
from the child's unwed mother who told the
former never to reveal her (the mother's)
identity because she wanted to get married and
did not want to destroy her future.
- The mother, who never provided for the
maintenance and support of her child,
instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to
look for a suitable couple who will adopt the
child. Said couple happened to be herein
petitioners who later on had the child baptized,
with their names appearing in the records of
said baptism as the parents of said child.
- In the petition for adoption filed by
petitioners, Atty. Velasquez, as the de facto
guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of
the adoption petition, gave the written consent
in compliance with the consent requirement
provided for in Art. 340 of the Civil Code which
states that: The written consent of the
following to adoption shall be necessary: (1)
The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of
age or over; (2) The parents, guardian or person
in charge of the person to be adopted.
- Learning from the testimony of Atty.
Velasquez that the natural mother of the child
sought to be adopted was still alive, the court
then pressed her to reveal the identity of said
mother, however she refused to do so on the
ground that there existed an attorney and client
relationship between them, and that she had
been instructed by her client not to reveal the
latter's identity.
- Hence, the CFI dismissed the petition for
adoption on the ground that the consent given
for the same was improper and falls short of the
express requirement of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the person who gave the consent for
adoption, Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is
the proper person required by law to give such
consent
RULING:
The decision of the respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, is
annulled by the Court, declaring that the minor
Colin Berry Christensen Duncan is the adopted
child and the heir of petitioners Robin Francis
Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen.
RATIO:
- Yes. Besides the abovementioned Art. 340 of
the Civil Code, there also exists another rule
regarding consent to adoption found in Rule 99,
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, which states that
There shall be filed with the petition a written
consent to the adoption by each of its known
living parents who is not an insane or hopelessly
intemperate or has not abandoned such child,
or if there are no such parents by the general
guardian, or guardian ad litem of the child
- Going by the set of facts in this case, only one
of two persons particularly described by law
may be considered here as legally capable of
giving the required written consent. They are:
(1)under Art. 340 of the Civil Code: parent,
guardian or person in charge of the person to
be adopted, and (2) under Rule 99, Sec.3 of the
Rules of Court: each of the known living parents
who has not abandoned such child.
- The father's consent here is out of the
question as the child is illegitimate and
unrecognized, while the natural and unwedded
mother, who from the time she gave her child
to Atty. Velasquez up to the time of the
adoption proceedings, has not bothered to
inquire into the condition of the child, much less
to contribute to the livelihood, maintenance
and care of the same, is the antithesis of that
described in the law as "known living parent
who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or
has not abandoned such child.
- It can indubitably established based on the
facts that said mother had completely and
absolutely abandoned her child; thus, her
Cadorna
277 332
Duncan v. CFI
G.R. No. L-30576 ll Feb. 10, 1976 ll Esguerra, J.
consent to the adoption proceedings is not
needed and not the one being required by law.
- Meanwhile, there clearly appears only one
person who could be considered as the
guardian exercising patria potestas over such
abandoned child, since there was no guardian
ad litem appointed by the court and the child is
not in the custody of an orphan asylum,
children's home or any benevolent society. This
person is no other than Atty. Corazon de Leon
Cadorna
278 332
Cang v. CA
G.R. No. 105308 ll Sep. 25, 1998 ll Romero, J.
KEYWORDS: Consent needed to adopt minor
not abandoned
FACTS:
- Herbert Cang and Anna Marie were married
and had 3 children. They judicially separated
and Anna Marie was granted the custody of the
children. Herbert went to the States and
divorced her.
- Maria Clara, sister of Anna Marie, and her
husband Ronald Clavano petitioned to adopt
the three kids because Anna Marie wanted to
go abroad and could not take care of the minor
children. Keith who was 14 y/o by this time
executed consent to be adopted.
- Upon learning the about said petition, Herbert
immediately returned to the Philippines and
filed an opposition.
- RTC granted the adoption, citing mainly the
financial capability of the adopting parents to
provide for the children as opposed to the
inconsistent and meager support that the father
was able to give.
ISSUE:
1. WON the father has abandoned the children
2. WON the minor children may be legally
adopted without the consent of the father if the
father has already abandoned the children
RULING:
Petition granted. Adoption denied as it was filed
without the consent of the father who, by law
and fact, has not abandoned the children.
RATIO:
1. No. The Court found that there was no
abandonment, because despite the meager
amounts that Herbert was able to send and
deposit in bank accounts, the main fact is that
there were efforts exerted to provide for the
family.
- The Court also cited the letters as proof of the
bond that the father has with the children.
- The conclusion of the courts below that
petitioner abandoned his family needs more
evidentiary support other than his inability to
provide them the material comfort that his
admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There
should be proof that he had so emotionally
abandoned them that his children would not
miss his guidance and counsel if they were
given to adopting parents.
- Keiths consent to be adopted was also taken
as a want to continue living in the same
economic status that the prospective adopters
are providing them.
- The discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely on
best interests of the child but likewise, with due
regard to the natural rights of the parents over
the child.
2. Yes. Abandoned children may be adopted
without the consent of the abandoning parent.
The consent of the natural parent of the
children is needed if there was no
abandonment or other impediment.
- In this case, there was no abandonment.
Cristobal
279 332
Landingin v. Republic
G.R. No. 164948 ll Jun. 27, 2006 ll Callejo, Sr., J.
KEYWORDS: Aunt wants to adopt minor
children of her deceased brother allegedly
abandoned by their mom
FACTS:
- Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen residing
in Guam, filed a petition for the adoption of her
deceased brothers minor children, Elaine, Elma
and Eugene (all Dizon Ramos).
- When their father Manuel died in 1990, the
minors were left under the care of their
paternal grandmother while their mother,
Amelia, went to work in Italy where she
eventually resided with her live-in partner and
their son.
- It was alleged that the mother rarely
communicates with the children and only sends
minimal financial support. It was Diwata, her
children and other relatives abroad who
financially supported the siblings. Upon the
grandmothers death, Diwata decided to adopt
the children and bring them to Guam to live
with her.
- After filing, the trial court ordered the DSWD
to conduct a case study and submit a report
before the initial hearing.
- The minors have given their written consent to
the petition, as affirmed by the eldest minor
Elaine. Diwata testified on her behalf, stating
that she is a qualified adopter since shes a 57
years old widow, lives alone in her own home
and is gainfully employed as a part-time
restaurant server earning $5.15 per hour and
$1,000 per month in tips. She likewise
presented as evidence the Affidavit of Consent
executed by her children and notarized in
Guam.
- Elizabeth Pagbilao, a Social Welfare Officer
from DSWD, submitted the report to court,
recommending the minors adoption by Diwata
as the children are considered abandoned by
their biological mother, who she happened to
personally interview during a chance vacation in
the Philippines and who gave her voluntary
consent (but not written) to the petition.
- The trial court granted the petition, ruling in
favor of the adoption. But the OSG appealed to
the decision, citing lack of written consent from
the childrens biological mother, as well as the
ISSUE:
1. WON the petitioner is entitled to adopt the
minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos
2. WON the affidavit of consent purportedly
executed by the petitioner-adopters children
sufficiently complies with the law
3. WON petitioner is financially capable of
supporting the adoptees
RULING:
Petition denied.
RATIO:
1. No. Written consent of the biological parents
or legal guardian is indispensable for the validity
of a decree of adoption under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act
of 1998).
- The general requirement of consent and
notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the
proposed adoption.
- Though petitioner argues that the written
consent of the biological mother is no longer
necessary because the biological mother has
abandoned the children, it is necessary to
establish that abandonment existed at the time
of adoption.
- In this case, it was proven that there was no
complete abandonment as children still
communicates with the mother, though rare it
may be, and Elaine even mentioned that she
consults serious personal problems with Amelia.
Amelia also sends minimal financial support to
them.
- Court also stated that if Amelia has indeed
abandoned the siblings, petitioner should have
obtained the consent instead from the legal
guardian, the childrens uncle (fathers cousin).
Cruz
280 332
Landingin v. Republic
G.R. No. 164948 ll Jun. 27, 2006 ll Callejo, Sr., J.
2. No. The joint affidavit of consent by the
petitioners children notarized in Guam should
have been authenticated or acknowledged
before a Philippine consular office in order to
be acknowledged as duly notarized document in
our country in compliance to the Rules of Court,
Section 2 of Act No. 2103.
- No further proof was introduced by petitioner
to authenticate the written consent of her
legitimate children, thus it is inadmissible as
evidence.
Cruz
281 332
Tamargo v. CA
G.R. No. 85044 ll Jun. 3, 1992 ll Feliciano, J.
KEYWORDS: Natural parents wants to pass
liability to adoptive parents for sons shooting
incident
FACTS:
- December 10, 1981: Sabas & Felisa Rapisura
filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc
- October 20, 1982: Adelberto Bundoc, then 10
years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle. Her parents filed civil and criminal
charges2 against Bundoc.
- November 18, 1982: Petition for adoption was
granted.
- Now, Bundocs natural parents argued that it
was not they, but the adopting parents, the
Rapisuras, who should be the indispensable
parties to the case, since parental authority has
already shifted from the moment the petition
was filed before the shooting occured. They
relied on Art. 363 and 39 (2)4 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code.
- The Tamargos argued that Bundoc was living
with his natural parents at that time, and that
parental authority was not relinquished due to
the filing and granting of petition.
- The trial court ruled in favor of the Bundocs
and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Notice of appeal was then filed at the trial court
but was denied as it was filed beyond 15day
reglementary period on December 22, 1987.
- The Tamargos went to the CA petitioning for
mandamus and certiorari to reverse all three
trial court orders. CA denied them because they
lost the right to appeal.
ISSUE:
1. WON Supreme Court may still receive the
case, notwithstanding the loss of right to appeal
2. WON adoption may be given retroactive
effect, making the adopting parents the
indispensable parties even when actual custody
was with the natural parents
RULING:
Dantes
282 332
Sayson v. CA
G.R. No. 89224-25 ll Jan. 23, 1992 ll Cruz, J.
KEYWORDS: Status of natural and adoptive
children challenged by aunts and uncles in
estate proceeding
FACTS:
- When their parents died, Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel were left with the properties of their
parents which the latter inherited from the
grandparents.
- Their fathers siblings (Aunts and Uncles) filed
a complaint for partition and accounting of
the intestate estate.
- The children resisted the action and filed their
own defense alleging that Delia and Edmundo
were adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter. As such, they were
entitled to inherit their fathers share of his
estate by right of representation.
- The aunts and uncles contend that Delia and
Edmundo were not legally adopted because
Doribel had already been born when the decree
of adoption was issued. Under Art. 335 CC,
those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction were ineligible to
adopt.
- They also contend, however, that Doribel is
not the legitimate daughter but was in fact born
to another woman who manifested in a petition
for guardianship of the child that she was her
natural mother.
ISSUE:
1. WON Delia and Edmundo were legally
adopted
2. WON Doribel is the legitimate daughter
3. WON Doribel, Delia and Edmundo are heirs of
the intestate estate of their parents
4. WON they have a right of representation
RULING:
Petition (by the aunts and uncles) denied. CA
decision affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Yes. Delia and Edmundo are legally adopted.
- The position of the aunts and uncles is
inconsistent because they question the legality
of Delias and Edmundos adoption on the
De Castro
283 332
Sayson v. CA
G.R. No. 89224-25 ll Jan. 23, 1992 ll Cruz, J.
degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
- Art. 971: The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one
who the person represented would have
succeeded.
- Art. 981: Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead,
De Castro
284 332
Johnston v. Republic
G.R. No. L-18284 ll Apr. 30, 1963 ll Labrador, J.
KEYWORDS: Adoptive mother wants to give
adoptee surname of husband who did not
adopt her
FACTS:
- Petitioner (Isabel Valdes Johnston) filed a
petition for the adoption of one Ana Isabel
Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana (2 yrs
and 10 mos old)
- Both couples are Filipino, childless and SHE
already got the consent of the Mother Superior
of the orphanage (where the child stays) and the
husband.
- Petitioner contends that she used her married
surname in filing the petition, and that this is the
surname she has been using after getting
married and is known by it in the community and
by her friends/relatives.
RATIO:
- No. Art. 341 (CC) provides that the adoption
shall: 1) Give to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child
of the adopter; 2) Dissolve the authority vested
in the parents by nature; 3) Make the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter; and 4) Entitle
the adopted person to use the adopter's
surname.
- Par. 4 refers to the adopters own surname,
which is her maiden name, and not her married
surname; She entered the adoption not as a
married woman.
- Adoption created a personal relationship
between the adopter and the adopted, and the
consent of the husband to the adoption did not
have the effect of making him an adopted
father.
- To allow the minor to adopt the surname of
the husband of the adopter, would mislead the
public into believing that she had also been
adopted by the husband, which is not the case.
ISSUE:
WON adoptee can use the surname of the
father, who did not adopt her
RULING:
Dilag
285 332
Dolot
286 332
Enad
287 332
Republic v. Hernandez
G.R. No. 117209 ll Feb. 9, 1996 ll Regalado, J.
KEYWORDS: Adoptive parents want to change
first name of adoptee
FACTS:
- Van and Regina Munson filed a petition to
adopt minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. At
the time of the filing, Kevin had been in the
Munsons care for almost a year.
- In the same petition, they prayed for the
change of Kevins name to Aaron Josephthe
name he was baptized with, and the name his
adoptive family, relatives and friends had
called him by since his arrival in the Munsons
home.
- The petitioner opposed the inclusion of the
change of name in the petition for adoption,
arguing that change of name should be a
separate
proceeding
from
adoption,
according to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
- The trial court found that the Munson
couple was fit to adopt Kevin. It also held that
Kevins name could be changed to Aaron
Joseph, saying: The first name sought to be
changed belongs to an infant over a year old.
Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor
engaged in any contractual obligations.
Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf be
deemed to have any immoral, criminal or
illicit purpose for seeking said change of
name. There is no way that the state or any
person may be so prejudiced by the action for
change of Kevin Earls first name.
- Thus, petitioner appealed by certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON an adoption decree entitles the
adopted to a change of first name
RULING:
No. The Court modified the order of Judge
Hernandez, affirming the adoption of Kevin
and giving him the surname Munson, but
maintaining his given name, so that he is
known as Kevin Earl Andrade Munson.
RATIO:
288 332
Republic v. Hernandez
G.R. No. 117209 ll Feb. 9, 1996 ll Regalado, J.
The name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; b. The
change results as a legal consequence of
legitimation or adoption; c. The change will
avoid confusion; d. One has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name and was unaware of alien parentage; e.
The change is based on a sincere desire to adopt
a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice
to anybody; and f. When the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
Espaola
289 332
Hermosisima
290 332
Reyes v. Sotero
G.R. No. 167405 ll Feb. 16, 2006 ll Ynares-Santiago, J.
KEYWORDS: Relatives of adopter contest
adoptees adoption papers in estate
proceedings
FACTS:
- Respondent Corazon Chichioco, together
with the other collateral relatives of the
deceased, filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration and settlement
of the estate of Elena Lising before the RTC
of Tarlac.
- Ana Joyce Reyes filed an opposition to the
petition, alleging the she is the only rightful
heir as the adopted daughter of the deceased
Elena and Serafin Delos Santos, and that
there is no need for an administrator as
there was no debt to settle.
- As proof of adoption, she presented the
judicial decree registered in the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac. She also
included a copy of the decree of final
distribution issued by Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office, showing that the benefits of
the deceased Serafin was paid to his wife,
Elena, and daughter, Ana.
- Respondents tried to cast a doubt on the
authenticity of the judicial declaration and
decree presented by the petitioner, alleging
that the natural mother of Ana committed
fraud. They filed a criminal complaint
against the petitioner but this did not
prosper for want of evidence.
- However, RTC enjoined Ana from using the
property because she allegedly converted the
basement as billiards den without the
judgment of the administration. The clerk of
court, Atty. Saguyod was delegated as
administrator of the estate. This was reversed
ISSUE:
WON petitioner needed to give additional
evidence to prove her adoption
RULING:
Petition granted. The Court did not remand
the issue back to the RTC to avoid the
clogging of the courts dockets and ruled that
there is no need for further admission of
evidence in the lower court.
RATIO:
- No. A copy of the judicial declaration of
adoption and a copy of the clerk of court that
the decree was in file in the general docket of
the RTC Tarlac, both under the seal of the
proper issuing officers. There is the
presumption that these have been regularly
issued as part of the official duties that said
public officers perform. The fact that it is a
public document, found in the Civil Registry is
a prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. These are sufficient proof that the
petitioner is adopted by the Delos Santos
spouses.
- Mere imputations of irregularities will not
case cloud of doubt on the presumption of
validity of these documents, unless proven
to the contrary. Furthermore, it cannot be
assailed collaterally in a special proceeding
for administration and must be raised in a
separate proceeding contesting the validity of
the documents.
Macariola
291 332
Ex Parte Devine
398 So. 2d 686 ll Mar. 27, 1981 ll Maddox, J.
KEYWORDS: Father challenges tender years
presumption on equal protection grounds
FACTS:
- Alice Devine and Christopher Devine were
married in 1966 and separated in 1979. As a
consequence of their separation, the matter
of who would gain custody of their children
was decided by the Court.
- During the proceedings that would
eventually determine who custody of their
children would go to, the Court could not find
any substantial reason that would render
either Alice or Christopher suitably unfit to
raise their children. However, owing to the
fact that the children still fell within ages
covered by the tender years presumption,
custody was granted to the mother. This was
because in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, custody of children whose ages fell
within the scope of the tender years doctrine
would always go to the mother.
- The father contested the decision and
brought the case all the way up to the
Supreme Court of Alabama.
RULING:
Yes. The tender years presumption is
unconstitutional because it violates equal
protection.
ISSUE:
RATIO:
- By placing upon fathers who intended to
gain custody of their children upon separation
from their spouse an additional requirement
of proving that their wife was unfit and not
placing any similar requirement of the
mothers, the law unjustly favored the
mothers.
- Under the tender years presumption, it
would not matter if the father was objectively
the parent better suited to raise his children.
If he could not prove that his wife was unfit to
raise their children who were under the
tender years, then custody would
automatically be awarded to his wife.
- Hence, the tender years presumption not
only prejudiced fathers, it also potentially
prejudiced children whose best interests the
Court must consider when deciding custody
hearings.
Marin
292 332
Espiritu v. CA
G.R. No. 115640 ll Mar. 15, 1995 ll Melo, J.
KEYWORDS: Mother kissing bad man; custody
battle between married couple whose
relationship soured
FACTS:
- Petitioner Reynaldo and private respondent
Teresita maintained a common law
relationship while working in the states
where they had a child named Rosalind. They
returned to the Philippines to marry. At the
states they had a second child named
Reginald.
- Soon after, their relationship soured and
Teresita left for California from their home in
Pittsburgh.
- Reynaldo returned to the country and filed a
bigamy case against Teresita after learning
that a marriage was subsisting when they
lived together. Teresita soon filed a habeas
corpus suit praying for custody of the two
kids below seven years old.
- RTC thru Judge Bersamin (future Justice and
ponente of De Castro v. JBC) denied the
petition and awarded custody to Reynaldo.
CA, however, reversed the decision based on
Art. 213 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
1. WON CA erred in giving custody based
solely on Art 213 of the FC
2. WON the tender years presumption
prevails at the time of filing the petition or at
the time of decision
3. WON the basis for denying custody was
biased and unfair
RULING:
Petition granted.
RATIO:
1. Yes. The CA was swayed by an abstract
presumption of law (by none other than
Nuez
293 332
Celis v. Cafuir
G.R. No. L-3352 ll Jun. 12, 1950 ll Montemayor, J.
KEYWORDS: Mom executes two documents
allegedly renouncing her custody over child
FACTS:
- Respondents Soledad Cafuir and her
husband appealed the decision of the lower
court granting the writ of habeas corpus to
Ileana (Nenita) Celis and ordering
the
delivery of the child to petitioner.
- Petitioner, after giving birth to Joel (John)
Cafuir turned over custody to Soledad, fearing
the extreme displeasure and anger of her
father over her illicit relations with Joels
father, an American soldier to whom she had
not been married.
- Soledad provided for all the needs and
comforts of the child, including a nurse hired
to care for the child.
- After marrying Agustin Rivera, petitioner
filed a suit for habeas corpus.
- The CFI of Manila granted said petition,
ordering the Sheriff, who then had custody of
the boy, to deliver said child to his mother,
petitioner Ileana.
- Respondents argued that petitioner
executed the following documents to the
effect that she had renounced her custody of
and patria potestas over her child.
1. TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
I hereby entrusted to Mrs. Soledad Cafuir x x x
my son named John Cafuir, for the reason
that I don't have the means to bring the
child up. Anybody who may claim my son for
adoption in the future without the consent of
the undersigned is hereby ignored.
(Sgd.) NENITA CELIS Mother
2. TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
I, Nenita Celis, x x x hereby designate Mrs.
Soledad Cafuir x x x to be the real guardian of
my son, named Johnny Cafuir. No one has
the right to claim for adoption except Mrs.
Soledad Cafuir.
(Sgd.) NENITA CELIS Mother
Ordoyo
294 332
Sy v. CA
G.R. No. 124518 ll Dec. 27, 2007 ll Tinga, J.
KEYWORDS: Mom praying in the rain; custody
battle after dad charges mom unfit
FACTS:
- Respondent Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a
petition for habeas corpus against petitioner
Wilson Sy before the RTC, praying that said writ
be issued ordering Sy to produce their two
minor children.
- Writ was issued in favor of the respondent
along with an order for petitioner to pay
P50,000 a month for support so petitioner
appealed to the CA, alleging that the court erred
in awarding to the respondent sole custody of
the minor children and in ordering petitioner to
provide respondent with monthly support of
P50, 000.
- CA held that petitioner was unable to
substantiate his contention that respondent was
unfit to have custody and that questions as to
care and custody of children may be raised in a
petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
Moreover, contrary to his claim, petitioner was
properly heard on the matter involving support
for the respondent. Motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
1. WON CA erred in granting custody of minor
children to respondent
2. WON CA erred in ordering petitioner to pay
support
RULING:
CA decision affirmed. Custody of children
remains with respondent Mercedes Tan Uy- Sy,
and the petitioner Wilson Sy is ordered to pay
P50, 000 a month for support, of which is merely
provisional as the amount may be modified.
RATIO:
1. No. The applicable provisions to the case at
hand are Art. 213 of the FC and Sec 6, Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court.
Pagdanganan
295 332
Feldman v. Feldman
358 N.Y.S.2D 507 ll Jul. 15, 1974 ll Benjamin, J.
KEYWORDS:
Screw Magazine, sexually liberated mom, child
custody
DOCTRINE:
Unusual sexual practices of wife do not ipso
facto mean she is unfit for custody of their
children.
FACTS:
- Parties were married and had two children.
Wife eventually filed for divorce based on
cruel treatment, and was awarded custody
of their two minor children. Wife
subsequently cohabited with another man.
- When husband visited former wifes house,
he saw a copy of Screw Magazine and
letters (some with explicit photos attached)
responding to advertisements about having
fun and games (sex) with other couples.
- Husband then filed for habeas corpus,
seeking custody of their children.
- Upon presentation of evidence to the court,
it was determined that the wifes private
sex life in no way affected her children. Her
children never saw the offensive material, it
was proven that the children were still well
provided for emotionally and physically (in
fact, both children were class officers in
school), and the atmosphere at their home
was happy and cheerful.
- However, the lower court gave custody to
father based on her wild lifestyle and
stated:
- "The record and exhibits indicate her desire
to experiment sexually. It cannot be that
the best interests and welfare of the two
Poblador
296 332
Santos Sr. v. CA
G.R.No. 113054 ll Mar. 16, 1995 ll Romero, J.
KEYWORDS:
Mother v grandparents, child custody
DOCTRINE:
Only when the parent present is shown to
be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents
exercise substitute parental authority.
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos Sr., an army
lieutenant, and Julia Bedia, a nurse by
profession, were married and had a son. From
the time the boy was released from the
hospital, his grandparents (Bedia spouses) were
the ones taking care of him. The Santos couple
agreed to place their son in the temporary
custody of Julia's parents. Julia then left for the
US. Respondents were the ones to provide for
all of Leouel Jr.'s needs. On one visit, Leouel Sr.
along with his brothers, took (abducted) his son
from the grandparents. The grandparents filed a
"Petition for Care, Custoy, and Control of Minor
Ward Leouel Santos, Jr." RTC and CA granted
the petition. Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC and CA erred in granting
custody of Leouel Jr. to his grandparents
HELD:
Yes. The right of custody accorded to
parents springs from the exercise of authority.
Patria potestas is a mass of rights and
Quiambao
297 332
FACTS:
- Jocelyn took her 4-year old son with her to
Mindoro when she decided to abandon her
Crisanto, her husband.
- Crisanto commissioned Renato Santos to
conduct a surveillance on Jocelyn and found
out that she was having lesbian relations
with one Noreen Gay, this was
corroborated by the house helper of the
spouses who stated that Jocelyn was often
out and on one occasion slapped the child.
ISSUES:
1. WON Petition for Review was filed beyond
the deadline (Oct 24, 2002)
2. WON petition was premature
3. WON CA gravely abused its discretion when
it ordered the trial court judge to "consider,
hear and resolve the motion to lift the
award of custody pendent lite" without any
proper motion by Jocelyn and after the
April 3, 2002 Order of the trial court had
become final and executor.
4. WON Section 1 of Rule 36 (for judges to
state clearly and distinctly the reasons for
their dispositions) violated
5. WON art FC Art 213 which stated that no
child under 7 years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise
should be applied instead of FC Art 211
HELD:
1. No. Husband claims that the petition was
sent only on Nov 4, 2002 according to the
Registry Bill. Rules of Court Sec 3 states that
the date of mailing of motions, pleadings
and other papers or payments or deposits,
as shown by the post office stamp on the
envelope or the registry receipt, shall be
considered as the date of their filing,
payment, or deposit in court. The envelope
shall be attached to the records of the
case.
Records reveals that copies of the
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Quilala
298 332
Quilala
299 332
Goldstein v. Goldstein
341 A. 2D 51 ll Jul. 17, 1975 ll Joslin, J.
KEYWORDS:
Smart child, Israel, child custody
FACTS:
- Wife filed for a decree of divorce against
husband but was denied by the Family
Court. Also, the custody of their 9 year old
daughter Ann Robin was given to the father
(she was still given visitation rights).
- Husband and child went to live in Israel.
Wife initiated series of proceedings to
compel their return and that custody over
their daughter be given to her.
- After 3 years, Supreme Court of Israel
granted her petition.
- Trial judge determined to reestablish their
mother-daughter relationship. The hearing
determined the following:
Both parents were fit to have custody
of their daughter
Their daughter is a smart girl.
There was threat of war and terrorist
activity in Israel (husband acknowledge
such violence)
That child cannot be considered to be
Jewish until her mother upon the
consent of her mother
- Ann Robin admitted she loves her father
more than her mother and wishes to go
with him to Israel
- She also said that she had no desire to visit
with her mother but agreed, after the trial
justice's urgings, that it would be a "fair
bargain" if he were to condition her being
allowed to live with her father in Israel
upon her visiting willingly with her mother
for 4 weeks during each summer.
- Trial justice gave custody to husband (with
the conditions stipulated above)
ISSUE:
Was the awarding of the child's custody to
the father justified?
HELD: YES!
Wife's claim answered:
Those factors would have simply been
placed on the scales together with the
other relevant considerations weighed by
the trial justice, such as the parties' equal
suitability to have the child's custody, the
psychiatric evidence of the child's
emotional stability and intelligence, the trial
justice's opportunity to observe her
demeanor, appearance, and attitude, and
his obvious conclusion therefrom that her
expressed desire to be with her father was
not a mere whim and was entitled to
substantial weight.
(BASTA ANG POINT, EQUAL ANG POSITION NG
BOTH PARENTS; HENCE, HINDI NAG ABUSE
YUNG JUDGE TO GIVE WEIGHT SA GUSTO NUNG
BATA. Note also that the judge gave visitation
rights to the mother, so binigyan pa rin niya ng
chance si wife to be with the child)
Ramos
300 332
Laxamana v. Laxamana
G.R.No. 144763 ll Sep. 3, 2002 ll Ynares-Santiago, J.
KEYWORDS:
Lawyer turned drug dependent dad, child
custody
FACTS:
Petitioner Reymond Laxamana was a
graduate of Bachelor of Laws while respondent
Ma. Lourdes Laxamana held a degree in Banking
and Finance. Upon marriage, respondent quit
her job in order to become a full time
housewife while petitioner managed buy and
sell, fishpond and restaurant businesses (he did
not pass the bar). The couple had three
children. In October 1991 petitioner was
confined in Estrellas Home Care Clinic for being
a drug dependent. He was again confined in
1996 for rehab. In 1997, petitioner was declared
drug free but respondent alleged otherwise
stating that petitioner has become irritable
since his return and had even maltreated her at
one point.
Respondent abandoned petitioner in June 1999
taking the children with her. Petitioner filed a
writ for habeas corpus for visitation rights
which the court granted. The parties were
ordered to undergo psychological evaluation
which they passed except for the pyschologists
opinion that petitioner, in his belief, was not
completely drug free.
ISSUE:
WON the lower courts decision erred when
it resolved the issue of custody without trial.
HELD:
Yes. The paramount interests of the
Reposar
301 332
Garska v. McCoy
278 S.E. 2D 357 ll May 26, 1981 ll Neely, J.
KEYWORDS:
Trailer baby, adoption, child custody
SUMMARY:
Grandparents filed adoption petition to
adopt the child. Natural father of the child filed
writ of habeas corpus, claiming the custody of
child.
FACTS:
Gwendolyn McCoy, then 15, left her
grandparents to live with her mother. She got
pregnant by Michael Garska who was sharing
the trailer with her mother. McCoy returned to
her grandparents home. During pregnancy she
did not receive support from Garska. McCoy
signed a consent agreeing to the adoption of
her son by her grandparents Alitzers. Upon
learning of the adoption, Garska visited the
baby and started to send weekly money orders.
The Alitzers filed a petition for adoption while
Garska filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
to secure custody of his son. Both proceedings
were consolidated. The petition for adoption
was dismissed because the baby had not
Reyes
302 332
Salientes v. Abanilla
G.R.No. 162734 ll Aug. 29, 2006 ll Quisumbing, J.
KEYWORDS:
Evil in-laws
FACTS:
- Loran and Antonette are the parents of the
2-year old Lorenzo Emmanuel.
- They lived with the wifes parents.
However, due to problems with his in-laws,
Loran suggested to his wife that they
transfer to their own place but she refused.
Thus, he left the house of the Salientes
-
ISSUE:
WON the father may be prevented to visit
his son based on the Tender Years Presumption
(TYP).
RATIO:
NO.
Art 213 FC (TYP) only deals with the judicial
adjudication of custody and serves as a
guideline for the proper award of custody by
the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter
argument for Lorans petition for custody, but it
cannot serve as a basis for preventing the father
to see his own child. Nothing in the said
provision disallows a father from seeing or
visiting his child under seven years of age.
Also Art 211 FC states that the father and
the mother have joint parental authority over
their children. This parental authority also
includes joint custody.
Although they are already separated de
facto, the issue has yet to be adjudicated by the
court. In the absence of judicial grant of custody
to one parent, both parents are still entitled to
the custody of the child.
Reyes
303 332
Cabanas v. Pilapil
G.R.No. L-25843 ll Jul. 25, 1974 ll Fernando, J.
KEYWORDS:
Uncle v mother over childs money
FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil had a child, Milian Pilapil
with Melchora Cabanas. Francisco Pilapil is
Florentinos brother. Before Florentino died, he
insured himself and instituted his child as
beneficiary with his brother to act as trustee
during the childs minority. Upon his death,
proceeds went to Francisco. The mother filed a
complaint seeking the delivery of the sum to
the child. The mother filed the bond required by
the Civil Code. The uncle contends that he has
the right to retention by invoking the terms of
the insurance policy.
ISSUE:
WON the mother has the right to
administer the property of the child
HELD:
Sevilla
304 332
Libi v. IAC
G.R.No. 70890 ll Sep. 18, 1992 ll Regalado, J.
KEYWORDS:
Twisted Romeo and Juliet
DOCTRINE:
CC 2180 Parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor
children under their legal authority or control,
or who live in their company, unless it is proven
that the former acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent such
damages.
FACTS:
- Julie Gotiong (age 18) and Wendell Libi
(aged 1819) were sweethearts
- Julie broke up with Libi for being sadistic
and irresponsible, Wendell persistently
tried to reconcile with her Jan 14, 1979
Julie and Wendell died from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same
firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver
licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio
Libi (Wendells father)
- There were no eye witnesses
- Libis family contends that an unknown
third party, whom Wendell may have
displeased or antagonized by reason of his
work as a narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU),
must have caused Wendell's death and then
shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and
thereby avoid identification.
ISSUE:
WON Wendells parents are civilly liable for
their sons action (YES)
HELD:
Amelita Libi (Wendells mom) admitted that
her son knew the keys to the deposit box
holding the gun was in her bag and that the gun
is now missing from the deposit box. This
showed a lack of due diligence of a good father
of a family
Wendells parents never knew that the gun
was taken from the deposit box since 1978 as
evidenced by a picture (of Wendell holding the
gun) given to Julie and Wendell was said to
have kept said gun in his car for his supposed
role of CANU agent
Court Held: It is still the duty of parents to
know the activity of their children who may be
engaged in this dangerous activity involving the
menace of drugs. Had the defendantsappellees been diligent in supervising the
activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping
said gun from his reach, they could have
prevented Wendell from killing, Julie Ann
Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:
The father, and in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children who
live in their company.'
Tan de Guzman
305 332
Lindain v. CA
G.R.No. 95305 ll Aug. 20, 1992 ll Grio Aquino, J.
FACTS:
Widowed mother of minor petitioners who
owned a parcel of land sold the land to
defendants- spouses in 1966. Defendants knew
that the sale was illegal, the owners being
minors, but bought the land anyway. Petitioners
therefore sued to declare the sale null and void
in 1987. RTC ruled in favour of petitioners. CA
reversed RTCs ruling, holding that property
under P2,000 may be sold without judicial
approval by father/mother acting as legal
administrator of minor owners.
ISSUE:
1. WON a parent, as legal administrator of
property owned by his/her minor children,
can sell said property without judicial
approval
2. WON defendants purchased the land in
good faith
3. WON the action for reconveyance has
prescribed
RATIO:
NO. Parent, as legal administrator, only has
powers of possession and management and no
powers of disposition or encumbrance.
Tejano
306 332
People v. Silvano
G.R.No. 127356 ll Jun. 29, 1999 ll Per Curiam
KEYWORDS:
Sex as punishment
DOCTRINE:
It is the duty of the father to give her love
and
affection,
advice
and
counsel,
companionship and understanding. The Code
recognizes the authority of parents to discipline
their children but not to the extent that the
father would force her daughter to have sex
with him under the mask of punishment.
FACTS:
The father, David Silvano y Hayag had been
sexually abusing her daughter, Sheryl, since she
was 13 years old. Three days after she had
turned 16, and on the pretense of punishment
for coming home late, the father raped his
daughter. She went to school the next day and
did not come home for two weeks until she
reported the incident to the authorities.
ISSUE:
WON the appellant is guilty of qualified
rape punishable by death penalty? YES.
HELD:
The fundamental presumption of innocence
enjoyed by appellant was overcome with the
requisite quantum of proof; his guilt was proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Sec 11 of RA 7659
imposes death penalty to qualified rape
committed by the victims parent. The following
elements of rape were proven:
i. Sexual congress the testimony of the
victim and the medical report stating that
she is no longer a virgin
ii. With a woman his own daughter
iii. By force and without consent substituted
by the moral ascendancy of the offender
over the victim
iv. Victim is under 18 years of age at the time
of the rape
v. The offender is the parent proven by the
certificate of live birth of Sheryl.
The father is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and is given death penalty with P50,000 as
moral damages andP75,000 for civil indemnity.
Tiangco
307 332
People v. Silvano
G.R.No. 127356 ll Jun. 29, 1999 ll Per Curiam
responsible for the defilement of her
daughter.
4. The behavior of her daughter after the
alleged incident is not consistent with the
behavior of a raped victim. Without merit
for different people react differently. The
failure of the victim to immediately reveal
the incestuous acts is not indicative of
fabricated charges. Her shame and genuine
fear of what the appellant might do to her
brothers and mother prevented her from
reporting the incident.
5. The testimony of the girl could not convict
him (credibility) the presumption that a
young and decent Filipina would not
humiliate herself unless that is the truth for
it is her natural instinct to protect her
honor.
6. That he could not have raped her in a small
Tiangco
308 332
Shields v. Gross
58 N.Y.2D 338 ll Mar. 29, 1983 ll Simons, J.
KEYWORDS:
Brooke Shields story, child model, Sugar and
Spice
DOCTRINE:
Other rights and duties in exercise of
parental authority > Section 50 of Civil Rights
Law: A person, firm or corporation that uses
for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of
trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living
person without having first obtained the
written consent of such person, or if a minor of
his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a
misdemeanor"
From the Family Code, Article 220 (6): To
represent them in all matter affecting their
interest
From Tolentino, page 620: No person
below eighteen years of age may be employed
or allowed to work in any place of work or
employment without the written consent of his
parent, guardian or person having custody over
him.
NATURE:
The parties have filed cross appeals.
Defendant requests reinstatement of the trial
court's judgment. Plaintiff requests, in the
alternative, that the order of the Appellate
Division be modified by striking the limitation
enjoining use only for purposes of advertising
and trade, or that the order of the Appellate
Division should be affirmed or, failing both of
these, that a new t rial be granted.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, Brooke Shields is a well-known
actress who was previously a child model.
When she was 10 years old she obtained
several modeling jobs with defendant, Garry
Gross, through her agent, the Ford Model
Agency.
In 1975, she got a job involving a series of
photographs to be financed by Playboy Press
requiring plaintiff to pose nude in a bathtub
back in 1975. These photos were known to be
used in a publication entitled "Portfolio 8" (later
renamed "Sugar and Spice").
Before the photographic sessions, plaintiff's
Yumol
309 332
Shields v. Gross
58 N.Y.2D 338 ll Mar. 29, 1983 ll Simons, J.
common-law right to disaffirm the consent
given defendant by her parent. While another
Justice added that the consents were governed
by section 3-105 of the General Obligations Law
and therefore could be interpreted to have
expired after three years. But it accepted the
trial court's findings that the consents were
valid and unrestricted as to time and use.
ISSUE:
WON an infant model may disaffirm a prior
unrestricted consent executed on her behalf by
her parent and maintain an action pursuant to
section 51 of the Civil Law Rights against her
photographer for republication of photographs
of her. NO.
RATIO:
Historically, New York common law did not
recognize a cause of action for invasion of
privacy. In 1909, however, responding to a
previous court decision, the Legislature enacted
sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.
Section 50 is penal and makes it a misdemeanor
to use a living person's name, portrait or picture
for advertising purposes without prior "written
consent". Sect ion 51 is remedial and creates a
related civil cause of action on behalf of the
injured party permitting relief by injunction or
damages. Section 51 of the statute further
states that the prior "written consent" which
will bar the civil action is to be as "above
provided", referring to section 50 which in turn
provides that: "A person, firm or corporation
that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture
of any living person without having first
obtained the written consent of such person, or
if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
The statute acts to restrict an advertiser's
prior unrestrained common-law right to use
another's photograph until written consent is
obtained. Once written consent is obtained,
however, the photograph may be published as
permitted by its terms. It may abrogate an
infant's common-law right to disaffirm the
consent or, conversely, it may confer upon
infants the right to make binding. Where a
Yumol
310 332
ISSUE:
WON the father is entitled to visitorial
rights to his children? (The right of access of a
Alampay
311 332
Palisoc v. Brillantes
G.R.No. L-29025 ll Oct. 4, 1971 ll Teehankee, J.
KEYWORDS:
Daffon 1, fistfight, school liability
QUICK READ:
Daffon killed Palisoc in a fistfight while at
school so the parents of the latter are suing
Daffon + member of the Board of Directors,
President and Instructor of MTI invo king Art.
2180.TC absolved all co-defendants using
doctrine in Mercado requiring a kind of living
and boarding arrangement between the
student and school for the latter to be liable as
suggested by the phrase so long as they
remain in custody. Ct reversed TC and said
there was nothing in the law that requires that
kind of arrangement and that the liability stems
from the substitute parental authority that
requires them to exercise protective and
supervisory custody over the students as long
as theyre attending school even during recess
time. Mercado dictum was set aside and Ct held
that Daffon, President and Instructor were
jointly and severally liable for damages [12k]
arising from Palisocs death. Brillantes was not
being a mere board director [only head of trade
school liable].
FACTS:
Dominic Palisoc [16] and Virgilio Daffon
were classmates at the Manila Technical
Institute (MTI), a non-academic institution.
While Daffon was working on a machine at the
schools laboratory, he remarked that Palisoc
was acting like a foreman. Palisoc slightly
slapped Daffon in the face. The latter retaliated
with a barrage of blows causing Palisoc to
retreat. While retreating, Palisoc stumbled on
an engine block and fell unconscious. He died
thereafter. The cause of death was internal
injuries probably caused by strong fist blows.
Parents of Palisoc sued Antonio Brillantes
[member of Board of Directors], Teodosio
Valenton [President], and SantiagoQuibulue
[instructor] along with Daffon. Daffon was of
legal age at the time of the incident, hence the
parents were not liable under Art 2180.The trial
court found Daffon guilty for quasi-delict, but
absolved the defendants-officials of MTI, citing
the ruling in Mercado v CA.
ISSUE:
Whether defendants school officials are
jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors
HELD:
YES. Valenton (head) and Quibule (teacher)
are liable for damages under Art 2180 CC.
Brillantes is not liable as being a member of the
schools board of directors. School heads and
teachers, to a certain extent, stand in loco
parentis to students who remain in their
custody. Custody, as used in Art 2180, means
the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over
their students for as long as they are in
attendance in the school, including recess time.
The basis of the presumption of negligence in
Art 2180 is some culpa in vigilando that the
parents, teachers, etc.are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority.
Where the parent places the child under the
custody of the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one responsible for the
tortuous act of the child. Palisoc. The
unfortunate death could have been avoided,
had said defendants but complied with their
duty of providing adequate supervision over the
activities of the students in the school premises
to protect their students from harm, whether at
the hands of fellow students or other parties.
NOTE:
The basis of TC for absolving is a dictum in
Mercado v CA which is also based on
another dictum in Exconde, both of which
are set aside in this case
Brillantes was the former owner of the
school but during the occurrence of the
incident, the school was already
incorporated thus hes not liable as being a
member of the Board. The school could be
held liable but since it wasnt properly
impleaded, then Ct cant hold it liable.
DISSENT (Makalintal):
The size of enrollment of educational
institutions makes it highly unrealistic to
consider students as in the custody of
Bayona
312 332
Palisoc v. Brillantes
G.R.No. L-29025 ll Oct. 4, 1971 ll Teehankee, J.
teachers or school heads merely from the fact
of enrollment and class attendance, unless the
latter can prove due diligence. The restrictive
interpretation of Art 2180 in Mercado should be
maintained. Under Art 2180, parents are
responsible for the tortious acts of their minor
children who live in their company. Since the
Bayona
313 332
Amadora v. CA
G.R.No. L-47745 ll Apr. 15, 1988 ll Cruz, J.
KEYWORDS:
Student killer, Daffon 2, school liability
FACTS:
- April 13, 1972: Alfredo Amadora, a high
school graduating student of Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos went to school to submit his
Physics experiment. However, while he was
in the auditorium, his classmate Pablito
Daffon fired a gun that mortally hit him. He
died at 17. Daffon was convicted of
homicide thru reckless imprudence.
- Amadoras parents filed a civil action for
damages under Art. 2180 CC against the
school, its rector (HS principal), dean of
boys, and the Physics teacher, together
with Daffon and 2 other students through
their parents. The complaint against
students was later dropped.
- CFI Cebu: defendants were liable in the sum
of P294,984.00 (death compensation, loss
of earning capacity, costs of litigation,
funeral
expenses,
moral
damages,
exemplary damages & attorneys fees)
- CA: reversed, all defendants absolved
completely.
i. As per Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 45, CC
Art. 2180 is not applicable since the
school was an academic institution of
learning & not a school of arts & trades.
ii. Students were not in custody of the
school at the time of the incident since
the semester had already ended.
iii. No clear identification of the fatal gun.
iv. Defendants
exercised
necessary
diligence in preventing injury.
- Petitioners claim their son was still under
schools custody because he went to school
to comply w/a requirement for graduation.
While the respondents allege that in
submitting the said report, Amadora was no
longer in their custody since the semester
was over.
- A gun was confiscated by Sergio Damaso,
the Dean of boys, from Jose Gumban on
April 7, 1972. It was an unlicensed pistol
which was later returned to Gumban
without reporting such to the principal or
taking further action. Gumban was one
Reyes
314 332
Amadora v. CA
G.R.No. L-47745 ll Apr. 15, 1988 ll Cruz, J.
HELD:
PETITION DENIED.
1. Rector and Dean not liable because they
are not teachers-in-charge; only had
general authority over students.
2. Teacher-in-charge: not disclosed by
evidence. Just because Amadora went to
school in connection with a physics report
does not necessarily make physics teacher
the teacher-in-charge. Besides, theres no
showing that the teacher was negligent in
any manner.
3. Dean of boys no proof that the gun he
released was the same gun that killed
Amadora.
4. School only teacher or head is
responsible.
NOTE: This is just a revised version of a digest
that
I
got
from
the
internet.
Reyes
315 332
Cristobal
316 332
Vancil v. Belmes
G.R.No. 132223 ll Jun. 19, 2001 ll Sandoval - Gutierrez, J.
KEYWORDS:
US citizen grandma v mother, guardianship
DOCTRINES:
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. But if either parent is alive,
grandparent should prove parents unsuitability
in order to claim rights of substitute parental
authority.
Courts should not appoint persons as
guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of
our courts for they will find it difficult to protect
the wards.
FACTS:
In May 1987, Bonifacia Vancil, a naturalized
US citizen, commenced before the RTC of Cebu
City guardianship proceedings over the persons
and properties of minors Valerie (6) and Vincent
(2), her grandchildren from his son Reeder C.
Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died in the
US, with his common-law wife, Helen G.
Belmes. It is claimed in the petition that the
minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines
and have an estate consisting of proceeds from
their fathers death pension benefits with a
probable value of P100,000. Bonifacia Vancil
was eventually appointed legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate the
children.
Helen submitted an opposition to the
subject guardianship proceedings asseverating
that she had already filed a similar petition for
guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City.
She then followed this with a motion for the
Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a
New One, asserting that she is the natural
mother in actual custody of and exercising
parental authority over the minors at Maralag,
Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing; that the petition was
filed under an improper venue; and that at the
time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was
a naturalized American citizen and a resident
thereof.
RTC rejected and denied Belmes motion to
remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as
then,
as
Cruz
the
surviving
317 332
Vancil v. Belmes
G.R.No. 132223 ll Jun. 19, 2001 ll Sandoval - Gutierrez, J.
grandparent, can exercise substitute parental
authority only in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of respondent. Considering that
the mother is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent,
Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to
be the minors guardian, respondents
unsuitability. She, however, has failed to
provide convincing evidence showing that
Helen is not suited to be the guardian of
Vincent. She merely insists that Helen is morally
unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that the
latters live-in partner raped Valerie several
times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is
no longer a subject of the guardianship
proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as
Cruz
318 332
Abiera v. Orin
G.R.No. 3236 ll Mar. 27, 1907 ll Mapa, J.
KEYWORDS:
Sibling war, special administrator
FACTS:
- Vicenta, Mariano and Petra Cacao were
siblings. Petra Cacao married Juan Abiera.
Petra Cacao died.
- Vicenta married defendant Miguel Orin.
They have no children. Vicenta Cacao died.
- In 1898, Mariano Cacao, Juan Abiera and
Miguel Orin entered into an extrajudicial
partition of properties/animals acquired
during the marriage of Vicenta Cacao and
Miguel Orin. Specifically, Orin was to pay
the other two P1,000 each.
- Abiera was representing his children by
Petra Cacao. Because of the circumstances,
the natural nephews became heirs of
Vicenta Cacao.
- Juan Abiera died. Plaintiff Sebastian Abiera
ISSUES:
WON Sebastian Abiera may demand
payment as special administrator to the estate
of the father of the heirs?
HELD:
NO. The obligation was executed in favor of
the heirs, not in favor of Juan Abiera, who was
merely representing them. Sebastian Abiera
could only manage Abieras estate, not those of
third persons. Juan Abiera cannot transfer his
right to represent his children to Sebastian.
The right to represent the children is
attached to parental authority or guardianship.
This is a personal right. It died with Juan Abiera.
Dantes
319 332
Cortes v. Castillo
G.R.No. L-16903 ll Mar. 18, 1921 ll Malcolm, J.
KEYWORDS:
Adulterous mom, custody
QUICK READ:
The mother who was found guilty of
adultery was deemed unfit to acquire custody
of her children from her mother-in-law.
FACTS:
- Maria Cortes was found guilty of adultery
by the trial court but Col. Alejandro Herrera,
her husband, condoned her and came back
to live with her.
- On the suspicion that she might be
committing adultery again, he left, took the
kids with him, and stayed with his mother.
He filed an action for divorce, but
- He died in the line of duty (he was a
policeman,
apparently)
Maria then
proceeded to re-obtain custody of her
children from her mother-in-law but the
latter refused.
- The trial court sided with the mother-inlaw.
- Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
WON A woman found guilty of adultery is
unfit for custody of her children - Yes
RATIO:
(The entire ratio is just one paragraph long, and
I might as well copy it verbatim)
"Article 171 of the Civil Code, presumably
still in force, because of continued judicial
construction and enforcement, provides that
parents who, by the example set by them, tend
to corrupt their offspring, may be deprived by
the courts of their parental authority. (There
can also be noted sections 770 and 771 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.) This provision of the
law imposes a discretionary power on the
courts, which should be made use of, with a
primary regard for the welfare of the minor.
(See 2 Manresa, Codigo Civil, pp. 63, et seq.;
decision of the supreme court of Spain, June 23,
1905.) Both under the civil law and the common
law, the best interests of the child is the
paramount consideration"
De Castro
320 332
Chua v. Cabangbang
G.R.No. L-23253 ll Mar. 28, 1969 ll Castro, J.
KEYWORDS:
Hostess, Betty the adopted child
DOCTRINE:
Abandonment
authority
terminates
NATURE OF PETITION:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal dismissing Pacita Chuas
petition for habeas corpus for the custody of
her daughter Betty from respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner, when she was still at the prime
of youth, worked as a hostess in nightclubs
She slept with different men, but she got
pregnant with 2 children from a certain Sy
Sia Lay and 1 daughter with Victor Tan
Villareal
She gave her youngest daughter to a
comadre in Cebu
The custody of the other daughter, Betty,
was acquired by Mr. and Mrs. Cabangbang
during the formers early years (4 months
old)
- They christened her Grace Cabangbang
Petitioner now wants to get custody of
Betty
- She contends that Villareal took the
child away and gave her to the couple
- The couple avers that they found the
baby, wrapped in a bundle, at the gate
of their residence
ISSUE:
WON the custody of the child can be
granted back to the mother
HELD:
NO, petitioner abandoned the child, thus
she has lost her parental authority over the
child
RATIO:
CFI ruled that the mother was unfit to have
parental authority, as she is not an upright
woman.
- But SC ruled that it was more of an
SIDE ISSUE:
Petitioner contends that no child under 7
years of age shall be taken away from her
mother.
- Moot and academic, as she is already
11 years old
We therefore affirm the lower courts decision,
not on the grounds cited by it, but upon a
Dilag
321 332
Chua v. Cabangbang
G.R.No. L-23253 ll Mar. 28, 1969 ll Castro, J.
ground which the court overlooked i.e.,
Dilag
322 332
In Re, Edward C
126 Cal.App.3d 193 ll Nov. 30, 1981 ll Barry-Deal, J.
KEYWORDS:
Divine punishment, child maltreatment
DOCTRINE:
Maltreatment of a child is not privileged
simply because it is imposed in the guise of
freedom of religious expression. Whether the
discipline is excessive or a lifestyle is harmful to
the child must be measured in the light of an
objective standard of reasonableness under all
circumstances.
FACTS:
3 kids: Eric, Marlee and Edward
During the maternal grandmas two-week
visit in March 1980, she observed the father
disciplining the three children by hitting
them with a leather strap, looped over.
Although the boys were spanked a few
times with clothing on, Marlee was beaten
at least a dozen times, usually on her bare
flesh. The boys witnessed Marlee's
whippings, heard her cry, and listened to
their father, while administering the
beating, explain to the children that he was
doing it because God wanted him to and
that it was Biblically ordained.
There were other forms of discipline and
parental control:
a. Marlee was made to sleep in her
underwear on a plastic sheet on the
floor with no bedding in 60 degree
weather as punishment for wetting
b. One night Marlee was strapped three
times during the night for wetting the
bed
c. The children were made to stand in a
corner for long periods and were
lectured about God at mealtime. One
night, after three hours of dissertation
by the father, the dinner was cold and
the children fell asleep without eating
d. After school the children were not
allowed to go outside the home, to visit
friends, or to have friends visit them
e. When Marlee was unable to recall what
she learned in church, she receive a
ISSUE:
W/N the maltreatment is justified by the
religion? NO
HELD:
Sufficiency of Evidence
The court reasoned that the "parental
preference" and the "child's best interests"
standards are usually compatible, but when the
rights of the parents conflict with those of the
child, "`... the legal system should protect the
child's interests. Not only is the child a helpless
party but the parents should suffer the
consequences of their inadequacy rather than
the child. Thus, in any proceeding to remove a
child from the parents, either temporarily or
permanently, the court must balance the
fundamental rights of the parents against the
fundamental rights of the child.
Mistreatment of a child, however, is not
privileged because it is imposed in the guise of
freedom of religious expression. Whether
discipline is excessive or a lifestyle is harmful to
the child must be measured in the light of an
objective standard of reasonableness under all
the circumstances.
Reunification of the Family
Until the father cooperates to counselling
program, reunification of the family will be
detrimental to the family.
Dolot
323 332
Prince v. Massachusetts
321 U.S. 158 ll Jan. 31, 1944 ll Rutledge, J.
KEYWORDS:
Jehovas Witness magazine, child labor
FACTS:
Sarah Prince was the aunt and legal
custodian of 9 year old Betty Simmons. One
night, the kid and Princes legit children insisted
they come with Prince in distributing Jehovahs
Witness literature magazines (Watchtower and
Consolation) on the streets. The children used
to come with her, but she was chastised by the
school attendance officer, Mr. Perkins. She was
then convicted of violating Massachusetts
comprehensive child labor law, which prohibits
any boy under twelve or any girl under eighteen
to sell, expose, or offer to sell any newspapers,
magazines, periodical or any other articles of
merchandise of any description, or exercise the
trade of bootblack or scavenger, or any other
trade, in any street or public place. Specifically
she was found guilty of the complaints:
a. Furnishing her (Betty) with magazines,
knowing she was to sell them unlawfully,
that is, on the street;
b. As Betty's custodian, permitting her to work
contrary to law.
Prince argues that the law violated her
Fourteenth Amendment right to exercise her
religion and her equal protection rights, in
particular because the children themselves
were ministers of their religion as well.
ISSUE:
Does the freedom of religion of the First
Amendment, and the parental rights secured by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibit Massachusetts from
enforcing the child labor law?
HELD:
No. The States authority to prevent child
Enad
324 332
Strunk v. Strunk
445 S.W.2D 145 ll Sep. 26, 1969 ll Osborne, J.
KEYWORDS:
Sibling love, organ transplant, substituted
judgement
FACTS:
Arthur and Ava Strunk had two sons:
Tommy, 28, married, and suffering from a fatal
kidney disease called chronic glomerulus
nephritis; and Jerry, 27, handicapped by a
speech defect, feeble-minded and committed
to a state institution for such individuals.
In order to keep Tommy alive, he had an
artificial kidney and was undergoing treatment,
but this could no longer be sustained. A kidney
transplant would better help him survive.
The Strunks and other relatives were tested
for the compatibility of their blood type or
tissue with that of Tommys, but only Jerrys
was found to be acceptable.
Tommy and Jerrys mother Ava thus
petitioned the county court, praying for the
authority to proceed with the operation.
The county court held that going through
with the organ donation would beneficial to
both the brothers. First, Tommy would have a
new, better-functioning kidney. Second, Jerry
would not have to lose his brother, on whom he
was
emotionally
and
psychologically
dependent.
Upon the appeal of the guardian ad litem,
Morris E. Burton, the Franklin Circuit Final Court
adopted the findings of the country court and
also ruled to allow the transplant.
ISSUE:
Whether a court may permit an organ
transplant from an incompetent ward of the
state at the petition of his mother and
committee.
RATIO:
YES. The Court AFFIRMED the judgment of
the lower courts and PERMITTED THE ORGAN
TRANSPLANT, reasoning that:
A. Through the doctrine of substituted
judgment, the court has jurisdiction on all
matters pertaining to a wards well-being.
The doctrine of substituted judgment is the
right of the court to act in behalf of any person
with a legal disability, not only with regard to
their property, but also in the interest of their
well-being.
This power has been delegated by the
courts to the incompetents committees. The
court stated its belief that such power would
not extend so far as to allow a committee to
subject his ward to serious surgical techniques
[] unless the life of his ward be in jeopardy.
Thus, in this case, it was only in exercise of
this delegated power that Ava Strunk, the
mother and committee of Tommy, sought the
approval of the county court, and only in
exercise of the power conferred by the doctrine
of substituted judgment did the county court
give its permission.
B. The surgery would be for the benefit of
both brothers.
The Department of Mental Health was
amicus curiae. It recommended that the surgery
be permitted not only so that Tommys life may
be saved, but also to prevent Jerry from feeling
any guilt if his brother were to die.
The court also noted that all the members
of the immediate family have recommended
the transplant, in addition to the Dept. of
Mental Health and the county and circuit
courts.
Based on the lower courts findings that the
procedure would be to Jerrys best interest, the
judgment was affirmed.
Espaola
325 332
Conservatorship of Valerie N
40 Cal.3d 143 ll Oct. 21, 1985 ll Grodin, J.
FACTS:
- Valerie N, 29 years old, is inflicted with
Down Syndrome and has an IQ of 30. Living
w/ mother and stepfather
- Mother instituted a court proceeding for
appointment as conservators and also
requested for additional powers to sterilize
Valerie through tubal ligation
- Reason? Valerie was sexually aggressive at
the sight of men. She would kiss, hug and sit
on random men's laps. Though she is not
sexually
active,
she
masturbates
excessively.
- Mother fears when she leaves her daughter
and the harm she may suffer if she does get
pregnant.
- Failed behavior modification. Also rejected
contraceptive pills. Other contraceptive
devices like intrauterine devices would be
harmful.
- Lower court granted conservatorship but
ruled that it had no jurisdiction to order the
sterilization since Subdivision (d) of 2356
prohibits other persons from obtaining
sterilization for a conservatee without the
latter's consent
ISSUE:
1. WON State law is unconstitutional
2. WON Court can grant the parent's request
for Valerie's sterilization
HELD:
1) Yes, said state law is unconstitutional. It
violates the conservatee's privacy and
liberty interests protected by the 14th
Amendment of the US Constitution
- Sterilization is encompassed in the right
2) NO
- Lack of sufficient evidence from parents
about the necessity of sterilization
- They didn't provide proof that Valerie
can become pregnant
- Did not provide proof that besides the
pills, they have tried other less-intrusive
way
of
making
Valerie
take
contraceptives
Court affirms lower court's decision without
prejudice for more factfinding for the parents
and to petition again
Hermosisima
326 332
Johnson v. Calvert
5 Cal.4th 84 ll May 20, 1993 ll Panelli, J.
KEYWORDS:
Surrogate mom
DOCTRINE:
Under California law, she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own is the natural
mother.
PROOF GIVEN:
For the Calverts; Evidence of blood tests
showing that Crispina is genetically related to
the child
FACTS:
Mark and Crispina Calvert are married but
unable to have a child. Anna Johnson offered to
serve as surrogate mother. The two parties
enter into a contract where Anna serves as
surrogate, while the Calverts pay her $10,000 in
installments as well as purchase a life insurance
policy for Johnson. The relationship between
the two sides soured, with Anna demanding the
payment of the balance or else she would
refuse to give up the child. The Calverts
responded with a lawsuit seeking a declaration
that they were the legal parents of the child.
Upon the birth of the child, it was proven
through blood tests that Anna was NOT the
genetic mother of the child. The trial court ruled
that 1) the Calverts were the genetic, biological
and natural parents of the child, 2) Anna had no
parental rights to the child, and 3) the surrogacy
contract was legal and enforceable against
Annas claims, all of which were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1. WON Anna can claim custody of the child
2. WON the surrogate contract violates public
policy
HELD:
1. NO. Because undisputed evidence shows
that Anna gave birth to the child and that
only Crispina is genetically related to such
child, and no clear legislative preference is
given between blood tests and gestation as
means of establishing a mother and child
relationship, then the case can only be
decided by looking at the intent of both
parties as manifested by the surrogacy
agreement. Basing it on such agreement, it
is clear then that the parties aim was to
bring the Calverts child into the world, and
not for them to donate the zygote to Anna.
From the outset, Crispina intended to be
the mother of the child. Annas act of
carrying the child may have been
indispensible for eventually giving birth to
him, but she would not have been able to
do so had she manifested her intent to keep
the child as her own prior to the
implantation of the zygote. Although the
Uniform Parentage Act, which bases parent
and child rights on the existence of a parent
and child relationship, recognizes both
genetic consanguinity and giving birth as
means of establishing a mother and child
relationship, when the two means do not
coincide in one woman, she who intended
to procreate the child is the natural mother
under California law.
2. NO. Gestational surrogacy is completely
different from adoption, and as such,
should not be subject to adoption statutes.
Both parties voluntarily agreed to
participate in in vitro fertilization before the
child was conceived. Moreover, the
financial considerations given to Anna
($10,000 and the purchase of an insurance
policy) were NOT for her giving up her
parental rights over the child but rather for
carrying the child and undergoing labor.
327 332
Macariola
328 332
Macariola
329 332
Marin
330 332
Marin
331 332
Roe v. Doe
29 N.Y. 2D 188 ll Jul. 7, 1971 ll Scileppi, J.
KEYWORDS:
Disobedient daughter
FACTS:
Jane Roe was the guardian of a 20 year-old
student on the University of Louisville
(Kentucky) who was supported until 1970 by
her wealthy father (John Doe) who was an
attorney in New York. She was instructed to
take up residence in her college dormitory but,
in defiance of her father's orders, she bunked
with one of her female classmates. Upon
learning of this, Doe instructed her to return to
New York. Instead of obeying him, she decided
to finish her academic year, paying for tuition
and other expenses by selling her car. She then
moved back to NY, but lived in the home of a
friend. She now instituted the present action
wherein she claimed that her father should
furnish support from the time he stopped
sending her money until the time she returned
to NY.
Family court ruled in favor of Roe, ordering
Doe to pay for the support of his daughter, he
willfully disobeyed the order and was thus
sentenced to be committed to jail for 30 days.
The commitment was stayed on appeal, which
Nuez
332 332