98 F.

3d 1336

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit Local Rule 36(c) states that citation

of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing
res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires
service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth
Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
David Milton CREWS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 95-5457.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 20, 1996.
Decided Oct. 3, 1996.

William E. Martin, Federal Public Defender, William S. Trivette,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant.
Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Paul A. Weinman, Assistant
United States Attorney, Gill P. Beck, Assistant United States Attorney,
Lynne P. Klauer, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:

David Milton Crews appeals his convictions for a conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 846 (1994), the related
distribution charges, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A) (1994), and money
laundering charges. 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) & (a)(1)(B)(i) (1994).
Crews's only argument on appeal is that his conviction was barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution because it followed on the heels of

four separate forfeiture proceedings under 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(A) (1994) and

21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6) (1994). Because Crews's argument is without merit, we
affirm the convictions.
2

The Supreme Court recently resolved the uncertainty regarding the effect of the
Double Jeopardy Clause on civil forfeitures in United States v. Ursery, --- U.S.
----, 64 U.S.L.W. 4565 (U.S. June 24, 1996) (Nos.95-345, 95-346). That
decision affirmed the Court's adherence to the two-part test refined in United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984). Under this
test, a court must first determine whether Congress intended for proceedings
under the relevant forfeiture statute to be criminal or civil. If the intent was to
create a civil proceeding, then a presumption arises that the forfeiture does not
implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ursery, --- U.S. at ----, 64 U.S.L.W. at
4571-72 & n. 3. Under the second step of the test, the presumption may be
rebutted where the "clearest proof" demonstrates that the forfeiture is so
punitive in nature that the proceedings may not be fairly viewed as civil
notwithstanding Congress' intent. Id.

Applying this test, the Supreme Court first found by the statutory language that
Congress intended for forfeitures conducted under 18 U.S.C. 981 and 21
U.S.C. 881 to be civil, not criminal, sanctions. Id. at 4571. The Court then
asked whether the statutes were so punitive as to negate Congress' intent. This
inquiry focused on the nonpunitive goals served by these sections, explaining
that 881(a)(7) encouraged property owners to exercise greater care in the
management of their property, made crime unprofitable, and could even be said
to abate nuisances. Id. at 4572. Likewise, the Court found 881(a)(6) and
981(a)(1)(A) serve similar interests with the additional nonpunitive goal of
ensuring that individuals reap no benefit from their criminal activity. In light of
these goals, the Court determined that "there is little evidence, much less the
'clearest proof' ... suggesting that forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C.
881(a)(6) and (a)(7) and 19[sic] U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(A), are so punitive in form
and effect as to render them criminal." Id. at 4572 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Court found, categorically, that forfeitures under 881(a)(6)
and (7) and 981(a)(1)(A) are "neither 'punishment' nor criminal for purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id.

The Supreme Court's holding completely forecloses Crews's argument. The

Government conducted the forfeiture of Crews's property under the same
statutes expressedly considered by the Court in Ursery. Crews suffered no
punishment in a constitutional sense as a result of the forfeitures. His
subsequent conviction did not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Accordingly, we affirm his convictions.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED