UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-4434

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BRYANT WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-04-518)

Submitted:

November 23, 2005

Decided:

December 19, 2005

Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kenneth W. Ravenell, Matthew A.S. Esworthy, SCHULMAN, TREEM,

KAMINKOW, GILDEN & RAVENELL, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Philip S.
Jackson, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:
Bryant Williams entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841 (2000).

He reserved his

right to challenge the district courts ruling on his motion to

suppress.

After the district court sentenced him to 120 months

imprisonment, Williams noted his appeal.

In determining the propriety of a district courts denial
of a motion to suppress, this court reviews the district courts
findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
Ornelas

v.

United

States,

517

U.S.

690,

699

(1996);

United

States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992).

At the hearing on Williams motion to suppress, the
Government

and

Williams

stipulated

to

these

facts.

While

conducting surveillance at an apartment complex in regard to

suspected

narcotics

trafficking

activities,

Detective

Peter

Sullivan observed Williams enter the apartment building shortly

after midnight.

Some time later, he observed an unknown female,

later identified as Tyra Tucker, arrive and enter the apartment

building.

Approximately ten minutes later, Williams and Tucker

exited the building together and approached Tuckers vehicle.

Williams was carrying a brown shoulder bag.

Tucker opened the

trunk of her vehicle and Williams placed the bag in the trunk.
Williams

then

got

into

his

vehicle
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and

drove

away

from

the

apartment complex. Tucker, in her vehicle, followed closely behind

Williams.

The police officers then initiated a stop of both

vehicles.

The officers obtained from Tucker her consent to search

her vehicle, and they recovered the bag from her trunk.

Inside the

bag, officers discovered ten kilograms of cocaine.

Williams

asserted

that

he

had--and

at

all

times

maintained--an ownership and possessory interest in the bag and its

contents.

He stated that, when he and Tucker left the apartment

complex, he had instructed Tucker to follow him and stay in close

contact with him [so that] he could keep an eye on her and the bag
at all times.

Williams contends that he intended to retrieve the

bag from Tucker once they reached their destination. Williams also
asserted that Tucker did not know the contents of the bag.
Following the presentation of this evidence and argument
on the issue, the district court denied the motion to suppress,
finding that Williams lacked standing to contest the consent
search.

Williams appeals, arguing that the district court failed

to recognize his supervisory role over the transportation of the

bag and thus his expectation of privacy in the bag.
To succeed on a Fourth Amendment claim, an individual
must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched
or the item seized.
(1980).

See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106

A passenger in an automobile normally has no legitimate

expectation of privacy in an automobile in which he asserts neither

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a property nor a possessory interest.

See Rakas v. Illinois, 439

U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 874
(4th Cir. 1992).

Here, Williams was never a passenger in the

vehicle being searched. Thus, he could not have had an expectation

of privacy in the area being searched.

See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at

106; United States v. Washburn, 383 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2004)
(finding defendant, who was not present during the search, lacked
standing to challenge search of luggage he placed in a vehicle for
delivery to another location), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1746
(2005); see also United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that unauthorized driver of rental car had no
expectation of privacy in the car or any container found in the
car, and denying standing to challenge search of luggage found in
trunk of car).
Williams

asserts,

however,

that

he

retained

an

expectation of privacy in the bag, which he placed in the trunk of

Tuckers car.

In Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991), the

Supreme Court held that a general consent to search an automobile

authorized a search of any container within the vehicle that could
contain contraband.

The Court held that it was objectively

reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to

search respondents car [for narcotics] included consent to search
containers within the car that might bear drugs.

Id.; see United

States v. Gant, 112 F.3d 239, 243 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that

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general consent [to a search] permits the opening of closed but

unlocked containers found in the place as to which consent was
given. (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, 8.1(c) &
n.75 (1986))); United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 977-78 (1st
Cir. 1994) (Because the duffel bags were lying in the trunk,
appellants

general

consent

to

search

of

the

automobile

constituted consent to a search of the duffel bags.).

Based on the above-cited authority, Tuckers consent to
the search of her vehicle included consent to search the unlocked
bag in the trunk of her vehicle. Williams claim of a supervisory
role over the transportation of the bag and its contents is
insufficient to afford him standing to challenge the search of a
vehicle belonging to another and the contents of that vehicle. See
United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 82 (1993); United States v.
Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 930-31 (4th Cir. 1995) (No expectation of
privacy is created simply because one has a supervisory role in
the conspiracy or joint control over the place or property involved
in the search or seizure. (quoting Padilla, 508 U.S. at 82)).
Because Williams did not have an ownership interest in
the vehicle searched, and because his co-conspirator/supervisor
argument has been rejected by the Supreme Court, we find no error
by the district court in determining that he lacked standing to
challenge the search of Tuckers vehicle, including the bag in the
vehicle.

We therefore affirm the district courts order denying

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Williams

motion

to

suppress

and

affirm

his

conviction.

We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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