UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-4000

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MALIK MONTREASE MOORE,
Defendant - Appellant.

______________
No. 07-5031
______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MALIK MONTREASE MOORE,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville.
Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:05-cr-00235-RLV-DCK-3)

Submitted:

November 25, 2008

Decided:

December 31, 2008

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Andrew B. Banzhoff, DEVEREUX & BANZHOFF, P.L.L.C., Asheville,

North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United
States Attorney, Adam Morris, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
Following

jury

trial,

Malik

Montrease

Moore

was

convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute

at

least

fifty

grams

or

more

of

mixture

or

substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 (2006), for a drug distribution
conspiracy existing between 1987 and 2005 in Caldwell County,
North Carolina.

Because Moore had two prior felony convictions,

the district court sentenced him to the enhanced sentence of

life in prison.

Moore timely appealed.

On appeal, Moore argues that the district court: (1)

erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because
the Government failed to sufficiently prove that he conspired to
distribute

cocaine

base;

(2)

engaged

in

improper

judicial

factfinding, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights; and (3)

erred

in

using

prior

convictions

to

enhance

his

sentence.

Finding no error, we affirm.

We review de novo a district courts denial of a Fed.
R. Crim. P. 29 judgment of acquittal.
430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005).

United States v. Alerre,

In conducting such a review,

we are obligated to sustain a guilty verdict if, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
verdict

is

supported

by

substantial

evidence.

United

States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
3

(citing

Glasser

v.

United

States,

315

U.S.

60,

80

(1942)).

Whether there is a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies,

and

whether

there

was

an

agreement

to

participate

in

the

conspiracy, are questions of fact for the jury, and we must

affirm its finding unless the evidence, taken in the light most
favorable to the government, would not allow a reasonable jury
so to find.

United States v. Harris, 39 F.3d 1262, 1267 (4th

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see

Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80.
evidence,

this

court

does

In evaluating the sufficiency of the

not

review

the

credibility

of

the

witnesses and assumes that the jury resolved all contradictions

in the testimony in favor of the Government.
Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 563 (4th Cir. 2008).
testimony

of

one

witness

or

accomplice

may

United States v.
The uncorroborated
be

sufficient

to

sustain a conviction.

United States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185,

1190 (4th Cir. 1997).

This court can reverse a conviction on

insufficiency

grounds

only

when

the

prosecutions

failure

is

United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir.

clear.

2006) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To
government

prove

must

prove

conspiracy
(1)

an

under

21

agreement

U.S.C.

between

846,

two

or

the
more

persons to engage in conduct that violates a federal drug law,

(2) the defendants knowledge of the conspiracy, and (3) the
defendants

knowing

and

voluntary
4

participation

in

the

conspiracy.

United States v. Strickland, 245 F.3d 368, 384-85

(4th Cir. 2001); see Burgos, 94 F.3d at 857.

convicted

of

conspiracy

without

knowing

A defendant may be

all

the

conspiracys

details, its full scope, or all of its members, and without

taking part in all of its activities over its entire existence.
United States v. Nunez, 432 F.3d 573, 578 (4th Cir. 2005).

He

need only enter the conspiracy understanding its unlawful nature

and

willfully

join

in

the

plan

on

at

least

one

occasion.

Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858; see United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d

1044, 1054 (4th Cir. 1993).

The existence of an unspoken or

mutual understanding between conspirators is adequate evidence

of a conspiratorial agreement.

United States v. Cardwell, 433

F.3d 378, 390 (4th Cir. 2005).

There is often little direct

evidence of the conspirators agreement.

857.

Burgos, 94 F.3d at

The government need not prove a conspiracys identifiable

organizational structure.
A single conspiracy exists where there is one overall
agreement or one general business venture.
578

(internal

quotation

marks

and

Nunez, 432 F.3d at

citation

omitted).

The

existence of a single conspiracy depends upon the overlap of

main actors, methods, and goals.
sufficient

to

establish

Id.

single

[T]rial evidence is
conspiracy

where

the

conspirators are shown to share the same objectives, the same

methods, the same geographic spread, and the same results.

See

United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 218 (4th Cir. 2006).
Here, Moore and his coconspirators were shown to have
shared

the

same

objectives

and

methods:

cocaine in Caldwell County for profit.

distributing

crack

Witnesses explained that

Moore regularly purchased a vast quantity of drugs to supply to

numerous

individuals

for

resale.

buyer-seller transactions.
with

Moore,

pleaded

These

were

not

isolated,

Howell and Edmisten, coconspirators

guilty

and

then

testified

involvement with Moore to distribute cocaine.

about

their

Other witnesses

testified as to specific details of Moores involvement in drug

distribution:
cocaine

and

they
to

knew

whom

he

from
sold

whom
it.

Moore

obtained

Moore

also

his

sold

crack

drugs

to

confidential informants working directly for police on more than

one

occasion.

The

totality

of

the

evidence

revealed

large

quantities of crack cocaine regularly being purchased and sold

among the same individuals, indicating the existence of a casual
but common plan.

Based upon the evidence, the jury was entitled

to conclude that the actions of Moore and his conspirators in

the

distribution

of

drugs

amounted

to

single

conspiracy.

Therefore, the court properly denied Moores motion for judgment

of acquittal.
Next, Moore argues that the district court violated
his

Sixth

Amendment

rights

when
6

it

engaged

in

impermissible

fact-finding and used prior convictions to enhance his sentence.

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998),
the

Supreme

Court

held

that,

when

seeking

sentencing

enhancement based on a prior conviction, the Government need

not allege a defendants prior conviction in the indictment or
information that alleges the elements of an underlying crime.
The Court reaffirmed this holding when it held that, [o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
New

Jersey,

530

U.S.

466,

490

(2000)

(emphasis

Apprendi

v.

added).

Moore concedes that we observed after Apprendi that

the fact of a prior conviction remains a valid enhancement even

when not found by the jury, United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d
278, 282 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), but
argues that the overruling of Almendarez-Torres is imminent, and
that

using

prior

convictions

to

enhance

sentence

is

constitutionally infirm.
Despite
remains

Moores

authoritative,

validity after Apprendi.

policy

and

we

arguments,

have

Almendarez-Torres

reaffirmed

its

continuing

See Thompson, 421 F.3d at 282; United

States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, 351-54 (4th Cir. 2005).

argument lacks merit.

Moores

Moore also argues that the two prior convictions used

to

enhance

his

sentence

were

not

prior

to

the

instant

conspiracy conviction as they were merely separate convictions

arising out of the same transaction, citing United States v.
Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 145-46 (4th Cir. 1990).

Moore contends

that because the drug conspiracy as alleged in the indictment

began in 1987 and continued through 2005, his convictions on
August 1, 2000, for the sale and delivery of cocaine, and on
April 14, 2003, for the sale of cocaine, arose out of the same
criminal

enterprise

and

could

not

be

used

to

enhance

his

sentence.
Moores
concluded

that

argument

[w]hen

is

misplaced.

defendant

is

We

have

convicted

squarely

of

drug

conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. 846, prior drug felony convictions

that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance a
defendants

sentence

if

the

conspiracy

continued

after

his

United States v. Smith, 451

earlier convictions were final.

F.3d 209, 224-25 (4th Cir. 2006); see 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)

(outlining
final

penalties

prior

sentence).

felony

for

846

violations

convictions

may

be

and

stating

used

to

that

enhance

Because the conspiracy for which Moore was convicted

continued well beyond his 2000 and 2003 convictions for the sale
of

cocaine,

we

conclude

these

two

convictions

were

properly

considered

prior

convictions

for

sentencing

enhancement

purposes.
Accordingly,
sentence.
legal
before

affirm

Moores

conviction

and

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

contentions
the

we

court

are

adequately

and

argument

presented

would

not

in
aid

the
the

materials
decisional

process.
AFFIRMED