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3d 127
3 A.D. Cases 1025, 6 A.D.D. 1012, 5
NDLR P 327
Stephen D. McCullough brought this suit against Branch Banking and Trust
Company (BB & T), claiming that he was terminated because of his handicap
as a recovering alcoholic, in violation of Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 794 (West 1985 & Supp.1994). BB & T filed a motion
to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) based on the statute of limitations, and
to strike the requests for punitive and compensatory damages. The district court
denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the action was not barred by the
statute of limitations, but granted BB & T's motion to strike the requests for
compensatory and punitive damages. BB & T next moved for summary
judgment, arguing that it did not receive federal funds for the purposes of the
Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted BB & T's motion for summary
judgment on that ground, 844 F.Supp. 258.1
2
McCullough began working with BB & T in 1986, after he was fired from his
previous employer, First Union Bank. That termination followed an automobile
accident in which McCullough was convicted of hit and run with injury and
driving under the influence of alcohol, and was sentenced to two years in jail.
II.
7
The Rehabilitation Act, like many civil rights statutes, does not contain a
specific limitations period. In such situations, Congress has directed the courts
to select the most appropriate state statute of limitations to apply to the federal
cause of action. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1988(a) (West Supp.1994). "When Congress
has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled
practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not
inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). This process
involves a two part analysis. In choosing the applicable statute, the court
should first select the state statute "most analogous" to the federal claim. Id. at
268, 105 S.Ct. at 1942. See also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656,
660, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 2620, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987). The court should then
consider whether application of that limitations period is consistent with the
federal statute and its underlying policies. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266-68, 105
S.Ct. at 1941-43.
This court, however, recently held that state personal injury statutes are not
always the most analogous to Rehabilitation Act cases. In Wolsky, 1 F.3d at
224, we held that when a state has enacted a counterpart to the Rehabilitation
Act, the statute of limitations of the state counterpart and not the personal injury
statute was most analogous and therefore, the most appropriate limitations
period. Wolsky involved a Rehabilitation Act claim arising in Virginia.
Virginia has its own act protecting disabled individuals, the Virginia Rights of
Persons with Disabilities Act, Va.Code Ann. Secs. 51.5-40 to -46 (1991 &
Supp.1994) (the Virginia Act). Because the Virginia Act was enacted with the
same legislative purpose as the Rehabilitation Act, namely the protection
against and redress for employment discrimination based on a person's
handicap or disability, and reflected that purpose by tracking the language of
the Rehabilitation Act and providing for similar protections, we determined that
the Virginia Act was the most analogous statute, and applied its one-year
statute of limitations. See Wolsky at 224. In Wolsky, we expressly declined to
follow the decisions of other courts that had applied the personal injury statute
of limitations to Rehabilitation Act cases, finding those cases distinguishable in
that either no state counterpart to the Rehabilitation Act existed, or the state
counterpart lacked a statute of limitations. Id. at 224-25.
10
Here, like Virginia, North Carolina has an act which protects disabled
individuals from discrimination. The North Carolina Act was enacted with the
purpose
11 encourage and enable all handicapped people to participate fully to the maximum
to
extent of their abilities in the social and economic life of the State, to engage in
remunerative employment, to use available public accommodations and public
services, and to otherwise pursue their rights and privileges as inhabitants of this
State.
12
N.C. Gen.Stat. Sec. 168A-2. Similar to the Rehabilitation Act and the Virginia
Act, the North Carolina Act specifically addresses employment discrimination
on the basis of handicap or disability. N.C. Gen.Stat. Sec. 168A-5. The North
Carolina Act also prohibits such discrimination in public accommodations,
service, and transportation. N.C. Gen.Stat. Sec. 168A-6 to -8. Although the
language of the North Carolina Act does not correspond to the Rehabilitation
Act as precisely as the language of the Virginia Act, the North Carolina Act
provides similar protections to disabled individuals.
13
14 court shall have jurisdiction over an action filed under this Chapter where the
No
plaintiff has commenced federal judicial or administrative proceedings under Section
503 or Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Secs.
16
17
The federal policies behind the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are similar,
since both statutes were enacted, at least in part, to help disabled persons find
and maintain employment. Compare 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 701(b)(2) (West
Supp.1994) (one of the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act is "to ensure that the
Federal Government plays a leadership role in promoting the employment of
individuals with disabilities ... and in assisting States and providers of services
in fulfilling the aspirations of such individuals with disabilities for meaningful
and gainful employment") with 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 12101(b)(1) (West
Supp.1994) (an objective of the ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities"). We consider it unlikely that Congress, while enacting a 180-day
time-bar for an ADA claim, would not approve of the same limitations period
under the Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, we hold that application of the 180day statute of limitations is not inconsistent with the federal policies behind the
Rehabilitation Act.
18
19
McCullough cites the following distinctions between the North Carolina Act
and the Virginia Act applied in Wolsky: 1) the North Carolina Act only
provides for a bench trial, while the Virginia Act and the Rehabilitation Act
allow jury trials; 2) the North Carolina Act only allows awards of injunctive
relief and back pay, but the Virginia and Rehabilitation Acts provide for full
compensatory and punitive damages; 3) the North Carolina Act, unlike the
Virginia and Rehabilitation Acts, does not extend or base its coverage upon
receipt of any state assistance; 4) the North Carolina Act requires the disabled
person to apprise the employer, employment agency, labor organization, or
place of public accommodation of his or her handicapping condition, make
suggestions for possible accommodations, and cooperate in any evaluations of
possible accommodations, which is not specifically required by the Virginia
and the Rehabilitation Acts; and 5) the North Carolina Act, unlike the Virginia
Act, does not specifically require that the scope of the Act's protection be
defined in a way that is consistent with the regulations imposed under the
Rehabilitation Act.
20
This argument, however, begs the question of which North Carolina statute is
most analogous to the Rehabilitation Act. The differences between the North
Carolina Act and the Rehabilitation Act identified by McCullough do not, by
themselves, magically tip the balance of similarities so as to make the general
wrongful discharge provision more analogous to the Rehabilitation Act than the
specific provisions of the North Carolina Act. It simply means that, in North
Carolina, there is no perfect counterpart to the Rehabilitation Act, and we must
determine which statute is more appropriate. To make this determination, we
must look at both statutes in their entirety to ascertain which North Carolina law
is most similar to the cause of action provided under the Rehabilitation Act. For
example, in Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272-75, 105 S.Ct. at 1945-46, the Court
considered the underlying causes of action created by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983
(1988) and determined that, because such a broad variety of claims could be
asserted under Sec. 1983, it was more analogous to a general cause of action.
Since all Sec. 1983 actions involve alleged injuries to the personal civil rights
of the claimants, the Court concluded that the cause of action can best be
characterized as one for personal injury. Id. at 277-78, 105 S.Ct. at 1948. In
Wolsky, 1 F.3d at 223, we reasoned that the Rehabilitation Act was not a
general provision such as Sec. 1983, but a more specifically tailored statute
intended to redress discrimination against a defined class of individuals. We
therefore concluded that the underlying cause of action of the Rehabilitation
Act was more similar to the specific provisions of the Virginia Act, which also
redressed discrimination against disabled individuals, than it was to the general
personal injury provisions under Virginia law. Id. at 224. We also held in
Wolsky that, although there were differences between the Virginia and the
Rehabilitation Acts, "the distinctions between the two statutes [were] not
significant enough to decline applying the statute of limitations as set forth in
the Virginia Act." Id. at 225.
21
Here, both the North Carolina Act and the Rehabilitation Act redress
discrimination against the same very specific group of persons. In contrast, the
general wrongful discharge statute protects against a wide range of
discrimination which, although including persons with disabilities, also
encompasses many other classes of individuals. N.C. Gen.Stat. Sec. 143-422.2.
Based on our decision in Wolsky, we conclude that, because the Rehabilitation
Act is a specific statute directed at protecting one class of persons, the specific
North Carolina Act is more analogous to McCullough's claim than a general
wrongful discharge statute. "It is a basic principle of statutory construction that
when two statutes are in conflict, a specific statute closely applicable to the
substance of the controversy at hand controls over a more generalized
provision." Farmer v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 4 F.3d 1274, 1284 (4th
Cir.1993).2 Accordingly, we reject McCullough's argument.
III.
22
For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the North Carolina Act is the
most analogous statute, and its 180-day limitations period should have been
applied to McCullough's claim. Because McCullough filed his complaint more
than a year after his termination, his lawsuit should have been dismissed as
untimely. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of McCullough's
claim on this alternate ground.
23
AFFIRMED.
In the opinion granting BB & T's motion for summary judgment, the district
court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over McCullough's
state law claims, and dismissed those claims without prejudice. See 28
U.S.C.A. Sec. 1367 (West 1993). McCullough has not appealed that decision