544 F.

2d 746

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.
Paul R. GREEN, Appellant.
No. 76-1445.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fourth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 7, 1976.
Decided Nov. 17, 1976.

William B. Cummings, U.S. Atty., Alexandria, Va., N. George Metcalf,

Asst. U.S. Atty., and Richard Cullen, Richmond, Va., on brief for
appellee.
Harold M. Marsh, Richmond, Va. (Hill, Tucker & Marsh, Richmond, Va.,
on brief), for appellant.
Before BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and
RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

The sole issue on appeal raised by Paul R. Green, who was convicted of
making a false statement in connection with the acquisition of some firearms in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), is whether the government must prove that
he knew that the dealer from whom he purchased the weapons was federally
licensed. We affirm the conviction, because knowledge that the dealer has a
federal license is not an essential element of the crime. The fact that the dealer
was licensed serves only to establish a basis for federal jurisdiction.

Section 922(a)(6) provides that it shall be unlawful:

3 any person in connection with the acquisition . . . of any firearm . . . from a . . .

"for
licensed dealer . . . knowingly to make any false or fictitious . . . written statement . .
. intended or likely to deceive such . . . dealer . . . with respect to any fact material to
the lawfulness of the sale . . . of such firearm . . . under the provisions of this

chapter."
4

Section 922(d)(1) prohibits a licensed dealer from selling a firearm to any

person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the purchaser has
been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year, and 922(h)(1) makes it unlawful for such a person to receive any
firearm that has been shipped in interstate commerce. Section 923 requires
every dealer in firearms to obtain a federal license and keep records of his sales.

The government proved that the dealer from whom Green purchased firearms
was federally licensed, and that Green had executed a "firearm transaction
record" in which he falsely answered "no" to a question that asked whether he
had ever been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a
year. The government did not introduce direct evidence to show that Green
knew that the dealer was federally licensed.

The pertinent legislative history of 922(a)(6) is summarized in Huddleston v.

United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824-829, 94 S.Ct. 1262, 39 L.Ed.2d 782 (1974).
Congress, concerned that firearms could be acquired easily for criminal
purposes, acted to restrict public access to certain weapons. It selected the
dealer in firearms as the principal agent of federal enforcement. Section 922(a)
(6) was enacted to provide information about the dealer's transactions and to
curb crime by preventing criminals from purchasing weapons.

It is apparent that the statute's reference to a licensed dealer supplies a

jurisdictional base for enforcement of the federal system of gun control. This,
however, does not resolve the case, for as United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671,
676-77 n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) explains, the critical
question is whether the role of the licensed dealer in the transaction is
"jurisdictional only." If it is jurisdictional only, a defendant's lack of knowledge
of the dealer's license is immaterial, because it is not an essential element of the
offense. United States v. Feola, supra.

Feola also teaches that whether a fact is jurisdictional only must be ascertained
from the intent of Congress. The text of 922(a)(6) discloses the congressional
intent. The statute prescribes that the government must prove that the accused
knowingly made a false statement. Significantly, the Act does not require the
prosecution to prove that the accused acquired the firearm from a dealer whom
he knew to be licensed. The express requirement of knowledge with respect to
one aspect of the transaction, contrasted with the absence of a similar
requirement with respect to the dealer's license, is, we believe, a fair indication

that Congress did not intend knowledge about the license to be an essential
element of the crime. The gravamen of the offense is the making of a false
statement to acquire a firearm. The accused's lack of knowledge about the
dealer's license does not detract from his culpability.
9

The judgment is affirmed.