ELECTION

ANSWERS
Q

LAWS

QUESTIONS

AND

Rev. Nardo B. Cayat filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet for the

May 2004 elections. Thomas Palileng, another candidate for Mayor filed a petition to annul/nullify his
certificate of candidacy and/or to disqualify on the ground that Cayat has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Twenty three days before the election, Cayats disqualification became final
and executory. He, however won and was proclaimed and assumed office. Palileng filed an electoral
protest contending that Cayat was ineligible to run for mayor. The Vice-Mayor intervened and
contended that he should succeed Cayat in case he is disqualified because Palileng was only a
second placer, hence, he cannot be declared as the winner. Is the contention of the Vice-Mayor
correct? Why?
ANS: No, because there was no second placer, hence, Palileng should be proclaimed as the winner
on the following grounds:
First, the COMELECs Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayats certificate of candidacy due to
disqualification became final and executory on 17 April 2004 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed
filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004
elections. Twenty-three days before the election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final
judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a
second placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine
on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the
present case because Palileng is not a second-placer but the only placer. Consequently, Palilengs
proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.
Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the
present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending
on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias,
Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final only after the

elections. (Cayat v. COMELEC, April 27, 2007).

It was contended that the doctrine of rejection of the second placer laid down in Labo v.

COMELEC should apply. Is the contention correct? Why?

ANS: No. Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the second
placer, does not apply because in Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the
elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other
cases because the judgment declaring the candidates disqualification in Labo and the other cases
had not become final before the elections. Labo and other cases applying the doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition the disqualification of the
candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the
present case. (Cayat v. COMELEC).
Reason in Labo.
In Labo, Labos disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992
elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the case of Cayat he was
disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 lections. On election day, Cayat was
no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayats candidacy for Mayor was legally nonexistent in the 10 May 2004 elections.
Q

What is the effect if a candidate is disqualified by final judgment? Explain.

ANS: The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of
law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number
of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the

evidence of his guilt is strong.

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the
disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence
of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the
situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the
first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be
voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became
final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8, 164 votes cast in
Cayats favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palilengs
proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none. (Cayat v.
COMELEC).

Why is the proclamation of Cayat void? Explain.

ANS: Cayats proclamation is void because the decision disqualifying him had already become final
on 17 April 2004. There is no longer any need to ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by
the voters of his disqualification when they casted their votes on election day because the law
mandates that Cayats votes shall not be counted. There is no disenfranchisement of the voters.
Rather, the voters are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus their
votes are stray and shall not be counted. (Cayat. v. COMELEC).
Q

Is the intervention of the Vice-Mayor proper? Why?

ANS: No. The petition-in-intervention should be rejected because the doctrine on the rejection of
the second placer does not apply to this case. The doctrine applies only if the winning candidates
disqualification has not yet become final and executory before the election. In this case, the
disqualification was final and executory before the election, hence, there was no second placer.
(Cayat v. COMELEC).

Three-term limit; even if as caretaker.

Q

Mayor Marino Morales ran for a fourth term despite having served for three (3) consecutive

terms as Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga. In answer to a petition to cancel his certificate of

candidacy, he alleged that while he served his second term, he did it as a caretaker of the office or
as a de facto officer because he was suspended by the Ombudsman from January 16, 1999 to July
15, 1999 and that his proclamation was declared void and which became final and executory on
August 6, 2001. The COMELEC declared him disqualified. Before the Supreme Court, he contended
that his second term from July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2001 may not be counted since his proclamation
was void. Is the contention correct? Why?
ANS: No, because his service from July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2001 was for a full term, hence, the
three-term limit rule applies to him. This is especially so that he assumed office. He served as mayor
up to June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the decision in the electoral
protest case ousting him as mayor. As held in Ong v. Alegre, G.R. Nos. 162395 and 163354,
January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 473, such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving
the full term. In Ong, he served the full term even as there was a declaration of failure of election.

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution provides that the terms of the office of elected local officials x
x x, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. x x x
Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code) clearly provides that no local official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position.
Morales has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995, hence, he
is disqualified. (Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167591 and Dee v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 170577, May 6, 2007).
Q

Explain the reason for the maximum term limit.

ANS: The framers of the Constitution wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive
accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms.

As held in Latasa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601, the threeterm limit is an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction
as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. (Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
167591 and companion case, May 9, 2007).

Is not the case of Morales similar to the case of Lonzanida v COMELEC? Explain.

ANS: No. In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, while he assumed office, he voluntarily vacated when there
was a declaration of failure of election. He did not fully serve the term, hence, he was qualified to run
for a third term.
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in
Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty elections was declared a nullity for the stated reason of failure
of election, and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was
nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of the mayor. For another, Lonzanida did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a
result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. But more
importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis service
respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in
question; he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
Instead, Ong v. Alegre applies to Morales. Francis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of the
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms. But his proclamation as mayor
in the May 1998 election was declared void. As ruled, his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the
full term. Clearly, the three-term limit rule applies to him. There is no reason why this ruling should
not also apply to Morales who is similarly situated. (Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., May 9,

2007).

Morales cited Borja v. COMELEC to apply to him. Is this case applicable? Why?

ANS: No, because with the death of Mayor Cruz, Capco assumed office as mayor by virtue of the
principle of succession, he being the vice-mayor. He was not therefore, elected even if he served the
rest of the term of the mayor, hence, his assumption of the office of the mayor upon the death of the
incumbent mayor may not be regarded as a term.
Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 90, it was held
that assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the remaining term is not the term
contemplated under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. 7160 (the
Local Government Code). There was a break in the service of the mayor. He was a private citizen
for a time before running for mayor in the recall elections. (Rivera III, e al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 167591, May 9, 2007).

Q What is the effect if the certificate of candidacy of a candidate is cancelled? Explain.

ANS: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. (Secs. 6 and 7, RA 6646).
Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for
an office for which he did not present himself shall be considered as a stray vote but it shall not
invalidate the whole ballot. (Sec. 211, Omnibus Election Code).
Morales cannot be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being a candidate, the
votes cast for him should not be counted and must be considered stray votes. (Rivera III, et al. v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007).

It was contended that since Morales was disqualified, the second placer should be

proclaimed as the winner. Is the contention correct? Why?

ANS: In Labo v. COMELEC, the Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be
proclaimed as a substitute winner.
The rule is that, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
As a consequence of ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This
should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code.
(Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007 citing Labo v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 105111, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297).

What are the requirements which must concur for the three-term limit to apply?

ANS: For the three-term limit to apply, the following two conditions must concur:
1)

that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local

government post; and

2)

that he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No.

133495, September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157; Ong v. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473; Adormeo v. COMELEC,
376 SCRA 90; Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007).

Effect if there is a tie.

Q

What is the proper procedure to be resorted to in case of a tie? Explain.

ANS: To resolve the tie, there shall be drawing of lots. Whenever it shall appear from the canvass
that two or more candidates have received an equal and highest number of votes, or in cases where
two or more candidates are to be elected for the same position and two or more candidates received
the same number of votes for the last place in the number to be elected, the board of canvassers,

after recording this fact in its minutes, shall by resolution, upon five days notice to all the tied
candidates, hold a special public meeting at which the board of canvassers shall proceed to the
drawing of lots of the candidates who have tied and shall proclaim as elected the candidates who
may favored by luck, and the candidates so proclaimed shall have the right to assume office in the
same manner as if he had been elected by plurality of votes. The board of canvassers shall forthwith
make a certificate stating the name of the candidate who had been favored by luck and his
proclamation on the basis thereof.

Nothing in this section shall be construed as depriving a candidate of his right to contest the election.
(Sec. 240, BP 881; Tugade v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 171063, March 2, 2007).

Withdrawal of certificate of candidacy.

Q

Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy but withdrew the same. He was substituted by

Joy Luna but the COMELEC denied due course to her certificate on the ground that Hans being
under age, he could not have filed a valid certificate of candidacy. There was, however, no petition to
deny Hans certificate of candidacy. Did the COMELEC act correctly? Why?
ANS: No. The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a
valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may
not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
filed in due form. (Cipriano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004, 436 SCRA 45). In
Sanchez v. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for
non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.
If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of
candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code.

In this case, there was no petition to deny due court to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans
Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and,
thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Lunas certificate of
candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Rogers
certificate of candidacy and declared the substitution of Luna invalid. (Luna v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 165983, April 24, 2007).

Pre-proclamation controversy; extent of power of COMELEC.

Q

What is the extent of the power of the COMELEC in pre-proclamation controversy? Explain.

ANS: It is a well-established rule in pre-proclamation cases that the Board of Canvassers is without
jurisdiction to go beyond what appears on the face of the election return. The rationale is that a full
reception of evidence aliunde and the meticulous examination of voluminous election documents
would run counter to the summary nature of a pre-proclamation controversy. However, this rule is not
without any exception. In Lee v. Commission on Elections, it was held that if there is a prima facie
showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the questioned election
return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there is
basis for the exclusion of the questioned returns. (G.R. No. 157004, July 4, 2003, 405 SCRA 303;
Ewoc, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 171882, April 3, 2007).
Handwritings have only one general appearance.
Q

May the COMELEC invalidate certain ballots merely on a finding that the writings have the

same general appearance and pictorial effect? Explain.

ANS: No. General resemblance is not enough to warrant the conclusion that two writings are by the
same hand. (Silverio v. Clamor, 125 Phil. 917 (1967)).

In order to reach the conclusion that two writings are by the same hand there must not only be
present class characteristics but also individual characteristics or dents and scratches in sufficient
quantity to exclude the theory of accidental coincidence; to reach the conclusion that writings are by
different hands we may find numerous likeness in class characteristics but divergences in individual
characteristics, or we may find divergences in both, but the divergence must be something more than
mere superficial differences. (Osborns Questioned Documents, p. 244; Delos Reyes v. COMELEC,
et al., G.R. No. 170070, February 28, 2007).

Neighborhood rule.
The votes contested in this appeal are all misplaced votes, i.e., votes cast for a candidate for the
wrong or inexistent office. In appreciating such votes, the COMELEC may applied the neighborhood
rule. As used by the Court, this nomenclature, loosely based on a rule of the same name devised by
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in Nograles v. Dureza, HRET Case No. 34,
June 16, 1989, 1 HRET Rep. 138), refers to an exception to the rule on appreciation of misplaced
votes under Section 211(19) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for
an office for which he did not present himself shall be considered as a stray vote but it shall not
invalidate the whole ballot.
Section 211(19) is meant to avoid confusion in the minds of the election officials as to the candidates
actually voted for and to stave off any scheming design to identify the vote of the elector, thus
defeating the secrecy of the ballot which is a cardinal feature of our election laws. (Amurao v.
Calangi, 10 Phil. 347 (1958)). Section 211(19) also enforces Section 195 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides that in preparing the ballot, each voter must fill his ballot by writing in the
proper place for each office the name of the individual candidate for whom he desires to vote.
Excepted from Section 211(19) are ballots with (1) a general misplacement of an entire series of
names intended to be voted for the successive offices appearing in the ballot (Cordero v. Hon.
Moscardon, 217 Phil. 392 (1984)); (2) a single (Farin v. Gonzales, 152 Phil. 598 (1973)) or double

(Sarmiento v. Quemado, No. L-18027, 29 June 1962, 5 SCRA 438) misplacement of names where
such names were preceded or followed by the title of the contested office or where the voter wrote
after the candidates name a directional symbol indicating the correct office for which the misplaced
name was intended (Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199 (1939)); and (3) a single misplacement of a
name written (a) off-center from the designated space (Mandac v. Samonte, 54 Phil. 706 (1930)), (b)
slightly underneath the line for the contested office (Sarmiento v. Quemado, No. L-18027, 29 June
1962, 5 SCRA 438; Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199 (1939)), (c) immediately above the title for the
contested office ((Villavert v. Fornier, 84 Phil. 756 (1949)), or (d) in the space for an office
immediately following that for which the candidate presented himself. ((Abad v. Co, G.R. No. 167438,
25 July 2006, 496 SCRA 505 and Ferrer v. Commission on Elections, 386 Phil. 431 (2000)). In these
instances, the misplaced votes are nevertheless credited to the candidates for the office for which
they presented themselves because the voters intention to so vote is clear from the face of the
ballots. This is in consonance with the settled doctrine that ballots should be appreciated with
liberality to give effect to the voters will. (Velasco v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 166931, February
22, 2007).
Marked ballot.
Q

When is a ballot considered as marked? Explain.

ANS: In order for a ballot to be considered marked, in the sense necessary to invalidate it, it must
appear that the voter designedly place some superfluous sign or mark on the ballot which might
serve to identify it thereafter. No ballot should be discarded as a marked ballot unless its character
as such is unmistakable. The distinguishing mark which the law forbids to be placed on the ballot is
that which the elector may have placed with the intention of facilitating the means of identifying said
ballot, for the purpose of defeating the secrecy of suffrage which the law establishes. Thus, marked
ballots are ballots containing distinguishing marks, the purpose of which is to identify them. (Perman
v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 174010, February 8, 2007, Tinga, J).

Failure of election.
Q

When is there failure of election?

ANS: There are three instances where a failure of elections may be declared, thus:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
In all three instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. In the first instance, the election has
not been held. In the second instance, the election has been suspended. In the third
instance, the preparation and the transmission of the election returns give rise to the
consequent failure to elect; the third instance is interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as
a winner. (Mutilan v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 171248, April 2, 2007).
Note:
None of the three instances is present in this case. In this case, the elections took place. In
fact, private respondent was proclaimed the winner. Petitioner contests the results of the
elections on the grounds of massive disenfranchisement, substitute voting, and farcical and
statistically improbable results. Petitioner alleges that no actual election was conducted
because the voters did not actually vote and the ballots were filled up by non-registered
voters.

May an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division be the subject of certiorari to the SC?

Explain.
ANS: As a rule, No. The exception is in an unusual case where the petition for certiorari questioning
the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division was pending before the SC, the main case which
was meanwhile decided by the COMELEC En Banc was likewise elevated to the Court. Thus, there
was a situation where the petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC
Division and the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc on the main case were consolidated. The issues raised in the petition for certiorari were also
raised in the main case and therefore there was actually no need to resolve the petition assailing the
interlocutory orders. (Rosal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168253 and 172741, March 16, 2007; Soriano,
Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 164496-505, April 2, 2007).
Note:
The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to
the SupremeCourt through a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En
Banc. However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be
resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the members of the
division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc.
Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can they be
proper subject of a petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise would not only delay the disposition of
cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court docket and unduly burden the Court. This does
not mean that the aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the motion for
reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course
of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. The exception
enunciated in Kho and Repol is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent
nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC
Division issued a temporary restraining order without a time limit, which is the Repol case, or where
a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with counter-protest which was filed beyond the
reglementary period, which is the Kho case.

The Court has already ruled in Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro, that it is the decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that, in accordance with Section 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution,
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The exception provided in Kho and Repol is
unavailing in this case because unlike in Kho and Repol, the assailed interlocutory orders of the
COMELEC First Division in this case are not a patent nullity. The assailed orders in this case involve
the interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither will the Rosal case apply because in
that case the petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Second
Division and the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc on the main case were already consolidated.
The Court also notes that the COMELEC First Division has already issued an Order dated 31 May
2005 dismissing the protests and counter-protests in EPC Nos. 2004-36, 2004-37, 2004-38, 200439, 2004-40, 2004-41, 2004-42, 2004-43, 2004-44, and 2004-45 for failure of the protestants and
protestees to pay the required cash deposits. Thus, the Court have this peculiar situation where the
interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division is pending before the Court but the main case has
already been dismissed by the COMELEC First Division. This situation is precisely what the Court
are trying to avoid by insisting on strict compliance of the rule that an interlocutory order cannot by
itself be the subject of an appeal or a petition for certiorari.

Misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy; effect.

Q When is misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy material? Explain.
ANS: A misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material when it refers to a qualification for
misrepresentation, he or she may be proceeded against through a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, or through criminal prosecution under Section
262 for violation of Section 74. Third, a misrepresentation of a non-material fact, or a non-material
misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78. In other words, for a candidates certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or
cancelled by the COMELEC, the fact misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for the office
sought by the candidate. (Nelson T. Lluz, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007).

Q If a candidate misrepresents his profession, is he disqualified? Explain.

ANS: No. No elective office, not even the office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
requires a certain profession or occupation as a qualification.
Profession or occupation not being a qualification for elective office, misrepresentation of such does
not constitute a material misrepresentation. Certainly, in a situation where a candidate misrepresents
his or her profession or occupation in the certificate of candidacy, the candidate may not be
disqualified from running for office under Section 78 as his or her certificate of candidacy cannot be
denied due course or canceled on such ground. (Nelson T. Lluz, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
172840, June 7, 2007).