Maternity

Childrens Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor G.R. No. 78909June 30, 1989EN BANC:
MEDIALDEA,
J.:Facts:
Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan deOro
Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The
hospital derives its finances from the club itself as well as from paying patients,averaging 130 per
month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity SweepstakesOffice and the Cagayan De Oro
City government.Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances,
theemployees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from their
respectivesalariesOn May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different
capacities/positionsfiled a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment,
Region X,for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-7186.On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and WelfareOfficers to
inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of the allegations in thecomplaints. Based on
their inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director issuedan Order dated August 4,
1986, directing the payment of P723,888.58, representingunderpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the
petitioner's employees.Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment,
Hon. Augusto S.Sanchez, who rendered a Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying the said Order in
thatdeficiency wages and ECOLAs should be computed only from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986,On
October 24, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by theSecretary of
Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so, the extent of coverage of
any award that should be forthcoming, arising from his visitorial and enforcementpowers under Article
128 of the Labor Code.
Held:
This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as amendedby E.O. No.
111. Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial andenforcement power over
labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicatemoney claims, provided there still
exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the
employer concerned.

Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, andregulations
relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary andwelfare benefits,
including occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Ruleson the Disposition of Labor
Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September 16,1987).
Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as regards allpersons still
employed in the Hospital at the time of the filing of the complaint, but GRANTED asregards those
employees no longer employed at that time. SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes,Grio-Aquino
and Regalado, JJ., concur

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Third Division, Q.C. and PRISCILA ENDOZO, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari with application for a temporary
restraining order seeking to set aside the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
affirming in toto the decision of Labor Arbiter Andres C. Zaballa finding the termination of employment
of respondent Priscila Endozo as domestic helper in Taiwan as unwarranted and ordering petitioner to
pay her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract of employment of eleven (11) months and (19)
nineteen days amounting to NT$151,996.60, plus ten percent (10%) thereof as attorney's
fees.1wphi1.nt

The facts are as follows:

In June 1993, respondent Priscila Endozo applied to petitioner Sameer Overseas Employment Agency, a
local recruitment placement agency, for overseas employment in Taiwan as a domestic helper. As she
was initially found to have a "minimal spot" she was advised to rest for at least two (2) months.

On April 6, 1994, petitioner told respondent Endozo that she would be finally deployed to Taiwan and
required her to pay the amount of P30,000.00, which she did, but petitioner did not issue any receipt.

On April 8, 1994, respondent Endozo left for Taiwan. She was to be employed as a housemaid of Sung
Kui Mei with a monthly salary of NT$13,380.00 for a period of one year.

However, she stayed in Taiwan only for eleven (11) days as her employer terminated her services, and
sent her home on April 19, 1994 for alleged incompetence.

Immediately upon her return, she confronted petitioner agency and Rose Mahinay of said agency told
her that she was just unlucky and that she would be refunded the amount of P50,000.00.

On June 20, 1995, private respondent filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration a
complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal, payment of salary corresponding to the unexpired
portion of her contract, illegal exaction, violation of the Labor Code, falsification of contract of
employment, attorney's fees and costs.

Meantime, on June 7, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8042, vesting jurisdiction over claims of
overseas workers with the National Labor Relations Commission (hereafter NLRC). Consequently,
respondent's claim was transferred to the National Labor Relations Commission, Arbitration Branch, in
San Pablo City.

After position papers were filed, on May 28, 1997, Labor Arbiter Andres C. Zavalla rendered a decision
finding that private respondent was illegally dismissed and ordering petitioner to pay her salary
corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract of employment of eleven (11) months and
nineteen (19) days equivalent to NT$151,996.80, plus ten percent (10%) of the award equivalent to
NT$15,199.68 as attorney's fees. 1

In time, petitioner appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission, Third Division,
Quezon City.

On November 28, 1997, the NLRC rendered decision affirming in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 2

On December 23, 1997, petitioner filed with the NLRC a motion for reconsideration; 3 however, on
January 28, 1998, the NLRC denied the motion. 4

Hence, this recourse. 5

On May 14, 1998, we required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from
notice. 6 On July 13, 1998, the Solicitor General filed his comment, submitting the proposition that
private respondent had been illegally dismissed by her foreign employer entitling her to payment of her
salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract. 7 However, private respondent failed to
submit her comment, and on February 1, 1999, we required her counsel to show cause why she should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure. 8

We now resolve to give due course to the petition. We consider private respondent to have waived the
filing of her comment and set aside the resolution of February 1, 1999.

The issue presented is whether the employer in Taiwan could lawfully terminate private respondent's
employment as domestic helper for incompetence during the probationary period of her employment.

Petitioner recruited private respondent for employment in Taiwan, and she executed a contract of
employment with her Taiwanese employer under which she was to serve as domestic helper for a
period of one year, with six months probationary period. After only eleven days of work, the Taiwanese
employer terminated private respondent's employment for alleged incompetence.

It is an elementary rule in the law on labor relations that even a probationary employee is entitled to
security of tenure. 9 A probationary employee can not be terminated, except for cause. 10

In this case, the employment contract was for a definite period of one (1) year, with six (6) months
probationary period. After only eleven days of work, the employer dismissed private respondent
without just cause.

"Under Article 281 of the Labor Code, a probationary employee may be terminated on two grounds: (a)
for just cause or (b) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement." 11 Under the
contract of employment, the employer may terminate the services of private respondent during the
probationary period for "being found losing ability to work." However, "the power of the employer to
terminate a probationary employment contract is subject to limitations. First, it must be exercised in
accordance with the specific requirements of the contract. Secondly, the dissatisfaction of the employer
must be real and in good faith, not feigned so as to circumvent the contract or the law; and thirdly,
there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal." 12 In termination cases, the burden of
proving just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer. 13 In this case, petitioner
was not able to present convincing proof establishing respondent Endozo's alleged incompetence. "Due
process dictates that an employee be apprised beforehand of the conditions of his employment and of
the terms of advancement therein." 14 "Precisely, implicit in Article 281 of the Code is the requirement

that reasonable standards be previously made known by the employer to the probationary employee at
the time of his engagement." 15 Thus, the termination of respondent Endozo's employment was not
justified 16 and hence, illegal. 17 Consequently, private respondent is entitled to payment of her salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract of employment for a period of one year. 18

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission adopted on November 28, 1997, in NLRC NCR CA No. 013114-97.

No costs.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., and Puno, J., concur.

Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., are on official business abroad.


People vs. Vera ReyesG.R. No. L-45748April 5, 1939EN BANC, IMPERIAL,
J.:Facts:
The defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the assistant city fiscalwith a
violation of Act No. 2549, as amended by Acts Nos. 3085 and 3958. The informationalleged that from
September 9 to October 28, 1936, and for the some time after, the accused, inhis capacity as president
and general manager of the Consolidated Mines, having engaged theservices of Severa Velasco de Vera
as stenographer, at an agreed salary of P35 a monthwillfully and illegally refused to pay the salary of
said stenographer corresponding to the above-mentioned period of time, which was long due and
payable, in spite of her repeated demands.The accused interposed a demurrer on the ground that the
facts alleged in the information donot constitute any offense, and that even if they did, the laws
penalizing it are unconstitutional.After the hearing, the court sustained the demurrer, declaring
unconstitutional the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549 as last amended by Act No. 3958 for the
reason that it violates theconstitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, and dismissed the
case.The last part of Section 1 of Act No. 2549, as last amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958considers as
illegal the refusal of an employer to pay when he can do so, the salaries of his employers or laborers on
the 15th or last day of every month or on Saturday of everyweek, with only two days extension, and the
non-payment of the salary within the periodspecified is considered as a violation of the law. The same
act exempts from criminalresponsibility the employer who, having failed to pay the salary, should
provesatisfactorily that it was impossible to make such payment.The fiscal appealed from said order. In
this appeal the Solicitor-General contends that the courterred in declaring Act No. 3958
unconstitutional, and in dismissing the cause.
Issue:
Whether or not the last part of Sec. 1 of Act No. 2594 as amended by Act No. 3958 isconstitutional and
valid.
Held:
We hold that the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as last amended by section 1 of Act No.3958, is
valid. We do not believe that this constitutional provision has been correctly applied inthis case. A close
perusal of the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as amended by section 1of Act No. 3958, will show
that its language refers only to the employer who, being able to makepayment, shall abstain or refuse to
do so, without justification and to the prejudice of the laborer or employee. An employer so
circumstanced is not unlike a person who defrauds another, byrefusing to pay his just debt. In both

cases the deceit or fraud is the essential elementconstituting the offense. The first case is a violation of
Act No. 3958, and the second is estafapunished by the Revised Penal Code. In either case the offender
cannot certainly invoke theconstitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.

Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits,
topromote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. In the exercise of thispower
the Legislature has ample authority to approve the disputed portion of Act No. 3958which punishes the
employer who, being able to do so, refuses to pay the salaries of hislaborers or employers in the
specified periods of time. Undoubtedly, one of the purposes of thelaw is to suppress possible abuses on
the part of employers who hire laborers or employeeswithout paying them the salaries agreed upon for
their services, thus causing them financialdifficulties. Without this law, the laborers and employees who
earn meager salaries would becompelled to institute civil actions which, in the majority of cases, would
cost them more thanthat which they would receive in case of a decision in their favor.
Decision:
We hold that the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as last amended by section 1 of Act No.3958, is
valid, and we reverse the appealed order with instructions to the lower court to proceedwith the trial of
the criminal case until it is terminated, without special pronouncement as to costsin this instance. So
ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur


Philippine Association of Service Expporters, Inc. vs. DrilonG.R. No. 81958June 30, 1988EN BANC,
SARMIENTO,
J:Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm"engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas placement," challengesthe Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character
of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARYSUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC
AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,"and specifically assailed for "discrimination against males or females;"
that it "does not applyto all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills;"and that it isviolative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the
lawmakingpower, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.On May 25, 1988, the
Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Commentinforming the Court that on March 8, 1988, the
respondent Labor Secretary lifted thedeployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada,
Hongkong, United States, Italy,Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the
challenged "guidelines," theSolicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
Issue:
Whether the challenged Department Order is a valid regulation in the nature of a police power measure
under the Constitution.
Held:
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare."

As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to

underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits .It finds no specific
Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the
taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a
fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of
governance. The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection. It may be said
to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society .As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity.
In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.There is
no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that"equality before the
law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rightsamong all men and
women."Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns
theConstitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, andhumane.
Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toilingexpatriates have
adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. Inthis case, the Government
has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such
protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered anindefinite ban on deployment.This Court
understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The
concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the
ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of
the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens.
Decision:
The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find theimpugned
Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed
for.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,Bidin, Cortes and
Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave


ABELLA v. NLRC

FACTS

PETITIONER Abella leased a farmland from Ramona for a period of 10 years and renewable for another
10 years at the option of the former. Abella hired the private respondents Quitco and Dionele. Abella
renewed the lease for another ten years. At the expiration of the lease, she dismissed both private
respondents and turned over the hacienda to the owners. Private respondents filed a complaint against
petitioner. for overtime pay, reinstatement, and illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the
dismissal was warranted by the cessation of business, but the respondents are entitled to separation
pay, invoking Art. 284 of the Labor Code, as amended.

ISSUE
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay.

RULING

The Court upheld the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that Article 284 is the applicable law in this case. Art
284, as amended refers to employment benefits to farm hands who were not parties to petitioner's
lease contract with the owner of Hacienda Danao-Ramona. That contract cannot have the effect of
annulling subsequent legislation designed to protect the interest of the working class.
It is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and
its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. It is the kind of interpretation which gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all
doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor." The policy is to extend the
applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the
law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to
labor.


Euro-Linea Phil, Inc. vs. NLRC

Facts:

Petitioner Euro-Linea Phil, Inc hired private respondent Pastoral as shipping expediter on a probationary
basis for a period of six months. Prior to hiring by petitioner, Pastoral had been employed by Fitscher
Manufacturing Corporation also as shipping expediter. On 4 February 1984, Pastoral received a
memorandum terminating his probationary employment in view of his failure to meet the performance
standards set by the company. Pastoral filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. On 19
July 1985, the Labor Arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioner appealed the decision
to the NLRC on 5 August 1985 but the appeal was dismissed. Hence the petition for review seeking to
reverse and set aside the resolution of public respondent NLRC, affirming the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, which ordered the reinstatement of complainant with six months backwages.

Issue:

Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ruling against the dismissal of the respondent, a temporary or
probationary employee, by his employer.

Ruling:

Although a probationary or temporary employee has a limited tenure, he still enjoys the constitutional
protection of security of tenure.

Furthermore, what makes the dismissal highly suspicious is the fact that while petitioner claims that
respondent was inefficient, it retained his services until the last remaining two weeks of the six months
probationary employment. No less important is the fact that private respondent had been a shipping
expediter for more than one and a half years before he was absorbed by petitioner. It therefore appears
that the dismissal in question is without sufficient justification.

It must be emphasized that the prerogative of management to dismiss or lay-off an employee must be
done without abuse of discretion, for what is at stake is not only petitioner's position but also his means
of livelihood. The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees is subject to regulation
by the State, basically in the exercise of its paramount police power.

Petition dismissed for lack of merit and decision by the NLRC is affirmed.

Manila Electric Company vs National Labor Relations Commission (1989)

Facts:

Apolinario Signo was employed by the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) as supervisor-leadman since
1963. During his 20 year-tenure of service in said company, he had been commended twice for honesty.
However, one time in 1981, he facilitated an illegal connection to the house of a certain Fernando De
Lara; the latter received free service of electricity for a year since he was not billed for Meralcos
services. This irregularity was later discovered and so in 1983, Signo was fired by Meralco on the ground
of breach of trust and loss of confidence which are grounds for termination under the Labor Code.

Signo filed a case for illegal dismissal and for backwages. The Labor Arbiter ruled that though there is
breach of trust on the part of Signo, dismissal is too harsh a penalty considering that Signo has been
employed by Meralco for 20 years; that except for that one time infraction, Signo had a clean slate with
Meralco. On appeal, The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the factual findings of
the Labor Arbiter. Meralco questioned the validity of the NLRC decision before the Supreme Court via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of the NLRC, an administrative body, is reviewable by the Supreme
Court in this case.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court sustained the decision of the NLRC. Well-established is the principle that
findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined
to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Judicial review by this Court
on labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper
labor officer or office based his or its determination but is limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion. No such issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is present in the case at bar.

Further, notwithstanding the existence of a valid cause for dismissal, such as breach of trust by an
employee, nevertheless, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is too severe a penalty if the latter has
been employed for a considerable length of time in the service of his employer. Reinstatement of
respondent Signo is proper in the instant case, but without the award of backwages, considering the
good faith of Meralco in dismissing him.

CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION), vs.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and RAMON PILONES
Subject: Labor Standards

FACTS:
Ramon Pilones, private respondent, was employed on February 16, 1978 on a probationary period of
employment for six (6) months with petitioner CRP. After said period, he underwent medical

examination for qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is suffering from PTB
minimal. Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his employment by respondent since his
illness was not curable within 6 months.

Pilones complained against his termination before the Ministry of Labor which dismissed the same. The
dismissal was reversed by the public respondent who ordered the reinstatement and payment of back
wages.

Granting reinstatement, the public respondent argues that Pilones was already a permanent employee
at the time of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure. The alleged ground for his removal,
to wit, pulmonary tuberculosis minimal, was not certified as incurable within six months as to justify
his separation and that the petitioner should have first obtained a clearance, as required by the
regulations then in force, for the termination of his employment.

CRP claims that the private respondent was still on probation at the time of his dismissal and so had no
security of tenure. The dismissal was necessary for the protection of the public health, as he was
handling ingredients in the processing of soft drinks which were being sold to the public.

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal was proper.

HELD:

No. The dismissal was not proper. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employee who is allowed to
work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. Pilones was already on
permanent status when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after he ceased to be a
probationer. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure guaranteed to him by the Constitution
and the Labor Code.

The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier because the x-ray
examination was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not immediately available. That
excuse is untenable. We note that when the petitioner had all of six months during which to conduct
such examination, it chose to wait until exactly the last day of the probation period.

The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code which states that the employer shall not terminate
his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is
of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with
proper medical treatment. The record does not contain the certification required by the above rule.
Hence, dismissal was illegal.

It is also worth noting that the petitioners application for clearance to terminate the employment of the
private respondent was filed with the Ministry of Labor only on August 28, 1978, or seven days after his
dismissal. As the NLRC has repeatedly and correctly said, the prior clearance rule (which was in force at
that time) was not a trivial technicality. It required not just the mere filing of a petition or the mere
attempt to procure a clearance but that the said clearance be obtained prior to the operative act of
termination.

Although we must rule in favor of his reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his fitness to resume
his work, as certified by competent authority.

**Another Doctrine under Sec4 of Labor Code on construction:

Concern for the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his employers, must look up to the law for his
protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness and even favor and always with faith and
hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nations future. It is error to take him for granted. He
deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will determine whether the knife in his hands shall
be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry weapon of defiance and revenge. The choice is
obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should, we must resolve to lighten the weight of centuries
of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but does not bow his head.

Daniel Sanchez, et al vs. Harry Lyons Construction, inc., et al.
JULY 13, 2015KNOWYERLAW
G.R. No. L-2779 October 18, 1950

FACTS:

Plaintiffs were employed by DEFENDANT MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC. and DEFENDANT HARRY LYONS
CONSTRUCTION, INC.

Plaintiffs agreed: I accept the foregoing appointment, and in consideration thereof I hereby agree that
such employment may be terminated at any time, without previous notice, and I further agree that
salary and wages, shall be computed and paid at the rate specified up to the date of such termination.

Also in consideration of such employment I hereby expressly waive the benefit of article 302 of the
Code of Commerce and that of any other law, ruling, or custom which might require notice of discharge
or payment of salary or wages after date of the termination of such employment.

Plaintiffs were dismissed by the defendants on December 31, 1947 without one months previous
notice. Each of the plaintiffs demanded payment of one months salary from the defendants and the
latter refused to pay the same.

Plaintiffs claimed from defendants P2,210 plus interest as one month advance past due them. The
parties entered into a stipulation of facts upon which the municipal court rendered judgment for the
plaintiffs RTC ruled in favor of plaintiffs. From this judgment, defendants filed an appeal with this court
purely upon a question of law.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiffs, both those paid on a monthly and daily basis, are entitled to the benefit
granted in article 302 of the Code of Commerce; and secondly, if they are so entitled, was their waiver of
such benefits legal and valid?

HELD: AFFIRMS DECISION OF LOWER COURT.

Article 302 of the Code of Commerce reads as follows:

ART. 302. In cases in which no special time is fixed in the contracts of service, any one of the parties
thereto may cancel it, advising the other party thereof one month in advance.

Applicable when 2 requisites are complied: (1) that no special time is fixed in the contract of service, and
(2) that said employee is a commercial employee

Plaintiffs are commercial employees and no special time has been fixed in their contract for service.
Hence, this Court holds that plaintiffs-appellants come within the purview of article 302 of the Code of
Commerce.

Also, this court holds that such a waiver, made in advance, is void as being contrary to public policy.

It is safe to presume therefore, that an employee or laborer who waives in advance any benefit granted
him by law does so, certainly not in his interest or through generosity but under the forceful
intimidation of urgent need, and hence, he could not have so acted freely and voluntarily.

For all the foregoing, this court hereby affirms the decision of the lower court, with costs against
appellants.

MANUEL SOSITO vs. AGUINALDO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
DECEMBER 14, 1987

Facts:
Petitioner Manuel Sosito filed for an indefinite leave from the company on January 16, 1976. Months
later, the company underwent a retrenchment program but offered separation pay to those who had
been in the active service as of June 30, 1976 and had tendered their resignation not later than July 31,
1976. Petitioner, to avail of the benefits, submitted his resignation. The company denied him the
benefits.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was entitled to the benefits?
Held:
The Court held that the petitioner was not qualified to avail of the benefits because at the time he
submitted his resignation, he was not in the active service, having been on voluntary indefinite leave.
The petitioner cannot just do as he please to the detriment of the company.
The Court expressed that labor disputes arent necessarily immediately tipped in favor of labor. The
Management also has its own rights, which must also be afforded the same protection as that of labor.
The Court held that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.

COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, Inc. vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, COLGATE PALMOLIVE SALES UNION
JUNE 30, 1988

Facts:
Respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair
labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing
employees to retract their membership with the union and restraining non-union members from joining

the union. The Office of the MOLE, upon petition of petitioner, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute
pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code.

Petitioner pointed out that the allegations regarding dismissal from employment due to union
membership were false. It also averred that the suspension and eventual dismissal of the three
employees were due to infractions committed by them and that the management reserves the right to
discipline erring employees. Petitioner also assailed the legality of the Union, among others.

The minister rendered its decision, ruling that there was no merit in the Unions complaint. It also ruled
that the three dismissed employees were not without fault but nonetheless ordered the
reinstatement of the same. At the same time, respondent Minister directly certified the respondent
Union as the collective bargaining agent for the sales force in petitioner company and ordered the
reinstatement of the three salesmen to the company on the ground that the employees were first
offenders.

Issue:
Whether or not the minister erred in directly certifying the Union based on the latters self-serving
assertion that it enjoys the support of the majority of the sales force in petitioners company and in
ordering the reinstatement of the three dismissed employees.

Held:
The Court held that the minister failed to determine with legal certainty whether the Union indeed
enjoyed majority representation. The Court held that by relying only on the Notice of Strike, the minister
had encouraged disrespect of the law. He had also erroneously vested upon himself the right to choose
the collective bargaining representative which ought to have been upon the employees.
The Court held that the reinstatement of the three employees despite a clear finding of guilt on their
part is not in conformity with law. Ruling otherwise would only encourage unequal protection of the
laws with respect to the rights of the management and the employees.
The court rendered the decision of the minister reversed and set aside, ordering petitioners to give the
three employees their separation pay.

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R.
CORIA, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

Guillermo H. Pulia for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 14, 1985 Decision of Labor Arbiter Teodorico L.
Ruiz which held that herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was illegally dismissed; and of the
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission which dismissed petitioner's appeal on the
ground that the same was filed out of time.

In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire
Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a
regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a
permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office
Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his positiondesignation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450,00 a
month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to
P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing
clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus
allowances and other benefits.

On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the
grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor
Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with
the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp.
31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the
instant petition (Ibid, pp. 2-22).

In compliance with the resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated April 30, 1986 (Ibid., p. 94),
private respondent filed his Comment on May 23, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 97-101) and public respondent on July
2, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 120-124).

On June 6, 1986, petitioners filed their Reply to private respondent's Comment (Ibid, pp. 102-105) and
on July 25, 1986, their Reply to public respondent's Comment (Ibid., pp. 126-131).

In a Resolution dated August 18, 1986, the Second Division of this Court resolved to give due course to
the petition and to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda (Ibid., P. 132).

In compliance with the above mentioned Resolution, petitioners filed the,.r memorandum on November
10, 1986; while private respondent filed his Memorandum on October 17, 1986 (Ibid, pp. 139-144), and
public respondent on November 16, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 160-166).

Before going however, into the merits of the case, an important point to consider is whether or not it is
still within the jurisdiction of this Court to review.

Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:

SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
notice thereof.

xxx
xxx
xxx

SECTION 6.
No extension of period. No motion or request for extension of the period within
which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.

The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April
11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy"
of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its
resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time
(Rollo, pp. 31-32).

Petitioners claim, among other things, that respondent Commission committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in arbitrarily dismissing petitioners' appeal on a technicality
(Rollo, p. 9). It invokes the Rules of Court provision on liberal construction of the Rules in the interest of
substantial justice.

It will be noted however, that the foregoing provision refers to the Rules of Court. On the other hand,
the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room
for interpretation.

Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the
force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA
314 [1985]).

Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case
has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.

Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in
rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who
should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all
be demanded.

WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

CBTC Employees Union v. Clave
G.R. No. 49582
January 7, 1986

Article 5: Rules and Regulations

Facts:

Petitioner Commercial Bank and Trust Company Employees' Union (CBTC) lodged a complaint with the
Department of Labor, against private respondent bank (Comtrust) for non-payment of the holiday pay

benefits provided for under Article 95 (now Article 94) of the Labor Code. Failing to arrive at an amicable
settlement at conciliation level, the parties opted to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration.

On 22 April 1976, the Arbitrator handed down an award on the dispute in favor of petitioner union. The
next day, 23 April 1976, the Department of Labor released Policy Instructions No. 9, a policy regarding
the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays.

Said bank interposed an appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), contending that the
Arbitrator demonstrated gross incompetence and/or grave abuse of discretion when he failed to apply
Policy Instructions No. 9. This appeal was dismissed on 16 August 1976.

Private respondent then appealed to the Secretary of Labor. On 30 June 1977, the Acting Secretary of
Labor reversed the NLRC decision. On the principal issue of holiday pay, the Acting Secretary, guided by
Policy Instructions No. 9, applied the same retrospectively, among other things.

Issue:

Whether or not the monthly pay of the covered employees already includes what Article 94 of the Labor
Code requires as regular holiday pay benefit in the amount of his regular daily wage.

Ruling:

In excluding the union members the benefits of the holiday pay law, public respondent predicated his
ruling on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement Article 94 of the Labor Code promulgated
by the then Secretary of Labor and Policy Instructions No. 9.

In Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, this Court's Second Division,
speaking through former Justice Makasiar, expressed the view and declared that the section and
interpretative bulletin are null and void, having been promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor in
excess of his rule-making authority.

The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the Secretary's Policy Instruction
No. 9 add another excluded group, namely, 'employees who are uniformly paid by the month'. While the
additional exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all monthly paid employees have already
been paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or a deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be
valid. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the
statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires

Ruled in favor of the petitioners. Presidential Executive Assistant and the Acting Secretary of labor are
set aside, and the award of the Arbitrator reinstated.


National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988)
The civil service does not include Government owned or controlledcorporations (GOCC) which are
organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

Facts: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally
dismissed. NLRC ruled orderingher reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order

her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation byvirtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC,
which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms andconditions of
employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.

ISSUE: W/N employees of NASECO, a GOCC without srcinal charter, are governed by the Civil Service
Law.

HELD: NO. The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose
before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other
employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Constibut prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this
court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms andconditions
of employment in GOCC's, among them NASECO.In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC,
the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC v Juco wasbased. It provides that the
"civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government,including government owned or controlled corporation with srcinal charter." Therefore by
clear implication, the civil service doesnot include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC
under the general corporation law.



BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL
HOUSING CORPORATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) dated March 14, 1991, which reversed the Decision dated May 21, 1990 of Labor Arbiter Manuel
R. Caday, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent National Housing Corporation
(NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service
for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds.

On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the
Department of Labor.

On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground
that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case.[1]

Petitioner then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982,
reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[2]

Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, respondent NHC appealed before this Court and on January
17, 1985, we rendered a decision, the dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent National
Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case before it
for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED.[3]

On January 6, 1989, petitioner filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal,
with preliminary mandatory injunction.[4]

On February 6, 1989, respondent NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case.[5]

On April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commission issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. It ratiocinated that:

The Board finds the comment and/or motion to dismiss meritorious. It was not disputed that NHC is a
government corporation without an original charter but organized/created under the Corporate Code.

Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government,
including government owned and controlled corporations with original charters. (underscoring supplied)

From the aforequoted constitutional provision, it is clear that respondent NHC is not within the scope of
the civil service and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this board. Moreover, it is pertinent to state
that the 1987 Constitution was ratified and became effective on February 2, 1987.

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, the instant complaint is hereby dismissed.[6]

On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with
preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent NHC.[7]

On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled that petitioner was
illegally dismissed from his employment by respondent as there was evidence in the record that the
criminal case against him was purely fabricated, prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against
him. Hence, he concluded that the dismissal was illegal as it was devoid of basis, legal or factual.

He further ruled that the complaint is not barred by prescription considering that the period from which
to reckon the reglementary period of four years should be from the date of the receipt of the decision of
the Civil Service Commission promulgated on April 11, 1989. He also ratiocinated that:

It appears x x x complainant filed the complaint for illegal dismissal with the Civil Service Commission on
January 6, 1989 and the same was dismissed on April 11, 1989 after which on April 28, 1989, this case
was filed by the complainant. Prior to that, this case was ruled upon by the Supreme Court on January
17, 1985 which enjoined the complainant to go to the Civil Service Commission which in fact,
complainant did. Under the circumstances, there is merit on the contention that the running of the
reglementary period of four (4) years was suspended with the filing of the complaint with the said
Commission. Verily, it was not the fault of the respondent for failing to file the complaint as alleged by
the respondent but due to, in the words of the complainant, a legal knot that has to be untangled.[8]

Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of the complainant as illegal
and ordering the respondent to immediately reinstate him to his former position without loss of

seniority rights with full back wages inclusive of allowance and to his other benefits or equivalent
computed from the time it is withheld from him when he was dismissed on March 27, 1977, until
actually reinstated.[9]

On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC
promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.[10]

The primordial issue that confronts us is whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code.

Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and /or controlled corporations were
governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Hence,

Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided:

"The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of
government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations x x x.

The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided:

The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation v. Juco,[11] that employees of
government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as
subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the
Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now
provides:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivision, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporations with original charter. (Article IX-B, Section 2[1])

In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission,[12] we had the
occasion to apply the present Constitution in deciding whether or not the employees of NASECO are
covered by the Civil Service Law or the Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when
the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. We ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of
NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in
place at the time of the decision. Furthermore, we ruled that the new phrase with original charter
means that government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special
law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had
been organized under the general incorporation stature and a subsidiary of the National Investment
Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded
from the purview of the Civil Service Commission.

We see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case.

In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in
1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of
Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred
percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former
corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service
Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National
Investment and Development Corporation and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation.[13]
Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under act 1459, the former corporation law, it
is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are
subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in recent case of Trade Union
of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing Corporation,[14] where we held that
the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, we also
held that the workers or employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or
employees organization and that there is no impediment to the holding of a certification election among
them as they are covered by the Labor Code.

Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is
that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters.[15] Having been incorporated under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are
governed by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Commission.

One final point. Petitioners have been tossed from one forum to another for a simple illegal dismissal
case. It is but apt that we put an end to his dilemma in the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR-04-02036089 dated March 14, 1991 is hereby
REVERSED and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 21, 1990 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. ASSO. OF LDB EMPLOYEES and GARCIA

G.R. No. 120319

October 6, 1995


FACTS: From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of Luzon Development Bank
Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

Whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision and the MOA on promotion.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers. Atty. Garcia,
in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBEs Position Paper ; LDB, on the other hand, failed

to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As
of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.

Without LDBs Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the CBA provision nor the MOA
on promotion.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

ISSUE: WON a voluntary arbiters decision is appealable to the CA and not the SC

HELD: the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.

YES

The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited
compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC for
that matter. The (d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a
labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary
arbitrator.

Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not,
elevated to the SC itself on a petition for certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the
NLRC or the CA. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise that the judgments of courts and
awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that the
awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same
legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court
ruled that a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Under
these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law
the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are
not appealable to the latter.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall
exercise:

(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
RTC s and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be
considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel are
comprehended within the concept of a quasi-judicial instrumentality.

An instrumentality is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms governmental agency or
instrumentality are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a government
acts, or by which a certain government act or function is performed. The word instrumentality, with
respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function. An individual person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial
instrumentality in the settling of an estate, in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a
bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation
is an instrumentality of the state.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated
to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation
of the term instrumentality in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and
powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since
he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein.

It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for in the
Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No.
1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the CA under the foregoing
rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. A
fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be
appealable to the CA, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95,
just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.

In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as
the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the
contract or submission, or if none be specified, the RTC for the province or city in which one of the
parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction.

In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the RTC.
Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the CA must be deemed to have
concurrent jurisdiction with the SC. As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the
Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON
MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO
AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98,
QUEZON CITY, respondents.

G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989

Facts:


On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the
officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building,
preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business
with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which
ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS
suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants
(petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which
included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay;
conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular
and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to
other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the
SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of
discrimination and unfair labor practices.

Issue:

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

Held:

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of
these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November
24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being
the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE,
petitioner,
vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENT SUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION
& THEIR MEMBERS, respondents.

Bienvenido D. Comia for respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner's
complaint in Civil Case No. 88- 44048 praying for a declaration of illegality of the strike of the private
respondents and to restrain the same. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's petition for
certiorari, hence, this petition for review.

The key issue in this case is whether the petitioner, National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a
government agency, or a private corporation, for on this issue depends the right of its employees to
strike.

This issue came about because although the NPDC was originally created in 1963 under Executive Order
No. 30, as the Executive Committee for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other
national parks, and later renamed as the National Parks Development Committee under Executive Order
No. 68, on September 21, 1967, it was registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a
non-stock and non-profit corporation, known as "The National Parks Development Committee, Inc."

However, in August, 1987, the NPDC was ordered by the SEC to show cause why its Certificate of
Registration should not be suspended for: (a) failure to submit the General Information Sheet from 1981
to 1987; (b) failure to submit its Financial Statements from 1981 to 1986; (c) failure to register its
Corporate Books; and (d) failure to operate for a continuous period of at least five (5) years since
September 27, 1967.

On August 18, 1987, the NPDC Chairman, Amado Lansang, Jr., informed SEC that his Office had no
objection to the suspension, cancellation, or revocation of the Certificate of Registration of NPDC.

By virtue of Executive Order No. 120 dated January 30, 1989, the NPDC was attached to the Ministry
(later Department) of Tourism and provided with a separate budget subject to audit by the Commission
on Audit.

On September 10, 1987, the Civil Service Commission notified NPDC that pursuant to Executive Order
No. 120, all appointments and other personnel actions shall be submitted through the Commission.

Meanwhile, the Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association, consisting of employees holding
supervisory positions in the different areas of the parks, was organized and it affiliated with the Trade
Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) under Certificate No. 1206.

On June 15, 1987, two collective bargaining agreements were entered into between NPDC and NPDCEA
(TUPAS local Chapter No. 967) and NPDC and NPDCSA (TUPAS Chapter No. 1206), for a period of two
years or until June 30, 1989.

On March 20, 1988, these unions staged a stake at the Rizal Park, Fort Santiago, Paco Park, and Pook ni
Mariang Makiling at Los Banos, Laguna, alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC.


On March 21, 1988, NPDC filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila, Branch III, a complaint against the
union to declare the strike illegal and to restrain it on the ground that the strikers, being government
employees, have no right to strike although they may form a union.

On March 24, 1988, the lower court dismissed the complaint and lifted the restraining order for lack of
jurisdiction. It held that the case "properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor,"
because "there exists an employer-employee relationship" between NPDC and the strikers, and "that
the acts complained of in the complaint, and which plaintiff seeks to enjoin in this action, fall under
paragraph 5 of Article 217 of the Labor Code, ..., in relation to Art. 265 of the same Code, hence,
jurisdiction over said acts does not belong to this Court but to the Labor Arbiters of the Department of
Labor." (p. 142, Rollo.).

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 14204). On March 31, 1989, the
Court of appeals affirmed the order of the trial court, hence, this petition for review. The petitioner
alleges that the Court of Appeals erred:

1)
in not holding that the NPDC employees are covered by the Civil Service Law; and

2)
in ruling that petitioner's labor dispute with its employees is cognizable by the Department of
Labor.

We have considered the petition filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of NPDC and the comments
thereto and are persuaded that it is meritorious.

In Jesus P. Perlas, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 84637-39, August 2, 1989, we ruled that the
NPDC is an agency of the government, not a government-owned or controlled corporation, hence, the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over its acting director who committed estafa. We held thus:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on
January 14,1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks
(Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC)
on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia
were designated Chairman and Vice- Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer
it to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter
of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has
remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency
under the Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were
issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A Perlas, Item No. 2, 3). (Italics ours.)

Since NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service rules and regulations
(Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil service employees (Sec. 14, Executive Order
No. 180).

While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions of their
choice, there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of a labor dispute between the

employees and the government, Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides that
the Public Sector Labor- Management Council, not the Department of Labor and Employment, shall hear
the dispute. Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor dispute
between the NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of Labor and
Employment.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
14204 is hereby set aside. The private respondents' complaint should be filed in the Public Sector LaborManagement Council as provided in Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180. Costs against the private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.