In pre-industrial

LEARNING
1.0
42
INTRODUCTION
FROM FAILURES:
societies,
CASE once
STUDIES
a craft-based technique or thumb-rule for desi
gn was adequate for building an artefact, it was not considered necessary to dev
judged
elop it any
further.
The methods of design of buildings in those societies changed very slow
ly overNevertheless, medieval society was indeed developing although at a relativ
time.
ely slow
pace,
leading eventually to the construction and erection of large and visible s
Generally, these buildings symbolised the greatness or valour of a particular em
tructures.
perorglory
the
or of a particular God or religion. The impressive temples built by the g
reatPandia
or
CholaKings in South India or the great Gothic Churches and Cathedrals in Eu
(particularly in Italy) are excellent examples, which are impressive even by tod
rope
standards. The enhanced functional requirements of such buildings have continued
ays
challenge
example,
to
there
the designers
has been an
andincreasing
technological
demand
pressures
to achieve
havethe
continued
longesttopossible
grow. For
spa
ns and
the
greatest possible heights in most prestigious buildings. In their desire to
meet theiror patrons
clients
contemporary
technology
needs,
and buildings
the designers
and cathedrals
did sometimes
collapsed
stray beyond
as a consequence.
the limits of
was
Thisthe case with Beauvais Cathedral, which when built -was considered to be the
most daring achievement in Gothic Architecture. When its roof collapsed in 1284,
restoration
its
consisted of using tie rods of iron to hold the Gothic arches togeth
suggesting that the original designers had clearly over-reached themselves in th
er,
e design
of
arches. (As is well known, arches are mainly compression structures, and deve
horizontal thrust under purely vertical loads. We need sturdy supports to resist
lop
thrusts.
New
these
developments
Clearly,inthere
design
wasare
design
oftenerror
the direct
in thisconsequence
case).
of lessons learnt fr
previous failures, which are caused when the designers went too far beyond the s
om
art development
tate-ofthe
The
or the contractors
of scientific
did notmethods
implement
andthe
reasoning,
design intent
which started
in the construction.
in the 17th c
led to the ability to predict the forces to which a structure might be subjected
entury,
. This
the
ability
led toto validate structural designs at least to some extent in advance of
construction. The process of industrialisation of societies also ensured the pro
duction
new
materials
of
whose properties could be predicted (unlike the natural materials
stone -whichofthey
-like
development
newreplaced).
materials actually
This combined
led towith
theincrease
occurrence
in of
knowledge
more failures,
and
pr
as a result of enhanced demand for many types of novel structures for which ther
incipally
e Copyright
no
Version
were
historical
II 42reserved
precedents,
-{PAGE
}
(for example, railway bridges).

PostTHE
LEARNING
2.0
mortem
NEED
FROMisFOR
FAILURES:
anFORENSIC
exact science.
CASE
STUDIES
STUDIES
By employing it, we can establish the illness,
caused the death of the patient with a high degree of certainty. Many advances i
which
n Medicalhave been made possible by a systematic compilation of the results of p
Sciences
Engineering Designers, on the other hand, have been reluctant to reflect openly
studies.
ostmortem
upon theof design failures, thus denying themselves and the profession an opportu
causes
nity to
understand
the limitations of the particular design concept and improve the meth
For example,ofbysuspension
odology.
development
1840 the British
bridges,Engineers
followinghadthesimply
collapse
abandoned
of Menai
theStrait
designBridge
suspension
and
structures at Brighton Pier. All these failed in high winds, due to i
stiffening of the decks, a deficiency not recognised by the designers at the tim
nadequate
Rather than interpreting the failures as an indictment of the form chosen, a con
e.
American Engineer John Roebling collected case studies and established the force
temporary
s -not considered - which must be designed against in order to build a success
hitherto
suspension bridge. This resuscitated the suspension bridge technology. The famou
ful
sEnglish bridge-builder, Robert Stephenson, whose design of a Trussed Girder for
Bridge failed because of a very low factor of safety, was no doubt embarrassed b
Dee
ut was enough to admit that nothing was so instructive to the younger members of
candid
profession,
the
as the records of the accidents in large works and the means employe
d in
repairing
the damage. There were indeed plenty of bridge failures both in the U.S
. and
in
Great Britain during the latter half of 19th century and much discussion of t
catastrophic failures did, in fact, take place. These influenced the design deve
he
alopment
numberofof new forms of the bridges. The cantilever bridge across the Firth of
Forth Bridge)
(the
designed by Benjamin Baker is a good example of this new developme
and was adopted by several bridge builders the world over. An editorial titled T
nt
neering
he
who,
if he
Newswill
(1887)
looknoted
back upon
that the
.past
Thereandisbenohonest
Engineer
with himself will not find
most
Structures
thatvaluable
his which
andfail
mostare
effective
the onlyinstruction
ones whichhas
arecome
really
frominstructive,
his own failings...
for those
stand do not in themselves reveal whether they are well designed or so overly de
which
as to be wasteful of materials and resources. The natural impulse of those who ar
signed
e in responsible
anyway
.something
not difficult
for failures.is
to do in cases
to keep
where
thethere
matterisasnoquiet
greatascatastrophe
possible or lo
ss is
It
life.
of clear that much can be learned through the failure of a structure rather t
han a study which
structures,
of
are successful. The proper appreciation of the causes of failu
re refocus
to
helps uson our conceptual understanding of structural behaviour. We could the
n assess
our
analytical models, which are essential for successful design practice, and h
elp us toIIproper
exercise
Version
42 -{PAGE
engineering
}
judgement.

Many design
LEARNING
FROMdecisions
FAILURES:areCASE
inevitably
STUDIES based on engineering judgement, which does
merely come from an understanding of theory or a powerful command of computation
not
tools. Even extensive design experience in an academic context can only provide
al
perspectives in engineering judgement. Most fruitful lessons in engineering judg
limited
are obtained from the case histories of failures, which point invariably to exam
ement
ples of badthese, naturally, provide guideposts for negotiating around the pitfa
judgement;
lls in
conceptual
design. They also offer invaluable insights into the potential trip-w
ires in early
attempts
at innovative design and construction. In many cases, important new pri
of engineering
nciples
Some
Poor
(1)
engineers
structural
communication
involved
science
failures
between
in
conceptual
mayarethe
becaused
brought
various
design
dueout
design
to:inthose
and
the
professionals
study
involved
of failure
ininvolved,
the supervision
casee.g.
studies.of
(2)
(3)
execution
poorworkmanship,
Bad
communication
of works. which
between
is often
the fabricators
the result of
andfailure
erectors.
to communicate the des
decisions tointheprofessional
ign
Compromises
(4)
persons, involved
ethics and
in executing
failure tothem.
appreciate the responsibility
the profession to the community at large could also result in catastrophic failu
of
Other
res.
lackcommon
of appropriate
causes ofprofessional
structural failure
design and
are construction
summarised below:
experience, especially
novel
when
misapplication.
complexity
unwarranted
structures
ofbelief
codes
are in
needed.
andcalculations
specifications
and in
leading
specified
to misinterpretation
extreme loads andandproperties
. compressed
In
poor
inadequate
thistraining
chapter
preparation
design
of field
some
and/or
caseinspectors.
and
studies
construction
reviewofoffailure
contract
time.areand
presented.
shop drawings.
In each case study,
the-{PAGE
learning
Version
42
possible
IIpoints,
}
technical aspects and ethical implications are also discussed.

revolutionised
LEARNING
3.0
3.1
The
POOR CONCEPTUAL
Tacoma
destruction
FROM
Narrows
FAILURES:
the
of thinking
Bridge
the
DESIGN
Tacoma
CASEofSTUDIES
Narrows
structural
Bridge
engineers,
by aerodynamic
on how wind
forcesloading
subsequently
could a
large slender structures. This is a good example of errors in Conceptual Design.
ffect
State.
In 1940,OnTacoma
Nov 7,Narrows
1940, with
Bridge
a wind
was speed
openedofacross
aboutTacoma
60 km/hNarrows
(well below
in Washington
the design
speed),
wind the bridge began twisting and oscillating violently. As a result the tie
intended
down cables
to stiffen the bridge snapped, causing the entire structure to crash in
to the1:river
Fig.
below.
Investigations
Tacoma (subsequent
Narrows Bridge
to the collapse) showed that the excessive vertical a
torsional oscillations (which occurred prior to failure) were the result of extr
nd
degree of flexibility of the structure and its relatively small capacity to abso
aordinary
rb the forces. The deck was too narrow for the span and thus its torsional rigi
dynamic
dity was
inadequate.
The plate girders, which were provided for stiffening, had insuffici
flexural rigidity and little torsional rigidity. Their elevation caused wind vor
ent
ticesbelow
and
abovethe deck in moderate and steady winds. From the day bridge was opened
substantial horizontal and vertical movements of the deck in waveforms were noti
very
evenfailure
ceable
The
in moderate
was indeed
wind and
caused
highbytraffic.
a lack of proper understanding of aerodynamic f
and knowledge of torsional rigidity in the whole profession. It was not realised
orces
designers
by the that the aerodynamic forces (which had proven disastrous in the past t
o much and shorter flexible suspension bridges) would affect a structure of such
higher
magnitude as the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, despite the fact that its flexibility wa
s greatly
in
It
excess
is
clearly
of that
dangerous
of anytoother
exceed
longthespan
design
suspension
paradigmbridge.
without fully understandin
g the one is dealing with and the limitations of applicability of current desig
forces
n concepts.
Version
II 42 -{PAGE }

London
LEARNING
3.2
This
Millennium
320wasmFROM
spanFAILURES:
opened
Bridge
Aluminium
on 10atJune
CASE
London
and2000
STUDIES
Stainless
amidstSteel
a lotBridge
of fanfare.
acrossIttheisRiver
the first
Thamesriver
in
tocrossing
be built in London, after Tower Bridge (completed in 1884) and links St. Paul
Cathedral (in the North Bank) and the new Tate Modern and Globe Theatre (in the
's
In many ways it is an unusual structure. Sir Norman Foster, a famous British Arc
Bank).
South
claimed to have designed it in association with an Artist, Sir Antony Caro and t
hitect
Engineers were Ove Arup and Partners, a distinguished firm of consulting Enginee
he
From the start, Foster emphasised the innovative nature of its design. The objec
rs.
"tive
to push
was the suspension bridge technology as far as possible, to create a uniqu
ely thinprofile, forming a slender blade across the River Thames". Jonathan Duffy
bridge
, a BBC
commentator
remarked " It sounds great and on paper, probably looked sublime, bu
toften reality is the harshest judge of cutting edge Architects". The bridge was
made of decking and stiffened by suspension cables in the horizontal plane. No
Aluminium
During
attemptthe
wasfirst
made weekend
to stiffen
(10-11
it inJune
the2000),
vertical
someplane.
160,000 persons crossed the bri
essentially because of its novelty. As people began to cross, it became apparent
dge
bridge
that the
was swaying several inches from side to side. The transient population on
bridge
the swayed drunkenly as they walked in synchrony, as if choreographed. The br
was indeedItwobbling
idge
crossing.
was obvious
dangerously
that theover
bridge
verywas
deepnotwaters.
adequately
Many stiffened
felt sea-sick
to resist
while
loading. An American visitor remarked that " the design of the bridge looks as f
gravity
limsybridge
some
The
ofasthehad
ropetobridges
be closed
seentointraffic
Indianaafter
Joneshaving
films....".
been open only for two days.
Engineers/Designers
The
are hoping to install dampers (similar to shock absorbers) t
o reduce
the
This
oscillations
case study illustrates
to a minimumthe(acceptable)
dangers of over
level.confidence. The designers had ex
the established Technology into untested (and dangerous) situations. It is true
trapolated
thatnot
(if
dozens
hundreds) of Bridges have been built all over the world. Nevertheless it
the
remains
case that all the suspension bridges (as indeed all the structures) should b
e adequate
both
4.0
Cleddau
The
DESIGN
failure
withBridge,
respect
INADEQUACY
of three
Milford
to box
"strength"
Haven,
girder(UK)
as well during
bridges
as "stiffness".
erection in 1970 in quick success
revealed the need for a radical re-examination of the prevailing design methodol
ion
ogy for
Thin
Version
Plated
II 42Structures
-{PAGE } and their erection.

cantilevering
LEARNING
On
2 JuneFROM
1970,segments
FAILURES:
CleddauofBridge
CASE
theSTUDIES
span,
in Milford
out from
Haven
thefailed
piers.during
The bridge
its erection
was designed
by
as a continuous box girder of welded steel. The span that collapsed was the se
single
condtheonesouth side. The boxes were fabricated in sections and moved over the prev
on
built sections, aligned in place and welded. The collapse occurred when the last
iously
box
section
for the
of second span was being moved out along the cantilever. This section s
forward down the cantilever buckled, at the support and collapsed into the river
lid
killing
N.
S.
trestle
Temporary
Pier
South
Cantilever
Fig.
Investigation
(Fig
abutment
651side
2:
2),Failure
four
trestle
cantilever
on
men,
north
of
ofcollapse
including
Milford
side ofshowed
Haven
the site-engineer.
bridge
Bridgethe collapse was due to the buckling of th
that
ediaphragm at the support (i.e., at the root of the second span being erected). T
diaphragm was torn away from the sloping web near the bottom. This caused reduct
he
ion lever
the
in
arm between flanges resisting negative bending moment at the support.
tendency of the bottom flange to buckle was inevitably increased by the reductio
The
n of the between the flanges, as this increased the force needed in each flange
distance
to carry
the
The
moment with
support
diaphragm
the reduced
was, inlever
effect,
arm.a transverse plate girder, which carried h
eavy the
from
loadswebs of the plate girder at its extreme ends and was supported by the b
earingsinasFig 3. It was therefore subjected to a hogging bending moment and a lar
shown
vertical shear force. The shear of the transverse girder and diffusion of the po
ge
int load
from
the bearings were compounded with the effects of inclination of the webs of
main
the bridge girder. These produced an additional horizontal compression and outbending
ofplane
Diaphragm
Bearing
from
Fig.
Elevation
Section
Version
webII
3:
effects
Diaphragm
here
torn
42 -{PAGE
away
caused
over} Pier6
by bearing
of Milford
eccentricity.
Haven Bridge

The totalFROM
LEARNING
loadFAILURES:
transmitted
CASEbySTUDIES
the diaphragm to the bearings just before collapse
computed
diaphragm
was
aswas9700
designed
kN. This
to carry
load would
it. Allowing
not havefor
caused
likely
anyvalues
problemofprovided
distortion
theand
stress,
residualthe calculated design strength, using design rules that were drafted sub
was found to be as low as 5000 kN. Thus, the failure was essentially due to desi
sequently,
5.0 case
inadequacy.
gn
COMMUNICATION
Hyatt
FABRICATOR
The
POOR
Regency
studyWalkway
BETWEEN
presented
THEhere
Collapses
DESIGNER
focuses
ANDonTHEthe professional responsibilities of st
engineers as they assume overall responsibility for their designs. It also focus
ructural
es onfor
need
thea uniform understanding of the means by which specific responsibilities
communicated
On
are7th July 1981,
between
a dance
the members
was being
of held
project
in the
team.lobby of the Hyatt Regency Hotel
,Kansas City. As spectators gathered on suspended walkways above the dance floor,
support
the
gave way and the upper walkway fell on the lower walkway, and the two fe
onto
9ll
Dance
4th
2nd
32
Fig.
joints
expansion
rods
5supporting
10
The
mm9mmmtwo
floor
mthe
4:
competition
9walkways
Kansas
mcrowded
walkway
9 m City
dance
were
onHyatt
ground
supported
floor,
Hotel:
floor
killing
above
arrangement
114 another
one
people
of walkways
and
andinjuring
suspendedover
from200.
the ceiling
hanger
by
rods as shown in Fig 4. The walkways were supported on box beams, which w
madetheoforiginal
ere
In
two steeldesign
channels,
a single
welded
rodtogether.
supported the two walkways as shown in Fig.
5(a).originally
the
But
designed hanger detail for the two walkways was altered at the ti
me of
fabrication
as shown in Fig. 5(b). The second floor walkway was suspended from t
fourth one as shown. As a result, the connection between the fourth floor cross
he
beam-{PAGE
Version
42
andII}

Examination
LEARNING
the
hangerFROM
supported
ofFAILURES:
the boxdouble
beams
CASEthe
STUDIES
supporting
load originally
the upperintended
walkwayasafter
showntheincollapse
Fig 6(b).sho
that the upper hanger
wed
unsatisfactory,
and this
rodcondition
had pulledwasthrough
aggravated
the beam.
by theTheincreased
beam design
loadwas
on the
alson
ut.from
nut
Upper
Concrete
steel
Steel
welded
transverse
As-Designed
Nut
Channels
Hanger
walkway
Deck
P2P
(a)
Fig.
After
atat
in(b)
The
pulled
and
5(a):
nut
adds
6:
Hanger
deck
Channels
rod
nut
the
toFree-Body
Rod
lower
Washer
oninvestigations,
Pform
through
box
Hyatt
to
As-Built
Rod
deck
2nd
beam
under
from
Regency
floor
Diagram
theCeiling
boxHanger
(a)
it
beam
was
AsDetails
asfound
Designed
shownthat
Fig.
in(b)the
Fig.
5(b):
Assteel
7.Hyatt
Built
fabricator
Regency who
Hanger
built
Details
the h
anger detail
requested
a change in detail from the originally designed detail. The engineer a
pproved checking
without
it
the calculations. This accident occurred due to the carelessnes
s of the concerned as he failed to understand the importance of the details he h
engineer
changed. It also illustrates the importance of understanding the force flow in t
ad
he joints
and
Version
thatIIof42what
-{PAGE
is often
}
considered as minor detail.

The next
LEARNING
Upper
Lower
Fig.
6.0
King's
POOR
7:hanger
Hanger
Bridge,
Pulled
FROMrod
DETAILING
case
pulled
FAILURES:
study
-Out is
Melbourne
outanat
Rod
CASE
example
Fourth-Floor
STUDIES
of poorBoxdetailing
Beam
compounded by poor communica
and a Bridge
tion
Kings
lack ofinnecessary
Melbourneinspection.
is one of the relatively few examples of failure in se
rvice.
was
opened
It in 1961, but only 15 months later, on 10th July 1962, it failed when
a 45-tonwas passing over it. Collapse was only prevented by a wall, which had be
vehicle
en enclose
to
The
built
superstructure
the spaceconsisted
under theofaffected
many spans
span.
in which each carriageway was support
ed bysteel plate girders spanning 30 m, and topped with a R.C.C deck slab as sho
four
wn in 8(a) and 8(b). Each plate girder bottom flange was supplemented by an addi
Figs.
cover plate in the region of high bending moment. The cover plate was attached t
tional
o the
flange
An
investigation
by a continuous
into the
5 mm-fillet
possible cause
weld all
of failure
around (see
indicated
Fig. 9)that the failure w
as due tofracture and many other spans of the bridge were in danger of similar fa
brittle
Cracks were found in the main tension flange plate of the affected span under se
ilure.
ven eight
the
of
transverse fillet welds. One crack had extended such that tension flan
ge was
completely
Investigation
severed,
also revealed
and the that
crackdifficulties
had extendedwere
halfway
experienced
up the web.
during welding. S
pecial
to
avoidcare
unnecessary restraints during welding was not taken, despite the specif
The longitudinal welds were made before the transverse welds. As a result there
ications.
was a
complete
restraint against contraction, when transverse welds were made. Moreove
Version II 42 -{PAGE }
r,

transverseFROM
LEARNING
welds
FAILURES:
were made
CASEinSTUDIES
three stages. In some instances cracks were caused
main
in the
flange plate by the first run and later covered up by a subsequent one. In
other cases a crack was caused by the last run and later covered up by priming p
many
before the girders left the factory. The penetration of later paint coats into t
aint
he cracks
showed
that they had often extended further before the bridge was opened for tra
ffic.results
Fillet
Flange
Cover
Stiffeners
Fig.
The
9:Plate30.5
8(b)
8(a)
PlateFlange
Weld
plate
fillet
Girder
of investigations
weld
mElevation
Cross
Platesectionclearly indicated that, the failure of King's Brid
ge was due toof those who fabricated the girders as well as those who inspected
carelessness
bridge. It was also found that the most likely and most dangerous cracks were re
the
missed by inspectors, who had carefully got the less harmful longitudinal cracks
gularly
and
Version
cutrepaired.
outII 42 -{PAGE }

The following
LEARNING
7.0
Quebec
POORBridge
FROM case
JUDGEMENT
FAILURES:
Failure
studyCASE
is intended
STUDIES to show how, the errors of the judgement of
engineers
On
the29 August
could
1907,
leadthetopartially
the failure
constructed
of the structure
south cantilever
and loss arm
of soofmany
the Quebec
lives.
in Canada collapsed killing 75 workmen due to the grave error made in assuming t
Bridge
dead load for the calculations. Even when this error was subsequently noticed th
he
edesigner chose to ignore it, relying on the margin of safety inherent in his des
The bridge was intended to carry rail traffic across the St. Lawrence River at Q
ign.
uebec.
was
designed
It
and built under the supervision of Theodore Cooper, doyen of Americ
bridge builders in the late 19th century. The bridge consisted of giant truss ca
an
ntilevers
two
Two
main piers,
compression
on
with a (made
chords
suspended
of lattice
span inconstruction)
the middle. in the south cantilever ar
m failed
by
the shearing of their lattice rivets. As the distress spread through the enti
superstructure, the nineteen thousand tons of the south anchor, the cantilever a
re
rms and thecompleted centre span thundered down onto banks of the St.Lawrence Riv
partially
er andthe waterreport
into
Investigation
the bridge
on thehadmajor
beenevents
designed
leading
to cross.
to the accident is summarised b
The bridge wasofputT.for
elow.
specification
Cooper
a was
design
followed.
and construct
Originally
contract
the bridge
although
was designed
the original
for
a spanft.ofLater, the span was increased to 1800 ft, considering both engineering
1600
expenditure. For this Cooper had provided modified specifications that would all
and
ow forunit stresses. Accordingly, the design calculations were revised but due to
high
oversight
calculations
After
an placing
theand
added
the
fabrication
first
deadsteelwork
weight
of steelwork
inonthesite,
increased
began.
Cooperspan
realised
was not
thatincluded
the weights
in theof t
he fabricated
components
were not corresponding to previously estimated dead loads and that th
eworking stresses were in fact 7 to 10% greater than that allowed by specificatio
n. But decided that the increase in stresses was safe and permitted work to cont
Cooper
During construction, Cooper was once informed that some problems were encountere
inue.
d in
riveting
the bottom chord splices of south anchor arm on account of their faced
ends not But Cooper instructed that the work should continue, as it was not a s
matching.
When work on the central, suspended span proceeded, the rapidly increasing stres
matter.
erious
ses consequent
the
(and
buckles) on the compression members became intolerable. Later the
Version
end
II 42 -{PAGE }

details ofFROM
LEARNING
theFAILURES:
compression
CASEchords
STUDIES
began to buckle. The buckles started developin
g in the
alarming
Thus
an bridge,
fashion subject
leading to hasty
the collapse
design decisions,
of the structure.
came to an untimely end. The
enquiry
court offound a number of factors, which had contributed to the accident. Among
were the unusually high permissible stresses allowed in the specification and th
these
e lack of however,
communication
recognised,
betweenthat
consultant,
these were
designers
factors,andwhich
the only
site served
management.
to aggravate
It was the
cause
main of failure, which was that the designer had failed to provide the main com
load bearing members
pressive
investigations
it became
withclear
adequate
thatstrength.
the lacingInsystem
the subsequent
and the splice
enquiryjoints
and of t
compression members were not able to resist the effects of the buckling tendency
he
compression
8.0
Silver
of POOR
thebridge
Bridge
INSPECTION
members
Collapse
collapse
ANDisMAINTENANCE
considered to be one of the failures that had been ver
yinfluential. It led to the approval of the 1968 National Bridge Inspection Stand
ards Congress.
U.S.
by the
Built to specifications, this American Suspension Bridge was comp
in 1928 and failed in 1967. The cause of failure was a fracture in an eyebar lin
leted
k brief
Afrom
On
resulting
Deca 15,
crack
report
1967
which
onSilver
the
hadcauses
grown of
Bridge,
through
considered
failure
stress,
istosummarised
corrosion
be
first eyebar
below.
and corrosion
suspension
fatigue.
bridge i
n the States, collapsed without warning into the Ohio River. The bridge was spa
United
Ohio River between Point Pleasant, West Virginia, and Gallipolis, Ohio. The coll
nning
occurred when the bridge was crowded with heavy traffic resulting in the loss of
apse
and
Fig.
Version
Pleasant
46 nine
lives
10 II
a:injuries.
Silver
42
-{PAGE
Bridge
} at Point

A thorough
LEARNING
Fig.
10 b:FROM
Detail
investigation
FAILURES:
of Eyebar
CASE
revealed
Chain
STUDIES
Jointthe collapse of the bridge was caused by
that
failure of the eyebar at the first panel point west of Ohio tower as shown in Fi
the
At the beginning, the first joint of the eyebar, west of the Ohio tower came apa
g.10.
rt. As of
result
a the separation of the joint and the failure of the eyebar, the Ohio to
wer fell The collapse continued eastward, causing the West Virginia tower to fa
eastward.
eastward. Thus once the continuity of the suspension system was severed at first
ll
point
panelwest of Ohio tower, the unbalanced forces on each side of that joint cause
d the to totally
bridge
Investigations
showed
disintegrate.
that there were two main elements in the design and constr
of the chain that caused the failure -extremely high tensile stresses and corros
uction
ion on of
inside
Moreover
thethe
thechain
eyebar.
was composed of two bars, which meant that the breaking of on
e bar inevitably result in total instantaneous collapse of the entire bridge. It
would
found
was also
that the factors of safety for the eyebar design were too low compared to
requirements of the original design. No consideration was given in the design to
the
secondary
Another
inaccuracies
stresses
unequal
lack
ofundesirable
stresses
distribution
complete
created
in the
arising
by
free
feature
manufacture
unbalanced
ofmovement
the
from
oftotal
thearound
loads.
ofdesign
stress
thethe
bars.
was
between
pins.
that the eye,
two eyebars.
where the pin fits,
elongated 3 mm in a horizontal direction for ease of erection. This detail creat
was
ed an where
space
lubrication
air of
corrosion
the inside
couldofdevelop
the headundetected
of the eyebar
and unabated.
in the Silver
The inspection
Bridge wasorimp
without II
ossible
Version
dismantling
42 -{PAGEthe
} joint

Thus the combination

LEARNING
FROM FAILURES:
of high
CASE tensile
STUDIES stresses and corrosion caused a crack on th
e inside
of
the eyebar, under the pin at a location of a manufacturing flaw about 6 mm in
The
size.
tragedy of the Silver Bridge did not go unnoticed and unrecognised. Its coll
created a huge uproar in the United States. The first major benefit was that it
apse
led to theof Bridge
approval
(Systematic
the 1968Inspection
National and
Bridge
Evaluation).
InspectionAnother
Standards
major
by benefit
the U.S.arising
Congressout
Silver
of theBridge tragedy is the attention paid to eyebar trusses and details. In pa
tension members
rticular,
attention.
Such lower
composed
chords
of two
wereeyebars
strengthened
became or
suspect
replaced.
and required
A third benefit
special was
attention given to all connections: floor beams to trusses, stringers to floor b
the
eams,
to
bearings,
trussesand so on. It became necessary to inspect these details with great
9.0 next
care.
Cracking
The
POOR case
CONSTRUCTION
in
suspended
study (The
floors
Structural
of a school
Engineer,
building.
1994) concerns the cracking of a s
caused by the constructor not paying attention to the requirements of the Servic
lab
Limit State. Although this example concerns a R.C.C slab, it is regarded as impo
eability
rtant for engineers involved in Steel Design as frequently his designs incorpor
structural
atethe
slab
In
R.C
asschool
a component
building
in reported
Compositeherein,
Construction.
cracks were noticed in the suspended flo
ors.cracks
the
All were found on the top surfaces of the one-way slabs, on each side of,
parallel
In
andthe course
to, the
of investigation,
beams that weresurface
supporting
crackthem.
widths were measured. A covermeter
was
survey
carried out near the cracks. In addition, the slab was pierced at a number o
f locations
in
order to supplement the covermeter survey and also to measure the slab and pl
thickness. The range of measurements and a comparison with the specifications in
aster
structural
Specification
Slab
Reinforcement
Effective
Table
the thickness
1 Suspended
1,
clearly
depth
drawings
Measured
spacing
(mm)
ofindicates
floor
top
are(top)
100
range
steel
shown
slab
83-106
that
(mm)
parameters
(mm)
inpoor
Table
225
75 workmanship
235-400
35-55
1.
was responsible for the crackin
gobserved. There were adverse deviations from the specifications in slab thicknes
effectiveIIdepth,
s,
Version
42 -{PAGE
as well
} as reinforcement spacing.

The next
LEARNING
POOR
10.0
Roof
CONSTRUCTION
Truss
FROM
case
Collapse
FAILURES:
study
PRACTICES
is taken
CASE from
STUDIES
the Journal of Performance of Constructed Faci
ASCE (1992). In this example the designer of record did not have any field inspe
lities,
responsibilities. Construction was left in the hands of contractors who, whether
ction
experienced or not, used "customary" installation techniques that left the truss
inadequately
es
The
roof of abraced.
shopping centre (consisting of several timber roof trusses) collap
sed days
two
afterof snow and rain. Most of the trusses on one side of the centre beam ha
dcollapsed and the top of the load-bearing wall had been pushed out. The centre b
eam was and undeflected. Investigations showed that the building had been in s
undamaged
for six years. The structure was a rectangular building consisting of 3.7m high
ervice
block bearing walls and a wood truss supported system. A steel beam supported by
concrete
pipe
steelcolumns was installed in the centre of the building running along the longe
rdimension. The truss system consisted of two monopitch trusses placed peak to pe
forming a conventional "A" shaped roof. The pair of trusses spanning between the
ak
sidewall and the centre beam, rested on the top flange of the beam but weren't c
The roof system acted as two independent halves. And the building was subdivided
onnected.
several
into stores by non-load bearing partition walls. It was found that the trusse
s thatstanding
still
were
on the affected side of the beam had no lateral bracings and none
internal
of the diagonals had any bracing. The lateral bracings were provided only for
vertical members of the trusses at the beam bearing. The first diagonal members
the
compression were found to be out of plane by several centimetres. They had faile
in
d as bearing
load
exceeded
the allowable
members. Anlength
analysis
to depth
showedratio
thatfor
these
in plane
members,
compression.
when unbraced,
They were
able
not to withstand the requisite snow loading. Thus the trusses had been left unb
raceddrawings
understrength
Shop
and
at the
for
thecompletion
trusses produced
of construction.
by its manufacturers showed that two late
members were required for the first diagonal and one brace was required for the
ral
diagonal. This information was either never furnished to the installer or ignore
second
d by the During investigation it was also revealed that though the manufacture
installer.
rs had
developed
handling and bracing recommendations, many truss installers ignored th
HIGHnext
11.0
guidelines.
ese
FAILURE
The
fifty
ETHICAL
case
nineSTANDARDS
study
storeyiscrisis
ANDexample
an
TIMELY of
ACTION
the high
PREVENT
ethical
A
standards and professional
characteristic of a competent engineer involved in areas of safety and welfare o
ism
f the
Version
public.
42
-{PAGEII}

The Citicorp
LEARNING
FROMcentre,
FAILURES:
a fifty
CASE nine-storey
STUDIES
tower in Manhattan, New York designed b
yWilliam J. Le Meassurier, would have faced a major disaster if a serious error i
n its had not been detected in time. He acknowledged the errors done by his tea
design
prepared new plans and got all the necessary changes put into effect to avert a
m,
The Citicorp centre was the seventh tallest building in the world at that time.
disaster.
possible
The twenty
had
tower five thousand individual steel jointed elements behind its aluminium
skin.supported
was
which
It positioned
were
on four at
massive
the centre
two hundred
of eachandside
seventy
allowing
eightthemeter
building
high corners
columns,t
ocantilever twenty two metres out. Its wind bracing system consisted of forty-eig
ht braces
(in
six tiers of eight), arrayed like giant chevrons. A tuned mass damper was al
provided to dampen the wind-induced vibrations (due to the heavy mass of the dam
so
the trouble
per,
The
severitystarted
of the when
vibrations
Le Meassurier
would belearned
reduced).
that the wind braces designed by
team were not checked for diagonal winds, which would result in a forty percent
his
in strain in four out of the eight chevrons. Moreover despite the welded joints
increase
bolted joints were provided by the contractor as the welded joints were consider
specified,
ed to be and stronger than necessary. But if the bracing system was sensitive t
expensive
odiagonal winds, so were the joints that held it together. The joints must be str
ongresist
to
enoughthe moment, which was the difference between the overturning moment ca
by wind forces, and the resisting moment provided by the weight of the building.
used
At any given level of a building, the value of compression would remain constant
. Even
the
windifblows harder, the structure would not get heavier. Thus immense leverag
e couldfrom higher wind forces. In the Citicorp tower, the 40% increase in stres
result
s produced
by
diagonal winds caused a hundred and sixty percent increase in stress on the b
olts levels
some
at
of the building. The assumption of 40% increase in stress from diago
winds was theoretically correct, but it would go higher in reality, when the sto
nal
rm the
at
lashed
building. This fact was completely disregarded by his design team. The we
joint was discovered at the thirtieth floor and if that one gave way, catastroph
akest
ic failure
the
The
whole structure
statistical
of probability
would have
of occurrence
resulted. of a storm was found to be one in ever
y sixteen
years.
This was further reduced to one in fifty five years if the tuned mass dam
per been
had
(whichinstalled) was taken into account. But this machine required electric c
which
urrent,
Le
Meassurier
might fail
learnt
as soon
of these
as a design
major storm
faultshits.
after the building was completed and
over.
handedNevertheless, he acknowledged these errors because keeping silent would me
risking people's lives. So he brought these errors to the notice of the owners o
an
f the
building
and persuaded them to invest in his newly prepared rectification scheme
. Since
the
bolted joints were readily accessible, the new proposal was to strengthen th
e joints,
which
were weak. All the weak joints were reinforced by welding heavy steel plat
es over II 42 -{PAGE }
Version
them.

His honesty,
LEARNING
FROMcourage,
FAILURES:adherence
CASE STUDIES
to ethical and social responsibility during this
remains
12.0
All
ordeal
the
INDIAN
a testimony
Case
EXPERIENCE
Studiestoreported
the highsoideals
far inofthis
a true
chapter
professional.
have been compiled from pub
reports
lished
The
culture
and of
journals
reporting
fromfailures
UK and US.
and the lessons learnt from them has not yet d
in India. In many cases the reluctance of the Engineers concerned is also due to
eveloped
ofthepotential
12.1
The
next
fearcaselegal
Improper
designaction
study
isleads
an example
and
to heavy
resulting
ofrestoration
errors
claims.
committed in design due to inexperie
nce case
wrong
The
andassumptions.
study concerns a factory building near Nellore, India. The building was
25.7
of size
m X 52.5 m. The roof was made up of steel Pratt trusses supported on concre
columns. The entire truss was exposed except for the bottom chord members, which
te
embedded
149
1500
Fig.
After
were11490
11:
curing
inX 17
Elevation
concrete
the concrete
ofslab.
Trussslab, when the scaffoldings were removed, the deflecti
on ofwas
roof
disproportionate
thefound todeflections,
be 100 mm (>L/325).
the trussInwas
order
reanalysed.
to find out
Thethe
configuration
cause of these
of the
shown
trussinisFig. 11. From the analysis, it was found that most of the members of th
e roofwere not safe. After performing several analyses, it was concluded that in
truss
original
the
design, the designer might have miscalculated the loads. In India, indu
buildings were normally covered by asbestos cement sheetings. Hence the original
strial
designer of the truss, due to his inexperience, might have considered the truss
to supportsheeting, instead of heavier concrete slab. The analysis considering on
Asbestos
ly AC roofing confirmed that all the members of the roof would be safe for the r
sheet
By the time the investigation started, the expensive machinery, which were to be
loading.
educed
inside
housedthe building had arrived and were under installation at various parts of
Version II 42 -{PAGE }
the

building.FROM
LEARNING
HenceFAILURES:
the repair
CASEofSTUDIES
the roof had to be done without affecting the work
installing
of
these machineries. Hence it was decided to strengthen the top and bot
flanges of the top chord members by welding extra plates on them. It was also de
tom
cidedangles
weld
to
inside the web members of the truss. Since the bottom chord member w
inside the concrete slab, it was not possible to add anything to the bottom chor
as
It was also recommended to provide temporary supports to the truss at 1/3 point
ds.
welding extra plates and angles. But the contractor did not provide the temporar
for
ysupports and welded the extra plates and angles. This resulted in the buckling o
f the
of
theweb
top chord members. The web members in one or two trusses had also buckled
.Hence after careful consideration it was decided to reduce the span of the truss
would
whicheventually reduce the forces in the members. After consultation with the m
of the plant, the locations of these intermediate columns were fixed and then th
anager
e work
was
12.2
The
carried
next
Restoration
caseout.
study
of deals
a factory
withbuilding
another design error made by the designer due to
A factory building located at about 100 km from Bombay collapsed during a windst
overconfidence.
his
in 1994. The building was built using cold-formed channel members. The layout of
orm
building
The
thestructure
is shown
was provided
in Fig.12with
and column
the elevation
bracingsininFig.13.
every sixth bay. However no g
end bracings were provided. Extra columns were provided at the gable end to supp
able
ort the The structure was covered with asbestos roofing and all the sides were
cladding.
with
covered
asbestos sheet cladding. The structure was designed to support a 4t gantry
in order
bay.
In
each
A crane
to understand
bracket supported
the failure
by the
of the
column
structure,
(see Fig.13)
the original
supporteddesign
the gantry.
was exa
mined.loads
main
wind
(i)
column
(ii)
causes
The rafter
and
were
of failure
notsections
estimated
werewere
found
properly
found
to be,
toasbeperinadequate
IS:875. to resist the load; they
not the
did
during
(iii)
For
evenerection,
restoration
satisfy theofbracings
main
thel/r
structure,
rationot
were
specified
the
connected
designer
in properly
thewasCode.
asked
to to
theuse
mainthemembers.
same sec
tions anda design, which would not increase the cost of the project considerably.
produce
same
Hencechannels were used; but their spacing was altered to form a box section wit
hdiagonal bracings of channel section. The span and bay width were kept the same.
arrangement
perpendicular
This
increased
to the frame.
the moment
The rigidity
of inertia
of the
of the
structure
sectionincreased
along theconsiderably
frame and
Version
42
in-{PAGE
bothII}

the directions
LEARNING
FROM FAILURES:
and the bending
CASE STUDIES
stress was found to be well within the allowable
range12:
stresses.
Column
Front
Gable
Rear
Fig.
Version
side
ofbracing
wall
side
end
IILayout
bracing
Ridge
42
-{PAGE
plan
line
(not}ofprovided
the factory building

LEARNING
Fig.
Version
13:IICross
FROM
42 -{PAGE
FAILURES:
section} ofCASE
collapsed
STUDIESframe

In theImproper
LEARNING
12.3
next
FROMcase
FAILURES:
detailing
study, wrong
CASE STUDIES
results
detailing
in delayed
adopted
commissioning
by a designer resulted in delaye
Adcommissioning
144 m X 60 moffactory
the project.
building was constructed at Cochin, India. The plan is sh
own in The building was made up of portal frames spanning 60 m and placed at 6
Fig.14.
mintervals. The portal frames were supported alternately on columns and on lattic
e girder
that
was placed longitudinally at the mid-span. The portals and columns were mad
e up angles,
four
of
which were laced to form a box section. The lattice girder and the
column were made up of 4 channels, laced to form a compound section. The sides o
central
f the thewere
building
After
erection
also of
covered
portalbyframes
cladding
andfrom
placing
1.5 of
m above
asbestos
G.L.sheets, some problem
s were
encountered.
The purlins and side cladding girts got twisted. This resulted in t
he some
of
cracking
AC sheets. Some columns (especially those supporting the partitions) wer
e not
straight
and gave a buckled column appearance. Most of the side cladding girts w
A careful investigation showed that the purlins were not detailed properly and w
sagging.
ere
placed in the wrong orientation, which resulted in the torsion of the purlin sec
ere
tions.
is
explained
This in Fig. 15. Moreover the detailer had given a connection detail as
shown in(a) to connect the purlins at rafter points as against the correct detail
Fig.16
Due
in to
Fig.16
this(b).
the purlins got twisted till the tip of the purlins rested on the ra
fterthis
By
section.
time all the machinery of the plant had arrived and the erection of thes
e was in It was also a costly proposition to remove all the AC sheets, correct
progress.
detailing errors by refabricating the joints and relaying the AC sheets. Hence a
the
fter several
rounds
of discussions, it was decided to replace only the cracked AC sheets and
atotemporary
adopt
solution as shown in Fig.17 which would arrest further twisting of t
he purlin.
The
sagging of the side cladding girts was due to the fact that the sag rods wer
e not
anchored
by providing diagonal sag rods at the ends. This was rectified. The oth
problem was due to the fact that the fabricator was not experienced in cold roll
er
ed steel Since these sections were flexible and made of thin sections, the fabr
sections.
simply bent the columns and fixed them at the required place. These mistakes wer
icators
e also
rectified.
However, these corrective measures delayed the starting of the plant
by aboutIIsix42months.
production
Version
-{PAGE }

LEARNINGII
Fig.14:
Lattice
Version
Plan
girder
FROM
42view
FAILURES:
-{PAGE
support
of }theCASE
structure
STUDIES

LEARNING
Fig.
(a)
(b)
Fig.16:
Version
Connection
Correct
15:II
Adopted
FROM
Torsion
42connection
FAILURES:
-{PAGE
detail
and
of correct
purlins
}asdetail
CASE
adopted
seating
STUDIES
at detail
site of purlin

Over 30,000
LEARNING
Fig.17:
13.0
Lessons
Solution
FROMpeople
learnt
FAILURES:
adopted
are
fromreported
CASE
to hold
the
STUDIES
Gujarat
tothehave
purlin
Earthquake
diedininplace
of 26earthquake
the
January 2001
of magnitude 7.9
(on the Scale), which hit parts of Northwest Gujarat on Republic Day 2001. Thous
Richter
ands of- who had led respectable life-styles till then - have seen their life-sa
people
vingstheir
and
vanish
lives irrevocably destroyed. Do we have to accept this human suffering
carnage
and
with fatalism and detachment? Or can we protect our buildings by careful
and
Earthquakes
designs
thereby in
saveCalifornia
lives? of even larger magnitudes have not resulted in losses
in life
this
magnitude,
of
because the buildings in that State are required to comply with
the States
Earthquake-resistant
Design Codes. Indeed, when an earthquake of similar magnitu
de hit U.S.A. on 1 March 2001 there was not even a single loss of life and onl
Seattle,
y a few were injured, none seriously. This is the result of the extensive retrof
persons
itting
was
carried
that out in the city during the 1970s. The Central Public Works Department
claimed
has
that none of their buildings in the Kutch area had suffered any damage d
the earthquake due to their sound structural designing. Clearly, the technology
uring
exists toour buildings and prevent loss of lives and -equally clearly -the buildi
protect
ng Gujarat
in
designs have not been subjected to checks on their structural adequacy and on
safety
their by qualified Structural Engineers and Soil Engineers. (IS 13920 pertains
Ductile Detailing of Reinforced Structures subjected to Seismic Forces and IS4326,
to
Earthquake
prescribed
to
checks
resistant
wereDesign
not insisted
and Construction
on before the
of Buildings.)
appropriate authorities
Clearly, these
approv
Codeed the for construction. Thousands of these buildings collapsed subsequently, d
designs
the availability
espite
There
is an irrational
of design
reluctance
guidance.
to use Steel Structures among many professiona
ls in largely due to misinformation, lack of confidence, or inexperience. Steel
India
Version II 42 -{PAGE }
is

inherentlyFROM
LEARNING
ductile;
FAILURES:
steelCASE
structural
STUDIES components, when stretched or elongated und
overload, do not fail or collapse. On the other hand, concrete is a fracture-sen
er
material, which cracks under tensile forces. As a material, concrete is inherent
sitive
unsuitable to sustain overloads or repeated loads caused by earthquakes neverthe
ly
reinforced concrete was used as the preferred material of choice in practically
less
building. The only steel-concrete composite multi-storeyed building under constr
every
in Ahmedabad
uction
The
ignorancesuffered
of currently
no damage
available
due totechnology
the earthquake.
is compounded by the willingness
Indian
of theBuilders and clients to accept shoddy and primitive construction, particu
larly in structures. There is very little quality control of concretes used in I
concrete
buildings. There areinadequate
ndian
reinforcing-steel,
endemic problems
concretesuch
coverastolowreinforcing
cement content,
steel and
poornon-existe
quality
nt site
supervision;
all of these will need to be remedied systematically to prevent rep
etition
this
The
following
disaster.
of
is a partial list of inadequacies and infractions, identified by p
engineers
rofessional
Most buildings
who visited
that hadAhmedabad
a planning
after
approval
the disaster:
for (Ground floor plus 4 levels) had
further
a
floor added illegally; buildings with approval for (Ground floor plus 10
gardens
features
triggered
levels)
Columns (on
had
loaded
ofthesome
twocollapse.
soils
from
further
ofspread
thesefloors
above
towere
luxury
a depth
added
terminated
buildings.
ofillegally.
oneatmetre
Obviously
theSwimming
over end
free
thepools
they
roof)
of
were
a cantilever
and/or
were added
unsafe
roof
andat the
second floor level. There was no provision for transferring these loads on to th
eMost
used
foundations.
for
buildings
car parking.
that collapsed
The flexible
were columns
built onatstilts,
the ground
with floor
the ground
levelfloor
failedbeing
rapi
during the earthquake and initiated the progressive collapse of these buildings.
dly
This type of failure could have been prevented by concrete infill walls or suita
designed
bly
substantial
The falling
bracings
concrete
loss
oftolife
the during
debris
ground
fromthe
floor
collapsed
earthquake.
columns.
structural
It is essential
componentsthat
caused
the structu
integrityEach
ral
failed.
of building
the building
should
be be
maintained
effectively
eventied
if the
together
individual
at each
members
principal
had floo
rand roof level in both directions. Reinforcing bars in concrete floors should be
effectively anchored to the beams at its edges, so that these floors would funct
as -{PAGE
ion
causing
Version
42
edge-supported
damage.
II
}
membranes, rather than fall down on the floor below, thereby

Well-designed
LEARNING
collapsed
In many buildings,
FROM
around
FAILURES:
lift
it,shafts
only
as the
CASE
would
lift
former
STUDIES
effectively
shaft
was not
was effectively
saved,
function
andasthe
connected
core
restwalls
oftothe
and
thebuilding
provide
latter.t
much
he
Buildings
neededthat
stability
are unsymmetrical
in multi-storey
in plan
buildings.
will be subjected to unexpected twistin
gwhich
is
sensible
would to
cause
split
substantial
such plansdamage.
into rectangles,
Re-entrant with
corners
a crumple
should zone
be avoided.
(or constru
It
joint)
ction
The buildings
All
structural
in-between.
should
framinginvariably
system chosen
be designed
should to
invariably
prevent collapse
be of theand
strong
loss of
column
life
under the most severe earthquake it is likely to be subject to within its design
life. All structural components should be designed with adequate ductility, whic
hwouldlessons
strength
The
allow
or from
largethis
structural
plastic
experience
integrity.
deformations
and loss
to of
develop,
life must
without
be ansignificant
eye-openerloss
for all
of
professionals. Sound engineering principles should never be compromised and ther
building
e isrecent
no
14.0
In
room
SUMMARY
foryears,
complacency,
case studies
when have
it comes
cometotosafety.
be recognised as a source of understa
nding ourstate of technology and its limitations. Much improvement of our design
present
has been possible from a study of failures; these provide an invaluable source o
concepts
finformation about design limitations. Design is a process of the anticipation of
and
failure,
as such the more knowledgeable the designer is about failures, the more reli
able chapter
designs
This
hiswill provides
be.
examples of failures due to design error, construction err
or and
communication
Petroski,
1.
REFERENCES
Roebling,
H.Journal
gap
Failure
among
of Performance
asthea Source
team members
ofofConstructed
Engineering
having different
Facilities,
Judgement:
responsibilities.
Case ofvolJohn
ASCE,
7, n2, Feb.
Kagan,
2.
Trusses,
1993, 46-58.
H. Journal
A., Common
of Performance
Causes of of
Collapse
Constructed
of Metal-Plate-Connected
Facilities, vol. 7,Wood
n4, Nov,
Roof 1993,
Version
225-233.
42
pp.-{PAGEII}

4.
LEARNING
Morgenstern,
3.
Engineering
Delatte,
FROMJ.,
N.
Education
J.,
FAILURES:
Failure
Theand
FiftyCASE
Practice,
Case
STUDIES
Nine-Story
Studies
vol.and123,
Crisis,
Ethics
n1, in
Journal
Jan.,19
Engineering
of Professional
97,
pp.mechanics
23-29. issues
Courses,
in
Journal of Professional issues in Engineering Education and Practice, vol. 123,
Jan.,1997,
n1,
Lichtenstein,
5.
of
Dias,
6.
Engineer,
Petroski,
7.
8Engineering
Professional
1989,
Subramaniam,
9.
Advanced
The
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Madras.
Banset,
Constructed
authors
W.E.Course
273-288.
P.H.,
vol.
pp.
A.,
S.,
International,
are
issues
N.,
A.72,
111-116.
Facilities,
Communication
Case
on
grateful
G.,
Structural
n2,
Rehabilitation
inDesign
Engineering
Histories
ThetoJan.,
18
Siver
vol.
April
ofFailures
Dr.
and
Failure
Steel
7,1995,
1994,
N.
Bridge
ofSubramaniam
n4,Skeletal
the
Education
Steel
and
pp.
Nov,
Study
pp.
in
Collapse
Design
25-29.
Hyatt
250-254.
Structures-Some
1993,
ofStructures,
and
and
Structural
Regency
Recounted,
Philosophy,
Practice,
pp.
Prof.
249-261.
Disaster
A.Dec
Failures,
vol.115,
Case
R.Journal
The
16-18,
Santhakumar
Studies,
,Structural
Journal
n3,
of1998,
Structural
Performance
July
who
of h
SERC,
provided
ave
Version
42
-{PAGEIIthe
} case studies described in section 2.0.