Translated by David Johnston

THE HISTORY OF THE PANZERKORPS GROSSDEUTSCHLAND VOL. 1

By Helmuth Spaeter
An English translation by David Johnston
Copyright 1992 by
J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.
Originally published in German
As DIE GESCHICHTE DER PANZERKORPS GROSSDEUTSCHLAND I
In 1958, Bielefeld, Germany
English Edition published by
J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.
267 Whitegates Crescent
Winnipeg, Manitoba
Canada R3K 1L2
(204) 837-6080
Printed in the USA
ISBN 0-921991-12-6
Typesetting - The JADA Group
Printed by Publishers Press

PUBLISHER'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank the following individuals who have contributed to the publishing
of this book.
David Johnston - Translation
George Rugenius - Proofreading
Timothy Wallace - Maps
Matt Reinert - GD cuffband
Brian Molloy - Cover Design
I also wish to thank you the reader for purchasing this book, and all those of you
who have written to me with your kind words of praise and encouragement. It
gives me the impetus to continue to publish translations of the best German books
available. More excellent books are either being prepared or negotiated, thanks to
your helpful proposals. These will be announced as they near completion.
John Fedorowicz
Books published by J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing
THE LEIBSTANDARTE (1 SS Panzer Division) volumes I, II, and III
EUROPEAN VOLUNTEERS (5 SS Panzer Division)
DAS REICH I (2 SS Panzer Division)
OTTO WEIDINGER
OTTO KUMM
MANHAY, THE ARDENNES; CHRISTMAS 1944
ARMOR BATTLES OF THE WAFFEN - SS 1943-1945
TIGER; THE HISTORY OF A LEGENDARY WEAPON 1942-45
HITLER MOVES EAST
In preparation for publication in the coming year
PANZER ACES
TIGERS IN THE MUD
EASTFRONT DRAMA 1944
THE HISTORY OF THE 12 SS PANZER DIVISION HITLERJUGEND
SCORCHED EARTH
INFANTRY ACES
DAS REICH II
THE LEIBSTANDARTE IV/1

J . J . Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.

CONTENTS

Introduction

Part One - BETWEEN THE W A R S

Chapter O n e The Origins of

GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Chapter Two The History of Wachregiment Berlin
Chapter Three The Infanterie-Lehrregiment
Chapter Four Reorganisation of the Wachregiment

20
21
29
33

Part Two - W A R IN THE WEST

Chapter O n e - I.R. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Leaves Berlin
Chapter Two In the Homeland
Chapter Three The Day before the Attack
Chapter Four The Initial Days of the Attack
Chapter Five Crossing the Meuse near Sedan
Chapter Six The Battle for the Stonne Heights
Chapter Seven Breakthrough to the Sea
Chapter Eight To the Seine
Chapter Nine Pursuit until the Cease-fire
Chapter Ten The Armistice
Chapter Eleven Preparations for "Sea Lion" and
"Felix"
Chapter Twelve Wachbataillon Berlin and the
Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon
Chapter Thirteen The Balkan War
Chapter Fourteen Entry into Yugoslavia But No
Fighting!

41
52
55
60
75
85
98
112
126
136
144
149
153
156

Part Three - THE W A R IN THE EAST

Chapter One The Soviet Union as a Power and Opponent of
the German Wehrmacht
Chapter Two The Reinforced Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND in the Attack
in the East
Chapter Three Across the Beresina to the Dniepr
Chapter Four The Battle near Smolensk

171

174
189
193

Chapter Five The Defensive Battle near Jelnja and

Smolensk
Chapter Six - The Battle of Kiev
Chapter Seven Forest Battle near Karachev
Chapter Eight The Advance on Moscow
Chapter Nine - The Battles for Tula
Chapter Ten The Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon
Chapter Eleven The I.R. GD in the Winter Retreat
1941-42
Chapter Twelve - The Eastern Front Soldier 1941-45

205
223
232
238
247
261
265
290

Part Four - BATTLES IN THE EAST 1942

Chapter One The Infantry Division (mot.)
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Chapter Two Preparations for the Summer
Offensive
Chapter Three Breakthrough to the Don
Chapter Four Pursuit to the Manych
Chapter Five The Replacement Units
Chapter Six In the Wolfsschanze

293
313
319
365
384
388

Part Five - WITH A R M Y G R O U P CENTRE

Chapter One The Defensive Battle for Rzhev
Chapter Two With the Ninth Army in the Winter Battle
1942-43

391
436

INTRODUCTION
HISTORICAL UNDERTONES
GrenadierFusilierMusketeer
In the beginning the role of the Grenadier was to throw hand
grenades at the enemy. The grenades which in the modern sense
would be termed hand grenades were hollow spheres of iron or
lead, or sometimes glass, weighing two to three pounds. Because of
their weight, the handling of these weapons demanded especially
brawny and daring men, possessing great stamina. The Grenadier
had to carry his grenades close enough to the enemy to be sure of
hitting him, but also close enough to ensure that the resulting
explosions did not inflict casualties on his own troops.
Because of the unique nature of his fighting style, the Grenadier
was especially well suited to dispersed actions such as the taking of
important defensive strongpoints. Distinguished by their physical
stature, strength, manly appearance and independence in action,
they sought to make their outward appearance even more fearsome
and impressive through distinguishing features which could identify
them as elite troops even from a distance. Their most conspicuous
badge was the Grenadier cap or helmet.
In the same way Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, the
oldest regiment in the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Panzer Corps, was
justifiably proud to bear the title Panzergrenadier Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND as the new elite of the German Army. In
1940 and 1941 its soldiers earned the right to bear the title of
grenadier in combat on the battlefields in the west and the east. They
laid the foundation for the reputation of the division which took the
name GROSSDEUTSCHLAND and from which other divisions
later emerged.
By this time the colourful jacket had given way to the grey field
uniform; the grenadier's cap had been replaced by the functional
steel helmet suited to modern warfare; instead of the long grenadier's
pike, non-commissioned officers carried the short, compact submachine gun; the attack was carried to the enemy in fast armoured

personnel carriers. All of the external similarities with the Grenadiers

of old had disappeared. O n e thing, however, remained: the spirit of
the Grenadier in the forefront of the attack.
Wearing the identifying white fabric braid on their shoulder straps,
they were proud to be known as Grenadiers of the PanzergrenadierRegiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.
The Fusilier owed his name less to a style of fighting than to a
particular weapon: the flintlock musket. This weapon, named fusil
by the French, possessed considerable advantages compared to the
matchlock musket commonly used at that time. While the earlier
weapon was discharged by lighting a fuse which set off the powder
charge, the flintlock musket's powder charge was ignited by a spark
caused by the flint striking the steel of the pan. Consequently, a
Fusilier was a flintlock carrier. He wore the Fusilier's cap which
featured a metal peak.
The name Fusilier first appeared in France in approximately 1640,
where a cavalry regiment was the first to be equipped with the new
type of musket. Later the foot soldiers were also equipped with the
new weapon, and by the beginning of the Eighteenth Century
European infantry, with few exceptions, carried only flintlock muskets.
Until World War One, the third battalion of the Prussian Army's
Guards and Grenadier Regiments was a Fusilier Battalion. In addition, there existed the Guards Fusilier Regiment and thirteen independent Fusilier Regiments, each with three battalions of Fusiliers.
Even after the bulk of the foot soldiery had been equipped with the
modern flintlock musket, the titles of Fusilier, Musketeer, and
Grenadier were retained. The only differences between them were
in their insignia and uniforms.
Following this tradition, the title of Fusilier was revived in April
1942 with the formation of the second GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Regiment. This sister regiment of the Panzergrenadier Regiment
joined the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Division as a Panzerfusilier
Regiment. Just as the Grenadiers were conscious of their tradition
as an elite unit, so too the Fusiliers traced their traditions back to the
Guards-Fusiliers. The red fabric braid on their shoulder straps and
the embroidered insignia " G D " identified them as members of the
Panzerfusilier Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.
The title Musketeer can be traced back to the French word
mousquet, or musket; a Musketeer is therefore a soldier carrying a
musket. One of the earliest firearms, the mousquet appeared at the
beginning of the Sixteenth Century, replacing the cumbersome
arquebous with its three-legged support. The word mousquet goes
back to the Italian moschetti, which originally meant a small type of
sparrow-hawk which was used for hawking. The Musketeer, as the
bearer of one of the oldest firearms, remained the general term for
10

the mass of the foot soldiery; his title is much older than that of the
Grenadier or Fusilier.
By 1520 the then new musket was introduced into Spain and the
Netherlands by the Duke of Alba. However, with a weight of fifteen
to twenty pounds, it remained a rather heavy and unwieldy weapon.
The musket required support in the form of the so-called "musketfork" in order to fire its approximately 60-gram ball. Under King
Gustav Adolf in the Thirty Year's War the weight of the musket was
reduced to about five pounds. In Germany in the Sixteenth Century
each troop received fifty men armed with muskets, who were
designated Musketiere. The Musketiere of Frederick the Great were
capable of getting off five shots per minute.
At first the musket was issued only to the best and most favoured
marksmen. Later the weapon was also issued to the common foot
soldiery, who were likewise designated Musketeers, even after the
contemporary musket had been replaced by newer, technically
improved weapons. As well, their uniforms continued to identify
them as Musketeers at first.
When, in the last months of the Second World War, the two
armoured and motorised infantry regiments of the Panzergrenadier
Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND were joined by a third regiment
of the same style, it was designated Panzermusketier Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND in recognition of this oldest name for the
firearm-bearing soldier. Originating from units of the Panzergrenadier Regiment GD, after its formation the unit initially bore the
title Panzerkorps Fusilier Regiment GD in order to identify it as a
regiment of the Corps. As a result of the situation in the East,
however, it went into action in March 1945 as Panzermusketier
Regiment GD under the command of the Panzergrenadier Regiment
GD.
T h e Artillery
By its nature the artillery is characterised as a weapon which
supports the infantry in the attack or the defence. Like its sister
weapon the anti-aircraft artillery, the heavy weapons of the artillery
were indispensable in land warfare. The crash of artillery fire was
music to the ears of the infantry.
The development of artillery followed a different path from that of
the infantry. The origin of the word artillery which first appeared
in the German language around 1500 is uncertain. The appearance of artillery, however, goes back to antiquity, when the
Roman legions were supported in their attacks on fortified strongholds by catapults which flung heavy stones at the enemy. These
machines were the forerunners of actual artillery.

11

It was roughly at the beginning of the Fourteenth Century that

gunpowder was first used to propel stone or iron balls, often weighing
several hundred pounds, from brass or iron barrels. Guns of this type
were of necessity extremely heavy and were supported by a base
made of timber, which meant that they were useful in siege warfare
but not in wars of movement. It was not until the Sixteenth Century
that lighter guns appeared which could be moved by a double team
of horses and which, for example, could be attached, even if only
temporarily, to the cavalry. King Gustav Adolf occasionally had light
regimental artillery manoeuvre with the cavalry, and by 1675 the
Great Elector already had horse-drawn artillery and mounted gun
crews. He recognised the importance of this weapon and elevated
the artillery to a permanent place in his army as an arm of the service.
In 1759 Frederick the Great formed two mounted brigades each
possessing ten six-pounder guns. The French General Lafayette,
who visited Germany in 1785 and saw this new and mobile weapon,
introduced it to France. Napoleon used massed artillery often more
than one hundred pieces as a means of deciding a battle.
The introduction of breech-loading in 1848 brought a revolution
in gun construction. Such weapons were introduced into the Prussian
Army in 1859. A further, fundamental improvement followed around
1900 with the invention of barrel recoil, which significantly increased
the cannon's rate of fire. The positional warfare of the First World
War brought a tremendous increase in the artillery of both sides. The
most numerous German field guns of the First World War the light
and heavy field-howitzers remained, albeit in improved form, the
most important weapons of the divisional artillery in the post-war
period and into the Second World War.
The men who served the guns went from being referred to as piece
servers to bombardiers. The latter were numbered among the expert
artisans who rendered their oath not to the flag or to the gun, but to
the gun's load. In 1731 the bombardiers received the so-called
bombardier caps, which were made from black oilcloth and featured
bands which carried artillery emblems. The word cannoneer is
borrowed from the French, where the term was already in use in
1411.
Like almost every other trade, the artillery too had its patron saint.
The patron saint of miners was Barbara, who had stopped the
firedamp. When the thunderboxes arrived, she was revered as the
guardian of the artillery who commanded the lightning of battle and
before whom the walls of cities collapsed. This remains so to the
present day.
More modern versions of the early cannon were perm a n e n t , indispensable elements of the PanzergrenadierDivision GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. From the 4 0 0 t h Artillery
Battalion, which accompanied the Infantry Regiment GROSS12

DEUTSCHLAND in 1940, there arose in early 1942 the Panzer

Artillery
Regiment
of
the
Panzergrenadier-Division
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.
The
Panzerartillerie-Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND comprised four mixed battalions, in part equipped with armoured Wespe
and Hummel self-propelled guns, supported by a battery of 10-cm
cannon, a mortar battery and an armoured observation battery.
Whether employed in concert or individually, the artillery was the
backbone of the infantry in combat on all fronts.
Assault G u n s
The experiences of the First World War led to the development of
assault gun units by the artillery.
By 1916 it had been shown that it was necessary to provide
attacking and defending infantry with direct artillery support which
could eliminate the enemy's heavy weapons with direct fire. Light
artillery units filled this role. Operating in the front lines in close
cooperation with the infantry, without any protection against enemy
counter-fire, and using weapons which were too large and lacking
sufficient mobility for the role, they still achieved considerable
success.
As a result of this experience, in 1936 the artillery's ArtilerieLehrregiment in Jterbog developed an assault gun based on the
existing Panzer III chassis. The vehicle was initially armed with the
short-barrelled 7.5-cm KwK. This gun, which had been developed
for the Panzer IV, was installed on the chassis of the Panzer III in a
fixed, armoured superstructure. The optical-panoramic telescope,
which was used to aim the assault gun's cannon, and the scissors
telescope, which was employed as the means of observation for the
assault gun's commander, were standard artillery equipment. As was
standard practice in German tanks, VHF wireless equipment
provided communication between guns. As a result of experience
gained in numerous combat exercises with the Infanterie-Lehrregiment in peacetime, following the Polish Campaign the first assault
gun battery was formed in Jterbog in wartime formation three
platoons, each with two assault guns. (At this time the platoon
leader's vehicle was not an assault gun, but an armoured, one-ton
personnel carrier.)
This 640th Battery was attached to the Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND prior to the French Campaign and afterwards was incorporated as the regiment's 16th Company. The
assault guns soon proved their worth and made a significant contribution to the regiment's success in the French Campaign. In
addition, the technical and tactical experiences of this first front-line

13

assault gun battery significantly influenced the development and

equipment fit of all of the army's assault gun units.
Following the 1941/42 campaign in Russia, this first assault gun
battery was incorporated as the 1st Battery of the new
Sturmgeschtzabteilung
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.
Without any actual traditions of its own, this weapon, which
developed solely from its own experience and the esprit de corps of
the volunteers who streamed in from every artillery unit, subsequently
played a decisive role in every theatre.
The Allied nations learned from the effect of this new weapon and
by war's end and increasingly so after the war formed assault
gun units to support their infantry in attack and defence.
The Hussars
The Hussar was originally a light, quick and manoeuvrable
horseman, whose duties within the unit were scouting, delivering
messages and reconnaissance. His success depended on the strength
and speed of his horse. His weapons were the sabre or sword,
carbine and lance. Mounted troops were divided into light and heavy
cavalry according to the breed of horse and the size of the riders. In
the German Army the heavy cavalry consisted of the Cuirassiers, the
Horse Guards and the Carabineers; while the light cavalry included
the Hussars and the Cheveaulegers. In the middle were the Ulans,
Dragoons and Mounted Riflemen.
The Hussars thus formed the Light Cavalry Regiments. Their
origins go back to the Hungarian cavalry, when the superiority of
the Turks made it necessary to call upon swift, agile and skilled
horsemen to carry out the roles of reconnaissance and pursuit. The
term Hussar is of Hungarian origin (Husz = twenty, ar = price). From
1435 Hungarian cavalry was raised in the following way: every
twenty independent estates were responsible for the cost of furnishing and maintaining a horseman. With the increasing significance of
more daring, faster and lighter cavalry, the name Hussar gradually
came into use in all armies.
The first Prussian Hussar units were formed in 1721. Frederick
the Great expanded these and created the famous Hussar Corps with
ten elite Hussar Regiments.
The duties of the Hussar units were determined by the characteristics of the light cavalry. The earlier task of long-range reconnaissance disappeared with increasing mechanization. However, short
range reconnaissance remained one of the main duties of the Hussar
units. In addition, the Hussars were given the task of screening their
own side's offensive intentions by countering enemy patrols, as well
as that of covering the flanks in a war of movement. Adjustments to

14

meet the demands of mechanized warfare brought tanks to the

Hussars, enabling them to fill a modern combat role.
When the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Infantry Division was formed
in 1942, the motorcycle battalion was designated as its reconnaissance unit. The squadrons came from all parts of Germany. The titles
of "squadron" and "Rittmeister" (cavalry captain) were introduced
early on, as the unit had taken on the duties of the earlier Hussar
units. Later, the unit was redesignated the Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, adopting the gold-yellow badge of the cavalry.
In the old cavalry spirit reminiscent of their predecessors on
horseback, the Hussars of the modern war, the men of the Armoured
Reconnaissance Battalion GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, carried their
patrols deep into enemy territory in order to provide their headquarters with vital intelligence information.
Tanks
The tank is a modern mechanized weapon which increasingly
came to the fore in attack and defence, and which decisively
influenced the entire conduct of warfare, quite apart from the tactics
on the battlefield. The infamous static trench warfare of the First
World War was transformed into a war of movement in the Second
World War by the use of tanks, whose operations in the war's
opening stages were nothing short of classic. The tank commanders
also came to the fore, and Generaloberst Guderian, the creator of
the German Panzer force, must be mentioned as the outstanding
German representative.
With the trials in Spain in 1936 the tanks of the First World War,
clumsy and possessing limited mobility, gave way to those suited for
the armoured thrust which was to characterise the Second World
War.
Until 1942 there were four types of tank in production in Germany:
the Panzer I weight approx. 9 tons 3 man crew 2 machine
guns
the Panzer II weight approx. 12 tons 4 man crew 1 - 2-cm
KwK and 1 machine gun
the Panzer III weight approx. 18 tons 5 man crew 1 - 3.7-cm
or 5-cm KwK and 2 machine guns
the Panzer IV weight approx. 24 tons 5 man crew 1 - 7.5-cm
KwK and 2 machine guns

15

Above all it was upon the last two types that the reputation of the
German Panzer Arm was built in the first two years of the war.
Additional factors were the thorough training of the crews, as well
as the fighting spirit of the troops and the superior command of the
German tank units. With the beginning of the Russian Campaign in
1941 the clear superiority of the German Panzers decreased. Although the Russians initially committed heavily armoured and powerfully armed but unwieldy types such as the 52-ton KV II, in the
autumn of 1941 they sent the improved 44-ton KV I and the feared
26-ton T-34 into battle. It was the latter type which was subsequently
to dominate the war in the East. Without doubt the T-34 combined
qualities which came close to the ideal of the modern tank: speed,
mobility and relatively strong armour combined with a favourable
exterior shape (sloped surfaces). An additional advantage was the
firepower of its 7.62-cm cannon and two machine guns. The Panzer
III was no match for the T-34 and the Panzer IV could deal with the
Russian tank only under favourable conditions. But just as every
action results in a reaction, so the appearance of this Russian tank
called every German tank-producing firm into action. This development work resulted in the Panzer V (Panther) and Panzer VI (Tiger).
The Panther weighed approximately 44 tons, carried a crew of five
and was armed with a long-barrelled 7.5-cm KwK and two machine
guns.
The Tiger weighed approximately 55 tons, carried a crew of five
and was armed with an 8.8-cm KwK and two machine guns.
The Tiger II appeared towards the end of the war. It weighed 70
tons, had a five man crew and was armed with an 8.8-cm KwK and
two machine guns.
These German Panzer types restored the balance between the
warring nations in the field of tank construction.
Working as a unit, the tank crew formed a fighting team. The
success of the Panzer Arm depended largely on the fighting spirit of
the crews.
At the beginning of 1942 the I.(Flammpanzer) Abt./Pz.-Rgt.100
was formed for the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Infantry Division. In
February it was incorporated into the Division as Panzer-Abteilung
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. This unit constituted the cadre battalion
of the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Panzer Regiment. Possessing a
battalion each of Panzer IVs, Panthers and Tigers, the Panzer
regiment was the sharp sword in the hands of the division's commanders and saw action in offensive and defensive roles on the
Eastern Front as well as in the West. Even in the hopeless situations
of the final months of the war, many enemy attacks failed in the face
of the defence put up by the division's tanks.

16

C o m b a t E n g i n e e r s (Pioniere)
The Pionier, whose name perhaps came from the French pion
(walker), or even more probably from the Italian piccone (pickaxe),
was first trained and employed in France around 1500 as a builder
of field fortifications; hence the present-day meaning of the name.
In the Prussian Army the term first appeared in the Imperial Order
of 8 January 1742 from General von Walrave, the fortress builder
of Frederick the Great, which created the Regiment Pionniers,
whose first assignment was the improvement of the fortress works
on the Nei.
The designation Pionier in the present-day sense first appeared in
1810, when the existing mining and pontooning companies were
united in a Pionier Corps. The members of the corps were called
miners, sappers and pontooneers, indicating their specialised roles.
The Pionier s role included the duties of close combat; he was
trained not just for the technical role of a combat engineer, but also
on all infantry weapons. The flamethrower was the Pionier's best
means of dealing with enemy fortifications.
When, in 1940, the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
joined the fighting in the West, it was soon followed by the then 18th
(Pionier) Company. But it was to be Sturm-Pionier-Bataillon 43,
which was not incorporated, but which was attached to the regiment,
that accompanied it in the East and West. Cooperation and joint
success led, with the formation of the division, to the incorporation
of this unit as Sturm-Pionier-Bataillon GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.
The "Sturm" prefix was a special honour which indicated that the
unit had distinguished itself in action, specifically in the storming of
the fortress of Brest-Litovsk. This tradition was enhanced by the later
Panzer-Sturm-Pionier-Bataillon
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND in
all
of its actions and, with the reorganisation as Panzer-Corps
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, was carried on by its successors, the
Panzer-Pionier-Regiment and the Panzer-Corps-Pionier-Bataillon 500 GD
When the Pioniers fought their last great battle at the Wolittnick
railway embankment in East Prussia in March 1945, they did so as
members of Panzer-Pionier-Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.

17

Evolution from Wach. Rgt. BERLIN to Pz. Korps GD, from 1937 to 8 May 1945.
Illustrated on Pages 18 + 19.

Part I
BETWEEN

THE

WARS

Chapter One
The Origins of GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
W i t h the a b o v e l a c o n i c a n n o u n c e m e n t i n the A r m y
Verordnungsblatt, the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND came into being. Well known in Germany at that time was
the ceremonial guard in Berlin. Three times per week, accompanied
by the beating of drums, the guard was drawn up on the Unter den
Linden. At the stroke of twelve noon it marched through the
Brandenburg Gate to relieve the guards in front of the memorial in
the Schinkel Building. This guard, or " Wache` as it had been known
in the local Berlin dialect for many decades, was drawn from a
company of the unit which was quartered at the Moabit barracks.
Wachregiment Berlin, which was stationed there, produced the best
drill soldiers in the German Army.
It was decreed that this regiment was to form the basis of the new
unit. The new regiment was to represent the entire German Reich
in one unit. Only with this in mind can one understand the words of
the new regiment's first commander, Oberst von Stockhausen, on
the occasion of the unit's naming ceremony:
In our proud name we wish to embody the greater German
Wehrmacht, and we wish to do our duty like every unit of the German
Army. But just as we now march at the head of parades, so to we
wish, if it should someday come to that, to be able to lead the way
in the attack."
The choice of duties was appropriate, as the Wachregiment had
already carried out similar tasks for years. But it was also a requirement that the regiment's members all be volunteers and moreover
that it be volunteers from every region of Germany that formed the
the new unit.
20

The members of Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND

and the later division have grateful memories of General Schmundt,
who quite correctly was seen as the father of the new formation. As
long as there was a GD unit he came to its assistance, even speaking
directly to Hitler on its behalf. The introduction of the cuff title, similar
to those of the SS, was undoubtedly a result of a recommendation
by Schmundt.
The volunteers served proudly in their unit, mindful of the traditions
of their predecessors and true to the motto:
He who swears an oath on the Prussian flag,
no longer has anything which belongs to himself!
Proudly they served, true to the oath of allegiance they had taken
to the unit that bore the name:

GROSSDEUTSCHLAND

Chapter Two
The History of Wachregiment Berlin
The Versailles Treaty of 1919, which carried the seeds of the
Second World War, permitted Germany, in addition to the police,
the formation of a professional army. Because of its numerical limits
it was called the 100,000-man-Army or Reichswehr. It was intended
strictly to be a force for maintaining order, countering internal unrest
and preventing possible attacks against Germany.
In the course of the creation of the Reichswehr it became apparent
that it would be necessary to station a unit in the capital city of Berlin.
Tasks had arisen there which could not be carried out by the police
alone. The possibility of putting down attempted coups in the capital,
the question of guarding military installations and command centres
(such as the newly-constructed Reichswehr Ministry), the provision
of honour guards for state visits, funerals, memorial days etc., as well
as the necessity of having a reliable unit available, led in early 1921
(H.V.-Blatt Nr. 35 of 1921) to the formation of the Wachregiment
Berlin. In order to create an operationally- ready unit as quickly as
possible, whole companies and battalions were ordered to Berlin
from the available regiments in Germany.
The Wachregiment Berlin soon became a thorn in the side of the
left-wing parliamentary group in the Reichstag, which believed that
it perceived a threat in the new unit. Therefore, on 19 June 1921
(H.V.-Blatt Nr. 35 of 24 June 1921) the Wachregiment was
disbanded.

21

Soon, however, as a military unit in Berlin for guard and ceremonial

duties had proved indispensable, an alternative was found. The
Kommando der Wachtruppe was created. Wisely, the title of
battalion or detachment was omitted, since the companies which
comprised the Kommando were ordered to Berlin for a period of
only three months. The Kommando der Wachtruppe retained this
name and form for several years.
From the time of its formation the Kommando was quartered in
the barracks of the famous 4th Guards Foot Regiment and the 1st
Guards Field Artillery Regiment on Rathenower Strae in BerlinMoabit. The 4th Guards Foot Regiment in particular enjoyed a great
popularity among the population of Moabit. In fact, the 4th Guards
became known locally as the "Moabit violets" on account of their
blue shoulder straps. The barracks also enjoyed a certain degree of
fame, as it was from there that the Spartakist uprising had been put
down at the end of 1918. They were the only barracks that the
Spartakists had been unable to storm.
The units of the Kommando themselves were billeted in the
barrack blocks, while the so-called Kommando-Stab roughly
comparable to a battalion headquarters had quarters in the building
at 10 Rathenower Strae. The detached units were under its financial
and disciplinary control for the duration of their duty. The Kommando-Stab itself, to which belonged a limited number of permanent
staff and a music corps under Obermusikmeister Friedrich Ahlers,
was under the direct control of the Kommandantur Berlin, Unter
den Linden 1.
The Kommando der Wachtruppe consisted of seven rifle companies and a machine gun company, and from time to time a battery
of artillery. The companies were provided by the seven Reichswehr
divisions in a specified sequence usually for a period of three
months and following their duty returned to their divisions. The
orders for troop movements were issued by the Reichswehr Ministry.
The companies continued to be a part of their regiments, carried
their regiment's number on their shoulder straps and retained their
own structure. Nevertheless, during their duty with the Kommando
they were designated 1st Company/ Wachtruppe Berlin, 2nd Comp a n y / W a c h t r u p p e Berlin and so on. This arrangement continued
until 31 August 1934.
The companies went to Berlin with full combat strength and
equipment and were able to carry on their training as long as they
were not required for duty with the Kommando. In this way it was
ensured that the companies did not fall behind in their combat
training while assigned to Berlin.
As a result of the practice of each division furnishing a company
the Kommando der Wachtruppe mirrored the entire German
Army, with men from every region of the country. Each company
22

retained its regional characteristics, which often gave rise to goodnatured comparisons, but also to much welcome rivalry in routine
duties.
Franz Bischoff, then a member of the 7th (Bavarian) Company,
described the maintenance of regional customs and practices:
"The furnishings in the halls and rooms of the companies' quarters
reflected the origins of each unit. Everywhere there were slogans on
the walls, pictures of home and so on, and everywhere were the
respective state colours. In addition there were the unadulterated
regional accents among all ranks no one could go wrong when
looking for someone from his own state. Company festivals,
Christmas celebrations and other events always exhibited a regional
character. When considering the maintenance of regional customs
the 7th Company always comes to mind. That company's long-serving company commander, Major Hofmeister, saw to it that his
countrymen remained Bavarians even in the Reich capital and felt
at home there. Their presentations at the well- arranged Oktoberfests, Christmas celebrations, carnival evenings and so on were
always very original and entertaining. When they danced and
yodelled in their Bavarian costumes it thrilled even the hearts of the
Prussian guests. Another great attraction was the so-called 'Bavarian
mess,' which was actually only a beer cellar. It had been set up by
the company from its own resources and was simply, but pleasantly,
decorated. After their duties were over, soldiers of all ranks could sit
together on long, whitewashed wooden tables and exchange
opinions over something to eat and a Moa of real Bavarian beer.
Officers, senior commanders and government ministers, among
others, also met there frequently, taking an interested part in the
enjoyable activities of their Bavarian comrades, with some even
becoming regular guests. The mess was provisioned mainly from
Bavaria; Geselchtes, Leberks, Weiwurst and Brathnd'l were
flown to Berlin, while the good Ingolstdter beer came by truck
directly from the brewery. On leaving this familiar, hospitable spot
for home, the eyes of every soldier fell on the mural painted on the
broadside of the cellar:
"Never reproach the acts of soldiers,
Let them have fun let them kiss;
Who knows, how soon they will have to die."
At that time probably no one suspected. . . how soon.
Each company led its individual existence according to its native
customs and practices, but differences disappeared in the fulfilment
of their common duties. Among their duties was the provision of
guards, including the following:

23

The War Memorial Guard (Wache Ehrenmal) (Guard house in the

Kommandantur Berlin)
The Reichswehr Ministry Guard (Wache Reichswehrministerium)
the largest guard with approximately 90 men.
The Brandenburg Gate Guard (Wache Brandenburger Tor)
The Court Martial Guard (Wache Kriegsgericht) (established following
a theft)
The Reich President's Palace Guard (Wache ReichsprsidentenPalais)
The Barrack Guards (Kasernen-Wachen) on Kruppstrae (centre,
south and east blocks)
The Armoured Troops Guard (Wache Panzer-Truppen)
Other guards included:
The Army Ordnance Office (Heereswaffenamt) (Zoo station,
Landwehr Mess),
The Commander-in-Chief of the Army (Oberbefehlshaber des
Heeres)
The guard at the Reichswehr Ministry usually numbered forty to
fifty men. It was only during a guard parade with music that it may
have reached a strength of approximately ninety men.
The guard's watch went from noon to noon on the following day.
The affected company was placed at readiness the day before its
duty began. The famous guard parade with band took place every
Sunday, Tuesday and Thursday. The parade route led from Moabit
through the Brandenburg Gate and along the Unter den Linden to
the war memorial in the Schinkel Building. The officer commanding
the guard parade usually rode the white horse "Alaric." The horse,
too, went on to become quite famous and is well-remembered by
many Berliners.
In addition to guard duties the Kommando der Wachtruppe also
had to carry out the parades which were ordered "from above" from
time to time. The execution of the parade demanded Prussian
precision. To ensure this, the parade routine was run through over
and over again in advance using models. The parade's assembly,
marchpast and departure were plotted precisely on large-scale maps
of the city. The commander of the 7th Company, Major Hoffmeister,
proved to be an expert at assembling parades. Hoffmeister later
served on the staff of the Wachtruppe, where he was responsible
for that one task.
In addition to the purely military duties which had to be carried
out, there was always time for the soldiers to tour the Reich capital
and become familiar with its attractions and to pay a visit to Potsdam
and Sanssouci.
With the emergence of the "Third Reich," and more specifically in
the autumn of 1934, the former Kommando der Wachtruppe was
redesignated Wachtruppe Berlin. With this redesignation began a

24

Map of the Wachregiment's Barracks

25

transformation of the unit which was to come to a temporary

conclusion in 1937.
The Wachtruppe Berlin consisted initially of seven companies;
however, in autumn 1936 it was enlarged to eight. Moreover, in that
year a headquarters company was added which consisted of a signals
platoon, two bands, officer personnel and so on. At this time the
unit still did not possess heavy infantry weapons, as the artillery
battery had been sent to Jterbog. Generalmajor z.V. von Keiser was
acting commander until October 1935 when he was relieved by
Oberst Freiherr von und zu Gilsa. The unit's duties remained
unchanged.
However, the rapid build-up of the new German Wehrmacht,
which had been under way since 1935, brought revolutionary
changes to the parade unit in Berlin. Oberst von Alten, who was
named commander of Wachtruppe Berlin on 6 October 1936, was
given the task of reorganising the unit as the Wachregiment Berlin.
The order was given by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
Generaloberst Frhr. von Fritsch, and was published in the H.V.-Blatt
of 23 June 1937. The regiment was to retain this designation with
brief interruptions until the end of the Second World War.
At this stage the Wachregiment Berlin possessed a regimental
headquarters with the attached headquarters company, as well as
eight companies whose regional composition was retained. The
regiment now had a cadre of officers to which belonged the commanding officer, staff officers and the company commanders, as well
as the non-commissioned officers and men necessary for internal
duties such as platoon sergeants, clothing, equipment and weapons
NCOs, clerks and drivers.
The bulk of the regiment continued to be provided by detachments
from the individual army corps. Officers and NCOs were rotated
yearly and the men every six months. The regiment's duties continued to demand hand-picked, dependable soldiers. The difference
compared with earlier times was, primarily, that the members of the
Wachregiment were under its full control with regard to discipline
and promotion. Also, the soldiers of the Wachregiment carried a
" W " on their shoulder straps, while the officers wore the letter on
their shoulder boards. As time when on the practice of rotating entire
companies was discontinued and the army corps sent individual
soldiers for duty with the Wachregiment. For example, IV Army
Corps sent a number of hand-picked men four men from each
battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment in Freiburg for duty with
the 4th Company of the Wachregiment. The detached officers and
NCOs were rotated, with half serving until spring and half until
autumn, so that half of them always had experience with the unit.
From 1938 on, the members of the Wachregiment received a penny
a day as detached service pay.
26

Parades and guard duties continued to make up the majority of the

regiment's service. Extracts from a memo-book show the regiment
participating in the following events:
August 1938 Horthy's visit to Berlin
10-13 September 1938 - Reich Party Day
3 October 1938 Entry into the Sudetenland
20 April 1939 Parade of a colour party on Hitler's birthday
28 May 1939 Visit to Berlin by Italian Foreign Minister Ciano
All of the regiment's companies were represented in the birthday
parade on 20 April 1939 except one, which was providing the
barracks and other guards. Among the special parades on extraordinary occasions were:
The International Riding and Driving Tournament
The visit by Prince Regent Paul of Yugoslavia
Participation of individual companies in UFA films in Babelsberg;
especially in the film Drei Unteroffiziere
On 1 October 1938 orders were issued for the formation of a
Wachbataillon Wien (Guard Battalion Vienna), for which the appropriate implementing statutes were published in the H.V. Blatt
1938, Section C, of 15 June 1938. These indicated that the
newly-formed battalion in Vienna was to act in accordance with the
experience and regulations of the Wachregiment Berlin. Major
Kandt and Uffz. Singer of 8th Company were sent to Vienna with a
few NCOs to assist in this regard and only for the period of the
batallion's initial establishment. However, they soon returned after
the formation took another course.
It was also in the year 1938 about June that the order came
for each company to hold fifteen to twenty soldiers and a commensurate number of officers on call at all times, ready to guard the
supreme commander during trips outside the country. The code
word for this was "Fhrerreise". A sealed envelope was on hand at
each company for this purpose.
From 12 January 1939 the task of guarding the Reich Chancellor,
Adolf Hitler, at his seat of government, the Reich Chancellory, was
added to the duties of the Wachregiment. This guard came to be
known as the Wache Fhrer.
The regiment's internal duties may be described as follows: drill
took place on the barrack square on Rathenower Strae on the third
day after the watch. Regimental drill took place on Saturday every
week. This saw the entire regiment with its eight companies drawn
up on the barrack square, with the commanding officer and his staff
officers in the centre and close by the bandsmen and music platoon.
The band played marches and, group by group, the regiment
27

marched in line past the commanding officer. Afterward the group

leaders halted the men and rifle drill was carried out. During this time
the bandsmen and music platoon practised. Drill usually lasted all
morning.
And then came the day which was to bring a decisive turning point
for the Wachregiment Berlin. On 6 April 1939 the following order
was released by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army:
In autumn 1939 the Wachregiment will be reorganised. The new
regiment will receive the title Infanterie-Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.
The supplementary instructions given by the commanding officer
at that time, Oberst von Alten, to his companies sounded almost
laconic:
"Consequently, by autumn the Wachregiment will have ceased to exist
in its present form. The final release of detached NCOs and men will take
place in June of this year."
The order had little effect at first, as the corresponding implementing statutes had not yet appeared. However, appropriate preparations had already been started. Those soldiers and detached
personnel who were to have been released in May according to their
rotation were ordered to remain with the Wachregiment until they
left the Wehrmacht. At the same time word was received that the
Wachregiment was to be redesignated as the Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND and that beginning that autumn the
regiment would be training its own recruits. The enlisted men were
to continue to perform watch and honour guard duties until the new
recruits were trained and ready to take over.
Otherwise the actual routine of the Wachregiment remained
undisturbed by the approaching reorganisation. The only changes
took place in the headquarters where the necessary planning and
paperwork was begun.
It should also be mentioned that preparations were under way for
the construction of new barracks in Moabit, the plans for which were
already complete. The ceremonial laying of the cornerstone took
place on 14 April 1939. Construction work was begun immediately;
however, the barracks were never finished as work was interrupted
by the outbreak of war on 1 September 1939.
The order of 12 June 1939, the contents of which were already
known, now arrived, resulting in the formal renaming of the former
Wachregiment Berlin
as
the
Infanterie-Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. The creation of the new regiment had begun.

28

Chapter Three
The Infantry Lehrregiment
For some time the armies of the leading military states had created
dedicated instructional units. The primary task of such units was the
testing and development of weapons, equipment, battle tactics and
techniques. The dissemination of the knowledge gained was carried
out in the form of information circulars or practical demonstrations.
In 1819, in answer to the need for such a unit, particularly for the
infantry, which was the largest component of the Army, the German
Army set up the Lehr- Infanterie-Batailon which was based in
Potsdam, Neues Palais. The men of the battalion saw active duty in
the First World War and the memorial tablet in the Olympic Village
in Berlin showed that this unit alone lost 5,567 officers, NCOs and
men between 1914 and 1918.
With the establishment of the Reichswehr following the First World
War, a unit was formed to carry out similar duties: the Lehr-und
Versuchs-Kommando fr Infanterie-Waffen in Dberitz, near
Berlin. The unit's scope was narrow, limited by the constraints faced
by the Reichswehr at that time. In 1934 an infantry battalion was
created from the Kommando which first took in its own recruits in
October 1934. At that time the battalion was organised as follows:
Battalion headquarters, with signals platoon, band
Commanding officer:
Major Fleischhauer
Adjutant:
Obit. Masius
1st (Rifle) Company:
Hptm. Gronau
2nd (Rifle) Company:
Hptm. Kokott
3rd (Rifle) Company:
Hptm. v. Rhaden, Hptm. Blochwitz, Hptm. Grell
4th (Machine Gun) Company:
Hptm. Einstmann
5th (Infantry Gun) Company:
Hptm. Greim
It was also at about this time that the Dberitz Infantry School was
created as a training school for infantry officers. The Lehrtruppe
(instructional unit) was under the command of the school for its
purposes, while the school was under the direct command of the
Inspektion fr Infanterie im Oberkommando des Heeres (IN 2).
The troops were housed in Dberitz on the edge of the well-known
troop training grounds, which had absorbed the sweat of generations
of soldiers. This was the practice field used by the Lehrtruppe for
unit trials and the testing of new infantry weapons and equipment,

29

as well as for the infantry officers and officer-cadets on courses at

the infantry school. At the disposal of these courses was the Infantry
Battalion of the Lehrtruppe.
The uniform of this infantry battalion there was no more precise
designation at first was no different than that of any other infantry
unit, as its soldiers wore no identifying badge on their shoulder straps
or shoulder boards. The unit's soldiers often heard the remark: "You
have no number you must be a blind unit!
Not until 1935 probably after the introduction of universal
conscription did the formerly anonymous infantry battalion under
the command of the Infantry School in Dberitz receive its proper
and appropriate tile of Infanterie-Lehrbatallion and the right to
wear the "L" on its shoulder straps. After the redesignation no more
recruits were taken in, rather, experienced soldiers were sent on
detached service from all units of the army. Entrance requirements
to this special unit were strict: minimum height 1.68 metres, no
criminal record and a high level of training. There was even a special
O K H service manual for these enlistments.
This elite unit produced men such as Hauptfeldwebel Brnner of
12th Company, who was the best shot in the German Armed Forces
as well as an outstanding athlete.
The Potsdam N C O School, various machine gun battalions and
other formations were set up by the Infanterie-Lehrbataillon which
also provided some of the NCOs for these units.
As a result of the expansion of the new German Wehrmacht and
the increasing demands being made on the Infanterie- Lehrbataillon, a second battalion (II. Bataillon) was created in October 1936.
The new battalion was housed in the barracks in Dberitz-Elsgrund.
II Battalion was organised as follows:
Battalion headquarters with signals
Commanding officer:
Adjutant:
6th (Anti-Tank) Company:
7th (2-cm Flak ) Company:
8th (Machine Gun) Company:
9th (Infantry Gun) Company:

platoon
Major Jais
Obit, von Selle
Hptm. Reuter
Hptm. v. d. Mosel
Hptm. Einstmann
Hptm. Greim (with mounted
platoon)

With the exception of the mounted platoon of the 9th (Infantry

Gun) Company under Obit. Bohrmann, II Battalion was fully
motorised.
In October 1937 a third battalion (III. Bataillon) and a regimental
headquarters were formed. The Infanterie- Lehrbataillon was
expanded and redesignated as the Infanterie-Lehrregiment. The
regimental headquarters were accommodated in the Olympic Village

30

which had been built for the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. The
former II Battalion (mot.) was renamed III Battalion (mot.) and the
new II Battalion was fully motorised for the training of the so-called
fast units (Panzergrenadiers etc.).
Commander of the Infantry School was the one-armed Oberst
Hube, who demanded much of his men as well as the prospective
officers attending courses. The jump from the ten-meter tower in the
newly-constructed aquatic centre was just as much a matter of course
he demonstrated the dive himself as was soldierly conduct during
exercises with live ammunition.
On 1 September 1939, while courses for the infantry were still
running at an increasing rate in the Olympic Village to bolster the
almost too rapid expansion of the new Wehrmacht, and while the
Lehrregiment continued to strive to keep up with its growing
responsibilities, war broke out with Poland. The majority of the
German divisions marched to the East and both sides suffered their
first casualties, while in the homeland more divisions were quickly
raised and mobilised. Meanwhile, the Lehrregiment remained the
instructional unit for the new generation of officers who would serve
in the divisions then being formed. The regiment's commander,
Oberst Hube, who also commanded the Infantry School, saw to it
that they were well- trained.
Inevitable changes and shuffling of personnel took place in the
command of the Lehrregiment. I Battalion came to be commanded
by Oberstleutnant Garski, who would later play a significant role in
the success of the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment. II Battalion
passed into the hands of Major Mller- Blow, while Oberstleutnant
Khler, who later also became a battalion and regimental commander of high quality with the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment, assumed command of III Battalion.
Two days after the beginning of the Polish Campaign, England and
France declared war on Germany. The war against the two western
powers initially assumed the form of positional warfare in and around
the bunkers of the Maginot Line and the Westwall. Mobilised
third-line German divisions occupied positions in the Westwall to
prevent an incursion by the French. At first the war brought no
changes to the routine of the Lehrregiment, except that many of
the regiment's members were annoyed that they were unable to play
a part in the success of Germany's Army in the East.
This may have been the reason, perhaps also as a result of the
insight of higher command authorities and of Oberst Hube, that
u
Sturm-Bataillon Garski"was formed in September 1939 from the
Infanterie-Lehrregiment. The battalion consisted of elements of the
regimental headquarters and the 1st, 3rd and 4th Companies as well
as a company of engineers from a Sturm- Pionier Regiment.
Commander of the unit was Oberstleutnant Garski. The battalion

31

was sent by truck over the Potsdam Mannheim autobahn into the
area of Kaiserslautern. Arriving near Altenkessel and Fllgarten, the
troops dug in and built positions.
The official entry for this period read:
1.9. 10. 10. 39 Positional warfare near Saarbrcken.
There was not much fighting in the actual, and especially the later,
sense; when there was firing it was just to accustom the men and to
show the French that they were still there. Otherwise the training
went on just as it had back in Germany, albeit under somewhat more
difficult conditions.
In Germany, as part of the reorganisation of the Wachregiment
Berlin
into the
Infanterie-Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND,
the guard soldiers were being trained on the MG 34 machine gun
and the Panzerbchse 38 (anti-tank rifle) for a combat role by
instructors seconded from the Lehrregiment. Live firing was carried
out in the incomplete excavations for the new barracks.
The Infanterie-Lehr-Sturmbataillon, which was manning positions in the Westwall the line of bunkers built on the German side
went on with its combat training. The battalion was regularly
employed in the front lines. The single outstanding event from this
period, which resulted in the award of the Iron Cross, Second Class
to Hptm. Grell, Lt. Goeldel, Uffz. Kaufmann, Uffz. Torhauer and
Uffz. Luer, was Operation Ransbacher Berg (Westwall), which is
included in the official record. The decoration certificates bear the
signature of the Commander-in-Chief of the First Army, General der
Infanterie von Witzleben, dated 25 September 1939.
The time in the Westwall for the Infanterie-Sturm- Lehr-Bataillon as it called itself came to an end on 8 and 9 October 1939
when it returned to DberitzOlympic Village. Soon after its return,
Obstlt. Garski announced that it was to be incorporated as III
Battalion of the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND,
which was then being formed. In doing so, he pointed out the
associated responsibility to everyone. From then on, as an outward
sign of their new unit, a white stripe was worn on their shoulder
straps.
All the preparations needed to carry out this order were completed.
The former Wachtruppe Berlin joined with the elements of the
Infanterie-Lehrregiment which had already seen some combat to
form the Infanterie-Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. It was 1
October 1939.

32

Chapter Four
Reorganisation of the Wachregiment
In the Moabit barracks, where the Wachregiment Berlin was
housed, there was great activity. A so-called "formation headquarters" under the direction of the future regimental commander
Oberst von Stockhausen, assisted by Hptm. Beckschfer and Major
Krger, as well as the motor-vehicle specialist Government Surveyor
Dr. Nielsen and Chief-Inspector Biesinger were initiating the first
steps toward the reorganisation of the unit. First of all, steps were
taken to bring the companies back up to strength; requisitions were
sent out for the appropriate personnel. The government surveyor
concerned himself with vehicles which gave rise to speculation
that they had a motorised regiment in mind. Some of the first vehicles
to arrive were initially parked in temporary shelters such as the
barracks in Dberitz and in buildings on Rathenower Stra which
were under renovation. Field kitchens, equipment, weapons and
other articles were requisitioned so that the regiment, which had to
reckon on seeing action at the front, would be ready for the field and
equipped with the appropriate rear echelon units. At this time the
regiment's personnel complement was as follows:
Regimental Headquarters
Commanding officer
Adjutant
Staff Hauptmann
lb
Ila

Oberst von Stockhausen

Major Feyerabend
Hauptmann Beckschfer
Major von Boguslawski
Hauptmann Landgraf
Hauptmann Dr. Iffert (also
leader of HQ personnel)
Stabsarzt Dr. Krummacher
Sanitter Feldwebel Speer
Stab-Musikmeister Ahlers
Musikmeister Grosch
Stabszahlmeister Bischoff
until the Mosel (Western
Campaign), then replaced by
Stabszahlmeister Low, who
remained until GD Division
formation in 1942.
Oberfeldwebel Sense
Feldwebel Teubig
Hauptfeldwebel Kampka

Ic/mob.
Doctor
Medical Assistant
Music
IVa

Rgt. Clerk
Rgt. Bugler
Senior NCO

33

1st Company
Commander
Senior NCO
2nd Company
Commander
Senior NCO
3rd Company
Commander
Senior NCO
4th Company
Commander
Senior NCO
5th Company
Commander
Senior NCO
6th Company
Commander
Senior NCO
7th Company
Commander
Senior NCO
8th Company
Commander
Senior NCO

Hauptmann Wolkewitz
Hauptfeldwebel Schttler
Major v. d. Lancken
Hauptfeldwebel Pflug
Major Krger
Hauptfeldwebel Fromm
Major von Rheinbaben
Hauptfeldwebel Werner
Major Frotscher
Hauptfeldwebel Waldmann
Major Aschen
Hauptfeldwebel Fuhrmann
Hauptmann Graf
Hauptfeldwebel Manz
Hauptmann Ewert
Hauptfeldwebel Wellmann

There were no significant changes among the unit's personnel

prior to the outbreak of war on 1 September 1939.
An eventful day for the new regiment was 14 June 1939 when a
great parade formation was drawn up on the Moabit barrack
grounds. The companies stood in dress uniform, while in the
background was a model of their future barracks. Around them stood
other units of the German Wehrmacht, the Commanding General
of III Army Corps General der Artillerie Haase, the Lord Mayor of
Berlin Dr. Lippert, and Generalinspekteur Speer. Amid a hushed
silence, Generalleutnant Seifert, the City Commandant of Berlin,
read out the document bestowing the title GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. After the playing of the national anthem by the band,
Generalleutnant Seifert reviewed the troops accompanied by the
regiment's commanding officer.
The work of creating the new regiment went on; guidelines were
issued for the recruiting of volunteers. These prescribed a minimum
height, a good name, no eyeglasses, as well as a four- year tour of
duty. A new parade uniform was designed to outwardly distinguish
the regiment. The first new arrivals appeared; mostly they were still
instructors, but soon volunteers began to appear as well. For
example, the following men who had applied in Berlin joined 4th
Comp./I.R. GD as it was designated in abbreviated form from
1st C o m p . / I 2 t h Inf.Rgt.:

34

later Feldwebel
later Wachmeister
later
Fahnenjunker-Oberfeldwebel (KIA)
later Oberfeldwebel
later Feldwebel
later Stabsgefreiter
later Stabsgefreiter (KIA)

Gefr. Lehmann
Gefr. Lippold
Gefr. Kalinowski
Gefr. Ihle
Gefr. Gerber
Schtze Keller
Schtze Gottbeht

It was now August 1939. Some of the companies were rearranged,

company numbers changed and transfers were the order of the day.
Otherwise, nothing significant took place in Moabit. Part of 3rd
Company was detached to Wach-Bataillon 63 in Zossen to guard
the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht which was accommodated
there. However, it had returned to Moabit by 9 October.
Nothing more was heard of the new uniforms which had been
promised for the regiment. The approaching conflict made them
seem irrelevant. The cuff title which had been decreed by the H.V.
Blatt of 27 June 1939, which was to be of green fabric with German
script sewn in silver thread and worn on the lower right sleeve, had
also not yet appeared.
And then came the outbreak of war which many had expected.
Even the I.R. GD still in the midst of reorganisation and thus
scarcely prepared for war was placed on alert. Air raid trenches
were dug in the barracks square, passes to the city were cancelled,
uniforms were drawn from clothing stores; all civilian articles had to
be sent home. There was a considerable blow to morale when word
leaked out that I.R. GD would stay at home, carry on with its duties
and continue its reorganisation.
But on 6 September 1939, the sixth day of the war with Poland,
it became known that the I.R. GD was to take part in the Polish
Campaign as an air-landed unit. The regiment was immediately
reorganised into a field unit. Two battalions were formed: I Battalion
under Major Graf von Schwerin, who was transferred to the regiment
for this purpose, and II Battalion under Major von der Lancken. The
new field unit entrained at the Lehrter Station from the 7th to the
1 Oth of September. It lacked the equipment for operational use and
was short on experience; enthusiasm was to make up for these
shortcomings. A new weapon was received in the form of the
Panzerbchse 38. Designed as an anti- tank weapon for the infantry,
this anti-tank rifle was of 2.8-cm calibre, narrowing to 2.2-cm at the
front. It was accurate up to 250 metres. The infantry also received
the until now secret smkh armour-piercing machine gun and rifle
ammunition.

35

Trips to the front by the "Fhrer-Begleit-Kommando" during the

Polish Campaign 1939.

36

Events were to result in the cancellation of the planned air landing

operation, however. The advance into eastern Poland by the Soviets
made the operation unnecessary. On the 17th and 18th of September, after the special rations had been used up by the men, they set
out on the return trip to Berlin. They had spent ten days in the
SorauSagan area in Silesia.
The 5th (Heavy) Company arrived in Berlin at approximately
21.00. It was greeted at the station by a band and was feted by the
citizens of Berlin. Three "Sieg Heils " rang out and as one participant
wrote, "It was well that it was night, otherwise we would have been
embarrassed; we had not seen any action!" After the regiment's
return to its garrison the reorganisation was resumed with a degree
of urgency.
I Battalion/I.R. GD was formed and fully motorised. The remaining
elements of the regiment were sent to the Infanterie- Lehrregiment
in Dberitz where they received their combat training.
On 1 October 1939, with the Polish Campaign coming to an end,
the initial organisation of the new Infanterie-Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was as follows:
I . R . GD Commanding Officer Oberst von Stockhausen
Regimental Headquarters with signals platoon and band, motorcycle
platoon
I B a t t a l i o n formed from elements of the Wachregiment
Headquarters with signals section
1st-3rd (Rifle) Companies
4th (Machine Gun) Company
Heavy mixed Company
II B a t t a l i o n formed from II Battalion/92nd Inf.Rgt.
Headquarters with signals section
5th-7th (Rifle) Companies
8th (Machine Gun) Company
Heavy mixed Company
III B a t t a l i o n formed mainly from Inf.Lehr.Rgt.
Headquarters with signals section
9th-11th (Rifle) Companies
12th (Machine Gun) Company
Heavy mixed Company

37

IV B a t t a l i o n formed mainly from Inf.Lehr.Rgt.

Headquarters with signals section
13th (Light Infantry Gun) Company
14th (Anti-Tank) Company
15th (Heavy Infantry Gun) Company
Not all of the companies had achieved their desired forms, as in
the case of the 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company, which had been
created from elements of the 7th Company/Wachregiment and the
13th Company/Inf.Lehr.Rgt. and was equipped with four heavy
infantry guns.
In September, while the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was still preparing for the operation in Poland, orders were
issued for further honour-guard and watch duties in Berlin. While
most of the former Wachregiment Berlin had been incorporated
into the new GD Regiment, a small portion of the unit, amounting
to no more than one hundred men, had remained behind in the
capital. From then on these men, together with several additional
replacement personnel, formed the Wach-Kompanie Berlin under
the command of Hauptmann von Blkow. Joining the company was
the former 2nd Music Corps of the Wachregiment under Musikmeister Grosch. Various guards such as at the government
ministries were withdrawn, as the company could only attend to
the most important duties. Preparations were made for the creation
of a new battalion, resulting on 1 April 1940 in the appearance of
the Wachbataillon Berlin.
While the Infanterie-Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND itself
did not see action in Poland, some of its members did take part.
As mentioned earlier, in 1938 the former Wachregiment Berlin
was given the duty of maintaining a special unit, code-named
"Fhrer-Reise", to guard the Supreme Commander during travel
outside the country. The responsibility for this task had been passed
on to I.R. GD. In August 1939 a motorised section was detailed from
the 7th and 8th Companies which, when alerted, was to stand ready
to carry out the job of guarding Hitler. Appropriate preparations
such as the assembly of vehicles and the distribution of special
recognition markings with the text "Mil. Stab des Fhrers" (The
Fhrer's Military Staff) had been made when, on 23 August 1939,
a few days before X-Day, the unit was summoned from Moabit:
"Fhrer-Begleit-Kommando assemble immediately and stand
ready!"
Kbel passenger cars and Opel trucks were readied, loading
exercises began and the vehicles were outfitted everything happening in a rather hurried fashion. Subsequently the reinforced
platoon assembled on the open square of the Moabit drill grounds

38

where it was greeted by the Kommando's first commander, Oberst

Rommel. In a brief address he outlined the unit's task. It was the unit
of the army which was to escort and guard the Supreme Commander. Thus, the army took over the role of guarding the Supreme
Commander and his headquarters and continued to do so until the
end of 1944. The guards were provided by the Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND and the later Fhrer-Begleit-Batailon
which emerged from it.
Two platoons were formed for this "Fhrer-Begeit- Kommando":
1st Platoon (formed from 7th Company) Lt. Schneider
2nd Platoon (formed from 8th Company) Lt. Rssert
The Senior N C O of this roughly company-sized unit was
Hauptfeldwebel Schttler. Other members of the unit included Lt.
Grundmann, Feldwebeln Knauf, Lindner, Remsmeier and Hodes
mostly from II Platoon and many others. The men employed in
this role were hand-picked. By the end of the month, as a result of
experience in the Sudetenland, the Kommando was expanded.
Added were:
an anti-tank platoon with 3.7 cm Pak
a 2-cm Flak platoon with Vierlinge (quadruple guns)
an armoured car platoon
a railway Flak platoon with 2-cm Vierlinge
The entire Kommando was taken over by Major von Rohden when
Oberst Rommel became the first commander of the FhrerHauptquartier
(FHQu).
On 24 August 1939 the Rssert Platoon began the drive to Stettin
and Bad Polzin. After a further move the platoon took over the task
of guarding Hitler's special train in Gro-Born, where his headquarters were located during the first phase of the Polish Campaign.
The basic duties of the Fhrer-Begleit-Kommando were divided
among guarding and ensuring the security of Hitler's special train
and his headquarters and providing an escort and security for Hitler
during trips to the front. Among the trips to the front was one from
Gro-Born to the Tucheler Heath, where Hitler visited with his
troops. Another trip to the front took place on 12 September 1939
from Oppeln, Silesia, to where the Fhrer-Begleit-Kommando had
transferred in the meantime.
It was at this time that the cuff titles appeared; they featured the
title Fhrerhauptquartier in silver-white script on a green background. Generally, however, they were not worn while on escort
duties.

39

On 19 September, following a stop in Berlin, the Kommando

moved to Lauenburg in Pomerania to continue its escort duties. The
Fhrer Hauptquartier (FHQu), which had been set up in the
meantime, was taken charge of by Oberst Rommel together with the
command of the Begleit-Kommando.
Also belonging to the F H Q u were the three Wehrmacht adjutants,
namely: the Army Adjutant to the Fhrer, Hptm. Engel; the Naval
Adjutant to the Fhrer, Korvettenkapitn von Puttkamer; and the
Luftwaffe Adjutant to the Fhrer, Hptm. von Below. Obstlt.
Schmundt became the Chief Adjutant.
On 21 September, following the fall of Oxhft, near Gdingen, part
of the Begleit-Kommando moved to Zoppot. The men were
quartered in the Hotel Victoria where they stayed in style in single
and double rooms. The guardroom was in the Japanese tea room,
where, as the saying went, "You could let yourself live for a while,"
as did the soldiers of the platoon.
Hitler stayed in the Casino Hotel, in front of which stood an honour
guard of the Begleit-Kommando.
Directly in front of the Casino Hotel in which Hitler was staying
lay the Hela peninsula, which at that time was stll in enemy hands.
German warships kept up a steady bombardment of the fortifications, in the course of which they occasionally passed in front of the
hotel a unique spectacle!
The stay in Zoppot came to an end on 29 September and the
Fhrer-Begleit-Kommando returned to Berlin. The unit did not
rejoin the regiment, however. Instead it moved into the Hermann
Goring Barracks in Berlin-Reinickendorf as a separate unit, although
it was still part of the G D . There began the immediate expansion of
the Kommando into a guard company under the command of
Hauptmann Kolbeck, who came from the Wiener Neustadt Military
Academy. A further platoon was incorporated into the company
under platoon leader Leutnant Kraussold.
The following is an excerpt from the front-line newspaper " Der
Westwall-Bote":
"Following the return of the FHQu from the Eastern Theatre, the
Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon was formed from the units of the
Wehrmacht which had provided military protection for the Fhrer
during visits to the front. The Fhrer and Supreme Commander
bestowed upon the battalion the standard carrying the Fhrer emblem
and the national emblem of the Reich."
It was 1 October 1939.

40

Part II
THE WAR IN THE WEST

Chapter One
I.R.

GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Leaves Berlin

1. 10. 5. 11. 39
6. 11. 9. 5. 40

Employment in the homeland war zone.

Employment in the operations area of the
Western Front.

The occupation of Poland was formally decided in the GermanRussian Border and Friendship Pact of 28 September 1939. The
respective forces occupied Polish territory up to the demarcation line
between German and Russian territory which had been laid down in
August. As a result, the German frontier of 1914 was pushed forward
to the gates of Warsaw, and the area as far as Litzmannstadt (the
old German province of Posen) was incorporated into the Warthe
District. Germany and Russia had now become direct neighbours
and both states were careful not to injure the interests of the other.
The Germans soon stripped the East of troops except for several
police and occupation units. The civilian government took over the
Reich's interests in these areas.
While the Allies wished to sustain the existing state suspended
between peace and war, Hitler was making new plans. Emboldened
by his lightning victory in Poland, he decided to attack the West as
soon as possible. Hitler declared his intentions in an order from 9
October 1939:
"If it should become apparent in the near future that England and
France are unwilling to end the war, I am determined to take the
offensive without waiting for too much time to pass."
Despite the objections of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
Hitler had the General Staff draw up 'Deployment Order Yellow,"
which he issued on 29 October 1939. A-Day was fixed as 7

41

November 1939. Weather conditions, the transport situation and

objections from the General Staffwhich subsequently led to changes in the plan (also caused by discovery of the German deployment
plans by the Allies)led to twelve postponements of the attack date
by early 1940.
In the barracks of the former Wachregiment Berlin, in which the
now reorganised Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was
quartered, there was a great deal of activity. New personnel were
arriving from every direction, the companies were slowly gaining
character and form and the training program especially combat
and weapons training was accelerating, sometimes to the discomfort of the old parade soldiers of the Wachregiment. Driver training
was conducted on the streets of Berlin with the help of civilian driving
instructors, while the first of the new field vehicles had begun to
arrive. It was at this time that the regiment's first tactical symbol
appeared: the white Stahlhelm, an idea of the regiment's commander, was soon to be seen on the vehicles of the regimental
headquarters. Measures were taken to build the regiment's morale,
rousing its fighting spirit and stimulating its esprit de corps.
Frequent exchanges took place between the I.R. GD and the
Infanterie-Lehrregimentn Dberitz, where it was already common
knowledge that elements of the unit had been earmarked to fill out
the I.R. GD. Whole platoons and companies of the I.R. GD were
sent to Dberitz for fourteen days to learn the secrets of infantry
combat from the expert personnel of the Lehrregiment. The troops
were trained on new weapons and a great deal of sweat was spilled
on the sand of the "back slopes" of the Dberitz training grounds.
On 21 October 1939 the units of the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND which had been formed from the Wachregiment
left their barracks in Moabit, Berlin. Travelling partly by rail and partly
by motor vehicle, the regiment was transferred to the Grafenwhr
troop training grounds. Although no one could have suspected at
that time, the regiment was not to return to its garrison again.
Two other units were on the roads of Germany at about the same
time, also heading for Grafenwhr: the Garski Battalion of the
Infanterie-Lehrregiment and II Battalion of the 92nd Infantry
Regiment under its Commander Obstlt. Doege. The latter unit came
from the 2nd Infantry Division, which was stationed in the Greifswald
area. It was to become the new II Btl./I.R. GD. Its organisation on
21 October 1939 was as follows:
II/I.R. 92
Commanding Officer:
Adjutant:
Executive Officer:
Headquarters Commander:

42

Obstlt. Doege
Obit. Brockmann
Obit. Beug
Obit. Pankow

AO

5th (Rifle) Company:

Platoon Leader:
6th (Rifle) Company:
Platoon Leader:
7th (Rifle) Company:
Platoon Leader:
8th (Machine Gun) Company:
Senior NCO:

Hptm. von Schlter

Lt. Schulz
Obit, von Courbire
Lt. Prachowski
Hptm. Felsch
Lt. Wackernagel
Hptm. Toode, later Obit. Bethke
Hptfw. Maritzen

The units of the new Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND

were organised as follows:
Regimental headquarters with signals platoon, band and small vehicle
column
IIII Battalions each with 3 rifle companies,
each rifle company with 12 sections,
each platoon equipped with 1 light mortar
Machine gun companies equipped with 12 heavy MGs and 6 heavy
mortars
lV (Heavy) Battalion with: 13th (Light Infantry Gun) Company with 6
light infantry guns.
14th (Anti-Tank) Company with 12 - 3.7- cm Pak
15th (Heavy Infantry Gun) Company with 4 heavy infantry guns.
The regiment was transported in Opel-Blitz trucks; the 13th and
14th Companies had medium trucks for transporting personnel and
guns, while the 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company was equipped with light
gun tractors.
The fields were already covered with snow when the units arrived,
and the camp barracks like the west camp at Bernreuth, where
the 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company was billeted were cold. The
companies quickly settled in, however, and were soon engaged in
combat training on the magnificent practice range. The soldiers were
on the range almost daily, even though it rained heavily and the
loamy soil became very soft. Weapons firing with live ammunition
was a common exercise.
The regiment obviously held a preferred place in the High
Command's plans for the attack in the West. The oft-repeated attack
exercises against fortified field positions clearly pointed in this
direction. The companies were brought up to full combat strength
which now amounted to 204 men, including officers. The regiment's
vehicle strength was also approaching authorised levels. The 8th
Company, for example, had the following on strength:
8th Company
each section
1 Opel-Blitz truck each platoon 4 trucks.
1 Opel-Blitz truck for the light mortar crew
1 Opel-Blitz truck for the anti-tank rifle crew
43

TACTICAL SYMBOLS OF ELEMENTS OF THE I.R. GD

44

in addition:

1 command car (Kbel) with company commander

1 rations truck
1 munitions truck
1 fuel truck

As the combat exercises were repeated at battalion level the men,

despite the difficulty of the service, grew into a fighting team. Typical
was 12th Section of 1st Company, which consisted of the following
u
crew :
M

Section leader: Uffz. Hodes

Section:
Gefr. Seifert, Lauer, Clauss
Grenadiers Gasch, Hagen, Petri, Wolff, Sph
The training period was now coming to an end, however; plans
for the attack in the West were taking shape. The regiment moved
into the operations area of the Western Front.
The departure order for 6 November 1939, which detailed the
move into the Westerwald, arrived on the evening of 5 November.
In the dark of night the companies and battalions drove through
Bayreuth, Bamberg, Wrzburg, Hanau and Wetzlar into the area
around Montabaur. The 10th Company was involved in a tragic
motor vehicle accident en route, in which Unteroffizier Tpfer was
killed. Accommodations were soon arranged, mostly in private
quarters. While the regimental headquarters was billeted in Montabaur itself along with part of IV (Heavy) Battalion, I Battalion
occupied quarters in Westerburg, with 1st Company in Wilmenrod
(later Salz) and 2nd Company in Berzahn. Ill Battalion set up its
command post in Wirges, while its companies were nearby, with,
for example, 11th Company in Sinshahn and the 12th Company in
Bannerscheid.
In the Westerwald training went on despite bitter cold and heavy
snowfalls. The troops practised an advance in winter conditions and
spent nights in the open, even though the only winter clothing they
had was their long greatcoats.
11 November is especially well remembered, as this was the coldest
day, with a temperature of minus 28 degrees. For a change of routine
the troops shovelled snow to keep the roads open in the rear
operations area. Regular company parties as well as evenings with
local residents brought a change as well as an opportunity to relax.
Indeed, relations with the local population were so warm that, in
some cases, they lasted beyond the end of the war.
In those weeks the I.R. GD was joined by a new unit. The 43rd
Sturm-Pionier Battalion was attached to the regiment for present
and future duties. The battalion had already made a name for itself
in Poland as the following account shows:

45

"Corps-Pi.Btl. 43, III Army Corps' Pionier Battalion, originated in

peacetime from Pionier-Btl. 3, Kstrin, and Pionier-Btl. 4, Magdeburg, and was stationed in Brandenburg, Havel. As of about
February 1935 it was fully motorised. Its commander from 1 April
1936 was Major later Obstlt. Mahler, who was killed in action
near Chemery on 15 May 1940. He was undoubtedly one of the
pioniers of the idea of one day incorporating the Pionier-Btl. in
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.During the Polish Campaign the battalion's 2nd Company so
distinguished itself in the storming of the fortress of Brest- Litovsk
that, on orders from the O K H , the battalion was awarded the name
Sturm-Pionier-Btl. 43. After carrying out special assault training on
replicas of Maginot Line fortifications in Dessau-Rosslau, it joined
the I.R. GD in the area of Selters, Westerwald."
The Christmas season was approaching and in all quarters
preparations were made for the first Christmas of the war. Religious
services were held in the field to prepare the troops for the approaching holiday. Particularly impressive was the service in the Limburger
Cathedral.
A special event for the regiment took place on 23 December 1939
when the Supreme Commander (Adolf Hitler), on a visit to the front,
arrived in Montabaur to take part in the Christmas celebrations there.
He was escorted by units of the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon, which
had originated from the same regiment that was celebrating
Christmas in the Westerwald.
On Christmas Eve the companies and battalions joined for a
common celebration. As usual with soldiers, the most important item
of the celebration was the food. Here is the III Battalion's menu:
Menu:
Monday:

Boiled potatoes in open order, with rouladen as

look-outs, screened by sauerkraut.
Tuesday:
Potatoes, meat balls in a shallow rifle pit, cucumber
salad as ground cover.
Wednesday: Beef camouflaged with rice.
Thursday: Complex terrain vegetables.
Friday:
Potatoes in fatigue uniforms and puttees (rollmops).
Saturday:
Beans with smoked meat in a skirmishing line ( 8
meters spacing).
Sunday:
Potatoes, single Bratwurst, silhouetted sharply
against the horizon.

The year 1940, which began with snow and even colder temperatures, saw the regiment still in its quarters in the Westerwald around
the city of Montabaur. Following the break for the Christmas
holidays, which saw light duties on New Year's Day at least for
the 6th Company preparations by the entire regiment for the
46

coming action were pushed ahead with new enthusiasm. Despite the
snow, the 11th Company under Hptm. Krger organised route-marches to toughen the troops. On 18 January 1940 the 11th Company
carried out an exercise with white- painted tanks to test the effectiveness of the winter camouflage.
In the meantime tactical symbols appeared on all of the regiment's
vehicles, consisting of the white Stahlhelm on backgrounds of
various colours. The symbols served to distinguish the various units
and were the result of experience in Poland.
In preparation for X-Day (the attack date) the regiment, which until
now had been in the rear operations area of the Western front, was
moved forward. This began, in deep snow, on 29 January 1940 with
a move from the Montabaur area to the Mosel and into the Hunsrck
area. The move was carried out for the most part by motor vehicle
through Koblenz-Geisfeld (near Trier) in the direction of the
Hunsrck or through Koblenz along the Mosel valley.
The headquarters of the I.R. GD took up quarters in Zell on the
Mosel, I Battalion in Neef on the Mosel, III Battalion in the Hunsrck
villages of Biebern and Plter, and IV Battalion in Merl and Zell on
the Mosel. While the 11th Company of III Battalion had to shovel
its way into the village, the more mobile 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company
simply drove into Merl on the Mosel in its vehicles. The villages,
especially those on the Mosel, were jammed with troops and units;
it was difficult to find room for them all.
Even though the companies' accommodations were almost as
basic as those in the field the 11th Company, for example, slept
on straw mattresses they soon resumed normal duties, even
though they began by shovelling snow.
More and more all measures were directed towards preparing the
regiment for its special role an attack through fortified positions.
Map exercises were held regularly at the regimental and battalion
headquarters, with all available sources of information such as slides,
maps and aerial photographs providing the necessary realism. There
was also a continuous flow of fortifications maps from the northern
wing of the Maginot Line and the Meuse near Sedan, as well as
border fortifications on the Belgian and Luxemburg borders, which
were immediately analyzed. The regiment was informed of its
planned assignment in the first phase of the attack which, briefly,
was to smash a breach through Luxemburg and the Belgian fortifications for the tanks which were to follow. The assignment was
reflected in the following teletype from the Army's Operations
Department received on 11 November 1939:

47

C O M M A N D MATTER
O n l y to be Viewed by Officers!
Oberkommando des Heeres

H.Qu. OKH, 11. 11. 39

Gen.St.d.H. Operations-Abt. (Ia)

Nr. 44 485/39 g. Kdos.
Secret Command Matter!

10 copies
5th

copyTeletype
(with copies dispatched)
To
Heeresgruppenkommando A
Heeresgruppenkommando B
The Fhrer has issued the following order:
"A third group of fast units will be formed on the south wing of
the Twelfth or in the sector of the Sixteenth Army and, taking
advantage of the forest-free sector on both sides of Arlons TintignyFlorenville, will be committed in the direction of Sedan and east.
Composition:

Headquarters XIX Army Corps

2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions
1st Panzer Division
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler
and:
Rgt. Grossdeutschland.

The assignment of this group shall be:

a) To smash enemy mobile forces which have been moved forward
into southern Belgium and, in so doing, ease the tasks of the
Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies.
b) To take the west bank of the Meuse near and east of Sedan by
surprise attack and thus create favourable conditions for the
continuation of the operation, especially in the case that the Panzer
units committed by the Sixth and Fourth Armies should not have
a decisive impact there."
In carrying out this order it is directed that:
1. The units be committed under a centralised command. Army
Group A will report the disposition of forces and distribution of
assignments in detail.
2. The following will leave the formation of Army Group B and will
be attached to Army Group A:
a) : :-: : Corps Headquarters XIX Pz.A.K. with corps units.
48

Like all of the other units in the first wave, the I.R. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND received information concerning new fortifications on the Allied side of the frontier as they were discovered by
aerial reconnaissance. The steady flow of new information was
processed and the bunkers and defensive positions were entered on
the unit's maps. The resulting overall picture gave rise to mild
anxiety, as the extent of the installations appeared to be considerable.
A map exercise took place sometime in February 1940 at the H . Q .
of XIX Pz.A.K. in Koblenz under the direction of its commander,
General Guderian, w h o was slated to lead the armoured
breakthrough group. Guderian informed the commander of the I.R.
G D , Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin, that his regiment's role would be to
smash a breach through the enemy fortifications and that his - Guderian's Panzers would stream forward through this gap during
the night. GD would then follow the next morning. From this remark
Graf von Schwerin determined that not only was GD to be given the
task of piercing the fortifications, but also that of pursuing the enemy
deep into the interior. He was not convinced that the Panzer units
would be able to catch up during the night. Graf von Schwerin
countered Guderian's reply that, according to his experiences in
Poland, the infantry slept during the night and advanced no farther,
with a wager of a crate of champagne that such would not be the
case with GD. In fact, the infantry got through the fortifications
and reached the Meuse ahead of the Panzer units.
Special measures were taken in connection with these intensive
preparations which affected the I.R. GD. Elements of III Battalion
under the command of Obstlt. Garski including the battalion's
11th Company and elements of Sturm-Pi.Btl. 43 were transferred
on 28 February by rail to Crailsheim, where they were quartered on
the local airfield. These units were earmarked for a special operation
bearing the name "NIWI," which was to consist of airborne landings
behind the Belgian line of fortifications. No one knew any more
details about the operation. Some indication of its nature was gained
when practice flights in Fieseler Storch aircraft began in the early
days of March 1940. On 9 March General der Flieger Sperrle
watched one of the company's exercises.
Meanwhile, on the Mosel, the regiment continued to practise, train
and conduct map exercises. The unit's organisation was also improved; Regimental Order No. 49 of 4 March 1940 gave the following instructions under heading No. 4:
Regiment Abteilung lb
Effective 5. 3. 1940, all sections of the regimental H.Q. which deal
with the area of supply will be concentrated in Section lb (Abteilung
lb). Leader of this section: Hauptmann Gericke.

49

In April 1940 there were increasing signs that the unit would soon
see action. There were many indications that the date of the attack
was not far off.
On 4 April Sturm-Batterie 640 arrived and was incorporated into
IV Battalion as the 16th Company. Equipped with six assault guns
armed with short-barrelled 7.5-cm cannon, the battery represented
a considerable amount of firepower in the attack as well as the
defence, especially against tank attack. The battery had been sent to
the GD Regiment at the suggestion of Oberst Schmundt, Chief
Adjutant to the Supreme Commander, after the Leibstandarte SS
Adolf Hitler, the first regiment of the Waffen-SS, was promised an
assault gun battery.
On 10 April 1940 the commanding general of XIX Pz.A.K.,
General Guderian, appeared in person to assess the I.R. GD's state
of training. I Battalion, supported by heavy weapons (including the
heavy infantry guns of 15th Company), conducted live firing near
Tellich. The demonstration went well, much to the satisfaction of the
Panzer General. In his address to the troops Guderian stated:
"The tasks which await the regiment are great! They will bring
it days of uninterrupted driving and fighting, without rest, without
sufficient food. A piece of army bread, some Schokacola and a
canteen of coffee will have to suffice. After a victorious breakthrough
following a successful battle there can simply be no halt or rest,
we must maintain our pursuit of the enemy to prevent him from
settling in somewhere else! That would only cost new sacrifices,
which should be avoided as much as possible."
His words were simple and clear; the regiment and its soldiers
understood them only too well. Preparation down to the last detail
was the answer to Guderian's address.
River crossing exercises using assault boats of the nearby SturmPionier-Btl. 43 alternated with practice assaults on bunkers with
close-range weapons including, for the first time, magnetic hollow
charges. The newly-arrived assault gun battery, the 16th Company,
demonstrated its ability, participating in joint infantry-tank exercises.
Meanwhile, the elements of III Battalion which had been detached
to Crailsheim, in particular the 11th Company, returned to the Mosel
via Baumholder, where they resumed their training activities with the
regiment's other companies.
May arrived; morale in the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment
was at its highest, the headquarters and operations sections were
working flat out, everything was leading up to the day of the attack.

50

The French Build-up and

the German attack plan as seen
by the French on 9 May 1940.

German preparations for

the attack on 9 May 1940.

51

Chapter Two
In the Homeland
In the shadow of larger events taking place elsewhere, but no less
a part of the unit, the Wachkompanie Berlin continued to carry out
its duties. It consolidated its internal structure in an attempt to once
again become something like a parade unit and provided, albeit with
a limited number of sentries, security for the Berlin headquarters.
On 1 April 1940 the Wachkompanie Berlin was expanded to
become the Wachbataillon Berlin. This move brought some recognition for the work it had been quietly carrying out, and showed that,
in spite of the war, the unit had important duties to perform. In
Moabit the Wachbataillon Berlin continued to occupy the quarters
of the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, which was in
the field, and expanded its establishment to a headquarters company
and six infantry companies.
The officer complement of the battalion headquarters was as
follows:
Major von Boguslawski
Hauptmann Frotscher
Stabszahlmeister Bischoff
Oberstabsarzt Dr. Zeidler
Musikmeister Guido Grosch
Hauptmann Khn

Commanding Officer:
Adjutant:
IVa:
IVb:
Band:
Commander H.Q. Company:

This battalion tried to carry on the traditions of the regiment and

there was a continuous exchange of officers, NCOs and men.
Soldiers passing through Berlin while on leave and convalescents
were made welcome, and the needs of the wounded in Berlin were
seen to.
The somewhat boring nature of the duty and the almost unchanging routine in Berlin contrasted sharply with the almost ceaseless
activity of the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon, a sister unit of the Wachbataillon Berlin and the I.R. GD. While, in autumn 1939, expansion
of the battalion was going ahead at full speed the 2nd Company
had already been formed the weeks of the Christmas season of
1939 brought little rest for the unit. The battalion, whose duties
consisted of providing security for the headquarters and furnishing
escorts during visits to the front, usually remained idle while the
Supreme Commander was staying in Berlin. However, the 1st Watch
Company received a special assignment and had to make a difficult
52

road journey from Berlin-Reinickendorf through Braunschweig, Offenbach, Frankfurt/Main and Kaiserslautern to Hasloch. Driving
conditions were poor as the roads were covered with ice and snow.
On 24 December 1939, Hitler visited the Leibstandarte SS Adolf
Hitler in its quarters in Hasloch to share in the unit's Christmas
celebrations. The 1st Watch Company of the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon provided security. The battalion also had to provide detachments
for duties such as guarding special trains.
Separate from these detachments was a special detachment which
accompanied construction battalions of the Todt Organisation which
were constructing permanent headquarters whose installations and
facilities required constant supervision. The locations of these installations which were designated as "objects" provided an initial
indication of Hitler's intentions for the immediate future. The sites
were therefore top secret, and for that reason alone they demanded
constant guarding, even during construction.
One such site was Objekt Grnberg in Hesse, which was later
occupied by the Army High Command. Under construction was the
headquarters in Mnstereifel, designated Installation W O, cover
name Objekt Felsennest. Elements of the Watch Companies were
stationed there in early 1939, in rotation with guards at the
Reichskanzlei.
In about April of 1940, Oberst Rommel left his post as commander
of the Fhrer Headquarters, which he had set up, to take command
of a division (the 7th Panzer Division) before the beginning of the
attack in the West. An exchange of officers took place at the same
time, as some of those in the headquarters reported back to their
units prior to the attack in the West. This applied in particular to the
I.R. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, which had supplied the bulk of the
headquarters' officers, NCOs and men. Among these were Oberleutnants Rssert and Schneider, who had led the 1st Platoon of the
Begleit-Kommando since 1939. The two went to Neuruppin, while
others reported directly back to the regiment.
After the outbreak of war had become a fait accompli in September
1939, those active and therefore immediately available units were
moved to the front. In the course of mobilisation new contingents
were raised, uniformed, armed and trained in weapons and combat
tactics.
The replacement units which remained behind in Germany had to
take over important duties. With the departure of the active regiments these were raised at their garrisons, for the most part from
cadre units, men left behind and instructors specially detached for
that purpose. It was in every regiment's interests not to leave inferior
units behind in Germany, and through a continuous exchange of
combat-experienced soldiers they ensured that the replacements
received training which approximated conditions at the front.
53

When war broke out, however, some of the recently-formed units

did not yet have such replacement units at their disposal. O n e such
unit was the I.R. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, along with its sister
units the Wachkompanie Berlin and the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon.
In November 1939, at the instigation of the regiment, InfanterieErsatz-Bataillon (mot.) 99 was formed in Neuruppin. Approximately one hundred men drawn from various Army units came to
Neuruppin where they were received by NCOs of the 4th Rifle
Regiment, which was the unit responsible for the formation of the
new battalion. After a brief period under an unidentified commanding
officer, Major Toode, previously of the 8th Company/ Wach regiment Berlin, took command of the battalion. As the flow of
transports increased, the soldiers were trained for six to eight weeks,
and those who could not meet the standards of the I.R. GD were
sent back. The others were once again asked whether they definitely
wished to remain with G D .
In the meantime, Hptm. Wolkewitz took over the 2nd Training
Company. The basis for training incoming volunteers to the GD's
standards had been established.
The battalion was organised as follows:
"See-Kaseme"
1st and 2nd Training Companies for infantry replacements.
"Friedrich-Franz-Kaserne"
Headquarters and 3rd and 4th Training Companies Heavy Training Company for heavy MG, heavy mortar, 3.7-cm Pak, light
infantry gun, heavy infantry gun.
Joining 4th Company soon afterward was the Reich Youth Leader,
Baldur von Schirach, who was to fulfil his compulsory military service
as a non-commissioned officer candidate of the I.L.R. In doing so he
provided an example for his charges, which in later years was to
result in many of them entering the GD.
In April 1940 a search began for volunteers for a motorcycle
platoon which was being formed by the regiment, in part from the
3rd Kradschtzen Battalion in Eberswalde. The first B M W motorcycles were soon delivered from Munich. Prior to the campaign in
the West, Lt. Gnzel took over the new motorcycle platoon before
leading it to join the regiment. The platoon caught up with the
regiment shortly before the Meuse crossing and was incorporated
into the regimental headquarters.

54

Chapter Three
The Day before the Attack
The German plan for the campaign against France, a modified
version of "Fall Gelb" based on the Manstein Plan, foresaw the main
thrust taking place through LuxembourgBelgium toward Sedan.
The decision would lay in breakthrough, not envelopment!
The Meuse was to be crossed near and north of Sedan, the
extended Maginot Line pierced and bridgeheads won on the west
bank of the Meuse from which to continue the advance to the west.
Remembering the Schlieffen Plan, the French Commander-inChief Gamelin expected the main thrust of the German attack to be
in the direction of Antwerp. Contributing to this conviction were
careful security measures on the German side, as well as rumours
planted by various means in the Allied camp that the Germans were
retaining a strong northern wing. In any case, it seemed highly
doubtful that the Germans would attempt to send powerful armoured
forces through the difficult terrain of the Ardennes. So the Allies
persisted with their deployment, which saw their forces spread
almost equally along the entire Eastern Front.
On the German side the focus of the attack lay with Heeresgruppe
A (Army Group A). The main task had fallen to the spearhead of
Gen. d. Kav. von Kleist's Panzergruppe, which boasted a strength
of three corps with a total of five Panzer and three motorized infantry
divisions, as well as several army units including engineers and
artillery. The most stalwart advocate of a concentration of armoured
forces for the planned breakthrough was General Guderian, who was
to play a leading role in the campaign.
Panzergruppe von Kleist was organised as follows:
XIX Pz.Corps

XXXXI Pz.Corps

XIV Army Corps

(mot.)

Gen. Guderian
1st, 2nd, 10th Panzer Divisions with attached
Inf.Rgt. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Gen. Reinhardt
6th and 8th Panzer Divisions and 2nd Infantry
Division (mot.)
Gen. von Wietersheim
13th and 29th Infantry Divisions (mot.)

According to the attack plan, which was based on the concepts of

General Guderian, the three Panzer Divisions of XIX Pz.Corps, with
the I.R. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND which was attached to the 10th

55

Panzer Division, would break through the weak fortifications on the

Luxembourg border and then advance westwards without delay.
After piercing the Belgian frontier fortifications between Vianden and
Echternach and advancing into the Florenville area, the Panzergruppe would wheel southwest toward Sedan and force a
breakthrough of the Maginot Line.
The X X X X I Pz.Corps under General Reinhardt was to follow
Guderian's corps as the second blow. After clearing the Luxembourg
border installations, it was to advance alongside Guderian's corps
and, crossing the Meuse, break through the Maginot Line. Finally,
the XIV Army Corps (mot.) was to follow as the third blow with the
task of guarding Guderian's left flank near Sedan.
The release of the code word for the attack did not catch GROSSDEUTSCHLAND unprepared. The alert order came at 14.30 on
the afternoon of 9 May 1940; by 18.00 the regiment's units were
already leaving their former billeting area to begin the difficult night
march to their jumping-off positions. The weather was extremely
favourable.
While the bulk of the regiment, less a planned advance battalion,
drove towards the Luxembourg frontier to cross the border at
Echternach as ordered, the elements of III Battalion under Obstlt.
Garski earmarked for the air landing operation "NIWI" separated
from the rest of the regiment before making their way to the
departure airfields at Bitburg and Deckendorf. The regiment also had
to release the 9th Company less two sections to XIX Pz.Corps
as headquarters guards.
At the regimental headquarters of Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin all
the necessary measures were taken to ensure that the regiment's
departure went smoothly. At this time the regiment was organised
as follows:
Regimental

Headquarters

Commanding Officer
Regimental Adjutant
Staff Officer
lb
IVa
IVb

Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin

Hptm. Masius
Obit, von Kirchbach
Hptm. Gericke
Stabszahlmeister Low
Stabsarzt Dr. Krummacher

I (Rifle)

Hptm. Fllmer, Obstlt. Khler

Obit. Schwarzrock
Obit. Kolb
Obit. Fabich, Obit. Bohrmann
Obit. Hnert, Lt. Schiller

Battalion

1st (Rifle) Company

2nd (Rifle) Company
3rd (Rifle) Company
4th (MG) Company
II (Rifle)

Battalion

Major Fst, Major Greim,

Adj. Oblt Benk

56

5th
6th
7th
8th

Obit.
Obit,
Obit.
Obit.

(Rifle) Company
(Rifle) Company
(Rifle) Company
(MG) Company

Schneider
von Courbire
Wackernagel
Bethke

Obstlt. Garski, Adj. Lt. Wentges

Hptm. Westphal, Lt. Dr. Usadel
Obit, von harder, Obit. Lucke
Hptm. W. Krger, Lt. Vogt,
Lt. Obermeir
Hptm. Grosser

III (Rifle) Battalion

9th (Rifle) Company
10th (Rifle) Company
11th (Rifle) Company
12th (MG) Company

Major Schneider, Adj. Obit.

Teubert
Obit, von Massow, Obit. Dairies
Obit. Beck-Broichsitter, Lt.
Hintze,
Lt. Janke
Obit. Mrz, Obit. Gerbener
Obit. Frhr. von Egloffstein, Obit.
Wirth, Lt. Franz, Lt. Piarks, Lt.
von Werlhof

IV (Heavy) Battalion
13th (Lt.InfGun) Company
14th (Pz.Jg) Company

15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company

16th (Assault Gun) Company

Supply Column 400 - with HQ and 1st-3rd (and later 4th)

Columns, and workshop platoon.
Attached: Sturm-Pionier-Bataillon 43 - CO Obstlt. Mahler, with:
1st-3rd Pionier Companies Light Bridging Column "B"
Thus organised, the reinforced Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND left its former billeting area.
Everyone experienced the departure differently. The commander
of 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company/IV Battalion provided the following
description:
"Alert! The real thing! We had practised it so often that it came as
no surprise to us. Time for packing was short. The quarters personnel helped out.
The company stood below, drawn up on the bank of the Mosel.
The pay-sergeant read someone an order. Just then no one wanted
to hear any more orders, rather they all wanted to get on with it.
I was standing off to the side with the Hauptfeldwebel; we were
deliberating over which documents from the paper war we had time
to burn. We had a total of an hour left.
All of a sudden a part of the regiment came rolling down the street
through our village. The advance had begun! Our battalion had
miscalculated by an hour, therefore my speech was brief: 'Comrades
it's beginning! I wish each of you luck. Heil 14th Company! To
the vehicles march! march!'

57

Everywhere motors were running. The regiment's heavy weapons,

the flak, artillery and assault guns, rolled down the street. A platoon
from my company had already left. It was driving with the advance
guard. When was I to see it again?
The commanding officer drove off. There was a space behind
several infantry guns. That was our place. Start up! All the vehicles
were bedecked with flowers."
The regiment's formation at departure was as follows:
Advance detachment with elements of 5th, 7th and 8th (MG)
Companies as well as 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company.
Commander: Hauptmann Felsch
Advance guard II Battalion Major Fst
Sturm-Pionier Battalion 43
March Group Schneider as main body (IV Btl.)
I Battalion - Obstlt. Khler
Remaining vehicles of III Battalion
March route: AlfWittlich SdDreisSpeicherIrrel
With the beginning of the advance, the following regimental order
was read to all the soldiers:
"Comrades! We are setting out against the enemy. Every officer,
non-commissioned officer and Grenadier will do his duty to the utmost.
Forward to the enemy! With God!
Long live the Fhrer!
Long live Grossdeutschland!
signed: Graf von Schwerin
Oberstleutnant."
The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment rolled into the evening
twilight toward the enemy and its objectives.
In the meantime, following the arrival of the alert order at about
14.15, the Garski Battalion set off towards the airfields at Bitburg
and Deckendorf, the designated takeoff points. The battalion's
advance elements reached the airfields at about the same time as
Gruppe Frster, which had flown in with its Storch aircraft from
Crailsheim. It was approximately 19.00. Final discussions confirmed
the Stuka support. It was again emphasised that the first bombs must
fall at the initial approach of the landing force in order to make use
of the element of surprise. A Staffel (later two) of Stukas was
allocated to the operation; no fighter support was assigned. The
leader of Operation "NIWI," Obstlt. Garski, described the mission as
follows:
"The Garski Battalion, consisting of about 400 men of III/l.R. G D ,
had been selected to be flown into Belgium in 100 Fieseler Storch

58

aircraft and landed about 15 km behind the enemy's front lines. Its
assignments were:
1. cut signals and courier traffic on the Neufchateau Bastogne and
NeufchateauMartelange roads;
2. hinder the approach of reserves from the Neufchateau area, and
3. by exerting pressure from the rear on the bunker line along the
border, ease the capture of the bunkers and facilitate the advance.
The force consisted of two groups which were to land near Nives
and Witry. Since the aircraft had room for only two soldiers, each
would have to make two trips to the landing site. According to
calculations which later proved to be correct the arrival of the
second flight would take place approximately two hours after the
initial landings.
Since the focal point of the operation lay in the area assigned the
southern Witry group, it was allocated more resources than the
northern Nives group.
The northern group was to consist of a company reinforced by a
heavy machine gun section and a section of Pioniers, while the
southern group was made up of the battalion headquarters and a
company, reinforced by a heavy machine gun section, a heavy
mortar section and two sections of Pioniers.
For defence against tanks, the landing force carried twice the usual
number of anti-tank rifles and a double issue of smkh ammunition.
As signals equipment the battalion had at its disposal one 15 watt
set (for communication with XIX Pz.Corps) and two 5 watt sets (for
communication between the two groups).
Transport of the northern group required 42 aircraft, the southern
group 56. Two aircraft remained behind in reserve and were later
flown from the Witry landing site on reconnaissance and courier
duties.
Space and weight limitations permitted the carriage of only a basic
supply of ammunition which might have been inadequate if the
battalion had become involved in heavy fighting. Three JU 52 aircraft
were therefore assigned to drop additional ammunition to ensure an
adequate supply."
The empty trucks of III Battalion rolled back to the regiment, from
where they were sent on under Hptm. Grosser, commander of 12th
Company.

59

Chapter Four
The Initial Days of the Attack 1940
10. 5.12. 5. 40
13. 5.14. 5.40

15. 5 --17. 5. 40
18. 5.--21. 5. 40
22. 5.--26. 5. 40

27. 5.--28. 5. 40
29. 5.-- 4. 6. 40
5.
8.
10.
15.

6.-- 8.
6.--10.
6.--14.
6.--19.

6. 40
6. 40
6. 40
6. 40

Advance through Luxembourg. Penetration of

southern Belgian fortifications and the Ardennes. Battle on the approaches to the Semois.
Forcing of the Meuse crossings near Sedan and
penetration of the extended Maginot Line. Main
line of resistance between Frenois and Wadelin
Court breached. Enemy tank attacks repulsed
near Chemery and Bulson.
Battles for the Stonne Heights.
Breakthrough to the sea and creation of defensive front on the Somme.
Encirclement of enemy forces in Flanders, enlargement of the breakthrough. Battles for
Boulogne and Calais.
a) engagement near Desvres 22. 5.
b) establishment of bridgeheads on the Aa
canal in the St. MomelinGravelines sector. Capture of bridgeheads across the Aa
canal at HolqueSt.Pierre Brouck, St.
Nicolas.
Attack on Wormhoudt and Herzeele to encircle
Dunkirk. Dunkirk shelled. Capture of heights at
Crochte and Pitgam.
Battles on the Canal de la Colme. Battles for
Dunkirk. Capture of Bergues.
Breakout from the Amiens bridgehead.
Battles of pursuit up to the Oise.
Breakthrough to the Seine.
Forcing of the Seine crossings. Capture of
bridgeheads on the Losor and the Allier.
pursuit through Lyon.

The attack order in the West was issued on 9 May. It fixed the
attack for 05.30 on 10 May 1940. For the Germans everything
depended on the Allies not recognising the threat to their northern
wing until it was too late. The spearhead of Von Rundstedt's Army
Group A tipped by Panzergruppe von Kleist would move out
of the Ardennes, cross the Meuse and head for the sea. To achieve
this, the armoured forces of Guderian's corp, including the I.R. GD,
would first have to press forward to the Meuse, deep into enemy
territory.
60

The French recognised the German offensive on the morning of

10 May 1940, but not its strength and direction. The Second, Ninth
and First French Armies immediately dispatched mobile forces to
slow the advance of the German troops. The cavalry of General
Huntzinger's Ninth French Army advanced in three groups to the
line ArlonBastogne. However, they were attacked by German
armoured forces and thrown back across the Semois. The French
continued to remain unaware of the intentions of the German
command. Their mobile reserve of fourteen divisions, including four
armoured divisions, stayed where it was.
The Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, reinforced by
artillery and engineers, reached the area around Irrel from its
approach march at 02.00 and rested.
The advance detachment under Hptm. Felsch which, largely
formed from II Battalion, included elements of 7th and 8th Companies, an anti-tank platoon from 14th Company under Lt. Hintze,
as well as elements of 5th Company, made ready. Departure was at
05.00. It set out for the Luxembourg frontier near Echternach,
reaching it at about 06.00. The advance battalion was rolling.
Feldwebel Schwappacher, with a heavy infantry gun of 15th
(Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company, described the advance:
"The regiment's main force remained behind; the advance detachment under Hptm. Felsch pushed on alone. Two trucks with infantry
were on their way; they drove in the lead. We 'Gruppe Fhrer'
meaning the advance headquarters of II Battalion, who were to follow
directly behind the lead vehicles, set off after them. Following close
behind us was our commander, Major Fst, then Obit, von Massow
of the 13th (Lt.Inf.Gun) Company, Obit. Mrz, chief of 15th
(Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company and, in support, an anti-tank platoon from
the 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company. In the meantime it had begun to get
light; slowly, the outlines of the last houses of Echternach blurred
and disappeared in the morning fog. Only the shining band of the
road to Bollendorf showed us the way. The first inhabitants ventured
from their houses. An old woman greeted us cheerfully and gave us
her blessing for the coming battle. All at once shadows again loomed
before us, became larger and took form that must be Bollendorf.
Desolate and empty, the buildings stared at us, then suddenly a left
turn and before us was the border crossing. The Luxembourgers had
tried to blow the bridge over the Saur, but had been only partially
successful, so our engineers had no difficulty in repairing it immediately with several planks. The inhabitants, who were looking about
nervously, watched us with hostile, but inquisitive, looks. We were
gripped by an odd feeling which we had never felt before: advance
detachment! It was not without good reason that our group was
called this.

61

Our drivers had to push their vehicles hard. Forests, lakes, magnificent scenery and silent villages passed by. All this, together with
the roar of the motors and the rattling of the tailgates, occasionally
made us forget all thoughts of the advance detachment and battle.
The changing scenery, the ever- prettier views of this small, well-ordered, clean country left us with the impression of a pleasant drive
in the country.
Forward! Forward! The thundering song of the hot machines
became louder. Quickly and fleetingly, as if in a dream, we passed
through Luxembourg."
The main body of the regiment followed through Medernach
CrychtenRelange. Soon it was midday. Again a brief stop; the
regiment was standing before the Belgian frontier. It was 14.00. The
hot sun shone down and tremendous swaths of dust hung behind
the column. Overhead, major air battles were raging in the blue,
cloudless sky.
A sensational report from the spearhead of II Battalion soon
brought the halt to an end: 'Belgian frontier barricade line undefended!' The watchword was onward! onward!
The following account was provided by a member of the leading
elements of II Battalion, which were driving just behind the advance
battalion:
"We reached the Belgian border and drove across. Then suddenly
a cry: 'enemy tanks from the left!' We jumped down from the vehicles
and took cover. Our anti-tank guns went into position, but the enemy
disappeared just in time. We rattled slowly on and approached a
village. All at once Major Fst shouted, 'Attert is free of the enemy!'
Astounded, we looked at one another. Attert, which we had attacked
in so many sand-table exercises? It was hard to believe. But on we
went like Satan's fury. We left the main road and took to the
secondary roads. Shrouded in a brown-grey cloud of dust we roared
onward. We could scarcely recognise one another, so filthy had we
become. Soon the broad, green meadows with the black and white
cows disappeared.
The village through which we now passed appeared more warlike:
wooden barricades, barbed wire and so on. All this failed to hold us
up, however. Major Fst, this old campaigner of the First World War,
was a cool daredevil. He lay across the folded-down windscreen of
his vehicle armed with a rifle and a spade. Pumping his hand up and
down he gave the signal: Full throttle faster! We roared down the
roads. There. . . to the right, the first Frenchmen! They strolled
along, oblivious to the approaching danger. There were two men, it
wasn't worth our while to stop and get down. We let them continue
peacefully on their way, and soon we overtook our infantry ahead.
Suddenly. . . halt! What's up? . . . To the right of us in the clover
field a bunch of Frenchmen were marching into position. Startled,
62

Etalle - the death of Major Fst on 10 May 1940.

63

they stared at us; we, too, were somewhat taken aback. Should we
fire? Major Fst gave the order. We got down from our vehicles and
fired our first shots at the enemy. There! one of them had been
hit! One of the Frenchmen rolled in the clover, got up again and then
collapsed. The rest came toward us at once with their hands raised,
an entire platoon. Most of them were older men.
Cautiously we drove on. On the right lay the first dead; they looked
quite pale. Dead! A chill gripped our hearts, a shiver ran down our
spines. We would have to get used to that sight.
Again the column halted; there was the crackling and rattling of
gunfire. A sharp report. . . there, our anti-tank guns had gone into
action. But now we must get down and move out. They greeted us
with several well-aimed bursts of machine gun fire. The first houses
had already been taken.
We looked around: what was this blasted place called? Ah, there
it was: Etalle."
The report of the first serious resistance reached the regiment after
it crossed the Belgian frontier near Upper and Lower Colpach, south
of Attert. The forces which had taken up positions in Etalle were
elements of French cavalry and motorised reconnaissance units.
Armoured cars had been spotted. The regiment moved up. The
regiment's commanding officer drove forward as did the chief of the
14th (Pz.Jg.) Company who reported:
"We could hear machine gun and rifle fire. Now it had really started!
I drove forward. The advance guard's trucks stood there empty,
parked close together in a disorderly fashion. Several motorcars
drove towards me wounded from my advance platoon! The
regiment's CO was also there, completely calm. Although it was hot,
he had two coats on. 'Help the advance guard up ahead in the
village.' There was no time for questions. He likely didn't know any
more anyway.
Uffz. Kellermann went back to lead the platoons forward. They
arrived a few moments later, running at a crouch. We halted before
the village. There the machine gun fire was more audible. I went
forward on foot with Kellermann. Ahead was the marketplace of
Etalle. On the way we met an Oberleutnant Chrapkowski of the
Pioniers who had won the Iron Cross, 1st Class in Poland. He must
know what's going on. Together we moved farther forward. At the
marketplace Chrapkowski began to run. We followed. During a
breather he mentioned that we had been under fire. So that's what
it sounded like! I, too, had heard sharp hissing sounds, but hadn't
taken them seriously.
In the village of Etalle the fighting was serious. Houses had been
shot up, telephone wires hung down everywhere; on the comer sat
a bullet-riddled civilian automobile. There was a barricade up ahead
at the bridge. Rifle and machine gun fire was coming from the houses
64

behind it, but there was no one to be seen. I questioned several

Grenadiers, but they too knew nothing. Now and again several ran
across the street. Whom were we to help? Where was the enemy?
It was a real mix-up! Everything was unclear. I simply moved the
platoons of my company up to the entrance of the village and brought
them into position. This was the correct thing to do. We also met
the platoon under Lt. Hintze from the advance guard. Enthusiastically he told us of the combat. He had knocked out two armoured
cars."
"Remaining where you are is the best tactic." Major Fst thought
so too when he arrived at the edge of the village of Etalle just behind
the advance group under Hptm. Felsch. Almost in the centre of the
town, the spearhead had been fired on by the crew of an enemy
street-barricade. The truck-mounted machine gun opened fire on the
barricade. The gunner was wounded; his comrade jumped into his
place and opened fire, enabling the other gunners to move into
position. The firing from windows and holes in the roofs of houses
continued. Striking out through yards and gardens, Hauptmann
Felsch sought a favourable spot from which to attack the barricade.
Leaving two men behind in cover, he and several Grenadiers worked
their way up to the barricade from the right. He could see that the
enemy position was situated on a bridge. Hptm. Felsch now joined
in the house-to-house fighting. The leading section on the right threw
hand grenades behind the enemy barricade. The Hauptmann leapt
to the left side of the street to get closer; from there he would be in
a better position to lead the attack. It was there that his faithful leader
of the company headquarters personnel, Feldwebel Pitzner, was
killed. Felsch was wounded in the upper thigh, but was able to reach
the protection of the ditch at the side of the street. He died several
days later in hospital.
Meanwhile, the commander of II Battalion, Major Fst, appeared
on the spot to assess the situation.
The following is a description of the situation in Etalle, this time
by a member of 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company:
"We had no more time to look around; 50 meters ahead there was
a racket that took us quite by surprise. A clear, thin cry rang out for
the first time on our side: 'medic'. The infantry platoon up ahead
had been pinned down.
Our anti-tank guns had work to do; the first French tanks were
approaching. Messengers were sent back to fetch the heavy companies to break the enemy's resistance.
Meanwhile, the enemy fire intensified. We were 30 meters away.
Bullets and ricochets whirred and whistled past us to the right and
left, smacking into the roofs, tearing holes in the walls of houses,
smashing windows the air was filled with buzzing and whizzing.
But every effort by the enemy was in vain. We lay in good cover and
65

held our position, a hard-fought-for roadway. To the right of us was

an anti-tank gun of 14th Company, which we could see clearly. There
were sharp cracks from the gun as it sent shell after shell at the
enemy. The enemy force was apparently a French cavalry battalion
supported by light motorised forces. We built street barricades
against an expected enemy tank attack from the side.
The anti-tank gun fired ever faster. In the midst of the raging
firefight Uffz. Podwojewski turned and fell to the ground. Then a
second member of the crew collapsed. A medic rushed forward, but
both men were beyond his help.
The seriousness of the fighting became clear when the word went
through our ranks: Major Fst has been killed!"
Lt. Dr. Schreiber provided a detailed report on the death of Major
Fst:
"As we moved farther forward I joined up with Major Fst. The
village street made a turn and led across a bridge, on which the
barricade was located. It was already in our hands and one of our
anti-tank guns was dug in nearby. The French, however, were still
keeping the area in front of the barricade under heavy small arms
fire. We could advance no farther, so we went around to the left
along the wide ditch. We Major Fst, Lt. Schulz of 5th Company,
several Grenadiers and myself moved forward between the village
and the hillside without resistance. Suddenly, halt! Fifty meters ahead
of us was a French armoured car, but it had not yet spotted us. It
drove into the village square to our line of advance and was knocked
out with one shot by the anti-tank gun at the barricade. Up and
onward. Suddenly, from behind us, a tremendous din: a munitions
truck had been hit and had caught fire. Meanwhile, Major Fst had
made his way to the bridge 50 meters away, over which the French
armoured car had just driven into the village. The Major disappeared
from my view. I worked my way forward in leaps and bounds,
because bullets were still whistling about. On the bridge itself lay the
Grenadiers who had been accompanying Major Fst. One of them
was quite shaken up; he pointed in the direction of the village: T h e
Major is lying over there! Dead!' Then an N C O came wading across
the stream from the other side and repeated: the Major is dead!
Then, quite unexpectedly, a Frenchman came across the bridge:
'La guerrefinie' Others followed."
Meanwhile, the bulk of II Battalion had arrived. In the face of a
flanking manoeuvre by 6th Company, the French withdrew from
Etalle. The first tanks of the 10th Pz.Div. which carried a buffalo
painted on their turrets as unit insignia also arrived. The tanks
roared through the village at high speed.
The I.R. GD gathered in and near the village to assemble for a
further advance. It set out at about 17.00, but while crossing the
heights behind Etalle it again came under enemy fire. The regiment
66

immediately prepared for another attack with I Battalion on the right,

Stu.Pi.Btl 43 in the centre and II Battalion on the left.
While this was taking place the spearhead, with Obit. Rothermund
(on a motorcycle) and Feldwebel Brnner, both of 12th (MG.)
Company, drove into the village of Villiers sur Semois, where they
were both severely wounded by surprise enemy fire. Rothermund
died of his wounds. The regiment's attack, in which all three
battalions would be employed in the front line, was to be carried out
through Villiers sur Semois in the direction of Harinsart. On reaching
the hills southeast of Villiers sur Semois, the regiment was met by
heavy machine gun fire from the village. Neither side received artillery
support during the attack, as it had not yet reached the area.
Obit. Beck-Broichsitter, company commander of 14th (Pz.Jg)
Company, described the attack:
"II Battalion under Major Greim attacked as if on the exercise field.
The village of Villiers sur Semois was occupied by a strong enemy
force. Five or six machine guns fired from the village in a slow
rhythm. I moved forward with a platoon along a country lane. The
bursts of machine gun fire hissed close by. Still under fire, the platoon
was moved into position. We were all afraid, but no one said
anything. We succeeded in setting up our positions without loss, and
opened fire on the edge of the village with high-explosive shells. Now
and then we came under heavy machine gun fire. The gun commanders and Grenadiers performed magnificently. From the cover
of a thicket I watched as, one after another, four enemy light tanks
were knocked out. Our plan of attack had been correct.
The regiment's commanding officer slowly made his way to II
Battalion. We saw him point with his stick toward the village. Then
the bugle signal: move out!
A little later a platoon of my company became engaged in wild
house-to-house fighting. A machine gun in a church steeple was fired
on with HE and armour-piercing. It soon fell silent. Assault guns of
the 16th Company under Obit, von Egloffstein assisted. The CO was
now quite far forward; he wanted to get a better view of the terrain
so he could best decide what to do next."
It turned out that the enemy force consisted of French cavalry.
Hastily thrown into the defence of the village, it nevertheless put up
an extremely tenacious, brave and clever defence. In spite of this the
village was taken between 20.00 and 21.00. The regiment took up
positions on the hills northwest of Villiers sur Semois for the night.
The enemy had again settled into Harinsart. In its night positions
outside the enemy-occupied village, 3rd Company suffered its first
dead from sniper fire: Ogefr. Kthe and Ogefr. B. Brock.
Except for occasional small arms fire, the night passed relatively
quietly. The regiment's first day of combat had ended. Many, many
more were to follow.
67

Now back to the early morning of the first day, to III Battalion
which, together with its commander Obstlt. Garski, had set off for
Operation "NIWI." At roughly 05.00 the first Storch took off in a
westerly direction toward B e l g i u m . The aircraft had been
positioned in a horseshoe formation for takeoff, and the wind was
such that the first machines had to take off over the last. They were
to land in two groups near Witry and Nives. Events were to turn out
differently, however, but had little effect on the overall operation.
The pilot of the aircraft carrying the commander of the Nives group,
Hptm. Krger, veered off course and landed fourteen kilometres
south of his objective near the town of L'Eglise. The following aircraft
landed three kilometres farther to the east near Rancimont. It was
there that Krger linked up with some of his men. The following
report was made by an N C O of 11th Company who took part in the
operation:
"Soon after takeoff we lost contact with the Storks flying ahead of
us. We stared out at the countryside over which we were flying at
low altitude. On the roads were the endless columns of our advancing
army. They waved to us. Behind us were the other two machines of
the platoon command flight; we signalled them and landed in
Belgium in a field. We had landed in the wrong place and amid
loud cursing the three aircraft took off again. There smoke forming
ahead of us! It wasn't burning houses, but a burning Stork, and
around the aircraft were our comrades. We descended and landed.
There was much confusion. The ammunition was taken to a nearby
wood and the road barricaded. The first brown Belgian uniforms
appeared and soon the first civilians had also been detained. These
informed us that we were near L'Eglise and that this was the road
to Witry.
We reinforced our perimeter and set up machine gun positions.
Order replaced confusion; the Oberleutnant took charge. We commandeered several automobiles. Among the prisoners who had
unsuspectingly walked into our hands were several high-ranking
officers; they were thunderstruck.
Then, suddenly, our messenger Preusch arrived on a motorcycle.
He had landed with the Hauptmann about two kilometres away. We
were to go there immediately. A JU 52 appeared and dropped
munitions containers by parachute. However, we left them where
they landed; we had no time for them. Our automobile column set
out. I heard the voice of Goebbels on the radio. We soon reached
the Hauptmann and the prisoners were locked up in a house.
Hauptmann Krger now took command of the party. He wanted to
try and reach the battalion, which he estimated was eight to ten
kilometres away, by motor vehicle. But then the first shots rang out;
a Belgian troop convoy had been spotted. Again the machine guns
and anti- tank rifles were moved into position. And as if that were
68

not enough, an enemy tank now approached, forcing us to take

cover quickly. The motorised breakthrough was called off and we
were forced to try and get through on foot. We took the prisoners
with us.
It became midday and the sun shone down damned hot on our
heads. Nevertheless, the Hauptmann didn't let us slacken the pace;
we had to keep going. Then the report came: the battalion is on the
far slope. Outside Fauvilliers we finally met our people; we breathed
easier. As we entered Fauvilliers German troops were moving
through the town."
The landings by Obstlt. Garski's detachment did not go according
to plan either. Garski and nine men landed at about 06.00. However,
it was not until roughly 09.00 that the two platoons arrived. Garski's
force then occupied the village of Traimont. The third flight subsequently arrived at 10.00 with several mortars and anti-tank rifles.
Thus reinforced, at 14.00 Obstlt. Garski occupied the village of
Witry, where Belgian armoured cars were driven away by mortar
fire. Radio contact was established with XIX Pz.Korps and Garski
learned that east of the village Belgian Ardennes mountain troops
were putting up stiff resistance. Acting quickly, Garski advanced
toward the fighting, drove the Belgians from the village of Fauvilliers
with mortar fire and sent several men on motorcycles to Bodange,
where they made contact with motorcyclists of the 1st Pz.Div. So,
despite many errors, this operation was a success, delaying the
French advance by hours and opening the way west for German
motorcycle units.
At that time the air-landing of troops behind enemy lines, as in
Operation "NIWI." was unprecedented. Obstlt. Garski made the
following observations on the operation:
"Successful completion of the mission was made more difficult
when the first flight of the northern detachment lost its way and
landed fifteen kilometres farther south near L'Eglise. The northern
detachment thus lost half its planned strength and therefore had to
contend with great difficulties. The southern detachment, the focal
point of the operation, consisted of only ten men for the first two
hours, because contact had been lost between the aircraft of the first
wave, and the main force including the battalion headquarters,
which had the radio sets, less the commander and adjutant joined
up with the northern detachment which had crossed its route. Thus,
there was no contact between the southern detachment and XIX
Pz.Corps until the early hours of the afternoon. Contact with the
northern detachment was maintained by aircraft.
Until the arrival of the detachment that had landed in error near
L'Eglise, the southern detachment (Witry) was reduced to half its
planned strength.
Total losses suffered by the battalion in the operation were:
69

9 dead
7 wounded
3 missing
The units involved brought in 82 prisoners, among them 1 Major
and 5 other officers."
As a result of the progress made by X I X Pz.Corps, the
Panzergruppe's orders of 10 May were to stay on the enemy's heels
and continue the advance toward the Meuse.
The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment - as a part of the 10th
Panzer Division spent the night on the hills northwest of Villiers
sur Semois screened by a thin line of pickets. The first day of the
campaign against France had come to an end; while many had
received their baptism of fire, it had been a day of trial for everyone.
Orders for the continuation of the advance arrived during the night;
the regiment was to veer to the north and march in the direction of
Rossignol. It was a beautiful spring night, but one with burning
villages, bawling cattle and a terrible jumble of men, vehicles and
equipment.
The morning of 11 May found the regiment regrouped including
the recently arrived artillery for the continuation of the attack. The
forces of the 10th Panzer Division, with GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
in the front and the tanks still far to the rear, wheeled toward the
north. The men moved ahead on foot, leaving the vehicles behind,
as these would be slowed greatly by the numerous barricades. As a
result, the advance was extremely exhausting for the troops. The
commander of I Battalion, Obstlt. Khler, was temporarily detached
to take command of the 69th Infantry Regiment and was replaced
by Hptm. Fllmer. The 69th Regiment's previous commander had
been killed the day before.
In wide open formation, the infantry of I Battalion advanced across
the slope toward Rulles. Machine guns, ammunition canisters and
mortar bases weighed heavy on the men. Panting and sweating, they
plodded along under the hot morning sun.
Deployed on the left was II Battalion, which was moving toward
Rossignol as flanking protection for I Battalion.
Rulles proved to be free of enemy forces, and I Battalion continued on
toward the forested area which spread out before it. The deciduous forest
provided some protection from the burning sun of the late morning, but
the uninterrupted series of hills that had to be climbed demanded the utmost
of the men. Among them in the 4th (MG.) Company was Gefreiter
Baldur von Schirach who, like the other Grenadiers, carried his burden and
kept advancing.
Passing west of Mellier, I Battalion pushed on toward the village
of Suxy, which reconnaissance had reported occupied by the enemy.
70

At approximately 14.00 the battalion made contact with enemy

forces. The attack on Suxy developed into a perfect training school
attack, supported by the regiment's heavy weapons, including artillery. The enemy forces a French cavalry reconnaissance unit
suffered heavy losses while putting up a stubborn defence. Every
grenadier did his utmost to ensure the success of the attack. The
assault guns had a terrible effect, softening up the enemy positions
with direct fire. The leader of the assault gun platoon, Leutnant
Franz, reported:
"My platoon, which was attached to the I Battalion for the assault
on Suxy, moved along the road in stages so that we neared the village
at about the same time as the leading elements of the infantry. Then,
all at once fire from the direction of Suxy. The infantry deployed
immediately. The platoon's assault guns left the road and set out in
the direction of the village. We were somewhat concerned about a
swampy-looking depression which lay before the village, but we got
through all right. Breaking into the first rows of houses with the
leading infantry, we spotted several fleeing Frenchmen. Our artillery
and heavy infantry weapons fired over our heads, engaging enemy
targets in the centre of the village. Little was to be seen of the enemy;
however, machine gun and rifle fire whistled in from all sides. We
attempted to orientate ourselves by opening the hatches, but they
had to be closed immediately, as concentrated rifle fire was directed
down at us from some higher point.
Moving on, we felt our way forward with the infantry, who were
springing from house to house, and engaged recognised and
suspected machine gun and rifle positions in the village. In this way
we reached the far side of Suxy.
Then, in the hedgerows country opposite, we saw movement by
vehicles, or was it cannon? Something appeared to be moving into
position. Following brief instructions, Wachtmeister Schdlich
opened fire. As we later discovered, the movement had been by a
French battery which was attempting to go into position. There was
not much left of it.
This was the first actual combat that we had carried out in our
assault guns in cooperation with the infantry. This first battle near
Suxy demonstrated the possibilities and limitations of the assault
guns as they were organised and equipped at that time. We amassed
plenty of experience during the campaign and then had the opportunity to pass it along to the artillery school, so that by the next
campaign in Yugoslavia the organisation of the assault gun units
looked quite different."
Wachtmeister Schdlich had spotted an approaching French battery, which he destroyed with only a few shots. He was decorated
in the field by the regiment's commander, Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin,

71

becoming the first member of IV Battalion to receive the Iron Cross,

Second Class.
I Battalion stormed and took Suxy, suffering only four dead and
eight wounded, among them Obit. Kolb. The heavy weapons played
a considerable role in the battalion's success. Ofeldw. Schwappacher
of 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company reported:
"The order reached us: 15th Company forward support I
Battalion. We turned left off the main road onto a forest lane. Obit.
Mrz made his way to the regimental observation post, where he
received the combat orders. 1st Platoon installed itself on a small rise
and the guns were moved into firing positions. The company zero
line was a white, chateau-like building at a range of approximately
2,500 meters. We could smell the fighting. A burst of machine gun
fire swished overhead. We had to act quickly! One gun was moved
farther forward to provide direct fire. Obit. Mrz himself took aim.
With a dull crack, the first shell whistled toward the white house.
T o o short! Increase 50 meters!' The next shell crashed into the
gable. Shell after shell delivered greetings to the village of Suxy. To
the right, our Grenadiers stormed forward and had soon reached the
gentle slope. 2nd Platoon went into position in a hollow next to 1st
Platoon to increase our firepower. Gen.Lt. Schaal, CO of the 10th
Panzer Division, arrived and followed the attack attentively.
Our assault guns now had another opportunity to go into action.
The grey monsters roared over the soggy terrain, across the hollow
and up the slope on the other side. In the midst of the fighting a
Leutnant of our regiment appeared up front on a motorcycle. He
brought a report that the white house was in our hands and that we
should cease firing. Apparently, the forward troops had no flares
with which to signal us.
Soon afterward the first of the battalion's wounded came back,
among them Obit. Kolb of Berlin. The French had fired on the
advancing infantry from the flank.
The 2nd Platoon now moved its position about 500 metres and,
firing over Suxy into the forest, paved the way for the advance to
continue. Then 1st Platoon followed; loading and mounting up took
only a few minutes. We followed Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin in the
wild rush toward Suxy. We reached the slope and from there we
could see the devastating effect of our shells. Soon after we were in
the village. The bridge over a small stream had been blown. The
15th Company assembled and, with the others, drove into a large
meadow, vehicle after vehicle, just as in peacetime.
Departure was at approximately 20.00."
The battle for Suxy was followed by a pursuit, if one could call it
that, which made great physical demands of the men. By the time
darkness fell, the regiment had advanced so near to the Semois that

72

a battalion which was sent ahead during the night was able to reach
the river at approximately 03.00.
While this was going on, II Battalion advanced farther to the
northwest through the wooded country but, due to the difficult
terrain, did not arrive in St. Menard until the morning hours of 12
May. When it did arrive, II Battalion found that the leading elements
of I Battalion had already reached the area. Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin
was decorated with the Iron Cross, Second Class in the field by
Gen.Lt. Schaal for his exemplary leadership during the battle.
During the course of the evening, GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was
released from its secondment to 10th Panzer Division and withdrawn
through St. Menard for employment by XIX Panzer Corps.
The 1st Panzer Division under Gen.Lt. Kirchner, which was
attacking farther to the right, and whose III Battalion had made
contact with the enemy in Fauvilliers on 10 May, reached the Semois
river and took the city of Bouillon on the evening of the 11th, while
the 2nd Panzer Division, which was part of the same Panzer Corps,
was able to advance through Libramont. Further pursuit brought
Panzer Corps Guderian up to the river Meuse, where the first serious
enemy resistance was expected.
While, on 11 May the French still had the impression that the main
German attack was under way on both sides of Lttich in the
direction of BrusselsAntwerp, during 12 May it gradually became
clear to the French high command that the greatest threat lay
between Sedan and Namur the sectors held by the Ninth and
Second French Armies. Thus, the armies that were to meet the
spearhead of the German attack were those whose defensive
capabilities were rated the lowest, and this situation had been brought
about by the French high command's inaccurate assessment of the
situation.
The French Army strove to occupy positions along the Meuse, but
this move was only partially complete by the evening of 12 May. By
then, however, the first German Panzer units had already been
reported moving fast towards the river. Everything that the French
command could scrape together in the way of troops was rushed
forward to the Meuse to occupy Maginot Line bunkers or reinforce
the existing crews. The Germans spent 12 May clearing the east
bank of the Meuse and securing their assembly areas for the crossing.
That evening, General von Kleist gave the order for the crossing to
take place at 16.00 on 13 May 1940. The Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was placed under the command of the
1st Panzer Division for the attack.
". . .on 13 May 1940, the focus of the battle in the west will lay with
Gruppe von Kleist. . ."

73

AIR L A N D I N G OPERATION "NIVI"

74

Chapter Five
Crossing the Meuse near Sedan
The three divisions of Panzer Corps Guderian 2nd Panzer
Division on the right, 1st Panzer Division in the centre and 10th
Panzer Division on the left readied themselves in the front lines.
The focus of the attack was to lay in the attack sector of the 1st
Panzer Division and the attached GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment. The assignment given GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was to clear
the bend of the Meuse, advancing initially as far as the Bellevue
Torcy road, carry forward the attack on the heights of the Bois de
la Marfe, and subsequently push through as far as the line
ChemeryChaumont.
The regiment had been given several days of rest after advancing
into the Orego area on 11 May. After recovering its vehicles, the
previously detached III Battalion under Obstlt. Garski rejoined the
regiment and took up positions in Nevraument. During the absence
of the rest of the company, the two remaining sections of the 9th
Company joined the battalion headquarters. A period of quiet began
the calm before the storm.
The night of 1 2 / 1 3 May 1940 was short. Setting out at approximately 03.00, the regiment's leading elements rolled through
the forest in the darkness towards Bouillon. Order of march was: II
Battalion, III Battalion and, in the rear, I Battalion. A participant
related:
"The darkness hung like a curtain on the night of 1 2 / 1 3 May,
when we were awakened after an hour's sleep by an unexpected
alert. It was to be one of those uncomfortable nighttime drives - more slow feeling our way forwards, the only comforting sign the
feeble blinking of the preceding vehicle's brake lights. In the light of
dawn a burning, badly ravaged Belgian city: Bouillon, with its castle
of the ancient crusader perched on a rugged crag."
The regiment moved into its assembly area. The approach march
was carried out over jammed roads, past the foul-smelling bodies of
decomposing horses and under intermittent harassing attacks by
individual French bombers. After passing Bouillon, however, the
route again took the regiment through a forest, although it was less
dense than before. Along the sides of the road were the positions of
the German artillery, whose guns were firing single rounds at French
targets. Beside the guns the gunners were hurriedly digging in. In the
distance could be heard the loud explosions of bombs the Stukas

75

were dropping on bunkers and fortifications on the far side of the

Meuse. The regiment's column was soon under the cover of the Bois
de Sedan; the approach march continued along forest roads, over
hills and through valleys, always toward the southwest. Then came
the signal to leave the vehicles and break out the equipment.
The regiment proceeded on foot into the assembly area north of
Illy. The heavy weapons scouted about for positions for their guns.
All the while, the rumble of German heavy artillery could be heard
in the distance. Again, a situation report by Ofeldw. Schwappacher
of the 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company:
"At approximately 03.00 we crossed the Porte de France, the
French border. A few kilometres farther we ran into countless heavy
units which were to support us in the Meuse crossing. At every halt
there immediately began a frantic breaking of branches and uprooting of small trees. Soon our vehicles were so well camouflaged with
foliage, that not a wheel or any other part was visible from the sides
or above. As we continued on we came ever nearer to the city of
Sedan. We left the main road, veered left onto a narrow, bumpy
forest lane and disappeared into a large wood. The trucks of the
infantry companies were already there, well-camouflaged on both
sides of the road.
The companies and assault teams made ready for the attack which
was to result in the crossing of the Meuse. We got down from our
vehicles, packed our equipment on our backs and marched probably
seven kilometres in the hot midday sun across open terrain. No one
knew for certain, but everyone believed that we might already be
close to the enemy. Carrying the equipment as we did resulted in a
great deal of cursing and sweat. The guns followed behind in close
order. The forest road now fell away sharply and a marshy meadow
spread out before us. The area had been badly ravaged by French
artillery fire; the single house that stood there was badly shot up and
the garden and surrounding meadow had been cratered by countless
shells. There were also barricades of felled trees and mines and
behind was a blown bridge. We were forced to halt for a few moments
while a makeshift crossing for our guns was fashioned from tree
trunks. We worked our way through on the right. In the village
through which we passed there was no sign of life; everything was
abandoned, the people had fled. Again a halt. Ahead of us dense
groups of our infantry and Sturmpioniere were moving across the
heights. They were easily recognizable from the demolition charges
on long poles and flamethrowers they were carrying.
Waves of our aircraft mainly Stukas and DO 7s had been
roaring overhead for several hours; there must have been several
hundred in all. We watched them peel off: from medium altitude they
plunged down on their targets like falcons.

76

Our platoon leaders had meanwhile occupied their observation

posts. We drove into firing positions and all of the ammunition was
unloaded. It could begin. Scarcely were we ready, the sweat pouring
from us, when we were ordered to change position, and quickly!
Before the site where the Meuse was to be crossed was another line
of hills, so we had to move farther forward. We loaded everything
up and once again the tractors rattled off. We had to drive back
several hundred metres and pass through Floing, which was under
French artillery fire and well ablaze. It was quite a drive! Past the
cemetery and through narrow alleys, artillery shells bursting to our
right. Finally we made it. We were at a steep bank, behind which
our guns went into position. Behind the bushes and shrubs were
abandoned machine gun nests and fox holes, complete with mattresses and pillows, and beside them empty champagne bottles.
The company observation post was near the memorial to the
Chasseurs d'Afrique. Next to it on the left was Obit. Gerbener and
beyond Ofeldw. Schwappacher. The platoons set up quickly, firing
could begin. The 1st Platoon's field of fire reached from a factory to
the Meuse, that of 2nd Platoon comprised the left half of the terrain.
Our assignment was clear: support the infantry and destroy light
field fortifications.
Ofeldw. Schwappacher felt as if he were in Dberitz; plainly visible,
he set up his scissors telescope and observed the enemy's movements. Then there was a hiss and a crash close by; the enemy had
spotted the observation post. The telescope snapped and quickly
disappeared that was a close one! The observation post was set
up again in a garden house.
Ofeldw. Schwappacher now opened fire on the blue-windowed
factory, but he was unable to get a good view of the bursts. One shell
fell quite short, almost on our own lines. The firing data were checked
everything was correct! Same range! This shell was too long.
Something wasn't right.
Meanwhile, the leading troops had pushed far ahead."
It was approximately 15.00 and the regiment was grinding its way
toward the Meuse. The unit's CO, Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin, began
to pace, wearing his coat and carrying his walking stick. The objective
was the northwest comer of Sedan it was in that area that the
crossing was to take place. II Battalion was in the lead, spearheaded
by a section from 8th Company, followed by III Battalion. They
moved down out of the edges of the wood, which ended there on
the slope, across fields and meadows. The air was full of buzzing,
crackling and roaring. Finally the advancing troops could see the
Meuse and the opposite bank. Also there in the distance were
meadows and the forest-covered heights behind. There was little to
be seen of the enemy, but plenty of firing.

77

The following is a report by Obit, von Courbire, commander of

the 6th (Rifle) Company, which was the second to cross the Meuse:
"The battalion command post was at the head of the battalion, at
a crossroads. The CO sat on a stone, around him the commanders
of the heavy weapons. The regiment's orders had just arrived. The
II Battalion of the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Inf.Rgt. was to cross
the Meuse first, break through the Maginot Line and take possession
of Hill 247. The CO's voice rang hard. The battalion's route to
the crossing point was pencilled in on the maps. At 14.00 the
battalion was to move out of its assembly area: 7th Company was
to set out from the factory on the western edge of Sedan and lead
the way across the Meuse, followed by 6th Company. The orders
were gone over again, and soon afterward the companies were on
the move. They had two hours (until 16.00) to cross the ten
kilometres of no-man's land and reach the Meuse. All of the
equipment, ammunition, heavy machine guns and mortars had to
be carried across ploughed fields, through fields of young corn, over
hills and deep gullies. Despite the great heat the soldiers carried on:
much sweat was spilled and plenty of cursing was directed at the
heavy machine guns, mortars and ammunition boxes. The terrain
became more difficult until, finally, the Meuse valley lay at our feet.
There, to the left, was burning Sedan, directly before us the completely destroyed town of Floing, and to the south, on the far side of
the Meuse, lay our objective!
Everywhere one looked there was smoke, bursting shells and
bombs. The French were still quiet, the inactivity on the far side of
the river seemed unreal. Had they been so hard hit already, or were
they waiting for the moment when we are about to cross the river?
Nothing can be seen as the French fortifications were shrouded in
smoke, but new groups of Stukas continued to drop their deadly
loads on them.
We still had not yet reached the objective. We had to hold up so
as to reach the river at the designated time. We passed through
Floing; not a shot was fired, the inhabitants had fled. Dogs and cats
roamed the streets, whose shattered houses were evidence of the
pitiless power of war. Below, on the main street, we turned to the
left and were soon at our factory. The French now recognised the
danger and took up the fight, oblivious to the bombs exploding
around them. The Pioniers brought their assault boats forward, but
they are unable to reach the river. Despite our cover, the French are
able to observe every movement from their bunkers and direct fire
onto us. Assault guns moved forward, but their shells are unable to
pierce the steel and concrete. Valuable time was lost until a heavy
8.8 cm Flak finally silenced the enemy.
Again the assault boats were brought forward, but this attempt also
failed in the face of enemy fire. A young Leutnant of the 7th
78

Company, Lt. Graf Medem, and two Pioniers paid for their bravery
with their lives; the wounded were brought back. Once again a heavy
Flak intervened in the battle and, under its covering fire, the first
elements of the lead (7th) company set out in inflatable boats across
the Meuse. The crossing was a success! Quickly, as practised during
the winter, the spearhead of the "sixth' followed. In the lead was the
1st Platoon with Leutnant Prachowski at its head; behind it were the
company headquarters personnel with elements of 2nd Platoon and
a heavy machine gun section. The rest of the company was below
in inflatable boats on the Meuse. Four kilometres in the distance we
could clearly see Hill 247, whose eastern slope the company was to
assault. The units quickly regrouped. Then began an attack which
was to become a glorious page in the battalion's war history."
There was some confusion when the leading elements of II
Battalion reached the far shore of the Meuse, but order slowly
returned. The enemy was now firing from his embrasures. The
crossing point came under rifle fire, but only the occasional artillery
shell landed. Several men were wounded by snipers and were
assembled at the riverbank near the crossing point. More and more
inflatable boats and now also assault boats were crossing the river.
The crossing was gaining momentum, and more soldiers were
arriving at the crossing point. As the companies arrived, they were
ferried across the river.
The enemy fire died down; the first bunkers had been destroyed
or had surrendered. The Stukas continued to drop their bombs on
the fortifications on the slope, often only metres ahead of the
advancing German troops. It was approximately 19.00 and the sun
was setting in the west. The assault by II Battalion went on, however.
The commander of 6th Company reported:
"Scarcely had the lead platoon set out from the shore of the Meuse,
when it came under heavy rifle and machine gun fire from the first
French field positions. Just like on the troop training grounds the
sections worked their way up to assault range and, after lobbing hand
grenades, broke into the French positions. The first prisoners were
soon making their way to the rear, hands raised. They left their
weapons and equipment behind, glad to have escaped the raging
inferno of this day with their lives.
The advance continued with only one objective in our minds: Hill
247.
The leading soldiers disappeared into the suburb which lay across
the path of the advance. There was house-to-house fighting and
some prisoners were taken. Onward, onward, ever forward, we
haven't reached the bunkers yet. The blue-painted window panes of
the factory stared eerily at us. Flames and biting smoke gushed from
the buildings, while bullets whizzed about. We crossed the Sedan
Mezire railway line and reached the SedanDonchery road.
79

A look to the left revealed that the large road bridge had been
blown; on the right were elements of 7th Company. When communication was established between the two company commanders
it was learned that the "Seventh' was pinned down on the road by
fire from several bunkers. Despite its lack of heavy weapons, 6th
Company decided to attack. A quick reconnaissance revealed that a
large bunker with six embrasures about 200 metres south of the road
at the edge of an orchard offered good approach possibilities; a
further, somewhat smaller, bunker lay about 250 meters behind and
to the right.
There was a brief conference, orders were issued to the platoon
and section leaders: the company would take the large bunker first.
1st Platoon attacked from the orchard, while 2nd Platoon struck out
to the left and worked its way forward from the cluster of trees.
As difficult as the attack at first seemed, it proved to be a complete
success. After a brief battle an N C O and two men reached the
bunker. The enemy were smoked out with hand grenades; completely demoralised, they came out from the bunker. The strain of the
battle showed in their faces. They lined up with their backs to their
bunker and raised their hands. Tirez, shoot!, they called. When the
astonished company commander asked what they meant, the French
soldiers replied that they had been told that any poilu captured by
the Germans in a bunker would be shot.
We were quite alone, no other German troops were to be seen to
the left or right. Heavy machine gun fire was coming from the Frenois
manor house and grounds. An anti-tank gun kept up an unrelenting
fire, but we were unable to make out its position. The first wounded
called out for help. O n e soldier entrusted his platoon leader with his
last farewell to his mother and then closed his eyes forever. But there
was no time to linger; the objective had to be reached while it was
still light. We could not afford to allow the enemy any respite.
The second enemy bunker fell and we could then see the position
of the anti-tank gun. On a slope at the edge of the grounds was a
barn on which rested a suspicious grey shape, in which we could
now clearly see an embrasure. The assault squad was redeployed
while the machine gun sections engaged the enemy rifle nests. Soon
we had taken this bunker too. Afterward we were able to quench our
thirst ten to twenty bottles of mineral water had been found in the
bunker.
By then it was 18.00. We sat down for a brief rest. During the
well-deserved break, contact was established with the 1st Infantry
Regiment of 1st Panzer Division which was advancing on our right.
The Grenadiers set out once again. Advancing through deep bomb
craters and wide barbed wire entanglements, things were looking up,
until the French suddenly opened up a terrific fire from a strong
reverse-slope position. Three of our men fell. Ignoring the enemy
80

fire, the light mortars opened up an extremely accurate fire from

close range while machine guns and submachine guns fired burst
after burst. Hand grenades whirled through the air, exploding close
to the enemy; there would be no more stopping until we had reached
our objective. The first of our soldiers were in the enemy position.
Hand to hand fighting! Everyone was swept forward by the momentum of the assault."
Hill 247 was in German hands; the way to the south had been
opened. As soon as the first elements of II Battalion had reached the
first ridge, at the crossing point the engineers began constructing a
bridge across the river. Meanwhile, the river crossings continued.
The first vehicles (motorcycle combinations) and the first guns (3.7
cm Pak) were brought across.
Temperatures dropped rapidly as night fell over the river valley.
Columns of vehicles backed up among the groups of houses on the
east side of the river. General Guderian stood with two executive
officers (including the author) at the crossing point and pensively
watched the work.
The noise of battle had practically ceased. An occasional shot was
heard, otherwise all was still. The French had been beaten.
Without a moment's hesitation, the heavy weapons of the IR. GD
crossed the river, as described in the following account:
"We drove up the hill around a narrow and extremely sharp curve,
in which we had to unlimber, and on into Sedan. Now and then
enemy artillery shells fell in our vicinity. Ahead of us the 13th and
14th Companies paddled and were towed across the Mass in
inflatable boats. We were supposed to cross, but the bridge was not
yet finished. Vehicle after vehicle waited in the darkness. Finally, at
approximately 22.30, it was ready; we rolled slowly across to the
other shore, turned sharply to the right and followed the road which
ran along the Meuse about a thousand metres as far as the small
village of Villette. A large crater left by a Stuka's bomb forced us to
turn into a meadow. Despite the darkness we could clearly make out
the bank of the Meuse. We halted before the crossroads, burning,
smoking houses all around us."
In the darkness III Battalion, with the headquarters, 11th Company
less the Obermeier Platoon, and 12th Company less the Gruss
Platoon reached Hill 247.3. The 10th Company which had moved
too far to the right was to secure the railway bridge in Torcy on
orders of the regimental commander. Elements of the 12th Company were temporarily attached to II Battalion. Despite heavy enemy
artillery fire, the bulk of III Battalion was assembled on Hill 247.3.
The plan for the regiment on 14 May was: continuation of the attack
in the same direction as before.
The breakthrough on both sides of Sedan had not gone as well for
all three Panzer divisions of Panzergruppe Guderian: on the right,
81

the 2nd Pz.Div. had been unable to force a crossing over the Meuse.
In contrast, the 1st Pz.Div. had the entire reinforced Inf.Rgt. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, equivalent to an entire infantry brigade, on the
far side of the Meuse, while on the left, the 10th Pz.Div. had only
been able to establish a small bridgehead.
During the night troops continued to roll across the bridge which
had been thrown across the river near Floing, with the heavy
weapons and tanks in the lead. While darkness settled over the events
of the day, the 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company under Obit. Beck-Broichsitter
waited for the enemy counterattack. The battle which followed was
to be recorded in the regiment's history as "The Panzer Battle near
Chemery." The following is an extract from the combat report:
"During the night of 1 3 / 1 4 May 1940, on orders from Major
Schneider (IV Btl.), two platoons of the 14th Company moved into
Gloire et Villette, northwest of Sedan. Enemy artillery fire of every
calibre. At dawn the two platoons drove to Frenois to offer their
services to the regimental headquarters or a battalion. Nothing was
known of the regiment's formation or direction of attack or the
employment of the other heavy weapons. Encountered the
regiment's C O , Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin, at a bend in the road
about 2 km south of Frenois.
He gave the following orders to the company commanders:
I Battalion's objective is Bulson. Your platoons are to take over
the anti-tank role with I Battalion. Move out at once!
While searching for I Battalion, the two platoons of 14th Company
were stopped by a Panzer-Oberleutnant of 1st Panzer Division. At
approximately 06.00 he verbally informed the company commander
of the orders given him by division:
T h e division's commander, Herr General Kirchner, is of the
opinion that the village of Chemery (roughly 12 km to the south) is
free of the enemy or very weakly occupied. I have been assigned to
capture and hold the bridge there with several armoured cars and
your two platoons. Please move quickly.'
The two platoons under Lt. Hintze and Feldw. Albers were called
back for the new assignment. The Panzer-Oberleutnant climbed back
into his armoured car and the vehicles started their engines. The road
to Chemery had been torn up by shells and bombs. The armoured
cars were able to cross these obstacles immediately. However, in the
twenty minutes it took our trucks to get by, contact was lost with the
armoured cars. The anti-tank platoons continued on in the direction
of Chemery, reaching the crossroads east of Connage at approximately 07.00. While driving up, the detachment came under
fire from the left, and then several French tanks appeared from the
right. Both platoons went straight into position and the guns immediately put the enemy tanks out of action. Machine gun fire forced a
French cavalry unit of approximately squadron strength, which had
82

broken out of the forest 800 metres south of the crossroads, to turn
back.
More French tanks approached from south and southeast of
Connage; they were allowed to approach to within 200 metres and
then knocked out. Other French tanks attempted to go around our
position and attack from the flank and rear. To counter this move,
the six guns formed a hedgehog position. This was the situation
when, between 08.00 and 09.00, a very excited Panzer- Oberleutnant came and told us that the Oberleutnant driving in the armoured
car ahead of him had been pinned down by heavy fire in Chemery.
Several of his men had been wounded. He wanted us to take the
two platoons to Chemery and get him out.
The commander of 14th Company had to refuse this request as
further French tanks were approaching, and moving to Chemery
would mean the destruction of the two Pak platoons. This would
have left a gap between two German Panzer divisions and a clear
route to the Meuse bridges for the attacking French tanks. As the
French tank forces involved were of considerable strength, this would
have endangered the success of the, entire German attack. It was
decided, therefore, that the ground which had been won would be
held by the two platoons east of Connage.
During the course of the battle, two 8.8 cm Flak went into position
farther back and joined in the defence against the attacking French
tanks. They met with no success, however, as they opened fire from
too great a range. At roughly 09.00 a Hauptmann of a reconnaissance battalion appeared with a weak infantry platoon. He was asked
to take over the task of securing against the French cavalry, which
he agreed to do. At approximately 10.00 the leaders of the 1st and
4th Platoons reported to the company commander that Stu.Pi.Btl.
43 was advancing along the road.
Soon afterward, 14th Company received the following order from
the commander of the Stu.Pi.Btl., Obstlt. Mahler:
T h e enemy holds Chemery. Stu.Pi.Btl. 43 is to take Chemery.
14th Company is placed under the command of the Stu.Pi.Btl. to
support the attack by engaging tanks and machine guns. The
company will be released following the capture of Chemery.'
While the Stu.Pi.Btl. carried out its attack on both sides of the road,
the twelve guns of 14th Company went into position on the asphalt,
silencing enemy tanks and machine gun nests which had been
spotted to the southwest.
Just outside Chemery, Ogefr. Frauenknecht discovered that the
machine gun fire was coming from a bunker which was built into the
bridge which stood 500 metres west of the town. Under continuous
enemy fire, he and Gefr. Bierwagen silenced the bunker with several
direct hits.

83

Chemery was taken shortly before 12.00. The 14th Company

assembled on the road due north of the town before driving to
Maisoncelle. Just as the company was moving out two Stuka attacks
were made on Chemery. Wounded were Uffz. Konert, Ogefr. Hamel
and Gefr. Grunzke, but the worst loss suffered in the Stuka attack
was Obstlt. Mahler, who was killed.
In the battle near Chemery the 14th Company destroyed forty-four
enemy tanks, silenced several machine gun nests on the right flank
of the Stu.Pi.Btl and silenced the bunker in the bridge 500 metres
west of the town. The company did not lose a single man!"
The order of battle for 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company was as follows:
Company Commander Obit. Beck-Broichsitter
Company Headquarters Uffz. Kellermann, Observer NCO and 6 messengers, commander's driver and range
finder operator.
Feldw. Hindelang Leader platoon head1st Platoon:
quarters personnel, driver, 3 messengers,
observer.
Uffz. Kramer
1st Gun:
Ogefr. Giesemann
2nd Gun:
Uffz. Anding
3rd Gun:
Machine Gun Section
Feldw. Albers
2nd Platoon:
Uffz. Meyer
4th Gun:
Ogefr. Hhn
5th Gun:
Uffz. Busse
6th Gun:
Lt. Hintze
3rd Platoon:
Ogefr. Mehler
7th Gun:
Uffz. Kleimann
8th Gun:
Uffz. Grper
9th Gun:
Feldw. Herold
4th Platoon:
Ogefr. Schweickl
10th Gun:
Ogefr. Stllein
11th Gun:
Uffz. Klsner
12th Gun:
Hptfw. Fromm
Company Train:
Maintenance Section

84

Chapter Six
The Battle for the Stonne Heights
While the main body of the Guderian Corps continued to attack
toward the northwest in the direction of Abbeville and the English
Channel, Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was given
the task of covering its left flank. On the afternoon of 14 May,
following the conclusion of the battles against the tanks of the French
3rd Armoured Division near Bulson and Chemery, the regiment set
out in the direction of Stonne to carry out its new assignment.
Repeated bombing attacks by French aircraft, especially the fast
Moranes, were unable to halt the advance, but they did inflict serious
casualties. T h e following account was provided by 15th
(Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company:
"Strafing attack! A Morane roared straight overhead, took a look
and opened fire! We dove under our vehicles. The noise from his
motor grew louder as he came nearer and nearer on his second pass.
Two bombs fell. Helpless, we fired back with our rifles. Then we
looked at one another: where was the explosion? Someone shouted:
it's a dud! Gefreiter Waldemar Kiedrowski, from Essen in the Ruhr,
who had formerly been mess orderly in the Olympic Village, jumped
up from the ditch toward one of the bombs. The sinister, khaki-yellow
thing was still rolling. As Kiedrowski lifted it from the road, the bomb
exploded. Gefr. Kiedrowski was no more. Gefr. Schieg lost a leg. In
the meantime, the Morane crashed behind us, a victim of our
machine guns. Kiedrowski was our first fatal casualty. Not a trace of
him could be found; there was nothing to bury. A simple, hurriedlyerected cross marked the spot where the bomb had torn him to
pieces. A few flowers hung their heads in the sun, as if they wanted
to express their sorrow by doing so. But we had to carry on."
The regiment drove to Maisoncelle, east of Chemery. II Battalion
continued on foot to Artaise le Vivier and went into position at the
edge of the village. Powerful enemy tank forces had been reported
in the Bois de Mond. The battalion quickly dug in and the attached
light infantry guns moved into firing positions. Ill Battalion had been
given the job of capturing the main road to the south by moving
through Artaise to the crossroads two kilometres to the west. As
darkness fell, the advancing 11th Company, which was spearheading the battalion, came under surprise heavy machine gun fire near
Point 170. There was also rifle and machine gun fire from the woods
to the left and right of the road. The deep ditches and metal guard
85

rails on both sides of the road offered good cover. A probing French
tank was driven off. In the meantime, elements of the 12th (MG.)
Company opened fire on the edge of the wood and 11th Company
was able to withdraw from its dangerous position. These elements
of III Battalion returned to Artaise without loss. I Battalion was still
behind in the Maisoncelle area. The regimental order for III Battalion
for the next day read:
"III Battalion is to occupy the wooded areas west of Artaise, and
from there secure the advance road of the XIX Panzer Corps."
As the force covering the left flank of the advancing XIX Panzer
Corps, Inf.Rgt. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND could expect heavy fighting. The German penetrations against the French Ninth Army near
Dinant and Charleville on 14 May were so deep that they had reached
the French artillery batteries. At the junction of the French Ninth and
Second Armies which lay before the GD the German spearheads had reached Donchery, approximately fifteen kilometres in
the enemy's rear. As a result of the rapid German occupation of
Bulson and Omicourt, the French 55th Reserve Division was forced
to fall back to the south and southwest. The two divisions to the east,
the 3rd and 71st Reserve, were forced together as they withdrew
toward BeaumontStonng. Their losses were considerable. On the
evening of 14 May the mass of the French Second Army was holding
the line BeaumontStonne.
The crisis facing the French Second Army was obvious. The front
was threatening to collapse. On the French side they tried everything
possible; every available reserve was thrown into the gap in an
attempt to master the situation at the critical point at Stonne.
While, on the German side, the objective at hand was to hold open
the Meuse crossings and take the high ground on both sides of
Stonne, that of the French were to prevent this at all costs, close
their front and, where possible, throw the Germans back across the
Meuse. If they succeeded, the German attack plan would fail. It was
expected, therefore, that the outcome would be decided in the area
of Stonne. It was there that the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, with its artillery and the attached Stu.Pi.Btl. 43,
were situated. The following report is typical of the regiment's
situation at that time:
"The village had to be secured on all sides for the night. Once again
there was no rest. The ongoing lack of sleep had the greatest effect
on the tactical commanders. Day and night, without pause, they had
to organise their men, issue orders and lead the attack. The
Grenadiers were exhausted. Despite this there was only one thought
in their minds: attack!
On the following morning, the 15th of May 1940, we climbed out
of our holes. Our faces were pale, unshaven and dirty, our eyes
sunken and yet we were all filled with an eagerness to fight. We
86

THE FRENCH SITUATION AS OF

13 MAY 1940, EVENING

THE SITUATION AS OF
10:00,

14 MAY 1940

THE SITUATION AS OF
14 MAY, AFTERNOON AND
15

88

MAY,

MORNING

drove into the morning mist, through burning Artaise. To the right
and left lay half-finished bunkers, abandoned in haste by the enemy.
We drove along a freshly-paved road deep into a wooded valley."
The orders for the attack on Stonne were issued at dawn on 15
May: I Battalion was to attack the town from the north; II Battalion
was to advance over Hill 208 (southeast of Artaise) in the direction
of Bois de Raucourt, providing flanking cover for German tanks
advancing on the left. At about 04.15, III Battalion was to take the
wooded areas west of Artaise to protect the advance by XIX Panzer
Corps. Hptm. Grosser, commander of 12th Company, temporarily
took over command of Stu.Pi.Btl 43 and assembled the unit to hold
the southern edge of the Bois de la Grand Cte, or if need be, to
take it and then hold it.
While I Battalion was advancing, II Battalion committed the 5th,
6th, 7th and 8th Companies as well as the battalion staff. On
reaching the northern edge of the Bois de Raucourt, the companies
were met by enemy fire from camouflaged machine gun nests.
Progress by the exhausted infantry was slow. Nevertheless, II Battalion (5th and 8th Companies) captured its defence sector, occupying the key Hill 225. At this time the regimental command post was
located approximately 800 metres northwest of Stonne.
By 06.00 III Battalion had occupied its designated positions in the
wooded area west of Stonne and was digging in. The French kept
the position under constant artillery fire.
The town of Stonne was situated on a commanding hill. The steep
slope to the north was unforested; at the foot of the slope were
woods which could be overseen from Stonne. The inhabitants of the
town could even see as far as the Meuse valley when the visibility
was good. Whoever held Stonne would be able to see far into the
French countryside to the south and southwest.
Uffz. Gnter Krupp provided the following account which
describes the advance by II Battalion and, in particular, the part
played by 6th Company:
"The regiment was attacking Stonne! Our company moved
through the meadows to the left of the road, the sections widely
spaced in a skirmishing line. The sound of battle rumbled over from
the right. Ahead of us lay a large wood. The sections closed up so
as not to lose contact with each other. The enemy scattered fire
through the wood; shells burst with loud crashes among the treetops.
The smell of horses was mixed with powder smoke. Wellcamouflaged, improvised stalls stood in the woods to the left and
right. Large numbers of French baggage wagons loaded with equipment sat abandoned in a broad clearing. Steel helmets lay scattered
about; everything pointed to a desperate flight.
Finally we approached the edge of the wood. Before us lay a wide
meadow dotted with scattered bushes. To our right we could see the
89

terrain climbing toward the hill. A path snaked its way up the only
negotiable approach.
The enemy's defensive fire intensified. His situation was extremely
favourable. From the hill he had a perfect view far into our rear.
Initially, our battalion had orders to advance no farther. Orders were
orders! therefore we stayed put. Security detachments were set
up. Enemy aircraft and artillery give us no rest."
Ill Battalion remained in its positions in the forest west of Artaise
and secured there. It was now midday. Following a Stuka attack, I
Battalion and elements of II Battalion were able to enter the village
of Stonne. The following account was provided by the commander
of 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company:
"It was difficult to say exactly where the front line was. There was
firing from ahead, from the left and the right. It was mostly rifle fire.
The thickly-wooded hill which lay before Stonne was quite eerie. The
regimental command post was forward in a hunting lodge.
The commander of IV Battalion (Major Schneider), the leader of
the infantry gun company, Obit, von Massow and I went ahead to
reconnoitre. On the way to Stonne we had to jump into the ditch at
the side of the road; someone was firing at us from the cover of the
forest. Pistols in hand, we climbed the wooded slope, but nothing
else happened.
Moving carefully, we worked our way into Stonne. We found
abandoned houses, overgrown gardens, romantic old wells, ruins of
bakeries and makeshift shelters. A high water tower commanded the
entire village.
We walked along the village street. Individual Grenadiers from
every company were running here and there. They had no orders.
A knocked-out German tank lay tipped over in a ditch. An officer
and an NCO stood next to the tank, pistols in hand. A dead crewman,
his face waxy and yellowish, lay in the grass in his dusty black
uniform. Rifle fire rang out from the water tower, kicking up dust in
the street. A French tank drove towards us. We leapt behind a house;
the tank thundered past close by. The decisive hill appeared to lay
several hundred metres farther on. We worked our way towards it
through a ravine and several gardens. When we got there we found
a few men of my old mortar platoon standing around. Led by their
dashing Leutnant Schiller, they had gone a little too far forward.
Enthusiastically they joined us and fell in behind.
In an open planted field we came under machine gun fire from
behind. We waved, thinking that it was our own people. Then they
really began to fire, and we ran for our lives to some bushes fifty
metres away. The fire was coming from the water tower.
About 30 Frenchmen approached us, deployed for an attack. We
were only ten. A mortar was hurriedly moved into position, but the
sight mount could not be found. The Frenchmen approached to 400
90

metres; they probably didn't suspect that we were this far forward
yet. After a few mortar rounds they disappeared into a hollow. We
wanted to move everyone we could find forward into position, as
this was in fact the commanding hill. The way back across the planted
field was no joy ride. Halfway back, in the gardens, we looked
around: several French tanks were driving straight for the other part
of the village.
The edge of the village lay under machine gun fire from the water
tower. Concealed riflemen fired unexpectedly from the wooded hill
behind us. A completely confused situation!
By chance we ran into a couple of machine gun crews from the
machine gun company. They were led by Hauptfeldwebel Spierling.
We now gave up any thoughts of the strategic hill.
Artillery began to fire into the village, while the infantry fire
intensified. Fire swept overhead; it must be from the French tanks
we had spotted earlier. A messenger was sent back to bring forward
Oberfeldwebel Harold's platoon.
The brave Oberfeldwebel brought his platoon forward in an
exemplary fashion and quickly sized up the situation. His three guns
moved into the ravine so that they could not be seen by the enemy
and waited in readiness.
The enemy tanks attacked. We could see six, with infantry advancing between them. A brief command and the guns were moved into
position with a jerk. A few seconds more and targets were assigned
to the gun commanders, and then: crack!
The firefight lasted quite a while. The tanks were difficult to knock
out. In addition, they were aided by the numerous bushes and
gardens. Often the gunners could see only a small part of the whole
target. At that moment, of course, the enemy machine gun fire was
concentrated exclusively on the three guns. Nevertheless, the Herold
platoon disabled all the enemy tanks in sight. Next to me Uffz. Anding
received a bullet wound in the leg.
The anti-tank guns disappeared again into the cover of the ravine.
More French tanks appeared and fired over our heads. There was a
low whistle and a shell smacked into the earth wall behind us.
A messenger brought forward Oberfeldwebel Albers' platoon. With
a brave matter-of-factness it went into position next to Herold's.
Together, the two platoons shot up the next wave of French tanks.
Platoon leaders, gun commanders and Grenadiers all put their backs
to it. Most of the crews consisted of only three men. Many of the
Grenadiers were wounded. The battle was a duel. Once they had
opened fire, there was no question of concealment for the guns.
Moreover, flight was out of the question: either the tank was knocked
out or the gun was. Artillery shells burst all over the village, the fire
was really heavy. The platoon leaders were constantly in action.
When the situation became serious, the gun commanders could be
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seen standing half-erect at their guns. The example of their coolness

under fire inspired the Grenadiers to hold on. None of them looked
to the rear. Our units were very much mixed together. Here a platoon
from 1st Company, there a part of the machine gun company, an
infantry gun platoon and several Grenadiers from other companies.
The rifle fire had a great effect on us mentally. It was our first
defensive infantry battle. Many men sat in the ditches, not daring to
leave cover. Gradually, the fire came closer; individual French tanks
were bringing more infantry forward. In the gardens it was difficult
to assess their strength. The situation became critical; the soldiers'
will to fight sank under the heavy fire. All of them had been in action
since 10 May and they were at the end of their strength. Beyond
that, it was still oppressively hot. We were in a tough situation.
Several of the Feldwebel fired round after round from their rifles;
they were the old peacetime snipers.
I issued the order: "Everyone fire! This village will be held!' The
word spread left and right down the line. It helped. Command in the
village changed hands several times. During the time my company
was in the main fighting I was in charge.
Oberleutnant Hanert, commander of I Battalion's machine gun
company, came hobbling over from the water tower. He had been
wounded in the pelvis by rifle fire. The French were attacking from
the water tower! I moved forward along the ravine a short way toward
the gardens to have a look. In the village itself, several soldiers were
running back from the water tower. Their cries of "tanks' spread
terror. The French had launched a new attack from another direction. I had no idea how to get Feldwebel Hindelang's platoon forward
in time. These ongoing difficulties were wearing us down. The
situation was very serious. The other platoons had their hands full
with the enemy on their own front. How were we to halt the new
tank attack? The French fire intensified. There were fires everywhere.
Dead lay in the street; a continuous flow of wounded disappeared to
the rear.
The cry of 'tanks' had reached the hunting lodge. Right away
Hindelang set out on his own initiative. At the last moment he came
racing through the wreckage of Stonne, the Grenadiers hanging onto
the vehicles, the guns bouncing to and fro. Hindelang stood on the
running board of his car. Onward as far as the water tower. They
reached the end of the village. About ten French tanks were rolling
toward them on a wide front. At 40 km/hr the drivers hauled their
vehicles around as the French tanks opened fire. There was firing
from the water tower; the guns were unlimbered in the middle of the
street, several men were wounded right away. But the platoon set
up its guns! The duel began. In an hour-long firefight the Hindelang
platoon held on in the face of fire from attacking infantry and flanking
fire from the water tower and the wooded hill. The fighting in the
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village abated. The infantry units were being worn down by the
determined French attack. Assault guns provided support. Obit, von
Egloffstein himself took command in Stonne. Four heavy infantry
guns went into position and fired 15 cm rounds at the water tower,
but it refused to fall. Losses mounted. Several of the anti-tank guns
had been hit and damaged, but they kept firing. Then I met Obit.
Fabich "Maxe' with elements of his 3rd Company. Obit.
Bohrmann was also there.
Hindelang was attacked by three 32-tonne tanks. Every shot
bounced off them and the tracing rounds disappeared somewhere.
They rolled on through the gardens. From one hundred metres one
of them scored a direct hit on an anti-tank gun and raked the
wreckage with machine gun fire. The gun's commander Uffz.
Kramer and his gunner were wounded and the other member of
the crew killed. Kramer crawled to the gunner and, under machine
gun fire, dragged him behind a house.
The fire from the three heavy tanks was threatening to wipe out
the platoon. Then one of the giants turned sideways. The commander of the gun on the left, Ogefr. Giesemann, spotted a small,
ribbed panel on its right side; apparently, it was the tank's cooling
system. The panel was no larger than an ammunition box.
Giesemann took aim at it and fired. A tongue of flame shot up from
the tank. The young Obergefreiter was a true sharpshooter with his
anti-tank gun!
Both gun commanders now opened fire at the small squares on
the flanks of the heavy tanks. Soon afterwards the left gun took a
direct hit and was put out of action. Hindelang pulled the surviving
gun back into the village. The three heavy tanks had been put out
of action. The other tanks sat disabled before the village. Hindelang's
decision, his holding out while under fire from all sides, even after
the destruction of his other two guns, saved the Stonne defensive
front on the decisive right flank. The Grenadiers of all platoons had
survived a great test.
On orders, in the afternoon the company left its positions in the
village. It was difficult. At that time the French were only a stone's
throw away in places. The men with machine guns could move out
faster than those with the anti-tank gun. The fire from close range
was alarming. The three of us Ogefr. Frauenknecht, Grenadier
Schmidt and I jumped up and pulled the gun into cover. We were
under steady rifle fire on the road to the hunting lodge, but we came
through smoothly."
The l4th(Pz.Jg.) Company had fought courageously. Its total
losses were:
Killed: 1 officer, 12 NCOs and men.
Wounded: 16 NCOs and men.

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Equipment losses: 12 vehicles and 6 guns (of 12).

In its more than ten-hour battle, the company knocked out 33
French tanks. Obit. Beck-Broichsitter and Ofeldw. Hindeland were
later decorated with the Knight's Cross for their exploits.
While I Battalion and parts of IV Battalion pulled back from Stonne
on orders from regiment and once again took up defensive positions
on the wooded hill, III Battalion was moved to the regimental
command post, where it received the following orders:
"Elements of I and IV Battalions are withdrawing from Stonne. Ill
Battalion is to take up covering positions at the forest's edge on both
sides of the regimental command post."
An anti-tank front was created around the command post, reinforced by III Battalion, combat engineers and elements of I Battalion.
The main body of II Battalion remained in its positions and dug in.
Elements of the 69th Rifle Regiment arrived with orders to relieve
the units there. This was only partially completed , however; most
of the units remained where they were, attempting to assemble in
the darkness. The men were overtired; they fell to the ground where
they stood and went to sleep. Few rations found their way forward.
The regiment's situation was less than rosy. The French artillery
fired into the forest and shells burst among the treetops, while their
tanks kept up a steady fire. Exhausted, the regiment's units held out
at the forest's edge. Partially outflanked, they took some fire from
the sides. Wounded streamed to the rear. The regimental command
post remained in the hunting lodge and it too was under artillery fire.
The individual battalions reported:
II Battalion:
"At 05.00 the 6th Company reported that it was expecting an enemy
tank attack. Anti-tank rifles were brought into position, but no attack
followed. Instead, an enemy artillery barrage of long duration. While making
contact with regiment in the morning, our adjutant Obit. Brockmann was
wounded. Repeated minor artillery barrages, which were answered by
Stuka attacks. Enemy artillery activity ceased at about noon."
III Battalion:
"The troops were awakened by a false alarm at about 04.00. At 04.30
the battalion was ready to march; assignment: the battalion was to occupy
the old positions west of Artaise. Following a foot march without significant
occurrence, the positions were occupied. A company of Panzerjger
occupied a defensive position at the edge of the forest; sporadic artillery
fire. Enemy 7.5 cm batteries inflicted several casualties, especially on 12th
Company and the signals section."
I Battalion:
"In position. Obstlt. Khler has once again assumed command of the
battalion."

94

In the late morning Junkers transport aircraft arrived overhead and

dropped ammunition. Wounded continued to come back, some of
whom assembled near the hunting lodge at the regimental command
post. Uffz. Schweiger arrived at the aid station at the hunting lodge
with a serious face wound; despite his pain, Schweiger presented
himself to his company commander and made a report on the
position of his gun. Obit. Mrz of 15th Company was wounded by
an artillery shell which landed near the command post. Obit. Gerbener subsequently took command of the company.
The regiment's CO awaited reinforcements. The 64th Infantry
Regiment was approaching, trailing a great cloud of dust. The road,
however, was clearly visible from the heights around Stonne. The
troops got down from their vehicles. . . then the French artillery
opened fire. The regiment was unable to come any nearer and went
into positions farther below.
The following account describes the situation at the regimental
command post:
"There was a steady flow of field ambulances along the approach
road to Sedan and back. Some of the companies' vehicles were also
temporarily pressed into service to transport out the many wounded.
A tractor from the heavy infantry gun company was loaded to
capacity with wounded, among them Obit. Massow, who had been
hit badly. The wounded officers and men were blood-encrusted and
dusty, their faces haggard and unshaven. Many of our comrades had
already been taken to the rear. There were fewer and fewer of us
left. We almost felt guilty at being unwounded."
On the morning of 16 May a mixed battle group from elements of
Stu.Pi.Btl. 43, IV Battalion and I Battalion GD launched another
attack on Stonne. Meeting only light resistance, the German force
entered the village. At the moment of the relief order therefore at
the end of the battle the main line of resistance was in the
regiment's hands.
Relief orders arrived early in the morning; the 29th Inf.Div. was
on its way. The elements which were to relieve III Battalion were
already in position by about 15.00; despite the usual enemy artillery
bombardment the relief proceeded quickly. Widely separated, the
relieved companies moved down into the valley. Relief of II Battalion
was delayed. The 79th Inf.Rgt. failed to arrive until late that night.
It was not until morning that all elements of the battalion were at
their vehicles.
The regiment was to assemble in and near Bulson. A soldier of the
15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company reported:
"By 20.00 we were ready. We roared back on a hellish drive.
French artillery fire exploded to the left and right. The horror of the
last days of fighting, the full depth of which we could not describe,
was written across our stubbled faces. On the road we could see
95

evidence of how effective the French artillery fire had been here in
the rear: shell hole after shell hole, shot-up trucks and motorcycles.
In one of 14th Company's vehicles the driver still sat at the wheel,
half his skull ripped away a horrible sight. The wild drive continued.
Artaise was burning, a torch in the night sky. A short time later we
were there, driving through the streets. The heat from the burning
houses was terrific. We were through in minutes, still pursued by the
French artillery fire. Shells burst, tearing apart houses; sparks
showered down and smouldering beams flew through the air. Then,
all of a sudden, it was still. This quiet had an unsettling effect on us,
we simply weren't used to it. No bursting shells or rattling machine
guns; here and there a demolished house, a knocked-out tank,
freshly-dug graves.
We passed Bulson. Then we met the first infantry regiments. They
had covered a tremendous distance on foot. We halted. The vehicles
were parked and we climbed out. Deathly tired, we slumped to the
ground, wrapped ourselves in our blankets and went to sleep."
After days of tough combat and great stress, the company rested.
This peaceful period lasted until the late afternoon of 19 May. The
regimental order of 17 May had stated:

Regimental Order

1. The regiment will rest in its present location for 4 days, during
which it will remain under the command of the 10th Pz.Div. which
is continuing the advance toward the west.
2. The commanding general has ordered that, in these four days,
the regiment must be brought back up to full operational effectiveness.
Following a complete recovery from his illness, the former
regimental commander, Oberst von Stockhausen, returned to the
regiment and assumed command. (18. 5. 1940) The battalion
commanders at that time were:
I Battalion:
II Battalion:
III Battalion:
IV Battalion:

Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin

Major Greim
Obstlt. Garski
Obstlt. Khler

On 18 May the companies were called from their rest for their first
parade, where they were read the following regimental order:
"After seven days of an unprecedentedly triumphant advance through
Luxembourg and Belgium into France, the regiment stands at the end of
its first test in combat. At this moment I feel the deep inner need to thank
96

every officer, NCO and man for his extreme devotion and true performance
of duty, with which each and every one contributed to the victory. The
regiment is proud of every one of its men.
Committed at decisive points, the regiment has achieved every objective
set for it by the high command, even when the exhaustion and over-exertion
of the restless pursuit stretched physical endurance to the breaking point!
Pursuit of the enemy through Luxembourg! Destructive attacking blows on
the move through Belgium! Relentless pursuit to the last breath of man and
horse south of Sedan!
Resolute defence against counterattacks!
These are the milestones of our triumphant advance!
"The unprecedented forward momentum of the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment opened the way across the Meuse for the Panzer units.
If this major operation brings us victory in this war, then the regiment can
know that it made the first decisive contribution!' These are the words of
the commander of the 10th Panzer Division.
I am proud and grateful that it was my soldier's fate to be allowed to lead
this regiment in these days of victory. I thank you all! Onward with God!"
signed Graf von Schwerin
Oberstleutnant
The period of quiet allowed time for leisure. Everywhere one saw
soldiers walking across the meadows in bathing suits and sitting by
fires; a piano was fetched from a nearby village and was played by
Obit. "Maxe" Fabich of 3rd Company. Peace and quiet reigned,
undisturbed even by the few aircraft which flew overhead.
In the meantime, the regimental command took stock; the painful
losses revealed the bloody toll of the past few days:
In the period from 10 May to 17 May, 1940:
Killed:

Officers and officials

Non-commissioned officers
Men
Total

9
15
79
103

Wounded:

Officers and officials

Non-commissioned officers
Men
Total

30
84
328
442

Missing:

Non-commissioned officers
Men
Total

2
23
25

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The following companies' losses were typical:

13th (Lt.Inf.Gun) Company - 22 wounded, among them the NCOs
Schwanitz, Siedler and Gerdes.
14th (Pz.Jg.) Company - 13 killed, among them Lt. Hintze, and 65
wounded.
The regiment's part in the success was also reflected in the
decorations awarded for bravery. Obstlt. Garski presented Lt. Obermeier with the Iron Cross, First Class, the first member of the
regiment to receive this award. Forty-five members of his III Battalion
were awarded the Iron Cross, First or Second Class for their role in
Operation "NIWI" and the later fighting.
The advance orders for departure arrived on 19 May, 1940, at
about 21.00. The period of rest came to an end; the men had got
their wind back and were ready for further action.
As the regiment rested near Bulson from 17 to 19 May, the fate
of the French Army in its first phase had been decided. The
Wehrmacht communique of 22 May stated:
"The French Ninth Army, which was to have established and maintained
contact between powerful enemy operations groups in Belgium and the
Maginot Line south of Sedan on the Meuse between Namur and Sedan,
has been smashed and is in disintegration."
On 20 May the panzer divisions of Panzergruppe von Kleist
reached Amiens and Abbville. A battalion of the 2nd Pz.Div.
reached the sea northwest of Abbville, the first unit of the German
Wehrmacht to do so. The panzer units stood poised to wheel toward
the north and northeast so that their advancing left wing could break
through the enemy bridgehead which had formed on his southwest
front.

Chapter Seven
Breakthrough to the Sea
The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment received orders to transfer into the St. Quentin area and place itself at the disposal of
Panzergruppe Guderian. The battalions set out at 08.00. Marching
through Bulson, Mezires and Vervins, they reached St. Quentin,
where they bivouacked west of the city. The advance roads were
choked with columns of refugees fleeing to the east and south,

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infantry columns marching toward the west, and the supply columns
of the panzer units which were rushing forward with the vital supplies
of fuel.
Regimental orders reached the marching columns late in the
evening: following a brief rest for rations, the unit was to reach the
area of Combles, where it was to place itself at the disposal of
Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps. On 21 May the regiment drove
through St. Albert into the area south of Doullens where, late on the
morning of the same day, it occupied a defensive position in the line
MarieuxThievesOrville. Its assignment was to secure the right
flank of the 1st Panzer Division against an attack from the north.
The threat was expected to be enemy tanks from the direction of
Arras; without a doubt the enemy units encircled to the north would
attempt to break out. The regimental command post was located in
Marieux Castle the same building in which the British King George
V and French President Poincar had met in 1915.
It was in this sector that the regiment encountered British and
Canadian prisoners of war for the first time. Bordering the roads
were large military cemeteries from the First World War. In contrast
to the previous area of operations near Sedan, the country here was
wide and open. There were fields and magnificent beech woods,
clean pleasant villages and excellent roads.
The motorcycle platoon which had been formed in Neuruppin
arrived under the command of Lt. Gnzel and was incorporated into
the Regimental Headquarters Company. On 22 May the regiment
prepared for a new mission, details of which were contained in the
following regimental order:
Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Btl. Ia

Rgt. Command Post, 22.5.40

Regimental Order

1.
2.

3.

1st Pz.Div. is to secure the flank and rear of 2nd Pz.Div. which is
moving on Boulogne; front to the north and east.
To this end the division will deploy:
Left:
Gef.Gruppe Balck
Centre: Gef.Gruppe Krger
Right: I.R. GD in the sector north edge Haute Foret Zoteux
Deployed in the regiment's sector (beginning from left)
I Btl.
II Btl. each with an attached light infantry gun and
III Btl. anti-tank gun platoon. In addition, one company of SturmPionier Battalion 43 will be attached to each battalion.
Boundaries for reconnaissance and security:

99

THE SEDAN FRONT

DIRECTION of I.R.GDs
ADVANCE and ATTACK

100

(a) left to Gruppe Krger: Cremarest (I Btl.) north edge Haut

Foret-Bournonville (I Btl.) Brunembert (Gr. Krger)
(b) between I and II Btls.: north edge of Desvres Quesnes
(c) between II and III Btls.: Beaucoroy Bcourt (north)
Blequin (II Btl.)
On the south flank III Btl. is to bend its wing around and make
contact with 2nd Pz.Div. Reserve behind right wing.
4. Assignments: Prevent the enemy's withdrawal to the coast in the
designated sectors. All roads in the these sectors are to be blocked.
Reconnaissance: as far as the line : RucquellersBourthes
Quesnes Escoeuilles.
Forward boundary of security: due east of the Zoteux Sacri
Quier roadeast edge of the Haute Foret.
Battalions are to hold back powerful mobile reserves in the rear of
their sectors.
5. 14th Company (less 3 platoons), 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company and
the assault gun battery will initially be located in the vicinity of
Longfosse. Opportunities for action in the three sectors are to
be explored.
6. Rgt. Command Post: Longfosse. Btl. command posts and
dispositions to be reported there as soon as possible.
7. Vehicles are to move into the sectors as soon as possible.
8. Signal communications: to I and III Btls. by wireless, to II Btl. by
wire.
9. Prisoner assembly point: is to be set up in Wierre au Bolz by the
headquarters of the Pi.Btl.
10. Fuel distribution from the morning of 23. 5. is expected to be in
the wood southwest of La Capelle (east of Boulogne). Orders to
follow.
11. Telephone lines and postal facilities are to be interrupted.
12. Further movement is to be expected on the morning of 23. 5.
signed von Stockhausen
verified
Masius
Hauptmann and Adjutant
This order reached the battalions in the evening hours of 22 May,
and the security sectors were occupied. The night passed uneventfully.
A report by the 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company described in detail
the situation on the roads:
"We were moving in the direction of Calais. On the roads were
scenes of the bitterest misery; endless columns of refugees passed
by. We had no choice but to force them from the roads. They stood
by their high wagons in the fields and meadows. They had loaded
the most impossible objects. Motorcycles, chairs, tables, beds, pots
and pans, household utensils of all kinds, crates with chickens, rabbits
and doves, sacks stuffed full, sofas, bundles of straw, blankets. . . all
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thrown on the wagons in a jumble. Many objects were merely hung

on the outside on the wagon racks. Behind the wagons followed
cows, horses and sheep, often tended only by children, while dogs
sniffed about. On the wagons with their colourful splendour sat
frightened, shaking people, mostly women with small children, babes
in arms and half-grown boys and girls. Only a few men accompanied
this caravan of misery. Now and then they dropped everything at
the sound of an approaching aircraft, until they realized that the
German fliers posed no threat. Often we handed what little we had
to the population. They nearly jumped for joy at the gift of a loaf of
bread or a tin of meat. We thought of home, of parents, brothers
and sisters, women and children."
The increasing levels of air activity, especially by British and
Canadian aircraft operating from England, demanded increased
vigilance. Fierce air battles took place, while repeated low- level
attacks often hampered the advance.
Late on the morning of 23 May, orders reached GD to begin the
advance towards the north at once objective: St. Omer, in the
direction of Dunkirk. The regiment neared the channel coast. The
terrain was completely flat, with fields and many canals. The only
raised features were man-made: roads, railway embankments and
villages. Visibility was excellent; the burning port of Dunkirk was the
aiming point. Large palls of black smoke hung over the city.
The flat terrain offered little protection against enemy fire. After
three or four spadefuls of earth the soldiers struck ground water. The
many drainage ditches were filled to the brim with water. Discarded
equipment lay everywhere; abandoned vehicles mostly British
littered the roads and lanes. Bawling cattle, hungry and abandoned,
roamed the countryside. There were few refugees here; most had
fled to the south.
The signs of battle were clearly visible in the villages. The tremendous effect of the German panzers was evident: at the railway station
an abandoned freight train, in the wagons starving horses; many
abandoned trucks, some overturned, piled high with food, cigarettes
and boxes. Everything lay strewn about the road, but scarcely anyone
paid it any attention.
At about noon on 23 May, II Battalion GD set out on its march
toward Audruicq, northwest of St. Omer. The battalion rolled
forward over jammed roads, past heavy guns, through badlydamaged villages. Then, near Nortkerque, contact with the enemy:
fire whistled in from several blocks of houses. Resistance was quickly
broken, however. Orders came to change direction toward Audruicq,
take the village and move on toward the St. Omer canal.
It was midday. In Audruicq sat the English and French; they
defended themselves bitterly. During the first approach Obit.
Bohrmann of 2nd Company/ I Batallion, as well as Feldw. Gabriel,
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Feldw. Blanke and Gefr. Letmoden were killed. It was all for no
purpose; orders came to go around the village to the south. Then
new orders came from regiment: change direction toward the north,
force the crossings near St. PierreBrouck.
It was already dark; the burning houses luridly illuminated the
countryside. Dunkirk appeared as a torch against the night sky.
There was the objective!
With 5th and 6th Companies in the lead and 7th and 8th
Companies providing security to the sides, II Battalion marched
toward the bridge positions near Pont St. Pierre and St. Marie-Kerque. There was confusion in the darkness. Ill Battalion advanced
toward Hennuin. In the lead was an assault gun of the 16th SturmBattery, followed by three sections of 11th Company, the rest of the
attached platoon from the 16th Company, an anti-tank gun and then
the main body of the battalion. The first elements of the battalion
reached Hennuin near midnight and the last at roughly 05.00. Some
of the vehicles lost their way in the darkness and became stuck.
II Battalion also arrived in Hennuin in the dark of night. It received
orders to continue the advance immediately in the direction of St.
Nicolas and take possession of the bridge site. The 7th Company
moved forward but was fired on. It went into position on the west
bank of the Aa and dug in there for the rest of the night. A member
of 7th Company, Grenadier Wolfgang Mller, recalled:
"When it became dark we were split up into platoons. What would
be awaiting us now? All around everything was dark. A fine Flemish
drizzle sprinkled our helmets, dripping onto the tent squares we had
draped about us and leaking into our tunics. Even our wool pullovers
were no barrier to it, and we shivered from the cold. 'Dig in deep',
advised our platoon leader, 'we'll likely be getting artillery fire.' And
so we spent half the night digging our foxholes, hoping that the rain
would cease and smelling the characteristic odour of meadow earth,
which combined the odours of freshly-turned sod and rotting subsoil.
One spade-cut, two, three, then four spade-cuts down and we could
go no farther as we had reached ground water. A somewhat higher
shelf was cut out on the short side for a seat and a step and then the
foxhole was ready. We hunched down in our holes, lost in thought.
Then, in front of me, I heard the muffled rattling of equipment and
hushed voices. 'Hans, man, they're coming!' Hans said to take it
easy. We both stared into the darkness. We couldn't see a thing. .
But Hans had heard the noise too. Should we fire? Don't drive the
whole front crazy! If we see something, we'll fire. But as hard as we
strained, we couldn't see anything in the rain- blackened darkness.
The noises slowly died away. All was quiet."
At that time I Battalion was on the west bank of the Aa canal facing
enemy positions on the opposite side outside St.Pierre- Brouck. At
the canal the Grenadiers secured both sides of the HennuinAa
-i

no
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canal bridgeSt.Pierre-Brouck road. The attached 2nd

Platoon/Sturm-Pionier Company prepared for the crossing to the
east bank.
The main dressing station was in the rear with I Battalion's train
in Osthove. The wounded were treated there and then housed in a
large farmhouse. Battalion Medical Officer, Dr. Alberts, described an
incident which took place there:
"After a day of fighting the wounded lay in the main house of a
large farm. An English truck strayed into the village and caused quite
a lot of firing, which left the wounded feeling rather uneasy. I was
called in to prevent a disorderly evacuation of the farm, which was
an ideal location. In order to settle things down, I made an inspection
of the loft of the one-storey house accompanied by First-Aid
Feldwebel Steinhauer and the powerfully-built Oberschirrmeister
Heinke. We passed a light over the loft, which proved to be empty,
as was the adjoining room which had been built into the gable-end.
As we were making our way back there was a sudden burst of firing.
We fired back into the darkness. Heinke was down the stairs with a
leap, ready to meet anyone who should come that way. Steinhauer
likewise leapt down to the main floor through the lighted square of
the hatch in the floor of the loft. After firing a final few shots into the
corners to keep the enemy at bay, I too raced downstairs with a
mighty leapright into the arms of the Oberschirrmeister! We were
just considering a plan to smoke out the enemy, as the wounded
could now scarcely be kept in the house, when a soldier came in to
see what was going on.
We found out that outside were some security troops from an antitank unit. The men had seen our light while searching the area and,
believing it to be a light signal, had opened fire.
On learning the cause of the uproar the wounded calmed down
again and spent a peaceful night in the house."
The morning of 24 May saw the regiment's I Battalion in position
before St.Pierre-Brouck, while II Battalion was dug in on the Aa canal
facing St.Nicolas. Ill Battalion and elements of II Battalion were
stationed in Hennuin. An assault gun was sent up to II Battalion at
dawn, where it destroyed an enemy machine gun position which
commanded the approach road. The battalion sent 6th Company
and elements of 8th Company across the Aa canal and established
a bridgehead on the other side. The 5th Company was unable to
take the bridge site itself because of heavy fire from enemy machine
guns and anti-aircraft guns.
Under sniper fire from trees and hedges, 6th Company, which was
accompanied by a company of Sturm-Pioniers, made only slow
progress and was finally halted. 5th Company and the 7th Company
behind it hung on. Observation posts for light and heavy infantry
guns were set up on the far side of the canal and fire and attack plans
104

were drawn up in preparation for the capture of the bridge site. The
resumption of the attack was set for the afternoon.
Gefr. Johann Neumann described the attack and the crossing by
6th Company:
"The new day dawned. Everything was still, until behind us we
heard the sound of a motor growing louder. One of our assault guns
was rolling forwards along the road beside us. The wide, heavy tank
moved past slowly towards the canal on our left and stopped several
metres from the bank. We described the target to our comrades. It
was a single tree, at the foot of which was the enemy outpost.
Turning its steel body slightly to align its gun on the target, the assault
gun seemed to crouch like a beast of prey. Then there was a flash
and a roar like thunder and a fountain of earth erupted at the tree.
The assault gun fired shot after shot. The ground over there was torn
up and clods of earth whirled through the air. It seemed impossible
that anyone could be left alive. Then, suddenly, all was quiet; the
target had been eliminated. The tank's motor roared to life. It rolled
forwards on its broad tracks to the crossroads a few metres away
and turned a bit to the left. Once again shells thundered from its
short gun barrel. The target now was the nearest houses in the village
on the other side of the canal.
In the meantime, our first sections had raced across the road. The
crossing now began using inflatable boats. The boats smacked onto
the water and we leapt in. A mighty heave and we were away from
the bank. It was twenty metres to the other side. Everything now
depended on speed. We had to get to the other side before enemy
machine gun fire could foil our plan. All the while our remaining
comrades of the platoon lay along the road, their weapons directed
at the enemy, fingers on their triggers.
The boats bumped against the high bank of the canal. The platoon
leader jumped out with his messenger, the section leader and several
infantrymen. The first men dropped to the ground near the tree. The
machine gun went into position farther out to the right. All of this
happened in a few seconds. As we came nearer, we could see the
completely bewildered French to one side of the tree. They were
simply unable to fire. One of them tried to escape to the village, but
he was shot down. In the meantime the remaining sections crossed
the canal. The platoon leader deployed his platoon toward the village
on a wide front. However, the enemy was well-entrenched there.
The first shots whizzed toward us, but we kept advancing. Houseto-house fighting broke out. It was the beginning of a very hot day!"
A small bridgehead had been established, approximately 1,000
metres deep. It was secured and set up for defence. The main body
of II Battalion remained quietly on the west side of the canal.
Pioniers forced a crossing over the canal for I Battalion near La
Bistade. The bridge had been blown and the Grenadiers fought their
105

way forward towards St. Pierre-Brouck. The most forward security

outpost lay near the railway embankment of the St. Omer Bourbourg line.
The following account was provided by a participating member of
the 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company, which had deployed a gun platoon
in support of the attack by I Battalion:
"In the early hours of the morning we drove across open country
toward St.Pierre-Brouck. Harassing machine gun fire from the flank
was annoying, but we were pushing the enemy hard. The observation
post was under enemy fire. The platoon leader and his signals people
were squatting behind a meagre wall which was their only protection.
As soon as a head was raised above cover, the enemy answered with
rifle fire. One of our shells smashed into a house scarcely 150 metres
away. The enemy guns there fell silent, but fire was still coming from
a hedgerow. Through gaps in it we could see French soldiers flitting
by, some even jumped into the canal.
Finally, we could move forward again; in any case, at 600 metres
the distance was quite small. We set up our range finder and scissors
telescope in a villa and organized the observation post. However, an
enemy machine gun opened fire, forcing us to take cover and dig
foxholes."
The main body of III Battalion remained idle in Mennuin. The
companies were widely scattered in barns and houses.
10th Company under Obit. Lucke was able to take Audruicq by
surprise and occupy the village. The commander of the British
battalion there was captured at the entrance to the village. 12th
Company moved up to reinforce the attack.
The enemy commander was invited to surrender, which he did.
He persuaded another officer to go to his people as a parlamentaire.
As a result, 1,100 British and French soldiers surrendered, among
them 14 officers. The rest, who continued to offer resistance, fell
victim to the fire of the assault guns.
On 25 May the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment was still in
the same positions. It still came under enemy fire, sometimes from
artillery, but there was no significant combat. At about 11.30, 9th
Company, which had been detached to XIX Panzer Corps as
headquarters guard, returned to III Battalion. Replacements arrived
at midday and were assigned to the various units.
Obstlt. Khler took over command of IV Battalion. For the most
part the troops rested as much as was possible. In the rear an English
supply dump was inspected, revealing many delicacies which improved the food rations noticeably.
The 26th of May also saw no significant combat; as on the day
before, it saw only positional warfare with the usual artillery fire. I
and II Battalions remained in the bridgeheads across the Aa canal,
while III Battalion rested in Hennuin.
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General Guderian arrived at 14.00 and delivered an address in the

Audruicq Manor park to the assembled members of III Battalion. It
was in this manor park that Obit. Bohrmann (of I Btl.) and the other
fallen were buried.
The regiment went to the attack on 27 May with the SS- Leibstandarte on its right. Objective: the heights in the line Crochte
Drincham, through St.Pierre-BrouckLynck Looberghe. The
tactical assignment was to attack and tie up powerful enemy forces
and prevent them from embarking at Dunkirk. I and II Battalions,
with III Battalion staggered to the rear and left as flanking cover,
attacked toward the east. The advance was greatly hindered by the
need to cross many canals, and made only slow progress. The enemy
defended stubbornly.
I Battalion pushed on to Lynck and farther to the northeast. II
Battalion, which was advancing on I Battalion's left, attacked
Drincham, in the course of which 7th Company made sufficient
headway to enable 5th Company to get as far as the Lelaurier
Station. 6th Company won Khatove, which was reported free of the
enemy. The battalion's attack sustained its m o m e n t u m and
Drincham was soon reached. Large numbers of the enemy surrendered when they realised that they were in danger of being
surrounded. From Pitgam the enemy fled toward the north. Fleeing
enemy batteries were fired on and disappeared in a wild gallop.
By about 16.00 the companies were again on the advance. II
Battalion occupied the heights east of Pitgam, where it secured
positions until darkness fell. As the heavy weapons had not been
needed, III Battalion likewise moved to Pitgam and secured to the
north and northeast. I Battalion had become involved in heavy
fighting in St.Pierre-Brouck in the morning and had suffered considerable losses. However, II Battalion's rapid advance brought relief
and finally the entire town was captured. This day also saw the arrival
of the first mail from home.
On 28 May the regiment continued its attack to the northeast.
Weather was rainy and dull. As he had often done before, the enemy
abandoned his field positions during the night and established himself
farther to the rear.
The regiment's objective: the line PitgamSteene, as far as the
vicinity of Bergues. The new positions were reached by midday and,
as ordered, the regiment went over to the defensive. Much of the
terrain in front of the left side of the regiment's sector was flooded.
The English put up a stubborn defence from behind the canals in an
effort to cover their withdrawal to Dunkirk. The ring around the port
had been closed; Reichenau's army was pressing in from the
northeast. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND stood outside Bergues. The
following report was made by 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company:

107

"We were outside Bergues. The light field positions near and in
the town were quickly taken by surprise. On the right the 2nd Platoon
went into position behind a poultry farm outside Soex. The 1st
Platoon remained in the centre behind a farm. The company
headquarters personnel pushed on across the railway embankment
and took up position in a house. Small hedgerows, bushes and
gardens provided some cover, but we were unable to escape the
sharp eyes of the enemy observers in the towers and churches
opposite us. We were very soon conscious of that fact. A hail of
shells showered down on us. Even our assault guns took cover. The
1st Platoon engaged truck columns with great success. 2nd Platoon
aligned its gun on a very narrow church steeple. The fifth and sixth
shells scored direct hits. Gradually, it became dark and we began to
dig foxholes."
In the afternoon approach routes were reconnoitred for a possible
attack on Bergues.
A patrol from 6th Company under Lt. Prachowski was the first to
enter the town of Bergues. Once there, the men hoisted the flag.
They had gone over so as to reach the town ahead of a Silesian
division which was approaching from the southeast. The patrol
returned with several prisoners.
The attack on Bergues planned for 29 May was called off;
conditions were unfavourable as much of the surrounding terrain was
flooded. It appeared, however, that the approach of Reichenau's
divisions would obviate the need for the attack in any case.
The battalions remained in position, widely separated. Enemy
artillery, including naval guns, kept up a steady fire. The light infantry
gun platoon of 13th Company received a direct hit, which killed
Ogefr. David Grossthe smallest man in the companyand
wounded Grenadiers Riermeyer, Brehm and Grn. A member of 8th
Company described the positional warfare outside Bergues:
"We were outside Bergues. We broke out the entrenching tools
and began to dig into the clay. Let the shells come! Only a direct hit
could impress us now.
On both sides clay. At the head and foot of the trench, clay.
Beneath us clay. Over us a tent square, with the rain spattering
against it. After the first hour the clay on the sides had become
damned soft. Several litres of water had collected on the tent square.
Bits of clay swam around in the water like goldfish. They came from
the fresh shell-holes all around us, and there were more and more
of them by the minute. We lay stretched out in our holes and stared
up into the clouds.
After the second hour there were bits of clay on our cheeks. We
had moved for a moment; now there was no water on the tent square,
instead there was a pool in the bottom of the hole. We propped
ourselves up on our elbows and stared into the clouds.
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After the third hour again a pool of water on the tent square. Shell
fragments hissed close by. We must stay down. It was no longer wise
to stay propped up on our elbows. We lay flat and stared into the
clouds.
After the fourth hour we moved again. The water had risen to ten
centimetres, running over the tent square. Earth from a nearby shell
crater ran into our bath water. We lay outstretched and stared into
the clouds.
After the fifth hour the first wounded. . . we didn't know how much
longer we'd be staying outside Bergues."
At about 18.00, III Battalion was taken from the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment and XIV Army Corps and placed under
the command of the 11th Rifle Brigade. The battalion travelled on
foot over poor roads towards West-Cappel. At roughly 24.00 it
arrived there and received orders to attack and take the chateau at
West-Cappel, which was being stubbornly defended by English
troops. So far the 11th Rifle-Brigade had been unable to take the
chateau.
Also on 30 May, heavy, well-directed artillery fire fell on the
positions of GROSSDEUTSCHLAND's I and II Battalions. A
platoon from I Battalion extended the regiment's front to the right
to a total of 12 kilometres. Persistent British air attacks forced the
troops to keep their heads down. Again and again the supply trains
and heavy weapons were forced to change positions.
An 8.8 cm Flak was towed into position in 13th (Lgt.Inf.Gun)
Company's sector. From there it shot up the steeples in Bergues one
after the other, as it was suspected that the enemy artillery fire was
being directed from them. Patrols sent out by II Battalion confirmed
that the town was still occupied by the enemy. II Battalion had to
extend its front to the right. The battalion's 5th Company took over
a sector from I Battalion after it moved farther to the right. The
enemy artillery continued to fire after dark, and the Allied air forces
continued their low- level attacks on the German positions.
Meanwhile, III Battalion was in position near West-Cappel. A
strong patrol reconnoitred the chateau in the early morning. It
discovered that the enemy had abandoned the chateau during the
night.
In the afternoon an attack was ordered on the channel coast
between the Belgian border and Dunkirk. Ill Battalion's combat
report stated:
"On the right the 110th and 111th Rifle Regiments, on the left on the flank as usual III Battalion, which was to break through
near Feteghem and thus secure the way to the sea for the motorcycle
battalion. As there were no reconnaissance results available, Lt. von
Blankenburg was ordered to take a motorcycle patrol as far as the
Canal de la Colme. Ill Battalion was lined up along the West-Cap109

pelcanal road. Part of the patrol returned along the same road. It
had been fired on by enemy troops holding the canal crossing. Lt.
von Blankenburg had been wounded and Feldw. Gther killed.
Afterward III Battalion moved forward and, in bitter fighting, fought
its way through the first houses of Benty-Meulen. In the midst of the
heaviest fighting came the order from division: In the event that the
bridge over the canal has been blown, halt the attack immediately.
Under heavy artillery fire, the battalion remained in its positions
for the night."
On 31 May nothing new happened in the regiment's sector, which
now ran along the Canal de la Colme between SoexBergues
Steene to the channel near Pitgam. The battalions secured the area.
The ring around Dunkirk was drawing ever tighter. Prisoners
reported that the defenders were being worn down by Stuka bombs
and shells from the German heavy artillery.
Ill Battalion reported nothing out of the ordinary during the
morning other than harassing fire. Gefr. Herbert Gnthersberg, the
son of the commander, was fatally wounded on a patrol to the canal;
Gefr. Jakob Kreusch was killed by artillery fire. Reconnaissance
carried out at midday revealed that the enemy forces on the other
side of the canal had been reinforced.
The first elements of the relieving infantry of Reichenau's army
began reaching the regiment's positions during the afternoon. The
first patrols reached III Battalion which briefed the new arrivals on
the situation. Ill Battalion remained in its positions, however. Members and liaison agents of the 484th Infantry Regiment reported to
the Garski Battalion, which was slated for relief. It was rumoured
that the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment was to be withdrawn
and assembled in the Boulogne area for new duties. Preparations
and briefings for relief and withdrawal were carried out. Warning
orders were issued for this eventuality.
The battle in Flanders was nearing its end. Resistance in the
Dunkirk bridgehead slowly waned; the lessening of enemy artillery
fire was especially noticeable. Clouds of black smoke still hung over
the port. Enemy warships were anchored at sea and smaller craft
could be seen shuttling back and forth to the beaches: the British
Expeditionary Force was embarking, evacuating the bridgehead.
On 1 June I.R. GD was still in its positions outside Bergues. The
enemy artillery fire had lost some of its intensity. The impression was
that the Allied artillery positions had shifted to the rear. While nothing
special took place with I Battalion, two infantry regiments, the 51st
and 54th, arrived at II Battalion outside Bergues. The 51st Regiment
was slated to attack the town, but the planned participation by II
Battalion in the operation was cancelled. Then the attack by the 51st
Regiment was also put on hold.

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Prior to the arrival of the relief forces, III Battalion, under the
command of Obstlt. Garski, had been idle. By 05.00 it had handed
over its positions to the relieving units and all elements of the
battalion had assembled in the eastern quarter of Zeggers- Cappel.
Unfortunately, the continuous enemy air attacksmostly by the
R.A.F.resulted in casualties to 12th Company of four wounded,
one of whom later died. During one attack a vehicle was struck by
a bomb, killing the driver and wounding the other occupants.
The scene on 2 June for the GD Regiment was almost a peaceful
one. The only enemy activity was scattered artillery fire, although a
chance hit on II Battalion's command post claimed the lives of two
men, one of whom was the well-liked Gefr. Lorenz, who had earned
a reputation as a stalwart messenger. German forces were now able
to occupy Bergues as the enemy forces had left their positions in the
town during the night. Meanwhile, the Sturm-Pionier Battalion 43,
which was still attached to GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, together with
elements of a rifle brigade and supported by an assault gun, launched
an attack on the Canal de la Colme west of Bergues near Mille
Brugghe. This attack was carried out in order to gain complete
control of the canal in this sector. The advance was a success; it was
also the last act of the German offensive on this front.
During the course of the day and night the regiment was relieved
by other units without incident. The only attempt to interrupt the
relief was a night raid by British bombers. At 09.00 on 3 June, 1940,
II Battalion, which had been relieved by the 14th Reconnaissance
Battalion, moved to the rear into the area of Bellezeele, where it set
up camp. Ill Battalion continued to rest in Zeggers-Cappel, taking
on supplies and regrouping. Meanwhile, it had been learned that the
regiment was not moving to the area east of Boulogne, but to
Pommier, between Dollens and Arras. Preparations were begun for
departure.
Stu.Pi.Btl. 43 had been attached to the GD Regiment since before
the start of the attack in the west and the men of the two units had
become true comrades in arms. However, the battalion was now
released temporarily by the regiment. Now seen as an experienced
breakthrough battalion, it was transferred into the Zweibrcken area.
The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment was withdrawn and sent
to the south. Its initial destination was the Biensvillers area. It was 4
June, 1940.

111

Chapter Eight
To the Seine
The second phase of the German attack, the piercing of the
Weygand Line on the lower Somme, was to begin on 5 June. The
German bridgeheads at Abbville and Amiens were to be of great
significance to the attack.
Panzer Corps Hoth was the first to penetrate the prepared
positions of the Weygand Line south of Abbville, driving 15
kilometres into the enemy's rear. However, in the assault launched
from the bridgehead at Amiens, only the panzers were able to push
into the fortified enemy positions. The rifle regiments, on the other
hand, bogged down in the well-prepared positions, and it became a
battle for each fortified town against mines and barricades of every
description. The battle raged bitterly until the ring of hastily-erected,
but well-prepared, positions was pierced. The German regiments
streamed south through the gaps which had been smashed in the
French line toward St.Fuscien, then Sains and further in the direction
of Estres.
The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment waited north of Amiens
ready to march. Its task would be to follow up and exploit a
breakthrough by pushing ahead into the enemy's rear. The regiment
was moved farther forward and on the night of 5 / 6 June was on the
road south of Amiens waiting to go into action. The mood was tense.
The regimental commander sat nervously in his staff car, repeatedly
scanning his maps. . . and waited. The noise of battle could be heard
in the distance with the booming of the artillery and the dull thunder
of the Stuka attacks. From this distance the troops could clearly
follow the dive bombers as they plunged toward their targets. Lt.
Stockmann of 6th Company reported:
"The advance led us through Amiens. Whole blocks of houses had
been completely destroyed. The air was poisoned by the decaying
bodies of horses and men. Tangled power and telephone lines hung
from their poles. The few remaining French inhabitants crowded
around the hastily set up food centres which were under German
control and supervision. It was a horrible picture, but rising out of
the field of rubble, like a vigilant guardian, was the undamaged
cathedral.
South of the city we drove past the former German field positions
from which the attack had been launched. To the left of the road
were the sad remains of a French air base, with burned-out hangars
112

The breakthrough of the Weygand Line on 6 June 1940. The

symbol in the bottom right corner indicates French positions.

113

and destroyed aircraft. Scattered about the place were numerous

pieces of equipment, uniforms, steel helmets, weapons and so on.
Large boxes, still containing bombs, were stacked one upon the
other. Now, however, they were of little use to their owners."
Early on the morning of 6 June, the regiment was marched forward
through St.Fuscien and Sains into the wooded area north of Estres,
where it encamped. Once again Lt. Stockmann of 6th Company:
"We halted in the meadows near St.Fuscien, which had fallen into
G e r m a n hands the day before. The vehicles were quickly
camouflaged and machine guns set up for anti-aircraft defence. Our
good friend, the Fieseler Storch, circled overhead while we ate our
lunch. On the move with us were the armoured forces. Our artillery
had taken up position on both sides of the AmiensSains road.
There was battery after battery as far as the eye could see. The barrels
of the big guns pointed menacingly towards the southern horizon.
The artillery opened fire with a sound like thunder, the shells whistling
on their way toward their targets, bringing death and destruction to
the enemy. Farther forward they were joined by the medium and
light guns, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns.
The great battle raged only a few kilometres ahead of us. Without
pause our artillery fired into the area south of Amiens, where
yesterday our forces had driven a wedge into the enemy positions.
At about 15.00 we launched an attack towards Estres and the hill
to the southwest (Hill 127)."
The regimental order was issued to the battalions in the late hours
of the morning:
Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Btl. la

Rgt. Command Post, 6.6.40

R e g i m e n t a l O r d e r for t h e A t t a c k :

1. The regiment is to assemble at the south edge of the Bois de

Camon for the attack against Hill 127 and the terrain to the east.
2. The battalions will take up positions as follows:
III Btl. rightthe south edge of the B. de Camon.
II Btl. the area Fme. east of the Bois de Camon.
I Btl. behind III Btl. north section of B. de Camon.
3. Boundaries for assembly, reconnaissance and later attack:
southeast edge B. de CamonHill 127south edge B. du
Domont.
4. II Btl./A.R. 677 will support the assembly and attack from firing
positions north of St.Fuscien; in particular, preparatory fire on
enemy positions near Hill 127 and in Estres. Two forward
observers to III Btl., one to II Btl.
114

5.

15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company will support the regiment's assembly

and attack, especially III Btl. Preparations are to be made for
possible fire against Estre.
6. 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company will take charge of anti-tank defence,
especially on the regiment's left flank during assembly and attack.
7. The rest of 13th Company will remain at my disposal at the
northeast edge of the B. de Camon, and explore opportunities for
action in III Battalion's attack sector.
8. I Btl./7th Pz.Rgt., which is attached to the regiment, will, in close
cooperation with III Battalion, support the regiment's attack initially as far as Hill 127.
9. Battle reconnaissance: by II Battalion, in the wooded areas northeast of Estres.
10. I Btl./38th Flak Btl., which has orders to cooperate with the
regiment, will support II Battalion's attack on Hill 127 with one
heavy battery and a half of a light battery by covering the flank,
especially toward Estres and the forest northeast of Estres.
11. All units are to report attack readiness!
12. Signals communication: initially wireless to II and III Battalions.
13. Rgt. Command Post: initially at south entrance to Sains, later at
south edge of B. de Camon.
14. Main dressing station: Amiens-South, Rue de St.Fuscien.
15. Munitions distribution: from 7. 6. 08.00: at vehicle column in
Gardonette, approx. 8 km northeast of Amiens.
16. Fuel: immediately in Behencourt, approx. 14 km northeast of
Amiens.
17. V. and G. trains: from 7. 6. 06.00: in Gardonette.
signed von Stockhausen
verified correct
Masius
Hauptmann and Adjutant
The battalions set out in the heat of midday, which was especially
hard on the men of the mortar and heavy machine gun sections. In
some cases the advancing troops were met by French artillery fire.
The march into the assembly area cost III Battalion, which was
earmarked as the spearhead battalion, 10 casualties. II Battalion,
whose assembly area lay at the eastern tip of the Bois de Camon,
also suffered serious casualties from artillery and machine gun fire.
Nevertheless, the two battalions reached the assigned areas and
stood ready for the attack at 17.00.
The battalions reported their situations as follows:
III Battalion - Obstlt. Garski:
"The move into the valley north of St.Fuscien followed late in the
morning. While moving into the assembly area there, we came under
surprise artillery bombardment which cost the battalion 10 wounded.
Obit. Gruss' truck drove over a mine; however, only one man was
slightly wounded. Further casualties necessitated that we fall back to
115

the north. At about 17.00 the battalion, which was deployed at the
head of the regiment (II Btl. on the left), went to the attack west of
the St.FuscienCains road, through the Bois de Camon and south
of Cains toward Hill 127, which was the initial objective.
Because of heavy machine gun fire from the direction of Estres,
the battalion went around the hill to the west. Working closely with
the attached I Btl./7th Pz.Rgt., the battalion reached the southern
tip of the Bois du Domont at roughly 21.15. There the battalion
came under enemy fire from the Bois de Berny. Decision: continue
the advance as far as Hill 161, south of Flers. As a result of the
greater distance involved and not least because of poor signals and
road communications, we were out of contact with the regiment,
which had meanwhile changed its intentions.
On this day (and also on 7. 6.) the battalion formed the spearhead
of the entire force attacking Amiens.
As the attack continued, enemy resistance stiffened. Following his
initial surprise, the enemy noticed that the attack was not being
carried forward on the flanks of III Battalion, which now suffered its
first casualties from flanking fire from the Bois de Berny.
Continuing the advance, III Battalion also received fire from the
right rear from the vicinity of Rossignol (near Essertaux). Taking into
consideration the approaching nightfall, the battalion commander
reached the following decision: call off any further attack, dig in on
Hill 161 due north of the road which runs from the north exit from
Flers to the Bois de Berny. Barrage fire lay behind this line. II
Battalion followed gradually and, linking up with 11th Company,
secured the battalion's left flank. Tank noises were heard from 03.00
to 03.30, otherwise the night was comparatively quiet."
II Battalion:
"Assembly was carried out in spite of heavy artillery fire which cost
II Battalion alone 22 casualties. The assembly area was moved
forward about 800 metres in the direction of Estres. A patrol
determined that Estres was heavily occupied. Decision of the
battalion commander: advance past Estres to the west and take Hill
127! II Battalion moved forward in the protection of a gully, won
Hill 127 and held. Ill Battalion could be seen from the hill as it
continued its advance. Estres was screened by tanks. II Battalion's
commander decided on his own initiative to carry on the attack
against the Bois du Domont, the division's objective. Heavy enemy
fire was suppressed by the panzers. As it advanced, II Battalion ran
into heavy machine gun fire from the Bois de Bemy. Initially the
battalion evaded the enemy fire and was then given covering fire by
the Panzers. Since III Battalion was far ahead in the direction of Flers
and could not be left on its own, the commander of II Battalion
decided to continue the advance in order to cover III Battalion's flank

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to the south and southeast. The advance went smoothly and succeeded in establishing contact with III Battalion's 11th Company.
Neither II or III Battalion noticed that their positions lay across the
Weygand Line. The French, too, seemed unaware of this. The
escorting Panzers helped secure the territory that had been won;
however, the noise of their motors brought down enemy artillery fire.
This led to casualties in the battalion headquarters, as well as 8th
and 5th Companies."
The enemy forces facing the regiment consisted mostly of negro
soldiers. They fought like wild animals, firing from trees, bushes and
hedgerows. It was an uncomfortable, bitter battle.
Following up behind II Battalion, I Battalion succeeded in entering
and taking the strongly-fortified town of Estres. Lt. Pierson was
killed as the fighting was coming to an endit was his birthday. The
French had done much to improve the town as a defensive position.
Holes in cellar walls served as gun ports and ridges of roofs provided
high firing platforms for the negro soldiers.
Lt. Stockmann of the 6th Company reported on the course of the
battle west of Estres:
"At about 15.00 we were sent to the attack against Hill 127,
southwest of Estres. The objective was to widen and deepen the
wedge which had been driven to the southwest. In long rows we
crossed the meadows south of St.Fuscien. In the afternoon heat the
infantry's line of skirmishers, several kilometres wide, moved toward
Hill 127, the day's objective. It was as if a great manoeuvre was
unfolding. The French had done an outstanding job of extending
their defences; every village and farm had been turned into a fortress.
The cellar windows of the houses at the edge of the village had
become gun ports, the hedgerows were studded with artillery pieces
and anti-tank guns, and behind every bit of cover was a machine
gun. Riflemen in trees and on rooftops rounded out the French
defences.
However, too late the French artillery opened fire on the advancing
lines of infantry on the left wing. We lost only two killed and several
wounded. When the shells came too close we threw ourselves to the
ground. As soon as the smoke cleared we were up and moving before
the next shell landed.
We took our first rest in a small wood. The thick undergrowth
concealed dugouts armed with machine guns. It was incomprehensible to us that these excellent defensive positions had been abandoned so quickly. However, at the same time we realised something
else: nothing could stand in the way of an attack carried out with
sufficient force.
We set out again after a brief rest. The sun burned down on us
mercilessly and the equipment became a crushing burden as we
marched through cornfields and woods and across meadows. There
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was plenty of cursing, but it had to be done! It was tremendous how

everyone did his duty.
We walked out of a small wood and crossed the road which farther
to the left led into Estres. Now came the moment that we had all
been nervously awaiting: we were to advance with our panzers past
Estres towards Hill 127. It was unforgettable how the rolling giants
began to move, slipped through our ranks and drove on before us.
Uninterrupted machine gun and rifle fire whistled in from the flank.
While our machine guns went into position and screened to the left,
our advance rolled on irresistibly. Soon the first enemy targets came
into sight. Most were eliminated by the panzers.
The sound of enemy guns and exploding shells, which were still
strewing the wide field, merged into the noise of battle. Suddenly,
heavy fire began to come from the water tower which was offset
somewhat on the right of the village. Shells were whizzing past our
heads even before we heard the shots. But then the panzers opened
fire. They poured shell after shell into the water tower and soon great
holes appeared in the structure. Clouds of mortar and dust settled
and were blown off to the right by the wind, and while the village lay
in the golden midday sun, tongues of flame licked from the roofs of
most of the houses. The first panzers had since driven up to the edge
of the village. The French soldiers who had been unable to escape
now began their sad walk into captivity. In the meantime, the leading
elements of the battalion had finally reached Hill 127.
The whistle of incoming artillery shells was now more frequent.
We received orders to dig in, but not for long. Soon we were moving
forward again. Almost without pause the panzers drove on before
us. For us, despite all the difficulties, there was only one thing:
onward! We continued on, unperturbed by the fire which came to
life again and raked our flank.
Columns of black smoke rose from the farmhouses which were
scattered across the broad plain. Fortunately for us, it had become
somewhat cooler as dusk fell. Our canteens had long been empty
and our lips were dry and brittle. No drinkable water could be found,
so we tapped a barrel of wine which had fallen into our hands.
At about midnight we finally reached the hill where our advance
was to halt. We had advanced far beyond the day's objective. On
orders from the company commander the individual companies
moved into their sectors and began to dig slit foxholes. But this was
not to be an easy task. Digging in the chalky soil demanded a great
deal of effort. While this was going on, heavy machine guns opened
up from the Bois de Bemy, not 600 metres away, forcing us to again
take cover. Our panzers had meanwhile driven into cover behind a
thick copse in a gully. We got only a few hours of rest- -the morning
to come would once again demand a maximum effort from everyone.

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The two of us lay in our hole. It had become cold and the dew fell
on us in thick drops. The enemy artillery thundered at regular
intervals and shells burst pitilessly among us. Cries for help rang out
through the moonlit night. As morning dawned it seemed somewhat
quieter, but this was just the calm before the storm."
Indeed, as the moon rose in the clear sky and the Grenadiers sought
protection in their holes from the enemy artillery fire, medical
personnel moved onto the battlefield and searched for the wounded
and the dead. . . searched for their comrades. And the battalions
recorded a high cost in human life, which in the end was reflected
in the sober numbers. Losses during the attack and the night of 6 / 7
June amounted to:
III Btl. 28 killed and nearly 100 wounded.
II Btl. 21 killed and close to 80 wounded.
This was a high toll in young men who bled and died, but the two
battalions were the first to succeed in piercing the fortified and
bitterly-defended Weygand Line south of Amiens. A stream of fresh
units stood ready to pour through the gaps they had created. Victory
was in sight!
Even as dawn broke on 7 June, shells began to fall on the
battalions' exposed positions. Soon there were more dead and
wounded; the holes in the chalky ground were simply not deep
enough. As the sun rose in the east the regiment was disposed as
follows: elements of Stu.Pi.Btl. 43 (2nd Company) south of Oresmaux, ready for the attack against Rossignol and Essertaux III
Battalion on the hills west of the Bois de Berny (east of Flers), far to
the fore due to its success of the previous eveningII Battalion north
of the EssertauxJumel road, about 600 metres directly in front of
the Bois de Berny, and I Battalion south of Estres following the
capture of the town.
During the night the enemy, which consisted mostly of negro units,
rushed forward everything still at their disposal. French resistance
especially in Rossignol, but also on the northern and western borders
of the Bois de Berny stiffened significantly. They were staking
everything on one card and defended desperately.
For the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND it was the
most difficult day and at the same time the high point of the
campaign, as was recorded in the regimental report.
Orders for the continuation of the attack came out at about 08.00.
The direction of attack had now been changed. In addition, following
units had arrived in the meantime, and the 69th Inf.Rgt. prepared
to attack in the sector held by III Battalion. Ill Battalion was to be
moved more to the left, toward II Battalion. The objective for the
two battalions was the Bois de Berny, the enemy's key defensive
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position. If this could be taken, they would be through the enemy

line. I Battalion, which lay farther to the rear, had orders to initially
take the Bois de Lozires and then was to advance against the Bois
de Berny.
Once again we turn to the reports submitted by III Battalion for
the best account of the attack, in the course of which misunderstandings arose and with them a change in orders for the other battalions:
III Battalion - Obstlt. Garski
"04.00artillery fire, most of which fell behind the battalion's front
lines. Several casualties, especially from artillery and mortar fire. At
about 07.40 the regiment's executive officer brought the divisional
order for the continuation of the attack, which was to begin at 08.00.
New attack sector farther to the left. The battalion was not to set
out until the 69th Rifle Rgt., which was now to advance in III
Battalion's sector, had arrived. Due to difficulties in the transmission
of orders and as a result of a misunderstanding, several panzers rolled
across the front line, beginning the attack prematurely, before the
main body of the 69th Rgt., which was about 1,000 metres to the
rear, had reached III Battalion. At the same time, as several infantrymen were observed approaching from the right rear, III Battalion immediately went to the attack.
The attack was initially carried out in a southeasterly direction past
the southwest edge of the Bois de Berny. Although the edge of the
Bois de Berny was kept under fire, the enemy put up an obstinate
defence from there with heavy return fire from numerous machine
guns. 1st Platoon of 10th Company, which was spearheading the
attack, suffered particularly heavy casualties. The battalion adjutant,
Lt. Wentges, who had gone along on the attack with 1st Platoon,
was wounded in the stomach and died soon afterward.
Deliberation by the battalion commander: should he continue the
advance, even though fire was coming from a wooded area approximately one kilometre southwest of Flers into the flank of the
attacking battalion? All of the battalion's heavy weapons concentrated their fire on this section of the wood and forced the enemy
to surrender. Approximately 150 prisoners were taken. The forest
was cleared and the battalion regrouped in preparation for continuing the attack towards the southwest. Then it assembled at the
south-southwestern edge of the forest while an armoured reconnaissance was carried out against the Bois de Morienval, which was to
be the next objective. However, at approximately 14.00 the assembly area was struck by a surprise concentrated bombardment from
numerous enemy batteries, which led to a withdrawal to the
southeast. The battalion suffered very heavy casualties, including
Assistant Medical Officer Dr. Snoek, who was killed.
Since our own troops had not moved up on the left or right, the
attack was called off.
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At about 15.20, III Battalion was relieved by I Battalion/69th Rifle

Regiment and moved into positions in the northwestern section of
the Bois de Berny, where it remained at the regiment's disposal.
Resumption of the attack was ordered at 18.00, with II Battalion
right, I Battalion left and III Battalion in reserve farther to the rear.
The attack made no progress and was halted.
Ill Battalion was pulled back into the valley northwest of the Bois
de Berny. The rest of the battalion arrived there at approximately
24.00. Rest and quiet. New battalion adjutant Lt. Ehrmann."
Also available is a report made by an N C O (name unknown, later
killed in action) of 11th Company, III Btl.:
"It was 08.00. Our panzers drove up, dozens of them. They
worked their way around our foxholes and positioned themselves
above on the slope in order to engage the targets we called out to
them. Perhaps 400500 metres from the enemy, they lined up in
the open and fired their cannon and machine guns without pause.
We breathed easier, because it looked like we would be able to get
up out of our holes. However, the French fire continued to fall on
us. Then orders came from company that the battalion was being
relieved. 3rd Platoon had already moved back. Mnicke ordered 1st
Platoon to follow and link up with 3rd Platoon. Everyone stood up.
I looked once more over toward the village, and there. . . the French
were running towards us. There must have been hundreds of them,
running towards the panzers with their hands raised high. But the
French in the forest were still hammering away at us with their
machine guns. I implored Mnicke to withdraw the order, because
it was impossible that the Oberstleutnant would have the battalion
withdraw now, especially since no relief had arrived and the French
were on the run. But Mnicke insisted he had the order in writing.
We made our way back in stages and then we saw our comrades
laying dead or severely wounded. There was nothing we could do
for any of them.
We had to cross open country and the French again raked us with
machine gun fire until we reached cover behind a bank."
There is also a report by the 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company, which
was assigned to support the attack by III Battalion:
"Meanwhile, our 1st Platoon made a change of position over Hill
127 into a valley. All around the ground had been torn and ripped
up by shells. 1st Platoon opened fire on the edge of a wood. We
came under fire from both sides ourselves, but we couldn't locate
those damned enemy nests. The terrain, with its rows of bushes,
small woods and concealed valleys, presented us with major difficulties.
Ill Battalion attacked with tanks. Obit. Gerbener, our platoon
leader, drove forward with Obstlt. Garski. Before us extended a level
area which was under harassing fire. This was unable to hinder our
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advance, however, as long as we worked our way forward slowly in

stages.
We drove along a wide road which ran at right angles to our lane
of attack. We roared along at a terrific speed, as furious machine
gun fire had opened up from the flank. We were supposed to go into
position, but we could find no suitable spot for our observation post.
We searched the length and breadth of the valley, driving between
the advancing infantrymen of III Battalion.
Ill Battalion had driven a narrow wedge into the French fortifications, while on its left, II Battalion had been unable to keep pace.
The enemy apparently elite troops were not allowing themselves
to be dislodged so easily.
We drove across an open field into a small ravine where there was
not much room for us. As a result we had to line up the vehicles one
behind the other with no interval between them. Nevertheless, we
felt quite secure there. Then, suddenly, the French artillery opened
up on us. Shells fell ever closer until they were bursting just 20 metres
away. Shell splinters hit the vehicles but inflicted no major damage.
As suddenly as it had started, the fire stopped, and we quickly
changed positions again. Soon afterwards the French opened up
again precisely on the spot where we had just been standing!"
II Battalion had meanwhile been pulled back from its positions due
north of the Bois de Berny into the Bois du Domont to prepare for
an attack against the Bois des Varinois. This placed the battalion
square to the French front in the Bois de Berny. The attack was also
probably intended to relieve the pressure on I Battalion, which was
attacking the Bois des Lozires from the north and making slow,
difficult progress against stubborn resistance.
The planned attack by II Battalion was subsequently called off. Ill
Battalion had pushed into the Bois de Berny, but its neighbouring
infantry regiment, which had likewise been ordered to attack, had
not set out. So, initially, II Battalion remained in its positions. A
period of quiet set in. The main body of the regiment was no longer
in direct contact with the enemy. Other German units had arrived
and occupied the front-line positions.
The regiment's greatest success had been the capture of one of
the bulwarks of the Weygand Line the Bois de Berny by a
courageous platoon from III Battalion in cooperation with the Panzers. Large numbers of prisoners had been taken and great amounts
of weapons, equipment and baggage had fallen into German hands.
Following its great efforts the regiment rested in anticipation of
further orders for the following day.
The orders which arrived for GROSSDEUTSCHLAND for 8 June
foresaw the continuation of the attack to the south and the pursuit
of enemy forces. Reconnaissance confirmed that the enemy was in
retreat everywhere and offering little resistance. At about 10.00 the
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regiment marched southwards in the direction of Paillart to force a

crossing over the Noye there. The enemy was now in full flight, and
only seldom did the regiment come under enemy artillery fire and
then from an ever increasing range. There now began a great race,
the pursuit. While I Battalion advanced only slowly, II Battalion made
much faster progress. It advanced towards Lawarde, meeting no
enemy resistance. Both battalions now marched irresistibly towards
the south in the oppressive heat. This was particularly trying for the
men as the units' vehicles had not yet arrived. II Battalion's new
objective was Esquennoy, north of Breteul. Still on foot, the battalion
watched as elements of the 69th Rifle Rgt. drove past in their vehicles
in pursuit of the enemy.
The tremendous effects of the German bombers and heavy
weapons were visible everywhere. Shot-up batteries loomed against
the sky amid a landscape of abandoned field positions, discarded
equipment, burned-out tanks and destroyed villages.
The regiment's own heavy weapons, the anti-tank guns and the
heavy infantry guns, loaded all the infantry they met on their vehicles
and drove them forward. The fleeing enemy was to be given no time
to pause.
There were still casualties, however: through sudden fire from
single enemy soldiers or from the rearguard which had hastily taken
up position in a thicket. Gefr. Kaiser, a member of the fast-advancing
motorcycle platoon was killed; Gefr. Freudenberg was wounded and
died en route to the aid station. In the heady joy of the pursuit it was
all too easy to forget the ever-present danger.
General Guderian and the commander of 10th Pz.Div., General
Schaal, arrived at the regiment's command post and assigned new
objectives for the pursuit. The primary concern was covering the left
flank of the advancing Panzer divisions. The first objective was the
La Noye and the villages of Breteul and Paillart, where bridgeheads
were to be established.
II Battalion, whose vehicles finally caught up with the troops at
about 17.00, drove toward Breteul while, on the left, I Battalion
advanced towards La Faloise and Hill 128. There was little resistance
and enemy columns and horse-drawn artillery could often be seen
pulling out of the other end of a village as the Germans entered. Ill
Battalion, which had rested in the valley at the west end of the Bois
de Berny until 15.00, climbed aboard its vehicles and set off towards
Paillart at 18.00. The battalion's route took it through Lawarde and
the valley near Esquennoy. The village of Paillart was occupied in
the evening darkness by 10th Company in the face of light enemy
rifle fire.
Before the battalion's departure it had taken time to bury its dead
from the previous two days of fighting. Among the losses suffered
by 12th Company were Feldwebel Beck and Unteroffiziere Otto and
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Jackerts. The company stood sadly beside the freshly-dug graves as

the company commander bade farewell to the fallen.
Ill Battalion established a bridgehead over the La Noye which
extended from the village of Quiry-le-See through Point 157 as far
as the marshes along the Le Noye north of Paillart. On the right, II
Battalion took up position in the wooded areas north of Tartigny.
The battalion's 7th Company had suffered casualties while repelling
an enemy breakthrough attempt as it advanced on the village of
Tartigny, east of Breteul.
Prisoners were taken everywhere, as the French were unaware of
the locations of the German units. Among those captured was a
French lieutenant-colonel. Night fell and found the regiment in its
security sectors around the village of Paillart.
The French took advantage of the darkness to escape. It was vital
for the German forces to follow as quickly as possible the following
day. Unbroken motorised columns drove into the bridgehead, bringing in the vital supplies of fuel. German bombers were also active
during the night, illuminating their targets with parachute flares
before dropping their loads on the fleeing French units.
Still, on 9 June the danger of enemy attack, even if launched out
of desperation, had not been eliminated. Considerable numbers of
stragglers were about, such as those met by III Battalion. In this case
they surrendered after coming under the fire of the battalion's heavy
weapons. Individual enemy soldiers who tried to sneak up on or
through the German pickets were picked up or shot. The regiment's
assignment was to continue the pursuit to the southwest in the
direction of Bailleul. In the meantime, the units were relieved from
their security sectors and rested. The battalions arrived at their
departure point near Breteul at about 16.00 and found four columns
already waiting to cross the La Noye. It was dark by the time the
regiment's units finally began to move. Their route took them past
St.Just and through Noroy to Bailleul, where they dug in. While
III Battalion waited for day's end in the Bois d'Eraine, II Battalion
occupied security positions on the hills north of Fouilleuses. This
motorised advance made great demands on the skill and endurance
of the drivers. An eyewitness from the 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company
reported:
"In the end we used fields and meadows as roads. As long as it
remained light things went ahead smoothly, but driving in the black
of night demanded extreme concentration, alertness and sharp eyes.
We had to follow close behind one another and we were already
exhausted. Vehicles regularly bumped into the man ahead, and our
tractors soon looked somewhat the worse for wear. All around us
were light signals from the head of the column, burning villages and
haystacks. We now paid little notice to the bombers which flew
overhead. Finally, at 03.00, we parked our vehicles in an open
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garden under camouflage netting. Completely exhausted, we sank

to mother earth.
At almost the same time our train, with which we had lost contact,
was ambushed by Senegalese soldiers. While the men slept, sentries
determined that the forest in front of us was occupied by the enemy.
A firefight developed and, with the enemy's threefold superiority,
things were looking bad until the assault guns were called up. Uffz.
Shlfleisch was wounded seriously in the arm and leg. A day later
the men who had taken him to the rear reported that he had died.
It was almost noon when we rubbed the sleep from our eyes in the
bright sunshine."
It was 10 June and the regiment's soldiers got a good rest. The
quiet lasted until early evening. During the night, however, Ofeldw.
Stve of the regimental headquarters was killed in an enemy air
attack.
A single negro soldier turned up suddenly at III Battalion's maintenance section. A search of the forest, which was carried out
immediately by Lt. Peters and several men of 10th Company,
discovered 6 white officers and about 150 negro soldiers. The
negroes still carried the long bush-knives with which they had
committed so many bestialities.
According to the road signs Paris was now only 76 kilometres
away. The unit's hopes of reaching Paris were dashed, however. At
07.00 on 11 June the vehicles moved out, but towards the north,
as the Oise bridges had been blown. The regiment's route led through
Cuvilly, Tilloloy and Noyon into the Muirancourt area, where, having
received no further orders, it rested. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
spent 12 June in the same area, resting and taking care of internal
duties. An order of the day by the commander of 10th Pz.Div., to
which the regiment had thus far been attached, was read out to the
units. It described the division's successes after the breakthrough of
the Weygand Line in which GROSSDEUTSCHLAND had played
such a major role:
10th Panzer Division

Chauny, 12 June

The division has broken through the Weygand Line south of Amiens
against an enemy markedly superior in artillery, and in the subsequent
pursuit has forced strong enemy forces to retreat to the south and
southwest.
50 tanks and numerous anti-tank guns have been destroyed, 20,000
prisoners, more than 100 guns and other materiel have fallen into our
hands on the battlefield.
We are proud of this success and now, after short days of rest, we set
off for our next action, reinvigorated and determined to triumph.

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Heil to our Fhrer

signed Schaal, Gen.Lt.
At noon on 13 June the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment
moved off towards the south as the last march group of the 10th
Panzer Division. This was the beginning of a march which was to
end in Lyon. The advance was so quick that one could only list the
towns, and perhaps the dates the regiment passed through. On 13
June the units drove through Chauny, le Chateau (Affrique), Epagny
and Ambleny to Cutry, where there was a brief rest during which the
commander of III Battalion presented the Iron Cross, First Class to
the commander of 12th Company, Hptm. Grosser. Then the wheels
rolled on toward the south. The route led through Villers-Cotterets,
La Ferte Milon and Marigny into the Coupru Domptin area. There
the vehicles were simply parked along the right side of the road while
the men rested. The drive continued on the 14th through Charly sur
Mer, Viels, Maisons, Villeneuve, Gerneux and Lechelle into the
Sourdun area. The tempo on this day was terrific. There were often
up to three columns side by side, all driving south. It was as if no one
could wait.

Chapter Nine
Pursuit until the Cease-fire
The 15th of June saw Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND resume its drive to the south, moving through Nogent sur
Seine, Trainel La Postolle and Cerisiers as far as Joigny, where a
short rest had been scheduled before resuming the advance. Afterwards the advance was continued in the direction of Aillant, as far
as the Toucy area. There the troops rested in the ditches at the sides
of the road. Local security measures were taken. The units were
again nearing a front-line area once more, caution became the
watchword.
It was on this drive that the posting of signs along the advance
roads for following vehicles proved its worth. This practice simplified
matters for the following supply vehicles, especially the vital fuel
trucks. This was a method which was later used to even greater effect
in Russia.
On 16 June the regiment continued the advance towards the south.
The appropriate sections of road were marked out by the simple
expedient of placards left by motorcyclists, allowing the advance to

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maintain its rapid pace. The pursuit of the fleeing enemy continued
through Toucy, which had been heavily bombed the day before. As
III Battalion drove into the city, it was able to intercept a French
leave-train, taking more than 400 prisoners. As a result of the speed
of the German advance, the French no longer had any idea where
friend or foe was.
III Battalion formed the regiment's spearhead, with only the 90th
Reconnaissance Battalion ahead of it. The latter regularly encountered enemy forces but was always able to put them to flight.
The advance continued through Leugny, Druyes, Clamecy, Tanney,
Corbigny and Vandaise to Chateau-Chinon. It was anticipated that
the troops would remain there for the night, but orders to resume
the march arrived after a short rest. Driving through hilly terrain, the
units passed through Arleuf in the direction of Mt.Prenely, and rested
for the night in roadside ditches outside the town.
The objective for 17 June was the city of Le Creusot, which was
to be reached via St.Prix, St.Lger, Etang and Moncenis. The units
were to arrive there in the afternoon. Obstlt. Khler, Obit. Gerbener,
Feldw. Semper and several grenadiers were the first to drive into Le
Creusot, with the intention of capturing the Schneider-Creusot
Works undamaged:
"The Schneider Works were surrendered undamaged and without
resistance. Incalculably important and valuable material thus fell into
German hands. We furnished ourselves with fuel and new trucks.
Rumours of a ceasefire buzzed through our ranks. The inhabitants
ventured back into the streets and watched us nervously. We were
very curious and made inquiries about French troops and units, but
the people merely shrugged their shoulders.
Following a quick breakfast we resumed the chase."
The pursuit continued through St.Martin to Buxy, where enemy
fire and fierce resistance were met. Obstlt. Garski and Obstlt. Khler
calmly organised the attack on the town. Resistance was quickly
overcome and the town captured. More than 500 prisoners were
taken and a German patrol (led by Lt. Peters of the motorcycle
battalion), which had been captured while scouting the advance
route, was freed. The brief, but intense bombardment by mortars
and infantry guns had ended, and the civilian population fearfully left
their cellars. The following report was made by 15th Company:
"Three hours later the company ran into enemy resistance. We
whisked past the densely-packed vehicle column, aligned the guns
and opened fire. From 500 metres the 2nd Platoon shot up some
houses, which our shells simply wiped from the canvas in a cloud of
dust. As a result of this action Obstlt. Khler promoted the gunner,
Gefr. Freitag, to Unteroffizier, while his tireless loader received the
Iron Cross, Second Class. Ogefr. Beeresthal and Ogefr.
Baumgrtner received leg injuries when they were struck by the gun
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as it was driven back by the recoil on the hard road surface. We were
all in the front line and played a major role in overcoming this French
battalion which included negroes and Chinese as well as emigrants."
The regiment bivouacked in the ManceyTournus area and rested.
On orders from higher up, GROSSDEUTSCHLAND advanced no
farther on 18 June. Ill Battalion took up quarters in Toumus, while
II Battalion, which had in the meantime moved through Valliere to
the front of the regimental march group, moved into Louhans, where
it was to establish a bridgehead. Both battalion commanders organised appropriate security measures, but it was now extremely rare
to encounter armed Frenchmen.
At 03.00 on the 19th advance orders from regiment arrived at the
battalions: Resume the advance in the morning! At 07.00 the
regiment set off in the direction of Lyon on two advance roads.
Obstlt. Khler of IV Battalion greeted his companies at the departure
point at the south exit from Tournus with the words: "Today you
have the honour of capturing the second-largest city in France
Lyon!" The vehicles rolled southwards with I Battalion in the lead,
followed by IV Battalion and III Battalion in the rear.
Morale was at its highest. Talk of a ceasefire had begun in Le
Cruesot, and now it was again overheard in all circles that soon the
fighting would end. The vehicles rolled southwards in what was more
of a sight-seeing trip through the magnificent Sane Valley than a
military operation. The unit commanders warned their men to
remain vigilant, especially because of the large numbers of enemy
stragglers but who still took the threat seriously?
Macon was reached quickly. Individual fleeing French battalions
were sighted, but there was no more firing. Instead the roads were
lined with the local population, some waving, some looking on
bitterly. In many instances white flags were in evidence as the vehicles
rolled through the villages.
Up front, an assault gun platoon under Lt. Franz rolled along with
the lead company 3rd Company under Obit. Fabisch as a
symbol of power. The superstructures of the assault guns were
adorned with white flags. Two interpreters stood next to the commander of the assault gun platoon; they had been brought along to
handle negotiations for the surrender of the city. Then, suddenly, fire
from the area between the villages of Anse and Les Chres. Amid
the crack of anti-tank guns was heard the familiar slow rattle of
French machine guns. The company soon suffered its first wounded.
The troops jumped down from their vehicles and returned the French
fire. Enemy fire from the houses intensified. The enemy anti-tank
guns were silenced by the assault guns following a brief firefight. Then
the first enemy soldiers were spotted; they were black troops, skilfully
returning the German fire.

128

In the meantime, the rifle companies had deployed to the left and
right of the road but made only slow progress. The terrain was
unfavourable, with vineyards on a steep slope, and this crowned by
a monastery with thick walls. This was where the main enemy
resistance was coming from, and it included artillery. The heavy
weapons were sent into action. Company after company climbed
the hill, exchanging fire with the unseen enemy who was dug-in in
the vineyards. One enemy hole after another was smoked out until
the Germans stood before the walls of the monastery. The enemy
fire abated and then ceased. In the monastery grounds the soldiers
discovered shattered artillery pieces and dead crews. The French
troops were all Moroccans. This last combat in the war in the west
cost the companies, especially those of III Battalion. Total casualties
were 10 dead and over 30 wounded.
The advance continued on foot, with enemy fire still coming from
the vineyards. The area was cleared by Feldw. Stadler of 2nd
Company and his platoon.
In the early hours of the afternoon the regiment rolled on towards
Lyon. At the same time, II Battalion left its positions in Louhans and
set off in the direction of Lyon. The officer in charge of the battalion's
departure, Lt. Blumenthal, organised the advance party with the
assignment of advancing through Romenay, Pont-de-Vaux, past
Macon, through Pont-de-Veyle, Thoissey, Montmerle, Trevoux and
Neuville. Lt. Blumenthal reported:
"I was to drive towards Lyon with a section in trucks and an assault
gun. I drove ahead in a motorcycle combination as the assault gun
was too slow. Ahead of me were only a few guides, with whom we
soon caught up. We drove through the bushy terrain at high speed.
Then, suddenly, 5 blacks! We braked and pulled our pistols. I
shouted, 'A bas les armes!' They didn't want to at first, but after
several obviously threatening gestures they dropped their weapons.
Their guns were smashed. I told them to wait as the rest of our forces
would soon arrive. We then went on, a machine gun in the front of
the side car that way at least we could open fire right away.
We drove on to the next village. A pair of blacks came around a
corner and these, too, were disarmed. More were in the forest above
and we went after them. They also came in, hands raised high.
We pulled up at a filling station, but there was no gas and we were
soon on reserve.
Soon we encountered more French cavalry; they, too, were taken
prisoner. Suddenly, another road barricade. Behind it men were
running around like ants in an anthill. We drove up. 'La guerre est
finie!' We rounded them up and smashed their rifles. They were
foreign legionnaires. I yelled, 'Vite, vite!' Someone said, 'take it easy'.
They were about 40 men with 3 heavy and several light machine
guns; we were only a rifle section. Not until our assault guns arrived
129

did they realise how few of us there were. They grumbled and swore
at each other. We moved on. Then, behind the next barricade, they
were smiling at us when, suddenly, one of them opened fire. Then
they all began to fire. My driver fell. We jumped into the ditches, but
there was no proper cover. Damn! Now they really opened up; the
air was filled with the whistle of bullets. Then the Oberleutnant and
the rest of the company arrived. The assault gun poured fire into the
barricade until it made an opening. We immediately lined up behind
it and moved forward. The 'Sixth' was now in the lead. Major Krger,
the battalion commander, drove with the company past shot-up
anti-tank guns. Onwards, onwards!"
The following report is interesting as it describes the same combat
as seen by II Battalion:
"Pont-de-Veyle was reached at 10.45 and at approximately 11.25
a barricade was taken by surprise attack in Trevoux. Captured behind
the barricade were its commander, a French captain, and his 45
men, some drunk and some asleep, as well as 2 heavy machine guns.
The advance continued with an assault gun from Lt. von Werlhoff's
platoon leading the way. The first serious enemy resistance was met
near Neuville sur Seine. The enemy had built strong machine gun
positions which commanded the road to Lyon, as well as flanking
positions in the front gardens, especially in that of the Chateau
Bellevue. There was a barricade in front of the village which had a
heavy machine gun, two light machine guns and a 4.7 cm anti-tank
gun. This barricade was taken. The second barricade, which was
located in the village itself, defended itself energetically. We suffered
one dead and two wounded. At first, some of the men behind the
barricade raised their hands in surrender. When our men approached
the barricade, machine gun and rifle fire suddenly erupted from every
house and the park. The assault gun immediately went into position
and blasted the barricade. Several of the crew manning the barricade
were taken prisoner; the rest were killed."
The 6th and 8th Companies were now moved up and the advance
was continued forthwith. It was now midday. Several more barricades had to be overcome and again the assault guns went into
action. The attackers had the impression throughout that the French
had thoroughly prepared the defence of the advance road. It was
14.45 and the advance guard of II Battalion was outside Neuville sur
Seine, when the mayor of the city approached under a flag of truce.
He informed the Germans that the members of the Prefecture of
Lyon and the French officers in command in the city were prepared
to come out for the purpose of negotiating surrender. He left it to
the discretion of II Battalion's commander, Hptm. Grosser, as to
whether he wished to accompany him back to the city. Grosser
declined. II battalion moved slowly into the first suburbs of Lyon.
Hptm. Grosser reported:
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"Then there appeared from the inner city a civilian automobile

flying the flag of truce. It was the city commandant himself. He
declared Lyon an open city and said that he wished to negotiate with
me. I told him that there was nothing to negotiate, I was about to
enter the city. Reluctantly he climbed into my vehicle, while two
French officers stood on the running boards. The civilian car drove
ahead, followed by my vehicle and the whole of II Battalion.
I had already assigned tasks to the companies beforehand: immediately after entering the city, Obit, von Courbire's 6th Company
was to seal off the square at the Prefecture, while Obit.
Wackernagel's 7th Company was to guard the Sane bridges. O n e
of the executive officers was assigned to procure the appropriate
maps immediately after the entry into the city. And then we drove
peacefully into Lyon. In the streets were the normal scenes of
everyday life: women in light summer dresses, open movie theatres
and running streetcars.
Naturally, we looked at all of this in astonishment. The two French
officers on the running boards called uninterruptedly to both sides,
"Rentrez chez uous!'
And then we arrived at the Prefecture, an imposing building.
Standing solemnly on the steps were Prefect Bollard, his deputy
Cohendy, then Cardinal Gerlier as well as the secretary of the
Association of Former Front-Line Fighters Vizounire. Present on the
German side were: Hptm. Grosser as battalion commander II
Battalion/Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, his adjutant Obit. Beck and Assistant Medical Officer Dr. Hahn.
I was invited into the building, but first I had something else to take
care of. I sent Obit. Beck with two French officers as parlementaires
to the regiment, accompanied by an assault gun, in order to convince
the French forces facing the regiment to cease all resistance and
demonstrate the futility of their holding out. Not until then did I
formally accept the surrender of the city of Lyon."
The battalion commander presented the following five conditions
to the city prefects:
The bridges were to be guarded by French police as well as German
occupation troops. Traffic was free to move under the following
conditions: all traffic in the Rhone Departement was forbidden after
21.00, with the exception of the following occupations, with proper
identification: officers of the church, doctors, pharmacists, printers
and midwives. Blackout notices and the regulations for the vehicle
lights were to remain in force. The occupation troops were in
possession of special currency with the rate of exchange fixed at 1
Franc = 0.05 Reichsmarks. All previous, contradictory regulations
were cancelled for the time being.
The negotiations lasted about one hour, then the conditions were
accepted by the prefecture.
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After executive officer Obit, von Kirchenbach left the battalion at

approximately 11.00, there was no contact with regiment
throughout the afternoon. The time was now 18.00; the sounds of
battle were heard from the area of Ville-Villefranche, where the
regiment's advance guard was suspected to be. A messenger from
II Battalion attempted to make contact with regiment, but soon after
leaving the city he ran into the enemy at a bridge. The battalion
adjutant, Obit. Benk, also returned following an unsuccessful attempt
to reach the regiment. During a renewed attempt at approximately
20.00, he encountered assault guns and I Battalion at the outskirts
of the city. II Battalion reported:
"During the negotiations at the prefecture, Lt. Brock had made his
way to the town hall to obtain maps of the city for the troops. He
drove his motorcycle combination through the dense crowd which
had gathered in front of the town hall. Meanwhile, Lt. Benk had set
out with 10 motorcycle combinations, an assault gun and a munitions
truck to drive back to the regiment. This detachment first drove along
the Rhone to Serin, where it came upon a barricade. The soldiers
manning the barricade surrendered as the detachment approached.
A further 175 prisoners, including 4 officers, were taken prisoner at
another barricade near Fontaines. Near Neuville the detachment
prepared to cross the Sane. Preparations had been made to blow
the large, new bridge there, and the bridge officer was about to set
off the charges. Despite the white flags it was flying, the detachment
was fired on from the front gardens and the bridge officer refused to
remove the charges. Under urging from the accompanying French
officer a colonel the bridge officer agreed to go to his people
and convince them to surrender the bridge. They were all drunk. The
detachment under Obit. Benk crossed the bridge to the west bank.
However, while driving around another barricade on the other side,
the vehicles again came under fire, suffering several casualties. At
that point the assault gun opened fire and destroyed the barricade.
While this was going on, groups of French soldiers fled the suburbs
in panic in a northerly direction. At approximately 19.00 the
detachment drove back into Lyon, having failed in its attempt to
reach the regiment."
Obit. Benk reported that it was impossible to get through to the
regiment and as proof displayed his notebook which had been riddled
with bullets. In the meantime, the regiment's main force was making
slow but steady progress towards Lyons. Firefights with straggling
French units slowed, but were unable to halt, the advance. In
addition, the advancing force encountered obstructions at every
curve in the road and in every village. It was already dark as the
regiment neared the city, and at roughly 21.30 it drove into Lyon,
joining II Battalion which had been there since approximately 16.30.

132

All of the vital points in the city were immediately occupied. Ill
Battalion's 9th and 10th Companies guarded the exits from the city
at Vaise (west exits), 11th Company the village of Oullins (southwest
exit), while 10th Company watched the approximately 200 Moroccan prisoners. The remainder of the regiment's troops received strict
orders to remain with their vehicles. Entry into the surrounding
houses was forbidden.
An amusing incident occurred when 11th Company moved into
Oullins. As the first of the "Eleventh's" vehicles drove into the village,
a woman watched from her window and called, "Oh, the English,
have you finally come?" At this the Grenadiers of the "Eleventh"
shouted back, "No we're Germans!" The woman shut the window
again with a bang. Nevertheless, relations between the population
and the occupying soldiers soon improved. The residents heaved a
sigh of relief that their city had been spared the fury of war.
Arriving with the main body of the regiment was Major Greim who,
having recovered from his illness, relieved Hptm. Grosser and again
took command of II Battalion. The next day the German radio
network reported the capture of Lyon by II Battalion. Obit. Khler
was appointed city commandant and issued the appropriate instructions to the civilian population. During the next few days the
battalions moved into more permanent accommodations after the
regiment let it be known that they would be remaining in the city for
the time being.
The regimental command post was set up in the "Grand Hotel"
of Lyon, which offered magnificent accommodations. There the
headquarters staff made the acquaintance of a retired French general
who repeatedly expressed his admiration for the regiment's discipline.
Only III Battalion saw any action at this time. Orders came from
regiment on the evening of 20 June for the battalion to relieve the
1st SS-Regiment which was billeted in L'Arbresle, northwest of
Lyon. Lt. Peters was sent there at about 24.00 to establish contact
with the SS unit. The men of III Battalion were not at all happy over
this assignment, which meant that theirs would be the only battalion
still on the move.
When Lt. Peters returned at around 03.00, his report was not very
rosy. The SS-Regiment in L'Arbresle had lost several men killed in
ambushes by black troops scattered through the mountainous terrain. Ill Battalion set off while it was still dark and arrived in L'Arbresle
at 09.00. The town itself was magnificently situated among the
mountains. A small, picturesque town, it came to be much liked by
everyone. Security detachments were quickly moved into place,
being particularly watchful of the hilly, bush- covered terrain where
the black troops had been making trouble. To close this day which
had begun unhappily, the commander assembled his officers in the
133

"Lion d'Or" where, amid a festive atmosphere, he presented the Iron

Cross, First Class to Feldwebel Gter of 11th Company and the Iron
Cross, Second Class to Obit, von Usadel. Subsequently the entire
officer corps listened to the broadcast of the armistice negotiations
from the Compigne Forest over the German radio network.
However, combat operations were not yet over for the 6th
Company of II. Battalion. At approximately 11.30 orders came to
occupy the Fort de Corbas, which was still in enemy hands. The fort
lay about 10 kilometres south of Lyon. Ofeldw. A. Sielaff of 6th
Company described what happened:
"There was a short briefing by the company commander, Obit,
von Courbire: 'We have been given the assignment of occupying
the Fort de Corbas south of Lyon. Enemy resistance is to be
expected!' The 1st and 2nd Platoons climbed aboard their vehicles;
3rd Platoon remained behind in the city to guard a fuel dump. My
section took the lead. We approached the fort to the left of the road
while the vehicles waited on the road. Moving quickly, but carefully,
we soon reached the entrance to the fort. As the gate was standing
wide open, it seemed that there would be no resistance. My platoon
leader was the first to discover that there were already German
soldiers inside the fort. Our Panzer comrades had been there since
yesterday. They reported that there was another fort about 3
kilometres away which had not yet been occupied. The company
commander's decision: 1st Platoon would take over the fort from
the Panzers; 2nd Platoon would send a strong patrol, supplemented
by a heavy machine gun and a mortar section, towards the unoccupied Fort de Corbas.
After we had covered the first 500 metres we were again joined
by the company commander. We cautiously approached a village,
which proved to be free of the enemy. A machine gun was set up at
a crossroads for security and then we moved on. We were soon
standing before the fort, towards which led a long, straight road. The
entrance and bridge were clearly visible before us. The large iron
gate was closed.
We showed a white flag in order to let the French know that we
were here as negotiators. Nothing stirred. Then, suddenly, I saw the
muzzle of a machine gun appear slowly over the wall. Farther to the
right was another and then a third. We automatically sought cover,
as up until then we had been standing upright. Then the company
commander jumped up and yelled across to the fort that they must
either surrender immediately and hand over the fort or it would be
bombed by our Stukas. That worked! First a guard appeared at the
window. Shortly afterwards the fort's commander stepped out
through the gate. He was still hesitant, however, to surrender the
fort. He demanded that his soldiers be set free; he would surrender
himself as our prisoner. That was out of the question. The company
134

commander gave him 5 minutes. After being assured that the

prisoners would come to no harm, the fort's commander decided to
capitulate. With raised hands, 27 Frenchmen walked through the
gate into the open. Then we entered the fort and looked around.
Inside we found:
2,400 cases of aerial bombs, each containing 2 - 4 kg bombs
2,700 cases of aerial bombs, each containing 3 - 10 kg bombs
3,500 cases of aerial bombs, each containing 1 - 15 kg bomb
100 cases of explosives
300 cases of 75 mm shells
2 - 1 5 cm guns with an armoured cupola
5 heavy machine guns, each with 30 canisters of ammunition, as well
as many rifles and a large quantity of equipment.
This brought our last warlike operation to an end, which this time
had only been a test of courage."
The Lyon airport was occupied by 5th Company, while the 3rd
Panzer Division took over security farther south of Lyon. The routine
now was almost that of peacetime.
Lyon was a city of more than 600,000 inhabitants at the influx of
the Sane into the westwards-flowing Rhone, the second largest city
in France. Major bridges spanned both rivers. Above on a hill stood
the Lyon monastery with its ancient walls. Immediately beside it was
the radio transmission tower, modern technology next to the time
honoured monastery. In the city picture the grey of the soldiers of
the
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Regiment
soon
became
predominant. They were to be seen everywhere usually in pairs,
as travelling alone was forbidden. The behaviour of the soldiers was
very correct which, as much as anything, was a sign of their pride.
Their conduct was much praised by the French.
The larger buildings were requisitioned as billets. The prefecture
was also the local headquarters for Lyon. 6th Company was billeted
in the slaughterhouse while their vehicles were parked in the yard.
Following its return from L'Arbresle, III Battalion moved into the
Peugot workshops. This was much to the companies' advantage, as
facilities were at hand there to carry out repairs to their vehicles. II
and IV Battalions were quartered east of the Rhone, while I Battalion
sought accommodations west of the Morand Bridge. The main body
of III Battalion found quarters in the houses and public areas of the
Rhne-Quai, near the telegraph office.
The 25th of June, 1940, was the day of the armistice between
France and Germany. At 01.35 the guns fell silent.

135

Chapter Ten
Armistice
Deeply moved, the regiment's Grenadiers listened in their quarters
to the news of the cease-fire and the provisional end of combat
operations. They were also moved by the words of their Commander-in-Chief, Generaloberst von Brauchitsch, in his order of the
day in which he spoke of the comrades who had not lived to see the
end of the fighting. Among other things, that order of the day from
25 June said:
"At this moment we thank the almighty, who has so visibly blessed our
difficult struggle.
In proud sorrow we think of our fallen and wounded comrades who gave
their blood and lives for Germany's greatness."
For the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment the sacrifices in
blood and lives had been great. The magnitude of the sacrifice is
reflected in the following list of losses in France suffered from a total
strength of 3,900 men:
Up to Stonne:
Officers
NCOs
Men

Up to Flanders:
Officers
NCOs
Men

Up to Lyon:
Officers
NCOs
Men

Wounded:
21
64
250
335

Killed:
5
12
64
81

Missing:
1
3
20
24
=

440

1
8
50
59

10
27
197
234

2
17
19

2
21
58
81
221

9
37
215
261
830

3
11
14
57

=
356
= 1,108

312

Representative of those who fell and whose names are today

inscribed on the memorials in all of Germany's communities are:

136

From the 2nd Platoon of 8th Company: Rudi Endlich, Paul Heyn, Hubert
Grumme.
From the headquarters of III Btl.: Wentges, Friedland, Gnthersberg,
Beise, Snoek.
And there were many more their names remain, rank now means little.
Ill Battalion ended the war with a parade in the marketplace of
Lyon. In his address following the reading of the regimental order of
the day, Obstlt. Garski once again touched on the memorable days
which had passed. Ill Battalion's success had been great. It had
fought from the extreme north to deep in the south of France.
Members of the Garski Battalion had been the first troops of the
Greater German Reich to fight on enemy soil when they were air
landed in Belgium on 10 May 1940. Then there was the crossing of
the Meuse in which the battalion was the first across, and the days
of the heaviest fighting, the 6th and 7th of June, with the battles near
Flanders and the Bois de Berny. In honour of those who had not
survived to see this proud day, the order was given: "Helmets off!"
The battalion's thoughts were of their fallen comrades as they
listened to the strains of the " Lied vom guten Kameraden". The
parade ended with a marchpast in front of the battalion commander.
Hundreds of Frenchmen watched this military drama.
In the evening there took place a gathering of the battalion's officer
corps in which Leutnant Baldur von Schirach, recently decorated for
bravery in the face of the enemy, took part for the first time. At this
point in the war there were few German battalions which could boast
more than 400 decorations, from the Knight's Cross to the Iron
Cross, IInd Class. Representative of those decorated were Lt.
Schreiber, Feldw. Czichi, Uffz. Kppke, Ogefr. Steinberg, Schilling,
Borgmann, Werner, Zilizinski, Heldt and Gefr. Zippel of 8th Company. From the headquarters of III Battalion were Uffz. Dost,
Assistant Medical Officers Dr. Imhof and Preu with the Iron Cross,
1st Class.
The regimental order of the day from 27 June specified that the
regiment was to take part in a parade which was to take place in
Paris at the beginning of July. From then on all of the units efforts
were directed at preparing for this event. Drill practice was carried
out as it had been in the days of the old Wachregiment. Rifle drills
and marching practice were carried out, just as on the barrack
grounds. The troops did plenty of grumbling but, on the other hand,
none of the Grenadiers wanted to miss this spectacle in Paris and so
they gave their best. Hauptmann Grosser and an advance party were
sent to the French capital to make the necessary preparations.
A new regimental order on 30 June altered the regiment's participation in the planned parade in Paris. The new order specified
that the unit would not participate on foot but seated in vehicles. All

137

INFANTRY REGIMENT GROSSDEUTSCHLAND ORDER OF BATTLE

DECEMBER 1940

138

DURING HOSTILITIES
AFTER ARMISTICE

I.R. GD's route through France, approximately 7,000 kilometres.

139

efforts were immediately shifted to preparing for the parade in

vehicles. The vehicles themselves were spruced up and driving in
ranks was practised, usually on the Lyon airfield. The maintenance
section did all that was possible to make every vehicle ready for the
parade.
Advance orders for departure on 4 July in the direction of Paris
arrived on the 3rd. All preparations were made and the troops took
one more walk through the streets of Lyon. Everyone wanted to bid
farewell to the city which had been the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Regiment's final objective in such a successful advance.
At 08.00 on 4 July the first vehicles now no longer combat ready
rolled through the departure point at the edge of the city towards
the north. Their march route was: LyonCharolles Autun
Chateau-Chinon, where a rest stop was scheduled. The rest of the
journey was laid down in detail in the regimental order of 7 July:
Infantry Regiment G R O S S D E U T S C H L A N D
Abt. Ia
Rgt.St.Qu., 7. 7. 1940

Regimental order for the move to Paris on 7. 7. 40

1. On 8. 7., I.R. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, Leibstandarte SS Adolf
Hitler and I.R. (mot.) 93 (in this order), travelling by road, will reach
the cantonment area near Paris.
2. March Route: Chateau-Chinon, Corbigny (winding road, drive with
special care!) Clamecy, Courson, Toucy, Douchy, Montargis,
Fontainebleau, Corbeil Paris-South.
3. Point of Departure Crossing Times:
March Group II Btl. with attached motorcycle platoon,
which is to be used to scout the roads.
03.00
March Group III Btl.
03.25
March Group I Btl.
03.50
March Group IV Btl with the bulk of Rgt.H.Q.
04.15
Small vehicle column, and behind it the assembled regimental
maintenance echelon, will follow 5 minutes behind March Group
IV Btl.
Leibstandarte will pass through Chateau-Chindon at 05.00.
4. Departure Officer provided by II Btl. Point of departure is to be
marked by two green lamps.
5. Maximum Speed: 30 kilometres per hour. Less by dark, if necessary.
6. Lights: dimmed lights with lens shutters; the lead vehicle is temporarily permitted to use high beams.
7. Rest Periods: from 07.00 - 07.10, 09.00 - 10.00 (long rest),
12.00 - 12.15, 14.00 - 14.15. The rest periods are to be strictly
adhered to. The units are to join up during the long rest.
8. The billeting officer has orders to await the battalions in the Corbeil
area.

140

9.

Arrival of the march groups is to be reported immediately to the

regimental headquarters, (re. accommodations)
10. I will leave with the group leader from the former regimental
headquarters at 05.00.
signed, von Stockhausen

With the arrival of the battalions a new unit joined the regiment.
It was the newly-formed Reconnaissance Company. The new unit
was a mixed company with motorcycles and armoured cars, which
had been formed by the Aufklrungs Lehr- und Ersatz- Abteilung
(Reconnaissance Training and Replacement Battalion) in Krampnitz,
near Potsdam. The company was organised as follows:
Company commander with Kfz. 18, a first-aid motorcycle-sidecar combination and a standard motorcycle.
An armoured car platoon, 4 cars armed with machine guns and 1 with
a 2 cm cannon.
3 sections, each with 3 motorcycle-sidecar combinations (BMW 750 cc.),
the first machine of each section mounted a machine gun.
1 mortar team (5 cm) on motorcycle-sidecar combinations.
1 heavy machine gun platoon on motorcycle-sidecar combinations.
Train
The new company met up with the regiment in Laye les Rose,
near Paris, and was incorporated into IV Battalion as 17th (Reconnaissance) Company.
The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment moved into quarters in
the southern section of Paris. The units continued to drill in preparation for the parade, but in general the soldiers had plenty of
opportunities to see the sights in the city and its environs. Ogefr.
Rose of 6th Company reported:
"We moved into our quarters, which were in a school in Villejuif
on the southern edge of the city. We made an excursion to Versailles,
where we viewed the historic hall of mirrors in the splendid palace
built by Louis the Fourteenth.
Naturally, we also got to know Paris. We stood in awe before the
grave of the unknown soldier, which lay beneath the Arc de Triomphe, and then at the sarcophagus of Napoleon the First in the Church
of the Dome. We drove farther along the Champs Elyses, past the
monument to Clmenceau, to the Place de la Concorde. The Reich
war flag waved from the naval ministry. Our attention was then
drawn to the Egyptian obelisk. Later we inspected the Louvre and
Notre Dame. We got an impressive view from the Trocadero of the
Eiffel Tower, the highest in the world. Afterwards, we drove past the
Quai d'Orsay the government quarter, crossed a splendid bridge
over the Seine and had a quick look at the city's entertainment
quarter. The Avenue Madelaine with its elegant restaurants glided by

141

as we drove past slowly, and everyone quietly pictured how busy it

must have been here before the war."
On 17 July arrangements were made for a large thanksgiving
service in the Notre Dame Cathedral. Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin,
Oberarzt Dr. Alberts and Minister Damroth of the Garrison Church
in Potsdam held discussions with the Archbishop of Paris. A joint
service for both denominations was planned.
The Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND held
its
thanksgiving service in the Notre Dame Cathedral on 19 July. Over
3,000 soldiers kneeled in the pews, as well as a small number of
Frenchmen. The sound of thousands of soldiers' voices in song was
impressive, the sight of the men of GROSSDEUTSCHLAND in
common prayer was unforgettable. The sermon by Minister Damroth
of the Garison Church in Potsdam was uplifting. Printed in the
booklets, which contained a copy of the sermon, and which were
later collected on orders from above, was:
Presented by Army Chaplain Damroth,
Garrison Church, Potsdam, chaplain of an
Infantry Division,
to console the bereaved of our fallen,
in memory of our regimental comrades.
At the conclusion of the impressive gathering the soldiers streamed
out through the three opened portals of Notre Dame into the
church's sunlit forecourt. Thousands of Frenchmen were unable to
conceal their admiration for this scene or of the calm and disciplined
way in which the soldiers quietly formed up into units and marched
off.
Unfortunately, the size and uniqueness of this service had a sequel
which can only be categorised as unpleasant. A report on the service
reached headquarters, prompting Generaloberst Keitel to dispatch
an order to the regiment by officer courier: in future the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment was strictly forbidden from holding
religious services of this nature, including services in the field. The
regimental commander, Oberst von Stockhausen, was so offended
by this order from a senior commander that he declined to pass it
on to the battalions. Perhaps the service in Notre Dame was the
reason that, in the future, no GROSSDEUTSCHLAND units were
permitted to have chaplains. The parade in its planned form was
called off, and orders were sent to the regiment to hold itself ready
for a move into Alsace. A regimental order followed on 22 July,
1940:

142

Orders for the Transfer of the Regiment

1. The regiment will depart Paris on 26. 7. and transfer to Colmar
and Schlettstadt.
Intermediate accommodations: 26./27. 7. in Troyes.
27./28. 7. in Neufchateau
2. The following are to be sent ahead as an advance party:
Hauptmann Grosser as officer in charge, accompanied by
Leutnant Senger
one officer from each battalion,
3 NCOs or men and one vehicle from each unit,
inclusion of 1-2 motorcycles per battalion is desirable.
From the Rgt.H.Q.: one Feldwebel and 3 NCOs or men from
one of the sub-units.
Assembly of the advance party for departure on 24. 7., 06.00, on
the road in front of the regimental headquarters.
Hptm. Grosser will report to regiment at 16.00 on 23. 7. for more
detailed instructions.
3. Exact allocation of intermediate accommodations will follow from
A.O.K.l, with which the regiment is in communication.
4. In its new billeting area the regiment will be under the command
of XXXIII Army Corps. Corps headquarters: Dreihren, west of
Colmar where, following assignment of interim accommodations,
Hptm. Grosser is to establish communication.
5. On 27. 7., 3rd Company, the band and 24 bandsmen will remain
in the former billeting area until the morning of 28. 7. for a large
tattoo in honour of Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt. If necessary, 3rd Company is to be reinforced for the tattoo by suitable
personnel as assigned by I Battalion.
I and II Battalions will each detach a truck to 3rd Company for
transportation of the bandsmen.
6. Departure of 3rd Company with attached band and bandsmen for
the new billeting area on the morning of 28. 7. in two days of
travel according to instructions from I Battalion.
7. Company commander 3rd Company, Stabsmusikmeister Ahlers
and the appointed regimental bugler are to report for instructions
to the adjutant of Army Group A at 11.00 on 23. 7. in St.Germain.
signed, von Stockhausen
The regiment's route to Troyes, the first intermediate stop, was
laid down as: Paris-Corbeil (N7), Melun (N446), Nancy (N446),
ProvinsNogent (N19), RomillyTroyes. The route led past earlier
battlefields into the Vogesen, where the regiment moved into its
quarters on 28 July with I and III Battalions in Colmar and II and IV
Battalions in Schlettstadt. The battalions soon returned to a normal
routine: drill, field exercises and range practice. Peacetime style

143

training was in full swing. The men took full advantage of the
opportunity to take some home leave.
The arrival of replacements to bring the regiment up to strength
resulted in many changes in the units; some officers were promoted
and moved. The changes in III Battalion were as follows:
Obit, von Usadel was transferred back to Germany as a result of
complaints. Obit, von Mackensen arrived from the Army NCO School as
Battalion Adjutant, while Obit. Richter moved over from I Btl. to become
Executive Officer. Dr. Richards joined III Btl. as Surgeon-Major, while Dr.
Imhoff had become Assistant-Surgeon. Obit. Harder again took over 10th
Company after Obit. Lucke, who had led the company throughout the
campaign, returned to 12th Company as a platoon leader. After having led
I and II Battalions in action on several occasions, Major Krger again
became commander of 11th Company. Lt. Obermeier (Iron Cross, 1st
Class) again became a platoon leader in the same company (12th Company), which was commanded by Hptm. Grosser. Lt. Peters (Iron Cross,
1st Class) was again a platoon leader with 9th Company, while Hptm. Gru
was posted to the Fhrer-Begleit- Bataillon.
At this time a further, heavy battalion was formed under the
command of Obstlt. Garski. Designated IV Battalion, its composition
was:
17th
18th
19th
20th

(Reconnaissance) Company
(Pionier) Company
(Signals) Company
(Flak) Company

With this addition the regiment had reached a size which already
looked like the framework for the future formation of a division.
On 24 August the long-awaited cuff titles bearing the name
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND were handed out. However, the shoulder
boards with the initials GD had still not yet arrived. The cuff title,
which was worn on the right forearm, was made of green fabric with
white script.

Chapter Eleven
Preparations for "Sea Lion" and "Felix"
A new operation was on the horizon. On 16 July 1940, following
the cessation of hostilities against France, Hitler issued Directive No.
16 which concerned itself with the preparations for a landing in
England:
144

"Since England, despite her hopeless military situation, still shows no

signs of being ready to come to an understanding, I have decided to
prepare a landing operation against England and, if necessary, carry it
out. The purpose of this operation is to eliminate the English homeland
as a base for continuing the war against Germany and, if it should
become necessary, to occupy it completely."
The preparations were to be carried out under the code name "Sea
Lion" and were to be brought to a conclusion as quickly as possible.
The I.R. GD made the necessary preparations, although the whole
business was not taken very seriously. The idea of wanting to move
entire units across the channel seemed somewhat Utopian. In fact,
the operation was called off in September on account of the failure
of the Luftwaffe to gain air superiority over England. The preparations which were under way on the German side came to an end,
meaning they simply fizzled out; in the final analysis Operation "Sea
Lion" was simply an episode.
In those September days in 1940 an artillery unit was added to the
strength of the I.R. GD: the 400th (mot.) Artillery Battalion. From
this point on the battalion would remain with the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment (later Division) until the end.
The battalion's composition was as follows:
H.Q. 400th Art.Btl.
H.Q. Battery with:

Signals Platoon, Meteorological

Section, Printing Section.
1st and 2nd Batteries each
4 light field howitzers
3rd Battery
4 heavy field howitzers
Formed from II Btl./4th Art.Rgt. (Leitmeritz) and elements of 629th
(mot.) Hvy.Art.Btl. which, in turn, was formed from II Btl./4Oth (mot.)
Art.Rgt. (Meien).
The battalion's first commanding officer was Major von Scheer,
Adjutant Lt. Theermann. 1st Battery was c o m m a n d e d by
Hauptmann Khme(until early 1942), 2nd Battery by Hptm. Ohling
and 3rd Battery (until early 1942) by Hauptmann Mller.
The entire regiment was assembled on the Marsfeld at Colmar on
2 October 1940 after which there was a marchpast in front of the
regiment's commanding officer, Oberst von Stockhausen.
Obit. Beck-Broichsitter and Feldw. Hindelang were awarded the
Knight's Cross. More than 300 Iron Crosses, First and Second Class,
were presented, as well as the recently-instituted Infantry Assault
Badge, (see photo)
7 October 1940 brought a change in the regiment's dress regulations as a result of a publication in the Heeres Verordnungs-Blatt:

145

Volume 22

Berlin, 11 October 1940

Issue 59

Cuff Title for Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND and

the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon.
1. A new cuff title is being introduced for the Inf.Rgt. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND and elements of the Fhrer-Begleit- Bataillon
belonging to the Army in place of the one described in H.-V.B1.1939, Section B S 179 No. 271 sub.para. lc2. It consists of a
3.2 cm wide band of black cloth with GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
hand-sewn with aluminum thread in German script. Samples of
the cuff title will be sent separately.
2. The cuff title will be worn as before on service coats, blouses and
greatcoats.
3. Once the troops have been provided with the new cuff titles the
old ones are to be removed.
O.K.H. (BdE) 7. 10. 40
- 6 4 c 32 - AHA/Bkl. (Ilia)
The change from the former cuff title in green cloth was said to
have been the result of a remark by Oberst von Stockhausen, who
said, "The I.R. GD is no army postal regiment!"
On 12 October the 18th Pionier Company arrived in Schlettstadt
to round out V Battalion which was in the process of being formed
at that time. It came from Stettin-Podejuch after being established
by the 12th Pionier Replacement and Training Battalion in
Schwedt/Oder. Its composition was as follows:
Company Commander
Platoon Leader, 1st Platoon
Platoon Leader, 2nd Platoon
Platoon Leader, 3rd Platoon
Bridging Platoon

Hauptmann Rdiger
Leutnant Krger
Leutnant Gansor
Feldwebel Weienborn
Feldwebel Rser

The company was fully motorised, including a platoon with Bridging Equipment K.
On 27 and 28 October 1940 the I.R. GD left its well-liked quarters
in the Colmar-Schlettstadt area and drove to Le Valdahon and the
troop training grounds there. Accommodations were in wooden and
stone barracks. In addition to the usual duties there now also began
preparations for Operation "Felix", the surprise occupation of the
fortress of Gibraltar. The basis for these preparations was Directive
No. 18 of 12 November 1940:
"The preliminary measures by the high commands for the conduct of
the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:
2.

Spain and Portugal

146

Political moves are under way to ensure a speedy entry into the
war by Spain. The objective of German intervention on the Iberian
Peninsula (code name Felix) will be to drive the English from the
western Mediterranean.
To this end
(a) Gibraltar is to be taken and the straights closed,
(b) the English are to be prevented from gaining a foothold at
another location on the Iberian Peninsula or the Atlantic
Islands.
Obit. Rssert of 2nd Company/I.R. GD described the exercises
which were carried out by the regiment at that time:
"Preparations for the surprise capture of Gibraltar began under the
direction of General of Mountain Troops Kbler. The Infantry
Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND and the 1st Mountain Division,
which was stationed in the Pontalier area, were to form the core of
the forces which were to undertake this venture.
Photographs, maps and other sources were used to explain the
assignments to the officers and men and their roles in carrying out
the operation. Sand table models of the Gibraltar area were constructed (in Besancon, for example) and every participant was
familiarised with local landmarks.
The terrain around Le Valdahon, Pontalier and Besancon and to
the east as far as the Swiss border was ideal for conducting exercises
in the style of combat which would be necessary at Gibraltar.
A narrow north-south neck of land led from the Spanish mainland
to the Gibraltar peninsula and was crowned by a motorway. Ocean
waves lapped at both sides. I Battalion's 1st and 3rd Companies
were to attack the peninsula across this neck of land, while 2nd
Company would have to cross the bay to the right in assault boats.
On the eastern part of the peninsula the steep, almost unscalable
wall of its famous limestone rock faces the Spanish mainland. The
Jger of the 1st Mountain Division planned to climb the north face
of the rock in a daring, almost impossible operation and bypass the
English casemates and rock positions. Batteries of artillery were to
be positioned around the bay west of Gibraltar. Guns of this size and
in such concentration had not yet been used at that point in the war.
Together with the Stukas they were to support the surprise attack
by bringing the English harbour and field positions under fire at the
decisive moment.
It became apparent from the description of the plan that we were
being assigned tasks with which we were unfamiliar and for which
we were simply not prepared. The use of assault boats by 2nd
Company meant that it would have to cross the wide bay between
Spain and the quay-wall in Gibraltar harbour completely in the open
as quickly as possible. The company could not, therefore, take along
its light and heavy weapons and would have to leave fire support to
147

the Stukas and the heavy weapons arrayed around the bay. In order
to fill the gaps in the fire plan somewhat, it was decided to send
anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns along with the mass of
assault boats. These were to be placed on rafts, each of which would
be pushed along by two assault boats. As protection against infantry
fire the rafts were to carry a sand bag barricade and a smoke-generator. On reaching its objective 2nd Company would be faced by a
4-5 metre-high, completely smooth quay-wall. The troops would
have to scramble out of the heaving boats and climb the wall under
enemy fire. Grappling hooks and climbing poles would be taken
along. The most agile climber would go up the climbing poles,
hauling up rope ladders over which the others would follow.
Naturally, we practised the laying of smoke-screens and fighting in
the dark rock casemates and fortress installations with much enthusiasm. I remember well that for some time we didn't leave our
two-storey company building in Valdahon through the door as usual,
but instead leapt from the second-floor window. Even following
strenuous field exercises we were not permitted to re enter our
quarters using the entrance, but had to climb to the second-storey
window using climbing poles, grappling hooks and rope ladders. We
practised every aspect of the operation to the smallest detail. The
wording and sequence of every order were laid down to section level.
Through the intensive preparations and training the men achieved
a level of proficiency in climbing and scaling they would never have
thought possible. When we returned from our exercises we no longer
looked like military units. The men wore no belts, instead each had
a tool in his hands, such as long bamboo poles, rope, rope ladders,
grappling hooks, home-made smoke generators, wire cutters,
demolition charges, and so on.
Naturally, we enjoyed the entire operation. It was a welcome
change and gave us the opportunity to practice a style of warfare
which we had never been called upon to use before, but one which
thoroughly appealed to our sense of sportsmanship."
The meeting between Hitler and Franco on 23 October 1940 in
Hendaye was undoubtedly connected with Operation Felix. However, Franco succeeded in delaying his decision on bringing Spain
into the war until he later rejected the idea completely.
Despite the war games and assault team practices in the companies, there was still plenty of time for enjoyment. The transfer of
Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin from the regiment to other duties on 2
November resulted in a tremendous party. He was presented with
an Opel-Admiral which the Assault Gun Company had brought in
on a flat-bed trailer. With von Schwerin seated in the Admiral and
the regimental bugler in front, a procession of vehicles drove through
Le Valdahon and finally to Besancon where the next highest commander was just having lunch. The racket almost resulted in the alarm
148

being sounded, until it was discovered that it was only the GD acting
up again!
Arriving on 29 November was the Flak company which had been
formed for V Battalion. It was incorporated into the regiment as the
20th Company. Formed from the 103rd Flak Replacement Battalion
in Dberitz, it possessed three platoons each with three 3.7 cm Flak
mounted on 5-tonne tractors, as well as a signals section with a small
radio station, three radio sections and a telephone section. Its first
commander was Hptm. Weidemann.
In about mid-December 1940, Major "Kiki" Gehrke took over the
command of I Battalion in place of the departed Graf von Schwerin.
The Christmas service, the second of the war, took place in the large
church in Omens and was an extremely impressive affair.
The year 1940 drew to an end with the regiment on the Le
Valdahon troop training groundsapparently at peace, but still far
from home. Many thoughts went back to the events which were
engraved deeply in everyone's memory. It was through these events
that the regiment, a collection of men from all over Germany, had
become a fighting team. Proven in action and ready for new
deeds-that was how the men of the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Regiment faced the new year of 1941, although none of them
suspected what that year was to bring.

Chapter Twelve
Wachbataillon

Berlin

and

Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon

As the bearer of the traditions of its predecessors, the Wachregiment Berlin and the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
which emerged from it, the Wachbataillon Berlin continued to
represent the interests of the regiment fighting at the front. In the
shadow of events, it carried out its necessary duties in the Reich
capital.
With the announcement of the cease-fire on 25 June 1940, waves
of joy swept over the German capital. This placed no special
demands on the battalion, although 2 officers and about 50 NCOs
and men were detached to Belgium to take over the guarding of the
Belgian King in Laeken Castle. Their duties there guarding the
Belgian royal family differed little from those of a normal guard
detachment.
For the remaining companies in Berlin, November 1940 brought
one of the high points of their existence when Marshall Antonescu
of Rumania paid a visit to the capital. The companies formed the

149

honour guard at the Marshall's reception and he was most impressed

by the precision of their movements and the manner in which they
carried out their orders. Major Frotscher also a senior member of
the elite unit took over command of the battalion and saw to it
that it continued its work in the traditional manner.
With the beginning of the campaign in the West on 10 May 1940,
the Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces, Adolf
Hitler, and his staff moved to the Fe\sennest installation which had
been constructed near Mnstereifel. With the first indications of
success, in particular by Panzergruppe von Kleist, Hitler drove to the
front-line headquarters. These trips to the front by Hitler were
escorted by elements of the Fhrer Begleit-Bataillon which was
responsible for the Supreme Commander's security. Setting out on
6 June, the battalion's fast vehicles Kbel cars and motorcycles
escorted Hitler through Aachen, Maastricht and Lttich to Dinant.
A few days later, on 18 June, the 1st Guard Company under the
command of Rittmeister von Blomberg, with platoon leader Lt.
Grundmann, set out for Compigne via Laon and Soissons. Arriving
on 19 June, the company took up quarters in the town school.
Together with units from the other branches of the armed forces it
formed the honour company for the signing of the cease-fire with
France. At 20.00 on 22 June 1940 three buglers from 1st Company
(Obergefreiten Tigges, Vasters and Reble) blew the "Full halt!" to
mark the cease-fire.
That same evening the company left the Compigne Forest and
drove to Object W 1, code-named Wolfsschlucht (Wolf's Gorge).
From there it escorted the Supreme Commander to Freudenstadt in
the Black Forest where he visited wounded in a military hospital.
The period beginning 5 July 1940 saw the Guard Company of the
Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon
in the Adlerhorst
Installation near Ziegenberg, Hesse where it carried out its usual
guard duties. Repeated trips to the front were also made from this
installation. As did its sister regiment the I.R. G D , effective 7 October
1940 the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon received the black cuffbands
bearing the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND title, further proof of its close
ties to the regiment.
On 20 October part of the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon set out to
drive through France to the Spanish frontier. The journey was well
remembered for the hardships it entailed and for the distances
covered. Stretches of 800 kilometres were the order of the day; this
was necessary in order to ensure that the battalion took over security
of the meeting site prior to Hitler's arrival. Only two days later, on
the evening of 22 October, the men were standing at their posts in
and around the town of Hendaye, where Hitler was scheduled to
meet with the Spanish head of state. The 23rd of October saw the
arrival and discussions between the two statesmen, during which
150

Hitler tried to interest Spain in joining the war. Of this, however, the
guards knew nothing; their only duty was to provide security for the
meeting. On the following day the vehicles of the Fhrer-BegleitBataillon headed north again, arriving back at the Adlerhorst
Installation near Ziegenberg on 28 October.
The 2nd Guard Company, nick-named the 2nd "Fast (it was a
motorcycle company), moved to Paris, where it was stationed in the
Cit Universitaire for several months as a standing unit. Together
with a grey column it remained there at the disposal of the F H Q u to
guard important personalities visiting Paris.
In the meantime, the 99th Infantry Replacement Battalion (mot.),
the unit in Neuruppin which furnished replacements for the I.R G D ,
had taken over the training of young recruits. On 21 July it sent a
large transport of replacements to the regiment in the West. The
group was under the command of Hauptmann von Meyer, with Lt.
Ulrich as platoon leader. Following a four day stop in Krefeld, it
passed through Arras to Colmar and Schlettstadt providing the new
formations there with necessary personnel. The 30th of November
1940 saw a change in the unit's designation. The corresponding

decree in the Heeresverordnungsblatt was as follows:

1251. 22nd Year

Berlin, 16 December 1940

74th Issue

Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND

Effective immediately the 99th Replacement Battalion is designated:
"Replacement Battalion Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND"

O.K.H (Ch H Rst. u. BdE)

16 k
24433 / 40

AHA/Ag/H

(Id)

Beginning at the same time as the redesignation of the battalion

was the recruiting of qualified volunteers for the I.R. G D . The
following notice was published in a Berlin newspaper on 26 November 1940:
The Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND - peacetime garrison Berlin is enlisting long-service volunteers (applicants for career
NCOs12 year term of service) and war volunteers (2 year period of
active service) from the entire Reich. Minimum age on day of enlistment: 17 years; maximum age for longer service volunteers: 25 years.
Minimum height: 1.70 metres, no wearers of glasses.

151

The path of the I.R. GD

in the Balkan Campaign

Written applications are to be directed to the regiment's replacement

battalion: Recruiting Office, Infantry Replacement Battalion, Neuruppin. Leaflets providing more detailed information concerning terms of
enlistment, careers, supply and so on are available from Recruiting
District Headquarters and Draft Boards as well as from the Replacement Battalion in Neuruppin on personal demand or by mail.
On a sunny winter day in January 1941 (27 January) the last of
the regiment's vehicles rolled out of the Le Valdahon troop training
grounds into the magnificent Doubs Valley. Travelling the winding
roads, they made their way to the city of Belfort. For the next while
this city, with its famous Golden Lion, was to be home to the
regiment and its attached units. On reaching the city limits the men
of the regiment were met by the advance parties which had gone
ahead and were directed to their billets. There were many surprised
faces to be seen as elements of II Battalion drove through the city
and out the other side. The accommodations waiting in Offomont
were anything but inviting. The idea itself of living in barracks again
was not popular. But these were temporary barracks whose windows
had been painted blue, apparently as a precaution against air raids.
More than fifteen men were assigned to each room. The barracks
featured bunk beds with damp straw mattresses, concrete floors and
were equipped with the famous French "Wonder Stove" which was
almost impossible to light. More than a week was necessary to turn
the barracks into reasonably comfortable quarters.

Chapter Thirteen
The Balkan War
Despite the months of peace for the German troops at the end of
1940 and early 1941, the great game of world politics went on
unabated. In September 1940 there was little activity along the line
of strongpoint-style positions in North Africa held by the Axis partner
Italy. However, as a prelude to a more active conduct of the war,
the English were assembling an attack force on the Egyptian-Libyan
border. These preparations were not yet complete when Mussolini
launched a new adventure which would threaten to completely
destroy him and his entire army: on 28 October 1940 several Italian
divisions launched an attack on Greece from Albania. This action by
the Italians, which ran contrary to all of Hitler's plans, demonstrated
to a shocking degree the weakness of Italy's military striking power.
Without the help promised by England, the Greeks succeeded not

153

only in bringing the Italian offensive to a halt, but forced them onto
the defensive and even occupied parts of Albania.
The British Expeditionary Corps, which was standing ready to
attack in North Africa, soon realised that the Greeks would initially
be able to contain the invasion without outside help. Therefore, on
the night of 7 / 8 December 1940, it went to the attack with
comparatively weak forces but with tank support. The first assault
by the British broke through the Italian positions south of Sidi Barani.
The weeks that followed brought defeat after defeat for the Italian
forces under General Graziani. On 22 January 1941 the Italian
garrison of Tobruk laid down its arms.
These Italian setbacks in North Africa also came as a complete
surprise to Hitler. The precarious Italian situation in Greece and
North Africa finally forced him to take measures which had not been
foreseen. On 22 February 1941 a German holding force under
General Rommel was moved to North Africa to halt the British
advance. For the time being this took care of the trouble-spot on the
Italian-German front, especially since the British laid on a several
week pause in their offensive.
To Hitler the situation in the Balkans seemed more uncomfortable
and much more dangerous. The necessity of securing the Balkan
region had led him to send a German instructional unit to Rumania
in October 1940. Hungary and Bulgaria were pacified by including
them in the Axis partnership. Yugoslavia, whose strategic position
had been made extremely unfavourable by the German entry into
Bulgaria, now likewise found itself under pressure to join the Tripartite Pact. However, internal political opposition and external political
influences delayed the decision in Belgrade. Not until 20 March 1941
did the Yugoslavian government, with only the barest majority in its
parliament, decide in favour of entry, signing the pact in Vienna on
25 March 1941.
However, while the German Twelfth Army under Generalfeldmarschall List was moving up in Bulgaria for the attack on Greece
to provide the Italians with promised assistance, a coup d'tat took
place in Belgrade on the night of 2 6 / 2 7 March. The government
fell, the Prince Regent Paul was driven from the country and there
was an obvious swing towards the side of the Allies. Riots in the
streets of Belgrade underlined this action and made obvious the
country's hostile intentions towards Germany.
Hitler therefore decided to expand the attack on Greece at the
beginning of April 1941 to include Yugoslavia, while at the same
time postponing Operation Barbarossa (the attack on the Soviet
Union) by at least five weeks.
Directive Number 25 laid down the guidelines for the offensive:

154

As soon as sufficient forces are assembled and the weather situation

permits, the Air Fleet shall destroy the Yugoslavian ground organisation
and Belgrade through continuous day and night attacks. The army is
to begin the operation against Greece as close to simultaneously as
possible, initially capture the Saloniki Basin and then exploit favourable
opportunities to advance as far as Mount Olympus.
The attack from the area north of Sofia should take place with stronger
forces advancing in a northwesterly direction towards Nisch and a
weaker group from the direction of Kstendil and south from the west
towards Skoplje. In addition, all forces which are still available in
Bulgaria and Rumania are to be moved in; only one division and
sufficient air defences must remain to protect the oil region in Rumania.
The Bulgarians will secure the Bulgarian Turkish border; a German
Panzer division is to be held in readiness behind them.
For the attack on Greece and the assaults towards Skoplje and
Belgrade the Twelfth Army (Generalfeldmarschall List) had six Corps
Headquarters with three panzer divisions, two motorised divisions,
eight infantry divisions, three mountain divisions, the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND and the SS Leibstandarte at its
disposal. The powerful fast units sent toward Belgrade were concentrated in Panzergruppe 1 under Generaloberst Kleist. The
Second Army under Generaloberst Freiherr von Weichs, which was
moving up to Yugoslavia's northern border, consisted of a panzer
corps with two panzer divisions and a motorised division, as well as
six infantry divisions and a mountain division under three Corps
Headquarters.
As early as 30 March 1941 the Army High Command had fixed
the date of the attack on Greece as 5 April 1941 based on its
calculations. However, for Germany this date brought a certain
weakening of its position and the confirmation of the growing
mistrust between itself and the Soviet Union when the latter country
signed a non-aggression and friendship treaty with Yugoslavia. This
in spite of the fact that militarily the pact was of little use to either
nation. For the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, which
was still located in and around Belfort, France, the preparations for
the employment of German troops in a new theatre brought orders
to entrain for transport to the southeast.

155

Chapter Fourteen
Entry into Yugoslavia But no Fighting!
5. 4. 10. 4. 41

Transfer from France to Yugoslavia. Balkan

Campaign Breakthrough south of Temesvar
and pursuit to Belgrade.
11. 4. 12. 4. 41 Fighting for Werschetz border fortifications and
pursuit as far as the Danube.
13. 4. 41
Occupation of Belgrade
14. 4. 15. 5. 41 Securing of former Yugoslavian territory.
19. 5. 41
Arrival in Troppau-Bielitz.
15.6. 2 1 . 6 . 4 1 Departure and preparations for the Eastern Campaign.

From the Wehrmacht communiqu of 6 April 1941:

"In the face of the northwards advance of British landing troops from
Greece and the developing union with the mobilising Yugoslavian
Army, units of the German Army early today have launched a
counterattack. The Greek and Serbian borders were crossed at several
places. . ."
While the loudspeakers in Germany were still broadcasting this
special report, elements of the reinforced Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND were rolling out of their billeting areas in Belfort,
France. Travelling through Mlhausen, Landau, Bruchsal, Heilbronn
and Nuremberg they reached Vienna East. There the bulk of the
regiment was disembarked while the tracked elements continued
their rail journey as far as Hungary. The units which had disembarked
in Vienna were to continue their journey in the direction of Hungary
by motor vehicle. The units of I Battalion under Major Gehrke
disembarked at about 16.30, and were amazed to find the city
brightly lit despite the war. The journey continued towards Hungary
over good roads but in the face of snow, rain and strong winds.
Speed was the order of the day and the Hungarian border was
crossed at dawn. In Hungary the vehicles had to drive on the left side
of the road, something new for the drivers. The German soldiers
found their brothers-in-arms very reserved; Hungarian military police
with rifles had been positioned every hundred metres to prevent the
vehicles from straying into the interior of the country. The population, on the other hand, were in a mood of happy excitement. They

156

waved cloths and passed out wine and cigarettes, happy to see
German soldiers.
The march route led through Deutsch-Haslau, Raab and Tokod to
Budapest, which the units passed through in the afternoon hours of
8 April 1941. Following a brief rest the vehicles were again rolling,
now over poor roads, towards the southeast. They drove through
the Hungarian towns of Kecskemet and Szegedin to Mako where
they crossed the Romanian border. The troops were quartered in
German-inhabited villages, where the citizens welcomed them enthusiastically. In the past years they had suffered a great deal because
of the fact that they were of German origin.
Haste was necessary. The German Twelfth Army was already on
the attack to the south and west and it was vital for the regiment to
link up with it as quickly as possible. The 10th of April finally brought
clear operational orders. In addition to the la Order, which the
regiment passed on to its battalions during the day, the order for the
rear services provided details of the difficult task of providing supplies
to the fighting units:
I.R. GD
lb

10. 4. 41.
20.30

Order for the Rear Services

1. The regiment has been ordered to cross the Yugoslavian border
early on 11. 4.
2. The regiment will be under the command of XXXXI Army Corps
and will fight among the units of the Twelfth Army.
The medical officer attached to the Chief of Supply Services will
assume responsibility for provision of medical services to the
combat and supply trains.
Signal communications are temporarily not available.
3. The supply trains shall carry at least seven days rations per person
for the authorised strength of their battalions. Extra supplies
needed to comply are to be picked up from Army Supply Dump
Temeschburg after prior arrangement.
4. The munitions columns are to move out immediately and stand
ready to issue in Deta from 12.00 on 11. 4.
Issued munitions are to be replaced immediately from the Army
Supply Dump Temeschburg.
Issue of fuel is to be guaranteed from 07.00 on 11. 4. in Deta.
Replacement from fuel dump at Army Supply Dump
Temeschburg. All available cargo space is to be used for fuel.
Interim issue to each unit of up to one-and-a-half times its
consumption per 100 metres as supply allows.

157

5.
6.

Workshop Company is to move to Deta during course of 11. 4.

Supply and combat trains to Vorteg or Deta as accommodations
permit.
Chief of Supply Services and supply columns remain in assigned
operational or quarters locations.
Ib Section in Moravita in the interim. Two messengers and a liaison
officer with vehicles are to be detached.
signed Gericke
Hptm. and Ib

The order foresaw the regiment assembling in the Moravita area

of Rumania, followed by a break through the fortified positions on
the other side of the border. The regiment would then storm through
Werschetz in the direction of Belgrade. The attack was to begin at
09.00 on 11 April with the SS-Division Das Reich on the right and
the familiar 10th Panzer Division on the left.
The regiment passed through Arad and Temesvr (Temeschburg),
advancing towards the Romanian-Yugoslavian border as quickly as
possible over muddy roads with no consideration given to men or
machines.
The specified assembly area was reached early on 11 April. The
supporting tanks under the command of Major Graf Strachwitz
arrived; the heavy weapons of the artillery (400th Art.Btl.) and the
heavy infantry guns went into position. The vehicles were driven back
to the dispersal areas. The men stood around in cover, nibbling on
the white bread which the locals had given them or calmly smoking
cigarettes. They did not have the impression that there would be any
serious fighting.
The heavy weapons opened fire abruptly at 09.05. At the same
time the grenadiers set out with the tanks and their own assault guns.
The border was crossed at 10.30, after the tanks first drove over the
Yugoslavian border huts. Labouring through the clinging, coal-black
earth, the men dragged themselves towards the Serbian defensive
lines. The attackers came across small earth bunkers, slit trenches
and even an anti-tank ditch. The positions were weakly manned and
only a few older men with shaven heads came out to meet the
attackers, the last of the Serbian troops which had withdrawn the
day before. There had been no firing so far, except for the German
heavy weapons which were firing more for moral effect than against
an actual target.
The individual companies soon assembled on the road to continue
the advance towards Werschetz. The grenadiers moved quickly
towards the small, German-inhabited town where they were greeted
by a band. The townspeople, who had suffered at the hands of the
withdrawing Serbs, threw their arms about the necks of the German
soldiers and handed them bread and wine, not wanting them to move
158

on. The troops rested at the far side of the town, waiting for their
vehicles. This was too boring for the regiment's commander, however, and he ordered the advance to resume. The tanks which had
arrived in the meantime picked up 2nd Company and the pursuit
went on in the direction of the Danube and Belgrade.
In the villages along the way the mayors and the local population
stood waiting to greet the liberators in their own fashion. Quite often
it turned out that whole units of Serbian troops were still hiding in
the villages, waiting to allow the leading German elements to pass.
They were soon discovered, however, and unhesitatingly laid down
their weapons. The march went on until evening when the leading
company the 2nd under Obit. Rssert marched into another
purely German village. The soldiers had earned a rest; the march
through the clinging mud had been exhausting. The prosperity of
these German villages was astounding, each surpassing the last in
its hospitality. The German soldiers felt quite at home.
Meanwhile, the motorcycles, assault guns and armoured cars of
the 17th (Reconnaissance) Company moved on, hoping to take the
bridges over the Danube near Pancevo in a coup de main. Crossing
blown road and foot bridges, which proved little hindrance to the
motorcycles, soldiers of the company reached the Danube where
they stopped before the new bridge, which had been blown the day
before. What were they to do now? Messengers were sent back and
the company waited for the Pioniers. In the meantime a search was
organised for boats or ferries. The remaining elements of the
regiment arrived on the afternoon of 12 April and began preparations to cross the Danube. Obit. Rssert, commander of 2nd
Company, reported:
"Early in the afternoon we reached Pancevo, the last stop before
Belgrade. But there we were held up by a blown bridge over the
Tamis (also Temes) which we were unable to repair as the train was
still too far behind. It was then that the fantastic plan was born to
man the small steamers which were tied up along the river bank and
sail upstream to Belgrade. There was much enthusiasm for this
scheme and we immediately set about making the ships ready for
action. A wall of sandbags was erected on the deck, behind which
machine guns were set up. The belly of the ships were filled with
landlubbers, as we termed the infantry, who were quite looking
forward to the trip. We found some stokers and soon the stacks of
our improvised fleet were smoking merrily.
Perhaps it was just as well that the regiment ordered us to call off
our marine operation. The enemy situation on the Danube and in
Belgrade was completely unknown and one anti-tank gun would have
been sufficient to sink one proud ship after the other.

159

The German quarter in Pancevo was nothing to be sneezed at, so

we took up quarters there. The march to Belgrade was to be resumed
the following day.
We had not all crawled beneath our covers when I Battalion was
placed on alert. On Good Friday a patrol from the SS-Division Das
Reich had succeeded in crossing the blown railroad bridge over the
Danube and had entered Belgrade! The few men were now surrounded and hard pressed in the German embassy. I Battalion was
awakened and sent to help the surrounded men. The companies
were taken across the Tamis in a few inflatable boats that had been
brought up in the meantime and on makeshift rafts, with 2nd
Company leading the way.
Between the Tamis and the Danube ran a road on an embankment;
the terrain on both sides was flooded. The moon shone down on the
gurgling desert of water from which projected the ruins of farm
houses and the tops of trees. Ghostly, violet lights from the last flames
of burning farms flickered across the water. The horizon in front of
us was lit by the sea of flames that was Belgrade, as the city had been
bombed heavily by Stukas the day before.
On motorcycles, horses, donkeys and anything else they could lay
their hands on, the men of 2nd Company hastened towards the
Danube. The railroad bridge was reached at 03.00. On the other
side of the river, which flowed silver in the moonlight past the
collapsed sections of the bridge, lay the city of Prince Eugen, now
submerged in a sea of flames.
An SS man, a member of Obersturmfhrer Klingenberg's motorcycle patrol, was waiting for us. He described his patrol's daring dash
through the city which was still teeming with the enemy. The rest of
the patrol was now sitting in the German embassy waiting for us to
come to the rescue.
But how were we to get across the Danube? The same way as the
SS before us? That wouldn't work; in the meantime the Serbians
had blown the railroad bridge completely. But then all was saved. A
Serbian assault boat suddenly set out from the far shore and
approached the spot where we stood deliberating. In the boat itself
stood an ethnic German in Serbian uniform, shouting loudly and
waving. He had been waiting for the purpose of showing us the way
to Belgrade.
The information he gave us about the enemy situation was
extremely valuable. Together with Lt. Baumann, leader of I
Battalion's Pionier Platoon, and three trusted men, I made the first
trip across. The minutes of the crossing were unforgettable it was
Easter Morning.
There was no movement on the enemy side; in the distance shots
and explosions came from the city. We secured a small area on the
far bank. Then a convertible roared out of the city towards us. A
160

civilian in a dust coat was standing in the car waving a submachine

gun. The German ambassador in Yugoslavia jumped out and hugged
us joyfully. He looked somewhat the worse for wear; he had only
just managed to escape a stoning at the hands of the mob in the
streets."
The ambassador led the elements of I Battalion into the city where
they first occupied the quarter containing the Parliament buildings.
It was about 06.00 Easter Sunday 1941 (14. 4. 1941). The radio
station of I Battalion's signals section was the first to make contact
with the elements of the regiment still on the other side of the river.
Its first message was: "Belgrade has fallen!"
The order of the day to the regiment released by its commander
indicated that the fighting was over:
With the reaching of the Danube northeast of the Yugoslavian capital
of Belgrade, the reinforced Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND (I.R. GD) (Arko. 30, 151st hvy.Art.BtI., 851st hvy.Art.Btl., a
lgt.Art.Btl. of the SS Art.Rgt., 50th PI.Btl., I Btl./2nd Pz.Rgt.) has
fulfilled its task.
The Commanding General of the XXXXI Army Corps has expressed
to me his thanks and full recognition for the march performances which
you achieved under the most difficult conditions.
I pass along this recognition with the additional comment that the
accomplishments which the reinforced Regiment has achieved in the
past days were only possible through the smooth cooperation of
leaders of all ranks and through the firm will of all to fulfil the assignment
set them as quickly as possible, right down to the youngest soldier.
While I Battalion was taking the first security measures in the city,
II Battalion followed across the Danube in the steamer "Fruscagora"
and also moved into Belgrade. Almost everyone was employed on
guard duties. The others buried the civilians killed by Stukas in proper
graves; initially the bodies had been simply thrown into bomb craters.
In addition, water and electricity were restored, the police put back
to work and prisoners rounded up. This was often an unpleasant
task, especially as individual snipers were still hiding in rooftops,
ready to throw down hand grenades. There was also still some firing
which created further confusion. Draconian measures were occasionally required to halt looting by the civilian population.
In the meantime, the 18th (Pionier) Company had organised a
regular flow of ferry traffic across the Tamis and the 1,200 metre
wide Danube using motorboats and civilian ferries. Supplies were
sent across as well as horses, trucks, cars and prisoners of war. Ill,
IV and V Battalions remained in Pancevo, sending out patrols to
secure the local area. Individual companies were distributed among
the local villages; 15th Company was sent to Welika Kikinda,
elements of 17th Company to Weikirchen and so on. They con161

tinued to provide security against the appearance of partisans, who

frequently undertook to ambush lone motorcyclists, ethnic Germans
and civilians. This resulted in some killed and wounded. In Pancevo
itself, where the main body of the regiment was stationed, there was
no peace. The local commander, Obstlt. Bandelow, had his hands
full. There were reports that in Pancevo, which contained about
35,000 people, almost two people daily, usually ethnic Germans,
were disappearing or being killed through unexplained causes by
the partisans. It was not for some time, principally until the prisoners
of war received decent treatment, that peace was restored to the city.
The war in Yugoslavia ended at 12.00 on 18 April 1941 following
the surrender of the Serbian Army the day before. Life slowly
returned to normal. Conditions between the soldiers and the population improved daily and the men soon felt comfortable in their new
quarters. The following description was provided by Lt. Bartram of
the 17th (Recon.) Company:
"I was transferred with my motorcycle platoon to Weikirchen. It
was a small, purely German winemaking town with an unusually high
standard of living for the area and a cleanliness, gaiety and German
consciousness that amazed us.
Immediately on our arrival I, as platoon leader, reported to the
town's Burgermeister. In no time I was surrounded by the local
residents. The same thing happened to my men. The assignment of
quarters was something else. Every resident wanted to have a
German soldier, but I had only a platoon of 35 men. We finally came
to an agreement: each soldier had to change quarters every eight
days so that everyone had the opportunity to have a soldier stay in
his house.
The people there ate unbelievably well and often. As a consequence the consumption of wine was enormous. The wine was of
outstanding quality and was drunk like water. Word of our high life
naturally got around to the other units and soon the entire 17th
Company was transferred there."
The securing of Yugoslavian territory soon became a routine affair.
It was practically a period of rest for the troops, who used the time
to regain their strength and for training. It also had a psychological
purpose, however, because over the course of time the conduct of
the German soldiers, their behaviour and presence, brought about a
change in attitude on the part of the Serbian population in favour of
the Germans.
The senior command authorities also did everything in their power
to bring about this change of attitude. One means was the Belgrade
radio station, which very soon attained a fame quite beyond all
expectations. Radio was one of the best advertising and propaganda
mediums as it reached into the remotest corners of the land and
beyond the country's borders with words and music. Recognition of
162

this fact had led to the formation by the Wehrmacht of special

propaganda units. It was part of one such unit which put the radio
station back into operation only hours after the fall of Belgrade.
The Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, probably at the
inspiration of its music-loving men, also payed particular attention
to this medium as a way of transmitting news and music. Obit.
"Maxe" Fabich, commander of 3rd Company which was part of I
Battalion in Belgrade, received orders to breathe life back into the
Belgrade transmitter. There he met five PK men who were absorbed
in the technical aspects of getting the transmitter back on the air.
Maxe Fabich, who was known throughout the regiment as the
musical Oberleutnant, and who immediately set about playing any
piano he came across, was very enthusiastic about the project. The
first broadcast to the soldiers, which was put together by Obit. Fabich
and broadcast under his direction, rang out from loudspeakers all
across the land on the same day that Adolf Hitler made his great
speech before the German Reichstag in Berlin. The date was 19
April 1941.
Hosted by PK man Erich Kistenmacher and under the technical
direction of Dr. Lippert, who for his part was an alderman in the city
of Berlin, the program soon became more varied. It came to include
singing by soldiers choirs from the 2nd and 3rd Companies, the
band, led by Stabsmusikmeister Ahlers, playing airs and marches, as
well as poetry hours and tributes to the fallen. Light music provided
a change from the serious music played on two grand pianos,
including "Peterle", which was well-loved by many soldiers. The light
orchestra put together for this purpose came to be held in high
esteem, as confirmed by the many letters which were received from
various units of the Wehrmacht. C o m m o n soldiers, who had previously not had the opportunity to display their talents, also came to
play a role in the broadcasts. Gefreiter J u p p Piotrowski, in military
life in charge of refuelling I Battalion's vehicles, and Gefreiter Paul
Sassen made their debut as tenors on the program "Soldiers Sing
for Soldiers". Eventually it became necessary to establish a daily
broadcast schedule. An example follows:
Schedule:
10.00

14.00
14.15 15.00
15.10 16.00
16.00

Opening message
German News Service followed by the news in
the Serbian language.
German News
Soldier-Comrade, fall into step, Comrade Songs
for soldiers, old and new
"This and That Something for Everyone"
Report of the Wehrmacht High Command,
repeated slowly, followed by the news in the
Serbian language.
163

18.00 - 18.30
18.30 - 19.40
19.45 20.00
20.00
20.15 22.00
22.00

"Volksdeutsche Hour"
"Olle Kamellen"
Political news and radio show from the German
Broadcasting Service.
German News, followed by the report from the
Wehrmacht High Command in Serbian.
"Learn to Laugh instead of Complaining"
German News.

Among the small number of records which the PK men brought

with them to Belgrade was one which was destined to become
famous: "Lilli Marleen", sung by the Swedish singer Lale Andersen.
When they selected this record, Kistenmacher and Maxe Fabich had
no idea how popular it would become. The song, which was played
regularly in the broadcasts, struck a note with the men and soon
became the love-song of the common soldier. The Belgrade station
regularly ended its broadcast with the melancholy tune, sung by Lale
Andersen in her deep voice, and it was awaited daily by tens of
thousands of soldiers. "Lilli Marleen" is the one song which no
member of the German Wehrmacht will ever forget. The men of
the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment of 1941 were there for the
birth of the song which every soldier took to his heart and which
became well known to the troops, including those on the Allied side,
as did no other song of the Second World War.

Lilli Marleen
Words which travelled around the world. . .
Music: Norbert Schulze
Text: Hans Leip
Vor der Kaserne,
vor dem groen Tor,
stand eine Laterne,
und steht sie noch davor,
so woll'n wir uns da wiedersehn,
bei der Laterne woll'n wir stehn,
wie einst, Lilli Marleen.
Unsre beiden Schatten
sahn wie einer aus,
Da wir so Lieb uns hatten,
164

das sah man gleich daraus,

und alle leute soli's es sehn,
wenn wir bei der Laterne stehn
wie einst, Lilli Marleen.
Schon rief der Posten,
sie blasen Zapfenstreich,
es kann drei Tage kosten,
Kamerad, ich komme ja gleich.
Da sagten wir auf Wiedersehn
wie gerne wollt ich mit dir gehn,
mit dir, Lilli Marleen.

Occupation duties went on for the troops in Yugoslavia, but were

not restricted only to specific localities. While the 14th and 15th
Companies were quartered in Welika Kikinda, the 18th Company
was transferred to Werschetz to provide security services in the area,
but also to carry out patrols and bridge building. The company's 3rd
Platoon built the Uffz. Rckheim Bridge between Werschetz and
Kovac and then the Obstlt. Garski Bridge, which was sixty-two
metres long with a load carrying capacity of four tonnes. These, too,
were tasks for the unit, especially since they met a military need as
well as the wishes of the local Brgermeisters.
The regiment's duty as an occupation unit came to an end in mid
May 1941; new tasks awaited the battle-tested unit. Also, other units
had arrived in the country in the meantime and were setting up for
a longer stay. The regiment's heavy units, such as the 15th (Heavy
Infantry Gun) Company and the 18th (Pionier) Company, drove to
the designated entraining stations of Indija and Mitrovica, where
loading began. On 17 May the transport trains rolled through Ruma,
Mitrovica, Budapest and Bratislava (Preburg) through Slovakia to
Upper Silesia. The individual battalions moved into the Troppau
Freudenstadt area and established themselves there. Here, too,
duties soon took up most of the day. There was no leave; however,
dependents were permitted brief visits to the unit. This period passed
uneventfully.
The regiment had marched into the large eastern concentration
area; numerous small signs as well as the political situation suggested
that its stay in East Silesia would be a temporary one. The departure
of a regimental advance party under the command of Lt. Forstbauer
on 6 June 1941 caused little excitement. Only the senior ranking
officers of the regiment knew more, because they had laid down the
advance party's route which covered about 500 kilometres: Bendzin
(near Kattowitz)TschenstochauRadomsko- RadomDeblin
Maciejowice (north of Koziewice). The destination was therefore the
eastern part of Poland near the Russian border. They knew no more
than that.
165

Rastenburg and the Wolfsschanze Installation.

The regimental departure order was finally issued on the evening

of 14 June 1941, directing the unit into the area east of Warsaw.
This order marked the beginning of the time when, following the
greatest victories in the history of German arms, the Wehrmacht
was to suffer its worst defeat. No German soldier suspected the
treason of which more will be spoken later which was flashing
through the aether, caused by Germans, sent by traitors:
Lucie through Dora (Rado) to Director (Moscow Central):
"Dora to Director through Taylor:
Russian attack definitively fixed by Hitler for 22 June!"
At the beginning of 1941 the main body of the Fhrer BegleitBataillon, which had arisen from the I.R. GD and was therefore
closely tied to it, was stationed in Dberitz, near Berlin. As long as
there were no combat operations taking place the Fhrer Headquarters were located in Berlin and the units escort duties were
restricted to the local area around the capital. This period was used
to rest, train and organise. On 1 January 1941 the battalion's
composition was as follows:
Headquarters Company
1st (Guard) Company
CO:
2nd (Fast) Company
CO:
3rd (Heavy) Company CO:
in addition, a column with camp

Hptm. Gruss
Hptm. Frhr. von Blomberg
Hptm. Nehring
equipment (tents, etc.)

At that time the unit's commanding officer, who was under the
command of the Fhrer Headquarters, was Obstlt. Thomas.
While the 1st (Guard) Company was roughly comparable to a rifle
company, with a machine gun platoon as its only heavy weapons,
the 2nd (Fast) Company was more similar to a small reconnaissance
battalion. It had BMW motorcycles, both solo machines and sidecar
combinations of the heaviest class at that time, as well as armoured
cars, which were under the command of Lt. Guderian, son of
Generaloberst Guderian. The 3rd (Heavy) Company possessed
anti-aircraft guns, 5-cm. anti-tank guns and infantry guns.
In the course of time the men of the battalion achieved a special
status. As a result of the ongoing exchange of personnel those
leaving the battalion were able to select the unit in which they wished
to continue their service. This was one of the peculiarities of the
battalion: other than a certain core of personnel, part of the unit was
always detached for service at the front, while those men were
replaced by combat-experienced soldiers. This exchange of personnel was deemed necessary due to the monotony of the duty and,

167

moreover, the FHQu. attached great importance to including distinguished combat soldiers in its ranks.
In order to visibly acknowledge the special nature of the unit, on
15 January 1941 it was decreed that its members would wear a
further cuff title in addition to the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
issue. To be worn on the lower left sleeve, the cuff band bore the
title Fhrerhauptquartier. Wearing of the new title was only permitted away from the Headquarters, especially while on leave, in
order to prevent giving away the location of the command centre.
Arriving in the period January-March 1941 as part of the unit's
expansion to a reinforced battalion was the "Hermann Goring Mixed
Flak Battery" under Hauptmann Gasda. The battery was to provide
the battalion's anti-aircraft defence on all of its operations. It was
equipped with one platoon each of heavy, medium and light antiaircraft guns. Formed in Dberitz in March/April 1941 as the future
basis for the 4th Company of the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon was a
"reinforced Panzer Platoon." Equipped with Skoda (Czech) tanks,
the platoon was under the command of Obit. Peiper. Also appearing
but not under the command of the Escort Battalion was a Fhrer
Aircraft Squadron, which was to be employed mainly on courier
missions and which included the Fhrer's own aircraft. A Fhrer
Signals Company was also formed, whose primary function was to
prepare signals communications while away from the FHQu. The
men of this company later manned the telephone exchanges within
the various command installations, ensuring trouble-free communications.
On 9 April 1941 the main body of the Fhrer-Begleit Bataillon
occupied and secured the Frhlinssturm (Spring Storm) installation
near Mnichkirchen, Steiermark. Although designated as headquarters during the Yugoslavian campaign the installation saw little
use. Used instead were Hitler's special train Amerika and the train
of the Wehrmacht High Command which were parked at the
Aspang Tunnel. Two locomotives were always kept under steam; in
case of air attack they were to pull the two trains to safety within the
tunnel.
The headquarters was set up at the Aspang Tunnel which was in
a deep valley surrounded on all sides by wooded mountains. Crews
working day and night had built a special platform along the tracks.
The railway line appeared to be a branch line over which few trains
travelled. Now it was idle and on it sat the two trains. They didn't
look much different than the familiar express trains, consisting of
about eight cars. One car featured a conference room, another was
a sleeping-car, another contained showers and bathing facilities, one
a kitchen, and another telephone and radio installations. In this train
lived and worked the command central, while the neighbouring train
which was similarly equipped housed the O K W .
168

Adolf Hitler's birthday, as well as the day chosen to celebrate the

victory in the southeast, 20 April 1941 gave cause for a parade by
the Begleit-Batailon on the platform in the presence of Goring,
Himmler and other party notables. A few days later the headquarters
and the Begleit-Batailon returned to Berlin and Dberitz respectively. Following the necessary servicing of vehicles and a brief period
of rest, the men of the battalion soon resumed their normal duties.
The battalion now began preparations for its next assignment, the
setting-up and securing of the new headquarters in East Prussia. For
this purpose a special detachment from the headquarters of the
Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon had been active for some months in the
forests east of Rastenburg together with units of the Todt Organisation laying down a permanent headquarters. The installation received
the name Wolfsschanze.
During the night of 19/20 June the vehicles of the now reinforced
Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon left the unit's quarters in Dberitz and
rolled eastward. Meanwhile, the newly-formed 4th (Panzer) Company under the command of Hauptmann Rohrbeck was being loaded
aboard transport trains for its journey to the east. New tasks awaited
the men of the Fhrer-Begleit Bataillon, tasks which would result
in them never coming back to Berlin again as a complete unit.
Every combat operation costs casualties which need to be replaced
if a unit is to retain its effectiveness. Based in Neuruppin, the
Replacement Battalion Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND provided trained replacements for the Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND as well as the Fhrer-Begleit Bataillon.
At the turn of the year the needs of the latter unit demanded
specially-picked men with the best training. The special conditions
contained in the HV-Blatt of 11 February 1941 under the title O K H
(Ch.H.Rst.u.B.d.E) az.-l2b - A H A / A g / E (Id) No. 9 3 2 6 / 4 0
demonstrated the increased level of interest in the unit. At the end
of January 1941 the battalion, under its commander Major Tode,
carried out a battalion exercise in the presence of the press, revealing
to the public for the first time the rigours of training with the
replacement battalion.
When, on 16 April 1941, recruits once again moved into the See
and Friedrich-Franz Barracks in Neuruppin, they found everything
well-prepared. They came from all parts of Germany, representing
every district. Just as the Wachregiment Berlin had brought
together men from every German district years before, so now men
and youths arrived in Neuruppin of every class, dialect and education.
It was the task of the instructors of the Replacement Battalion to
mould them into a fighting team in preparation for what lay ahead.
At that time the 1st Training Company's establishment was as
follows:

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Obit. Lucke
Lt. Blumenthal
Lt. Letz

Company Commander
Training Officer
1st Platoon
2nd Platoon
3rd Platoon
4th Platoon
Senior NCO

Hauptfeldwebel Tenter

Composition of the 4th Section of 1st Company was as follows:

Section Leader
Deputy Section Leader

Uffz. Tner
Gefr. Kanthack, then Obgefr.
Claus

The Pionier Platoon was then under the command of Lt. Jacquot,
while the Signals Platoon was under Lt. Kosella. Everyone, however
including the many not named here gave their best. The success
of the I.R. GD rested mainly on this training, which was constantly
improved and refined based on the lessons of experience. The means
available to the instructors were initially limited and most had to be
improvised. It was thanks to the awareness of the units on the outside
that there would be no success without well-trained replacements
that experienced people were sent back to pass on what they had
learned.
The unit commands of the replacement unit and the regiment in
the field had to wage a constant battle against a certain laziness in
the administration of this vital exchange. During every pause in
action, therefore, the Regimental Adjutant came back to meet with
the commander of the training unit to establish requirements. In the
years to come this practice proved extremely beneficial to the units
involved.

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Part III
THE WAR IN THE EAST

Chapter One
The Soviet Union as a Power and Opponent of the
German Wehrmacht
When, some years after the events of 1941, one examines the
situation and position of the German Wehrmacht before the attack
in the East it is apparent that three factors were underestimated by
Hitler not the General Staff: the endless expanse of the Russian
land, the military strength of the enemy and the potential weakness
of the German Wehrmacht. In addition, there were the differences
of opinion between Hitler and the Army High Command over the
actual plan of operations which could not be resolved by the outbreak
of war.
The Soviet Union has an east-west length of more than 8,000
kilometres and a maximum width of approximately 4,000
kilometres, making it the largest political state in the world. The
USSR accounts for one-seventh of the earth's land mass, including
in its scope eastern Europe, all of northern Asia, the island groups
of the Arctic Ocean, the western part of Asia and the Caucasus,
which pushes deep into the Middle East. Despite a shoreline of
40,000 kilometres, most of which was accounted for by the arctic
and far eastern coasts, the Soviet Union was virtually a landlocked
nation with only a few ice-free seas: the Baltic, where, excluding the
Baltic States, Russia's share of the coastline was barely 150
kilometres, the Black Sea and the harbours of Murmansk on the
Arctic Ocean and Vladivostok in the Far East.
Containing more than 180 different ethnic groups, at that time this
tremendous land mass was not united geographically, culturally or
racially. There were also great differences in the density of population
among the various regions: the thickly- settled lands of the Ukraine,
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the central black-earth regions, the industrial areas of Moscow,

Leningrad, the Don Basin, the central Urals and the Transcaucasus,
as well as oasis-rich Central Turkestan, stood in sharp contrast to
the almost uninhabited regions of all of Northern Siberia and the Far
East. The country was therefore essentially only sparsely settled, a
land with hot summers and severe winters which, through its
seclusion from world trade and from the active cultural life of central
and western Europe, led an existence marked by its own unique
mentality. The population exhibited an all-suffering, passive character, which was so very difficult for western Europeans to comprehend.
In 1939 the total population of the USSR stood at 170,467,000
people and the strength of the Red Army was at least ten to twelve
million men. At the beginning of 1941 the Germans quite correctly
estimated the strength of the standing Red Army at about 150
infantry divisions, 36 motorized brigades and 32 cavalry divisions,
of which about 35 divisions were considered tied down on other
borders, especially in the Far East. The German command reckoned
on encountering approximately 125 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry
divisions and about 30 mechanized brigades, including some 5 tank
divisions, at the outbreak of war. This was in no way, however, the
total resources of manpower available to the Soviet Union. Indeed,
further divisions could be raised quickly from the yearly intake of 1.5
million conscripts. To what extent Soviet industry would be in a
position to arm these masses of men remained at first an open
question. The neutralizing of the Soviet arms industry would therefore have to be one of the main concerns of the German war leaders.
It was also known on the German side that the existing Russian
divisions were equipped with sufficient numbers of modern weapons
and that each division contained an organic tank battalion. It was
accepted that the numbers of Russian tanks were far greater than
the German, even if the Russians were not yet familiar with the
organization of larger and, for operational tasks, faster armoured
formations.
There were no doubts about the toughness and absence of wants
of the Russian soldier, but it was believed on the German side that
these advantages could be overcome by their higher level of technology, moral superiority and, above all, their combat experience.
Facing the Russians at the outbreak of war were 140 fully combatready formations. Assembled in the marshalling areas were 81
infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 17 Panzer divisions, 15
motorized divisions and 9 police and security divisions. The army
reserve consisted of 22 infantry divisions, 2 Panzer divisions, 2
motorized divisions and 1 police division. On 22 June 1941, the
Luftwaffe possessed approximately 1,300 operational and combatready aircraft in 3 air fleets.
172

Although some idea of the proportions of the opposing forces can

be reached by comparing these figures, the manpower potential of
both nations must also be included in the calculation. While the
German Reich had to keep units on various fronts as standing
reserves whose withdrawal would have serious consequences for the
conduct of the war, the German manpower reservoir had its limits.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, could draw on its immense
reserves of manpower and form large numbers of new units quickly,
without the concern of being tied down on other fronts.
Taking these facts into consideration, the German leadership had
to once again depend on offsetting these weaknesses with the
Blitzkrieg. In an air of optimism which could only be explained by
the atmosphere of victory following the triumphs over Poland,
Norway, France and Yugoslavia, the Supreme Command again
allocated a passive role to the enemy such as they had become used
to in both previous campaigns. This was reflected in Directive No.
21 of 18 December 1941, which established the basis for the
strategic build-up in the east as well as the initial operations of the
campaign. The directive stated that the Wehrmacht must be
prepared to destroy the Soviet Union in a quick campaign. The
operation's target was the main body of the Russian Army which
was situated in western Russia. These forces were to be destroyed
in bold operations employing deep thrusts by Panzer forces. The
withdrawal of combat-capable forces into the Russian hinterland was
to be prevented. Then, in a rapid pursuit, a line was to be won which
would prevent the Russian Air Force from launching attacks on Reich
territory. The ultimate objective of the operation was the shielding
of the newly-won territory against Asiatic Russia from a line extending roughly from the Volga to Archangelsk.
In order to achieve the objectives set for it, the army's main thrust
was to be north of the Pripet Marshes. Two army groups were
created for this purpose. Located in the centre of the entire front,
the southernmost of these two army groups (Army Group Centre)
was given the task of advancing out of the area east and north of
Warsaw with especially powerful armoured and motorized forces and
smashing the Soviet armies in White Russia. Conditions were to be
created which would allow powerful elements of the fast units to veer
northwards. Then, together with the army group which was attacking
from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, they would
destroy the enemy forces fighting in the Baltic countries. Not until
these vital objectives which must be followed by the occupation
of Leningrad and Kronstadt had been secured, could the attack
on the important transportation and armaments centre of Moscow
be carried out. Only a surprisingly quick collapse of Russian resistance could justify a simultaneous effort on both objectives.

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This OKH's assessment, that the smashing of the Red Army was
a pre-condition for the winning of large areas of territory and the
occupation of the raw materials district, was contrary to Hitler's.
Hitler sought a military decision on both wings, while the O K H was
aiming at the central front.
The focal point of the attack by a further army group committed
south of the Pripet Marshes was to be the Lublin area in the general
direction of Kiev. Its powerful armoured forces were to advance
quickly into the deep flank and rear of the Russian forces and roll
them back to the Dniepr.
Hitler agreed to the distribution of forces suggested by the OKH,
which would see the main body of the army committed in two army
groups in the area north of the Pripet marshes and only one in the
south. However, the tug-of-war over the operational objectives to
follow lasted throughout the campaign and overshadowed planning
on the German side.
The Russian war council issued a state of alert for all units on the
Western Front on 10 April 1941, and further urgent measures and
preparations for war were taken "to protect the western frontier" on
1 May 1941. It can be said that the Soviet Union as much as was
within its power was prepared for an armed conflict with Germany.
Whether attack preparations were included at this time can not be
stated with certainty. Nevertheless, in his speech in Nuremburg in
1941, Gen.-Oberst Haider described the Russian build-up as typical
of one prior to an attack.
That the Soviets, in the course of their plans for world domination,
would sooner or later attempt to conquer Western Europe, has not
only been proved by present day events, but is, when all is said and
done, an element of their doctrine.

Chapter Two
The Reinforced Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND in the Attack in the East
15. 6.21. 6. 41

Departure and assembly for the eastern

campaign.

The double battle of Bialystock and Minsk.

22. 6.24. 6. 41 Penetration of the frontier positions.
24. 6 2. 7. 41 Battle of Bialystock-Slonim.
2. 7. 5. 7. 41 Advance towards and through Swislotsch and
Beresina.
5. 7 - 9. 7. 41 Battle on the Dniepr.
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The battle near Smolensk.

9. 7.14. 7. 41 Breakthrough of the Dniepr position.
14. 7.20. 7. 41 Capture of Smolensk.
15. 7.17. 7.41 Battles in the Dniepr bridgehead.
18. 7.23. 7. 41 Break into the Desna position near Jelnja.
The defensive battle near Jelnja and Smolensk.
24. 7.26. 7.41 Defensive battles on the Chomare.
27. 7. 5. 8. 41 Defensive battles near Jelnja.
6. 8.22. 8.41 Defensive battles at the bend in the river Jelnja.
18. 8.30. 9. 41 Defensive battles on the Desna.
The battle for Kiev.
30. 8. 5. 9. 41
6. 9. 9. 9. 41

10. 9.25. 9.41

Pursuit as far as the Desna. Break into the

Desna position. Enemy forces encircled in the
area around Gomel.
Battles of pursuit in the fighting near Kiev.
Battle near Konotop, Romny and Lochwiza.
Closing of the Kiev pocket.
Battles for Putiwl.

The double battle near Vyazma and Bryansk.

26. 9 3. 10. 41 Battles east of Romny.
7. 10.10. 10.41 Preparations in the Roslavl area for the advance
on Moscow.
11. 10.-20. 10. 41 Battle near Bryansk.
The advance towards
20. 10.24. 10. 41
21. 10.-31. 10. 41
1. 11.-17. 11. 41
18. 11. 5. 12. 41

Moscow and Voronezh.

Battles in the area around Jefremov and Tula.
Advance on Tula.
Battle for Jefremov and Tula.
Battle for Tula and advance on Rjasan and
Kashira.

Army Group Centre (Feldmarschall von Bock), with 31 infantry

divisions, 7 motorized infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division and 9
Panzer divisions, was the strongest of the three German army
groups. The shape of the frontier, with a salient jutting out east of
Warsaw, created extremely favourable conditions for the disposition
of the German forces. Army Group Centre was to drive forward
powerful forces on its wings, rout the enemy forces in White Russia,
link up with fast units north and south of Minsk and with these take
Smolensk in good time. If this objective was achieved, powerful
elements of the fast units were to work together with Army Group
North to destroy the enemy forces fighting in the Baltic States and
the Leningrad area.
Facing Army Group Centre was a roughly equal group of forces
under Marshall Timoshenko, consisting of 36 infantry divisions, 8
cavalry divisions, 2 tank divisions and 9 motorized-mechanized
175

brigades. Two-thirds of these forces were forward in the frontier area

around Bialystok, while the other third was in the rear in the Minsk
area.
Taking advantage of the shape of the frontier, Army Group Centre
had formed two armies, each of which had been coupled with a
Panzergruppe for the break through the frontier positions. In the
area west and northwest of Brest-Litovsk the Fourth Army under
Feldmarschall von Kluge and Panzergruppe 2 under Generaloberst
Guderian stood ready to attack. Supported by the Fourth Army,
Panzergruppe 2 was to break through the enemy forces on both
sides of Brest-Litovsk and, in a rapid advance on Sluzk and Minsk
in cooperation with Panzergruppe 3, which was advancing on Minsk
from the northwest, was to create conditions for the destruction of
the enemy forces in the area between Bialystok and Minsk. When
this had been achieved, both Panzergruppen were to win the area
around Smolensk.
Meanwhile, the left wing of the Ninth Army under Gen.-Oberst
Strau, which was deployed on the left of the Fourth Army, and
Panzergruppe 3 under Generaloberst Hoth were to break through
the enemy positions in the direction of Grodno and then form the
northern prong of the pincer movement around the enemy forces
between Bialystok and Minsk. Later objectives were Vitebsk for
Panzergruppe 3 and Polozk, on the upper Duna, for the Ninth Army.
The reinforced Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, with
its twenty companies in five battalions, and the three batteries of the
400th Artillery Battalion were attached to Panzergruppe 2 for the
assault as part of the Fourth Army. As an external sign of its
affiliation, all of the regiment's vehicles carried a white " G " on their
right fender. The regiment was well- equipped and rested and at full
strength in personnel and vehicles. Despite the seriousness of the
coming operation the troops were in good spirits; commanders and
men alike were conscious of the coming tasks, and all were determined to do their duty.
The attack on Russia began on 22 June 1941; orders were issued
to begin the advance. The idle loafing about and waiting in forests
and camouflaged positions had come to an end: everything made
sense again, everyone knew the objective. Up front, from the
positions on the Bug (in the sector of Panzergruppe 2) in BrestLitovsk and north, the heavy weapons, the artillery and rocket
launchers (the latter a completely new weapon), raised their barrels
and opened fire on recognised and suspected targets on the far bank
and beyond. Visibility was good; the land on the far side of the Bug
lay flat and fallow; only a few clumps of trees obstructed the view
into the enemy hinterland.
The only forces from the regiment taking part in the opening act
of the campaign were the heavy weapons of IV Battalion and the
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batteries of the 400th Artillery Battalion. Their positions lay on the

Bug, roughly between Janow and Brest-Litovsk. From their observation posts they could observe well the crossing by the infantry in
assault boats. They could also see that enemy resistance was much
weaker than anticipated. This gave the men of the attacking units a
reassuring feeling of security. They were being supported by the guns
of the artillery and squadrons of Luftwaffe aircraft overhead, while
the infantry fire from individual nests of resistance on the far side
was worthy of little note. The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment
remained, albeit in a relaxed state of readiness, in its billets north of
the Vistula, southeast of Warsaw. As the attack on the Soviet Union
began at 03.05 on 22 June 1941, the regiment was far to the rear.
The only clues that the unit would soon be going into action were
the mounting commotion in the area, the traffic on the roads which
passed close by and the thundering motors of aircraft as they flew
overhead toward the east.
The troops were preparing to move out. All superfluous equipment
and baggage that might slow them in action was sorted out. The
band, under Obermusikmeister Ahlers, was chosen to watch over
the discarded junk which was piled in considerable heaps. Fuel and
extra rations were stowed in the spaces created. It is known that 6th
Company, under its commander Obit, von Courbire, took with it
fifteen to sixteen days worth of fuel (approx. 13,000 litres), as well
as four extra days rations. All this materiel demanded a lot of space,
and every available corner was cleared out in a rigorous fashion amid
much complaining.
The following extracts are from the special instructions for the
supply of X X X X V I Army Corps during the attack, issued on 18 June,
and they give some idea of the measures necessary to ensure that
adequate supplies reached the fighting units (18th Copy, Secret
Command Matter, Corps Quartermaster Section):

I . Basis o f S u p p l y :
(a) Panzergruppe 2 will be in charge of supply for the units under its
command with the beginning of the operation.
Requests for all supplies to go through XXXXVI Army Corps
which, after release of these supplies to supply districts or supply
support bases respectively, and after delivery into the corps
transport area, will allocate them to units under its command.
(b) Panzergruppe 2 is based on the installations of Supply District
Centre (Commander of the supply district in Warsaw)
Panzergruppe 2 is concerned with the following dumps in the
supply district:
1. Ammunition dumps "Marie": forest 12 km northeast of
Parczew, on the road from Parczew to Wisziec.
177

"Martha": forest 10 km northeast Biala Podlaska, on the road

from Biala Podlaska to Janow Podlaska.
"Margarete": 5 km northeast of Deblin.
2. Supply dumps "Veronika" and "Vineta": on the road from
Biala Podlaska to Brest-Litovsk.
3. Fuel dumps "Berta": forest 15 km east of Radzyn, on the road
from Radzyn to Wisnice.
"Brigitte": forest 3 km north Chotilow, on the north road from
Piszcac.
Control of traffic at the above dumps by Supply District
Centre.
II. Provision of S u p p l y :
(a) General:
Supply in large areas can only be ensured with the available
transport space if the divisional columns as well as the motorized
trains are employed outside the corps transport area to the limits
of their capacity. Therefore, supply from areas and dumps near
the frontier is to be carried out for as long as possible by the
divisional columns.
(b) Roads for Motorized Transport:
South Road = R 1 = Miedzyrzec, Biala Podlaska, military bridge
northwest of Brest-Litovsk (16 to), Kobryn, Bereza/Kartuska,
Iwacewicze, Sinjawka Sluzk, in direction of Bobruisk. (R 1)
North Road = R 2 = Siedlce, Losice, Kornica, Konstantinow,
Janow, Podlaski, military bridge near Kolodno, Csernawczyce,
Widomla, Pruzana, Rezena, Slonim, Baranowici, in direction of
Minsk. (R 2)
The hour finally arrived at approximately 05.00 on 25 June 1941.
Get ready! The regiment rolled into the morning, one vehicle after
another. In calm wind conditions the regiment drove along the dusty
roads through Zelecow, Lukow and Siedlce as far as Mordy. There
the companies and battalions went into well- camouflaged positions
in woods, valleys and villages in the area around the town to begin
waiting again. What the regiment's assignment was to be was still
not known. And yet, everyone from Grenadier to General was
consumed with the battle, with the showdown with the enemy.
Not until the evening was the waiting over and the advance
resumed. Driving forward along advance road "R 2", with interruptions only for refuelling, the regiment crossed the frontier at the Bug
during the night of 2 7 / 2 8 June. The river crossing was made over
the military bridge on 'R 2", the General Guderian Bridge.
The regiment was assembled in combat formation for the advance:
I Battalion/I.R. GD
one platoon of 13th (Light Infantry Gun) Company

178

TROOP CONCENTRATIONS
AND THE GERMAN ATTACK
ROUTES ON EASTERN FRONT
22 JUNE 1941

March Route of the Motorised Infantry Regiment "GROSSDEUTSCHLAND" 1941

Regimental HQ/I.R. GD
HQ IV Battalion/I.R. GD
14th (Panzeijger) Company
15th (Heavy Infantry Gun) Company
one Flak platoon of 20th (Flak) Company
400th Artillery Battalion
II Battalion/I.R. GD
III Battalion/I.R. GD
Remaining units
Supply.
The Polish advance roads were deep, sandy tracks. The route (R
2) led the spearhead through Mordy and Lonice to the vicinity of
Konstantynow. The regiment's assignment was finally made known
and at first may have seemed almost laughable to many: secure the
advance road for the panzer divisions which were passing through
and later take part in surrounding Russian forces southwest of Minsk.
That was why the regiment was so far to the rear and why it was
committed late and was moving only slowly toward the east. The
landscape gradually changed after crossing the Russian frontier. The
regiment now entered an area of dense forest, untended and barely
passable. On the sides of the roads were the first knocked out enemy
tanks, twisted and shattered guns and smoking collective farms.
Scattered among the debris were twisted brown forms: the bodies
of fallen Russian soldiers. The trees on the sides of the road had been
shattered, their leaves charred black. The air smelled of smoke and
smouldering wood, of sweat and bad tobacco. And always there were
more dead Russians, small heaps along the road covered in dust from
the passing columns. It was a picture of a battlefield of a type never
before seen by the Grenadiers. The regiment continued to move
forward, through Prushany and Roshany towards Slonim. The
advance was interrupted by a sudden outburst of rifle fire from a
wood close by the advance road. Snipers? Quickly the company
nearest the firing got down from its vehicles, deployed and moved
toward the suspected enemy position. The fire soon died down,
however, and the column continued on toward the northeast. The
companies passed through the village of Polonka and it was already
night when they reached the area around Stolowici, north of
Baranowici. It had begun to rain, which kept the dust down and
improved visibility, making it easier for the drivers. Everywhere were
columns from other units. All along advance road "R 2" could be
seen Luftwaffe signals men hurriedly laying their lines, the vital links
between the command centres and the fighting units. Artillery fire
rumbled in the distance; the front was not far away.
The regiment suddenly found itself in the midst of a battle as it
moved on from Stolowici towards the northeast on the morning of
30 June. The commanding general, far to the front with the
spearhead, had been ambushed in a village. He managed to escape
181

with great difficulty, but his driver was wounded and his executive
officer killed. The regiment made its first solid contact with the enemy
in the wooded country north of Goroditsche. The regiment was
surprised by the ferocity of the fighting, which included an attack by
tanks. The enemy attack was beaten off with the help of the anti-tank
guns, but the encounter cost a large number of dead and wounded,
especially among 6th Company, which suffered a total of ten
casualties. The day ended with patrol activity, necessary to clarify the
enemy's situation. The following account was taken from a press
clipping which described the day's events:
"Our slit trenches were already finished when the platoon leader
called the section leaders together. We were to reconnoitre a village
which lay 7 kilometres away and determine if it was held by the
enemy.
We set out at approximately four in the morning and headed off
through some rye fields toward a wood. Then we neared the edge
of the village. There a hundred metres ahead was a Soviet machine
gun sentry. We took him prisoner before he could make a sound.
Passing through the weakly-held village, we reached the exit on the
far side, where five more Russians appeared who were also overcome. But then more emerged from a nearby cornfield and the
shoot-up began. We eventually counted over 130 enemy soldiers;
however, we were able to pin them down and even captured 23
Russians and a commissar. The prisoners were delivered to the
company command post. We suffered no losses, our only casualty
was the platoon leader who received a grazing wound. These were
our first Russian prisoners."
That same night the advance was resumed with a stronger spearhead; an area approximately 40 kilometres northeast of Baranowici
was to be occupied in order to secure the flank of Gruppe Guderian.
Generaloberst Guderian's Panzergruppe 2 had meanwhile pushed
on through Slonim and Baranowici in the direction of Minsk with the
objective of encircling the enemy forces which had escaped the
Bialystok pocket. Guderian's forces formed the southern wing of the
encirclement, while Generaloberst Hoth's Panzergruppe 3, which
was advancing through Wilna towards Minsk, formed the northern
flank. By 26 June Panzergruppe 3 had won the northern edge of
Minsk, and on the 27th the armoured spearhead of Guderian's forces
likewise reached the city and linked up there with Hoth. This closed
the ring around Russian forces which totalled approximately 40
divisions with more than 400,000 men. Following in a forced march
were the German Fourth and Ninth Armies. Their role was to prevent
a breakout from the pocket, especially to the south and southeast.
While awaiting the arrival of the two armies, Panzergruppe 2
rushed forward Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND to
contain the enemy's initial attempts to break out of the pocket. The
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regiment's thinly-held front faced north and northeast. When the two
German armies arrived, the regiment was to move on and join
Gruppe Guderian.
Details of the assignment were contained in a regimental order
issued at 21.00 on 30 June 1941:
R e g i m e n t a l O r d e r for S e c u r i n g t h e F l a n k o f G r u p p e
Guderian
1. The enemy is attempting to break out of the area Novogrodek
Puszeza forest regionZaniemonska and these efforts will intensify
in the next days. Organized large-scale breakout attempts are not
expected. Most will be local efforts by dispersed units, supported
by tanks.
70-80 divisions are thought to be holding out in the abovementioned area.
2. The security role ordered for I.R. GD remains the same. The
security sectors for I and II Battalions are also unchanged; II
Battalion's forces are to be concentrated near Poloneoska and I
Battalion's near Berodysscze. A combat-capable reserve is to be
formed which can be employed at threatened points.
The designated sectors are to be actively patrolled day and night.
II Battalion will reconnoitre the front to the wooded areas and,
employing motorized patrols, establish contact with its neighbour
to its right, the 5th MG. Btl., in Mir. The 5th MG. Btl. will arrive
in Mir this evening.
I Battalion will reconnoitre the west flank across the Myssanka as
far as Pelonka and make contact with its neighbour on the left
there. Further reconnaissance will be carried out to the wooded
areas lying directly in front of its security sector.
3. The line of security is to be held in the event of an enemy attack!
4. Password from 30. 6. to 1. 7. : "Moltke", in accordance with the
password list. It must be known by every soldier.
5. Ill Battalion will secure Stolowicze with one company and hold its
remaining elements in readiness so that the units can move
immediately if alerted.
6. Heavy weapons: I and II Battalions will each retain a heavy infantry
gun platoon under its command. heavy infantry gun company
will remain in its positions in II Battalion's sector under the
battalion's command.
IV Battalion's 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company will remain at the
regiment's disposal in Stolowicze. The 5 cm Pak platoon, which
until now has been attached to the battalions, is to be sent back
immediately to 14th Company. 14th Company is to be held in
readiness so that it can be employed with the battalions in the
shortest time in the event of enemy tank attack. Approach routes
to I and II Battalions are to be reconnoitred.

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IV Battalion's 16th (Assault Gun) Company at the regiment's

disposal in Stolowicze. Opportunities are to be explored for
counterattacks with I and II Battalions.
V Battalion's 17th (Motorcycle) Company will conduct reconnaissance as per special orders from regiment. Hptm. von Kirchbach
will report to regiment for instructions.
V Battalion's 18th (Pionier) Company will remain in Stolowicze.
V Battalion's 20th (Flak) Company will assume the anti- aircraft
role in the Stolowicze billeting area. 20th Company will go into
position so that it can engage enemy tanks that seek to escape
across open terrain.
7. The 400th Art.Btl. will remain in its positions. It is instructed to
cooperate with I Battalion; assignments remain the same.
8. Wireless communications to the battalions, in addition each battalion is to detach a messenger to the regiment.
9. Stukas are free to attack the area enclosed by our forces. The
concerned battalions are therefore to increase the practice of
displaying swastika flags at the approach of friendly aircraft.
10. Light signals:
white = we are here;
red
= enemy attack;
green = lift artillery fire;
blue
= (purple) enemy tank attack.
11. I.R. GD is under the direct command of Panzergruppe 2.
12. Regimental command post: Stolowicze.
13. Sentries are instructed to be especially watchful during the early
hours of the morning.
14. Vehicles are to be camouflaged and the main street in Stolowicze
is to be cleared. Hptm. Weidemann is designated regimental
anti-aircraft defence officer.
15. All civilians with shaven heads are to be detained and, if it is
determined that they were soldiers, handed in as prisoners. Leaflets
are being dropped by aircraft into the encircled area urging the
Russian soldiers to surrender and promising good treatment.
Use caution when taking prisoners! Prisoners have been transferred to the regiment still carrying weapons. Russian soldiers often
feign death and then fire on our troops from behind.
16. Reports to regiment from I and II battalions are to be made by
radio as much as possible. Every evening until further notice, V
Battalion will dispatch an armoured car to I and II Battalions and
the Regimental Staff for conveyance of reports.
signed von Stockhausen
The new security area was reached during the night and the
positions occupied, with I and II Battalions in the front line. The
sectors were widely spaced and many kilometres long. There was
contact with the enemy all night long, but this usually consisted of
individual groups of Russians attempting to break out to the south.
The fighting morale of the Russians was not the best; it had been

184

reduced by the continual Stuka attacks, the increasing reduction of

the pocket and the knowledge that there was little hope of escape.
Most tried to sneak quietly past the German outposts. An increasing
number of prisoners was assembled near the command posts and it
gradually quieted down in front of the regiment's sectors. This
situation of "quiet vigilance" punctuated by individual combats lasted
until 3 July, when transfer orders arrived.
The best description of the companies' situation during these days
was provided by a young executive officer of I Battalion: "We veered
off the advance road during the night. The battalion had taken up a
so-called line of security, which was spread improbably far apart.
This was something new for us; we had never practised it. There
was no defence, only security. But what if the enemy launched a
strong attack? We couldn't withdraw because the line was too thin.
We would have to defend, but with insufficient means.
3rd Company was to attack a village in the morning. According to
what we knew, it was apparently weakly occupied. I drove off at
02.00. Our 2 cm Flak platoon and our Pionier platoon, which were
to support the attack, were a half-hour ahead.
Halfway there, in the semi-darkness, we came under rifle fire from
all sides. The driver stepped on the gas and we raced through. Ahead
of us lay a dirty, dark village. There was firing from all sides. All
around us were muzzle flashes and the dull thud of hand grenades.
Directly ahead of us lay a dead motorcycle messenger; the commander of the signals section had been wounded in the knee.
Employing every available weapon, we quickly built a hedgehog
position around the village.
With the leader of the Pionier platoon, a splendidly bright and calm
Leutnant, (Lt. Baumann) we looked for a way around. We continued
to suffer casualties from sniper fire.
On a side-road stood an abandoned German automobile: it was
the general's car. The windshield was shattered, the occupants gone.
We later learned that he and his adjutant had driven into an ambush
and subsequently had barely managed to escape.
Walking beside me was a young Gefreiter. He had never been in
combat before and hoped to become an officer. I had to see if he
could stand up under fire. He issued instructions calmly and factually.
Before the action started I told him: No one need see what is really
going on in the heart of a soldier. I knew that from experience."
At the beginning there was plenty going on in I Battalion's sector.
In such confrontations, where one side is attempting to get through
and the other is trying to prevent it, the situation often appears very
confused. All too often the individual is left on his own and has to
act on his own initiative. One such example was provided by the
Battalion HQ of I Battalion. In the same battle it drove into another
village in captured Russian trucks and met Russians driving captured
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German ones! Everyone fired at everyone else; it was pure chaos.

This was the type of situation where leadership had to prove itself.
This is exactly what the leader of the Pionier platoon, Lt. Baumann,
did. Baumann was one of those taciturn, difficult to fathom types
who made the war into a highly personal affair. For him the war
began at hand grenade range. Baumann was ordered to carry out a
long-range patrol. Baumann's group, with two personnel carriers
and a 2 cm Flak (a total of 12 Pioniers and the Flak crew), drove
over 60 kilometres into the enemy pocket and returned safely some
hours later with more than 60 prisoners. Once again Baumann had
lived up to his nickname "The Lion of Gibraltar", which had been
bestowed on him for earlier exploits. He was one those legendary
figures who was to be an example in courage for those who followed.
For II Battalion, too, the day did not go as quietly as it had initially
appeared it might. Many small engagements resulted from the
battalion's active patrolling to all sides. These engagements were
exhausting, but productive, as the numbers of prisoners brought in
by the patrols showed. The commander of 6th Company, Obit, von
Courbire, reported:
"At approximately 09.00 Lt. Stockmann was sent towards Mate
Zuchowicze with a patrol, as the village was reported occupied by
the enemy. On the way the patrol met one of the regiment's
armoured cars which reported the village free of the enemy. Nevertheless, Lt. Stockmann and his men (including Uffz. Sohn, Uffz.
Werner, Ogefr. Schnalke and Gefr. Konrad) went on and, following
a brief combat near Zuchowicze, took five prisoners. As the patrol
moved closer toward the village it came under fire from the farms
and the hills to the east. In a determined effort employing all available
weapons, the patrol broke into the village and cleared it with heavy
losses to the enemy. In a short time more than 40 Russians were
flushed from the houses and taken prisoner.
At the same time, at approximately 15.00, Lt. Doege led a patrol
toward Jurewicze and Niehnicze. The villages themselves were free
of the enemy, but there was a brief exchange of fire with several
Russians hiding in a cornfield. Forty-eight prisoners were taken
during the course of this operation and a large number of weapons
and a horse-drawn vehicle captured all without loss. On inspecting
the horse-drawn vehicle two Russian standards were found which
were delivered to the battalion command post.
Also at 15.00, Uffz. Kottwitz started out with a patrol from 1st
Platoon for Wysadowicze and Byklewicze. Seven prisoners were
taken in the first village, including an officer. A young chap, just
twenty-one years of age, he hardly looked the type to inspire
confidence. As the patrol continued its advance, it came under fire
from a wood about 500 metres southwest of the village and was

186

attacked by a strong enemy force. However, the enemy was beaten

back by the effective fire of Gefreiter Wollschlger's machine gun."
All was not quiet at the unit headquarters at this time as was shown
in a report by Schtze Menk of the 3rd Platoon of 20th (Flak)
Company, which had been instructed to protect the billeting area as
well as the regimental command post with its 3.7 cm guns:
"One evening we moved into a village on the advance road to
Minsk. 'We' consisted of a 3-tonne prime mover, on which was
mounted an unenclosed 3.7 cm anti-aircraft gun surrounded by seven
factotum: Uffz. Stoffels as gun commander, Gefr. Doss as K1 and
Schtzen Burkhard, Menk, Bothe, Zimmermann and Brunken the
latter known as 'little Fred' for short as K2 to K6, as well as Gefr.
Knauth, who had got the self-propelled gun platform this far thanks
to his skill as a driver.
This time we were to secure the regiment's command post against
air as well as ground attack. As the regiment's commander was in
our immediate vicinity, the placing of the gun was done especially
carefully, and it required much moving back and forth before we had
satisfied our platoon leader Lt. Schmidt and were ready for action at
the edge of the village. After our tents were pitched and we got down
to domestic chores, we thought of getting an undisturbed sleep. None
of us suspected that in the next few hours we were to see our
long-overdue premiere with our 3.7 cm gun in the title role.
It might have been 03.00 and dawn was beginning to break, when
the sentry quietly called us from our tent. The scene which lay before
our still inexperienced eyes was one we had never seen before:
emanating from the edge of the forest about 800 metres away, from
which a narrow path flanked by fields and meadows led to our village,
was a stream of mysterious figures. Without the sound effects which
later became the norm, the line of earth- brown figures approached
the uncertain gun crew. Whispering amongst ourselves, we tried to
clarify the situation: are these really Russians who are approaching
so innocently? Are they prisoners being transported to the rear? Or
are they even our own people?
We called for the password which had been designed for just this
type of situation. The column immediately halted about 100 metres
from us and without a sound began to vanish to the side into a wheat
field. This reaction from the other side left us in no doubt that we
had made our first contact with the enemy.
Shocked and suffering from opening night stage fright, we thought
of everything except our 3.7 cm gun which was standing idle. Our
good cannon might forgive us today that at first we fiddled about
with rifles and other small arms instead of utilizing its more effective
calibre. But like the actor whose stage fright leaves him with his first
line, with the first rifle shots we changed from amateur infantry into
an experienced Flak crew and carried on with our more accustomed
187

instrument. The first tracers reached for the emptying field-path and
after a few chords each clip contained 6 rounds the terrain as
far as the forest's edge had been swept clear. Only those left behind,
the silent victims of our premiere, offered us an impression of the
effects of our weapon against ground targets.
After this show, which lasted but a few minutes, the scene had
cleared to such a degree that we were filled with a thirst for action
and the proud feeling of a total victory on the battlefield. It only
remained for us to round out our victory with an impressive number
of prisoners. Under the sure protection of our 3.7 cm Flak we were
going to round them up, believing that we had smashed the enemy
attack in the wink of an eye with the effects of our weapon.
Everything appeared to be going smoothly as we flushed the first
5 or 6 Russians from a drainage ditch scarcely 50 metres in front of
our gun position. Guns carelessly at our sides, we thought the four
of us could collect hundreds of prisoners. Inexperienced and unconcerned, we neared the wheat field into which the front of the enemy
column had fled. It was all quite simple until the moment when
we were met by Russian rifle fire! Uffz. Stoffels lay on the field-path
with a serious shoulder wound, while the rest of us lay small and
plain in the grass, no longer so certain of victory. How the three of
us managed to bring the seriously wounded man back to the gun
position without further casualties is still a mystery to us today.
We began to sense that the enemy had not been beaten back for
long. Mixed in with the uninterrupted banging of our 3.7 cm, which
was soon joined by the other two guns of the platoon, was the vicious
chirping of enemy rifle fire, which whistled around our ears. Many
hits were clearly audible as they smacked against the armour plate
which, unfortunately, was only in front and not on the sides. More
and more we hid behind the armour plate, which we had not
appreciated until now, while a barn standing next to the gun position
shielded us from fragments from a mortar barrage. Small wooded
shingles rained down like roll shutters. The falling shingles were a
nuisance, but we much preferred that to the effects of the whirring
mortar fragments.
Our cannon had to be fed continually; flying hands refilled empty
ammunition clips. A barrel change, a job that had to be done outside
the protection of the armour plate, was carried out in no time. The
hot cannon barrel raised blisters on the hands of those involved.
Hands were in motion here and there, calls for full clips of ammunition, half deaf from the ceaseless pounding of the gun. . . there was
no time to feed hidden fears by looking beyond one's own task. The
Russians were unmistakably gaining ground. They stuck to their guns
although we kept up a continuous fire on the edge of the wood and
any groups of Russians that sprung up. Our supply of ammunition

188

was also running low; had minutes or hours passed? Finally, ammunition arrived, and with it I Battalion.
For the infantry, finishing the job was just routine work, which we
could not imitate. All around us lay shell casings, ammunition clips
and crates, barrel keys, oil cans and everywhere the bothersome gas
masks. A change of position ended this premiere, and soon afterward we left the nameless village."
The regiment was ordered to departure readiness at approximately
15.00 on 3 July 1941. That evening the vehicles rolled off towards
a new objective.

Chapter Three
Across the Beresina to the Dniepr
The road assigned to the regiment, R 2, which lay south of the
two roads over which Panzergruppe 2 was advancing on Minsk, was
also the southern boundary of the pocket which had formed in the
meantime. Also streaming eastward along the road were the march
groups and columns of the artillery and infantry of the Fourth Army
which were trying to reach the front, and the columns of motor
vehicles carrying vital fuel and ammunition to the Panzer units. In
the midst of this was GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, laboriously pushing
its way past the columns. Everyone kept an eye trained to the north,
weapons were armed and directed to the left towards the forest and
across the open plain, because danger threatened from there. The
surrounded Russians were attempting to escape from the pocket,
which resulted in many firefights, ambushes and breakthrough
attempts towards the south. The reinforced I.R. GD moved on along
the dusty road, but was frequently held up by congestion along the
route. The march order had changed: II Battalion was now driving
behind V Battalion. It was dark when the regiment passed through
Nieswicz, an indifferent village like so many others. Again it was other
columns, as well as damaged bridges and crossings, that considerably
slowed the unit's progress. During one such halt while passing
through Baranowici, brute force had to be employed in order to get
traffic moving again. All this strained the nerves of the men, especially
the drivers, who had to bear the brunt of this difficult type of driving.
Movement was restored and finally, roughly at midday on 4 July, the
regiment reached Stolpce and Swerzen, about 3 kilometres to the
south. Tschweren was named as the regiment's objective.
Once again, however, the regiment's progress was interrupted by
a Russian breakout attempt. In the afternoon it may have been

189

17.00 urgent orders arrived to immediately move all available

forces, at the least a strong battle group, into the area northeast of
Stolpce where the 15th Infantry Regiment was involved in heavy
fighting with an attacking Russian force.
17th (Motorcycle) Company was immediately dispatched to the
threatened area, with orders to reach Kamienka. That evening I
Battalion reached the area near Odceda, northwest of Stolpce and
north of the advance road, which had to be protected. II Battalion
under Major Greim reported assuming security positions with 8th
Company on the right, 6th Company in the centre and 5th Company
on the left. The troops soon heard rifle fire everywhere. There was
no quiet in Stolpce, which lay in the hollow of a valley. Rifle shots
whizzed over the huts. The Regimental Headquarters, which was
located in Odceda, posted heavy security for the night. A firefight
was under way as the morning fog of 5 July lifted. Masses of Russians
stormed out of the woods towards the positions which had been
hastily occupied by the battalions during the night; suddenly there
was firing from the impenetrable wooded areas and wheat fields in
the rear. The situation was completely confused.
The companies of I Battalion near Odceda rose and moved widelyspaced towards the woods. The enemy had to be ferreted out and
the woods combed. The Russians were hiding there, waiting for a
time when they felt secure and could launch another massed attempt
to beak out to the south. Often the only clue to the location of a
Russian hiding place was the distinctive aroma of their machorka
tobacco. Obit. Fabich, commander of 3rd Company, described those
hours:
"Advance road; the enemy was in the forest to the left. The assault
guns under Obit. Frantz, with whom cooperation had been marvellous, moved forward over the open plain to destroy the enemy. When
they halted 400 metres in front of the cornfield, the companies set
out on a wide front and likewise moved forward. The edge of the
forest was reached and one platoon went in. Then Hurrah! Very
suddenly the Russians attacked. There was wild firing, explosions
and ricocheting bullets. Panic! Individual soldiers ran back as far
as the road embankment. A new line was formed there; the Russian
attack had been too great a shock. A half-hour later the company,
escorted by a 5 cm Pak, reentered the wood to recover some
wounded comrades. There were five or six of them, including the
leader of my company headquarters personnel, Feldwebel Heidkamp. Then we found them; they were all dead, viciously mauled
and mutilated. That was the shock that the men carried with them
from then on; everyone realized what it meant to fall into the hands
of the Russians."
There was also a costly tragedy played out in Kamienka. As soon
as the 17th (Motorcycle) Company entered the village in the darkness
190

it became involved in heavy fighting. The Russians charged from all

sides against the desperately defending men of 17th Company. The
company commander, Hptm. von Kirchbach, was killed. Here, too,
there was panic. The men abandoned the village, but then settled
down again. Lt. Gamier took over what was left of the company,
assembled everyone who turned up in the morning, sent back a
report and requested reinforcements. The reinforcements arrived, as
described by Obit, von Courbire of 6th Company:
"The company was placed on alert at approximately 04.00 on 5
July 1941. 17th Company had been surprised by a far superior
enemy force in Kamienka, about 12 km northeast of the security
area, and was unable to hold out. 6th Company was instructed to
go to Kamienka at once and support 17th Company. A 3.7 cm Flak
platoon under Lt. Knzel was attached to the company, which set
out at high speed along R 2 toward the northeast. On the way we
learned of the loss of Kamienka by 17th Company. It was 04.35,
the company dismounted on the advance road south of Kamienka.
A platoon from 18th (Pionier) Company also arrived and it, too, was
placed under the command of 6th Company. The company commander established contact with 17th Company and formulated his
plan of attack. The heavy infantry guns of 15th Company were
requested. The plan was to attack Kamienka, throw the enemy back
and follow up. 6th Company and the attached platoon from 18th
(Pi.) Company assembled for the attack in a wheat field and a
bordering hollow to the right of 17th Company. The company's front
faced the northwest with 3rd Platoon on the right, 2nd Platoon in
the centre, the Pionier Platoon on the left, and 1st Platoon behind
3rd Platoon providing security to the right. The heavy mortars went
into position so that they could silence the enemy in the company's
lane of attack and at the edge of Kamienka as soon as the attack
began. Half of the Flak platoon secured the assembly area to the
right and against the edge of the forest in the north. The Pak platoon
remained at the company's disposal behind the Flak.
In the meantime, Obstlt. Garski, the commander of V Battalion,
arrived and took command of the regiment's forces deployed there,
which had been further reinforced by the remaining two platoons of
18th (Pi.) Company.
Our attack against Kamienka and the wooded areas lying behind
and on both sides of the village began at 05.45, supported by the
Schwappacher Platoon of 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company which had
arrived, and on the left near 17th Company by Lt. Drewes' assault
gun platoon. The enemy was well dug-in in the wheat fields, brush
covered areas and woods, and expertly camouflaged. The Russians
were almost impossible to detect and had available light and heavy
machine guns, heavy mortars and light and medium anti-tank guns

191

as well as several light artillery pieces. Undoubtedly the Russian force

comprised at least a regiment.
Rapid defensive fire met the attacking companies which nevertheless pushed forward with great lan, effectively supported by the
heavy weapons. When the Russians attempted to outflank the
attacking companies by launching their own attack from the side,
the 1st Platoon of 6th Company and the machine gun section were
committed and beat off the attack with heavy losses to the enemy.
The attack by the other three platoons soon disintegrated into bitter
close-in fighting. Casualties mounted. Lt. Stockmann was reported
wounded. Uffz. Gutt was killed and Feldw. Klatt wounded again.
Neither side gave any quarter. The enemy suffered considerable
losses, and by 07.00 Kamienka had been retaken and the southern
edge of the forest reached. At 07.45, following a brief pause to
regroup, the attack was resumed on both sides of the road. Scarcely
100 metres had been covered when the troops were met by heavy
fire from Russians concealed on the ground and in trees. The enemy
fire soon died down, however. Meanwhile, the 17th (Motorcycle) and
18th (Pionier) Companies encountered considerable resistance
which was not broken until approximately 09.00. The advance
continued slowly and large amounts of materiel, including heavy
machine guns and light artillery pieces, were captured. Two prisoners
were also taken, one of whom spoke some German. He explained
that his division was supposed to force a breakout from the pocket
near Minsk that morning and one regiment had attacked here. The
battle was over by 11.00 and contact was established with the
northern group.
Killed here from 6th Company were Lt. Joachim Stockmann, Uffz.
Wilhelm Gutt and Ogefr. Reinhart Bickel. The company also suffered
eleven wounded, three of them seriously. Ogefr. Wodenick and
Minnenbusch died of wounds while being evacuated."
These repeated surprise encounters and the resulting confused
situations led to casualties, which slowly and steadily reduced the
combat strength of the regiment. The reason for this lay in the
frequent changes from the advance to combat, resulting from the
unclear picture of the enemy. The command of the regiment, the
battalions and companies had to adapt to each suddenly- changing
situation. No one could say in advance whether the next hour would
see heavy fighting, or if Russian troops would be on the road during
the hours of darkness. This situation of constant tension strained the
nerves of the men to the breaking point. The resulting overexertion
left the men somewhat indifferent, one could also say resigned,
accepting everything as it came. This also explains the losses among
officers and NCOs, which were dreadfully high at the outset of the
campaign.

192

The 7th of July saw the regiment again on the march with the
objective of Beresino on the Beresina River. The old Polish- Russian
border was crossed. The drive went smoothly over the endless sandy
tracks which were interrupted only once by a 17 km stretch of paved
road. The drivers and passengers breathed a little easier. After
covering the stretch KodjanowMinsk SmilawiczeTscherwen,
the regiment reached the rest area in the wooded area about 6 km
west of Beresino. Everywhere, and especially in Minsk, there were
destroyed houses, some of which were still burning. For the first time,
too, there was the striking scene of multi-story buildings beside the
farm cottages. Thousands of prisoners streamed to the rear. At the
sides of the roads were groups of wooden crosses as well as single
ones: the graves of comrades who had paid for this victorious and
quick advance with their lives.
And then came the Beresina: the river was crossed under bright
moonlight. The columns rolled slowly across the wooden military
bridge. On the far side was only wasteland, sand and swamp.
Mosquitoes were everywhere.
The German armoured spearheads had reached the Dniepr.
Generaloberst Guderian's Panzergruppe 2 had pushed recklessly
ahead. All eyes were on one objective: Smolensk. Still marching
behind, carrying out its security duties, was the I.R. GD. But orders
were coming for the regiment to join up with the leading elements
of the armoured spearhead as quickly as possible. The regiment was
to take part in the breakthrough across the Dniepr!

Chapter Four
The Battle near Smolensk
The reinforced Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was
placed under the command of 10th Pz.Div. for the attack to create
a bridgehead across the Dniepr. An order from the Panzer Division,
which described the plan for the crossing, reached the regiment in
the late evening hours of 10 July:
10th Panzer Division: Div. Command Post, 10. 7. 41 - 20.00
la/op. Nr. 7

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Order for the Attack across the Dniepr on 11. 7. 1941

1. The enemy on the east bank of the Dniepr appears weaker than
previously supposed. In the division's attack sector there are light,
recently built field fortifications of apparently limited depth. Antitank ditches directly on the east bank.
Several times during the course of 10. 7. the enemy has sent strong
patrols to probe across the Dniepr and out of the Schkloff
bridgehead to the west bank.
Enemy counterattacks from the flank must be expected at any time
after the crossing.
2. 10th Panzer-Division with the attached I.R. GD will attack at 05.20
on 11. 7. across the Dniepr east of Lit. Prigonni and reach Jelnja
via GoroditscheGorkiSchamowo.
3. South of the division, Kampfgruppe SS Deutschland will secure
a line KnjashitschiPalykowitschi to the south.
North of the division, SS-Div. Das Reich, which at 17.30 on 10.
7. was still fighting to reach the Dniepr north of Hill 215 (3 km
SW of Schkloff), will attack to the northeast across the bend in the
river 2.5 km southeast of Schkloff and open the Dniepr crossing
at Schkloff from the south. Provisional boundary with SS-Div.
Das Reich: DubrowkBoriskowitschiSagorjecrossroads approx. 12 km east of Schkloff-Gorki (all to 10th Pz.Div.)
4. I.R. GD, which since afternoon on 10. 7. has been attacking to
clear the west bank, will prepare itself on 10./11. 7. on the west
bank of the Dniepr for the attack across the Dniepr on 11. 7. at
05.20.
Preparatory Stuka attacks on the east bank from 05.0005.15.
Bombardment by all artillery, including the heavy rocket battalion
and the regiment's heavy infantry weapons, from 05.1505.20.
Artillery fire will cease at 05.20. It is essential that the regiment's
first units cross in inflatable boats as soon as the last shell of the
bombardment falls. Stuka attacks east of the MogilevOrsha road
from 05.15- 06.45.
1st attack objective for I.R. GD: winning of a bridgehead in the
line AugustovoBel SzasskowkoTschamodany (to Rgt. CO.
verbally in advance!).
5. A.R. 90 - directed to cooperate with I.R. GD. With attached
400th Art.Btl. (I.R. GD) and 8th Smoke Producing Unit, will
support the attack by I.R. GD with a barrage on recognized field
positions on the east bank and the forest's edge, where there are
probably enemy positions, from 05.1505.20. In the further
course of the attack engage recognized enemy artillery and
eliminate flanking attempts from south and north.
6. Pz.Pi. 49 (less 3rd Comp.) with 18th (Pi.) Comp./I.R. GD and
Bridging Company K/I.R. GD, which have been placed under its
command for the crossing, will, in cooperation with I.R. GD,
prepare the means for the crossing by the regiment, begin construction of ferries for the crossing of reinforced K. 10 and a military
194

7.

8.

9.
10.

11.

12.

bridge at the position as already ordered verbally. Equipment for

the crossing is to be moved forward into the area west of the
MogilevSchkloff road, east of Prigonni, during the hours of
darkness on the night of 10./11. 7.
Reinforced K.10, with attached light anti-tank platoon from
Pz.Jg. Btl. 90, an 8.8 cm Flak of Flak. Btl. 11/11 and a light tank
company (if it becomes impossible to cross the entire company,
at least one platoon of I.R. GD is to be sent across by ferry) will
move through Kriwjet Faschtschewka and Tschamodany and
capture the Bassja crossing in Goroditsche, initially establishing a
bridgehead there.
Reinforced Panzer Brigade, with attached 6/69,1 lgt. battery A.R.
90 and 3/Pi.49 - 15.00, ready in the wood south of "o" from
Wysojoje (1 : 300,000) to cross the military bridge. Assignment:
Attack through the Gorodischtsche bridgehead to win the Gorki
bridgehead. Attached units to be sent to the brigade on morning
of 11. 7.
10th Rifle Brigade, with A.A. 90 in front, will wait from 16.00
with the rest of the division ready to follow behind the Panzer
Brigade.
Boundary: the Mogilev-Schkloff road for the crossing over the
military bridge. Traffic control officer there Hptm. Nippe.
Obstacle line: MogilevSchkloff railway line. Commander
Hptm. Harrichhausen.
Anti-aircraft protection: of the assembly area and the crossing as
per verbal instructions to the commander of II/Fla 11.
one 8.8 cm Flak is to be sent to K.10 (Barsuki)
one further to the I.R. GD on the MogilevSchkloff road near Lit.
Prigonni, until 11. 7., 05.00, for anti-bunker duties which may
become necessary.
Division Command Post: from 10. 7., 20.00: forest southwest of
Lopowitschi.

Accuracy verified
Seele
Lt. and Adjutant

signed Schaal

A few kilometres from the Dniepr the men of the regiment climbed
down from their vehicles and shouldered their weapons and equipment. The battalions, led by I and III Battalions, deployed and moved
forward on both sides of the road. Tightly-packed columns stood
everywhere. The Russians could easily observe the concentration of
German forces taking place here. The terrain was open and the view
from the far side of the Dniepr was good. The companies moved at
a steady pace towards the river. Heavy enemy artillery fire began to
fall to the left and right of the road, forcing the advancing troops to
take cover. This ceased as they approached the steep slope which
ran along the Dniepr as the last bastion before the river. Assembly
points were occupied and observation posts set up. Through their
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field glasses the Stuka liaison officers scanned the far bank, picking
out worthwhile targets.
The morning of 11 July dawned after a cold night. 18th (Pionier)
Company readied its assault boats and inflatable rafts, while Bridging
Column K broke out its equipment. Everything would depend on
them and their joint effort with the other Pioniers. If they were able
to throw a bridge across the river quickly, then the heavy weapons,
above all the tanks, would be able to go into action across the river
in time and begin a successful pursuit of the enemy deep into the
rear. The men of the Pionier company knew this well.
A member of I Battalion described the Dniepr crossing:
"We sat freezing in the grey of dawn. There was no hot coffee.
Everyone was dirty and unshaven. Hands in our pockets, we shivered
from the cold. Pipes took the place of breakfast, but the smoke
parched our throats. Some of the men had their helmets on, others
the plain forage-caps. Some men's hair hung down across their dirty
faces. This then was the picture before the battle: cold, dirt, thirst
and fear. We formed a great jumble of men on our slope, because
we didn't know where else we should disperse to. It is always better
to squat in groups in an area which is not being fired on than to run
around in artillery fire. Many had bought it doing that already. The
enemy shells had been going over our heads since the afternoon of
the day before. Now and then there was also firing on the famous
planted field in front of us, which we would later have to cross. Our
own artillery had fired several times since 04.30; only light calibre
and very few. We consoled ourselves: they were just ranging in.
Stukas came at 05.00, beautiful music that raised our spirits. But
the bombs fell far in the enemy rear; they were of no direct use to
the little man on the battlefield today.
We climbed up the steep slope. The decision to do so was not
easy, but also not difficult, because to the left and right everyone else
was doing the same. The German attack began. Everyone was wide
awake and on their guard. We reached the ploughed field and then
the crest. With a crash there was smoke, dirt and fragments
everywhere this was the Russian barrage fire. The shells screamed
bestially; everyone stretched out flat, scratching into the hard earth.
Cover, cover! We were pinned down.
After perhaps another minute it died down. 'Move out now! Go!
Go! We hollered with relief; we were still alive! We began to run.
Already the enemy artillery could be heard again. We ran and ran.
Others were running to the left and right. We crouched as the shells
burst behind us. We were through!
The ploughed field came to an end. Before us was a steep slope.
Down there was the river. We laughed; it was wonderful. We waded
up to our knees in the water. We sat pressed together in the inflatable
boats, men from the 'Second', the machine gun company and
196

Pioniers. It didn't matter. All that counted was getting to the other
side. Bullets splashed in the water around us and whistled past.
We reached the far shore out! Soaked with sweat, I stumbled
out of the boat. Out forward; there was nothing else we could do.
I threw myself down behind a bush. The Leutnant was not there and
Gefr. Binger was missing as was the wireless section.
Then Lt. Erdmannsdorf of 1st Company came towards me from
the left. His uniform was torn and bloody. He had been wounded in
a hand grenade duel. 'I'm just going to pull on another shirt, I'll be
back.' He said it as if he were just dressing for lunch.
Russian machine guns kept up a continuous fire from the left.
Muzzle smoke was visible from several bushes. Bullets whistled
overhead. The company was pinned down. Oberleutnant Hnert,
commander of I Battalion's machine gun company, crouched in a
shell-hole a few steps farther to the left. I leapt over to him. He was
smoking a cigarette with casual elegance. It seemed as if he could
care less about the battle, even though not a man of the battalion
could move in this fire.
All at once four heavy machine guns of his company opened up a
steady fire. This was sweet music for the Grenadiers. Clouds of dust
rose from the enemy positions. The battalion got up and the attack
went on. There was nothing to be seen of Hnert's company, but
they fired wonderfully and always at the right time. We continued on
and it became ever hotter, the sun burning down from the bright
sky."
For a time I Battalion was faced by the 'Stalin Students', a Soviet
elite unit. They were fanatical, unyielding and could take a lot of
punishment. The only way past them was to go straight at them.
The Soviets employed a human bridge in order to bring over planks,
weapons and equipment. They even dragged their guns across.
Unbelievable.
Ill Battalion's advance was also not without cost. 11th Company
lost its commander, Obit. Teubert, as he was about to cross the river
in an inflatable boat. Lt. Kiene, the leader of III Battalion's Pionier
platoon, as well as Lt. Maliszewski, a platoon leader in 2nd Company, also came to grief during the crossing. Many others, whose
names are not mentioned here, gave their lives in order to keep the
attack going.
The Russians defended desperately. Heavy artillery fire fell on the
bank of the Dniepr. Its target was the crossing point. Bullets whistled
about and Russian aircraft dropped their bombloads there. Nevertheless, the crossing went on without pause. More boats were
crossing the river and pulling up onto the other bank. On the far
shore the bridgehead was enlarged slowly, initially by infantry alone.
At first the heavy weapons were able to give only limited support.
The Pioniers worked feverishly; they were already preparing for the
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construction of the bridge. Until the bridge was ready, ferries had to
be employed to ship anti-tank guns, tanks and guns to the far side.
Late in the morning II Btl./69th Rifle Rgt. of the 10th Pz.Div. was
temporarily placed under the regiment's command. Its job was to
protect the northern flank against attacks from Schkloff and the
northeast. Enemy resistance lessened gradually; the bridgehead was
expanded. Soon the companies disappeared into a brush-filled
wood, moving forward towards their objectives. The men were
exhausted and plagued by thirst. Their backs, which had become
sweat-soaked under the hot sun, now became cold. Here there was
time to look around at the men ahead and to the sides. Who was
missing? Who had bought it? Names such as Feldw. Rdiger, Lt.
Beck, Gefr. Binger, Thomann and Dahlhoff were missing they
had been wounded and left behind. All were from I Battalion. Once
again the companies' strengths had been reduced, but the assignments remained the same.
The Pioniers completed their bridge-building in record time. The
first vehicles rolled across the bridge, also much-needed reinforcements. Meanwhile, the I.R. GD held on in the bridgehead against
desperate Russian counterattacks. Ill Battalion was only able to beat
off an enemy attack thanks to the timely arrival of anti-tank guns,
and I Battalion was even surrounded for a short time. Augustowo
fell to II Battalion, but was then lost again. Bely also changed hands
several times. It was 12 July, one day after the river crossing. There
was no rest, no pause the advance must continue. All resistance
had to be broken and the pursuit begun as soon as possible after the
breakthrough on foot, as long as the motorized forces remained
in the rear. Once across the river, they would soon overtake the
infantry.
The following is another eye-witness report from a member of I
Battalion:
"Our legs were heavy; tired and exhausted the mass of men set
itself in motion. There lay the village. Not a shot fell.
The 'Second' and 'Third' deployed for the attack. Suddenly the
place was full of Russians. They ran about between the houses like
startled chickens. We fired on them with machine guns and submachine guns. Ricochets buzzed past us. Once again the urge to
advance came over us; everywhere sections from our company leapt
forward, charged through the fields of sunflowers, shouting to each
other and laughing. Several houses were burning.
The village was taken in half an hour. Hundreds of prisoners stood
along the road. We had taken them completely by surprise, as they
had either been sleeping or were expecting us to come from the
other side. Our mood was excellent. The old man had been right;
he had a good nose for battle.

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We crouched in front of the houses and drank milk. Several

chickens were soon in the pot. We lit our pipes, stretched our legs
and reflected on the situation. Were we through now?
With inflamed eyes we scanned the map. It was smeared and sticky.
The men spoke slowly and we could only think slowly; the fatigue
was paralysing. Five kilometres further lay a large village with an
important bridge. According to the map it was a vital part of the
advance road to the east, to Smolensk. There were no orders from
regiment yet. 'In theory' we would probably have to have the bridge.
What did 'in theory' mean? In any case, we would make an attempt.
The main body of the battalion remained behind. One company,
a machine gun platoon and a mortar section roared off. It was dusty
again and the sun burned down. Ammunition was scarce. The
equipment weighed heavy as always. Our legs were thick and hot.
One soldier was still gnawing on a chicken leg. After two hours there
was still no report. Something was wrong. Since yesterday evening
we had advanced much farther than ordered. Ogefr. Franz Auf der
Mauer caught up with us on his motorcycle-sidecar. I drove ahead
with him. Then we saw the village. It was huge! We heard the crackle
of rifle fire and no doubt there came the company streaming
back. Now and then one of them fell. This was what I had always
feared when I read of war: our Grenadiers were in retreat. The
company commander was said to have fallen. Further to the rear I
had seen several German tanks standing about as we drove past. I
had a motorcycle. Should I fetch the tanks or stop the company? I
raced back and jumped onto the command tank of the following
assault gun platoon. The Oberleutnant grasped the situation straight
away and agreed to help. We set out at once. As we reached the
zone of rifle fire the tank's hatches were shut and I jumped down.
Obit. Hnert came forward. He was on the left wing. The machine
gun platoon from his company was streaming back with the other
Grenadiers. The Oberleutnant stood there, smoking. His soldiers
came nearer.
'Halt! Turn! Into position!!' That's all he said. The soldiers carried
out his orders and opened fire.
'Mortars! Put down your equipment and follow me!' Hnert drew his
pistol and set off, very calmly, as usual. The tanks drove up and helped on
the right. On the left was Hnert. He jumped, ran and fired. The
Pionier-Leutnant Baumann had also turned up. The mortar people followed, firing and throwing hand grenades. The machine gun platoon
pinned down the Russians ahead of it, firing precisely, as always. The entire
company turned and attacked again. There was not a man who didn't move
forward. But we were facing fanatical Bolsheviks. From close range they
greeted us from behind the houses with shouts of: Nazi Nazi! There was

199

bitter fighting. The Grenadiers saw their fallen comrades, one of whom had
been tied to a fence and shot. This time there were no prisoners.
The village with the bridge was stormed! "
It was I Battalion which set out toward the east after the river
crossing. In spite of Russian resistance which continually flared up,
it continued to advance, storming many villages, such as
Tschomodani. The other battalions, on the other hand, soon encountered heavy resistance, marked by Russian counterattacks. Ill
Battalion dug in, in and on both sides of Dubrovka and defended its
positions there. Prisoners there stated that at least a division was
attempting to break through the ring to the south. II Battalion had
stormed the village of Bely on the north- south road, but had been
thrown out again. Elements of the Russian division pushed past the
village, seeking a breakthrough. The first Russians appeared before
the positions of 1st Battery/4OOth Art.Btl. and were only beaten of
by direct fire. Terrible losses were inflicted on the Russians but still
they did not give up. A determined counter-attack from the west
across the north-south road by the reinforced 6th Company soon
returned the village to German hands. The company lost one man,
Ogefr. Schulze-Tertilt, who was killed by a sniper while going for
ammunition on the motorcycle. The desperate Russian attacks
abated by the evening of 15 July and peace settled over the
battlefield. The enemy's attacking strength at this position had
apparently been broken. The numbers were impressive: over 17,288
Russian prisoners were brought in and 167 light machine guns, 2
heavy machine guns, 21 light artillery pieces, 7 anti-tank guns, 13
mortars and 227 trucks were captured.
On 16 July 1941 the 29th Inf.Div.(mot.) captured the northeast
quarter of Smolensk and occupied the motorway crossing north of
the city. The most important city in western Russia was in German
hands. For the first time the Soviets sensed the direct threat to their
capital, which now lay barely 400 kilometres ahead of the German
armoured spearhead. This rapid and for the Soviets surprising
advance, with which the neighbouring German forces on the left and
right had been unable to keep pace, resulted in a dangerous situation
for the German command: Smolensk formed the extreme tip of a
salient pointing toward the east, which began approximately at Novy
Bychov on the lower Dniepr in the south, ran through Smolensk and
then bent back towards the northwest again, roughly as far as Rudnja
(approx. 100 km north of Vitebsk). Smolensk was the scene of the
heaviest fighting, especially along the MinskMoscow highway, or
roughly along the upper Dniepr, since the Russians had been able
to hold onto a narrow corridor there to the west. This corridor was
stuffed full of Soviet troops, which still had freedom of movement
thanks to the highway and the railway line which ran there. All
German efforts to close the gap failed.
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Behind the spearheads the German infantry was following slowly

to occupy the flanks. In the rear there remained many nests of
resistance and groups of straggling Russians whose forays posed a
threat to German supply lines in the direction of Smolensk. In many
cases only the road and a narrow strip of land on either side were in
German hands, and the ongoing battles and firefights impeded the
flow of supply traffic. The need to free the supply roads and clear
the surrounding terrain forced a pause in the advance.
On the Russian side Marshall Timoshenko, the new Commanderin- Chief in the west, moved up all available reserves in order to check
the attacking lan of the German armoured spearhead.
Near Smolensk the companies and battalions of Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND dug in and went over to the defensive.
Some of the favourable defensive positions had to be taken by force.
The change to a defensive posture was reflected in a corps order
from X X X X V I Panzer Corps:
Corps Headquarters
XXXXVI Panzer Corps

Corps Command Post, 16. 7. 41

23.15 hours

Corps Order No. 14 for 17 July 1941

1.

(a) The enemy is withdrawing from the area east of Mohilew,

especially south of the line RjasmaMstislawl, to the southeast
towards Kritschew; foot, motorized and armoured columns
(Gorki, Cholobin, Saljeszowitschi, Kritschew, Warodkowo,
Kritschew Moljatitschi).
Northwest of Kritschew approx. 70-100 tanks, heavy mot.
artillery and infantry, on the KaimowitschiKritschew road
and in the forest southeast of Kritschew trucks and motorcycles.
In the area south of Saborjesoutheast of Choslawitschi
motorized and horse-drawn vehicles, approximately battalion
strength.
Choslawitschi was taken by 10th Pz.Div.at 17.30.
SS-Div. "Das Reich" reached Mstislawl on the evening of 15.
7. over the worst roads.
Rearguards in front of I.R. GD are to be taken care of by the
artillery.
It is expected that the remains of 4 divisions with tanks will
withdraw from the area southeast of Orsha through Gorki to
the east. Units from eastern Russia have been detected
opposite Panzergruppe 2 since 15.7. The threat remains of
ambush by dispersed enemy units in and outside the forests.
The Red Air Force is attempting to disrupt the advance
through bombing and strafing attacks on the spearheads of
the columns.
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(b) XXIV Pz.Corps fought off heavy enemy attacks, especially

against the 1st Cav.Div. (Stary Bychow), on 16. 7. The 4th
Pz.Div. is advancing toward Tscherikow, 3rd Pz.Div. from
Schauszy toward Moljatitschi.
The 29th Inf.Div. of XXXXVII Pz.Corps has captured the
northeastern part of Smolensk and the railway bridge, and
reached the highway crossing north of Smolensk. 18th Pz.Div.
is on the attack against strong enemy forces south of Gusino.
17th Pz.Div. has reached Ljady.
2. Corps is continuing the advance, initially with 18th Pz.Div. towards
Jelnja, while securing the supply routes with local strongpoints.
Objective for 17. 7. the heights east of Potschinok.
10th Pz.Div. is seeing to the complete repairing of the bridges on
the advance road and the clearing of the forest south of Saborje.
3. Following relief by I.R. GD in Dribin and Gorki, SS-Div. "Das
Reich" will assemble in the MstislawlRjasma area, secure to the
south (establishing contact with 3rd Pz.Div.) and carry out reconnaissance and road scouting in strength towards Monastyrtschina
and from there towards Gogoljewka and Smolepitscha. Will establish contact with 29th Inf.Div. south of Smolensk. Preparations are
to be made for the early dispatch of a reinforced battalion to protect
the flank (on orders from corps H.Q.).
4. After relief by A.O.K. 2 (which was requested again) the main body
of the I.R. GD will follow the advance battalion through Tschernewka to Dribin for employment by Corps H.Q. and dispatch a
battalion to secure Gorki to the NE and NW.
5. Arko 101 will assemble Art.Rgt. H.Q. 697,11/68 and Mrser Btl.
817 in the area west of Mstislawl; Art.Rgt. H.Q. 41, III/109 and
s.FH. 845 in the Rjasma area at the disposal of Corps H.Q.
6. Pi.Rgt. H.Q. 513 will arrange for the dismantling of the military
bridge at Schkloff and the expeditious advance of Pi.Btl. 85 with
bridge. One company of the battalion is to be employed on
improving of the corps' supply road. Remainder of the battalion
to Mstislawl at the disposal of Corps H.Q.
7. Reconnaissance:
(a) Air: primarily on the advance road as well as the right flank.
Is the enemy (tanks) advancing against the corps' flank?
(b) Ground: by SS-Div. "Das Reich" primarily to the south, by
10th Pz.Div. to both flanks.
Boundary: MstislawlPietrowitschiSnigirewka (villages to
10th Pz.Div.).
8. Flak-Abt. 11/14: is to be moved forward from the Dniepr to protect
the area around Mstislawl against high- and low- altitude attack.
9. Traffic control: by Traffic Control Btl. 755 at the Schkloff bridge,
road bridges Jermaki Gorodischtsche and in Mstislawl, as well
as at bridges to the east and northeast. Otherwise by the divisions.
10. Signals communications: Corps axis Mstislawl Choslawitschi
crossroads north of Daschkowo. Telephone station there.
11. Corps command post: Budogotschtsche.

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Distributor:

signed, von Vietinghoff

see draft

It was the regiment's I Battalion which had gone ahead and was
securing the heights near Mstislawl. The remaining battalions
remained in their previous positions, where they continued to guard
the road. Not until the night of 19/20 July did the regiment transfer
into the area of Kasskowka. Its route to the new area was Diwnowo
Faschtschewkacrossroads 16 km east of SchkloffLjubistroad
fork 12 km south of GorkiDribin RjasmaMstislawl. Security
was posted on the road during the night while the remainder of the
unit rested. The following day saw the regiment move on through
Choslawitschi, Tscherjepowo and Kisseljewka. The regiment's assignment was to keep open the advance road of 10th Pz.Div., which
was fighting farther ahead, and at the same time hold the major
SmolenskRoslavl road. The assignment also included guarding the
airfield near Motschuly. With its front facing east and south, the
regiment occupied positions along the Stomjati, a small, deeplyeroded and swampy stream. II Battalion went into position in and
on both sides of Woroschilowo, with 7th Company on the left and
6th Company on the right. 5th Company initially remained in the
rear as reserve. It was known that the enemy was holding out in
roughly battalion strength in Sacharowka, approximately 6 km south
of this position. I Battalion was located about 20 km farther to the
right, right at the SmolenskRoslavl road and railway crossing,
which formed the battalion's defensive strongpoint. Further right
there were no German forces, a ticklish situation for the regiment's
right battalion. The situation near the village of Kruglowka was
reflected in a report by I Battalion:
"There is a level crossing on the major road from Smolensk to
Roslavl about 7 km southeast of the Waskowo station, which can
also be found on the largest scale maps. The road is paved, which
is not often seen in this country.
The level crossing, which means the crossing of the road and
railway line on level ground, is the middle point of our position. Here
we are screening the large-scale movement of troops through
Smolensk against enemy attack from the south.
We took over the position earlier today the 21st of July from
the Waffen-SS
The fields are fallow, the villages gloomy. The landscape is wide,
9i^ey and ugly, the sky appears larger than at home. In the terrain in
front of us flows a small brook. Over in the direction of the enemy
lay a series of interconnected woods.

203

On our right there are none of our own troops for 50 kilometres.
On the left it is 20 kilometres to II Battalion. We are entirely on our
own. The unit is no longer fresh.
The morning was quiet, except for one of our reconnaissance
aircraft which was fired on by a surprisingly large number of Russian
anti-aircraft guns. Otherwise all that is seen of the other side is
individual infantrymen.
Heavy artillery fire of all calibres has been falling on our position
since midday. One dares not raise a hand. The prime target is the
railway embankment where it crosses the road. Naturally, it is an
easy target. The linesman's shack is still standing, but is continually
shrouded in dirty smoke. Generally, one cannot see 50 metres. The
crashes of the exploding shells merge into one. The shrieking and
crashing is continuous and everywhere. We count at least 100
impacts in one minute. These are concentrated in an area of
approximately 100 square metres.
The command post is hidden in a drainage pipe beneath the road.
One can squat there with his knees pulled up. In doing so one must
keep his head bent low and endure the torment of the large stones
lying on the bottom of the pipe. A dead dog is lying in front of the
opening. It stinks terribly. We would gladly bury him, but we dare
not move. The barrage keeps up. The pipe shakes. Stinking powder
smoke drifts in. A troubleshooter has to go outside. The General's
coming!, he shouts. General von Stockhausen is pushed into the
pipe by the force of a new blast and, in falling, drops a handful of
Iron Crosses. He remains completely calm, but this is no place to be
awarding crosses!
Most of the men are sitting in a slit trench. It is narrow and deep.
While under artillery fire there are only three possibilities: either one
is not hit at all, or one is temporarily buried alive, or there is a direct
hit. Then it's all over in any case. In artillery fire one must remain in
one place. Many have died while searching for a better place."
Marshall Timoshenko's first reserve units were approaching
Smolensk, part from the east and part from the south, in order to
relieve the city. The I.R. GD was now facing these divisions, not
suspecting what the next few days were to bring. In their sectors the
companies spent the 21st and 22nd of July in peace, allowing them
time to set up their defences, but the 23rd brought enemy artillery
fire which forced them underground.

204

Chapter Five
The Defensive battle near Jelnja and Smolensk
The 23rd of July was the first of five days which were so confusing,
and at the same time so eventful, that they must be recounted as
one. There was no difference between day and night, the battle raged
on. No one counted the minutes any longer. Looking back, we think
of the village of Kruglowka for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Companies of
I Battalion, and Voroshilovo for the 5th, 6th and 7th Companies of
II Battalion and the 10th Company of III Battalion as well as the 18th
Pionier Company. It was here that the men of Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND stood and fought desperately and held
their positions against Timoshenko's attacking divisions. The attempt by the Soviets to break through failed. The attackers were bled
white against the defence put up by the men of GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. The following is a description of the situation as it developed
with I Battalion:
"From 01.00 to 03.00 the fire was weaker. Then it thundered
down with renewed vigour on the level crossing. Right at the
beginning they brought in my old Ofeldw. Herold; he had lost his
hearing and his wide eyes stared into space.
Obit. Hnert's slit trench was between his machine guns. Communications from there were poor. Troubleshooters and messengers
could not get out and he could barely move himself. Stuck there up
front he could scarcely look after ammunition and rations. The
Oberleutnant had been crouching at his scissors telescope since
dawn. Now and then between the shell bursts, one could see the
forest beyond. Then, for a moment, we had a clear view the field
before us.
They're coming!!
Great masses of men were climbing down into the bottom land.
Mounted officers circled round them. Everything ahead of us was
brown with Russians. Now and then a head raised up from one of
our slit trenches. I wanted to speak, but I had become quite hoarse.
Most of them were now in the bottom land. The Russian artillery
fire ceased. Our ears were ringing. The only fire from our side was
from two infantry guns. Their rounds landed precisely in the bottom
land but it was simply far too little. Then several mortars joined in.
The brown mass was before us. Our fire into the brook had not
weakened them. They're coming! More and more of them! The
air was suffocating. Obit. Hnert, commander of the machine gun

205

company, stood in his slit trench. 800 metres He did nothing.

Through the field glasses we could now make out every man, every
button on them. We could see their faces clearly. They kept coming.
A sustained fire opened up from twelve machine guns at once. It
began and ended abruptly. It was as if there had been one trigger for
all twelve guns.
The cries of amazement can not be described. In seconds the mass
of men was gone. There was a pause. Ammunition belts rattled and
here and there a machine gun bolt was worked back and forth.
Then they appeared one by one about 100 metres in front of us
and the rifle fire opened up. The Grenadiers aimed and fired
precisely, making every shot count.
The Russians came ever closer. Their fire sang, cracked and
whistled everywhere. There was also fire from the left. There were
none of our people there, meaning that the Russians had got past
us on that side.
The Russians ahead of us were about fifty metres away, firing
without pause. Our own fire had lessened. There were always two
Grenadiers in each hole. Many spent the day next to a dead comrade.
No one could help the wounded while it was still daylight. For hours
they came no farther. Had the attack been beaten off? The enemy
artillery opened up again and the fire lasted into the night. Most of
the Russians in front of us lay without cover. Many died screaming
under their own fire.
By 01.00 the enemy artillery fire had almost ceased. We climbed
out of our holes, stretched our stiff limbs and breathed deeply. The
leader of 2nd Company's headquarters personnel, Feldw. Altvater,
had been killed in the afternoon when he was struck in the head by
a shell fragment. As the linesman's shack had meanwhile collapsed,
the Grenadiers dragged wood from it to their holes and covered them
over. The day's dead had been laid out next to each other behind
one of the shack's walls which was still standing. They had all died
from head or chest wounds. That meant that they had been standing
in their holes and firing at the enemy when they were hit. In doing
so they had to expose their upper torsos or at least their heads. They
knew this ahead of time. Can a man do more, or be stronger?
Next to the railway line lay the familiar snow fences. The wounded
were brought in on these and laid next to the linesman's shack. More
and more came in from all sides. Doctors Alberts and Michaelis were
well-organized and sent the wounded back in every available vehicle.
There was sporadic fire from the enemy artillery."
After this first setback, the Russian battalions pulled back under
cover of darkness to regroup for a renewed effort in the morning.
At the same time it became apparent that the second prong of the
Russian attack was directed at the positions held by II Battalion,

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The action by I Battalion/I.R. GD at the Kruglowka railway embankment

207

approximately 20 kilometres farther to the left. The following is a

report submitted by 6th Company:
"At 04.30 in the morning (on the same day as I Btl.) following a
peaceful night, the sounds of fighting were heard from the direction
of the combat outpost. This intensified at approximately 05.15. At
this time a report arrived from the outpost that powerful enemy
forces were advancing from a southerly and southwesterly direction
in an attack toward Voroshilovo. At roughly 05.45 developing dust
clouds were observed between the Trigonometer Heights and Parfenoff Cholm, followed soon afterwards by advancing riflemen and
the light artillery pieces which were customary with Soviet infantry.
This attack was smashed by prompt fire from light infantry guns and
artillery. The enemy then attempted another attack farther to the
southeast, but this was recognized in good time by the observation
posts and came to nothing. It now became quieter. Single riders and
groups of infantry came over the heights and disappeared into the
bushes and cornfields. Light infantry guns and artillery kept up a
steady fire on recognized targets. By this time the enemy must have
realized that he could not hope to carry out his plan without support
from heavy weapons and artillery, as he now began to move these
into position. Small groups continued to move through the bushes
on this side of Parfenoff Cholm, so that by approximately 05.00
about two enemy battalions had moved forward from a southeasterly
direction against 3rd Platoon.
At the same time heavy dust clouds could be observed from
Ssanzoljubowka to Nedobraja. Apparently the enemy was attempting to move additional forces forward through the forest against II
Battalion and, therefore, 6th Company. The company was subjected
to weak artillery fire from 09.00. By 09.30 this increased to at least
three batteries, whose fire nevertheless remained ineffective.
At approximately the same time, the enemy launched an attack
from the Trigonometer Heights. Well-aimed shells and machine gun
fire quickly stifled the attack; the enemy hastily withdrew, leaving
behind many dead and wounded. This success was reflected in
reports to II Battalion, but at the same time requests for artillery fire
on Parfenoff Cholm and Ssanzoljubowka were denied. Ammunition
for the light infantry guns and 3rd Battery of the 400th Art.Btl. was
in such short supply that it was being reserved for use in an extreme
emergency.
Furious over his failure, the enemy opened up again with heavy
artillery fire and began to attack from the east. The enemy worked
his way to within 300 metres of the 1st Platoon and, as expected,
stormed out of the forest. Defensive fire from light machine guns and
rifles brought the attack to a standstill in front of 1st Platoon's
positions, while a counterattack by 2nd Platoon, supported by the 2
cm Flak half-platoon, threw the enemy back into the forest. Our first
208

losses were suffered here from Russian snipers concealed in trees.

2nd Platoon now took up positions on 1st Platoon's left, at somewhat of a slant to the forest. The enemy pulled back with heavy
losses. Effective fire from several well-positioned heavy mortar
sections had helped repulse the second enemy attack of the morning.
The sun burned down on men and landscape and there were no
shadows or cooling breezes to provide relief from the heat, while the
persistent Russian artillery fire prevented the delivery of anything
drinkable to quench the torturous thirst. The telephone lines were
cut several times and there was no radio communication with
battalion.
In order to form a picture of how things looked ahead of us, Ogefr.
Bhrs twice, and Feldw. Hollstein three times, had to cover the
approximately 1,000 metres back to the battalion command post
through the heaviest artillery fire. Ogefr. Jud and Ogefr. Wilier had
been wounded while fetching ammunition. The anti-tank riflemen
were employed for this task in their place. The deeds of these and
of all the messengers especially Feldw. Hollstein, Ogefr. Bhrs
and Gefr. Amann in these days were above all praise.
In the afternoon Stukas appeared and at once began attacking
targets which had been pinpointed near Ssanzoljubowka. The effect
of their attacks must have been slight, because they had scarcely
disappeared to the west when, at approximately 14.30, the enemy
artillery fire resumed and at 15.30 the third attack of the day began.
In the meantime, the Rothe Platoon had arrived from 7th Company as reinforcement for the left wing although only two sections
came, as Lt. Rothe and the 1st Section had fallen victim to the
Russian artillery fire. The balance of the platoon was placed under
the command of 6th Company and was inserted between the 1st
and 2nd Platoons. Once again, it was the light and heavy machine
guns which beat off the very heavy massed attack. After suffering
extremely heavy losses, the enemy became bogged down 200 metres
in front of the main line of resistance, and as dusk fell the Soviets
pulled back.
During the night, the 10th Company of III Battalion arrived to
reinforce the defences and was deployed on the left next to 6th
Company, its positions extending toward the northwest. The Rothe
Platoon was withdrawn.
Ammunition and rations were brought forward, while the battered
positions were extended and improved. By 23.00 it had become
bitterly cold. Everyone was wide awake, all senses were alert: who
knew whether the Russians, following the day's failures, would
attempt a night attack? In the clear, starry night we could hear calls
and shouts and the clatter of wheels in the distance to the southeast.
What were the Russians planning? Were they moving up fresh
troops?"
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The events of 23 July appeared to have been only the prelude for
the coming day. The Russian forces facing the two battalions of the
Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND were steadily reinforced. Enemy preparations could be heard throughout the night of
2 3 / 2 4 July. Loud shouts rang through the clear night, and the
rumble and rattle of vehicles gave an indication of what was to come.
Both battalions improved their positions, reorganized their defences and supplied their companies with ammunition and replacement
weapons. The greatest problem remained the shortage of ammunition for the heavy infantry weapons and artillery. The supply lines
were already so far from the supply bases, and the supply roads so
often interrupted by enemy incursions, that the ammunition simply
could not be delivered. Once again it would be the Grenadiers who
would bear the weight of the fighting with their light weapons. The
3rd Company under Lt. Fabich was sent forward to reinforce I
Battalion where it was to be employed on the left wing.
The following report from I Battalion's sector at the level crossing
near Kruglowka was made by Obit. Rssert's 2nd Company, which
was employed at the scene of the heaviest fighting:
"The situation on 24. 7. had become especially threatening, as the
Russians had now become accustomed to advancing in skirmishing
lines and taking advantage of their artillery support. The enemy
reached the stream which flowed into the valley in front of our
positions. In the brush-covered terrain on the far side he began to
construct rafts and watercraft for a crossing. Thanks to the outstanding support from our Stukas, which had meanwhile appeared on the
scene and with which we had very good communications through
visual signals, the crossing attempt was, in the main, frustrated. The
Stukas rained destruction on the Russians barely fifty metres ahead
of our positions. Often, rafts with 30 to 40 Russians were hit and
sunk. The Russians apparently had no anti-aircraft guns, so that there
was little they could do to disrupt the Stuka attacks. The only reply
from the other side was furious machine gun fire which met the
Stukas as they approached. Our own artillery could scarcely fire, as
it had no ammunition.
One of the regiment's assault guns, which was temporarily at our
disposal, had meanwhile found work with II Battalion, but it was
often bogged down for long periods in the marshy terrain, so that
we saw it only seldom.
A major danger for our defence arose when it turned out that most
of our heavy weapons had been rendered unusable by enemy artillery
fire, and the wireless equipment as well. Most of the machine guns
and submachine guns no longer fired, having been temporarily
rendered useless by sand. All that we had left were the rifles. As a
result of this, in the long run we could not prevent individual Russians
from slipping across the stream and settling into the wheat fields.
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The 1st Platoon under Feldw. Stadler, which was deployed in a

village which extended in front of our positions, was likewise forced
to defend itself against incessant enemy attacks. Eventually, the
Russians succeeded in outflanking the platoon's positions and for a
time the platoon was cut off. During the night the platoon leader
managed to make contact with the company, and, on orders, led his
entire platoon out of the encirclement and joined up with the
company where the platoon was employed on the right of the sector.
A short time later came the bad news that the Russians had
outflanked our positions and had cut the road behind us. Our
wounded could no longer be sent to the rear. In this dangerous
situation additional units (the 1st and 3rd Companies) were committed. These, with help from the assault guns, cleared the area to
our rear. We suffered painful losses to enemy artillery fire: Feldwebel
Altvater, leader of the company headquarters personnel, was killed
and Uffz. Sssenbach seriously wounded. We were to suffer further
losses during the night."
A dangerous situation also arose for II Battalion that day when the
Russians, after several attempts, finally broke into the battalion's
positions. The following report was made by 6th Company, which
bore the brunt of the fighting:
"The stillness of the night did not last long; Russian artillery began
to fire at approximately 03.00. Dust clouds behind and in front of
the enemy lines indicated that still more guns were being moved
forward. Our own artillery was silent, but we were supposed to
receive support in the form of two batteries from the 88th Artillery
Regiment as well as a Panzer battalion. But when? This question
became ever more acute.
Our machine guns remained silent. We were not to open fire until
the enemy had approached to point-blank range. The Russians
approached ever nearer under cover of their artillery fire, pulling with
them heavy machine guns on small two-wheeled carriages and hastily
moving light artillery pieces into position. The number of artillery
pieces was now beyond counting, but more than 60% of the enemy
fire was directed at the sector held by 6th Company.
Finally, at 09.00, the enemy went to the attack, and once again
his dense ranks were shot to pieces by our machine guns. The
survivors flowed back and once more the Russian artillery opened
up with a heavy fire. One after another our machine guns on the
main battlefield were put out of action. The defences were reorganized in great haste in preparation for the next assault.
On the other side we could see officers with pistols in their hands
riding and running about excitedly in order to assemble their troops
and once again drive them forward. Suddenly, at about 11.30, the
guns went silent along the entire front the losses over there must
have been terrible. Anxiously we observed rising dust clouds to the
211

south and east, apparently created by approaching reserves. And

how did our situation look? More losses; wounded crawling past the
company command post. Already some of the machine guns were
missing. Ofeldw. Sielaff's section on the right was the only one that
still had all three weapons operational and ready to fire. On the left,
where they would be needed most, there was only one light machine
gun left. We dared not raise our heads; if we did, rifle and machine
gun bullets immediately whistled past our ears. Slowly, the time
reached 14.00; it was relatively quiet. Breathing a sigh of relief, we
heard from the visiting battalion adjutant, Obit, von Thiesenhausen,
that a heavy artillery battalion with ammunition was moving into
position and that the 5th and 10th Companies were moving forward
and would be followed by tanks. But when? Raging machine gun and
artillery fire signalled new attacks. Up front with the platoons all hell
had broken loose, communications were poor. We heard hand
grenades exploding; heavy fighting was in progress. It was roughly
16.00. In this situation Feldw. Hollstein called everyone together
who was still healthy. At about 16.30 it became clear that the enemy
had broken into 1st Platoon's positions and that 2nd Platoon could
no longer hold out and was being forced back as it had been
outflanked. The company commander and all available men therefore went into position near the company command post and took
up the fight, but their ammunition was soon running low.
It was a bitter decision for the company commander to give the
order to abandon the position. The Russians were barely 100 metres
away. The last hand grenades were thrown at the enemy, then we
left our holes. Several men fell. We dragged the wounded along with
us; we weren't going to allow anyone to fall into the hands of the
Russians now. We had only four rifles left between us. Lt. Planke
exchanged fire with the Russians and then withdrew in the direction
of 7th Company.
A counterattack by the 5th and 10th Companies got nowhere. The
remnants of 6th Company assembled at the battalion command post
- - there were no more than seven men. Where were the others? 3rd
Platoon was probably still in position, 7th Company was in contact
with it.
Lt. von Neipperg had fallen; the outstanding, already-wounded
Ogefr. Feldmann did not return. He paid for his heroism and spirit
of sacrifice with his life.
Then the first elements of 18th (Pionier) Company arrived. They
attacked and the Russians showed white flags as a signal that they
wished to surrender. When the Pioniers stood up and approached
them, the Russians took cover and opened fire: the Pionier section
suffered 4 dead and 2 wounded. A bitter lesson on the cowardice
and deceitfulness of the enemy, and one which would not be
forgotten.
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Then dust clouds to the north: the promised tanks. But too late!
Only two hours earlier and everything would have gone well. From
18.30 they rolled forward and 6th Company assembled its men.
There weren't many left. Killed in addition to the Leutnant were Uffz.
Juds, Bergmann and Diebler, and with them seven brave Grenadiers.
From among the many wounded, Uffz. Wedel, Ogefr. Stolp and
Grenadier Zoller died at the main dressing station. An initial examination of 6th Company revealed that of 1st Platoon only Gefr. Bergner
and 6 men were left, from 2nd Platoon Lt. Doege with about 20
men and from the Company Headquarters personnel the company
commander and 6 men. There was still no news on 3rd Platoon.
The battalion was ordered to regroup for the night.
On the right, extending to the church hill at Voroshilovo, was 18th
(Pionier) Company, next to it the 7th Company, then the 5th; the
10th Company of III Battalion and 6th Company remained behind
the church hill on the north slope in reserve. Darkness descended
over the events of the day and the mantel of peace spread over the
earth."
The official designation for this desperate struggle was "the Defensive Battle near Jelnja and Smolensk." The Russian divisions arriving
to relieve the situation, mostly from the Far East of that huge country,
had joined in the battle. The German regiments had gone over to
the defensive and held onto the captured territory. The fighting was
bitter. There were still insufficient numbers of German infantry and
the artillery still lacked ammunition.
The next days saw no lessening of the enemy attacks in I Battalion's
sector. The difficulty of those days and hours was once again
reflected in the reports:
"Everywhere in the position we were under rifle fire from ahead
and from both sides. The fire coming from the flank grew steadily
heavier.
Suddenly, Obit. Hnert climbed from his hole. He was wearing his
peaked cap with the bright officer's cord and was smoking a
cigarette. He walked slowly right across the front to the observation
post of the infantry guns. He appeared to us like an apparition: this
big man was walking across the battlefield where no one else dared
even raise a hand. Now and then he looked to the side when
someone fired. Then he, too, ducked down. The infantry guns
desperately needed an order, fire directions or a target assignment,
but the walk by the Oberleutnant was just as important to holding
the position. Obit. Hnert was trusted by his men of his company,
but on this day he also earned their love. Later I asked him why he
had done it. All that he said was: I could no longer justify sending a
messenger.
On the right, the Grenadiers of the Second (2nd Company) had
been lying within a stone's throw of the enemy for days. There the
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The Jelnja Bend, first action (from 30 July 1941).

214

The Desna positions of the I.R. GD from 1-4 September 1941

fighting was dominated by rifle fire and hand grenades. The dead
and living Russians in the bushes at the edge of the stream were often
indistinguishable. Many Grenadiers suffered head wounds inflicted
by fire from the right. Anyone who fired to the front had to expect
to be shot at from the cornfield to the right. For days no one knew
if he would still be alive the next minute.
The commander of 2nd Company was the soul of the resistance
there. He was always calm. He listened to the sound of shots and
reports, considered a while and then issued his orders clearly. He
then repeated the orders himself in the midst of the heaviest fire.
The position's survival depended on him. His men loved him. He
needed only stand calmly in his hole, that Obit. Rssert of the
Second. That was enough.
The companies had become too small. The Second could no
longer fight off a determined assault by the enemy. It would be shot
to pieces from the cornfield. Also, despite the heavy fire, some of
the men had fallen asleep in their holes.
We were to be relieved in the evening! We had to hold on until
then. The Second could scarcely move. More and more Russians
were crawling forward through the cornfield and the bushes. The
concentric assault must begin any minute! Then it would be all over.
It began to get dark and the Russians hadn't come. The snow
fences were mostly used up. There were muzzle flashes from the
enemy positions at the forest's edge. The shells fell to the left near
Hnert's 4th (MG.) Company. Our name for these guns was simply
the 'Ratsch-Bum'.
A messenger arrived during the night: relief not possible, continue
to hold the position. The infantry of the relieving units were needed
elsewhere. Now what were we going to do? Several Grenadiers
overheard the message. Their reaction was: Man, that's totally
impossible!
Everyone was determined to hold out until night. The tension
mounted. It spread through the position like poison. Several men
wept, others immediately fell asleep. Most sat still in their holes. Our
eyes were red from the heat, smoke and lack of sleep. The faces of
the men were gaunt, but marked, as if the finest shapes were only
chiselled by the greatest danger.
Another day of the heaviest fighting went by until, finally, the
Russians achieved penetrations in every company's sector. Following
the assault the Russians shared holes with the dead Grenadiers.
Germans and Russians were often only 20 metres apart. Here a slit
trench with Grenadiers, next to it one with Russians and, as always,
Russians in the bushes ahead. For hours the battle raged with rifles,
hand grenades and pistols. In the long run our position was hopeless.
In the evening we began to take fire from directly behind. Not a single
board remained from the linesman's shack.
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Obit. Hnert radioed battalion: We will not withdraw!

The infantry from the right, which was to have come to our
assistance, was diverted elsewhere. A man at a machine gun received
a stomach wound. He was alone in his hole. The man shot himself
with his pistol. Immediately afterward two Russians jumped into the
hole.
The commander drove forward in a motorcycle-sidecar while it
was still light. Anyone who would do that had obviously already had
done with life, as had the Grenadiers in their holes. We could scarcely
believe his order: that evening a machine gun battalion was going
into position several hundred metres behind us. We were going to
disengage from the enemy. Once again a crisis had to be overcome
to prevent the withdrawal from becoming a flight.
Silently the Grenadiers crept from their holes. The damaged guns
and heavy weapons were brought back with the men as were the
wounded. Our legs were stiff and it was a miracle that any of us could
walk at all. By approximately 01.00 the last section had left its holes.
A Russian patrol followed only 50 metres behind. It was driven off
with hand grenades."
The last men of I Battalion the Grenadiers of 2nd Company
left the positions at the railway embankment near Kruglovka on the
night of 2 6 / 2 7 July 1941. They were taken into 1st and 3rd
Companies' prepared positions at the edge of the forest. A map
found on a Russian officer showed the strength of the Russians in
this sector: three enemy divisions had attacked and been stopped.
The heroism of the officers and men had prevented this force from
breaking into the flank of Panzergruppe Guderian. Their sacrifice
was reflected in the casualty figures. 2nd Company, which had born
the brunt of the fighting by I Battalion, suffered 16 dead and 24
wounded, some seriously.
The regimental order of 29 July 1941 once again bespoke the
severity, but also the decisive importance, of this operation by the
entire regiment not just I Battalion near Kruglovka, but also II
Battalion near Voroshilovo and the supporting heavy weapons of
the heavy battalions and artillery:
"Following the successful completion of its security duties along the
advance road, the regiment, now in the front line, forced the crossing over
the Dniepr in a daring advance against strong enemy resistance. This action
assured XXXXVI Panzer Corps a secure crossing point and made possible
the continuation of the advance.
In the period 11. 7. to 27. 7., during the determined attempts by the
enemy to recover the bridgehead we had created and later to break through
the front held by us, the regiment successfully held out in the most difficult
defensive fighting against a numerically far superior enemy in the strength

217

of several divisions on a width of front that only you Grenadiers and

Cannoneers could be expected to hold.
Under the heaviest artillery fire, not only has the regiment held its
positions, but its courageous counterattacks with bayonets and hand
grenades have repeatedly smashed the massed attacks by the enemy
infantry.
You have all made a decisive contribution to the holding of the front won
by the advancing spearheads, the securing of communications with the rear
and the destruction of powerful elements of the Russian Army. The
regiment's rear-echelon services have played an outstanding part in maintaining the unit's fighting strength.
Once again, glowing examples of heroic bravery adorn the regiment's
shield of glory. Filled with pride in your accomplishments, I express my
unbounded appreciation and fullest thanks.
With sorrow we think of our comrades who have sealed their loyalty with
death in the victorious battles. To our wounded go our sincere wishes for
a full recovery.
New battles stand before us!
The Inf.Rgt. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND will continue to do its duty."
signed von Stockhausen
The companies were allowed only a short period indeed, only
a few hours of rest. A new, dangerous situation in the Jelnja bend
called for reinforcements. Once again the regiment had to move on,
new operations awaited. The Bolsheviks wanted to push into the
large bend of the Jelnja which thrust into their second major
defensive line, the UschaDesna line at any cost. They intended
to employ whatever means were necessary to overcome this
dangerous penetration into their defensive position. To this end no
sacrifice would be too great. In the last days of July the regiment's
battalions drove through Choslawitschi, Potschinok and Baltutino,
reaching the city of Jelnja for which the new defensive sector was
named. The city, which was in ruins, presented a bleak appearance,
and was located on the major RoslavlDorogobush highway, which
was even paved. Otherwise the roads, which constituted the lines of
communication with the front, were scarcely passable. The front was
somewhere to the east, northeast and north somewhere in the
forests on the far side of the city.
The forward command post of the I.R. GD was set up in a small
village north of the city of Jelnja on the road to Dorogobush. The
battalions occupied their sectors on both sides of Uschakowa on 30
July, and scarcely had they begun to dig in when they came under
very heavy Russian artillery fire.

218

The unusual width of the sector in the salient, which extended

farther east than any other at that time, made necessary the
employment of all three rifle battalions in the front line. This time
the focus of the enemy's attacks and his artillery fire was on the
positions held by III Battalion.
For those who took part in the battle, the night at Uschakowa will
not be forgotten:
"There was little one could do, and nothing could prevent the
enemy from placing his masses of artillery wherever he liked.
Apparently the Russians had now got a bearing on our wireless
equipment. We had just crawled like rabbits into our narrow holes
when shells from a light battery whizzed towards us with a ringing,
poisonous sound. They exploded directly above us in the trees. We
therefore chose for once to put our helmets on. Then several heavy
guns joined in. There were no pauses between the impacts. The
shells hissed, whistled and crashed incessantly; splinters flew
everywhere. We sat pressed close together in the semi-darkness of
the slit trench. Sand trickled into our collars. Sometimes our drawnup knees shook that meant that a shell had landed quite close.
There was nothing we could do; we couldn't defend ourselves. All
we could do was wait for what? Our only hope was to escape a
direct hit!! Any other state of affairs seemed like paradise to us.
Suddenly the Russian artillery fire began again. The enemy was
launching another attack. He succeeded in breaking through in one
place. With shouts of 'Urra!' the Russians stormed into the night.
An attack from the flank threw them back out of our lines, but the
artillery fire continued to rain down as before."
That was how the day went: heavy enemy artillery fire, including,
for the first time, the so-called "Stalin Organ", which fired a salvo of
36 rockets. Its greatest effect lay in the large amount of shrapnel it
spread horizontally over a wide area. The new weapon's effect on
morale was alarming.
On 2 August Gefreiter Benk of I Battalion was killed in a sudden
barrage. More and more men were wounded, further reducing the
strength of the units. The depleted battle groups rallied round their
leaders. It was totally immaterial whether the man in command was
an officer, sergeant or corporal. They also held out from sheer spite.
Several of the younger soldiers wept. They were quietly reprimanded.
Nearly all of those with minor wounds remained with their companies
and carried on swathed in bloody bandages.
The small city of Gridina was taken on 2 August after heavy
fighting. Obit, von Usadel, commander of 9th Company, was killed
by enemy artillery fire, reducing the unit's strength a little more. The
commander of 10th Company, Obit, von Harder, was wounded so
seriously that he died two days later. That was how the fighting went
in this sector more defence than attack. The Bolsheviks attacked
219

the German positions in 8 to 10 waves, driven on by their commissars. Nevertheless, the positions held.
The style of fighting changed little on 4 August:
"At 06.30 in the morning artillery fire directly on our position. The
dug-outs shook. How long before we took a direct hit? It was a
murderous hail of steel. We were completely blanketed. Then there
was a droning overhead: Soviet aircraft! Nine Russian planes attacked our positions. Finally, at about midday, the fire abated, only to
resume as darkness fell. The calibre of the enemy guns was 21 cm.
The earth shook as the shells impacted; it was a nerve-straining wait.
If only this bombardment would end! We nervously smoked one
cigarette after another. No one would forget Uschakowa."
The Pioniers of 18th (Pionier) Company were repeatedly sent to
the attack against the Russian positions between Gridina and Ustinowa, finally with success. It was the company's 3rd Platoon which
broke into the enemy positions. The cost was high: over 40 dead
and wounded were counted approximately one fifth of the entire
company.
Every man in this sector was conscious of the necessity of these
sacrifices: a Russian breakthrough toward the west and south had to
be prevented and all resources committed to hold the territory which
had been won. It was to be from this piece of territory that the new
German offensive would one day be launched.
The regiment's days near Uschakowa came to an end. A period
of rest was planned. The 15th Infantry Division one of the infantry
divisions which was hurrying to catch up with the spearhead of the
advance relieved the Grenadiers of Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND in their positions.
The regiment's period of rest in the DankowoWaskowo (station)
area was a brief one. All hopes of time to recover from the strain of
the previous days of combat and the inner desire for a longer time
away from the danger of the front vanished when orders arrived on
9 August placing the regiment on alert. I.R. GD was to go into action
to the west of its previous area of operations. I Battalion was to move
into the wooded terrain around and west of Klimjatino. The other
two battalions were to go into position farther to the left, therefore
to the west, with their front facing north. In order to take advantage
of more favourable defensive possibilities, the regiment's positions
were moved back to two villages. Ill Battalion moved into Ssuborowka, while I Battalion occupied Jerdezy. The regiment's positions
formed an arc open to the north whose left wing joined up with the
90th Inf.Rgt. at the Dniepr. The regimental command post was
located in Dubassischtsche, south of the JelnjaSmolensk railway
line. This security sector was quieter, with few enemy attacks and
repeated, but not so heavy, artillery barrages. The terrain in this area
was impenetrable and jungle-like, very unfavourable for the defence.

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The field of fire was often only a few metres. German patrols combed
the area, always expecting an ambush from behind the next bush.
The river lowlands was a tricky area. Patrols suffered casualties, but
knowledge of the enemy's intentions was vital. The following account
is typical:
"A clearing. Machine gun and rifle fire crackled from half- right,
not more than fifty metres away. We immediately threw ourselves to
the ground. I took cover behind a small embankment with the
Unteroffizier section leader. Bullets hissed just overhead. Right
beside me lay a Gefreiter who had no cover. I called to him to crawl
over to us, but he didn't move. We rolled him over onto his back. A
small trickle of blood ran from his lips. His red cheeks became pale
in a few minutes and then turned a yellowish shade. His eyes were
still, his face relaxed and well-proportioned. The Gefreiter had been
walking only a few centimetres behind me. The step to death is only
a small one."
The I.R. GD was withdrawn from these positions on the night of
18/19 August. Brought up in the regiment's empty vehicles, men
of the 463rd Inf.Rgt. occupied the positions which, all in all, had
been quieter than the first sector in the bend of the Jelnja.
Once again a rest was scheduled for all the units of the regiment
and this time it actually came about. There were, perhaps, some who
half expected that their hopes for a period of quiet would come to
nothing because of a critical situation at the front. This had happened
before and no one could be certain; only rarely did the tension of the
next operation leave the soldiers.
The regiment's soldiers took up quarters in the Waskowo
ChochlowkaRudnaja Polyana area and the period of rest began.
Weapons and equipment were cleaned and overhauled, and the
soldiers found time to indulge in leisure activities:
"Mornings we all jumped into the lake. There was much splashing
and shouting and impromptu racing. Then followed a monumental
breakfast; the field kitchen even treated us to real coffee. Someone
managed to organize some honey.
We lay in the meadow and dozed in the sunshine, relishing every
breath. This was the life of the warrior, full of contrasts and always
on the edge of existence. In eight days we would again be in a hole
in combat, and in fourteen days perhaps already dead. But no one
was crippled by such thoughts. Instead we lived life more consciously,
also more simply. We just lived. In contrast, in peacetime one merely
passed the days."
Oberst Walter Hoernlein, commander of the Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND since 10 August 1941, a tall, lean figure
who spoke a north German dialect, visited the companies in their
quarters in turn. Such commander-to-soldier and soldier-to- soldier
contact produced the teamwork that influenced a unit's success in
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the field. Often a look, a gesture or a movement was enough for the
other to tell: here is someone I can depend on, or, he will never
amount to anything.
25 August 1941 was a day of honour for the entire regiment: Obit.
Hnert, commander of I Battalion's machine gun company, was
decorated with the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. It was the first
high decoration for the regiment since the beginning of the war
against the Soviet Union:
"The battalion stood drawn up in a square formation at the lake.
The machine gun company was not there yet. Obit. Hnert was
avoiding a lot of standing around. As they marched in, he was not
pleased with his company's order. Annoyed, he turned them around
and marched them in again. The rest of the battalion waited.
Completely annoyed at his company, Hnert positioned himself on
its right wing.
The Oberst reported to the Major. The Oberst spoke a brief word
in recognition of our difficult defensive battles not forced, but quite
naturally. It was just the type of address we wanted to hear. We felt
at one with the Oberst.
Obit. Hnert was ordered to step forward. He had no idea what
was going on.
The Oberst hung the Knight's Cross on Obit. Hnert and shook
his hand. The old man with the Knight's Cross at his throat like
one of Old Fritz' colonels congratulated the young, tough officer.
The magic of the Order of the Pour le Mrite was in the air.
The two officers reviewed the troops. Actually, to say it was a
review is an overstatement. The Oberst had no love for this sort of
thing and simply walked off with Hnert at his side. After the machine
gun company had been dismissed, the men crowded around to
congratulate their commander. Everyone wanted to shake his hand
and see him and his decoration up close, but they didn't dare to raise
him on their shoulders. Hnert was extremely pleased. He said very
little: 'Actually, I have a feeling that I ought to hang this Knight's
cross on one of you!' And on this great day every man of the battalion
really felt as if he had been decorated himself."
The sunny days became fewer; rain and cold nights signalled a
change in the weather. In Russia winter began much earlier at these
latitudes than in the west, in Germany.

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Chapter Six
The Battle of Kiev
Departure orders came on the evening of 30 August. The regiment
faced a new assignment. The days of rest were over, duty called the
Grenadiers to the site of new action. This time it was the Ukraine,
that wide, rich and abundant land which was known as the granary
of Russia.
The march southward progressed quickly over paved roads. The
regiment passed through Roslavl, Lukawiza and Starodub, where it
crossed the border into the Ukraine. The landscapes which met the
Grenadiers were different than before. Not only were dense forests
now a rarity, but the land as such, and especially the inhabitants,
made a better impression; everything was clean and orderly. The
houses had front gardens, the people were better clothed, neater
and friendlier.
The situation farther south at this time was as follows: seven
Russian armies were occupying a westwards-facing salient which
extended west from Trubtschewsk on the Desna as far as the
confluence of the Sosch (Sosa) and Dniepr rivers, thence south along
the Dniepr through Cherkassy, near Kiev, joining up with the general
front line near Kremenchug. The Russians were committing everything they had to hold this projecting position, although they knew
that this presented the Germans with an opportunity to pinch off the
salient.
On 22 August 1941 orders were issued for the destruction of the
Soviet forces in the Kiev area. On 25 August the German Second
Army, together with Panzergruppe 2, launched an attack to the
south. The first objective of the Panzergruppe was Konotop, which
lay far in the enemy rear. Its capture was part of the plan to create
a pocket at Kiev.
I.R. GD was one of the units called upon to protect Panzergruppe
2's unprotected 200 kilometre-long eastern flank against expected
enemy attacks. The regiment crossed the Desna river, which had
been forced by the panzers days before, near NovgorodSeversk.
The bridge was about 600 metres long. Enemy bombers made
repeated attempts to destroy the span. As soon as the regiment
arrived, the battalions were employed to secure the bridgehead and
relieve the 12th Rifle Regiment, which had distinguished itself during
the crossing.

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Ill Battalion's sector was about eight kilometres wide. Half of the
position ran through dense forest. The companies were positioned
accordingly: 9th and 10th Companies were stationed in the forest,
while 11th Company held a sector which was more than four
kilometres wide, but with a better field of fire. Initially, I Battalion
remained at the bridge in reserve.
In general it was quiet with scarcely any enemy contact. Positions
were selected and set up with great care the bridgehead had to be
held at all costs and the flanks of the two attacking panzer divisions
protected. Patrols determined that III Battalion was apparently faced
only by Russian reserve divisions, old men of the Soviet 468th
Infantry Division. There were no unusual occurrences or casualties
in the period up to the evening of 4 September, when the regiment
was relieved. Elements of the 29th Reconnaissance Battalion arrived
to relieve III Battalion during the night.
Withdrawn from the NovgorodSeversk bridgehead, I.R. GD
marched south through Pirogovka, Schostka and Voronezh into the
area west of Gluchow. Its assignment was to secure the road and
supply routes to the east. As part of the assignment the regiment
was to patrol as far as Gluchow. The regiment occupied its security
sector unhindered by the enemy. The regimental command post was
located in VoronezhGluchow. II Battalion was positioned in and
near Schostenskiy with the 6th, 7th and 8th Companies in and near
Polejewka and Ussok facing northeast and 5th Company near
Makow. Ill Battalion was south of VoroneshGluchow, while I
Battalion remained in its old positions. The 3rd Panzer Division
secured the area farther south in and near DolgalewkaKrolewez.
Only rarely did the patrols lead to minor clashes with the enemy.
However, all of the bridges had apparently been prepared for
demolition by the Russians. Following hurried preparations, II and
III Battalions attacked Gluchow and reached the edge of the town
without resistance. The town was taken at about 18.00, with II
Battalion moving in from the northwest and elements of III Battalion
from the west and south. Resistance in the town itself was weak.
The regiment's train followed, and soon the main body of the unit
was in quarters. It was 7 September 1941. Gluchow was burning in
several places and, as darkness fell, the companies moved out in long
columns to take up their security positions at the northern, eastern
and southern limits of the town.
In the meantime, I Battalion was involved in several defensive
actions. Gefr. Zimmermann was killed. On 8 September the battalion
joined the rest of the regiment in Gluchow, where it took over a share
of the security duties.
8 September saw elements of the regiment brought to departure
readiness. An advance detachment was formed, consisting of:

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17th (Motorcycle) Company

18th (Pionier) Company
11th (Rifle) Company
one platoon each from the 13th (Lt.Inf.Gun) Company and the 14th
(Pz.Jg.) Company
a battery from the 400th Artillery Battalion.
The advance detachment's assignment was to win the Sejm river
and establish a bridgehead near Putiwl. Under the command of
Obstlt. Bandelow, commander of IV Battalion, the detachment drove
to Wolokitino on the Kleweniij without meeting any resistance. There
the troops left their vehicles. The battle group assembled for the
attack on 9 September, harassed by enemy mortar fire. The attack
began. 9th Company stormed forward to the riverbank with its
inflatable boats as if on the exercise field. The first elements then
crossed the river and broke into the enemy positions on the far bank.
The attack cost the attacking companies four killed, but it laid the
ground for the continuation of the attack against Putiwl, whose
capture was decisive for the subsequent combat operations.
Further elements of the regiment had meanwhile arrived to fortify
the bridgehead, but also to occupy assembly areas for a further attack
to the south. The enemy launched a night attack while the regiment's
forces were still assembling for their own attack. However, this was
beaten off by concentrated defensive fire. The regiment's attack
began at 04.30 on 10 September, with III Battalion on the left,
spearheaded by 9th Company, and II Battalion on the right. The
attack made rapid progress. Enemy resistance stiffened on the
heights in front of Lykoff. The attackers quickly regrouped for an
attack on the village. During the attack on Lykoff Lt. Schrmann was
killed. Uffz. Bergner and Gefr. Ahl distinguished themselves while
storming a Russian battery. That evening elements of II Battalion,
as well as 10th Company, reached the Sejm. It was raining heavily.
Nevertheless, the regiment's commander ordered the resumption of
the attack on Putiwl. The attack could not be resumed until early on
11 September, however, due to the very poor road conditions. Putiwl
was taken by 10th Company in the face of weak resistance. The
enemy appeared to be concentrated at the Sejm, and the regiment
dispatched an advance detachment under Obit. Walle to reach the
river. Soviet resistance stiffened before it could reach the river,
however, and the advance detachment was initially unable to break
through. The German force was unable to prevent the destruction
of the Sejm bridge and afterwards it pulled back to Putiwl.
Ill Battalion reported losses of 13 killed and about 75 wounded in
the period 9. 9. - 11. 9.
Another bridgehead across the Sejm, which was held largely by
elements of II Battalion, was taken by surprise by a Russian night

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attack. A platoon from II Battalion was almost completely wiped out.

When Battle Group Schwarzrock and elements of 10th Company
arrived as reinforcements, they were met by a horrible sight. More
than 30 Grenadiers lay scattered about on the ground, tongues cut
out, eyes poked out, horribly mutilated. There was nothing to be
seen of the sadistic Bolsheviks. A deep sadness settled over the entire
battalion at the news of the brutal murder of their comrades. Nothing
in their experience so far had prepared the men for this type of
warfare.
Elements of the 17th Panzer Division moved into Putiwl, freeing
the regiment for other duties. The heavy weapons were moved up,
and further elements of the regiment crossed over the Sejm to the
south.
On 14 September I.R. GD received orders to prepare for an attack
to the south on Schilowka. The attack's objectives were to cut the
KievKurskMoscow railway line at Schilowka and then veer to the
west and roll up the Russian positions south of the Sejm. The final
objective was the city of Konotop on the south bank of the river.
In the afternoon, following a brief barrage by the heavy weapons,
III Battalion, with II Battalion and the 40th Rifle Rgt. on its left,
stormed across flooded meadows and deep ditches towards the
heights about four kilometres north of the railway line. These had
been reported heavily fortified. The heights were taken as darkness
fell and security posted. All three battalions were in position. The
attack cost the life of Lt. Boehm of III Battalion. Boehme was
wounded in the groin and, unable to stop the heavy bleeding from
a severed artery, bled to death before help could reach him.
After destroying two enemy batteries, the leading elements of II
Battalion, as well as 10th and 11th Companies from III Battalion,
broke into Schilowka and occupied the town following a brief
firefight. Night attacks by Russian bombers inflicted some damage,
but the Grenadiers took little notice.
After taking Schilowka the I.R. GD turned to the west and II
Battalion was transferred to Alexandrowka. 16 September brought
orders to attack Sswetschkino, northwest of Schilowka, where
enemy resistance was said to have stiffened. The companies were
driven forward in empty supply trucks. Ill Battalion's war diary
provided further details:
"At roughly 05.00 on 17. 9. 41 orders to attack Sswetschkino.
Right II Btl., left III Btl. Advance on foot. No resistance as far as the
heights in front of Sswetschkino, the enemy had dug in at the edge
of the village. The rifle companies advanced behind the assault guns:
on the right 11th Company, on the left 9th Company and behind
them 10th Company. During the battle the assault guns and several
anti-tank guns put 8 enemy tanks and 9 anti-tank guns out of action.
One rapid-firing 7.62 cm gun was also destroyed. The enemy was
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finally thrown back after bitter fighting and the leading companies
reached the edge of the village. The Russians pulled back in panic.
The west exit from the village was soon taken and secured.
The assault guns continued the advance and succeeded in destroying or capturing a large part of the enemy's supply train. Trucks,
ammunition and documents fell into our hands. Among the Russians
killed and captured were a number of female soldiers. Orders to
continue the attack arrived at about 15.00. New objective: Bankowa.
We advanced along the road. Motorized reconnaissance revealed the
area to be free of the enemy. Afterwards we climbed aboard following
vehicles and drove to Konotop, where our billets were."
The city of Konotop offered one feature of modern civilization in
the form of electric lights. The Germans were also favourably
impressed by the city's neat appearance, orderly streets, stone
houses and good quarters. The men soon felt at home and took
advantage of the opportunity for a brief rest.
On 18 September the I.R. GD was again transferred into the
Sswetschkino area for security and mopping up duties. The regiment
was soon moved again, however, this time to Schilowka. In the early
morning of 20 September it assembled for an attack in the direction
of Belopolje, east of Schilowka. The first objective was Djakowka,
where the enemy had dug in and was putting up stubborn resistance.
Well-aimed rifle and machine gun fire and heavy anti-tank and mortar
fire showed the Bolsheviks' will to resist. Following several futile
attempts, including efforts to the left of the railway line by II Battalion
and to the right by III Battalion, the enemy resistance was broken.
The Russians withdrew during the night.
On 22 September the regiment reached the Klimowka rail junction
outside Belopolje. The withdrawing Russians had blown up the
station and track system. There was no enemy contact. The regiment
paused and made preparations to continue the advance.
The enemy soon regrouped, however, and stood ready to launch
a counterattack. It was even rumoured that stronger enemy forces
were nearing the GluchowPutivl supply road. The regiment initially
planned to take up a defensive line along the Wiry river. This was
not done, however, as it would have stretched the unit's resources
too thin. Instead, the regiment manned a defensive line which ran
from Putivl through Djakowka along the railway line to Babakoff
Station. I Battalion was located in Putivl, while II Battalion's positions
were east of Schilowka along the railway line facing northeast. Ill
Battalion's 9th and 10th Companies were at Babakoff Station. The
defenders could not allow the Russians to cross the Wiry, but they
possessed insufficient forces to extend their positions right up to the
river. This inconsistency would later prove disadvantageous for the
defence. The companies moved into their oversized sectors, some
of which were poorly chosen for defence. However, the enemy was
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initially quiet; in fact, there was little contact at all. German patrols
which felt their way up to the river encountered only individual groups
of Russians, who were likewise carrying out patrols. A motorized
patrol from 6th Company was ambushed by the Russians. Uffz.
Bergner, Gefr. Ehm and Gefr. Ring were killed and three others listed
as missing. German patrols determined that the area was weakly
occupied, and it was concluded that the main body of the Russian
force was still east and northeast of the Wiry.
The regiment remained in these positions in the face of increasing
enemy activity until 3 October. During this time the Russians
succeeded in crossing the Wiry at several locations and occupied
individual villages. Patrols revealed that Nowyja Wiry and Sstaryja
Wiry as well as Hf. Woroshba were held by the enemy. Heavy
weapons were also being moved into the area. In particular, Russian
anti-tank guns were making their presence felt, forcing the
Grenadiers to ground, while the enemy infantry worked its way ever
closer to the German security positions. Casualties mounted. Lt.
Gnter was wounded seriously. The assault guns had to be called on
for help more frequently, and German artillery fire on recognized
enemy positions increased.
The situation was uncomfortable, especially for III Battalion near
Babakoff. It began to rain, and wet boots made any activity more
difficult. The soldiers recalled the battles in the Jelnja bend. The
nights became quite cold, and by the end of September water froze
overnight.
The Bolsheviks launched an attack from the village of
Tscherewatoj, but they were driven back by fire from the regiment's
artillery and heavy infantry guns. The terrain, which contained many
ravines, often allowed the Russians to approach unnoticed, which
was very disadvantageous for the defenders. What was more, the
Russian artillery with guns up to 15 cm calibre was now more
active. Under its protection Russian infantry moved up to within 30
metres of the German positions.
Meanwhile, I Battalion received orders to move by vehicle from
Putivl through Schilowka towards Nikolajewka-Nikolajenka and reinforce the regiment's right wing. The order illustrates the types of
demands made of the motorized units: the regiment was asked to
leave a defensive position, travel over 100 kilometres and occupy
two villages in a new area of operations without precise knowledge
of the terrain involved or the enemy's capabilities. In the beginning,
demands such as these were made only of good and homogeneous
units whose commanders had the situation well in hand. Later, in
other actions, this change in tactics became commonplace, a fact
which made command noticeably more difficult and constantly
increased the demands on the units. The Grenadier was forced to
bear this burden, but the overstrain was reflected in reduced results.
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Attrition among unit leaders, especially company and platoon commanders, increased to such a level that, in the end, their places had
to be taken by lance- corporals and corporals. This was the first sign
of the beginning of the unprecedented sacrifices which would eventually end in chaos.
The executive officer of I Battalion/I.R. GD described in detail the
assignment given the battalion:
"The 100 kilometres were difficult, and we didn't arrive until
evening. We had to assemble for the attack straightaway. The two
villages lay one behind the other. They were called Nikolajewka and
Nikolajenka. Nikolajenka was to be taken first, then we were to leave
the village and defend Nikolajewka, which lay behind it. We didn't
think much of that. Why first take a village and then give it up? To
what end the losses? We didn't understand and tried to have the
orders changed.
Nikolajewka was taken on the evening of 26. 9. in the face of weak
opposition. Several enemy guns fired from the next village,
Nikolajenka. The Major again demonstrated his fine nose for
battle: he refused to carry out the attack without first reassembling
his troops. He therefore called off the attack. It was his view that the
following day's battle would not be so easy.
It was 04.30. Patrols had reported Nikolajenka free of enemy
troops, but we didn't trust the quiet. Surely the enemy had been
sleeping; also, it was rather foggy. The terrain over which we would
attack was easy to describe:
Our village, in which we assembled for the attack 1,200 metres
of absolutely flat stubble-field then Nikolajena and to the right a
railway embankment where the Russians had dug in. This terrain
would not have been chosen for a peacetime attack exercise.
The plan of attack was not a simple one. We had to focus not on
the village, but on the railway embankment which lay to the right;
otherwise we would be running our heads against the wall at the
village. The 'Third' would therefore have to set out first and occupy
the embankment. On the left, the 'First' would attack the village once
the way was clear. The 'Second' was stationed far to the right with
the heavy weapons as security, and did not take part in this attack.
We thus had less than the full battalion available. In this attack our
spirit and training would have to win. On this day it was the only
advantage we had.
The 'Third' deployed and left our village, while the 'First' lay
well-camouflaged in readiness to the left. After 15 minutes the
Russians noticed something was up. Their artillery fire began to fall
on Nikolajewka, which we had just left. Soon afterward the Leutnant
commanding the 'First' also set out somewhat early, but it was
better than staying put under artillery fire.

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Things were not going well on the flat stubble-field. Rifle and
machine gun fire poured in from the railway embankment. There
were at least four Russian machine guns. The 'Third' lay flat and dug
itself in. There was firing from Nikolajenka; that was a job for our
infantry guns. They shrouded the whole village in smoke and dust.
Part of the machine gun company joined the 'Third' up front. There
was 400 metres left to cross. We realized that we could not silence
the Russians at the railway embankment. That was a job for the
machine gun company.
Things were going even worse for the 'First' farther to the left.
They came under steady mortar fire, moved out of range and then
came under Russian machine gun fire from the village. They advanced straight at the enemy, and many were brave against their will.
On the stubble-field there was nowhere to hide or take cover from
the bullets.
If Lt. Miede, the 1st Company's young Leutnant, had not acted,
his company would have been shot to pieces in half an hour. His
order was: 'Fire!' The company was magnificent. Although there
was no cover, every single man fired his rifle, machine gun or
submachine gun at every Russian that appeared. The Leutnant
watched through his field glasses and listened to the music of battle.
After twenty minutes the Russian fire had lessened noticeably. The
'First' had gained the upper hand. Miede sprang forward to the
company's foremost platoon and threw himself down in the front
line. 'Up move move!! Hurrah!!' The Leutnant led the charge.
The company stormed towards the enemy with all guns blazing.
At the same time the 'Third' took the railway embankment. There
it was not a charge, but a laborious effort which took the enemy
position. The machine gun company went into position up front,
where it could effectively cover the area to the left behind the village.
Its four machine guns raked groups of Russians fleeing past following
the assault by the 'First'.
Following their initial confusion, the Russians turned around to
escape the terrible machine gun fire. The 'First' ran headlong into
the fleeing Russians, resulting in a very confused situation. One
senior Obergefreiter suddenly came face to face with two Russians
in some bushes. Without a moment's hesitation he stuck his flare
pistol in the face of one of the Russians, as that was the only weapon
at hand. The company took about 70 prisoners, much to the
satisfaction of the Leutnant.
The battle for Nikolajenka was significant. What had turned the
tide was the heavy fire laid down by the individual Grenadiers. On a
completely level field, the companies had silenced the enemy with
accurate fire from 400 metres. Several factors made this success
possible: the Leutnant led his men forward under fire, and the
Grenadiers found the courage to raise their heads and fire accurately
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while themselves under fire, and then to get up and storm the enemy
position.
Dead Russians lay everywhere, at the railway embankment and in
their trenches. Many had been shot in the head or chest, torn apart
by hand grenades or killed with rifle butts or spades. We seldom used
the bayonet in storming an enemy position. Most fired their weapons
until at close quarters and then used a sharpened spade or dagger.
Unfortunately, the spade was not always readily at hand, as we kept
them stuck in our belts with the blade in front of our stomachs.
The battalion's losses in this assault were 6 dead and 20 wounded.
Our combat assignment had been carried out."
By the beginning of October, quiet had gradually settled over the
sector held by regiment. There was little direct contact with the
enemy other than artillery and mortar fire. Reserves relieved the
forward companies in rotation, providing the men with much-needed
rest.
The routine of these days was well-described in an order written
on a simple registration form by Major Krger of III Battalion:
Issuer:

Sent from:

Date:

III / I.R. GD

Btl. Command Post

2. 10. 41.

To
9th Company, hvy. Company, lgt. and hvy. Inf. Gun. Platoons,
400th Art. Btl.
1. No offensive operations by enemy in battalion's sector on 2. 10.
41. Instead, the enemy is blanketing the battalion's positions
especially strongpoint 97.63 with heavy artillery fire.
2. On 2. 10. at 18.15, 11th Company will be relieved by 10th
Company and move back into the area 500 metres west of Point
97.63 (haystack) as battalion reserve. Preparations are to be made
to explore and exploit opportunities for action toward the heights
south of Babakoff and the reinforcement of Strongpoint 97.63.
3. Operational assignment and signals communications light and
heavy infantry guns as before.
4. One forward observer to remain with each company employed in
the front line. Barrage fire areas as before.
5. Anti-tank defence as in order 1. 10. 41. Tank warning = flare
signal: red-white.
signed Krger

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Chapter Seven
Forest Battle near Karachev
Relief for the regiment finally arrived on 3 October. Elements of
the 153rd Rifle regiment moved forward during the day and early
evening to take over the regiment's positions.
Twenty-four hours earlier, three panzer and infantry armies of
Army Group Centre had launched the attack on Moscow:
"On the southern wing the Second Panzer Army (formerly Panzergruppe 2) set out toward the northeast from the area around Putivl
on 30 September. It had the longest path to cover and, taking
advantage of powerful air support, was to reach the Orel area as
quickly as possible. Screening its open southeast flank, Second
Panzer Army achieved its objective by 3 October, while its left wing
had already veered towards Brjansk and now stood in the rear of the
enemy forces facing the German Second Army.
On 2 October 1941 the other armies of Army Group Centre,
supported by the Second and Fourth Air Fleets, abruptly went to the
attack, taking the Soviets by surprise.
The Second and Fourth Armies and the Fourth Panzer Army
(formerly Panzergruppe 4) smashed a wide, deep breach in the
enemy front which led to the formation of two large pockets, in the
south around Brjansk and in the north around Wjasma."
These movements led to the double battle of Vyazma and Bijansk,
in which the I.R. GD was not initially directly involved. Rather, it was
initially although only temporarily removed from the Second
Panzer Army and transferred north into the Roslavl area. The journey
was made over terrible roads (there were numerous cases of vehicles
suffering broken springs) through Sswetschkino, Konotop, Baturin,
Tschernikow, Gomel and Propoisk.
9 October 1941, in itself a quiet day like many others in the long
war, would not have been worthy of note had several events not
coincided: the regiment was ordered to departure readiness, the first
snowfall of the war in the east took place, and a religious service was
held in the field by I Battalion.
On 11 October the regiment was on the march from Roslavl
through Schukowka and Brjansk to Karachev. From there it veered
to the north into the Karachev Forest. The regiment's assignment
was to take up positions in the forest north of the city and prevent
Russian units from breaking out of the pocket to the east. In blowing
snow the regiment disappeared into the forest along the muddy
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roads. Often the men sank into the loose, muddy subsoil; boots
became stuck and had to be left behind. The troops encamped for
the night in and around Sholtowodje, north of Karachev. Attack
orders arrived during the night, which specified the capture of the
village and sawmill at Annino. Throughout the night the companies
moved laboriously towards the assembly area so as to be in position
for the attack at dawn.
By 01.00, I Battalion under Major Gehrke was already plodding
along the forest lane toward the north. Its objective was the Resseta
river. Its assignment was to win the river and to secure to the north
and west. The 2nd Company under Obit. Darjes and the heavy
company remained behind to secure several crossings and clearings
along the road. The forest lane was the regiment's route of advance
and had to be held to ensure supply of the advancing I Battalion. I
Battalion was followed by II Battalion and, farther to the rear, III
Battalion. The regimental command post was initially located in
Sholtowodje.
The forest north of Karachev was an impenetrable, jungle-like
thing. Only a few bumpy, rutted roads led through it, and most of
these were torn up and reinforced with field-stone. Slightly raised,
they ran like cords through the wooded terrain. The few side roads
that branched off soon turned into forest lanes which looked to all
appearances to be firm. However, when the heavy vehicles drove
over them they quickly turned out to be bottomless mud. Usually
they ran deep into the midst of the forest. There were only a few
clearings, and these were bordered by high grass which restricted
the view. Although it appeared normal, the subsoil was swampy.
The longer a man stood on the ever-wet grass, the farther he sank.
Any move off the path could lead the attackers into an ambush.
Both parties here were on the offensive; both wanted to get
through the forested area. The Bolsheviks, encircled west and
northwest of Karachev, were looking for a way out to the east with
their vehicles, heavy weapons and par>je wagons. They knew their
way around in the dense forest and felt at home in the treacherous
bushy terrain. But they were also driven by the fear of destruction
and were forced to try anything to get out of this swamp.
The German soldiers especially the I.R. GD had orders to
prevent this. They were to employ all means to stop the enemy
wherever they met him. They, too, must move through the forest
terrain, must advance and fight. Since a precondition for a successful
defence is favourable defensive positions, these first had to be won.
Therefore, the companies struggled northward, creating a barrier in
front of the Russian groups and columns streaming from the west,
and fighting to capture the best positions from which to prevent a
Russian breakout. The effectiveness of their weapons would have to
be as good as possible if success was to be on their side.
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So the companies moved northward to occupy their defensive

positions. Widely separated, the security outposts with their machine
guns stood waiting for the enemy at the forest's edge, along lanes
and in clusters of trees. They did not have long to wait. Suddenly the
Russians were there, in front of a strongpoint, in front of a security
outpost. Rarely was there time to fire a machine gun. Pistols and
hand grenades were the fastest, most effective weapons here. There
was surprise on both sides. The Russians were surprised when they
suddenly found themselves facing a defensive position in the dense
bush or were fired on. The defenders were surprised when a mass
of earth-brown figures suddenly appeared, threw themselves down
and disappeared, or when a brown-clad mass burst forth with shouts
of "Urra", gesticulating wildly, firing from the hip with submachine
guns.
Losses in this type of fighting seemed unavoidable. Often a
Grenadier found himself facing a superior number of Russians
without help from comrades, on his own. Only quick action and icy
coolness could help in this situation. But not every Grenadier
possessed the strength of nerve to face such situations, to put up a
cold-blooded resistance against the recurring attacks by superior
numbers. There were only two possibilities in the forest battle,
namely victory or death.
The 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company, which was securing the forest lane
which was I and II Battalions route of advance, was the first to
encounter the enemy. A numerically-superior Russian force, determined to break out, was suddenly in the midst of the company's
positions. The Russians fired wildly to all sides, destroying everything
that opposed them. The commander of the "Fourteenth", Obit.
Kolb, recognized the danger. With a small force he rushed at the
superior numbers of Russians. Kolb was hit and fell. Oberfeldwebel
Berbrich took command of the company and led it out of the
encirclement.
A dangerous situation also arose for III Battalion as it moved
northward in the direction of Annino to establish secure contact with
the other battalions. The following account is from III Battalion's war
diary:
"Situation briefing in Sholtowodje; it was roughly 06.00. The order
was given to attack Annino. Departure at 06.16. The battalion had
advanced approximately 7 km along the road on foot when, suddenly, we heard loud battle noise several kilometres ahead. Around a
bend just beyond the bridge 11th Company, which was advancing
to the right of the road, came under heavy fire. The company
returned fire and the enemy withdrew. The advance continued
through the bushes along the left side of the road towards the
'factory'. Following a brief firefight this was taken and contact
established with the surrounded 2nd Company of I Battalion. The
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enemy continued to attack, however, firing with 8.8 cm anti-aircraft

guns as well as anti-tank guns, mortars and heavy howitzers.
General Nehring, commander of the 18th Panzer Division, came
forward with tanks. New orders from regiment: continue the attack
on the bridge approx. 1 km from the 'factory'. The companies set
out, with 9th Company on the left and 11th Company on the right.
Lt. Nicklas of 9th Company was killed as the attack developed. The
attack bogged down in the face of heavy enemy fire. The companies
went over to the defensive with 9th Company on the left and the
11th and 2nd Companies on the right, while 10th Company secured
the road behind us and formed the battalion reserve. Feldwebel
Thorhauer and Gonter were seriously wounded in the battle. The
enemy launched repeated attacks. Ammunition was running low.
Moreover, the Russians were now trying to outflank us to the left
and right and, in fact, partially succeeded in doing so to the west.
The Pionier Platoon was sent there to secure the flank for the night.
Heavy enemy artillery fire forced us to take cover in the ground and
in bunkers."
Soviet sections and battalions made repeated attempts to break
through the regiment's line of security to the east. In many places
this resulted in heavy fighting and, in all too many cases, bitter
close-in fighting which usually ended in the defenders' favour. The
number of Russian prisoners climbed, as did the quantities of
captured weapons and equipment sure signs of success for the
defenders.
The fighting in the forest north of Karachev reached its climax on
14 October, the second day of the battle. Heavy fighting was under
way all along the German line from first light. While I and II Battalions
prepared for the attack on Annino, other elements of the regiment,
together with individual batteries of the 400th Artillery Battalion,
secured the long forest lane to the west against repeated
breakthrough attempts by the enemy.
The high point of the fighting on this day was undoubtedly the
attack on Annino by I and II Battalions. An eyewitness described the
fighting:
"Establish contact with the south group immediately! We were
instructed to contact the regiment by radio. The orders that came
through were often incomplete. Questions and answers buzzed back
and forth. The enemy is strong, but a company is on its way. It
reports that it can't get through. II Btl., supported by I Btl. under
Major 'Kiki' Gehrke, is to attack. When? - Right away!! - There's
to be a night attack against this enemy? Yes, immediately! It will
cost losses. It has to be, otherwise the enemy will escape and the
destruction in the Brjansk pocket will be incomplete.
The two battalion commanders sat there somewhat depressed.
From patrols sent out during the day and early evening the officers
235

knew the enemy's positions and strength. They had doubts.

Moreover, we would have to leave our line of security. That would
leave a gap in the line here. Someone suggested that perhaps the
Russians had already gone. No one believed that.
Obit. Hnert was very quiet. I continued to receive and send
wireless messages. Really a night attack?? Understandably, the
questions over the wireless were no longer answered. The troops sat
there with their notes and their inner battles. Later the attack would
be nothing more than an arrow on a map.
So the order was given. The officers and staff of I Battalion and
the officers of II Battalion filled the small room. They were all aware
of what was to come. No man can adequately describe the feeling
that prevails before a major attack. The issuing of orders was the
same for the individual whether it was before the Battle of Leuthen
or a battalion attack in Russia.
The orders Obit. Hnert issued to his platoon leaders Obit.
Richter, Lt. Weber and Lt. Forstbauer were cold and clear. The
possibility of a failure on one of the attack's wings was thrashed out
mathematically and without feeling. He issued his orders no differently than on a peacetime exercise. Everyone knew what he had to do.
Beyond that, everyone knew as well what he could do.
The final order from regiment had still not arrived. They were
waiting too long. 'I'm going!' Obit. Hnert had hollow cheeks and
fluttering eyes. The commander of 3rd Company, Obit. Fabich, the
old warrior, also went quietly out the door.
We waited at a bridge in the forest for a report from the patrol. It
didn't come. The dark forest had swallowed the companies. It was
cold and snow lay on the ground. The stars twinkled. Gradually, the
sky became lighter. Ahead of us machine gun and rifle fire flared up.
The day was beginning.
The first wounded came back. It was Leutnant Schack of 3rd
Company. He had led his platoon into the unknown of the forest.
In hand-to-hand fighting he had been jumped by a commissar, was
shot twice and saved by one of his men. He didn't want to go to the
rear and, before he was evacuated, wrote encouragements to his
platoon on a message pad. He was brought to the dressing station.
The situation up front was unclear. The commander and I went
forward from the light infantry gun position. The 'Third' had dug in
in the face of strong enemy forces. Bullets cracked and buzzed
through the trees. The noise of battle was loud. We moved further
forward to the left of a deep, wide sandy track. The 'Sixth' was also
dug in. Obit. Schulz, commander of the 'Fifth', led his company
forward like a hunter. We crawled and leapt from cover to cover
through the bush. Then we saw Oberleutnant Schulz with his walking
stick. Because of rheumatism he had little movement in one leg. If

236

he had to lie down, the runner helped him back up again. But he
kept going!
Concealed riflemen fired on us. We leapt several times and finally
reached cover again behind a tree stump. A man came and said that
Leutnant Ehrmann of the 'Seventh' had been killed. He had only
taken over the company four weeks before. Before that he had been
with the 'Fourteenth'. I thought of him often when I thought back
to the company. I later learned what had happened. The 'Seventh'
was farthest forward. Before the attack the Leutnant stood calmly
among his men, his helmet pushed back on his head. He was
probably aware of what was coming. He went forward, thirty paces
ahead of his company, the young idealist. Very calm and very sure.
He was killed by a bullet through the heart. I felt unqualified
admiration for my young comrade as a man. I couldn't grasp it all
yet, as was always the case when a friend was killed. (Lt. Ehrmann
had just taken over 7th Company from Obit. Blomberg.)
Men speak of waves of rifle fire; here it was true. From the enemy
side it roared and crackled up and down the forest. Obit. Hnert's
aide, a young, enthusiastic lad, came up to us, a terrified look in his
eyes: 'The Leutnant has been badly wounded shot in the stomach!'
Shortly afterward he came again: 'Obit. Hnert has been killed
he's dead!' He wept. No one spoke a word. We didn't look at each
other. Everyone had been struck down by the news. I am not sure
what happened in the next hour. The flank was once again
threatened. The sound of firing no longer frightened us. We referred
to this phenomenon as becoming numb.
Leutnant Forstbauer took over the company. The soldiers said not
a word. In his Wrttemberg accent he said quite calmly: whoever
gets out of this has a great obligation! A deep and heavy sadness
hung over the battlefield. As such I still feel it today. Remain pure
and become mature! Karl Hnert had practised and attained this.
On the other side the 'Second' and the 'Heavy' were forced to
defend themselves. The Russians, pressed by our attack, were trying
to escape there. Oberleutnant Darjes and his platoon leader, Lt.
Lemp, were killed. The leader of the Pionier Platoon, Lt. Baumann,
the picture of warlike, manly strength, also fell. It was difficult to
comprehend that they were gone. Surely at any minute they must
come up and say something to us!
The battle came to an end. We secured the area. Let come what
may. During the night (14/15 October) Leutnant Forstbauer of the
'Fourth' was seriously wounded by one of our sentries. The leader
of company headquarters personnel was killed in the same incident.
Around us stood hundreds of Russian trucks, guns and horses. A
column of 3,000 Bolsheviks moved past, a look of apathy on their
faces. At the head of the column were twenty women. The battlefield

237

was a picture of total devastation. The Grenadiers were worn out

and frozen, the companies decimated."
This was the battle for the 'Factory" and Annino, a battle fought
by I and II Battalions and the attached heavy weapons. It was also
the high point of this day. The attacking Russians had met with
terrible destruction. The momentum of their attack had been broken,
evidence of their defeat was everywhere. Thousands of prisoners
gave themselves up to the Germans. The booty in guns and weapons
and in trucks and equipment was immense. Only seldom now did
small groups of Russians dare run the gauntlet of the German fire.
Quiet slowly settled over the strongpoints and the reality of what had
happened began to sink in. German losses had been heavy, the ranks
had been thinned. Many names were printed on the crosses beneath
which the men and heroes of this battle found their last resting place.
Names like Feldw. Schneider and Feldw. Jonasson of the Headquarters Staff of III Battalion were recorded on the bridge without a
name in the forest north of Karachev, beside that of the first member
of the I.R. GD to win the Knight's Cross in the east, Obit. Hnert,
commander of 4th (MG.) Company/I Battalion. Hnert was buried
on 17 October 1941.
Hnert was born in Hirschberg on 15 October 1914. He became
a soldier in 1934 and fought in France, Yugoslavia and Russia. He
was awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class in May 1940, the Iron
Cross, First Class in July 1941. In September 1941 Hnert received
the Knight's Cross for an action in the Jelnja Bend. There he
commanded a battle group consisting of a machine gun company,
a rifle company and elements of other units. The force held out for
six-and-a-half days under heavy enemy fire and held the position
against the attacks of two Soviet divisions. He remained with his men
until relieved, although he had been wounded once in the arm and
twice in the legs. On 14 October 1941 he was killed by a bullet from
a Russian sniper during the heavy fighting east of Brjansk.

Chapter Eight
The Advance on Moscow
The 17th and 18th of October brought relief for the regiment and
a transfer into the area east of Karatschew, on the road to Orel. The
regiment was allowed several days rest in the city of Orel, the high
point of which was an appearance by Generaloberst Guderian.
Guderian presented the German Cross in Gold to the commander
of II Battalion, Major Greim and to the commander of 6th Company,

238

Obit, von Courbire, for outstanding bravery. Lt. Felbinger and

Assistenzarzt Dr. Hartung of III Battalion received the Iron Cross, 1st
Class. In addition, many other officers, NCOs and men received
decorations from his hand, eloquent testimony to the regiment's
success in the previous days and weeks. His words to the men
provided a rough idea of their next objective, when he said: T h e job
must be finished! And what isn't achieved now, will be completed in
the new year."
"General Mud" had joined the battle, a general the Germans had
underestimated. The Grenadiers, the infantry and the supply units
were aware of his presence. The roads had become bottomless.
Rivers of mud flowed in the wheel-ruts of the supply routes. Torrents
of rain poured down on the Russian land from a lead-grey sky.
The battle against the inclement weather had begun. During those
dark, grey days figures shrouded in tent squares fought a hopeless
battle to move forward. The wheels of the horse-drawn vehicles sank
deep into the morass. Men pushed against the wheels of stuck
vehicles with the last of their strength in an effort to get them moving.
The motorized columns ploughed their way through the bottomless
mud, often with two or three vehicles in tow behind each tracked
prime-mover. On the sides of the roads, the supply lines to the
fighting troops, sat the vehicles which had lost the battle: those with
motor damage, overheated engines, broken axles bogged-down,
abandoned wrecks.
The German command hoped for an improvement in the weather.
It hoped for clear weather or frost which would once again make the
roads firm. They hoped, because the objective, Moscow, was so
close. Close enough to grasp and then came "General Mud". He
brought all their well-thought-out plans to nothing. The commanders
said that they had to carry on if they were not to give the Russians
time to collect themselves and bring in new reserves of troops.
The Grenadiers of the I.R. GD were also engaged in this battle
with the mud. They, too, pushed their way forward more than they
drove. Forward was where Generaloberst Guderian saw his objective: Tula, the last Russian bastion south of Moscow. He sought one
last effort to reach the objective before winter set in.
Mzensk, one city of many on the Suscha River, had been taken on
23 October 1941 by a panzer division of the Second Panzer Army.
However, the division ran into stubborn resistance on a commanding
ridge northeast of the city and the advance bogged down. The panzer
division possessed insufficient forces to go any farther.
In Orel the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was
placed on alert. The regiment set off along the OrelMzensk road
with orders to move into an assembly area northeast of Mzensk in
the early morning hours of 24 October for an attack on the heights.
The road to Mzensk was very muddy and the many holes prevented
239

a smooth flow of traffic. The Grenadiers cursed the roads. They were
forced to drive by night, unable to see a thing. They also had to
contend with vehicle breakdowns. These had to be avoided at all
costs, because they meant a loss in fighting strength. If only some
elements of the unit arrived they would be thrown into the battle on
their own, and if they possessed insufficient strength to force a
decision, failure would be the result.
Together with elements of the 3rd Panzer Division, which was
positioned to the right of the MzenskTula road, the battalions of
the I.R. GD launched an attack from the edge of the city of Mzensk
between the railroad and the highway against the well- fortified
Russian positions on the northeast heights. Nests of resistance had
to be stormed, and whole trench systems were softened up with hand
grenades and taken. The Russian defenders, who fought bitterly,
were cut down one by one. Ill Battalion, which was farthest to the
left, especially distinguished itself in the attack. When the 10th and
11th Companies, which were advancing on a wide front, were forced
to take cover by enemy fire, the 9th Company under Obit. Senger
swung out to the left to the railway embankment and attacked the
enemy's left flank. In this fashion the company was able to roll up
the Russian position from the left. Naked fear gripped the Bolsheviks
when, from the left and behind, they suddenly heard the loud
"Hurrah!" from the throats of the attacking German soldiers. At the
same time the soldiers of the pinned-down companies got up and
launched a frontal attack supported by assault guns which had
meanwhile arrived on the scene. There was no stopping the attack
now. The Russians fled their positions. The Grenadiers climbed
aboard the assault guns and charged after the fleeing Russians. The
most faithful friends of the Grenadiers in these battles were the
Stukas, whose bombs softened up the enemy positions. But uncomfortable situations could still arise, as a Grenadier of 6th Company/II
Battalion described:
"The Russians had fled, their positions were empty. The requested
Stukas approached and prepared to attack the Russian positions as
ordered. But now we were sitting in those positions! Using every
means available we tried to ward off the approaching disaster. Light
and smoke signals were fired; we jumped from the trenches, waving
flags and cloths nothing doing! The Stuka pilots were suspicious,
they continued their approach one by one.
We sat there, expecting the howling sirens and the whistling sound
of falling bombs any minute. The Stukas continued to circle above
us like a wild swarm of hornets. Had they recognized us after all?
No!! We held our breath; they were beginning their dives! In
desperation we waved like crazy, they must recognize us. And then
the miracle happened. At the last second the squadron leader pulled
his machine up and the others followed his example. They veered
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off. Whew! That was close. Making an elegant turn, the Stukas
swooped down again, rocking their wings as they roared overhead.
They waved to us.
Thank God. We had been lucky.
And we carried on forward after the Russians!
We moved farther forward, climbed aboard the tanks and moved
off. The Stukas roared ahead of us. We could hear their howling
sirens and the explosions of their heavy bombs. Onward. Thick
mushroom clouds of smoke hung in the air, showing us the way."
The tanks carried the Grenadiers in the direction of Tschern, the
day's next objective. A description of the events that followed was
provided in an account by Lt. Kolewe, a platoon leader in 9th
Company/Ill Battalion:
"We had been assigned to establish contact with the elements of
3rd Panzer Division pushing through from the west, and we set off
at a brisk pace. We had climbed aboard the command tank. Effective
attacks by our Stukas cleared the way. For once this was an easy
assignment.
After 5 km we came to a breaching point, which was heavily mined.
9th Company was ordered to immediately occupy the heights in
front. The 2nd Platoon advanced to the left of the road and reached
the edge of the village without resistance. While clearing the houses
there was a brief exchange of fire, after which about 15 Russians
gave themselves up. The advance continued.
White flares shot up about 3 km away. There was great joy all
round when we reached our objective. A short halt. Generaloberst
Guderian came and greeted the men.
The advance continued to Tschern. Elements of a German panzer
division were still involved in fighting in the town. With our support
the town was soon free of the enemy so it appeared.
A new assignment for 9th Company: attack and take a village
about 3 km beyond Tschern. Once again the Stukas went to work.
Close to the village we got down from the vehicles. Bomb after bomb
crashed a short distance ahead. The Stukas strafed every building
with their machine guns. A column stood at the edge of the village.
We were taking fire from there. 2nd Platoon was to clear the village,
the tanks moved in. Every hole was full of Bolsheviks. We flushed
them out with hand grenades and pistols. Our booty included 20
trucks, 6 automobiles and 3 motorcycles. My platoon took 60
Bolsheviks prisoner.
It was soon dark. Orders came to go back to the road. The battalion
had meanwhile arrived. During the night we were to push through
to the railroad junction, about 20 km ahead. In the darkness we
heard the sinister, rumbling noise of tanks on the move. The advance
went on. In front of Popowka lights flared up and died away. It might
have been Russian tanks, but we couldn't make out anything in the
241

darkness. We received orders to halt and take up a hedgehog

position."
On Sunday morning, 26 October, while units of III Battalion were
pursuing the fleeing enemy northeast of Tschern in an effort to take
the railroad junctions near Gorbatschewo and Plawsk by surprise,
the units of I Battalion which were resting in Tschern were awakened
in a lively fashion:
"In the grey light of dawn there was wild firing on the road. It was
a typical Sunday awakening in Soviet Russia. Cursing, the Grenadiers
struggled to get into their wet boots.
On the road there was wild confusion. Germans and Russians
chased each other around the corners of houses. There was firing
from everywhere. There could be no talk of a clear combat situation.
An anti-tank gun was moved into position in the middle of the road
and it fired on everything in sight. A truck filled with Russians drove
right in front of the gun and took a shell in the radiator. Hand
grenades exploded here and there. All of a sudden a Russian tank
appeared from around a corner. The crew tried to bail out, while its
commander, a Russian Major, attempted to hide beneath the tank.
He was knocked down by a pistol shot from an N C O of the machine
gun company.
It had meanwhile become light. The terror of the morning hours
was over. This, too, was typical for this country. That night we had
slept on the same road as the Russians; both sides were so exhausted
that neither noticed.
We now secured around the small town. The heavy and light
infantry guns ranged in and the mortars went into position. There
were still disorganized enemy units everywhere which had been
scattered by yesterday's attack. There was now only occasional rifle
fire.
While briefing his platoon leaders on the security sector, the
commander of the 'First', Lt. Miede, was shot in the back by a sniper.
The leader of the company's headquarters personnel and his batman
carried Miede into a house. He died there, with his wife's name on
his lips.
The company had lost its much-loved Leutnant. With his sure
combat instincts he had led it through hundreds of dangers. Never
had he spoken of the pressures of combat. Whether leading his
company forward under fire or sweating out an artillery barrage,
Miede approached the war almost as if it were a sporting event. He
was always in the midst of his Grenadiers: easy-going, cheerful,
elegant even when covered with muck. His career had taken him
from bricklayer to officer."
The German forces continued their assault in the direction of Tula.
The advance was held up for several hours at the Plawsk railroad
junction while the bridge was repaired. Everywhere the enemy was
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withdrawing towards the east and north. The little resistance that
was met was quickly broken.
The regiment and battalion headquarters made preparations for
the attack on Tula. The appropriate orders were issued, laying down
the details of the operation. The following is the order issued by I
Battalion to its companies:

I/Inf.Rgt. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Abt. Ia

Btl. Command Post, 28 Oct. 1941

Order for the Attack on Tula

1. The enemy continues to retreat. All bridges are prepared for
demolition.
2. The reinforced 5th Panzer Brigade has been ordered to take Tula.
3. I.R. GD / I Btl. is attached to the 5th Panzer Brigade.
4. Disposition for the advance:
Advance detachment:
A battalion of the 6th Pz.Rgt.
A battalion of the 6th Pz.Rgt.

Rgt. H.Q.
Brig. H.Q.

Reinf. 2nd Company (1 hvy. MG

platoon, 1 hvy. mortar section)
mounted.
Reinf. 1st Company (1 hvy. MG
platoon, 1 hvy. mortar section)
mounted.
Btl. H.Q. will mount up with the
last battalion of 6th Pz.Rgt.

2 light batteries
35th Pz.Rgt.

reinf. 3rd Company (1 hvy. MG

platoon, 1 hvy mortar section)
mounted

The remaining machine gun platoon will look for a place behind
the Battalion Headquarters, if possible mounted with the last
battalion of 6th Pz.Rgt.
The heavy company under the command of Feldw. Scholich must
remain close behind. The empty vehicles (Btl. Kbel) are placed
under Feldw. Scholich's command and under all circumstances are
to be brought forward with him. The heavy company must strive
to join up behind the last battalion of the 6th Pz.Rgt. Should
difficulties arise, then in or behind the 35th Pz.Rgt., then move

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forward at the next opportunity. Heavy Infantry Gun Platoon with

the Heavy Company.
5. Assembly: The battalion will mount up at the north exit from
Lopottkowo (local village). The companies will be formed up at the
northern exit from Lopottkowo at 05.00 so that they can mount
up immediately. I request a report from the battalion when the
operation commences.
A.B.
signed Beck
The losses of the past weeks resulted in some personnel changes
within I Battalion. Obit. Brockmann, formerly commander of the
Heavy Company, took over 2nd Company. Feldw. Scholich took
command of the Heavy Company.
The attack on Tula was launched on 29 October 1941. Forward
on the left was I Battalion, followed by III Battalion, and farther to
the right was II Battalion. Carrying the mounted Grenadiers, the
Panzers drove north through the village of Kolpna Nowaja and near
Jassnaja Poljana reached the last obstacle, the forest outside Tula.
The last mentioned village was of some historical significance,
because hidden in the forest nearby was the estate and tomb of Leo
Tolstoy. The soldiers felt a certain amount of awe at the name, but
the Panzers passed by quickly. The advance continued through
Kossaja Gora and Nowoje Bassowa. Finally, the city of Tula appeared through the haze of the day and the battle. That same day
the armoured forces penetrated as far as the first houses of Tula.
The action was described by I Battalion's adjutant:
"The battalion was to mount up with a panzer regiment. The
detailing, briefing and marshalling delayed our departure. The panzer
officers were splendid fellows; they took everything with a light heart,
real cavalrymen. With us in the infantry everything was more precise,
more serious, more by the book. This was a good mixture for the
battle.
The 4th (MG.) Company arrived at the assembly point. Along the
way stood the company's Hauptfeldwebel Spierling with a food
canister. Every Grenadier was given a cold cutlet, which we called
'meat with a handle.' They were eaten right away. He was a devil of
a fellow the company sergeant. He was really a mother to the
company.
We set off. The weather was clear; visibility was good. All of the
bridges had been blown, but in every case we were able to find a way
around. Once we made our way slowly along a railroad track.
Individual Russians came out of their holes with arms raised. Suddenly, there was a loud explosion in front of us: a crossroads had
been blown by a remotely-detonated charge. We began to take

244

intermittent rifle fire from a wood. The leading Leutnant dismounted.

Just as he was preparing to storm the wood, a mine blew his foot
off.
We left the road and drove one behind the other through some
low bushes. The commanding officer of the panzers was far ahead,
showing us the way. It was sometimes like being in a cavalry
engagement.
Inaccurate artillery fire fell behind us. We were well beyond it and
carried on, evading new fire and skirting nests of resistance. Above
us appeared three, six, nine Stukas. Escorting fighters circled round
them. The Stukas dive-bombed a village ahead. The road led directly
to it. The Panzers simply drove straight on; sitting on top, we were
at the mercy of their tactics.
The battle began in the middle of the village. There was firing from
all sides. We jumped down. The tanks closed their hatches.
On the left was a white house. Following a salvo of hand grenades
50 to 60 Bolsheviks gave themselves up. They jumped out of the
windows. Behind in the garden two brown figures were working with
a weapon. Immediately, an N C O of the 'Second' stormed after them
with three men. A machine gun laid down covering fire. Two tracing
rounds whistled through one of the Russians as if through a sack of
straw. Everywhere courageous NCOs led the assault on the next
objective at hand.
Bullets whistled, buzzed and cracked all around us. They crashed
against walls and into the ground. To our right hand grenades
exploded in a house. A piglet ran squealing around the corner. The
Panzers shot up every house. The village resounded with the sound
of their cannon firing and the exploding shells. The air smelled of
fire, powder smoke, oil and Russians. This was the smell of battle.
Off to the side the Stukas howled towards earth. Men shouted and
still could not be understood. Everyone took a couple of men and
stormed forward. Our 'Second' was magnificent. The Grenadiers
pounced on every Russian. Platoons and sections became intermixed.
The Panzers set out again. We were at the end of the village.
Suddenly, Feldwebel Ehlers of the 'Second' spun around and collapsed to the ground dead. Once again our strength was reduced
a little. We had lost another of the brave, unforgettable members of
the company.
The commander of the 'Second', Obit. Brockmann, who had
begun the war as a Gefreiter, jumped on the nearest Panzer and
shouted: mount up! Forward! Then he fell wounded to the ground.
Command fell to the battalion's executive officer, Lt. von Oppen,
who was all of nineteen years old: forward!

245

At a bridge there was firing from a 2 cm or 3.7 cm Flak. Two men

were hit on the leading Panzer. Their wounds were serious. The cry:
'medic' caused us to shudder anew every time we heard it.
The defile ahead of us was heavily occupied. Position after position.
The Russians threw hand grenades and Molotov cocktails. Once
again the 'Second' went to the assault. The battle was fought at close
quarters. Live grenades came back. One thrown by a Feldwebel
exploded in mid-air. The Leutnant's orders were clear and fresh,
almost cocky. The advance went on with the men bent low, safeties
off their pistols or hands ready to pull the pin of a hand grenade.
Men had become animals. They must kill to live. There was nothing
heroic on this battlefield.
We saw Tula ahead of us through the mist of the autumn evening.
Heavy, black clouds left by flak bursts hung above the city. An
anti-tank gun fired along the road, our panzers drove into cover.
In the meantime, the 1st Company under Obit. Derben was
diverted to the right for an enveloping attack with its Panzers. The
'Third' under Obit. Fabich was still far to the rear. We thus had barely
60 men available. Leutnant von Oppen was unconcerned by this
fact: 'Look!' 'That's Tula just up ahead'.
An hour later the 'Second' was in the city's workers settlement.
The enemy seemed to have disappeared. A trolley stood empty on
the street at its terminus. The Russian anti-aircraft guns kept up a
steady fire, even though there were no aircraft above. The anti-tank
gun fired past us again. Our 'Second' (von Oppen) was now the
spearhead of the entire Panzer Army.
Then orders came over the wireless: suspend the attack! Secure
both sides of the road! We wanted to carry on, even if we had only
60 men. We had already made over 45 kilometres today in one go.
There were no Russians ahead of us. Why halt now? Platoons and
sections assembled; tanks and vehicles drove up beside the houses
on the left and right. We officers gathered on the road and greeted
each other as if we hadn't seen each other for a year. Everything
was just as in peacetime. This was how we assembled on maneuvers
or on an exercise. There was plenty of grumbling over the unexpected halt."
Thus, this eventful day, which had seen the regiment's troops reach
the city of Tula, came to an end. The superiority of the German
troops and their weapons had been obvious. But when the advance
was resumed would it be as vigorous as before? Despite all the
indications of bad weather, would luck remain on the side of the
attackers?

246

Chapter Nine
The Battles for Tula
The 30th of October, the day selected for the occupation of the
city of Tula, began well for the attackers as reflected in the account
by the same participant from I Battalion:
"We were to attack again at 05.30. The 2nd Company was to the
right of the road, the 3rd to the left and behind. The enemy made
no move. Once again our attack was delayed. Panzers, artillery
observers, heavy weapons all had to be assembled first. The
commander of the 5th Panzer Brigade, Oberst Eberbach, ran from
house to house in the front lines, conducting a personal reconnaissance.
The regiment's commander, Oberst Hoernlein, dismissed us confidently: I wish you the prettiest maidens of Tula! That was an irony
in this land.
The workers settlement consisted of house after house built along
the main street. The houses and several wooden apartment buildings
were the only cover. In rows the 2nd Company, led by Leutnant von
Oppen, scrambled through the gardens. With it was a platoon from
4th (MG.) Company as well as mortars. The Panzers growled along
the street on the left. Forward artillery observers went along with the
Grenadiers. Behind us in long lines followed III Battalion under Major
Krger. The great war machine was at work.
The first enemy machine gun began to fire. It was an uncomfortable
sound, hurried and irregular. Rifle fire also began to come from the
nearest houses. The battle had begun. The picture changed in no
time: groups of soldiers collected behind every house. The stone
houses were the most sought after. Then two or three men would
dash forward to cover behind the next house. Every time the machine
gun would open fire seconds later.
The run from one house to another required a decision and an act.
It was no easier after a dozen such dashes. The veteran troops
listened to the noise of battle before deciding to go. The young,
inexperienced soldiers had not yet learned this skill. They followed
the old hands. These older fellows led the way in the fight firing,
running and looking. The younger ones ran behind them carrying
hand grenades and ammunition. All were enthusiastic: the young
simply over combat, the old over a good shot, a daring dash, a brave
comrade.

247

The style of combat was unusual. Up front there were only a few
men. The company was very deep. The few up front were the
boldest: the Leutnant, a Feldwebel and several others who had
worked their way forward. They worked in a quick and businesslike
fashion. This phenomenon was a source of wonder during every
attack: the forward impetus of the volunteers. Every one of these
splendid fellows acted as if the capture of Tula hinged on him alone.
Wounded came back. They walked calmly, despite the firing. They
were no longer bothered by it. They joked among themselves: Hey
Emil! Say hello to home for me. Don't talk foolishness. I'll be back
tomorrow! They kept their spirits up. In general, the wounded didn't
lower our fighting spirit, rather they raised it.
Helmet back, long hair, unshaven, cigarette hanging from his
mouth, one arm in a sling, boots and pants covered with mud, a
hand grenade still in his jacket pocket this was the fighter of Tula.
Ill Battalion tried to move out to the right. The attack had to be
broadened. The attempt failed and the battalion suffered casualties.
The 'Third' had to fight its way through a brickyard to the left of the
road. It then found itself facing apartment blocks at the edge of the
city 500 metres away.
Progress was slow. Suddenly, there was an anti-tank ditch ahead
and then an area of open ground. The rows of houses curved away
to the left. A large, red apartment building stood several hundred
metres in front of us. The decision to make this dash was more
difficult. Several made it. Others made it only as far as the anti-tank
ditch. Wounded gathered in the ditch itself. The red apartment
building was visible from everywhere. The main enemy fire must be
coming from there.
Our Panzers were unable to help. The forward artillery observer,
a plucky Wachtmeister, was up ahead, but he had no communication
with the guns.
There was no actual battle noise, but rather a large number of rifle
shots. One needed only raise a hand and the firing started. And
always from the red apartment building.
Unteroffizier Wichmann of the 4th (MG.) Company attempted to
work his way farther forward. He moved in stages from house to
house. This blond dare-devil, who had earned the Iron Cross, First
Class in France, was known by the whole battalion. His gun crew
panted along behind him. From far ahead he called out targets. He
was an irrepressible fellow with a secret love for battle. The crew
assembled the machine gun. With all his strength, Wichmann ran
towards the anti-tank ditch. Out in the open he was knocked down
by enemy fire. His gun went into position and opened fire. The
'Second' moved up a few houses farther.
By the afternoon the attack had bogged down. The 2nd Company
was too weak. It was unable to take the red apartment building.
248

Russian anti-tank guns fired through the roofs, the anti-aircraft guns
fired senselessly into the air and the rifle fire kept up. The company
was unable to obtain a clear picture of the overall situation over the
radio.
As darkness fell we organized a thin line of security based on
houses, sheds, rubbish heaps and barbed wire. The red apartment
building was about 150 metres away. The Leutnant went from man
to man, organizing and seeing to their needs. He was fresh and
apparently unaffected by the battle. This instilled confidence in the
Grenadiers. They read the state of things from the face of their
leader."
The report that went back to the rear was momentous '. . . the
attack has bogged down. . .' This meant that the objective the
commanders wanted so badly could not be taken. It remained in sight
unattainable, yet so near. It also meant that all of the efforts to
take Tula had been in vain. Success had eluded the attackers.
The changeover to the defensive placed a great strain not only on
the troops, but also on their commanders and headquarters. The
shift from an offensive to a defensive mentality, from the optimistic
atmosphere of the attack to the desperate need to hold on to what
had been gained and persevere against an ever-growing weight of
enemy fire meant a moment of weakness for everyone. The hours
of the changeover were the hours of the commanders who, in order
to master the situation, had to be pillars of strength in the front lines.
It was they who had to do everything necessary for their men in order
to change their earlier spirit of attack into a determination to hold
on. While the attacking spearheads still lay forward, facing the enemy
in lonely isolation, the heavy weapons moved up and dug in close
to the future defensive position so as to be ready to meet the enemy
counterattacks expected in the early hours. Supporting fire from the
heavy machine guns, the infantry guns and artillery and its effects on
the attacking enemy were to ease the transition to this new phase
of the battle for the Grenadiers.
Outside Tula the transition from the offensive to the defensive, a
process which was repeated so often in this war, was completed on
the night of 30/31 October 1941. Soon after midnight the Russians
demonstrated to 2nd Company/I Battalion under Lt. von Oppen,
which was holding onto the first houses at the edge of the city, that
they were determined to defend Tula. At 03.00 the company came
under fire from a weapon it had not encountered before. This began
the first day of the defence in the Tula battle zone and many more
were to follow until 30 November. This day also showed what was
in store for I.R. GD in the days to follow:
"A barrage from a Russian multiple rocket launcher. We called it
'Firing Elias.' On other fronts it was also known as the 'Stalin Organ.'
Thirty to forty rockets struck a small area simultaneously. It
249

thundered and howled for half a minute and the houses shook.
Window panes fell into the rooms. The 'Firing Elias' was not for
weak nerves.
The weather changed abruptly. The ground became wet and
slippery. It was raining lightly.
In the morning dawn there was machine gun and rifle fire from all
sides. A new entrance was knocked through the rear wall of our
house and the old one blocked up. Several messengers ran toward
the old entrance, drawing machine gun fire on the house. We stood
battle-ready behind the thickest wall and smoked.
Enemy soldiers moved against 2nd Company in the semi-darkness.
We couldn't see them until they were quite near. Tracer fire came
from the red apartment building. The Grenadiers lay in the mud and
fired on every suspicious shape. Often their tired eyes saw ghosts.
The mental strain on the individual soldiers was great. The fighting
there was reduced to a basic, instinctive level: the man whose
vigilance was poor and fired too late, or who failed to hear the enemy
as he sneaked toward him, was overcome. The mud, the cold, the
heaps of rubble, the barbed wire entanglements, the red apartment
building these things weighed heavy on the minds of the defenders.
This battle was no heroic charge across a field of flowers.
It became lighter. The sound of engines was heard from behind
the red apartment building. Soon afterward the first shells from the
Russian tanks crashed into our houses, which collapsed or had their
roofs torn off. Wounded called for help and were moved to the rear.
Rifle fire crackled everywhere. The enemy leapt from house to house,
apparently without any plan. The number of men wounded by rifle
fire grew. Crawling and running, the Leutnant moved back and forth
among the Grenadiers. He and his Feldwebel were the heart of the
position and the soul of the defence.
In the cold and mud, and after many serious situations, the day
came to an end. The companies had been weakened, but in front of
every rifleman lay a heap of brown forms. The position had held.
There were no longer sufficient numbers to allow relief. Everyone
had to spend the night out of doors."
The positions of I Battalion if the few holes manned by the
weakened companies could be referred to as such lay with 2nd
Company on the right and 3rd Company on the left of the Jassnaja
PolyanaTula road. To the right, or east of 2nd Company, on the
other side of a significant gap, was III Battalion, to which 1st
Company under Obit. Derben had been attached. As the right hand
battalion of the I.R. GD, II Battalion had dug in on the heights on
both sides of the village of Gostewka after the Soviet positions on
the heights had been rolled up by 6th Company on 1 November.
The brick yard played a major role in the battalion's defensive system.
The heavy weapons, as well as the batteries of the 400th Artillery
250

Battalion, were located in the wide area behind these positions near
Kossaja Gora, near Ssudakowa and at the northern edges of the
forest near Kostowka. The regimental command post, formerly
hidden in this forest, was transferred south into the village of Trossna
after the situation firmed up.
In the beginning the Soviets launched repeated attacks with and
without tanks against the weakened companies in their unfinished
defensive positions. Things went too far for the defenders when, on
1 November, four to five Russian tanks attempted to break through
at the junction between III and I Battalions and even opened fire on
2nd Company from behind. Lt. von Oppen and a Feldwebel worked
their way up to the tanks from behind. While the Feldwebel provided
covering fire with his submachine gun, the Leutnant climbed up onto
one of the tanks, pulled the pins on several hand grenades and stuck
them into the tank's turret. Two members of the crew who tried to
escape were shot down by the Feldwebel. The tank was disabled.
Another was knocked out by German anti-tank gun fire and the rest
withdrew. This type of incident occurred daily along the defensive
line. Each man had to look out for himself to defend against the
enemy's superiority in numbers. The numbers bear witness to the
depleted condition of the companies. The following strength report
was sent back by I Battalion on 3 November: 8 officers, 56 NCOs,
303 men.
This sobering report indicated that individual combat companies
often had no more than 50 men on strength. A novel experience
and one that was almost amusing for the men up front was the first
use of loudspeakers by the Russians. Suddenly, the Grenadiers of
Tula heard: "Come over brothers, and bring your mess kits." Or:
"The Russian winter will destroy you!" Between messages the
Russians played German marching music. This went on for a while,
until the troops in the front line discovered the approximate location
of the loudspeaker. There was a burst of fire and then quiet. A little
later it reappeared in another location and resumed its broadcasts.
Although the Russian propaganda messages made no special impression on the Grenadiers, the appearance of the loudspeakers
introduced a certain amusing variation to the daily routine.
Forward in the positions a monotonous daily routine set in: fire
from rifles or machine guns interspersed by salvoes from Stalin
Organs or mortar barrages. One Russian weapon which was very
noticeable was the much-feared 7.62 cm anti-tank or tank cannon,
the so-called "Ratsch-Bum". Its hard crack was a very unpopular
sound. In several places the enemy was within 60-80 metres of the
German positions. These were very dangerous areas; the men could
move little during daylight but had to remain constantly vigilant.
The Soviet soldier was certainly tenacious, but less out of conviction than apathy. Death was not the worst for him, as his life was
251

scarcely worth living. Although he seldom carried out close-quarters

fighting down to the final consequence, the Soviet soldier certainly
didn't run away. He fired from his hole until the enemy was within
about five metres. Then he ducked down, awaiting a bullet or the
death blow. If he was not noticed, he would fire into the enemy's
back. He would remain sitting between the positions all day long.
On the other hand, in counterattacks and battles of movement it
often came down to wrestling matches and knife fights; then he felt
personally threatened.
In this monotony of positional warfare the only bright spot was the
hope of relief. I Battalion was relieved by the motorcycle battalion of
a Panzer division on 6 November and was moved into five quiet
villages behind the defensive positions. In contrast, on 7 November
the numerically weak II Battalion near Gostewka had to face a heavy
attack by at least two Russian regiments. It was thanks to the heroic
action of Obergefreiter Wistuba and his 2nd Section/6th Company
that the battalion was able to hold on until the reserves the 5th
Company could be moved up. The section battled against superior
enemy forces for five hours. First Aid Unteroffizier Krings of the same
company, who remained up front tending to the wounded, died a
hero's death in this unequal battle. The way forward to his wounded
cost him his life. And while I Battalion began to recover from the
trials of the past seven days of fighting, it did not suspect that only
too soon was it to be back in combat again. A report from 7
November:
"It was snowing. Visibility was poor. The 4th (MG.) Company stood
assembled in the village. The company commander, Obit. Richter,
was awarding Iron Crosses. Suddenly, there was firing from the
sentries. One of our armoured scout cars approached at high speed:
the Russians were coming!
With their new Iron Crosses on their breasts the Grenadiers
grabbed their machine guns and took up positions. These were not
carefully selected or reinforced, as no one suspected the enemy to
appear here.
In a semi-circle around the village the black-brown figures came
nearer across the open plain. Heavy mortar shells exploded in the
village. Black on the white snow. The machine gun company fired
as if on the practice range. Nevertheless, the enemy came ever
nearer. Machine gun and rifle fire came from the enemy side. Small
snow walls offered little protection. Hauptfeldwebel Sperling took
the initiative. He stood on the village street, handing out ammunition
and hand grenades. While doing so he was killed by a stray rifle shot.
Sperling was never to learn of his appointment to officer cadet.
The 2nd Company under Lt. von Oppen was also attacked in its
village. Several machine gun posts spotted the enemy approaching
through the blowing snow. Each sent a man back to the houses to
252

raise the alarm. The company stumbled out, some men without belts
or coats, deployed, threw itself down in the snow and opened fire.
The 3rd Company was being issued rations when it was called away
to go to the assistance of 4th (MG.) Company. The Heavy Company
filled several gaps. After one night our rest quarters had become a
security position.
The bulk of I Battalion spent the night outside in the open. It
became colder. In the distance we could hear artillery shells exploding
from the direction of 1st Company."
The next day saw the entire battalion launch an attack against a
line of hills in order to improve its defensive positions. It could not
continue to hold out in the village in the valley below; it would have
to establish positions on the heights where it would have a wider
view. The leader of the Pionier platoon, Feldw. Krause, fell during
the attack just as he and his 14 men were about to storm 4 enemy
machine guns. The guns were taken, but the Feldwebel died. At the
same time as the hill was being taken, all the terrain for two
kilometres around was won back in order to shorten the German
position and strengthen their defences. This economizing of forces
allowed II Battalion which had been in the front lines without a
break to be transferred to the rear (to Worobjowka) for a rest. In
addition, Personnel Replacement Transfer Battalion 111/16 arrived
with 100 replacements. Following a short briefing and hasty preparations, they were assigned to the companies.
It was 9 November 1941. As has been said, the companies were
having it better resting in the rear. The following description was
provided by Grenadier Rehfeldt, who had been a member of Replacement Battalion 111/16 and was assigned to II Battalion's 8th
(MG.) Company:
"We travelled in 8th Company's trucks over snow-covered roads
to our sections and platoons. We reported to our company commander, Obit. Schneider, and our platoon leader, Ofw. Puis, who
greeted us and filled us in on the situation. He made an excellent
impression on me. He was quite the picture of calm itself.
I was assigned to mortar number one of the 1st Section/4th
Platoon. The other members of the section included:
Section leader
1st Mortar/1st Section:
Detachment leader
Mortar commander
Gunner I
Gunner II
Ammunition bearer

Uffz. Dittmann

KIA 16. 12. 41

Ogefr. Bunge
Ogefr. Wohner
MIA 16. 12. 41
Ogefr. Johne
Fatally wounded 16. 12. 41
Gefr. Leis
Gren. Keilhauer
KIA 16. 12.41
Gren. Schlobauer
Gren. Rehfeldt
253

Gefr. Monk

Runner
2nd Mortar/2nd Section:
Ogefr. Mochen
Detachment leader
Ogefr. Weidner
Mortar commander
Gefr. Banth
Gunner I
Gefr. Rieger
Gunner II
Gren. Postune
Ammunition bearer
Gren. Fritsch
Gren. Ladebeck
Gren. Fischer

MIA
KIA
MIA
MIA

KIA 1943
19. 12. 41
12. 09. 41
19. 12. 41
19. 12. 41

We all sat around a table and we new ones had to introduce

ourselves."
I Battalion was relieved in mid-November, II Battalion again
occupying its old positions. The positions outside Tula, now somewhat more developed, were held. The daily routine changed little
during these weeks Russian attacks, with and without tanks, and
the often hours-long artillery bombardments. The days had become
shorter. There was scarcely enough light to shoot before 07.00 and
after 15.00 the petrol lamps were already burning in the headquarters and billets. Other than limited patrol activity the nights
brought only occasional Russian artillery fire. The hardest battle was
being fought by the supply units, the heavy weapons, the dispatch
drivers and the headquarters personnel. They were carrying on a
delaying battle against nature. The mud, which had transformed the
few roads into bottomless ruts, was the soldier's worst enemy. It
prevented any orderly flow of traffic to and from the front. This may
have been one of the main reasons why the front remained frozen,
as the enemy faced the same conditions. On the German side
thousands of Pioniers, men of the labour service and their temporary
workers (local inhabitants fetched from the villages) laboured to keep
the roads at least passable. They built fascines and log bridges, dug
drainage ditches and created crossings. Positioned at every crossing
and important point in the supply net, military police regulated traffic.
They directed one-way traffic, they stood at the bypasses. Tractors
and tracked vehicles were a common sight along the roads as they
recovered vehicles that had skidded off the road. No one, not even
the High Command, had included this "General Winter" in his
calculations and plans.
The men were still unprotected; they were still fighting in the
uniforms they had worn in summer when the Eastern Campaign
began. Their greatcoats, a normal part of their kit, were their only
protection against the weather. However, the troops already perceived the coming cold and sought shelter. They wondered if they
had been forgotten by their commanders and the people at home.

254

A sketch from a situation report showing the regiment's positions outside Tula.

The Wolfsschanze Installation (FHQu) at the time of its occupation on 21 June

The 30th of November, a Sunday, brought a change following

weeks of stalemate outside Tula. It was the result of a decision by
Army Group Centre to take advantage of the frost and the resulting
improvement in the condition of the terrain to make one final attempt
to take the city which was the bulwark of the Soviet defences. This
was not to be another frontal attack from the south. The city was to
be enveloped from the east, cut off and stormed. The first objective
was the TulaWenew road, northeast of Tula. The battalions of I.R.
GD which were being used at the front were pulled out of the line
and marched off.
I Battalion under Hptm. Hagen (Major Gehrke had relinquished
his command on 3 November after being wounded) was attached to
the 3rd Panzer Division. In the freezing cold the main body of the
I.R. GD (less I Btl.) was moved over 80 km by vehicle into the
DubkiKolodesnajaDorofejewka area, a section of forested terrain
west of Wenew. The area that the regiment moved into was only a
narrow corridor. The situation west of Tula, north on the enemy
roads and east in the impenetrable forest west of Wenew was unclear.
As the advance detachment, 17th (Motorcycle) Company drove in
battle order through the village of Dubki, objective Dorofejewka. It
was 3 December 1941, a day which saw 17th Company reach the
village of Kolodesnaja after heavy fighting in the forest. While 17th
Company secured to the east, elements of II and III Battalions moved
north through the village to take the WenewTula road. II and III
Battalions had been ordered to relieve the forward elements of a
Panzer division, which was to be withdrawn for employment elsewhere. In the course of these movements the 17th (Motorcycle)
Company, as well as elements of V Battalion, encamped in Kolodesnaja. A member of 8th (MG.) Company reported:
"Pioniers had marked extensive mine fields, which we skirted
carefully. The 2 cm Flak rolled slowly toward a wooded slope, its
crew scanning the terrain; we followed a short distance behind. There
was supposed to be a village not far away. We continued on into the
forest with mixed feelings. To the left and right the other companies
worked their way forward through the forest. Suddenly, we were met
by furious machine gun and rifle fire. Tracers flitted close by. Shots
cracked wildly from the darkness. Every shot echoed loudly in the
forest. We secured to the left. I went into position on a narrow forest
path. I wanted to fire, but I could see nothing, even though the enemy
fire continued uninterrupted from the dark thicket. I lifted my head
a little too high and a burst of machine gun fire hissed past my ears.
I pushed my nose into the snow and cautiously tried to get a bearing.
After listening for a while, I determined from roughly which direction
the fire was coming. Damn! Couldn't we do something to defend
ourselves? Our anti-aircraft gun fired steadily, spraying the entire
forest with its HE shells. I fired a few times between the tree trunks.
257

I don't know if I hit anything, but a Russian already had me in his

sights. I scratched away the snow beneath me with my hands. Bullets
smacked close beside me. I had piled both of my ammunition boxes
in front of me for protection. Inexperienced as I was, I thought I was
safe behind them. Terrified, I watched as a bullet suddenly smashed
through the metal. That was too much for me. I hung my rifle around
my neck, took the boxes in my hand and crawled to the right where
there was a depression in the earth. Mortar rounds exploded in the
forest. One such shell killed Ogefr. Zippel and Grenadier Ruder and
wounded Obit. Schneider, the company commander. Lt. Hoffmann
took command of the company.
Finally, our heavy infantry guns joined the battle. Whoom! A shot.
It roared over us and then the earth trembled. Crash!!! A red-yellow
flame shot up. Soon the first houses were burning and an hour-anda-half later we were in the village. Everything was empty, strangely
empty. Several huts were in flames, casting a flickering light on the
battlefield. We took cover behind a haystack. The mortars were
brought into position and sentries posted. But we were not secure
here either. Machine guns and submachine guns rattled from every
end and corner. Reinforcements arrived in the form of assault guns
and several anti-tank guns. They were to support us the next morning
when the attack was resumed."
I Battalion, which had been attached to the 3rd Panzer Division as
supporting infantry, was involved in the attack east of Tula. It, too,
spent the day and night in continuous fighting. The battalion went
to the attack on the evening of 2 December and continued to attack
without pause until early on the 5th. The battalion's actions were
described in the following report:
"The moon sank slowly toward the horizon. It became colder.
Someone said it was minus 30 degrees.
We crept forward through the bottom land along a stream. We
knew nothing of the enemy. We wanted to surprise him. Then there
were several shots. A pair of Russians fled before us into the bottom
land. That was annoying. The village was soon visible as a silhouette.
It lay in a valley. The stream appeared to flow through it. A platoon
from 2nd Company clambered out to the right. Several bushes gave
them cover. We watched their advance. Soon they were among the
first houses. We crossed our fingers for them. Then they threw
themselves to the ground. An explosion! Immediately afterward there
were rifle and pistol shots. There was something wrong. The
company commander, Obit. Grundmann, moved into the bottom
land with the other two platoons.
We had to go in. 'Second' move out!
There was lively firing as we reached the first houses. A flash of
flame shot high into the air. There were wounded. An NCO of the
machine gun company Unteroffizier Kalinowski had brought
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two mortars into position. He laid down fire precisely in front of 2nd
Company. Kalinowski was the master of his weapon. Anti-aircraft
guns fired into the roofs. Heavy machine guns fired just over the
heads of the attackers, who could be seen only as shadows. Every
house that was taken was burning. Our medical officer, Dr. Alberts,
was up front with us. He assembled the wounded in several houses
that were still standing. They all had confidence in their doctor. His
task was more of an emotional one. Those who had been shot up
and were lying on the floor needed words of encouragement, not
empty phrases.
The commander of 2nd Company came back. He was being
supported by his batman. A stomach wound. He still walked upright.
He was an iron man, Obit. Grundmann.
We could get no farther than the centre of the village. The Russian
fire was too intense. Also, the enemy was sitting in the dark, while
we were in the light of the fires. What's more, there was also fire
coming from the heights on the left and right.
A runner approached. He was hit on the brightly-lit street. Next to
me the mortar N C O said to two boys: 'Fetch him in.' They looked
at each other. Then Uffz. Kalinowski leapt up himself. He picked up
the wounded man and brought him behind our house.
Our 1st Company under Obit. Derben had joined up. Derben
assembled his men behind the houses and calmly reorganized them
for the attack. Heavy machine guns and mortars were moved into
position. The machine gunners worked the bolts of their weapons
back and forth a few times. All was ready.
'1st Company forward!!!' A thunderous hurrah sounded
throughout the whole village. Pistols out and after them! We saw
the Russians running. Houses were burning everywhere. It smelled
of war. This assault could not be halted.
'Stalin Organs' opened fire on us unexpectedly. We threw ourselves to the ground. I lay on top of 5 or 6 Grenadiers. Next to me
Obit. Derben, the commander of 1st Company, took a large fragment in the thigh. We sat him up. Insisting on following procedure,
he handed the company over to his Leutnant. Then he gave notice
that he was leaving. Once again one could hear the familiar, 'the
company will obey my orders."
I Battalion's battle took place somewhere on the road to Tula
during the night of 4 / 5 December. It was on this same night that
tragedy struck a sister company, the 17th (Motorcycle), which was
located in and around Kolodesnaja. At the centre of events was the
company's commander, Leutnant Henke. A brave, but young,
officer, Henke was full of ideals, but lacked the vital experience which
only years of combat could produce.
Kolodesnaja was a small village in the midst of a great forest,
surrounded by a few fields and meadows which were now snow259

covered. Around the village, especially to the east, was the dark,
threatening forest, whose depths were unknown. The few panje huts
were the sole signs of a human presence. Some had been destroyed,
but the Grenadiers crouched in the few which were intact. These
offered some warmth and the soldiers were happy that they were
not exposed to the terrible minus 30 degree cold and the awful
snowstorms. The unspeakable harshness of the past days and weeks
was reflected in the faces of the Grenadiers. An overpowering
weariness caused them to sink into a half- sleeping state, forgetting
the danger concealed in the forests. The Leutnant, who had led the
company with great bravery, was also overwhelmed by exhaustion.
The few sentries and security outposts should be sufficient to warn
of approaching danger.
In another of the huts in the same village was the headquarters of
the Heavy Battalion (V Btl.), most of whose companies had been
assigned to other battalions. The battalion's commanding officer was
Major von Lentkze. He, too, had no idea of the events to come; he,
too, gave in to the vague feeling of security for which he was to pay
so dearly later.
Students from a Soviet officer school, on skis and clad in parkas,
sneaked cat-like through the forest towards the village. Moving out
of the darkness of the forest, they found a gap in the German line
of security, and suddenly burst into the village. The result was a
bloodbath. At the sounds of the first shots the Grenadiers raced from
the huts as they were, seized their weapons and attempted to defend
themselves. In sock feet, some partially clothed as if they had just
left from washing up, they tried to defend against an enemy who was
superior in numbers and had the advantage of surprise. The actual
battle was brief. Major von Lentzke was soon hit and killed, and Lt.
Gamier of 17th Company and many others were wounded. The
survivors scattered. Individually and in groups, scarcely armed, some
with no weapons at all, they reassembled several hours later.
The next morning the nightmare in Kolodesnaja was over; the
enemy had been driven away. But the scene in the village was a
terrible one: the wounded who had been left behind in the village
had been murdered. Those soldiers who had raced out of their huts
half- dressed and been captured by the Russians had been tied to
sleds and pushed into the village pond. They froze to death. Gefr.
Helmut Tuchscherer, a member of 2nd Battery/4OOth Art.Btl., had
stopped in the village for a rest with his comrades in their truck. He
was found by the door of one of the huts with a small hole in his
forehead. Beside him lay a dead Russian.
Almost half of the company's machines (BMW motorcycles) had
been left behind. Either there had not been time to start them or the
cold prevented them from doing so, and they had been burned or
destroyed by the Russians.
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The shame of Kolodesnaja, as the events of 5 December came to

be known, was seared into the consciousness of every man who was
there. As regimental commander, Oberst W. Hoernlein ordered the
17th (Motorcycle) Company to remove its GROSSDEUTSCHLAND cuff titles until it made good for this disaster. Obit. Borowski
was named new commander of 17th Company. Leutnant Henke
stayed on as a platoon leader.
The 5th of December, however, was a far more important date in
the course of events. It was on this day that the Russian reserves
Siberians from the Far East launched their great counter-offensive
against the Germans. It was the hour that saw the beginning of a far
greater tragedy for Germany: the first major retreat.

Chapter Ten
The Fhrer-Begleit Bataillon
As dawn was breaking on the morning of 22 June 1941, while
units of the German Army were setting out from their assembly areas
for the attack on Russia, motorised elements of the Fhrer BegleitBataillon were driving into the Wolfsschanze installation in East
Prussia. Without direction or large scale briefings the battalion
occupied the planned watches, strongpoints and outposts around
the installation in the forest. As the vehicles were still being
camouflaged beneath the trees, the men were already down from
the vehicles with their weapons and had begun building slit trenches
and foxholes. Fields of fire were laid down and sentry paths were
chosen and made passable. The importance of the installation was
explained to each guard. The most important structure in the
Wolfsschanze was House 11 the Fhrer's quarters. Hitler's house
was enclosed by Security Zone I. Within a larger radius was Security
Zone II, which included all the buildings belonging to the headquarters. The barriers consisted of wire screen fences topped with
barbed wire. Access was provided by gates at designated intervals.
It was there that the guards were posted. These were named for the
points of the compass, such as Guard West, etc. The sentry paths,
which led to the next sentry post, ran along the wire fences. Along
the paths at designated points were machine gun posts which,
initially, were constructed of logs. Later, these were replaced with
concrete dugouts.
The guards and companies were accommodated in wooden barracks, each of which was fitted out with beds and a lounge for a
section. For months one platoon of the 4th (Panzer) Company was

261

stationed on the east side of the installation while the rest of the
company was housed in the barracks. This company formed the local
reserve. In this period of German successes on the Eastern Front the
only possible threat was from parachute troops. The Flak Battery
was responsible for defence against such an attack as well as, of
course, the protection of the airspace over the installation. The only
other expected enemy activity was that of spies. From the very first
a large number of men was kept busy exposing and hunting down
Soviet spies. The company trains were stationed in the villages
around the installation and maintained a sort of forward control by
posting sentries and checkpoints on the access roads. In addition,
civilian defence officials were constantly active screening questionable elements in the immediate area as well as farther afield. The
closer one came to the installation, the denser became the net of
troops and security. Day and night, motorised patrols were on the
road as far as 100 kilometres away from the installation. Stationed
at the security zones, the sentries of the Fhrer-Begleit Bataillon
formed the last line of security before the installation. They themselves came under extremely close scrutiny. Every day and night officers
and NCOs in uniform and in civilian clothes tested the vigilance of
their soldiers. More than once, one of the officers or NCOs was fired
on by an alert sentry or even wounded after the first challenge.
At this time there was always a locomotive under steam at Grlitz
Station, the forest station within the installation, at the disposal of
the F H Q u . Its position was hidden from air observation by
camouflage nets hung between the trees.
The city of Rastenburg, about five kilometres west of the installation, served as supply base for the units in the headquarters. The city
was the express train station, which was common knowledge as the
Fhrer courier train left there daily for Berlin with great punctuality,
the return train also arrived daily. Incidentally, it was in Rastenburg
that the earlier Grenadier Regiment "King Frederick the Great" was
garrisoned. The "Royal Scots", the oldest British regiment,
originated from this regiment. Ironically, in 1945, towards the end
of the Second World War, this same British regiment fought against
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
units.
Rastenburg featured the Komtur Barracks (later artillery barracks)
and the Hindenburg barracks, which were to serve as quarters for
reinforcements for the Fhrer-Begleit Bataillon. For the amusement of the soldiers there was the Hotel Tuliweit, the Schtzenhaus
and the Bahnhof Hotel. Later, it was usually in the Bahnhof Hotel
that members were received and accommodated on arrival. The
Weigel'sche Bookshop took care of the men's intellectual needs,
while the Lyzeum was there for those who liked to dance.
The route travelled daily by the vehicles from the city through
Karlshof into the installation was over a good asphalt road. On the
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left side beyond the level crossing there were several brick buildings
and white barracks which served as a hospital. Many members of
the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon spent time there recovering from
injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents.
Farther to the east lay the Mauerwald in which, near Angerburg,
was located Installation Anna. Installation Anna was the cover name
for the O K H (Army High Command), which kept its command centre
in a large number of barracks and buildings there. Mention of
Installation Anna may call to mind the Lake Zeisig Heights and the
Jger Heights with their lovely pubs and restaurants.
The headquarters of the highest ranking personalities in Hitler's
entourage such as Reichsfhrer SS Heinrich Himmler's headquarters in Grossgarten, about 12 km southeast of Angerburg, or
Hermann Gring's in a local castle contained further command
centres of the German Reich and the German Armed Forces.
The actual Installation Wolfsschanze was under the Commander
of Headquarters who was also commander of the Fhrer-BegleitBataillon. At this time the post was held by Obstlt. Thomas, whose
staff was organised as follows:
Adjutant
Executive Officer
la
lib
IVb (construction)

Obit. (Hptm.) Schwerdt

Obit. Seldte
Obit, von Mllendorf
Obit. (Hptm.) Baum
Major Sewald
Hptm. Peiper
Lt. Kratsch
Obit. Niemeyer
Hptm. Spengemann

Next to him, not subordinate but instructed to work in the closest

cooperation, was the Commander WFSt, at this time Major Momm.
The Wehrmacht Operations Staff, headed by General Jodl and
Oberst Warlimont, was the General Staff group which provided
direct strategic counsel to Hitler.
Several weeks after the beginning of the war against Soviet Russia
on 26 August 1941 Hitler and Mussolini met at the fortress of
Brest-Litovsk. Feldmarschall von Kluge and Feldmarschall Kesselring
reported on their successes in battle. While this was going on,
elements of 1st Company/Fhrer Begleit-Bataillon guarded the
airfield and the inspection party.
In general, once the men had become familiar with the surrounding
area and the novelties of the installation, security duties in the
headquarters soon settled into a daily routine.
In mid-September 1941 a special unit, Battle Group Nehring, was
formed. The intention was to give the units of the Fhrer BegleitBataillon an opportunity to see combat and prevent them from
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becoming worn out by the monotony of security duties. Named for

the commander of the unit's heavy company, the battle group was
to be employed on the Northern Front. Initially, the intention was
solely to provide a change between security duties and front line
service. Later, however, events demanded a different style of detachment during the crisis periods which appeared nearly every winter
on the Eastern Front; often the unit was the last really well-equipped
combat unit available for employment at crisis points at the front.
The battle group's combat capabilities are illustrated by its composition:
a Panzer company under Lt. Rohrbeck,
an anti-tank platoon of the heavy company,
a motorcycle platoon of the 2nd (fast) Company,
an armoured car platoon of the 2nd (fast) Company,
an anti-aircraft platoon,
a signals platoon,
a medical platoon,
a field workshop platoon.
On 24 September 1941 this comparatively small battle group was
seen off from the Rastenburg station by Wehrmacht Adjutant Oberst
Schmundt, ostensibly for a tour of duty of only three weeks. The
journey by train led through Narva into the northern zone, an area
which was not exactly favourable for the operation of motorised
units.
Replacements were requisitioned from Neuruppin while the battle
group was still on its way to the front. Approximately 150-200 men
arrived during October 1941 to fill the gaps in the Fhrer-BegleitBataillon at the installation.
The first weeks saw the battle group employed on security duties
in rear areas. However, the situation at the beginning of December,
when the Soviets launched their winter offensive in the northern zone
of the Eastern Front, resulted in the employment of the battle group
in the front lines. Soviet penetrations led higher command authorities
to take actions that could only be seen as disadvantageous to the
battle group's leaders and men. The unit was split into small groups
which were attached to foreign divisions and regiments as stopgaps.
Not only did the battle group's leaders no longer have any direct
control over their troops, which were scattered over the whole front,
but the men in such splinter groups soon felt that they were
completely on their own. What was more, commanders were only
too glad to fully exploit these attached troops while husbanding their
own men. Also, the supply situation for these borrowed units was
always the poorest, not exactly a gesture of gratitude for their efforts.

264

Battle Group Nehring was forced to join combat under these less
than favourable circumstances and saw no further action as a unit.
Prominent in these actions was the Panzer Company, which did a
splendid job with its small 9.6 tonne panzers on the log roads in the
Volkhov swamps. On numerous occasions it was the efforts of the
Panzer Company which permitted an orderly withdrawal by the
infantry. Under the most difficult conditions it fought open the
TichwinGrusino road (actually no better than a log road), as a result
of which the German forces were able to occupy winter positions on
the west bank of the Volkhov almost unhindered. Unfortunately, the
Panzer Company, under the command of Obit. Rohrbeck, lost all of
its operational tanks, which resulted in the employment of the highly
specialised Panzer crews as infantry.
Not until the end of March 1942, when the situation at the front
finally stabilised, were the remaining elements of the battle group
released to return to Germany.

Chapter Eleven
The I.R. GD in the Winter Retreat 1941-42
Defensive battles b e f o r e M o s c o w

6. 12.26. 12. 41
27. 12.-10. 4. 42

Defensive battle in the area of Jefremov and

Tula.
Defensive battles northeast of Orel.

Following the desperate attempts of 2-4 December to get the

German Army moving again toward the offensive's objective, which
lay so near, the exhausted units ground to a halt. There was no word
of command that could drive the soldiers, who had given their utmost
under unimaginable hardships, forward again. "General Mud" and
"General Winter" wrested the order from the German command to
call off the attack: the units would hold the positions in the lines that
had been won.
The attack on Moscow had failed; a repetition of the successful
Blitz campaigns was not to be. The tremendous advance into the
heart of the land in the East had bogged down in mud and snow.
The Soviets realised that their hour had arrived. Perhaps recalling
the victory over Napoleon, and secure in the knowledge of the size
and depth of their land, they had brought in fresh, rested troops from
Siberia and the Far East. The time had come for the Soviets to strike

265

back. The thermometer showed minus 25 degrees Centigrade on

the night of 5 / 6 December 1941 when the Soviets launched a
massive counterattack by five armies with 25 rifle divisions, 7 cavalry
divisions, 18 rifle brigades and 11 tank brigades, all at full strength,
from lines south of the Waldai HeightsMoscow and MoscowTula
salientLivny in the direction of Smolensk and the West. The
objectives of the Soviet attack were first to smash the overextended
German Panzer armies and then destroy Army Group Centre by
enveloping it from both sides.
The projecting wedge of the Second Panzer Army presented the
Soviet's southern group with an opportunity for an envelopment
from three sides. Tula was still in Soviet hands, and even though the
foremost German positions near and south of Venev extended deep
into their flank, the situation invited a breakthrough to the south and
southwest.
In its positions in the salient, from east of Tula as far as Wenew,
was the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. The troops
huddled against the Siberian cold in the towns and villages. On the
morning of 6 December the Grenadiers were unaware of the danger
threatening their sector. Outside, the sentries and sections facing the
enemy in their positions in the snow stamped their feet to stay warm
as they fought their unrelenting battle against the cold. Woollen caps
were the only articles of winter clothing that had been issued, because
the high command had never entertained thoughts that this war
might carry over into the winter months. The feeling of abandonment
lay over the fighting morale of the troops like a paralysis. The will to
resist of the men, over a thousand kilometres away from home in a
strange land, threatened to break.
Out of the courage of desperation, out of the fear of falling into
the enemy's hands alive, and out of the instinct to survive, the men
of the Eastern Front endured the sacrifices, defended what had been
won and held on. They did not give up.
The following report is from 1st Company of I Battalion/I.R. G D .
It was made on 6 December 1941 from a village somewhere east of
Tula:
"At about 02.00 most of the houses were burning. The Grenadiers
no longer moved about; instead they just stood around apathetically.
If they came under fire they moved listlessly to another, darker spot.
From the left, quite close, there were loud cries. Rifle bullets and
ricochets smacked into the wood. Our own rifle fire in that direction
grew weaker. Several small forms leapt forward in the glare of the
fires. There was no doubt the Russians were in the village. Our
sentries, taken by surprise, were dead. The 'Second' was gone, the
'Third' was in position at the other end of the village. Elements of
the 'First' and the 'Fourth' were passing through. They had been
relieved and were unfamiliar with the situation. The leader of the
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'Fourth' assembled his company; then he set out with a small band
of men. Orders were no longer given; command had reverted to its
original form. It was a battle for survival. Each of us took over a task
somewhere. We knew and trusted each other in such situations. This
gave one confidence.
Our strength had long been at an end. No one mentioned it. What
good would it do? Who would hear our complaints?
Several men fell in the persistent rifle fire. Oberleutnant Richter of
the 'Fourth' went on. He had on a bright cap. 'Just keep up! Come
on!' He was calm as always. His batman saw a Russian taking aim
behind a house. Just then the Oberleutnant was in the bright glare
of a fire. He collapsed and a few minutes later he was dead. No one
had ever noticed any inner emotion in him in combat. He did
everything matter-of-factly, including the sacrifice of his own life.
We fell back, our tired legs tramping through the knee-deep snow.
The Grenadiers of the 'Fourth' carried their dead chief with them.
It was especially cold that day; minus 36 degrees we learned later.
After an hour's march several men had frozen ears despite their wool
caps. The cold pricked our cheeks and the men had to rub their
noses to prevent freezing. Eyebrows and eyelashes had become
white with frost. Beard stubble froze fast to the wool.
The Leutnant and his Pioniers had been waiting in the village for
twelve hours. By much walking back and forth they simulated a larger
force. To do so, everyone had to remain outside, which resulted in
numerous cases of frostbite. Activities were carried out almost
mechanically: halt, leader forward, post security. Silently and
apathetically the platoons and sections spread out. Losses were
considerable: individuals had to do sentry duty more often and for
longer periods. Everything seemed to take longer because of exhaustion. Often, orders did not get through. The commanders were
always on their feet. Even thinking was difficult. Men simply fell
asleep.
The village looked desolate. An Obergefreiter of the 'Second' and
a Russian lay together where they had fought. The Obergefreiter was
clutching his rifle desperately. The Russian's bayonet was sticking in
his chest. The Russian's face had been shattered by a bullet, but he
had not let go of his rifle.
We had to make our ammunition last until evening; we couldn't
fetch any during the day. The exit from the village lay under accurate
rifle fire. We were also short of fuel and there was nothing to eat. In
the evening we realised it was Sunday, the second Sunday of Advent,
and at home two candles would be burning on the Advent wreath.
Back there they didn't know if we were still alive or not.
During the night the order arrived to disengage from the enemy.
Only grudgingly did we give up what we had conquered and held."

267

It was 7 December, the second Sunday of Advent, when the order

came for the I.R. GD to withdraw. The order reached the battalions
at different times. Lines of communication were long and wireless
traffic was being interfered with. By late morning II Battalion had
already assembled at its vehicles, but I Battalion was not able to
disengage from the enemy until darkness was falling. The regimental
command post as command centre for the battalions had
already transferred its first elements to Uslowaja. The 400th Artillery
Battalion left its positions and drove through Karniki, Uslowaja and
Dedilowo into the area around Bolochowka, southeast of Tula.
II Battalion's vehicles pushed southward through the deep snow
into the area on both sides of Dedilowo, where the unit was initially
to take over a new security position. Everywhere, however, the
Russians were pursuing with massed, superior forces. The Soviets
took advantage of the precipitate and incoherent withdrawal by the
German units, following and charging into their columns. The Soviets
appeared suddenly with tanks and panje sleighs, seeking to cut the
roads and attempting to spread confusion. The following is a report
from the 8th (MG.) Company of II Battalion from the Dedilowo
sector:
"The Russians had obviously brought in reinforcements. For hours
during the night I listened to the sounds of tanks moving and firing.
Then it flared up to our left anti-tank guns. On the right the tanks
rumbled and fired. Ours? Russian? We guessed they were some of
ours from the Prussian panzer division which had begun its
withdrawal.
Meanwhile, employing panje sleighs, we fetched ammunition from
the supply train. As we could not pass through the ravine, we drove
over the hill. Scarcely had we reached the top when we came under
fire from a Russian anti-tank gun. With great haste we drove back
down the hill. The same thing happened to a 3.7 cm Pak. It was the
only anti-tank weapon we had up front.
It was the second Sunday of Advent. The Russians could see into
the village and they were able to rake the descent into the ravine with
their weapons. They also dropped mortar shells into the extended
ravine.
Springing from cover to cover we ammunition carriers worked our
way to the rear. As we were running along the long ravine, Franz
Schl. suddenly froze: Russians!!! But we continued on; apparently
they hadn't seen us. Laden with ammunition canisters, we made it
back. To the left on a rise stood a Russian armoured car and two
trucks. Our heavy infantry gun opened fire on them and destroyed
all three. The Russians ran about and tried to haul the trucks away
until the last was hit and destroyed.
Our situation didn't look too rosy. There were no longer any of
our troops to the left or right. We were in danger of being cut off.
268

The tanks we had heard all night were Russian T-34s and 52 tonners
from Moscow earmarked for the relief of Tula. What was more, they
had brought in fresh troops Siberians!! And we had only the small
3.7 cm Pak up front.
I went back through the ravine with three men to fetch some food.
On the way back an icy wind blew in our faces and our breath froze
on our woollen caps. The pea soup in the mess kits had frozen into
solid lumps. Our hands were numb and the tent square holding the
cold rations weighed heavily on us.
At a bend where there were some bushes we thought we spotted
movement, but then we laughed at our unnecessary fright. Scarcely
had we reached the village street in Dedilowo, when we heard several
cries and a few shots behind us from the ravine we had passed
through not ten minutes before. Startled, we stopped for a moment
and then went into our quarters. Our comrades were pleased that
we had finally arrived. The mess kits were thawed over the open fire.
A little later a messenger came in and we asked him about the cries
from the ravine earlier. He said that a pair of Russians had bayonetted
and killed two signals men sent out to lay a new line.
In the evening orders came to move; we evacuated our positions
and fell back."
Once begun, the movement of the German troops forced to
withdraw from the threatened areas by the weight of the Soviet
attacks accelerated. This was especially true of those units which had
been located in the most threatened areas of the German Eastern
Front. These were the units whose elan had carried them the farthest
into Russian territory: the units east and northeast of Tula. Among
them was the I.R. GD. The destruction of these units was undoubtedly one of the first objectives of the Soviets, going hand in hand
with the forcing-back of the German spearheads north and south of
Tula. The German commanders near Tula had to call on all of their
command skills in order to extricate the threatened units quickly, so
that they could restore the front again as soon as possible.
The result, however, was a retreat marked by the abandonment of
daily positions. The units fell back during the night on foot, in
vehicles or on sleighs. When dawn came they moved into positions,
waited for the enemy and held on through the day. When darkness
fell they set out once again to continue the retreat to the rear, to
the west.
The battle raged over villages, over the warmth of fires, over the
few still intact peasant huts. These were the driving forces behind
the daily exertions in the biting cold as low as minus 45 degrees.
These prizes provided a few hours of rest and sleep until it was time
to move on. They permitted the men to gather their strength for the
events of the morning. The common soldier, the Grenadier, suffered
heavily from this fate, but he bore the hardships which every hour
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heaped on him anew. Day after day he plodded through metre-deep

snow in a landscape which never changed. There were no paths,
scarcely any roads, only now and then a tramped-down track where
another unit had gone before. Usually, however, the Grenadiers had
to make their own way, and the leading man had to be relieved often.
The heavy equipment, the mortar base plates, the machine guns,
the ammunition canisters they were an almost unbearable load for
the individuals carrying them. And there was always the danger from
the rear, from the enemy. He was everywhere and he was nowhere.
It was difficult to comprehend; suddenly he was there and then he
was gone. Far superior in numbers, it was the enemy who dictated
the pace of the retreat. It was a pitiless battle, a battle for survival or
death in the icy cold of the East. The victims claimed by this enemy
were nameless and numberless. The bravery of those who endured
was indescribable.
The following place names marked the regiment's path: for
elements of II Battalion, Bolchowo, a small industrial city with coal
yards and factories. On 9 and 10 December, Prestaji for I and III
Battalions. For all of the regiment's units it was the Upa river on 11
December with its wooded heights on the west bank. The regiment
crossed the river over a military bridge near Truschkina and
Kamenka. And then there was Jassnaja Polyana on 12 December,
where the regimental command post was set up. It was through this
area, where the grave of Leo Tolstoy lay in the nearby woods, that
the regiment had passed several weeks before on its way to Tula.
At this point in time the regiment's commanders were concerned
with maintaining an orderly withdrawal and they sought to keep a
firm grip on the situation. However, the faster than expected advance
by the Russians forced higher command authorities to detach individual units to foreign divisions against the wishes of the regiment's
commanders.
II Battalion, with support from the 400th Artillery Battalion near
Kishkino, was involved in defensive battles on the west bank of the
Upa. On 13 December there was especially heavy fighting near the
village of Upskaya Fati. I Battalion, which had meanwhile been
placed under the command of a foreign division, was also involved
in major battles southwest of Tula. The Soviets were now sending
large numbers of tanks along with their fresh forces in hopes of
ensuring a breakthrough. During the fighting on 13 December the
assault guns of the 16th (Assault Gun) Company under Obit. Frantz
scored a major success. In the space of a few hours he and his platoon
destroyed 15 enemy tanks, raising the company's total of enemy
tanks destroyed since the beginning of the Russian campaign to 46.
On 14 December, at approximately the same time as the news of
16th Company's great success reached the regimental command
post in Kolpna Nowaya, the 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company, which was
270

DEFENCE AND ATTACK IN

THE FOREST AREA NW OF
BOLKHOV IN THE PERIOD
23 JAN.-15 FEB. 1942

also fighting with I Battalion, was able to report the destruction of

its 100th enemy tank. A member of 1st Company/I Battalion
described the events, including the success by the assault guns. It is
clear from his report how the sacrificial, courageous efforts of the
individual Grenadiers surpassed the mechanised tank battles. The
nameless soldiers on this winter front entered no numbers in the
war's victory lists. Their efforts were reflected in the numbers of
frozen and wounded men:
"As dawn broke enemy artillery was firing into the village. We
thought ourselves safe behind our stone house. Now and then anti
tank rounds hissed over. But we were mistaken: they were tanks!
We couldn't make out their exact position. Shells burst nearby. A
wireless truck at the wall was smashed into wreckage; the operator
lost a leg. In the distance several black shapes emerged from the
village: the tanks were attacking! Five riflemen on the left wing lost
their nerve; they ran back along a long snow covered slope. All five
fell as they were caught by a burst of machine gun fire. It was an old
truth: he who runs away is certain to die!
A few metres farther stood an anti-tank gun of the 14th Pz.Jg.
Company. Enemy machine gun fire rattled against its protective
armour shield. The commander of the anti-tank platoon was an
officer candidate, Bensinger. He had only recently joined the company. The tanks rolled through the snow, firing as they came. The
anti-tank platoon began its firefight. We could no longer make out
the guns, but we could follow their tracing ammunition. It was all
over in a matter of minutes. Any anti-tank gun that failed to fire
quickly and accurately was knocked out. Three enemy tanks were
set afire. They had done it! The company had its 100th victory!
Oberleutnant Frantz of the assault guns drove out against the
remaining enemy tanks and in a few minutes destroyed five more.
Just then we were about to retake the red house. The Pionier
Leutnant stormed towards it and fell leading his men. Nine men
returned without success. Without orders, Lt. Weber of 4th Company
tried the same thing. He took his time, springing forward from cover
to cover, waiting for his men in a wooden shed. There they made
ready. Then with a few bounds they were in the house. Not a
Russian escaped. Forty or perhaps fifty were killed.
In following up, the 1st Company pressed on into the enemy
village. Everything appeared to be going well. There were only 35
Grenadiers. Then, from nearby, shouts of 'Hurray!' rang out. From
all around Russians poured out of every house. The Grenadiers fired
to all sides; all around them was black with the enemy. They had to
pull back. Ahead of them lay a large snow covered field. Several
remained standing and kept firing. Among them was a Leutnant. It
was a difficult, almost hopeless run across the open snow field. Men
fell left and right. They lifted one man up: belly wound! The wounded

272

soldier said, 'Leave me here!' 'It's no use!' The assault guns and their
brave Leutnant Frantz prevented the worst from happening. Bullets
smacked against the armour plate. Frantz climbed out and hoisted
the wounded up onto the assault gun. The Leutnant was wounded
in the shoulder. Twelve men fell dead or wounded into enemy hands.
It was a black hour.
This, too, young soldiers should know. This was what an unlucky
battle was like for a Grenadier. Those who survived it no longer
scared so easily.
Very formally, the Leutnant handed over command. He had seen
the same thing happen to his Oberleutnant a few days before. The
commander placed the black-white-red ribbon of the Iron Cross
through the button hole of his field jacket. Then the Feldwebel took
over the small, hard company."
More than anything else, it is the names of the villages and towns
that recall the events of the retreat. It was for the possession of these
that the men shed their blood and tears. Most lay on either side of
the TulaPlavskMzensk road, over which the German forces had
first advanced and now retreated. The often nameless villages had
to be protected, had to be held to the end as bases for supply and
care of the wounded. It was around them that the battles were fought
and, as they were given up one at a time, the gains of the previous
months vanished. Also along the road were the graves of those who
had fallen, the wreckage of vehicles, the ruins and ashes of burneddown houses evidence of the ferocity of this war for survival.
The following report was made from the village of Laminzewo
which, on 15 December 1941, was being defended by the 8th (MG.)
Company and other units of II Battalion. It was made by a young,
perhaps eighteen-year-old Grenadier who was assigned as an ammunition carrier with the company's heavy mortar. He had left
Germany only eight weeks earlier as a young replacement:
"We had completely lost our way, and it took us more than three
hours to cover two kilometres. After a brief rest we had to go out
again on relief. We took along a Russian pot and some dry wood so
that we would have something warm in the snow bunker.
This time at least the weather was clear, and after an hour we
reached the outpost and relieved the sentries. The four of us sat in
the snow bunker, for which we had made a roof from all the available
cover in the section. Outside we erected a wall of snow blocks to
break the icy wind. With our bayonets we cut shavings, which we
burned in the pot. Naturally, this produced more smoke than fire
and our eyes ran continuously.
At noon we saw a troop of Bolsheviks leave the forest about 1,000
metres in front of us and move into the village. A little later they were
followed by another group of about battalion strength.

273

It was night again. Man is capable of enduring a damned lot, but

there is a limit! When would we be relieved or at least move into
better and warmer positions? What was it all for? Most of all, when
would we be going home? The way things were going, we would
come to a bad end. Thoughts of relief haunted the minds of the men
of our regiment.
Three days without any rations! With empty stomachs, almost
everyone was suffering from dysentery. We felt weak and lousy, and
on top of it all was the terrible cold. Day by day the frost wounds on
my feet became larger and more purulent. Nothing healed in the
cold. And there were the Bolsheviks. They pursued us relentlessly
and we couldn't stop them. We were alone and far too weak. Poor
but proud GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. Were we to go to the dogs
here? Did the people back home know our situation? Hopefully
not. But despite all of the misery and horror of the vicious Russian
winter, there was not one of us who had lost hope that we would
some day be able to pay all of this back."
The 16th of December saw II Battalion in a dangerous situation in
Kossaja, which lay east of the road, when a powerful Russian force
broke into the village. Only with great difficulty was the battalion able
to break out and reassemble in Ssury Nishnije. Things went much
the same for I Battalion, which had only a handful of Grenadiers of
5th Company available to meet an attack by three Soviet battalions.
Lt. von Bruchhausen was killed during a counterattack as he attempted to clarify the situation. In this battle Medical-Obergefreiter
Hoffmeister of the 6th Company distinguished himself through his
tireless readiness to help and his bravery in the recovery of the
wounded.
II Battalion spent 17 December at Lasarewo Station; I Battalion
was in Oserki the same day, while the rest of the regiment went to
Pirogowo for a night. Signs of the retreat were everywhere: burning
villages, plundered supply dumps, the wreckage of vehicles, heavy
weapons blown up by the withdrawing troops, roaming bands of
civilians. It was a picture of horror. But there was no rest, no pause
always onward toward the southwest and Mzensk.
There was heavy fighting for II Battalion at Lapotkowo. On its left,
I and III Battalions fought off the many enemy attacks with great
difficulty. The retreat continued. Men were so tired that they scarcely
saw the danger any more. Everyone had to help himself, and when
the situation became untenable the leaders officers, corporals,
common soldiers rose to the challenge and mastered the situation.
But leaders were becoming fewer. Their names recall the severity of
the fighting: Uffz. Dittmann and Keilhauer of 8th Company, Lt.
Nitsch of 7th Company and Lt. Bver of 11th Company were killed
on 19 December. Gefr. Portune and Grenadiers Fischer and
Ladebeck were killed the same day and Gefr. Wahner posted missing

274

(16. 12.). All were from 8th Company. There were so many who
never returned.
On 21 December 1941 the regimental headquarters moved its
command post to Tschern. The enemy's pursuit was not so vigorous
now, the pace of the retreat slowed. The companies still faced bitter
fighting but the pauses became longer, finally allowing an opportunity to regroup and rest. Gradually the regimental headquarters
was able to obtain a general view of the losses of the past weeks,
determine the strength of the units and assess their combat value.
The results of the tally were shocking. No better impression could
be conveyed of the scale of the unit's losses than the following
account of the reunion of the remains of a company with its motor
transport:
"After a seemingly endless night march, word came through that
trucks were waiting to collect us. Only two kilometres more. We
moved through burning villages with only one thought in mind our
trucks are there! Our field kitchen will be there! For days all we had
to eat was raw or cooked potatoes, pickles and doughy ch\eb.
Finally, the first trucks. Our company was in the lead, we almost
ran for joy. Finally, we reached them.
Our drivers shook our hands. They asked, where are the others?
We looked at one another in silence: killed, missing, wounded!! Of
the 17 men in our platoon, 3 had been killed, 4 were missing and 6
had been wounded.
Ogefr. Banth, Ogefr. Rieger and I (Gren. Rehfeldt). Climb in!
We jumped into the truck and soon we were wheeling our way toward
the rear. My God, it was such a feeling not to have to walk on frozen
feet any longer, not to have to carry the heavy equipment.
Following a quick night journey we moved into quarters north of
Mzensk."
The situation at the front had eased somewhat. Motor transport
came not just for this company, but for all of the other companies
as well. Travelling by night, the entire regiment was driven through
Orel into the Bolchow area, where it was to rest. However, the
strength of the infantry divisions along the Oka, which were to stop
the Soviet advance once and for all, was too weak and, despite the
trials of the past few weeks and its weakened condition, on 22 and
23 December the I.R. GD had to be sent back into action. The three
now-reinforced infantry battalions were sent to bolster three infantry
divisions in position along the Oka. Their fighting morale and ability
to hold on were judged far superior to the infantry there and they
were inserted as corset-stays at the likely focal points of the expected
Soviet attack mostly in the bridgehead facing the Oka.
With strengths of 10 to 25 men each (excluding the heavy
companies) the companies moved across the frozen Oka into
completely unprepared positions. At first there were only snow
275

bunkers, but, as soon as was possible, holes were blasted and

chipped out of the frozen earth. Night after night, timber, doors and
boards were brought forward to outfit the bunkers. Positions were
built and makeshift stoves fashioned out of buckets, pots and
canisters. The companies settled in. Temperatures dropped in the
days before Christmas. The Grenadiers laboriously blasted their way
deeper into the ground. At least they would be able to spend
Christmas in warmth. These trenches and bunkers were not to be
compared with the developed positions of the First World War but,
nevertheless, the men soon felt comparatively comfortable.
The Grenadiers of the three forward battalions, with outstanding
support from the heavy weapons of IV and V Battalions as well as
the batteries of the 400th Artillery Battalion, put up a heroic
resistance in these positions from 23 December 1941 until 4 January
1942. Again and again they repulsed attacks by far superior enemy
forces in the most difficult conditions in temperatures as low as 30
degrees below zero! The physical ordeal and privation endured in
these battles far exceeded that of the battles in the Jelnja Bend and
near Shatalowka. At great sacrifice the regiment fulfilled its assignment on the Oka. There were many individual acts of heroism, and
it would require many pages to describe them all. The following may
be considered representative: Gefr. Schweitzer who, after all the
other members of his machine gun crew had been put out of action,
filled a steel helmet with ammunition, barricaded himself in the corner
of a house and held out against the attacking Soviets until he was
felled from behind by a grenade. Or a bunker crew which engaged
a superior attacking force in close combat with hand grenades, finally
destroying the attackers directly in front of their position. Or Ofeldw.
Bielig of the 15th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company, who continued firing on
the attacking Soviets from an open firing position until they were at
point-blank range.
The Soviets always seemed to have fresh troops, attacking day and
night. But, though filthy and lousy, the Grenadiers were always ready
to rise from their holes and meet the attack.
The Grenadiers, other than those on sentry duty, passed Christmas
in warm quarters, bunkers and peasant huts. Their thoughts were of
home and loved ones. There was plenty of mail from home and gifts
from family and friends, as well as from strangers who had taken
time to remember their soldiers at the front. Here and there, on
tables, crates and wooden bases, were tiny Christmas trees in jam
jars, often pitiful, but always lovingly decorated.
Far from this quiet hour, before the assault against the enemy
fortifications, invisible to the eye, but audible to the listener, enemies
laboured with a traitorous intent. They were allies of those against
whom the war was being fought: the Bolsheviks. But they were
Germans, betraying their country in its hour of greatest need. Their
276

wireless traffic in the ' Rote Kapee" net, which worked for the
Soviets in Europe and even in Germany, revealed their shameless
game. The following transmission was sent to Moscow on Christmas
Night:
"Dora to Director (Moscow)
From Salter (cover name): From prominent Germans staying here in
government service, who were previously close to the Nazis:
German people war weary and resigned! Masses still believe in final
victory, however intellectuals and senior military circle sceptical concerning outcome of eastern war. Hitler's death or defeat at the front
would mean end of Nazi regime by military dictatorship. Victory on
Eastern front costing the elite of the German Army. Russian tanks far
superior. Latvians and Estonians convinced that Soviets will return;
Germans on leave from baltic states strongly impressed!"
Even if the soldiers on the Eastern Front suspected nothing of this
treachery, the retreat before the forces of nature and the strength of
the enemy was eating away at their fighting morale and their will to
resist. Their m u c h loved Panzer leader, the courageous
Generaloberst Guderian, was held responsible for the setbacks on
the Eastern Front. He bade farewell to his troops in an order of the
day:
The Commander in Chief
of the Second Panzer Army

Army H.Q., 26. 12. 41

Army Order of the Day

Soldiers of the Second Panzer Army!
"The Fhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has today
relieved me of my command. As I leave you I think of our six months
of battle for the glory of our nation and the victory of our arms, I think
in reverence of all those who gave their blood and their lives for
Germany.
To you, my comrades in arms, I give my deepest thanks for your loyalty,
devotion and true comradeship which you have proved over and over
again in this long period of time. We were bound together for better
or for worse, and it was my greatest joy to care for you and to intercede
on your behalf. Farewell!
I know that you will fight bravely as before and will triumph despite
superior numbers and the distress of winter. My thoughts go with you
on your difficult journey.
You make it for Germany!"
Heil Hitler!
Guderian

277

The 27th of December 1941 was a glorious day for the regiment.
The 17th (Motorcycle) Company under Oberleutnant Prachowsky
held its positions near Petrovka against far superior enemy forces.
The defence was marked by the heroic death of Leutnant Henke. A
member of the company described the day's events:
"The 17th (Motorcycle) Company was deployed along the Oka
river among the units of III Battalion. The company's positions
consisted merely of holes dug in the snow atop unprotected and
treeless heights. Attacking with massive forces, the Soviets attempted to press into these improvised defensive positions. They
achieved several local penetrations and partially outflanked the
company. Then Lt. Henke rose, rallied a few brave men around him
and, with a loud roar that was intended to conceal their true strength,
counterattacked the Bolsheviks with great elan, throwing them back
out of the positions. As the Russians fled across the frozen Oka, Lt.
Henke set out after them and put them completely to flight. It was
a terrific sight.
The Bolsheviks launched no more attacks in this sector during the
entire winter. The company received the special praise of the
regiment's commanding officer.
Lt. Henke, who had been somewhat unfairly held responsible for
the failure at Kolodesnaya, and on whom this blame had laid heavily,
was killed in the counterattack."
As a result of this action 17th Company was given back its cuff
titles. Lt. Henke's actions and his hero's death were acknowledged
by the regiment's commanding officer, Oberst Hoernlein, in a letter
to Henke's parents:
. . . he fell leading an especially daring counterattack which he
launched on his own initiative, and which put far superior enemy
forces to flight. . .
A captured Russian order showed clearly the superiority in forces
that the battalions had to contend with. II Battalion alone was facing
two enemy divisions, which so far had failed to gain more than a few
metres of ground in the Voronets bridgehead. Russian losses were
frightful.
At the turn of the year, when the situation in this sector on the
Oka had stabilised and the corps felt the position secure, II and III
Battalions were sent directly back to the regiment, leaving only I
Battalion still attached to a foreign division. Everywhere they went,
the Grenadiers with the black and silver cuff titles received thanks
and recognition for their outstanding achievements while with the
infantry divisions. An example of this recognition was an incident
involving I Battalion:
I Battalion under Major Gehrke was placed under the command
of one of the regiments of an infantry division. The regiment wanted
to send out a patrol to establish contact with the GD troops. A
278

surprisingly large number of men volunteered for the patrol. The

battalion commander asked why this was and the answer was
striking: We would very much like a chance to see the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Grenadiers!
In another case a Bavarian infantry division presented the Infantry
Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND with a service of Rosenthal
porcelain as a token of its special affection and appreciation for the
efforts of the Grenadiers.
This recognition of the achievements of the Grenadiers of the
Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was small compensation for the sacrifices of their comrades in the past weeks. Once again
it was dry columns of figures without names which were submitted
by the regiment when asked to report its losses:

Casualties of the reinf. Regiment from 22. 6. 41 - 6. 1. 42

Unit
I Btl.
II Btl.
Ill Btl.
IV Btl.
V Btl.
400th Art. Btl.
400th Supply
Services
Rgt. H.Q.
Company

Officers:
KIA Wounded MIA
11
20
15
7
8
23
2
6
6
13
2
10

36

2
89

NCOs:
KIA Wounded MIA
18
49
33 116
4
53 124
32
10
11
33
4
22

129

1
377

Men:
KIA Wounded MIA
174
617
19
226
723
35
208
756
28
43
121
2
24
65
266
14
1
93
4
11
1
1

735 :2,590

Total casualties of the reinf. Rgt.: 4,070 soldiers.

The situation on the Oka changed little in the early days of January
1942. The heavy Soviet attacks against the weakened German lines
continued, but they were unable to make any significant territorial
gains. This was especially true in the sector east and north of
Bolkhov, which was held by II and III Battalions and the infantry units
employed with them.
The situation on both sides of Belev, where General Stemmermann, later known as the "Lion of Belev", was in command, was
unclear. I Battalion, still attached to another infantry division, was
no longer in positions on the Oka, but had been moved southwest
of Belev, near Dolbino, its front facing north and northeast. The
Soviets had broken through north and south of Belev and were
streaming westward into the rear areas. Their objective was clear:
taking advantage of their breakthrough they would roll up the
279

110

German positions on the Oka to the south and get their offensive
moving again. But with the successful Soviet breakthrough on both
sides of Belev the attacks on the Oka positions lessened noticeably.
The quiet period allowed some units to be pulled out of the line for
a rest.
As the first unit to be withdrawn from the front lines in this fashion,
II Battalion was transferred into the Subkowo area on 17 January
1942. The soldiers spent their time sleeping, washing and cleaning
weapons. Thoughts of seeing action again were far from their minds.
And yet, because of the threatening situation in the rear of the Oka
positions, their next action was not far off. Enemy patrols and even
sleigh columns had been spotted in the wooded areas northwest of
Bolkhov. German rear echelon services found themselves confronted
by enemy columns. Ambushes were the order of the day; supply was
threatened.
At about 07.00 on 20 January 1942, II Battalion moved out. Its
assignment was to clarify the situation in the JagodnayaTschuchlowoAlfonasowo area and establish contact with elements
of the 4th Panzer Division attacking from the west. It had to be
determined which villages were no longer in German hands. II
Battalion therefore drove through to Gorodok, about 20 km west
northwest of Bolkhov, where it left its vehicles and continued on foot
to Jagodnaya. That evening the battalion occupied positions which,
possessing a field of fire of scarcely more than 50-80 metres, had to
be characterised as particularly poor. Scarcely had the Grenadiers
occupied the positions when the enemy put in an appearance. Heavy
fire from behind snowbanks and bushes whipped into the German
lines. The situation was becoming increasingly difficult.
As expected, patrols revealed a serious picture. The 17th (Motorcycle) Company, which had transferred to Gorodok on 21 January
to secure the supply road for II Battalion, which had passed through
twenty-four hours earlier, was ambushed in the town. The company
put up a heroic defence but lost its commander, Obit. Prachowsky.
Prachowsky, who was held in high esteem by his soldiers, was one
of the few officers left who had served with the regiment since its
formation.
The regiment's units were sent into action as reports of the enemy's
appearance on the battlefield came in. Withdrawal of the units from
the line did not always go according to plan. This and other factors
resulted in their being thrown hastily into the new areas of operations
without rest in conditions of biting cold and deep snow. As the next
available companies, the 20th (Flak) and 18th (Pionier) marched as
quickly as possible to Gorodok to clarify the situation and help firm
up the defences. The threat to II Battalion, which was fighting hard
in Jagodnaya, of being cut off had to be overcome. Elements of the
400th Artillery Battalion also moved to Gorodok and went into firing
280

positions there. Gorodok, through which passed the road from the
northwest in the direction of Bolkhov, appeared to be the focal point
of the Soviet attack. Severing the road remained their main objective.
The thermometer registered as low as minus 40 degrees, and the
inadequately-clothed Grenadiers suffered pitifully in the bitter cold.
The difficulty of fighting in such sub-zero temperatures is illustrated
by the following incident described by a wireless operator of 2
Battery/4OOth Artillery battalion:
"Before us in a valley lay the village the name is not important;
it was apparently not occupied by the enemy. The battery ranged in
on it. Soon afterward the Ivans came storming out of the forest across
the open field in front of the village. Alarm!!! I came out of the bunker
and set up the field telephone behind a log fence in front of a shack.
Obit. Wackernagel ran about issuing orders to Oberwachtmeister
'Ossi' Oswald, whose battery was to open fire.
Next to me stood a Grenadier. His hands were in his pockets and
his rifle was leaned against the fence as he watched the approaching
Ivans. I asked him why he didn't shoot, and all he said was, 'No, you
go ahead!' So, I took off my headset, stood up, snatched up the rifle,
took off my old mittens they were little more than tatters anyway
adjusted the sight from 500 to 300 metres, poked the rifle through
the fence and fired three shots. I doubt that I hit anything. Then it
was all over for me; I was simply unable to insert another clip of
ammunition; my hands were white and stiff. Now I was just as
powerless in the face of the attacking Russians as my chum from the
infantry. I felt what it was like to be unable to do anything when I
knew that I should and must do something."
The main body of the regiment was now assembled in the area
around Gorodok. The focal point was obvious from the transfer of
the regiment's command post from Jamskaya (near Bolkhov) to
Koljukina on 22 January 1942, especially since the overall situation
demanded a centralised command. The Russians attacked
everywhere. II Battalion's 6th Company, still in positions at the edge
of Jagodnaya, faced repeated enemy attacks under increasingly
heavy fire from heavy mortars. Nevertheless, the company held.
On the same day, III Battalion launched an attack against the
well-camouflaged bunkers and field positions in Ivanovski, supported
by 20th (Flak) Company. Despite heavy losses (all three company
commanders were casualties), the enemy positions were taken in
difficult close-quarters fighting.
I Battalion was still fighting near Dolbino, but expected to be
transferred soon due to the worsening situation. Everywhere the
situation was unclear. Russian sleigh columns were appearing
everywhere seeking to break through to the south. Wherever they
met resistance they withdrew after a brief exchange of fire and
attempted to go around the German positions. Near Gorodok the
281

danger to the German forces became ever greater. At 21.00 on 23

January, the weakness of the German forces finally forced them to
pull back to create a new, reinforced line of defence. Jagodnaya was
evacuated. II Battalion was moved into the area near Kudinowo and
the 5th Machine Gun Battalion was sent there to shore up the
defences. The 20th (Flak) Company gave up Nowoiginskij and in its
place "Gruppe von Erdmannsdorf" was inserted into the area in front
of Gorodok. I Battalion was relieved near Dolbino on 23 January
and transferred into the area on both sides of Aleksaschinskij to
assemble for the attack. As a result of these moves, the I.R. GD was
once again holding a continuous line, which ran from Aleksaschinskij
in the east (I Btl.) through Kudinowo (II Btl.) to Iwanowskij (III Btl.)
The heavy and supporting weapons were positioned behind this line.
With the arrival of more German forces including elements of
the weakened 56th Inf.Div. in the area north of Bolkhov, 'Gruppe
von Erdmannsdorf" (the 171st Inf.Rgt. and the 5th MG Btl.) in the
area west of Bolkhov, the 17th Pz.Div. and the 134th Inf.Div. south
of the forested area further west of Bolkhov, and the 80th Inf.Div.
and the 4th Pz.Div. southwest and west of the forest area a series
of strongpoint positions were thrown around the area of Soviet-occupied forest between Bolkhov and Lowat. The strongpoints
manned by these units, themselves weakened by months of action,
formed a semi-circle which was open to the north namely, where
the Soviet sleigh and panje columns were streaming in. The situation
there was unclear. Preparations were made for an attack, especially
by those units in the west and northwest and by the I.R. G D . The
attack's objective was to penetrate deep into the forest, creating
shorter lines of communication to the west.
While the battalions were moving into their assembly areas the
regimental headquarters was transferred from Koljulkino to
Konskaya for command reasons. This placed it behind the centre of
its units, in the area of the 56th Inf.Div.
Eight days went by before the attack could begin, because the
Soviet attacks on the German positions and their attempts to break
through to the south continued without letup. Although the companies were down to twenty to thirty men with the exception of
the heavy companies higher command authorities continued to
assign them tasks that bore no relation to their actual strength. Every
hundred or two-hundred metres was a pair of sentries, lost and on
their own, barely within sight of the next position. Expecting them
to stand and hold in the face of ever stronger enemy attacks, with
only infrequent breaks to warm themselves, were demands that
scarcely seemed credible any more.
So it is not surprising that, initially, all attack preparations were
stalled. The enemy was always on the attack, forcing the Germans
to remain on the defensive. On 25 January Obit. Schwarzrock,
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commander of 2nd Company, was wounded so seriously that he had

to be evacuated. An Oberfeldwebel took over what was left of the
company.
Large numbers of decorations were symbols of the soldiers' brave
conduct on this front. Almost without exception, the few who
remained, those who had endured everything, wore the Iron Cross.
The details of the acts that won them the decorations are to be found
in the dry recommendations from the companies and officers or in
the unit war diaries: Ogefr. X. had already distinguished himself in
the French and Serbian campaigns through his bravery and independent action. On the night of. . . he was deployed on the right
wing of his company with his machine gun. There he killed 12
Russians from point-blank range. After his section leader was killed,
he and his section, part of the time in close combat, prevented the
Soviets from pushing into the gap to III Battalion. Despite the long
duration of the war the black-white red ribbon continued to be held
in high esteem. It was difficult to earn at the front. The old hands
often said: The Iron Cross is the decoration for an act witnessed by
a superior. Therefore, the awarding of a fixed number of decorations
is wrong. It should only be recommended for acts of bravery.
The 29th of January brought disaster for III Battalion in its positions
in Iwanowskij and Ploskoje. The reinforced 10th (rifle) Company,
accompanied by a 3.7 cm Flak and supported by forward observers
of the 2nd Battery/4OOth Artillery Battalion, carried out a feint attack
in support of a reconnaissance in strength against Werch. The village
was not reached, simply because the Grenadiers could not get
through the deep snow. The only way the covering light machine
guns could fire was to rest the guns on the shoulders of the men.
One Grenadier, speaking to the accompanying regimental commander, said frankly, "Herr Oberst, we have failed today, but next
time, in the Spring, then we'll go for the Russian's throat!" The
remains of the desperate rifle company assembled in the forest and
called to the wounded, who must surely freeze to death if they were
not soon found. Only a few survived this day. Days later some of the
dead were found on the other side of the village frozen together,
stiff and black. Many were missing rings, others boots.
After the attack on Werch the once so proud III Battalion was
reduced to a pitiful band of survivors. Difficult as it was, III Battalion
was disbanded and its members distributed among the other battalions.
Fierce snowstorms caused heavy drifting, reduced visibility and
hindered the defence. The enemy, too, had to bend in the face of
the power of nature and suspended his attacks. The only activity on
both sides was active patrolling so as not to be caught by surprise.
The regiment's report began with the sentence: Situation quiet, no
unusual occurrences.
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8 February 1942 finally saw movement restored to the regiment's

units. Final pre-attack assembly areas were occupied, after weeks of
retreat they would be moving forward again. "Now it's our turn!"
how often has this been heard in similar situations?
The attack began on 9 February. With I Battalion on the right and
II Battalion on the left, the companies set out towards Werch which,
following initial resistance, was taken in the first rush. Two other
villages fell into German hands at almost the same time, and the
soldiers of the I.R. GD could see elements of the 20th Infantry
Regiment farther to the right as they advanced towards the west.
Everything was in motion. The Soviets fled in the direction of
Nogaya. The batteries of the 400th Artillery Battalion and the
regiment's heavy weapons kept pace with the advance. The signals
men plodded along behind the forward observers, unrolling their
drums of cable and patching in new lines. The prime movers
ploughed across the fields like ships at sea, throwing up a high spray
of snow.
On 10 February the two remaining battalions of the I.R. GD set
out from Werch to occupy the village of Iwanowskij which lay to the
southwest. On the right, the 20th Infantry Regiment chased the
Soviets as far as Nogaya and occupied the town. Following a hasty
regrouping and assignment of objectives, the two battalions pushed
on towards Nowoselki and Nowoiginskij, entering the villages on the
heels of the fleeing Soviets. This success once again brought them
to the main BolkhovGorodokJagodnaya road. The regimental
command post kept pace with its onrushing units, moving to
Kudinowo during the night. In the following days the tempo increased. I Battalion took Gorodok in the face of weak resistance and
II Battalion moved in to secure the village. On the right, the 20th
Infantry Regiment secured Nogaya and pursued the fleeing enemy
into the forest to the west. The advance went on. I Battalion
continued its attack in the direction of Jagodnaya. As the battalion
moved into the empty village, three T-34s blown up by the fleeing
Soviets a few hours before were still smouldering. Further to the left
were the spearheads of the 171st Infantry Regiment. It, too, had
fought its way forward through the deep snow and was nearing its
objective, which lay near Sopowo.
Finally, on 15 February, the two battalions of the I.R. GD set out
against Gorizy and Melechewo, with I Battalion attacking from the
south and II Battalion from the east. By evening both were in German
hands. Security was posted all round. There was plenty of activity in
the area, especially during the night. Surrounded and cut-off groups
of Russians sought to break through the German lines of security.
They did plenty of firing but mostly into the air. But the impression
was growing stronger that the Soviets had settled down and their
resistance was stiffening. This suspicion was confirmed by the
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increasingly heavy artillery and heavy mortar fire, especially on

Melechewo. Major Greim, commander of II Battalion, was wounded
there and was forced to hand over command to Obit. Senger.
Casualties climbed, due in part to a lack of caution on the part of
the Germans.
The attack by both battalions against Tschuchlowo and Rschewka
on 18 February, which they launched with the last of their strength
supported by a few assault guns, showed conclusively that the Soviets
had once again gone over to a tenacious defence. The 17th
(Motorcycle) Company was able to fight its way into Rschewka, but
its losses were so heavy that it could not hold the village. Hptfw.
Flottrong of 17th Company lost a leg in the fighting. A renewed
attack by II Battalion against Tschuchlowo bogged down short of its
objective after heavy casualties sapped the strength of its companies.
Lt. Horstmann, commander of 6th Company, was so badly wounded
that he died several days later. Lt. Weber, who was commanding the
battalion's heavy company, also lost his life there. The number of
survivors was pitifully small and by evening the battalion's strength
was no more than sixty men. The 6th Company was reorganised as
a platoon and, under the command of Ofeldw. Hollstein, was
attached to the Wackernagel Company. They occupied positions at
the edge of the village of Melechewo, where the battalions had gone
over to the defensive. On the basis of the unit's reduced combat
strength and the fact that higher command authorities continued to
assign tasks to the I.R. GD which simply did not correspond to its
actual strength, the regiment's commanding officer, Oberst
Hoernlein, decided to merge the two rifle battalions into a single Rifle
Battalion GD under the command of Major "Kiki" Gehrke. On 19
February 1942 the battalion's composition was as follows:
Commanding Officer
Adjutant
Executive Officer
1st Company
2nd Company
3rd Company

Major Gehrke
Obit. Mller
Lt. Schaller (formerly of 20th Comp.)
Lt. Keiner
Obit, von Gamier
Obit. Senger

Where this had not already been done, the former companies were
reduced to platoons retaining their company supply trains and
parcelled out. Only IV and V Battalions, which had not suffered such
heavy casualties, remained as before. Another attempt was made to
take Tschuchlowo. All preparations were made to ensure the success
of this difficult attack. Reconnaissance of the terrain over which the
attack was to be made revealed the difficulties that lay ahead. The
attack was to be made across an open, sloping, snow-covered field
which provided no cover and offered no opportunities for

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camouflage. What was more, the Soviets had a good view of the
entire area. Before reaching this open field, the attackers first had to
cross a ravine in darkness. The ravine was no more than 10 metres
wide and about 250 metres long and might prove a formidable
obstacle. On the positive side, elements of the 20th Inf.Rgt. were to
attack from the east at the same time, while elements of the 171st
Inf.Rgt. moved in from the west. The artillery of all units in the
immediate area were going to lay down a preparatory barrage on
the objectives of Kosowka and Tschuchlowo to ease the way for the
attackers.
Lt. Schaller, who had been detached from the 20th (Flak) Company
to serve as executive officer in the rifle battalion, provided an
eyewitness report:
The attack on Kosowka and Tschuchlowo on 20 February 1942.
"Everyone was on his feet at 04.00. The hard-frozen snow
crunched underfoot with every step. The Rifle Battalion GD prepared
itself for the planned attack. In the lead was Leutnant Keiner,
commander of 1st Company, followed by the 2nd and 3rd Companies. The commanding officer, the adjutant Obit. Mller, and I
followed with several soldiers from the battalion staff. Behind us
walked the signals men with their spools of cable.
It was 05.00: the beginning of the attack. Suddenly, to the south,
red-grey flashes. First one, then four, then too many to count: our
artillery battalions had opened the attack with a combined barrage.
The first shells were already roaring overhead. For five minutes,
mushrooms of smoke and flame rose from the enemy-held village.
It looked like all hell had broken loose. But several shells burst
damned close. Then the cry rang out through the grey morning for
medics: the first casualties from our own fire.
Lt. Keiner had meanwhile reached the edge of the village. A
murderous, well-aimed fire greeted the attackers. Dead and wounded
lay on the ground. In the light of dawn anything that moved
immediately drew heavy machine gun fire. It was fortunate that we
were all able to find cover in a ravine.
Our attack had bogged down. There was nothing to be seen of the
171st Inf.Rgt. and the 20th Inf.Rgt., which were supposed to be
attacking from the west and east respectively, and no battle noise
could be heard.
The enemy fire abated, but as soon as one of us raised his head
above the edge of the ravine he immediately drew machine gun fire.
During the course of the late morning the commander of the 2nd
Battery of the 400th Artillery Battalion suddenly appeared. He
crossed the open slope in great leaps and was lucky not to be hit.
We discussed the situation with him. He decided to screen the
dangerous areas with smoke so that we could recover the dead and
wounded from the entrance to the village. Our telephone lines were
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still intact. He made contact with his battery and, after several ranging
shots, ordered smoke shells. Under cover of the smoke we were able
to bring all of the wounded and most of the dead back to the ravine.
Our battle group was spread along the roughly 200 metre length
of the ravine. The machine guns stood ready to fire; the Russians,
too, could attack at any time.
Following another discussion of the situation with the battalion
commander, Major Gehrke, Lt. Keiner left to return to his men in
the forward part of the ravine. Not five minutes after he left, a
messenger came running up and said that Lt. Keiner had been shot
in the head and killed!
Obit. Mller took over 1st Company. Soon he, too, lay gasping
among the wounded with a chest wound. Anyone who moved in the
visible part of the ravine fell victim to snipers. Otherwise, the Russians
were comparatively quiet.
About midday a shell suddenly exploded in the middle of the ravine.
A number of men fell dead or wounded in the snow. Obit. Gamier,
who was standing only two metres from me, collapsed. Both of his
legs had been blown off. A few moments later he breathed his last
he was dead.
I immediately reported this blow to the regimental command post
by telephone. The regimental commander, Oberst Hoernlein, was
always on the phone. He, too, was deeply shaken. Moved, he said
to me: 'You and your men are all I have left. See that you get out
safely when dusk falls. And be especially careful of my last commander!'
Finally, the sun disappeared in the west, and it quickly began to
get dark. The first men moved out, carrying and supporting the
wounded, dragging the dead behind them in tent squares. It was truly
a sad procession. Few words were spoken. Undisturbed, we disengaged from the enemy and left the ravine. Before we joined the
last group our glance fell once again on the blood-flecked snow, on
the helmets and the shreds of cloth which lay about.
The pitiful group that returned to Rschewka numbered 3 officers
and about 30 men. It was the remains of the once so proud I.R. GD
without heavy weapons and without a supply train."
The attack on Tschuchlowo was the last that winter by the battle
group of the I.R. GD. With a last desperate effort it managed to set
up and hold a defensive line at the edge of Melechewo with standing
patrol in Rschewka. The Grenadiers sought out their positions under
fire from Soviet light and heavy weapons. These consisted merely
of holes dug in the snow and depressions in the earth. All available
weapons were quickly emplaced in an effort to compensate for the
Weakness of the regiment's forces. The artillery moved their firing
positions to Fedorowka so as to be able to cover all sectors held by
the Rifle Battalion GD. Contact was established with the 171st
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Inf.Rgt. on the left and a continuous defensive position was established. Everything was set up for defence; there were no more
thoughts of attack. It was simply no longer possible. It was just
fortunate that the Soviets failed to recognise the weakness of the
German position and pursue. The result could have been a
catastrophe. But the days passed relatively quietly, broken only by
artillery barrages which, unfortunately, inflicted more casualties.
Among these was Oberfeldwebel Puis, long-time platoon leader of
the heavy mortars of the 8th (MG.) Company. Wounded by shell
fragments in Melechewo, he died soon afterwards. Many others were
killed or wounded, further reducing the already limited strength of
the defenders.
Finally, on 28 February 1942, a bright spot: replacements arrived
from Neuruppin. Thanks to the quiet situation there was time to
incorporate them into the front-line units. The arrival of the replacements resulted in an increased feeling of strength and raised hopes
for relief and rest. In fact, it was now possible to send individual
sections to the rear by day to rest and regroup. The Rifle Battalion
GD was disbanded and I and II Battalions reformed. Once again there
were two infantry battalions and, therefore, an Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. Optimism increased visibly, they were
back.
The regimental command post had been located in Jagodnaya for
several days. A normal routine for a defensive position set in. Only
seldom did the enemy mount an attack, such as the one against an
outpost position in Rschewka. It was 29 February a day like any
other. A pound of chocolate had just been given to each man as a
morale booster for those at the front. Several hours later a Russian
loudspeaker blared out: "The chocolate you have just been given is
to take with you to heaven, which is where all GD men will be going
tomorrow!" The Soviets underlined their threat with artillery fire
followed by attacks on the German positions. The regiment's last
assault gun was knocked out while repelling one of the attacks. The
gun's commander was seriously wounded while abandoning his
vehicle; he lost both legs.
Until March 1942 the situation in front of the main line of
resistance changed little. On 5 March, advanced outposts manned
by 2nd Company secured the main line of resistance, which consisted
in part of bunkers blasted out of the frozen earth. During this time
they were able to relieve the forward platoons for six to twelve hours,
allowing them sufficient time to rest and get warm. The bitterest
enemy now was the deep snow and fierce storms which made relief
difficult. Improved defensive positions and changes among the units
resulted in new defensive lines for some elements of the I.R. GD,
especially for II Battalion which was employed farther to the west.
The battalion was inserted north of Podkopajewskij on 23 March,
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where the men took over a quiet position. The battalion command
post was in the village of Podkopajewskij itself. The regiment moved
to Bobrowka for the purpose of taking over the entire sector.
Signs of stabilisation of the front were the regular relief of the units
at the front and the rest periods in the rear, which were already being
used for training again. The de-lousing station in Afonasewo was
kept busy around the clock ridding the soldiers of vermin. What was
more, the rapid onset of Spring was apparent from the rising
temperatures, melting snow and break-up of the ice on lakes and
streams.
Senior officers turned up for inspections; quarters were polished
and uniforms and equipment were brought up to parade standard.
All that was still missing was the entertainment section, which could
have raised the men's spirits further with stage shows and films.
Finally, on 8 April 1942, the long-awaited message arrived: relief
and transfer on 9 April 1942!
Advance parties and horse-drawn infantry columns arrived, officers
from the relieving units familiarised themselves with the positions
and everything was made ready for departure. The heavy weapons
were loaded on trucks, while the men carried their own weapons
and marched off in the direction of Jagodnaja to the east. The rest
of the vehicles were waiting there and in Afonasewo to take the men
to Bolkhov. Once again the foot march was an ordeal: foot-deep
mud had transformed the roads and paths into swamps. The first
elements of the regiment finally arrived in Bolkhov on the night of
11/12 April. Following a brief rest the men boarded the vehicles and
continued on through Tschern and Mzensk to Orel. There the men
were quartered in schools and other buildings where they had a
chance to dry their wet clothing. They were once again in a large
city and wanted their uniforms and appearance to be appropriate.
Preparations were meanwhile made to load the regiment aboard
trains. The necessary cables and blocks for securing the vehicles were
organised. At the same time, word came through that the majority
of the regiment's members with the exception of a small core of
personnel were to receive home leave in Germany immediately,
for which purpose a special train had been laid on. On 15 April the
first elements of the I.R. GD were unloaded in Gomel, from where
they travelled by truck to Rjetschiza on the Dniepr. This medium size
city was to be the regiment's temporary home. It lay south of the
confluence of the Dniepr with the Beresina, where the river was quite
wide. The companies were quickly quartered in the city and soon felt
quite at home. Larger buildings were occupied and fitted out barracks-style. Paint and brushes brightened the quarters and cleanliness
and order brought a bit of Germany to this Russian city. Contact
with the local population resulted in a friendly atmosphere which, in
the time that followed, enabled the two groups to live in peaceful co
289

existence. On 1 April 1942 the regiment's commanding officer,

Oberst Walter Hoernlein, was promoted to Generalmajor.
At the same time a regimental parade was held in Rjetschiza, where
it was announced that:
Effective immediately the former Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND is expanded to the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.
In order to achieve this a further regiment was to be formed which
would be designated I.R. GD 2. The old core regiment received the
designation I.R. GD 1. At the same time there was a reorganisation
which saw some of the former regiment's units redesignated. For
example, the 8th (MG.) Company became the 9th (MG.) Company
within II Battalion. The former regimental adjutant, Hptm. Bethke,
was transferred to the I.R. GD 2 to set up and take command of the
new regiment's 8th Company. The former 6th Company/II Battalion became the 7th Company, and so on and so on. The former
V Battalion was dissolved. Its companies formed the basis for the
formation of new units. The former 20th (Flak) Company became
the 5th Battery of the new Army Flak Battalion G D . All in all the
reorganisation of the old regiment and the formation of the new one
resulted in a great deal of work and disruption. The old hands of the
I.R. GD were wise enough to avoid this by going on leave in
Germany. Understandably, that was their highest priority at that
moment.

Chapter Twelve

The Eastern Front Soldier 1941-45

It is not an easy task to provide a comprehensive explanation for
the conduct of the German soldier in the East during the Second
World War. It is difficult to do justice to his superhuman accomplishments in attack and defence, in summer heat and arctic winter
cold with dry words. What is certain is that there are few examples
of front-line soldiers in history to match his bravery, loyalty, discipline, enthusiasm, readiness to sacrifice and ability to endure
hardship especially when one considers the significance of his
length of commitment and the associated overburdening in the
course of four years.
A knowledge of the events leading up to the campaign against
Russia is necessary in order to be able to understand this conduct.

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We know that the German political leadership under Adolf Hitler

considered a preventive solution to a possible war, just as every
leader and politician possessed of unlimited power has in the past
and does in the present. Hitler believed that by recognising the
interests and pride of the British Empire he could bring the war to a
conclusion. As a result of these views the German war leadership
lost valuable time for the attack on the island kingdom. The British
Isles had become a fortress and a conclusion of the war by forceful
means appeared impossible due to British control of the seas. Two
reasons may have moved Hitler to launch to his attack against Russia:
1. The probability of a close alliance between Russia and England if
Germany did not give in to Russian intentions in the Balkans and
the Baltic States.
2. His high self-opinion as the sole authority in the struggle of the
German people, which he now saw as a battle for its racial and
territorial existence in Europe.
The politicians had decided. The German soldier accepted the fight
without exuberance, innerly contemplative, but determined and true
to his oath. The battle-tested German Army, accustomed to victory,
soon encountered a heavily-armed enemy, obviously assembled and
prepared for war. To the soldiers this discovery appeared to confirm
the correctness of the propaganda of the political leadership and
they now came to see the conflict as a patriotic war.
The tenacity and brutality of the enemy, the perfidious and subtle
manner in which he conducted the war, the numerical and in some
cases qualitative superiority of his weapons which began to become
apparent even in 1941, the unbelievable vastness of the country and
the primitive standard of living intuitively led the German soldier to
sense the danger to his people and nation.
This awareness of the incalculable danger and the consciousness
that he was fighting, not just to protect his homeland, but European
culture as well, brought forth in the Eastern Front soldier of World
War Two all the virtues of traditional Prussian German soldiery which
had been handed down from his fathers.
Discipline and comradeship unto death or until the bitter end were
the foundations for accomplishments in battle which have few equals
in military history. Bravery and courage to the point of self-denial
enabled the German soldier to achieve feats which bordered on the
superhuman.
His ability to endure suffering and deprivation reached admirable
levels. These were generated by his unshakeable belief in the
rightness of his cause and the purity of his motives, as well as by the
bestial conduct of the enemy which went beyond anything in his
previous experience as a soldier.
The German soldier's loyalty to his leaders and his cause sprang
from the awareness that they were allied in this battle for life and

291

death. This loyalty was further strengthened by the enemy through

his demands for unconditional surrender.
Readiness to sacrifice found its limits in death or ultimate defeat.
The German soldier placed himself at risk on behalf of his nation
and people, and also European values. Their defence rested on his
shoulders.
So there he stands before us, the German Eastern Front soldier of
the Second World War, worthy to go down in the glorious history of
his nation's soldiery. The correctness of his actions was confirmed
when the conflict between East and West went on even after
Germany's defeat at the hands of the Allies.
May future generations look to these men and their deeds as
examples of fulfilment of duty should the German people and
Fatherland be threatened with danger in the future.

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Part IV
BATTLES IN THE EAST 1942

Chapter One
The Infantry Division (mot.) GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
1 April 1942 is the formation date of the Infantry Division (mot.)
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
So declared the Supreme Commander of the German Armed
Forces, Adolf Hitler. This most modem division of the German Army
was organised according to the latest experience and outfitted with
the best weapons and equipment. The basis for this was a Table of
Organisation (KSTN) and a Table of Basic Allowances (KAN); these
were not finalised until 20 June 1942. They foresaw a division
consisting of:
2 Infantry Regiments each with 3 battalions of 5 companies (originally
4), and a heavy battalion. The allotment of heavy weapons was
especially high.
1 Reconnaissance Battalion with 5 companies
1 Panzer Battalion with 3 companies (30 Panzer IV)
1 Assault Gun Battalion with 3 batteries (21 assault guns Type III long)
Artillery regiment with 11 batteries 4 batteries of light field guns, 4
of heavy field guns, 1-10 cm cannon battery, 1 rocket launcher battery,
and 1 observation battery. Initially, a rocket launcher battalion was
planned instead of a battery.
1 Army Flak Battalion with 5 batteries
1 Anti-Tank Battalion with 3 companies
1 Pionier Battalion with 3 companies and 2 columns
1 Signals Battalion with 2 companies and 1 column
Supply Service with 18 truck columns, 3 field workshop companies
and a supply company
Administrative and Supply Services
Medical Service

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Formation of the division was to take place in Dberitz near Berlin

and in Wandern\Neumark, near Frankfurt on the Oder.
As assigned by the Personnel Office, the commanders of the two
regiments were:
I.R. (mot.) GD 1
I.R. (mot.) GD 2

Oberst Khler
Oberst Garski

Both had served with the former I.R. GD and had been successful
battalion commanders in France. They were two contrasting personalities whose personal rivalry, originating from their days in the
regiment, was carried over to the regiments commanded by them.
In contrast to the homogenous nature of the experienced and
battle-tested I.R. GD 1, the new I.R. GD 2 was made up of men from
every military district and province of Germany and was inexperienced.
The commanding officer of the division was Generalmajor Walter
Hoernlein, of whom his first la, General Staff Major von Hobe, said
following their first meeting: "My commander is a fine, tough soldier
with plenty of drive and full of ideas." It should be noted that for the
General, as well as for his la, the command and tactical operation
of a fully motorised unit such as the I.D. GD was new ground.
Consequently, the commanders of the division and both infantry
regiments faced problems which could only be solved through
experience gained on the battlefield. Since they could select from the
entire Wehrmacht, the division commanders chose the remaining
regimental commanders and those of the independent battalions
based on their technical qualifications and the particular type of unit
they were to command. They, too, would have to face their test of
fire with the new units they had formed.
Among the infantry regiments it must be recognised that one
shortcoming was the fact that, apart from a few men and officers or
small units (such as the 17th Motorcycle Company), not one complete unit or battalion was released by the I.R. GD to form the basis
of the new I.R. GD 2. If this had happened, perhaps the tension
which appeared between the regiments on occasion, even as late as
February 1945, would not have had such negative consequences.
Special directions were issued by the O K W and BdE (Commander
of the Replacement Army) relating solely to the formation of the new
division. Among other requirements, men enlisting in the unit had
to be young, at least 1.70 metres tall, possess good vision (no eye
glasses) and have no criminal record. They should, as stated in an
annex to the order, "conform to the ideal picture of the German
soldier." The formation headquarters had permission to select the
unit's officers from every military district and unit. The latest

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weapons, provided they had been developed and were fully tested,
were available to the division.
In is undeniable that the new division owed its preferential treatment in personnel and equipment to the personal efforts of Hitler's
Wehrmacht Adjutant, Oberst Schmundt. Assisting him in pushing
through these special provisions was Hitler's Army Adjutant, Major
Engel. Engel worked with the Ha and adjutant of the forming I.D.
GD, Hauptmann Bethge, in tying down the details. It was thanks to
the efforts of these two men in the highest headquarters in the Reich
that, in early 1942, the unit was the ideal picture of a motorised
infantry division.
Of course, the division's preferential status also had its drawbacks.
Such a situation could easily lead to unrealistic demands being placed
on the unit or an overestimation of its potential in action. There was
a great difference between sending a so-called "field-, forest- and
meadow division" consisting of thrown-together units to attack a
commanding hill and ordering a full-strength, 18,000-man division
equipped with the most modern weapons to accomplish the same
task. Every success had to be evaluated based on the unit's armament, personnel strength and command, while also taking into
account its fighting spirit. It is a fact that in the battles which took
place in the years up to 1945 it was normal for excessive demands
to be placed on the I.D. GD and that it justifiably earned the
reputation as a "fire brigade". Its operations, successes and failures
must therefore be evaluated in this light.
The new division's formation period lasted about seven weeks,
from 1 April to 23 May 1942. The process took place at the new
troop training grounds in Wandern, which are fondly-remembered
by many ex-Grenadiers. The advance parties watched the units of
the new Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND march in. It was
spring and nature was awakening. The training grounds were large
and expansive, with newly-constructed quarters in the Narvik and
Grokirschbaum Camps. There were many lovely villages in the area
surrounding the camps, such as Lagow am See, for one. All of the
new division's units were there except I.R. GD 1, which remained
in Rjetschiza in Russia. This first regiment was never sent back to
the homeland as a complete unit. As per directions, its reorganisation
was carried out in Russia.
The headquarters personnel assembled in Dberitz, where the
following took place:
About 12 men gathered there on 23 March 1942, knowing only
that they were to join the staff of the I.D. GD which was then being
formed. Thus, it was not unjustified when they asked the commander
in Dberitz, "What are we supposed to do?", especially since the
new division's la, General Staff Major von Hobe, did not arrive until
1 April. Once there, Von Hobe took the lost men under his wing
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and began setting up a headquarters based on the existing Table of

Organisation and the appropriate standing orders, so that at least a
basis existed for further work. Von Hobe wrote of the assembled
headquarters staff:
"Theo Bethge became Division Adjutant. He was a long-time
member of the regiment and fine front-line officer, proper, with
plenty of drive and very mature for his age. Obit. Kinzel from Flauen
became the O1 (executive officer assisting the la). He was a very
youthful, but an especially sober young man, already twice seriously
wounded and engaged to be married. Obit. Michel, who had been
active in my staff for a long time, was to become the Ic (officer
responsible for gathering information on the enemy). I valued his
connections and his intelligence highly. Obit. Ritter acted as O3
(executive officer assisting the Ic). A mountaineer and artilleryman,
he was an especially hard-working and proper man. The lb, the
second General Staff Officer and official in charge of supply for the
entire division, was Hptm. Kaufmann. He had come from the Panzer
arm and was an able and cheerful comrade. His assistant, the O2
(the 2nd Executive Officer), was the cheerful Obit. Bergemann from
the motorcycle troops. In general, the men of the lb-Section appeared to be very keen and knowledgeable. Also belonging to the
headquarters staff was the civilian official Maehl, who was responsible for the division's rations and clothing, and the Division IVa,
Oberzahlmeister Haum. In charge of medical care and responsible
for the medical units and their operation was the Division IVb,
Oberfeldarzt Dr. Werthmann. His adjutant was Stabsarzt Dr. Pflugmacher. Acting as the unit's VK, the official responsible for vehicle
organisation and the supply of fuel and spare parts, was Major (Ing.)
Hetz. The WUG Officer was Obit. Paulo, who was responsible for
the entire division's weapons and equipment."
All of these headquarters sections were provided with enlisted
personnel who were active as assistants. One of the most prominent
of these was Feldw. Heinze. He was assistant to the Division Adjutant
and was known as the "Grey Eminence". As Hptm. Bethge's deputy,
he naturally knew all about personal matters which were in a certain
sense of interest to everyone. Assistant to the la as la-Clerk was Uffz.
Wehner. Like Heinze, he too would remain in this position from the
time of the division's formation until the end. Acting as Chief Clerk
and assistant to the lb was Uffz. Maertens, formerly a senior
employee with AEG and one of the oldest members of the staff, even
though he was just thirty years of age. Attached to the division
headquarters was the Headquarters Commandant, who was in
charge of all headquarters personnel. At the time of the division's
formation this position was held by Obit, (later Hptm.) Paul Mller.
His senior NCO was Hptfw. Kestner, who would later carry out this
function himself. There was also a platoon of military police which
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maintained surveillance during transfers and marches. The members

of the platoon were generally senior enlisted men, most with a police
background. The division headquarters also possessed a unit of war
correspondents which was employed for recruiting and propaganda
purposes. It became apparent, especially later in the war, that it had
met with some success, as its accurate reports had done much to
enhance the reputation of the unit.
The headquarters staff work, often watched with envy by the troops
and sometimes thought of as useless, was soon directed along
sensible and productive paths and was focused on its tasks. The close
ties between the division's headquarters and the units were largely
due to the fact that many of the men active among the headquarters
personnel had originated from the units and therefore knew their
needs and wants very well. In addition, there was a steady exchange
of personnel between the front and headquarters. More will be said
of this later. In any case, the formation of the division headquarters
in personnel and vehicles had progressed so well that it was able to
transfer from Dberitz to Wandern to join the units on 21 April 1942.
The entire division was thus assembled on the troop training
grounds, with the exception of I.R. (mot.) GD 1, which was being
reorganised in Rjetschiza in Russia.
A completely new unit, the motorised Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND 2 assembled its companies and men on the troop
training grounds during the course of March/April 1942. Before
going into the unit's formation, however, it may prove useful to
provide a detailed description of a rifle battalion. Used as an example
is I Battalion/I.R. (mot.) GD 2 which, in personnel, equipment and
weapons, was identical to the division's other five rifle battalions.
The battalion's total strength was about 600-700 men; its actual
battle strength, excluding the supply train and so on, was about 450
men. The company headquarters personnel were as follows: commander of I Battalion/I.R. (mot.) GD 2 was Major Grosser (Hptm.
Bethge). His staff comprised Adjutant Lt. Weber, Executive Officer
Lt. G. von Oppen, Mess Officer Res. Lt. Dr. Kobelt, an unidentified
Battalion Medical Officer, a Paymaster, VK Officer Lt. (Ing.) Schmitz
and an officer in charge of the Maintenance Echelon. If one wishes
to make a comparison with the divisional headquarters described
earlier, it is apparent that the composition of the headquarters was
mirrored at the battalion, and even to a certain degree at the
company, level. Then came the rifle companies (in this case the
1st-3rd Companies). The 1st Company was commanded by Obit.
D. Kuehn, while his senior NCOroughly equivalent to adjutantwas Feldw. Brockmann. The company's motor vehicle section
commander was Feldw. Tiedemann; runners were: Obergefreiter
Khler, Z i m m e r m a n n , Snger and Perlitz. T h e c o m p a n y
commander's driver was Obergefreiter Matern. Motorcycle sidecar
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messengers were Gefreiter Koch and an unidentified Obergefreiter

Solo motorcycle messengers were Ogefr. Matz, Gefr. Radunz and
Gefr. Kalliske. The 1st Company's headquarters personnel were
typical for a rifle company. The main body of the company consisted
of four platoons; the 1st-3rd Platoons were rifle platoons while the
4th Platoon was the so-called heavy platoon. Each rifle platoon
consisted of three rifle sections each armed with two light machine
guns. The first two sections had the MG 42, the latest machine gun
at that time. In addition, each platoon had an anti-tank rifle team
equipped with a light anti-tank rifle. Platoon leaders were as follows:
1st Platoon, Lt. von Kleist, deputy, Feldw. Kurt Tiedemann; 2nd
Platoon, Lt. Jobski, deputy, Feldw. Bulla; 3rd Platoon, Lt. Winkler,
deputy, Ofeldw. Marquardt. Also included in the rifle company was
a heavy platoon. 1st Company's heavy platoon was commanded by
Lt. Eulen (later Lt. Emmo), deputy, Ofeldw. Kozak. The heavy
platoon consisted of four gun crews each with a heavy machine gun
MG 42, two mortar teams each with a medium mortar, as well as a
heavy anti-tank rifle team.
The company's total weapons complement was:
18 light machine guns (MG 34)
6 light machine guns (MG 42)
4 heavy machine guns (MG 42)
2 medium mortars
3 light anti-tank rifles
1 heavy anti-tank rifle
The company possessed the following signals equipment:
4 Gustav field radio sets
2 long light telephone cables
2 field telephones
The 1st Company's train was commanded by Hptfw. Heinz
Paegelow, the maintenance technical sergeant was Oberschirrmeister Schmitz. In charge of special duties was Feldwebel Rey.
As vehicles for the company commander and platoon leaders the
rifle company possessed four air-cooled Kfz.7O-Steyr. The 1st (Rifle)
Platoon was motorised with six Kfz.7O-Horchtwo for each section.
The 2nd and 3rd (Rifle) Platoons each received six Kfz.7O Mercedes
and the 4th (Heavy) Platoon the equivalent number of Kfz.7O Horch.
As commander of the company train the senior NCO as well as some
of his functionaries and the company clerk drove in a Kfz.15 Horch
and commanded a further five Opel-Blitz 3-tonne trucks which were
employed as follows:
1 for the maintenance echelon
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1 for fuel
1 for weapons and ammunition, tool boxes and so on.
2 field kitchen vehicles with fixed superstructure
Three of these trucksnamely those of the repair echelon, the first
field kitchen and the fuel truckhad four-wheel-drive, as did the Steyr
and Horch Kfz.7O. The company also had three heavy motorcyclesidecar combinations (BMW 700) and a number of solo machines,
likewise BMWs. In total the company possessed over 43 vehicles.
The equipment of the two other rifle companies was identical or
at least similarespecially in regard to vehicles. At that time the 2nd
Company was commanded by Obit. Dr. Gnther. The 4th (MG.)
Company, which was equipped with 12 heavy and 6 light machine
guns, was commanded by Obit. Gruss.
The 5th (Heavy) Company, commanded by Hptm. Bethge, had a
varied complement of weapons. It possessed three light infantry
guns, a Pionier platoon with three light machine guns, an anti-tank
platoon with three 5-cm anti-tank guns and an anti-tank rifle section
with three anti-tank rifles. The complement of vehicles assigned to
the company, which had to take its infantry support weapons with
it, was different than the rifle companies, but appropriate for its
needs.
The regiment had three such rifle battalions, of which II Battalion
was commanded by Major Feucker and III Battalion by Major
Kohlhaas. In addition to the regimental units and the Headquarters
Company there was IV (Heavy) Battalion under Hptm. Lehnhoff.
The battalion included the 16th (Flak) Company, the 17th (Infantry
Gun) Company and the 18th (Panzerjger) Company. The latter
unit's 1st Platoon was equipped with anti tank guns mounted on
armoured, self-propelled vehicles.
This concludes the general survey of the equipment and composition of the new second regiment when it formed in Wandern.
Wehrkreis (Military District) III (Berlin and Brandenburg) provided
the men for the future I Battalion/I.R. GD 2, while those intended
for III Battalion came from Wehrkreis IX, thereby ensuring a diversity
of personnel. It was thus possible to hear Bavarian accents in one
company, Silesian in another and Berlin in another; all of this led to
a special esprit de corps. There was also a certain similarity to the
composition of the former Wachregiment Berlin, each of whose
companies originated from a different military district. The military
districts had issued orders to the replacement units under their
command to each set up a unit for GD according to the specifications
which had been laid down. As soon as these units were assembled
they were to be sent to Wandern. It is understandable that the
replacement units were reluctant to give up their best men to a unit
which was a stranger to them. In some cases it happened that the

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troops sent to Wandem failed to reach the desired and specified

standards. Many were sent back after a trial period and exchanged
until each company was satisfied that it had the right men.
In Rjetschiza, where I.R. GD 1 was located, the same reorganisational measures were under way as in Wandem. There, however, it
was a simpler task. The cadre companies were already in place and
needed only to be filled out with replacements from Neuruppin which
soon began arriving in sufficient numbers. Where the supply of new
vehicles was concerned, however, the situation was less satisfactory
as these were sent only sparingly. As a result, when the regiment
later departed for the front the majority of the companies had to
carry on in the same albeit overhauled vehicles they had used
during the winter. But the unit's proven commanders were still there.
Major Gehrke was still in command of I Battalion and Major Greim
had recovered sufficiently to take over II Battalion. There were some
changes in II Battalion's composition:
Commanding Officer
Major Greim
II Btl./I.R. GD 1
Adjutant
Lt. von Mitzlaff
Medical Officer
Dr. Hahn
6th (Rifle) Company
commanded by Obit. Schulz
7th (Rifle) Company
commanded by Hptm. von Courbire
(Lt. Blumenthal)
8th (Rifle) Company
commanded by Lt. Doege
9th (MG.) Company
commanded by Hptm. Schmidt
10th (Heavy) Company commanded by Hptm. Peiler
Similar changes, especially in the numbering of individual companies, took place in the other two rifle battalions and also led to the
restructuring of IV (Heavy) Battalion. All in all, however, the preparations went as smoothly as those of its sister regiment, few details of
which were available in Rjetschiza on the Dniepr.
There was another regimental unit specified in the allocation tables
for the new division: the Artillery Regiment GD which, from a core
provided by the 400th Artillery Battalion, was to be expanded to
three battalions. I and II Battalions were the so called light battalions;
III Battalion was the heavy battalion. The battalions' origins were as
follows:
I Btl.
II Btl.
III Btl.

originated from the former 400th Art.Btl.

formed from men mainly from Vienna
formed primarily from men from Silesia

The battalions' weapons complement was as follows:

I Btl.

1st and 2nd Batteries each with four l.FH. 18

3rd Battery with four s.FH. 18.
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II Btl.

4th and 5th Batteries each with four l.FH. 18

6th Battery with four s.FH. 18.
III Btl. 7th and 8th Batteries each with four s.FH. 18
9th Battery with four 10-cm cannon.
Each battalion also maintained a Headquarters Battery with Signals
Platoon.
The rocket battery, which had been designated 10th Battery, did
not materialise and the battery number was left open. The Armoured
Observation Battery was formed in Wandern as the 11th Battery
under the command of Obstlt. Scholz. The command of the Artillery
Regiment GD was at that time in the hands of Oberst Jauer. Jauer's
adjutant was Obit. Kuhlmann, also attached to the Headquarters
BatterySuch an artillery regiment of course maintained a considerable
signals net with radios and field telephones. This was used mainly
by the forward observers to direct fire. Stationed in the front lines
with the infantry, the forward observers had a first hand view of the
situation up front. The division headquarters placed a great deal of
emphasis on making use of this front-line surveillance. It was in large
part the efforts of the forward observers that made possible the
orientation of the artillery and, as a result, its effective command.
Contrary to the Table of Organisation, the Flak artillery, which was
to have constituted IV Battalion of the Artillery Regiment GD, was
instead raised as the independent Army Flak-Artillery Battalion GD.
In action the battalion functioned independently. With three heavy
batteries of 8.8-cm cannon pulled by heavy tractors and two medium
batteries of 3.7-cm guns on self propelled chassis, the battalion
represented a considerable anti aircraft defence force. The bulk of
the unit originated from the 285th Army Flak Battalion in Freising,
near Munich. The battalion's 5th Battery arose from the former 20th
(Flak) Company of the I.R. GD.
Another independent unit created during the division's formation
was the Panzerjger Battalion GD under the command of Major
Hacke. The battalion consisted of a Battalion Headquarters, the 1st
(SP) Company and the 2nd and 3rd (Motorised) Companies. The 1st
Company, which was under the command of Obit. Waldmann, was
an interesting unit. It comprised three platoons each with three
Russian 7.62-cm anti-tank guns mounted on Panzer II chassis. The
platoon leaders were also motorised, being provided with a prime
mover. The height of these self-propelled anti-tank guns was 2.80
metres. The soldiers called them "barn doors." The other two
companies each consisted of three platoons which were each
equipped with four 5-cm anti-tank guns towed by prime movers. The
company trains were equipped with the large number of vehicles
needed to supply the guns with ammunition. This battalion was to

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suffer heavy losses during the next year of fighting, being virtually
wiped out on several occasions. It would become obvious that
anti-tank weapons had not kept pace with developments in tank
design. However, no one suspected this in April 1942.
T h e R e c o n n a i s s a n c e Battalion G D was f o r m e d a t the
Grokisrchbaum C a m p on the Wandern troop training grounds
under the command of Major von Usedom. It assembled five
companies, each equipped to fill a different role:
1st Company was an armoured car company equipped with four- and
eight-wheeled vehicles.
2nd Company was an armoured personnel carrier company equipped
with one-tonne half-track APCs.
3rd Company was a Volkswagen company.
4th Company was a machine gun company mounted on Kbels and
Volkswagens.
5th Company was the unit's heavy company. Equipped with Kbels
and trucks, it had an anti-tank gun platoon, an infantry gun platoon
and a Pionier platoon.
Most of the battalion's men came from a variety of army units, with
armoured car and Panzer units p r e d o m i n a t i n g . The unit
demonstrated a special elan based on the cavalry tradition. The unit's
efforts to be regarded as cavalry were reflected in its use of cavalry
terms such as squadron and Wachtmeister (Cavalry Sergeant) and
the use of the service colour yellow. The unit was very conscious of
its reconnaissance role and emphasised this in its training.
Playing an important role perhaps not so much in the beginning,
but more so in the next year's fighting were the men of the Panzer
Battalion GD under their Viennese commander, Hptm. Pssel.
Emerging from I Battalion of the 100th Panzer Regiment which was
equipped with flame-thrower tanks, the battalion was reformed in
February 1942 with standard Panzer III and IV tanks. The Panzer
Ills, which were in the minority, were armed with a 5-cm cannon,
while the more numerous Panzer IVs featured a long or short 7.5-cm
gun. Each combat company fielded about twelve tanks at that time,
as well as three with the battalion headquarters. The unit's formation
was completed in Erfurt, the home of its former replacement
battalion. Not until the second half of May 1942 did it move to
Wandern to join its new parent division. The battalion's personnel
at that time were as follows:
Commanding Officer
Adjutant
Executive Officer
Supply Officer
IVa

Hauptmann Pssel
Obit. Bergstrsser, Obit, von Brockhusen
Obit. Kramer
Lt. Mller, Ofeldw. Stephanski
Ozm. Petznick

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IVb
Vk.

Stabsarzt Dr. Freise

Ass.Arzt. Dr. Dauer
Major (Ing.) von Heising
Insp. Wilhelm Heinemann
Oberfeuerwerker May

Headquarters Company
Commanding Officer
Signals Platoon
Pionier Platoon
Recon. Platoon
Senior NCO
Accountant & Pay
Maintenance Sergeant

Hptm. Gergasewicz, Obit. Kuchenbecker

Obit. Zieger
Lt. Pln
Lt. Kranz
Hptfw. Bamberger
Ofeldw. Riggers, Uffz. Dreschler
Oberschirrmeister Winkler

1st (Panzer) Company

Commanding Officer
Platoon Leader
Platoon Leader
Platoon Leader
Senior NCO
Accountant & Pay

Hptm. Heimke
Obit. Hoppe
Lt. Ringe
Lt. Bornscheuer
Held
Ofeldw. Linke

2nd (Panzer) Company

Commanding Officer
Obit. Perner
Platoon Leader
Lt. Schweiger
Platoon Leader
Lt. Orth
Senior NCO
Lugschitz
Accountant & Pay
Ofeldw. Hobert, Uffz. Hantuch
3rd (Panzer) Company
Commanding Officer
Platoon Leader
Platoon Leader
Field Workshop Platoon
Workshop Foreman
Senior NCO
Accountant & Pay

Hptm. Schmidt, Hermann

Obit. Rothe
Obit. Sachse
Hptm. Piccard
Finger
Rothenberg
Uffz. Kaiser

Light Column
Commander
Acting Senior NCO
Accountant & Pay

Obit. Schulte-Gnne
Ofeldw. Schindler
Uffz. Mai

The Light Column under Obit. Schulte-Gnne joined the battalion in

Wandern.
The predecessor of the battalion, which had proved itself in France
and Russia, was the 100th Flammpanzer Battalion. The unit had
been formed in 1940 under its commanding officer, Major von
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Zeschwitz. At Christmas 1940, while stationed in Holland, a ring

was made for each member of the battalion. It carried the battalion's
tactical insignia a horizontal "Z" which bore a certain
resemblance to a Wolfsangel. The ring was to be seen worn by
veteran members of the battalion in Wandem and later, and was a
source of special pride to them.
The other armoured formation within the division was the Assault
Gun Battalion GD. The unit was formed under the command of
Major Schepers. The I.R. GD's former 16th (Assault Gun) Company,
which had emerged from the Army's first assault gun battery, formed
the basis of the new battalion. Joining it were elements of the 192nd
Assault Gun Battalion from Treuenbrietzen, which had been formed
on 24 November 1940. Together, these formed the three batteries
of the Assault Gun Battalion GD:
1st Battery
2nd Battery
3rd Battery

Obit. Frantz
Obit. Adam
Obit. Lemme

Following exhaustive training the battalion joined the division

equipped with twenty-one brand-new assault guns, for the first time
armed with the long 7.5-cm StuK. 40. The assault guns had
originated from the artillery and remained under its command. The
first assault gun crews also had an artillery background. The assault
gun's advantage lay in its low silhouette, which presented a relatively
small target to the enemy. The crew also obtained a much better feel
for the terrain. The assault gun's role in action was that of an escort
tank for the infantry, providing help and support in difficult situations.
The scissors style periscope carried by every assault gun proved
especially advantageous, especially in picking out targets quickly.
General von Manteuffel may have paid the Assault Gun Battalion
GD its greatest complement when he later characterised it as, "the
pearl necklace in the GD's collection of jewellery."
The 43rd Sturm-Pionier Battalion had accompanied the former
I.R. GD during the campaign in France under its unforgettable
commander Oberst. Mahler and had achieved great success storming
enemy fortifications. This unit now joined the new division as the
Pionier Battalion G D . This move saw the realisation of the battalion's
late first commander's fondest wish. With three Pionier companies
and a "K" Type bridging column, as well as a light Pionier column,
it was a well-equipped, excellently-trained and very experienced unit
which quickly took its place in the division. The ongoing battle with
senior command authorities to gain recognition for the battalion's
successes in actions at the Maginot Line and before Sevastopol finally
bore fruit during its second time in Wandem. The "Sturm" prefix
was bestowed upon the unit, an honour achieved by few Pionier

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battalions. Thus the unit went into action with the title Sturm-Pionier
Battalion GD under the command of Major Lorenz.
Wehrkreis VI in Mnster, Westphalia was instructed by the Chief
of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training
Army to set up the new Signals Battalion GD to consist of a radio
company and a telephone company. The unit was formed in Frechen
near Cologne. Former adjutant to the Commander of Signals,
Wehrkreis VI, Lt. Heydenreich carried out the necessary preparations and then joined the new unit as adjutant to its Bavarian
commanding officer, Major "Wastl" Binder. The Signals Company
of the former I.R. GD formed the basis of the new Signals Company
of the I.D. GD as well as elements of the 309th Signals Battalion
which had last been in action in Odessa.
The supply services were an essential part of a motorised division
and were commanded by a General Staff Officer. Such a unit could
not function without the replenishment of weapons, equipment,
clothing, fuel, medicine, vehicles, replacement parts, mail, rations
and so on. It was the supply services, which had earlier been
nick-named "baggage", that ensured that the fighting units received
the means necessary to continue fighting. The supply services were
vital for the existence and operation of every unit in the army. The
Administrative and Supply Services of the I.D. GD were extensive
as befitted a unit of its size and consisted of the following elements:
Division Chief of Supply Services with its elements, which included 18
columns, three field workshop companies, a replacement parts company which included na Armour-Artificer Platoon;
Administrative Services with a bakery and butchery company, as well
as the Division Ration Office and Field Post Office.
The division's Supply Service originated from the few supply
columns of the I.R. GD's 400th Chief of Supply Services. Under the
command of the veteran and experienced merchant and now Major
Gericke, the division's supply services included:
1st 10th
11th 14th
15th 18th

light truck columns

truck columns
heavy truck columns

By introducing large numbers of new vehicles and new men and

officers, the supply service was able to prepare quickly to meet its
responsibilities. When the columns entrained on 21 May 1942 the
division command was certain that the work had been completed.
In Wandern the Medical Service GD, with a representative in
Division Headquarters, was enlarged to two Medical Companies, a
GD Field Hospital and the 1st-3rd Ambulance Platoons. With a

309

strength of about 175 men, a medical company consisted of a light

and a heavy platoon with a total of five or six doctors as well as a
dentist and a chemist. Its equipment approximated that of a small
hospital and included a light X-Ray machine. The accounts which
follow are probably the best proof of the accomplishments of this
service, to whom uncounted soldiers of all ranks owe their life and
health.
The division's immediate source of personnel replacements was
the Replacement Training Battalion G D . Consisting of five companies, its primary task was to prepare the recruits sent from the
replacement battalion in Germany for combat at the front. Most of
the unit's personnel were combat-experienced officers and men. The
Replacement Training Battalion carried out its task in the division's
rear areas, ready to provide the necessary replacement personnel.
This, then, was the state of the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND in the months of April and May on the troop
training grounds in Wandern. With almost 18,000 men it was one
of the strongest units available. As befitted its armaments, equipment
and fighting strength, it was one of the units of which much would
be asked in the future. This fact was well known by the men of the
unit from the General right down to the youngest Grenadier. The
GD cuff title, worn by every member of the division, was the outward
symbol of their membership in the unit. When, on 14 May 1942,
the Division la received departure orders for the next day, destination
unknown, it was apparent that the days of preparation were over;
the war was again priority number one!
" C O R O here; C O R O here calling Director; calling Director!!
Plan III with objective the Caucasus, which was originally set for
November 1941, goes into effect in early 1942.
Assembly of
troops to be completed by 1 May 1942. All supply from 1 February
directed towards this objective.
Concentration area for the Caucasus offensive:
LosowajaBalaklejaTschugujewAchtyrkaKrassnograd.
High Command in Kharkov. Further details to follow."
Messages describing the upcoming German offensive were already
being transmitted to Moscow by the Rote Kapelle, the Soviet radio
net in Europe and Germany, in January 1942. This message
transmitted Hitler's intention to start a new offensive in the southeast
in early 1942.
The winter offensive of 1941/42 had undoubtedly seen the Soviets
make territorial gains, but at considerable cost in casualties. This
serious weakening, aggravated by the grievous losses of the previous
summer, was not, however, serious enough to break the Soviets'
ability to resist as had been expected. Rather, the backbone of the
Red Army remained firm, especially as it still had sufficient replacements to raise new units undisturbed in the hinterland.
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The country's defence industries, however, had been hit hard by

the loss of the Donets area with its rich coal resources as well as the
nearby iron and manganese ore regions. The new industrial centre
beyond the Urals, whose development had been started before the
war, was not yet in a position to make good the production capacity
of the lost areas. American assistance was only just getting under
way.
It must, therefore, have been part of Hitler's plan to destroy
additional significant elements of the Red Army and bring about a
decisive weakening of the Soviet economic system in order to
achieve a lasting paralysis of the Soviets' ability to conduct the war.
The oil in the Caucasus region was the objective which came
closest to filling the bill. In addition, its capture promised an easing
of the situation for the German defence industry. Besides, lying on
the way to the Caucasus was the rich agricultural region of the east
Ukraine. A precondition for success in the overall plan, however,
remained the bringing to battle and destruction of considerable
elements of the Red Army.
The German Army had undoubtedly been severely tested during
the previous winter; however, following the brief recovery period the
morale of the troops was high. Their offensive spirit had in no way
suffered. Nevertheless, there were no longer sufficient forces to
launch an offensive along the full length of the front which, with all
of its bulges and protrusions, now measured about 3,000 kilometres.
Only by concentrating all of their armoured and motorised units in
one sector of the front could the Germans hope to achieve a decisive
success. It was expected that a certain amount of relief would be
provided by the approximately 35 divisions from the allied nations
of Hungary, Rumania and Italy, even though their combat value was
somewhat lower than equivalent German units.
Following the elimination of Soviet penetrations near Charkov in
January 1942 and the loss of Kerch, the front held by Army Group
South, from which the planned offensive was to be launched, ran in
a roughly north-south direction from Taganrog on the Black Sea
through Isjum east of Charkov to a position due northeast of Kursk,
where it joined Army Group Centre. During June 1942 five fullstrength, well-equipped armies were assembled in the army group's
rear, which were to carry out the decisive assault toward the east
and southeast. Moving up behind them were Italian, Hungarian and
Rumanian armies which were to cover the flanks of the advancing
German armies.
For the planned operation Army Group South was split into two
groups. In the south was Army Group A under the command of
Feldmarschall List with the Seventeenth Army and the First Panzer
Army. Farther north was Army Group B under Generaloberst Frhr.

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I.R. GD's Transfer March from the Wandern

Training Grounds to the Schtschigry Area.

von Weichs with the Fourth Panzer Army and the Sixth and Twelfth
Armies.
The German plan was for powerful armoured forces to break
through the Soviet front from the area around Isjum (First Panzer
Army) and southeast of Charkov (Fourth Panzer Army) and push
into the area between the Donets and the Don. At the same time
the Sixth and Second Armies were to advance toward the Don line
which ran from Kalitwa to Voronezh. Not until later, when the Panzer
Armies were advancing smoothly, was the Seventeenth Army to join
the attack from west of Rostov. Following objectives would be laid
down after the success of the breakthrough operations was assured.
In principle, however, it was intended that Army Group A veer
toward the lower Don while Army Group B would win the Volga on
both sides of Stalingrad on as wide a front as possible.
Standing ready in the Kursk area for offensive operations within
the Fourth Panzer Army under Generaloberst Hoth (Chief of Staff,
General von Bernuth) was XXXXVIII Panzer Corps under General
Kempf (Chief of Staff, Oberst i.G. Friebe). Under the Panzer Corps'
command were the 9th and 24 Panzer Divisions and the motorised
Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. Positioned on the left
wing of Army Group B at the boundary with Army Group Centre,
the objective of these armoured divisions was to break through the
Soviet positions in the initial assault and win the crossings over the
Don near Voronezh. The bridges road as well as rail were to
be taken undamaged so as to provide the following infantry with
bridgeheads for the pursuit of the shattered enemy.
All elements of the I.D. GD were to assemble in the Fatesh area
northwest of Kursk and stand ready to move into the assembly area
due east of Schtschigry which still remained to be reconnoitred. Code
word for the attack by XXXXVIII Panzer Corps: Siegfried. Time of
attack: X + 2.15 hours.

Chapter Two
Preparations for the Summer Offensive
1. 06. 27. 6. 42
28. 6. 20. 7. 42

21. 7. 3. 8. 42
3. 8. - 17. 8. 42

Assembly within Army Group Centre.

Breakthrough and pursuit to the upper Don.
Capture of Voronezh.
Breakthrough and pursuit to the middle Don.
Breakthrough and pursuit in the Donets Basin
and towards the lower Don.
OKH reserve.

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When the main body of the I.D. GD left the site of its formation in
Wandern near Frankfurt/Oder on 23 May 1942, it was unlikely that
anyone knew its destination; it was in the east, that was all that was
certain. An intermediate stop in Mielau, Poland on 25 May was a
brief one. Forty-eight hours later the first units left the training area
there direction due east. The vehicles rolled off in long columns,
one behind the other. Travelling many hours per day the columns
passed through Lomscha, Bialystok, Slutsk, Rogatchev, Roslavl,
Bryansk and Orel before arriving in the area northwest of Fatesch,
where the units encamped. Here there was a longer stop, lasting
from 6 to 24 June, which was used mainly to carry out repairs to
the vehicles and for training. The troops spent an intensive period
in camp, sleeping in tents and lean-tos, becoming accustomed to the
Russian countryside. Meanwhile, the tracked vehicles and tanks
arrived by rail in their assembly area, where they were unloaded and
made ready.
The deadline for the great summer offensive was not far off. On
24 June, marching by night, the units moved farther east, quite near
the former main line of resistance where the German infantry had
been sitting out an almost peaceful positional war since the winter
battles. On the other side the Soviets had been especially quiet the
last weeks and months. Their artillery was virtually silent and they
mounted only occasional patrols. The German infantry had the
feeling that the positions opposite them were weakly manned, as if
the enemy suspected something of the coming attack.
When the attack order for the following day arrived at the I.D. GD's
divisional command post in Wjasowoje, northeast of Schtschigry, on
27 June 1942, all that was left to do was to issue instructions
directing the units to move into their planned jumping-off positions.
These final movements prior to the attack took place in the ghostly
darkness of the night of 27/28 June, occasionally lit by the light of
a descending parachute flare. The Russian air force was active,
especially the night harassment aircraft. The German soldiers had
dubbed these "Nhmaschirte" (sewing machines) because of their
low speed, almost noiseless approach and style of bombing. The
flashes of exploding bombs were everywhere; many houses and
vehicles went up in flames. One stick of bombs hit the GD Panzer
Battalion's fuel dump, which went up with a tremendous explosion.
In a desperate effort the vehicles were pulled away from the danger
zone, but all of the fuel was lost. The bomb hits on the train of 7th
Company/ II Battalion/I.R. GD 1, which was in waiting positions
farther to the rear, had far sadder consequences: the company's
well-liked senior NCO, Hauptfeldwebel Lange, was killed as were
Uffz. Riechert, Ogefr. Frohne, the company tailor and three other
men. Nine soldiers were wounded. It was a serious loss, of which the

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combat units found out only several hours later. Twenty-one vehicles
were more or less seriously damaged and initially out of action.
In the meantime, the individual companies moved forward on foot
into the attack positions one after another, assembled there and
prepared themselves for the morning attack.
Led by its I and III Battalions, I.R. GD 1 reached the positions on
the west bank of the stream that flowed through the village of
Polewoje. The regiment's forward command post was set up in
Polewoje itself. Pressed close together, the individual companies
assembled, occupied the existing positions and brought up sufficient
ammunition so as to be ready for the opening barrage planned for
dawn. The first objective was Dubrowka. Thought to be heavily
fortified, it lay on the road if it could be called such to
Tschermissinowo on the Tim River. Patrols by the infantry units
which had manned the positions earlier revealed the following picture
of the enemy fortifications in Dubrowka: images typical of a positional war, little different from those of the First World War, but
unfamiliar to the soldiers of this war. To all appearances the Russian
defences appeared to consist of strong bunkers and field fortifications
with wide areas rendered impassable by belts of mines. The reality
would later prove somewhat different, but who could know that at
the time? In any case, mines, which were a commonly used defensive
weapon in positional warfare, appeared to play a large role in this
sector. As a result, the Pioniers of the heavy companies and the
regiment's Pionier Company were placed in the front lines with their
mine detectors so they could begin the job of clearing the mines
straight away.
To the left of the attacking battalions of I.R. GD 1, near and north
of Polewoje, the men of I.R. GD 2 were also preparing for the attack.
The objective of III Battalion under Major Kohlhaas was to attack
along the SchtschigryTimVoronezh road and railroad and take
the bridges over the Tim in a surprise attack. Immediately behind,
the men of I Battalion assembled in order to immediately exploit and
enlarge the planned penetration into the enemy positions and also
protect the rear of III Battalion. Command of I Btl./I.R. GD 2 lay in
the hands of the former commander of 5th Company, Hptm.
Bethge.
The Artillery Regiment GD moved into the battery positions which
it had selected several days before and occupied firing positions.
Forward observers were sent to those companies which would be
employed at the points of main effort, in order to provide the
necessary covering fire. Telephone lines were laid, wireless communications established and the Armoured Observation Battery,
which had played such a major role in scouting enemy firing
positions, was moved in for other duties. The artillery regiment's
command post was in Nikoljewka, from where the necessary

315

preparations were made for a joint barrage with the positional

artillery on the morning of the attack.
The flak artillery of the I.R. GD was probably the only arm of the
division already in combat. Its guns 8.8 cm in firing positions and
3.7 cm on self-propelled chassis engaged enemy bombers, seeking
to protect the nocturnal troop movements from bombing attack. The
fire of the anti-aircraft guns lit the sky with flashes of colour, the
bursts from the 3.7 cm guns looking like strings of pearls. The tanks
moved over the clogged roads into their assembly areas which were
hidden in hollows and gullies behind the infantry companies. They
would not be committed until the infantry had broken through the
enemy positions and thrown the enemy out of his bunkers and field
fortifications. Then the armoured giants would form up into their
wedge formation, roll past the infantry and set out in pursuit of the
enemy. Following the thrust deep into the enemy's main defensive
area, and accompanied by mounted infantry, they were to prevent
the fleeing enemy from settling down again.
The assault guns had a different role to play. They were support
tanks for the infantry. With their accurate fire they would help by
knocking out bunkers or softening them up for attack by the infantry,
allowing them to be stormed with minimal casualties. The assault
guns worked closely with the infantry and provided moral support
on the battlefield.
On the night before the attack the squadrons of the Reconnaissance Battalion GD moved out of their former billeting area into the
so-called "Kradschtzen Wood", a small wood at the edge of a ravine
not far from Wjasowoje. There it waited in readiness at the disposal
of the division. The battalion's assignments reflected its composition:
long-range reconnaissance, advance detachment, flank protection.
The crews stood ready by their vehicles, awaiting the message from
division that the breakthrough had succeeded. They were waiting to
plunge deep into the enemy rear, hoping to surprise unsuspecting
units and headquarters. They were used to driving through enemy
territory on armoured patrols in their four- and eight-wheeled armoured cars, scouting ahead and relaying the results by wireless to
division headquarters, which based its next moves in the attack on
the information from its long-range eyes. The only contact between
the patrols and their units was by wireless; only the men at the Morse
keys understood the tap-tap-tap which formed words and sentences.
The kind of communications net that such a unit had to maintain in
order to meet a division's intelligence needs was illustrated by the
Reconnaissance Battalion GD.
In the area behind the front the division's other units prepared for
the next morning's attack. Among them were the medical companies
and their "mother", the GD Field Hospital, which was set up in a
school in the city of Schtschigry. The companies themselves were in

316

villages farther forward. It was here that the wounded were brought
first and where they received their initial treatment. Elements of the
medical services were with the infantry companies at the front. Men
of the medical service administered first aid in the front lines; the
lives of the wounded frequently depended on their skill and bravery.
Also involved in the preparations for the attack were the columns
of the GD Supply Service, which set up the necessary ammunition,
supply and fuel dumps. It was there that the materiel was issued, and
from there that the company supply trains picked up everything
needed by the fighting units to carry out their assignments. The heavy
trucks of the supply columns were under way every night fetching
the necessary supplies from the large supply bases in the rear.
18,000 men were crammed into a relatively small area, ready to
carry out the orders of the headquarters. The companies of both
regiments stood poised like a spearpoint at the enemy's main line
of resistance. Spread out behind them were the reserves, backed up
by tanks and artillery. In their midst were the vehicles of the combat
units, assembled and waiting to pick up the men after a successful
break into the enemy positions, waiting until they were finally on the
advance again with the enemy put to flight. Behind the main body
were the headquarters, the columns, the reconnaissance troops, the
flak artillery, the helpers in battle. With them too were the first units
of the Reich Labour Service (RAD). Once the military colossus had
been set in motion, it was the job of the RAD to repair and reinforce
roadways and bridges to create the highways over which to supply
the fighting units. Everything had been thought of. A gigantic
apparatus stood ready to begin the attack at 02.15 on 28 June 1942.
It was past midnight. The men were enjoying their last hours of
rest in their foxholes, but lights still burned in the headquarters of the
regiments and the division. The Commander-in Chief of Army Group
B, Generaloberst Freiherr von Weichs, as well as the commander of
the Fourth Panzer Army, Generaloberst Hoth, were at the division
headquarters. They had gone over the division's attack plan
thoroughly and had familiarised themselves with the condition of the
units. The Generals were prepared to experience the beginning of
the attack with the I.R. GD. But they had not come just to visit the
division's headquarters, but to see the men as well. Gen.Oberst Hoth
and his Executive Officer, Obit, von Papen, roved among the
companies of I.R. GD 2, making contact with the men. Obit. Kuehn
of 1st Company, I.R. GD 2 recalled:
"I had just finished a conference with my platoon leaders in a hut
when a man came in with the report that the Gen.Oberst was there!
I ran outside and reported, while the men some sleeping, some
lying near their foxholes and weapons, busy amongst themselves
passed the word from section to section, 'the Herr Generaloberst is
coming!', and jumped up to report. The little General and his

317

Radio net of the Signals Platoon of the Reconnaissance Battalion

GROSSDEUTSCHLAND on 28 June 1942.
Legend:
4-wheeled armoured car with radio
8-wheeled armoured car with radio.
Armoured personnel carrier with radio
Kfz. 17 with radio
Radio station (transmitter and receiver)
Radio receiver
The names beneath the vehicles indicate the name of the unit leader.
The numbers on the connecting lines are the radio frequencies in kilohertz.
Main Receiving Frequency
Emergency frequency for use by any detachment which has lost contact with its
318

Executive Officer, who was almost two heads taller, came through
our assembly area on foot, motioning vigorously to the men not to
get up: 'Remain sitting children, remain as you are!!'
He recognised me when I reported and asked most cordially if we
had completed our march into the assembly area without loss to air
attack. During the brief discussion I noticed that the General's glance
kept shifting to the soldiers standing around us. Thoughts of the
imminent attack and the unavoidable losses obviously weighed
heavily upon him.
Then, somewhat abruptly, he asked, 'Do you think all will go well
in the morning?' I answered, 'As far as we are concerned, it should
go well and everyone will certainly do his best.'
At the same time the thought struck me that from this question by
the Gen.Oberst I had learned for the first time for certain that the
attack was going to take place the next morning.
Finally, Gen.Oberst Hoth suggested that it was not going to be
easy and once again said, 'Hopefully, all will go well.' Again he gave
me his hand and wished me and my men well."
Another event that took place that night demonstrated the level of
morale among the young soldiers and their leaders. It took place in
the 4th Platoon of the same 1st Company/I.R. GD 2:
"During a meeting of platoon leaders Oberfeldwebel Kozak of 4th
Platoon reported that one of his men, a soldier since 1941 and
member of a machine gun team, was the last of four brothers left
alive. The others had fallen in the latest battles. Schtze Eggerth had
nevertheless implored not to be sent back to the vehicles during the
coming attack. He wanted to be there, even though he had a boil
on his arm which made movement extremely difficult. He insisted
that he wanted to go along anyway.
I already knew Schtze Eggerth. He had always struck me as a
bright, enthusiastic lad. I decided that he could stay with his gun for
the time being. However, if the boil didn't get better he would have
to be sent to the rear. Schtze Eggerth survived the attack and the
subsequent movements of the company and proved himself to be a
brave fellow. He died a hero's death in the later battles of 1942
the last of four brothers."

Chapter Three
Breakthrough to the Don
As the first light of the approaching day dawned shortly before
02.00 on the morning of 28 June 1942, with a thin mist rising from

319

the ravines and hollows, the German barrage began like a

thunderclap. All of the emplaced artillery batteries, the heavy
weapons and infantry weapons joined in. The incessant muzzle
flashes lit the rear areas with a flickering brightness. The sharp
crashes of the cannon and flak batteries drowned out the dull thump
of the howitzers. In the midst of the din a rocket battery howled to
life, shrouded in fire as its rockets roared skywards trailing swaths of
smoke. In seconds the enemy positions were enveloped in smoke
and clouds of dust which quickly spread across the entire attack zone.
The first flights of close-support aircraft approached from the west
with a dull drone. They were from Gen.Oberst Freiherr von
Richthofen's Fliegergruppe which was active in this area. The air
was soon filled with the howl of plunging dive bombers and the crash
of exploding bombs.
Each German infantryman watched from his hole in the winter
position as destruction rained down only several hundred metres
away. He felt the earth shake, felt the blast waves from the exploding
bombs and shells, saw the destruction and chaos on the other side.
He probably ducked down in his hole at first and felt a certain anxiety
rising in him, but this was relieved when he saw the first of his
comrades rising from their holes to his right and left. Amid the dust
and the whirlwind of explosions the grey forms rose, stretched briefly,
seized weapons or ammunition canisters and moved forwards. Then
he, too, made ready, draped his tent square about him and followed
his section or platoon leader forward.
The sections advanced in skirmishing lines, led by few men more
interested in seeing than assaulting. The enemy was damned quiet.
Scarcely a shot was heard. There was little to be seen. Had the
firestorm of the barrage forced the enemy to ground? Had the bombs
plunging from the sky paralysed all movement? Had the enemy
frozen in the face of the overwhelming force approaching him? Or
was he silent on purpose, waiting for the attackers to come within
lethal range of his weapons?
The German heavy weapons shifted their fire onto the Russian
rear, while the Stukas sought targets elsewhere. The infantry of I.R.
GD 1 pressed into the supposedly strongly-fortified village of
Dubrowka. The first tanks of the Panzer Battalion GD appeared,
seeking worthwhile targets as they advanced. The scene was that of
the approach of a tremendous combat force as the vehicles, moving
like caravans, slowly followed the infantry across the fields and
steppe. Widely spaced, the tanks rumbled forwards, and between
them came the prime movers with their mounted anti aircraft guns,
the tracked vehicles, Volkswagens and the courier motorcycles
flitting here and there. Shrouded in a great brown dust cloud, the
mass of vehicles pushed slowly up the slope, anticipating an enemy
counterstroke at any minute. Dubrowka itself had been flattened:

320

wreckage and ruins not a house was left standing, not a fence,
only smoking timbers and smouldering rubble. The companies of
I.R. GD 1 assembled in the remains of the village and prepared to
initiate the pursuit of the enemy in the direction of the Tim.
III Battalion/I.R. GD 2 had the most important assignment of the
day. The men of the 12th and 13th Companies, backed up by
infantry Pioniers and anti-tank guns of 15th Company, prepared to
move out, while 11th Company, reinforced by a battery of assault
guns from the Assault Gun Battalion GD and mounted in trucks,
waited in the bottom land north of Polewoje. Once a breakthrough
had been achieved, these motorised units would initiate the pursuit.
The objective of the attacking companies was to push past the north
side of Dubrowka to the left to the railway line and clear the terrain
on both sides of the tracks. As soon as they had broken through the
enemy positions, the mounted infantry of 11th Company was to
drive through the gap and capture the Tim bridges in a coup de
main. Despite the enemy's quick reaction with rifle and mortar fire
the attacking companies broke into the enemy positions with surprising ease.
I Battalion/I.R. GD 2's assignment was to follow close behind III
Battalion and clear the remaining enemy positions. Assembled in
depth, the battalion moved out of its assembly area into a narrow
ravine which ran across the southern part of the regiment's lane of
attack to within about 400 metres of the enemy's main line of
resistance. 1st Company led the way, with 1st Platoon (Lt. von Kleist)
on the right, 2nd Platoon (Lt. Jobski) on the left and 4th (MG.)
Company and the other rifle companies close behind in reserve. The
enemy defensive fire there was noticeably weak and uncoordinated.
A few shells burst on either side of the ravine without inflicting any
damage. The attackers gained the impression that the Soviets were
not expecting an attack at the ravine.
Following a preparatory artillery barrage, 1st Company moved into
the weakly defended enemy position and occupied the bunkers.
Knee-deep field positions between the bunkers presented no
obstacle. The only evidence of the enemy's presence was a few dead,
victims of the German artillery fire.
I.R. GD 2's alignment had III Battalion on the left, with I Battalion
on its right. Ill Battalion had smashed into and through the first
enemy field positions and was now rapidly advancing in the direction
of the Tim, disregarding the remaining enemy positions. The first
vehicles of the mounted 11th Company became visible as they slowly
assembled behind III Battalion and set out for the railway line. I
Battalion, echeloned to the right rear, followed. It moved across
terrain which consisted of fields divided by hedgerows, in which
enemy mortar and anti-tank positions were still visible. These had to
be cleared as quickly as possible. Everywhere lay items of equipment,
321

weapons and earth-brown greatcoats which had been abandoned by

the fleeing enemy.
The sounds of heavy fighting were heard from the left (north); the
attack by the 3rd (mot.) Infantry Division must have run into
determined opposition. Its attack sector on the far side, or north, of
the railway line lay in the area of the neighbouring XXIV Panzer
Corps, which formed the left wing of the Fourth Panzer Army as well
as Army Group B. Farther to the right (south) where I.R. GD 1 was
attacking, it was completely quiet. There was scarcely any resistance
and the battle had already gone over to one of pursuit. The enemy
had hastily abandoned his positions and all resistance had ceased.
In the rising humid heat of the early morning the riflemen pushed
ahead on foot carrying their heavy equipment. The terrain exhibited
all the typical features of the Ukraine: extended lines of hills, great
fields separated by relatively steep gullies, and bottom land with
dense woods. In the village gardens, most of which were bordered
by hedges, grew tomatoes, sunflowers and corn, or man-high grass
and thistles. Passing through these on foot, carrying heavy weapons
and equipment, was a trial which cost the soldiers a great deal of
sweat. On the other hand, to defend them, to wait there for the
enemy's approach, would have been simple. And yet this happened
only rarely; the enemy was up and gone. Where would he stop and
fight? Where would the first serious resistance be met? The Germans
were expecting it; they anticipated opposition at every prominent
position and advantageous section of terrain. But where?
Behind the advancing rifle companies the artillery batteries moved
forward into new firing positions. Leapfrogging ahead to keep pace
with the advance, there were always some guns ready to fire. The
companies of the Anti-tank Gun Battalion GD were distributed
among the regiments. They followed the companies in platoons,
ready to unlimber and go into action if needed. But no targets
presented themselves and the men hung off the tractors, following
with their eyes the slow advance of their comrades.
The commanders themselves were on the move in their Kbels,
followed by a train of messengers on motorcycles. Directing operations standing in their cars, they observed the advance, formed an
impression of the enemy's dispositions and decided on the next
moves. The division's commanding officer, Major Hoernlein, was
everywhere; here he exhorted a company to pick up its pace the
enemy must not to be given an opportunity to collect himself, they
had to keep him on the run , there he watched a battery going into
position, and farther on he spoke to an N C O wearing a blood-soaked
bandage on his shoulder. Command during a rapid advance was
possible only through the use of radio and messengers or by personal
intervention at critical points. The division operations staff was

322

already on the move in two or three radio-equipped vehicles to

intervene wherever there was trouble.
III Battalion/I.R. GD 2 had meanwhile reached the village of
Tschermissinowo. There it encountered an unexpected obstacle: a
Russian armoured train under steam, whose assignment was probably to interfere with the German advance. The train opened fire with
all guns. 13th Company immediately sent a section under Uffz.
Klavun to destroy the train. Oberschtze Canje, a member of 1st
Section/2nd Platoon, described the events that followed:
"After putting the crew of a 17.2 cm battery out of action, we
drove along the single track railway line, firing like mad with our
machine guns to both sides. Then we saw something steaming
towards us on the horizon: a giant Russian armoured train! It stopped
at a distance of one hundred metres and trained its cannon and
machine guns on us. We jumped down from our vehicles and lay
there with our noses in the dirt. We looked at one another; we were
all soaking wet, waiting for the first direct hit.
The second member of my machine gun team had stupidly left the
ammunition canisters in the truck, the fool. The Russians were now
firing incendiary bullets. I jumped up, ran to the vehicle and made it
back safely with the ammunition.
By now the Russians were firing like crazy. Suddenly, we were
gripped by a blind rage; seizing two hollow charges, we ran towards
the locomotive. Boom!! the engine was finished. The crew jumped
from the tender and fled. The train was now immobilised. We moved
towards the rear of the train, eliminated the armoured cars and finally
blew up the ammunition car.
The armoured train was out of action and we moved on."
These events were played out in a matter of minutes. The Tim, a
narrow stream in a deeply-eroded valley, was reached at 06.00. The
river was spanned by a rail bridge and a road bridge, the latter
destroyed. The rail bridge, which crossed the valley in a great arc,
was the objective of the mounted troops of 11th Company/I.R. GD
2. The bridge fell quickly into the company's hands and positions
were immediately taken up on the other side of the river. The vehicles
were meanwhile driven under cover in a gully. Fire from Soviet
bunkers on the far bank made the situation extremely uncomfortable.
The men of 11th Company, still without heavy weapons, stormed
the rather weakly-manned enemy bunkers. In a side valley near
Swoboda-Poshidajewka, about two kilometres east of the Tim, the
company ran into the first serious resistance, which brought its
advance to a halt.
Behind at the bridge, the assault guns were struggling to find a way
up onto the railway embankment so they could use the rail bridge
as a way across the river. 11th Company, which was ahead on its
own without heavy weapons, desperately needed reinforcement. At
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first the attempts met with no success. When one assault gun finally
did reach the bridge, it slipped over the side of the embankment and
became stuck crosswise, completely blocking the entrance to the
span. The other vehicles were lined up behind it and could move
neither forwards nor backwards.
While the other rifle companies set about crossing the bridge on
foot, tragedy struck 11th Company. Lt. Kersting, leader of 15th
Company's infantry gun platoon, which had accompanied 11th
Company on its successful advance, described what happened:
"After crossing the Tim we advanced about 2,000 metres farther
east to a ridge near Swoboda-Poshidajewka. There the Russians had
dug trenches, which we occupied, as we were expecting an enemy
counterattack at any minute. Meanwhile, the Russians assembled in
a forward-projecting ravine farther to the left.
I was just about to bring the guns into position and set up the
observation post, when nine horizontal and dive bombers approached. We immediately spread out our orange-coloured air
identification panels as well as swastika flags and set off smoke
signals. In spite of this we were hit by a stick of bombs. After the
smoke and dust cleared an initial count revealed that the infantry gun
(light) platoon was left with a strength of one officer, an N C O and
eight men. Moreover, there was only one gun ready for action, a
Kbelwagen and a damaged motorcycle; everything else was
smashed. The human losses were not insignificant, especially since
the other companies also suffered dead and wounded.
In a later discussion with the flying control officer involved, I was
told that the bomber group had been assigned to bomb the hill at a
designated time in support of Kampfgruppe Kohlhaas. At the time
the aircraft approached the target, it was considered impossible that
the high ground was already in our hands.
The pilots thought the laying out of cloth panels to be a Russian
ruse, because vehicles had been seen standing at the bridge (likely
tanks or assault guns) which were still showing the sign for 'front
line'. In addition to the panels and flags, the pilot of the last aircraft
saw white signal flares being fired as the bombs were being dropped.
He pulled up from his dive and did not release his bombs."
These losses, inflicted by supporting weapons and caused by
human error, and therefore especially painful for those involved,
were very heavy: sixteen dead, frightfully mutilated, and a large
number of wounded. The first medical officer to arrive was Dr.
Kleine. Among the wounded he treated were Gefreiter Wilger,
Gefreiter Eul and Oberschtzen Kppen, Jungkurth and Gerlich.
Some were so badly wounded that they died hours or days later.
Among them were Oberfeldwebel Weischede, wearer of the German
Cross in Gold, who died on 29 June and Gefr. Lorenz, who
succumbed to his wounds on 30 June. The battalion commander,
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Major Kohlhaas, was not quite so seriously wounded, but he was still
forced to turn over command of the unit to Hptm. Prss.
The major success of capturing the bridge over the Tim River and
the associated tactical, even strategic, gains were overshadowed by
these events. It would be a long time before 11th Company and the
attached elements of 15th Company recovered from this shock.
For the outstanding action at the Tim bridge, which was soon
named Obstlt. Kohlhaas Bridge, the commander of III Battalion/I.R.
GD 2 was awarded the Knight's Cross.
While the forward units of 11th Company temporarily went over
to the defensive in anticipation of a Soviet counterattack, elements
of 12th and 13th Companies moved in to reinforce the bridgehead.
Meanwhile, with the taking of the Tim bridge, the signal was given
for the waiting reconnaissance battalion to move across the river and
reconnoitre the territory beyond. Its assignment was to move quickly
to establish bridgeheads across the Kschen and open the way to the
east for the division. The battalion's vehicles moved past the columns
at high speed and reached the bridge over the Tim at 08.30. There
the Reconnaissance Battalion GD found dense columns of vehicles
stalled in front of the bridge. Traffic was backed up because of the
steep approach to the bridge. Also, vehicles could cross only slowly
because of the railroad tracks. Hours later, at approximately 11.45,
the 2nd Squadron was able to get its armoured cars across the river.
The battalion's commander, Major von Usedom, decided not to wait
for the rest of the battalion, but to push on to the Kschen near
Nikolajewka (Point 221.3) with the armoured cars and establish a
bridgehead there. Kampfgruppe von Usedom drove cross-country
in the burning heat and reached Nikolajewka at about 13.00. The
bridge there had been destroyed, but a small bridgehead was
established. Later, at about 16.00, tanks and assault guns arrived to
expand and consolidate the bridgehead. Meanwhile, the Pioniers of
5th Squadron's Pionier Platoon built a new bridge for the vehicles
to cross.
From the command standpoint, the most desirable situation following the penetration of a fortified position had been achieved: the
division's motorised and armoured elements were advancing and
pursuing the fleeing enemy forces.
Meanwhile, after a long march the infantry had halted to regroup
and wait for the arrival of its vehicles. The battalions of I.R. GD 1
rested on the battlefield for three hours after reaching the Tim near
Serenowka. Then, since the vehicles were delayed because of the
blown bridge, the troops set out on foot in long columns towards
their next objective, the Kschen. The pace of the march was slow in
the parching midday heat. After the exertions of the morning, the
tempo of the advance was reduced. By the time the first elements
of I.R. GD 1 reached the Kschen in the early evening, they had
325

covered more than 35 kilometres. However, the evening brought a

change of weather. It began to rain, which kept the dust down, but
it soon turned into a downpour, transforming the roads and fields
into impassable mud. The troops pitched their tents in the fields and
rested. Regiment GD 1 set up its command post in Manssurowo for
the night.
Meanwhile, I Battalion/I.R. GD 2 under Hptm. Bethge had also
crossed the Tim. It received instructions to follow the armoured
advance detachment as cover for its left flank. The first step taken
was to send a reinforced rifle platoon from 3rd Company, together
with the 1st Battery/Assault Gun Battalion GD, on a reconnaissancein-force towards a wooded hill approximately three kilometres east
of the Tim on the railway line. At the same time, reconnaissance was
carried out to the southeast towards Ssuchoj Chutor, which was
reported free of the enemy. When the main body of the battalion
followed, it came under heavy artillery, mortar and anti-tank fire from
the northern flank, from the same wood on the railway line. Caught
in the open, the companies soon began to take casualties. Eight
officers were wounded, including the commander of 1st Company,
Obit. Kuehn, the battalion adjutant, Lt. Weber, and others. Fortunately, losses among section leaders and the men were light, even
though the inexperience of the troops caused them to bunch up,
presenting an easy target. Only the energetic intervention of the
NCOs prevented further casualties.The companies moved into a
reverse-slope position behind a hill to regroup. The commander of
1st Company, who was wounded in the battle, described the action:
"We were caught by surprise by the sudden enemy fire. The first
salvo cost 1st Company about 15 casualties, including 3 or 4 dead.
I, too, was wounded and Lt. Jobski took over command. He
immediately set about trying to lead the company forward out of the
enemy fire.
While the fire was still coming in, the stretcher bearers were
fearlessly engaged in bandaging and recovering the wounded. Obergefreiter Matz suddenly appeared on his motorcycle-sidecar combination and, still under fire, began to drive the wounded to the rear.
He was assisted by another motorcycle messenger from 5th Company. Since this style of evacuation consumed a great deal of time,
orders were given to take out the seriously wounded first and dig in
those with minor wounds. An hour later it was my turn and Ogefr.
Matz picked me up. As I couldn't sit, he and Ogefr. Nater, our medic,
placed me in the sidecar on knapsacks and tent squares and bedded
me in. When, half-soaked, I finally reached the battalion aid station,
the battalion medical officer, Dr. Imhoff, told me that he had no more
anti-tetanus serum and that I should move on immediately. The
messenger from 5th Company finally took me to the rear, where I
was delivered to the field hospital several hours later."
326

The 2nd Company, which was accompanying 1st Company, also

suffered considerable losses to the unexpected enemy fire, including
some in a Russian counterattack launched by Cossacks. Platoon
leaders Lt. Grosser and Lt. Alberti, senior company N C O Feldw. van
Schick and Gefr. Melcher were wounded seriously. Gefr. G. Harm
suffered a severe abdominal wound.
As the companies moved into the village of Ssuchoj Chutor, an
enemy tank of English manufacture, a Mark IV, approached at high
speed and opened fire. The enemy tank did not get far, however, as
it was quickly knocked out and set on fire by the German assault
guns. After hastily regrouping, the advance was resumed towards
the southeast with the objective of Perewolotschnoje, which lay just
before the Kschen River. This village, which appeared fairly well-todo, was divided into two roughly equal parts by a deep, wide gully
which ran square to the direction of the advance. The troops reached
the village with no resistance and, as the companies passed through,
an enemy battalion was spotted on the far side of the gully preparing
to withdraw to the east. A planned pursuit was cancelled on orders
from the regimental commander, as I Battalion/I.R. GD 2 was to
immediately veer to the south. Riding on the assault guns, 3rd
Company moved on in the darkness to Nowosselidebnoje and
established a bridgehead there across the Kschen. The remaining
elements of I.R. GD 2 followed, some in vehicles, and camped for
the night in gullies near Perewolotschnoje. On this day the infantry
covered 47 kilometres on foot truly a remarkable accomplishment!
The division staff had meanwhile moved forward and set up its
command post in Lipowskoje, so as to be able to immediately make
preparations to issue orders for the continuation of the pursuit. As
the division command saw it, the situation as darkness fell was more
than favourable: the spearheads of the division's neighbour on the
right, the 24th Panzer Division, had reached the upper course of the
Kschen. I.R. GD 1 and its command post were in Manssurowo and
elements of the regiment had established a bridgehead across the
Kschen. Its sister regiment, I.R. GD 2, had one reinforced company
on the east bank of the Kschen. With these bridgeheads in their
hands, the commanders already possessed jumping off positions for
the following day. Earlier reports indicated that spearheads of the
division's neighbour on the left, the 3rd Infantry Division (mot.), had
advanced as far as the village of Rassowetz on the Leninski-Liwny
railway line, where it halted until 2 July on orders from corps.
While most of the troops now enjoyed a well-deserved rest, the
2nd Squadron of the Reconnaissance Battalion GD was sent by its
commander out into the streaming rain to establish a further
bridgehead over a tributary of the Kschen near Nish. Krestischtsche,
about six kilometres east of the bridge site. This was accomplished
without meeting any resistance.
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For the following day's operations it was vital that the division
reinforce the von Usedom advance detachment, which was farthest
east, with tanks and send it towards the southeast at dawn. That
night, at approximately 23.45, orders were radioed to the reinforced
Reconnaissance Battalion GD to link up with the tanks and next
morning advance through Jekaterinowka, Alexandrowka, Werch.
Graiworonka and Gologulowka towards Babanino as far as Hill
249.4 and interdict the Staryj OskolKastornojeJelez railway line.
The advance detachment was to make the necessary preparations
during the night.
That night, however, it rained heavily, transforming the
countryside, and especially the roads, into a bottomless morass. The
muddy conditions made motor transport extremely difficult and
delayed significantly the movement of vehicles to the regiments. The
situation was aggravated by the large numbers of damaged or
destroyed bridges which had to be repaired or replaced.
While the two infantry regiments waited for their vehicles until
08.00 and 09.00, the von Usedom advance detachment set out at
02.30 to link up with 2nd Squadron which was farther to the east.
The von Usedom group set out again at 08.00, after waiting for the
roads to dry out somewhat, and reached the Grjasnaja near
Alexandrowka without meeting any resistance. The bridge there had
been destroyed, however, and the advance halted. The Pioniers
immediately went to work. Elements of the Reconnaissance Battalion
GD secured the hills to the east. While waiting for completion of the
Alexandrowka bridge, a radio message came in from division. The
battalion was to form a reinforced battle group led by the commanding officer, which was to set out immediately for the city of Kschen
on the Kschen river in order to take the rail bridge there intact in
cooperation with the 9th Panzer Division.
The 2nd Squadron, reinforced by a tank platoon from Panzer
Battalion GD, a 2 cm flak platoon and an eight-wheeled armoured
car patrol this in the lead set out towards the northeast at noon
under the command of Major von Usedom. It was roughly 13.00;
the route led across completely open terrain. Far ahead was the
heavy patrol under the command of Wachtmeister Schmarbeck, who
described his assignment:
"At roughly 12.15 on 29 June I was given an assignment which
read as follows:
1. You will drive ten minutes ahead of the battle group and reconnoitre as far as Kschen.
2. A net of field fortifications is to be expected before Kschen.
3. Are the bridges in Kschen still intact? Are they occupied by the
enemy?
4. You will secure the bridge reached until the battle group arrives.

328

Continuous reports by radio.

I repeated my assignment and immediately made my way to my
patrol, which I had summoned in the meantime. My trusted men and
brave hussars stood by the armoured cars, waiting for their orders.
'Form a semi-circle!'. I then described the situation, the assignment
and the route we would be taking.
Then: armoured patrol move out! I had the patrol drive in battle
order as the distance to our objective was only 12-15 kilometres.
Our route led us through corn fields, potato fields and past fallow
land.
Then, suddenly, there was steam was coming from the lead car.
What's going on?, I asked. A clamp on the water hose had broken.
After a brief halt we were on our way again. Finally we reached the
enemy positions. There were field positions to the left and right of
the road, but they were deserted. Helmets, hand grenades and rifle
ammunition lay scattered about but there was nothing to be seen of
the Russians.
We drove on slowly. There were more field positions on both sides
of the road, but they, too, had been abandoned by the enemy. I sent
a radio message: 'All field positions passed so far have been
abandoned by the enemy.'
We moved on. The lead car halted behind the next hill and
observed. Suddenly the commander waved and pointed to the left.
I drove up on the left of the lead car, but could see nothing.
Afterwards we drove on to the last crossroads and up to the first
houses.
Here we had a good look round: on the right was a small wood,
half-right an airfield without any aircraft, and in the background what
appeared to be barracks. Ahead of us were more woods and then
houses, and farther left a ridge extended alongside the road.
We drove off again; it couldn't have been more than a few hundred
metres to the first bridge. The lead car, driving perhaps 50 metres
ahead of me, was about to take the last curve before the bridge when,
suddenly, a loud detonation was heard and a black cloud rose. The
lead car came to a halt. I saw the crew bail out and disappear behind
a house. All of a sudden, enemy artillery began to fire on the men,
then mortars and finally even anti-tank guns. The car's commander
leapt to the right into a ditch while his number one went left, was hit
and fell. Then a hidden machine gun opened fire on the fleeing men.
I instructed my gunner: 'Turret ten o'clock upper right corner of
the house high-explosive 50 open fire!' It took 5 to 7 shells to
silence the enemy machine gun in the house. At almost the same
moment there were three more loud explosions. The bridges had
gone up!

329

Afterwards I ordered: To the rear, move out! As far as the first

crossroads.' There stood Major von Usedom with his adjutant. He
had recognised the situation and ordered anti-tank rifles forward. I
drove forward again in my armoured car and, under the protection
of the anti-tank rifles, recovered the wounded men and the bailed-out
driver. Then, together with the battle group, we pulled back to
regroup for a systematic attack on Kschen from another position."
Since another attack from recognised positions in completely open
terrain offered little hope of success, the commander of Battle Group
von Usedom decided to drive round this sector of the river and renew
the attack through Alexandrowka. A shortage of fuel and the lateness
of the day led to a decision to postpone the operation against Kschen
until the following day. Also, the battle group's assignment, to take
the bridges in Kschen undamaged, was now irrelevant, as the bridges
had been blown. The bulk of the Reconnaissance Battalion remained
in Alexandrowka, while the reinforced 2nd Squadron moved that
evening to Wtoraja Dolina to secure better jumping-off positions for
the attack planned for 30 June.
Both infantry regiments had been trying to send their reserve
battalions forward by motor vehicle since early morning. The muddy
roads prevented any rapid movement and the battalions made better
progress on foot. That evening, following an exhausting march
through Nish. KrestischtscheAkatowoWtoraja Dolina, during
which no enemy resistance was met, the men of I.R. GD 2 moved
towards Hill 225.1, due east of Alexandrowka, where they were to
secure to the east with I.R. GD 1. I.R. GD 1 had likewise met no
resistance that day and had travelled on foot as far as Alexandrowka,
where it occupied positions on the hills to the east of the town. The
rain fell in streams, hindering all movement, especially that of the
motorised units. Natural forces were blunting the offensive which
had begun so well. Desperate attempts were made to repair the
blown bridges and make the roads passable in order to get the
offensive rolling again.
It was clear to the division command that the forced halt would
allow the enemy time to settle down in favourable terrain and bring
up reserves. These would have to use tracked vehicles, as only they
would be in a position to mount an effective resistance against
motorised units such as the I.D. GD and its neighbours, the 24th
Panzer Division on the right and 9th Panzer Division on the left.
After studying the maps, it seemed the most likely locations for the
Russians to make a stand would be on the Graiworonka, or on the
Olyn, both deeply-eroded river valleys. In spite of these obstacles, it
was vital that the division acquire the necessary jumping-off positions
during the night, so as to enable an early start to the renewed pursuit
of the enemy.

330

Unexpectedly, the morning of 30 June dawned clear and within a

few hours the roads and earth were rock-hard again. The men of
I.R. GD 1 which now was the spearhead of the division got up,
still in their damp uniforms, and marched off towards the east. As
at the beginning of the offensive, Stukas and close support aircraft
roared overhead into enemy territory seeking targets. And they found
them in the form of a total of seven enemy tank brigades which the
enemy had summoned during the brief pause in the German attack.
Together with their accompanying motorised units, they were intended to fight a delaying action.
In the hours that followed it fell to the infantry which, together with
the Panzer Battalion GD now formed the spearhead, to storm the
hastily-dug enemy positions and fight open the way for the waiting
fast units. Then the Reconnaissance Battalion GD would once again
send a battle group against Kschen and, together with 9th Panzer
Division attacking on the left, take this key point which protruded
into the German front.
Meanwhile, on the hills east of Alexandrowka, I.R. GD 2 waited
for a wedge to be driven into the enemy positions. The first serious
fighting of the day occurred when I Battalion/I.R. GD 1 ran into
hastily brought-up enemy units near Nasarowka. Watched by the
Commanding General and the Division Commander, the battalion,
despite being surrounded for a short time, was able to throw back
the enemy. Elements of the Panzer Battalion GD under Hptm. Pssel
stormed forward past Werch. Greiworonka towards Gologulowka.
The first Russian T-34 tanks to appear were destroyed or put to flight
following a brief firefight. German fighting superiority, especially of
the gun crews, but above all of the tank crews, was manifest. Without
waiting for the infantry which, still without its vehicles, was following
on foot, the tanks formed up into a wedge, the typical armoured
formation, and rolled on until the village of Gologulowka came into
sight. Once again enemy tanks entered the fray, opening fire at long
range, some between houses, others on the open plain. The hard
crack of the Russian 7.62 cm cannon mingled with the crash of the
German 7.5 cm guns, and once again smoking wrecks and exploding
ammunition marked the destruction of several Soviet tanks. Only
seldom did one of the German tanks take a hit from enemy fire.
When the division command realised that the enemy forces it was
facing consisted mainly of more flexible armoured and motorised
units rather than infantry, it ordered the Reconnaissance Battalion
GD, which had a battle group standing outside Kschen, to leave one
reinforced squadron there and move the bulk of its armoured
elements forward to once again take over the spearhead together
with the Panzer Battalion GD. Major von Usedom left the units
outside Kschen, joined up with the reinforced 2nd (Armoured Car)
Squadron and, trailing a great cloud of dust, roared past the marching
331

Summer Offensive 1942

First Day of Attack, 28 June

infantry columns of I.R. GD 1 through Alexandrowka- Werch.

Greiworonka in the direction of Gologulowka. At the same time, I
Battalion/I.R. GD 2 received orders to cover the left flank of the
advancing I.R. GD 1. Accordingly it turned off to the north, passed
through Gologulowka and pushed on towards the village of
Bytschek, arriving there in the early hours of the morning. The main
body of I.R. GD 2 followed the advancing I.R. GD 1, echeloned to
the right rear.
The advance by the I.D. G D , which had resumed its earlier fast
pace, continually met groups of Russians who, unsure of the situation, appeared suddenly and were taken prisoner. In one such
instance, riflemen of 7th Company/I.R. GD 1 came upon three
Russians sleeping in an open field. On awakening, the Russians
reached for their weapons as if to put up a fight. They were quickly
disarmed, however, draped with ammunition canisters and taken
along as bearers. At another location the advancing Germans spotted
white cloths fluttering from four rifles which were stuck in the ground;
four Russian soldiers lay asleep nearby. They, too, had lost contact
with their units. A wounded battalion commander who fell into
German hands was completely unaware of the overall situation. Such
events occurred hourly during the advance; they were more a source
of amusement than of danger.
The great heat made the going difficult for the men with their heavy
weapons and equipment and all their hopes rested on the early arrival
of their vehicles. But it was late in the afternoon before these finally
arrived. Once the weary soldiers were aboard the trucks, I.R. GD 1
set out after the tanks and armoured cars, which had already passed
through Prostojenoje, and reached the rail line near Krasnoje Olym,
where they halted. Here the tanks became involved in a sharp
engagement with Soviet T-34s which once again ended in favour of
the German side. A determined effort by the riflemen of I.R. GD 1
enabled them to establish another bridgehead across the Olym,
which was important as a jumping-off point for the following day's
attack.
The losses suffered by the Soviet 125th Infantry Regiment may be
considered typical. In the Greiworonka sector more than 600 men
from its II and III Battalions alone were captured by German forces.
By that evening the tank brigade of the Soviet 6th Infantry Division
had lost 16 tanks and at least 7 guns, which were captured. It was
a fine success for the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Division in its
renewed offensive in this sector.
The columns of the division supply services had to contend with
extremely poor road conditions and the ever-increasing distances
between the fighting units and the base supply dumps. Day and night
the heavy trucks rolled to the rear to fetch ammunition, replacement
weapons, foodstuffs and, above all, fuel from the army dumps and
333

deliver it to the front. The drivers were given no rest. Too often the
individual columns encountered groups of enemy stragglers on their
nocturnal journeys. These bands of Russian soldiers, separated from
their units, roamed the countryside and on occasion ambushed the
supply columns. More than once the men of the supply units had to
use their weapons and defend themselves against these bands at
some lonely, isolated spot and fight their way through. It was thanks
to their largely unrecognised efforts that the division command was
able to plan ahead without worrying about supply.
When the infantry went into positions on the heights on the far
side of the Olym for a brief rest on 30 June, the division was able to
report to XXXXVIII Panzer Corps that it had crossed the Staryj
OskolKastornjeJelez railway line and had established a
bridgehead across the Olym with a reinforced company. The leading
elements of the division units of I.R. GD 1, together with elements
of the Reconnaissance Battalion GD and the Panzer Battalion GD
extended like a spearpoint deep into enemy territory. Its flanks
were open on both sides, because the neighbouring divisions had
not kept up. On the right, the 24th Panzer Division had been held
up near Gorschetschnoje. On the left, the spearheads of the 9th
Panzer Division were in and due east of the city of Kschen. The
Soviet forces held up the division's advance until evening when they
abandoned the city and fled towards the east.
The most forward positions at the railway embankment were
clearly visible in the rising morning heat of 1 July 1942. Riflemen
occupied holes and hollows on the east side of the tracks, while
anti-tank guns had been set up at strategic points to protect against
the sudden appearance of enemy tanks. Between the bushes were
the Kbels and trucks, the infantry's transport. The men stretched
in the morning sun and, looking around, saw nothing. All was quiet,
with only a few smouldering wrecks of Soviet tanks to foul the air
and recall the battle of the day before. The tanks of the Panzer
Battalion GD were still taking on fuel and ammunition. Most of the
crews were washing, putting away their bedding or beginning their
breakfast. But like so many others, this day, too, was to begin with
a surprise. Feldwebel Rapp of the 2nd Company/Panzer Battalion
GD described what took place:
"Following a cool night, during which we had secured the railroad
crossing taken the evening before, the first rays of the sun began to
warm us. Between and around us lay the wrecks of the enemy tanks
which had fallen victim to our guns yesterday. They had burned out
during the night and a few were still smouldering.
Beyond the railway embankment were the positions of our antitank guns. We were just about to eat breakfast when, suddenly, a
cry rang out: 'Enemy tanks from the right and ahead!' We leapt into
our tanks and fired up the engines. In seconds we were ready to
334

move. We drove ahead across the railroad tracks to the positions of

our anti-tank guns. There about 150 metres away a T-34 was
driving across in front of us and firing at our anti tank gun. It had
already run over our other gun which had been positioned further
forward. 'Ready! Fire!' 'Hurray! A direct hit!' Another T-34 which
appeared behind the first was knocked out by my neighbour. The
enemy sought to take cover behind his burning tanks, but his fate
was sealed.
The rest of Panzer Battalion GD, which had made ready in the
meantime, now drove forward. We spotted the next enemy tanks at
a range of 1,500 metres. Providing mutual fire support we moved
towards the enemy. The Russians opened fire first. It was now a
duel. We fired shot after shot. There another one was burning,
and then another!
Our neighbouring company had meanwhile moved out to the left
and now picked off the enemy tanks from the flank one by one. We
received orders to face right and take up the pursuit of the fleeing
tanks.
As we advanced, we came under fire from the right. Suddenly our
tank shuddered. A hit on the running gear; two road wheels were
torn away. Then what was that? One of our crews was bailing out.
Their tank had also taken fire from the right a direct hit! The doctor
roared up in his armoured personnel carrier and recovered the
wounded.
The enemy tank that had done the firing was spotted at the railway
embankment. Two of our tanks worked their way towards it. A direct
hit blew up the enemy tank and its turret flew off, landing right on
the railroad tracks. When the battle was over we determined that few
of the enemy tanks had escaped: ten T-34s and two light tanks had
been destroyed. A fine success so early in the morning."
It was 06.30 and the Panzer Battalion GD had already successfully
concluded its first serious engagement. The division's Reconnaissance Battalion, reinforced by a battery of light field howitzers, set
off towards Jassenki led by an armoured patrol from 1st Squadron.
The advance went well. The roads were good and the weather was
clear and sunny. The terrain was completely open; as far as the eye
could see there were fields and meadows. A few small ravines ran
towards the road at right angles. When 2nd (Armoured Personnel
Carrier) Squadron reached the high ground to the left (north) of the
road on which was situated the small village of Kulewka, it came
under heavy fire from tanks in the village. The men got down from
their vehicles, assembled on both sides of the road together with
the arriving 4th Squadron and dug in near Point 239.5. Patrols
discovered that there were strong field fortifications as well as tanks
in Kulewka and Jassenki. While the approaching I.R. GD 1 assembled north of the road for the attack, Gefr. Wastler of the 1st
335

(Armoured Car) Squadron roared into Kulewka with three anti-tank

rifle cars and destroyed seven enemy tanks. The best description of
the action was provided by the Gefreiter himself:
" O n 1 July we were assigned to the 2nd (APC) Squadron, which
was leading the advance detachment, for the advance on Kulewka.
We set out early. A fresh wind whistled about our ears, but the day
promised to be a hot one.
An armoured patrol was sent on ahead to reconnoitre towards the
village. Then we saw it come back, and the Wachtmeister who had
led the patrol told us that the village was swarming with Russian
tanks. Now, we thought, there's work for us. We drove ahead to the
hill over which the road led.
The village lay about 800 metres ahead of us. The Russians had
a clear view of the terrain. We didn't need long to consider the
cleverest way to go about it, because from a ravine to our right we
heard the familiar sound of tanks on the move. Before we could get
set up the first Russian tank, a light type, appeared about 60 metres
away. I was in the best position and took aim at the approaching
tank. A shot a hit! The tank stopped, but a second was already
approaching. My friend in the next car, Gefr. Schwindler, saw it first
and fired. Now that I had a taste of blood, I let him have it from my
side too. The second tank was also disabled. We approached to have
a closer look, but before we got there the turret hatch of the second
tank opened, a Russian jumped out and escaped to the rear through
the high grass. A fat prize had escaped our grasp: as we were to
learn later, the Russian had been a commissar. We jumped onto the
two enemy tanks and finished them off with hand grenades.
The third car now drove up and the three of us took over security
to the right. We watched as, about 1,500 metres away, fourteen
enemy heavy tanks attempted to outflank us. The anti-tank guns
driving behind us were alerted by radio. We saw several palls of
smoke from destroyed tanks; how many, we could not determine,
as we received orders to secure to the left towards the village.
'Some more will probably come out', said my neighbour. And just
then three Russian heavy tanks came out of cover to roll over the
German infantry which had swarmed out to the attack. They were
still about 600 metres away when we opened fire. Several shots and
the tank on the left that had advanced farthest ground to a halt. He
continued to fire on us, but we stood our ground and returned his
fire. That was too much for him and he took to his heels. We went
after him but the terrain forced us to give up the chase. The first tank
was able to escape, and we turned our attentions to the other two.
But they also sought safety in flight.
All of this driving about had brought us quite close to the village
itself. While we are at it we might as well do a proper job, I said to
myself, and in we went. The attacking infantry was dug in around
336

the village and was not about to enter as there was still fire coming
in from enemy tanks in the village.
Gefr. Schindler's car came under fire from the left side of the
village, but he was able to avoid being hit by aggressive zigzagging.
Without a moment's hesitation he drove towards the source of the
trouble. My car and that of Gefr. Hoffmann sought another position
and raced towards the village's main entrance. Then, suddenly,
ahead of us on the road was an anti-tank barrier fashioned from
every sort of farm implement. Our infantry now arrived, however,
and we pushed the pile of junk to the side. My driver stepped on the
gas as an enemy tank appeared directly ahead of us. We swung our
weapon around and made for the tank. The enemy was so surprised
that he failed to take any action. This tank too was knocked out.
Immediately afterwards another appeared: two shots were enough
and it, too, was dispatched.
This rapid success gave me full confidence in my weapon and,
once at work, I didn't want to halt, but continued on into the village.
It was rather comic the way we bellowed at each other because, of
course, our hearing had suffered from the crash of the guns. But
everything went like clockwork; the drivers reacted to the slightest
gesture.
In any case, there was little time for reflection as another Russian
tank now appeared with another in tow. I quickly moved the car into
a favourable position and opened fire. This shot, too, was on target.
It was the fourth tank we had put out of action.
My ammunition supply was running low. I therefore sought out the
other cars and was just approaching when Gefr. Hoffmann's car was
threatened by a 44-tonne Russian tank from a range of 50 metres.
I pressed the trigger. Damn! The gun had jammed! Realising the
situation, my driver immediately brought the car out of the tank's
field of fire. The steering must have failed on Hoffmann's car,
because it blew up in front of our eyes. The crew was lucky; the men
were able to bail out just in time and escaped uninjured. I picked up
my comrades as well as three wounded infantry and drove to the
rear for more ammunition.
On the way I came upon Gefr. Schindler's car in some bushes. He
had just knocked out his second tank. I also saw that the infantry
had entered the village and occupied it without resistance.
On my return the battalion commander, Major von Usedom,
expressed his appreciation when we reported the destruction of
seven enemy tanks. Further recognition came in the award of the
Iron Cross, First Class."
I.R. GD 1 gathered in its assembly area in the ravines and valleys
north of the road to Jassenki, while the artillery batteries and rocket
launchers moved into their firing positions. These laid down effective

337

Attack by I.D. GD on 29-30 June 1942

against the Olym River Sector near
Alissowo and Gorschetschnoje

fire on recognised targets and soon there was a great deal of fire and
smoke coming from the village.
Meanwhile, II and III Battalions and IV (Heavy) Battalion of I.R.
GD 2 had advanced as far as the area between Gologulowka and
the railway line near Knjasnaja Olym and had set up a defensive line
there, guarding the division's southern flank. The regiment's job
there was to prevent enemy forces, especially tanks, from breaking
into I.R. GD 1's attack preparations near Kulewka.
I Battalion/I.R. GD 2 was operating independently of the other
battalions. Its assignment remained to cover the northern flank of
the division. In the meantime, supported by Hptm. Adam's assault
gun battery, it had reached the broad valley of the Olym near
Ivanovka. After crossing the marshy bottomland, the reinforced
battalion went into position on the heights to the east. The 3rd
Company established a bridgehead and occupied the high ground
south of Schirokij. Its right wing followed the course of the Olym,
while its left lay along the stream which flowed into the Olym near
Ivanovka. The area around this stream was very marshy and therefore impassable. Attached to the company was a heavy machine gun
platoon and a heavy mortar section from the 4th (MG.) Company,
as well as a light infantry gun platoon of the 5th (Hvy.) Company.
Due north of Ivanovka, the 2nd Company under Obit. Dr. Gnther
went into positions on both sides of the railway line and the road
which ran parallel to it with its front facing north. On its left was 1st
Company with its front facing north and west. With its remaining
machine guns and mortars, 4th (MG.) Company occupied positions
on and behind the heights west of Ivanovka as did the howitzers and
an 8.8 cm flak battery. The assault gun battery was held back in a
valley near Ivanovka in case of an attack by enemy tanks.
In the course of the late morning a single Soviet tank appeared on
the heights east of the Olym on the road to Kutschugry. Fired on by
the flak artillery, it quickly disappeared to the east. A short time later
three 42-tonne KV-I tanks appeared on the road west of the railway
line, rolling towards the positions of 2nd Company. The anti-tank
rifles of the 5th (Hvy.) Squadron were able to score hits on the
intruders but these could not penetrate the thick armour of the
Russian tanks. Meanwhile, a platoon of the 2nd Assault Gun Battery
under Hptm. Adam arrived. The commander of 2nd Company, Obit.
Dr. Gnther, jumped onto the command vehicle to go along.
Company messenger Gefr. Mebes described what then took place:
"Tanks have been reported! I crawled forward to the chief who
was staring straight ahead. Barely 200 metres in front of us in a
cornfield stood a T-34, turret hatch open and on the look-out. Obit.
Gnther turned quickly and shouted, 'Mebes, run quickly to the heavy
anti-tank rifle at the railway embankment and report: tank ahead,
2nd Company requests support.' The chief gave me the order with
339

an undertone of desperation in his voice. I jumped up and ran across;

it was about 300 metres to the embankment. I found the anti-tank
rifle well-camouflaged in some bushes near the embankment. They
already had the tank in their sights when a second T-34 appeared.
As I worked my way back, a motorcycle messenger drove up from
the embankment: 'There are six tanks coming along the embankment!' 'Go', I shouted, 'Drive to battalion headquarters and I'll come
with you and report.' I jumped into the sidecar and we thundered
over the few hundred metres to the rear. When I reported that six
enemy tanks were rolling against us and mentioned the situation of
2nd Company, which was up there with no cover, Hptm. Bethge
only smiled. Then I left, but the Hauptmann called me back again:
'Tell your chief that I'm sending over the 8.8 cm Flak and four assault
guns.'
I drove forward again by motorcycle and reported the approaching
reinforcements. The next moment our exemplary Oberleutnant Dr.
Gnther jumped onto one of the assault guns to describe the terrain
and guide the guns. Then the tank-versus-tank battle began. Shells
roared back and forth. A few minutes later the 8.8 cm Flak returned:
four enemy tanks destroyed! But our company chief did not return.
He had lost a leg to the enemy tank fire. It hung down from a few
strands of flesh, but he remained fully conscious as the medic cut it
off. As all of this was going on he calmly polished his glasses.
That afternoon Obit. Gnther died as a result of the great loss of
blood. His soldiers prepared his grave in Pokowskoje, near the
Olym."
After fighting off the enemy tank attack I Battalion/I.R. GD 2
remained in this position which still offered the best flanking
protection to the north for the night.
While, following the necessary artillery preparation, the first infantry of I.R. GD 1 (less I Btl.) was advancing against Kulewka, the
tanks of Panzer Battalion GD swung out to the north, bypassing
Kulewka, and plunged down on Jassenki from the northeast at the
same time as the Reconnaissance Battalion attacked from the west
and south. The result was a classic envelopment, which was a
complete success for the attackers. By approximately 18.00, about
the same time as Kulewka fell to the main body of I.R. GD 1, the
village of Jassenki was in German hands.
For the Reconnaissance Battalion GD, this was the first real day
of fighting in which all elements of the battalion took part. Eight
enemy tanks, three trucks and a gun were destroyed or captured and
numerous prisoners were brought in.
I.R. GD 1 moved its command post to Kulewka, while the
companies assembled to secure there for the night. Special emphasis
was placed on an effective anti-tank defence. An attack by enemy
tanks could take place at any time, especially, as experience had
340

shown, in the early morning. Orders from division for 2 July assigned
the Reconnaissance Battalion GD to secure Hill 242.4 in the eastern
section of Jassenki.
No significant combat operations were reported by I.R. GD 2 on
the division's south flank; however, considerable enemy concentrations, especially tanks, were observed near and in Gorschetschnoje.
Patrols also reported field positions and bunkers. The 24th Panzer
Division, which had run up against stiff opposition near this village,
had bypassed Gorschetschnoje and resumed its advance towards the
east. A divisional order which was issued during the night of 1/2
July ordered I.R. GD 2 to eliminate this dangerous flanking threat to
the I.D. GD and the 24th Panzer Division. Battle Group Garski
consisting of I.R. GD 2 (less I Battalion), Assault Gun Battalion GD
(less one battery), Artillery Battalion GD with support from Panzer
Battalion GD, which was to attack from the northeast, as well as
elements of II Battalion/I.R. GD 1, which were to screen the
assembly area in the north assembled for the attack due west of
the railway line.
Early on the sunny morning of 2 July the infantry of Battle Group
Garski moved towards Gorschetschnoje from the north. They were
met by fire, especially from tanks, from the forward positions and
the village itself. One of the first shells killed the commander of II
Battalion/I.R. GD 2, Major Feucker. Hauptmann von Ltzau, the
CO of 10th Company, took over command of the battalion.
The escorting assault guns were soon involved in a tank battle
which resulted in a considerable success for the attackers. However,
the battle proved more difficult than expected; artillery and repeated
Stuka attacks gave the attackers relief from time to time. An
Oberschtze of 13th Company/I.R. GD 2 reported his experiences
of the beginning of the battle, the most difficult of the offensive so
far:
'It was a hot day; we attacked the Russians early in the morning.
We ran into a major tank battle in which a T-34 came towards our
section 1st Section/2nd Platoon/I3th Company under the command of Uffz. Klavun to make us all into apple sauce. First, I
knocked all the mounted Russian infantry off the tank with my light
machine gun; then Uffz. Klavun disposed of the tank with a concentrated charge. The T-34 began to burn. As we advanced towards
the railway embankment we succeeded in eliminating three enemy
anti-tank gun crews, partly in close-in fighting. To the left in front of
the embankment was another enemy nest with a light machine gun.
I said to Uffz. Klavun: 'I'll take care of it!' But the Bolsheviks defended
themselves desperately. There were five Russians altogether, of
which four were killed and one taken prisoner. He was a Caucasian,
a student.

341

We then moved against the level crossing, which was very difficult
and caused us to see red. A number of Russian tanks and anti-aircraft
guns were positioned there. We ran about like hares. The Klavun
Section succeeded in putting three more enemy tanks out of action
in close-in fighting; then we were through.
Uffz. Hans Klavun was our section leader. Following the action at
the railway embankment on 28 June 1942, he was promoted to
Feldwebel for bravery, but he remained our section leader. He was
a foundry worker from the Bochum mining district. Hans Klavun
wore the German Cross in Gold. Today he is in a hospital as a result
of a serious head wound he suffered later. For him there are only
memories of his comrades and the battles in the vastness of the East."
As a result of a flanking thrust from the northeast by Panzer
Battalion GD, an attempt by the Russians to leave the village of
Gorschetschnoje to the east failed. A total of 51 Soviet tanks were
destroyed, a proud success for the heavy weapons in which the heavy
infantry weapons and artillery played a significant role. Elements of
four Soviet tank brigades, brought in to the area fresh from Stalingrad
and the Urals, went down to destruction there.
In the meantime, it was not exactly quiet for the men of I.R. GD
1 securing the hills east of Kulewka. They could not fail to notice
that enemy tanks with infantry were assembling in the ravines and
valleys, especially north of the village, apparently for an attack. Was
it their intention to recover the village lost the day before? Whatever
the Soviet intentions, the men of I.R. GD 1 felt safe, especially since
the bulk of the heavy weapons were in position.
It was apparent that the tank units of the Soviet relief force had
not been completely destroyed and therefore might yet pose a threat
to the division's advance. Therefore, I.R. GD 2 was allowed only a
brief rest following the capture of Gorschetschnoje. By noon the
regiment's units were already on their way by vehicle into the area
due west of Jassenki. Also, I Battalion, which until now had been
protecting the northern flank, was returned to the regiment. Only
the Reconnaissance Battalion GD was still active from its security
positions, mounting numerous patrols to the east and northeast
throughout 2 July in an effort to determine the enemy's strength and
movements. The results of the reconnaissance were as follows:
"Stronger enemy tank forces are still in the area east of Jassenki,
primarily in the forests near DubratnojeNowosselowka -Rasbrod
Gussewka and northeast, as well as dug-in infantry in the Kutschugry
area."
Notwithstanding this discovery, the division decided to resume the
advance to the east early the next morning. The fact that the
division's neighbour, the 24th Panzer Division, had already resumed
its advance to the east may have played a role in the decision, as
there was a friendly competition to be the first to reach the Don.
342

The 3rd of July began well when, at approximately 03.00, the

enemy forces spotted northeast of Kulewka the day before made a
surprise attempt to retake the village. More than 25 tanks, with little
infantry support however, roared towards the village. They were
spotted quickly and brought to a halt by the fire of the heavy
weapons. Several of the Soviet tanks blew up. Then the Panzer
Battalion GD joined the battle from the west. In less than sixty
minutes the German defences destroyed 21 Soviet tanks. The few
that survived fled to the northeast and were not seen again. A little
later, at about 07.00, the men of both regiments resumed the
advance to the east. On the right, I.R. GD 2, with I Battalion in the
lead, was to advance in the direction of Glasovka and the Dewiza.
On the left was I.R. GD 1, accompanied by the Assault Gun Battalion
GD; its first objective was Nishnedewizi and the Dewiza. The advance
detachment drove forward past I.R. GD 2 to lead the advance. The
von Usedom group, which included the Reconnaissance Battalion
GD, an attached battery of light field howitzers, an 8.8 cm flak battery
and the Panzer Battalion GD, took up the pursuit of the Soviet forces
withdrawing before I.R. GD 2. The sun shone down hot from a clear
blue sky. Shrouded in thick clouds of dust, the battalion rolled along
beside the advance road led by the Panzer Battalion, which was
followed closely by the 2nd (SPW.) Squadron. The advance went on
through wide meadows and cornfields. Driving through Krassjana
Polyana and Werchne Nikolskoye there was not a Russian to be seen.
Low bushes grew along both sides of the road. Led by the tanks, the
battle group rolled along in march order.
It was approximately 17.00. In front of the tanks appeared Staro
Nikolskoye, a small village on a steeply-climbing slope with a large
barn in its centre on the hill. At the foot of the slope a partiallydestroyed weir spanned a dammed brook. Most of the tanks crossed
the weir, but Pioniers were called up to erect a better crossing. Then,
suddenly, there was a hard crack a shot! The shell burst directly
on the weir and a motorcycle messenger was severely wounded.
Then there was another shot; this time the enemy tank was spotted.
One of the German tanks returned fire and peace returned. The
advance was resumed. Then another explosion: a tank had run over
a mine. Although there were field positions to the left and right of
the climbing, winding road, there was scarcely any resistance.
Individual bunkers were cleared with hand grenades. The column
then deployed and drove on again through the endless cornfields and
meadows. There was only one thought now: the Don! The tempo
of the advance automatically increased. It was dusk when the vehicles
reached Point 183.2, about two kilometres west of Dmitrijeskije.
Then, unexpected orders were radioed from division: halt and
secure! But why? In any case, orders were orders.

343

Behind the division's advance detachment was the advance guard

of I.R. GD 2. Meeting no resistance, it advanced across the hilly
terrain south of the Dewiza to the village of N. Matrenka and that
evening reached Chruschsch-Dmitrijeskije, where it passed the
division's advance detachment on its way to secure the hill positions
east of the stream while it was still dark. What was more, the advance
detachment needed rest to refuel and rearm. The next morning it
would again take the lead.
Led by II Battalion/I.R. GD 1, the northern march group was also
advancing eastward on foot. Based on its experiences with the enemy
in the early morning and patrol results it was expecting an enemy
assault in this sector from the northeast. The regiment's neighbour
on the left, the 3rd Infantry Division (mot.), which was echeloned
farther to the rear on the Shabisha near Wjasnowatowka was also
expecting enemy attacks from the north or perhaps the northwest.
The advance forces made good progress without meeting significant resistance and reached the upper course of the Dewiza at
about noon. Following brief preparations Glasowka was taken and
the German forces set out in pursuit of the enemy forces fleeing
towards the east. On crossing a ridge, advance patrols discovered
manned field positions on the west slope of Hill 204.4 behind a
stream near Schustowo. It appeared that the enemy was finally going
to stop and fight, as the patrols were greeted by rifle fire and even
artillery shells. The regiment assembled for the attack, the heavy
weapons went into position and the assault guns deployed. This was
most difficult for them, as the stream bed lying before the enemy
positions was very marshy and therefore unsuited to armoured
vehicles. The only answer was an old fashioned infantry assault with
strong artillery support.
The attack against Hill 204.4 north of Krassjana Polyana began
at 20.00. The strongly-fortified bunkers and field positions had to be
taken out one by one, occasionally with the aid of flamethrowers.
The men of the attacking companies struggled forward with great
difficulty, and there were times when it appeared as if they would be
unable to take the hill. But then, on an inspiration rather than on
orders, the company commanded by Obit. Schulz, accompanied by
several assault guns, went round the stream and attacked from the
south, taking the Soviets by surprise in their positions. Hill 204.4
was captured after heavy close-quarters fighting. Obit. Schulz and
several of his men were seriously wounded. An hour later the hill
was completely in the possession of II Battalion/I.R. GD 1. The
regiment spent the night in the newly-won hill positions.
Once again the division had covered more than twenty kilometres
in one day and was now close to its objective: the Don. The division's
forward command post was located in a wood east of Michnewo. It
was clear to the division's commanders that stubborn resistance
344

could again be expected the next day before Voronezh. For the
enemy, too, it was vital to hold onto a bridgehead on the Don for
later operations. It was the aim of the German forces to force a
crossing over the Don and ensure the successful continuation of the
offensive.
For the Soviets the wide river and its marshy bottomland offered
a perfect opportunity to throw up a firm barricade in front of the
German attack. But did they have enough troops left to accomplish
this? Would they be able to move their reserves, which had been
partially used up in front of the Don, into positions along the river
in time? Were the powers of resistance and morale of these Soviet
units adequate to hold on in the face of a determined attack? These
were questions that would soon be answered.
The Germans had to stake everything on preventing the battered
Soviet units from settling down and regrouping. Their spearheads
must force the crossing against the last Soviet units; they must strive
at any cost to capture the crossing points a road and a rail bridge
- undamaged. The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Division's objective
was clear: capture the rail bridge over the Don west of Voronezh.
Once again the fast mobile elements of the division took the lead,
with the Reconnaissance Battalion and Major Pssel's tanks forming
the advance detachment. This set out around 04.00 with the initial
objective of Chertkova.
With the Panzer Battalion GD in the lead, followed by the Reconnaissance Battalion's 2nd (SPW) Squadron, the force reached its
objective of Chertkova at approximately 07.00 without meeting any
resistance. Almost parallel to the advance guard, but farther south,
could be seen the spearheads of the 24th Panzer Division. Several
units of the I.D. GD had crossed that division's advance road during
the night. The 24th Panzer was also striving with all haste towards
the Don in the general area of the village of Gremjatsches and north.
It appeared that it would be the first to reach the river.
Low-hanging clouds filled the sky and light rain fell, transforming
the dust on the roads and paths into clinging, slippery mud. The
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Division's advance detachment pushed
on past Ustje, which appeared to be free of the enemy, in the
direction of Petino. The German artillery, which had meanwhile
driven up into position, opened fire on fleeing Russian columns on
the far steep bank of the Don, which was now visible. The bridge
which the maps indicated in this general area was not to be found;
it must lay farther to the north. Therefore, following a brief halt, the
advance detachment drove northwards in its previous formation.
Rain continued to fall and road conditions continued to deteriorate.
Now and again a vehicle slid off into the ditch and had to be pushed
back onto the road by the prime movers.

345

The next objective, the village of Dewiza on the Dewiza River, was
reached in the late morning. The bridge there had already been
blown. There was a temporary halt while the Pioniers went to work
to repair the span. In the meantime the sun broke through and slowly
began to dry up the roads.
Immediately after the departure of the advance detachment, the
spearhead of I.R. GD 2 had set off to follow in its vehicles. 2nd
Company took the lead in I Battalion and set off inasmuch as the
roads allowed at a high pace. When the leading vehicles arrived
outside Ustje there were no enemy troops to be seen. The advancing
Germans discovered, however, that some Soviet forces had halted
in the forest north of Petino and that there was a brisk flow of ferry
traffic moving troops from the west to the east bank of the river. This
action by the Soviets gave notice that they had no intention of holding
a bridgehead on the west bank of the Don. The 3rd Company under
Obit. Mehrens received orders to drive to the ferry landing as quickly
as possible and establish a bridgehead across the river there. The
regimental commander, who was under orders to capture the
railroad bridge, realised that the steep approaches to the ferries made
the site unsuitable for bridge building. He therefore turned 1st and
3rd Companies further north and gave them the task of capturing
the railroad bridge.
Initially, I.R. GD 1, led by II Battalion under Hptm. von Courbire,
followed its sister regiment along the road. Then, advancing towards
Dewiza, it moved up on the left. It was essential to the division
command that the movements of the advance regiment (I.R. GD 2),
which had the decisive task of capturing the bridge, be screened to
the north and northwest. Under the pressure of the southwards-advancing German motorised and tank units, the bulk of the Soviet
forces had been displaced northwards. As a result, the 3rd Infantry
Division (mot.) had run into determined resistance and overcoming
it was to be no easy task. On 4 July 1942 the division was located
near Latnaya, east of Werch. Turowo and on the hills north of Now.
Olschanka, its front facing north. Staggered to the left rear to the
I.D. G D , it fought its way slowly towards the Don.
Naturally, the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Division was striving to
be the first to reach the Don and hoped to capture one of the two
bridges over the river. At noon its attack deployment was as follows:
on the right and nearest to the Don was I.R. GD 2. Leading the
regiment was I Battalion, which was engaged in clearing the wooded
ridge over which the Russians were fleeing to the ferries. Farther to
the right, the 24th Panzer Division had succeeded in getting several
patrols across the Don in inflatable boats at approximately 10.00.
On the left was II Battalion/I.R. GD 1 as well as the main body of
the regiment in the area of the Dewiza. In Dewiza itself were Major
Pssel's tanks and the Reconnaissance Battalion G D , which were
346

attempting to get across the bottom land. The battalions of the

Artillery Regiment GD, which were assigned to the individual regiments, had moved forward with the advance. These were now in
firing positions and were engaging targets north of the Dewiza and
on the far side of the Don.
As they left the forest north of Petino, the advancing infantry of I
Battalion/I.R. GD 2 were presented with a uniquely scenic view: as
soon as the advance road reached the northwestern crest of the hill,
it veered to the east and led into a village which was strung out along
the road in a gentle arc. The village was huddled against the north
slope of the wooded heights and the exit on the far side opened out
into the northeastern tip of the forest. To the left of the road the
Don, which here bent sharply to the east, could be seen between the
peasant cottages.
The railroad bridge was now within reach! Field fortifications had
been constructed on the far bank of the Don and these had been
reinforced with concrete cupolas over the gun positions. An antiaircraft battery was spotted in position directly south of the railroad
line to Voronezh as it opened fire on a German reconnaissance
aircraft which was circling at a respectful altitude over the bridges.
On the west bank of the Don, on both sides of the railroad line,
was a factory with barracks-like buildings. At the factory station stood
a hastily improvised armoured train under steam. The guns projecting from the train's side armour were clearly visible. Unaware of the
situation, two transport trains approached from the west. These,
however, stopped about 10 kilometres away along an open section
of track. From them streamed Soviet infantry which disappeared to
the northeast over the hills.
Despite the great clouds of dust being kicked up by the German
vehicles, the Soviets on the far side of the Don seemed unaware of
what was happening on the west bank. Perhaps they thought that
the troops moving about there were their own.
The Germans had to expect that the railroad bridge had been
prepared for demolition and would be blown as soon as it was
reached by their forces. They therefore had to do their utmost to
take the bridge by surprise and even better if they could reach it at
the same time as the fleeing Russians. This assignment was given to
3rd Company/I Battalion/I.R. GD 2. However, the company ran
into enemy resistance and was pinned down in the village of
Janowischtsche. Instead, 1st Company was sent across the Dewiza,
whose water was chest-deep, with the objective of taking the factory,
which was also the exit point of the railroad bridge. Unfortunately,
the Soviets spotted the movements on the far bank, especially of the
vehicles, and laid down a heavy fire with mortars, artillery and
anti-aircraft guns on the area in front of the bridge. The makeshift
armoured train was set on fire by the heavy infantry guns of 17th
347

Company and its crew fled. Despite the heavy fire, several men
succeeded in reaching the mined approach to the bridge and set foot
on the bridge itself. There, however, they were met by extremely
heavy rifle fire which made all movement impossible. Several men
on the bridge were wounded or killed. Snipers on the far bank kept
the bridge under fire. The German infantry on the bridge were forced
to withdraw to cover. Platoon leader Lt. von Kleist carried a
severely-wounded messenger to safety on his back. All subsequent
attempts to approach the bridge failed in the face of the considerable
sniper fire.
I Battalion/I.R. GD 2 halted and moved all of its heavy weapons
forward, which went into position around the approach to the bridge.
Assault guns were sent forward to pin down the enemy in bunkers
which had been spotted on the far side of the river. The situation
took an unexpected turn for the worse late in the afternoon while
preparations for a new attack were still under way. Steered by an
unseen hand, the heavily-damaged armoured train, which was still
burning, began to move towards the bridge and drove slowly onto
the span. The bridge's wooden planking, which had been dried by
the sun, was immediately set on fire by the glowing coals and burning
pieces of wood which fell from the blazing rail cars. Soon the bridge's
iron girders began to glow. The bridge became an inferno and, as it
was certain that the girders would soon lose their load-bearing
capacity in the heat, any further sacrifices in an effort to capture the
bridge were senseless. The regimental commander, who was on the
spot in a sand pit, ordered a temporary halt while the possibilities of
another way across this time using inflatable boats was explored.
In any case, the approach to the bridge was secured for the time
being.
Meanwhile, the reinforced Reconnaissance Battalion GD had
succeeded in crossing the Dewiza. It set out to the north in the
direction of Ssemiluki but, together with the tanks, was stopped by
an anti-tank ditch in front of the village and became involved in heavy
fighting with enemy forces. After learning of the unsuccessful attempts to take the railroad bridge the battalion advanced northwards.
Not until evening did it succeed in penetrating the southern section
of Ssemiluki. At approximately 18.00 the battalion halted and
secured in front of the village, as II Battalion/I.R. GD 1 had
meanwhile arrived and was assembling for an attack on the village.
Unaware of the situation, groups of Soviet troops repeatedly tried
to reach the road and rail bridges across the Don from the west.
Some dug in and put up determined resistance, while others resigned
themselves to their fate and surrendered. For the German units the
situation was extremely uncertain, as they might come under fire
from any side at any time. The greatest disturbance was caused by
several T-34s which were driving about the countryside. Apparently
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seeking a way across the river, they had stumbled into German forces
in the process. All of these enemy movements on the west bank of
the Don were caused by the pressure being exerted by the 3rd
Infantry Division (mot.), which was pushing slowly but steadily
towards the river, driving the Soviet forces before it.
A typical example of the mix-up between friend and foe, which
also affected the artillery units, was the experience of the Freyschlag
gun of 2nd Battery/ I Battalion/Artillery Regiment GD:
"Scarcely had a bombing attack by several enemy IL-2s ended,
when we heard the shout: Tanks from behind! Damn! there they
were, rolling towards us!
There were one two three four, scarcely 500 meters behind
us. All T-34s. They appeared not to have spotted us, but rather they
turned their turrets to the right and sprayed shells on the surrounding
terrain where some of the vehicles of the regiment's supply train
were parked.
Thank God we had placed one gun in position facing west. We
had done so because we were aware of the unclear situation to our
left, but also to secure the level crossing.
The tanks must soon be close to the gun, but there was no
movement there, none at all. Were those fellows asleep over there?
Hadn't they noticed anything? The battery officer considered briefly
and ordered: right gun about 180 degrees! Target first enemy tank
armour-piercing ammunition fire! A direct hit but it was on
a telephone pole that was standing only 50 metres in front of us.
Ha, ha! We grinned at one another. The gunner had completely
failed to notice it.
Then, finally, there was movement around the single gun at the
railway embankment. We could see two men. There: it fired!! The
second enemy tank burst into flames. Another shot and the third
tank was finished; it was smoking! The turret hatch flipped open and
the crew scrambled out. Then more shots at the fourth tank, which
had just started to roll backwards and it, too, was done for.
Our gun continued to fire, now with impact-fused shells, on the
fleeing Russians who had been seeking a breakthrough behind their
tanks. In a few moments they were destroyed by a single l.FH 18
with a two-man crew gunner Obgefr. Freyschlag and 2nd Cannoneer Gefr. Willi Mller! Hours later four rings were painted on the
gun barrel as symbols of the successful destruction of four enemy
tanks.
A note: After the first three shots, the rest of the gun crew
Cannoneers 3, 4, 5 and the gun commander, Uffz. Mller had
scrambled forwards from the rail embankment, so that at the end of
the interlude the complete crew was there. The joy over the four
tank kills was great. Gun commander Mller, known as 'Communist
Mller' on account of his political views, made his report and was
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awarded the Iron Cross, First Class, while the rest of the crew
received the Iron Cross, Second Class. Only gunner Freyschlag
received nothing; he had already been awarded the Iron Cross,
Second Class for an action at Jelnja in 1941.
A few months later, however, it got around that 'Communist
Mller' had ordered his crew to take cover behind the embankment.
His crew had obeyed with the exception of Freyschlag and Gefr.
Mller. In spite of the order to stay put they ran to their gun and
acted without their commander. Obgefr. Freyschlag was later
awarded the Iron Cross, 1st Class and promoted to gun commander.
'Communist Mller' was transferred out and became ammunition
supply officer! He stopped wearing his Iron Cross, but put it on again
later in Cottbus and Guben with the replacement unit! (Today he
is an officer with the Volkspolizei in Leipzig, East Germany.) That
brave lad Gefr. Mller was killed near Guben in March 1945."
Situations such as this occurred often in the sector at the railway
embankment before JanowischtscheSsemiluki and it demanded
total alertness from all involved in order to meet the challenge. In the
same area were the artillery batteries which were to support the
attack preparations by II/I.R. GD 1. The objectives of the attack:
Ssemiluki and perhaps the road bridge, as the rail bridge could not
be taken.
Leutnant von Prittwitz, a platoon leader in 7th Company/I.R. GD
1, described the development of the attack and the capture of the
road bridge over the Don. His account was written some time after
the events and fails to mention the other companies of the battalion,
all of which made a contribution to II Battalion's success:
'Time: 18.00.
After 7th Company, fighting ahead of the units of II Battalion, had
taken Hill 166.2 by storm, it was given a new objective of the school
and church in Ssemiluki. In spite of bunkers and heavy enemy sniper
fire, the company, fighting ahead of and to the right of the battalion
with no communications, made good progress and reached its
objective.
Within sight of the Don the company took a short break. It was
organised as follows:
Forward on the right the Infantry Pionier Platoon from 10th
Company under Feldw. Wrede, a section from 1st Platoon, then 2nd
and 3rd Platoons; behind 2nd Platoon was the 4th (Hvy.) Platoon.
To 7th Company's left rear was 8th Company.
After the assault guns came forward and engaged the recognised
enemy targets, 1st Platoon was given the following assignment:
1st Platoon is to carry out a patrol as far as the bridge in the valley in
front of us. Distance about 6 kilometres.
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While the company continued its attack to the north, the 1st
Platoon which consisted only of a single section moved down
into the enemy's rear in the Don valley and engaged fleeing Russian
troops in hand-to-hand combat.
Time: about 19.30
It had meanwhile become quite dark. 7th Company had reached
the far side of Ssemiluki; 1st Platoon was in positions along the bend
of the Don. Obit. Blumenthal, commander of 7th Company, now
gathered all of his men together and with these few (roughly three
rifle sections and a heavy machine gun section) charged towards the
bridge under covering fire from the heavy machine section, driving
the enemy before them. Under the covering fire Blumenthal's men
pushed forward as far as the approach to the bridge to screen it
immediately to all sides. For their part the Bolsheviks kept up a lively
fire from their bunkers on the other side of the river while individual
groups attempted to recover the bridge site.
Time: roughly 20.00
The first action was to save the road bridge.
Standing almost up to his neck in the water, Uffz. Hempel removed
the demolition charges which were located on the bridge supports,
and which were already burning, with his bare hands. In the same
breath Obit. Blumenthal and a few men raced across the bridge and
reached the other side unharmed behind the fleeing Russians. Once
there he immediately deployed his men to secure the approach to
the bridge. In the meantime, using steel helmets and ammunition
canisters, the soldiers extinguished the few small fires on the bridge.
Still unaware of the situation, Russians repeatedly tried to cross
the bridge. They were taken prisoner and after an hour over 70 were
in our hands.
In the meantime further elements of the company had reached the
west bank; however, no more troops were sent across to the east
bank. Rather, the soldiers already there were pulled back under cover
of darkness. A light machine gun was placed on the west approach
to the bridge to cover the east approach.
8th Company finally arrived at approximately 24.00 and it, too,
took up covering positions on the west bank. The bridge had
meanwhile caught fire again and its eastern end was now under
water. As a result, 7th Company prepared to make another crossing
attempt the next morning using an old boat."
This act by 7th Company under its commander Obit. Blumenthal
was of great significance to the division and the following units. It
was thanks to the quick independent action of the men of the
company that the major part of the road bridge fell into German
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hands, allowing the following units to cross immediately and establish

a bridgehead.
As leader of this courageous group, Obit. Blumenthal was later
decorated with the Knight's Cross. But the men who went with him,
such as Feldw. Wrede of 10th Company's Pionier Platoon, Uffz.
Hempel, Gefr. Weinert, Gefr. Bttner and the others, all played an
equal role in the success by 7th (Rifle) Company, II Battalion, I.R.
GD. Certainly every one of them deserved the decoration, but it was
a tradition in the German Army that, following an action, the highest
decoration was awarded to the leader. Therefore the regimental
order of the day from 9 October 1942 also gave prominence to the
commander:
Order of the Day!
The Fhrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht has awarded
Oberleutnant Blumenthal, company commander of 7th Comp./I.R.
GD 1, the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. On 4 July 1942, acting
on his own initiative, he stormed the Don bridge near Voronezh in a
daring attack with only five men of his company and thus was able to
establish a bridgehead which allowed the division to push on towards
Voronezh the following day.
The regiment is proud that its accomplishments in the battles of attack
in the south have been recognised through this high decoration.
Khler
Oberst and Regimental Commander
It is also worth mentioning that the decision to act which resulted
in the award of the Knight's Cross was made solely by the commander of 7th Company on his own responsibility as was acknowledged in the order of the day.
Once again it is necessary to review the disposition of the division's
units as they were late on the evening of 4 July, as this is relevant to
the operation during the night by I.R. GD 2 and the continuation of
the attack across the Don.
I.R. GD 2, which was in position on the right securing the bank of
the Don, made preparations on both sides of the rail bridge (at the
approach and to the north near the factory) to cross the river in
inflatable boats, with the objective of establishing a bridgehead on
the other side at dawn.
Farther north, east of Ssemiluki at the road bridge (at and south of
the approach), 7th and 8th Companies/I.R. GD 1 were at the
riverbank. They were also planning to cross the river at dawn in
inflatable boats and establish a bridgehead. The objective of both
groups was to be the first to Voronezh and also to prevent the enemy
from establishing himself on the far bank. In addition, the crossings

352

were to create a springboard for subsequent operations on the far

side of the river.
For the division command it was absolutely imperative that there
be no surprise intervention by enemy forces from the north and
northwest, the direction from which the 3rd Inf.Div.(mot.) was
approaching. As the commanders saw it there was a threat that the
Soviet forces still on the west side of the river might try to reopen
the bridge sites from the west and encircle the German forces there.
That evening the 3rd Squadron of the reinforced Reconnaissance
Battalion GD under Obit. Spaeter was sent past Ssemiluki to the
north to secure Hills 161.1 and 161.6. The rest of the battalion was
to leave by dawn at the latest and advance north along the Don to
eliminate the threat.
Not to be forgotten on this successful day for the I.D. GD were the
supply services. By the time the division reached the Don it had
covered more than 300 kilometres, which placed great demands on
the division supply units. An old rule stated that a unit could not
operate more than 300 kilometres from its supply bases. The rapid
relocation of the munitions and fuel dumps, which had been located
in the Schtschigry area before the attack, the ever greater distances
to the rear-area supply bases, as well as the sudden periods of bad
weather which made the progress of the motor vehicle columns in
this black earth region extremely difficult, demanded the constant
utilisation of every available square foot of cargo space. Nevertheless,
supply was secured, even if the transfer of the army supply dumps
was not possible right away, as the destroyed railroad system had to
be repaired first.
While the division was still involved in the fighting for the Don
bridgeheads, the munitions and fuel distribution points were set up
behind the front. The supply units set up their headquarters - the
heart of the operation and occupied billets in the village of Ustje,
only 10 km southwest of Voronezh. From there they directed the
flow of supplies of the units.
By 5 July 1942 Soviet resistance on the east bank of the Don had
stiffened considerably. Aerial reconnaissance confirmed the
presence of a large number of fortifications, bunkers and field
positions, as well as the movement of reserves from deep within the
country. Soviet air activity increased as well, with bombing attacks
on vehicle concentrations, fire positions and assembly areas. The
division could no longer hope to achieve satisfactory results with
patrols and assault teams or surprise attacks. Instead, the division
would have to reassemble for a unified effort. It was especially
important that all of the artillery and heavy weapons participate in
the pre-attack bombardment. The Luftwaffe was called in to soften
up the positions on the other side of the Don. An agreement was
reached with the division's neighbour on the right, the 24th Panzer
353

Division, that as many bridgeheads as possible would be established

on the other bank and the attack would be carried out concentrically
against the city of Voronezh.
The assignment of the day for II Battalion/I.R. GD 1 was to
reoccupy the bridgehead at the road bridge taken the day before and
extend it for the coming attack operations.
The necessary orders were issued. The artillery went into position
on the west bank of the Don, especially in the area near and south
of Janowischtsche. These were the best firing positions of the
campaign so far. They were situated near a very large church which
was located on the crest of a hill. From there the observation posts
had a view far and wide across the Don. The forward observers also
directed the infantry's heavy weapons. These ranged in and began
pinpoint firing against targets on the far side of the river which
appeared to be of particular importance.
Meanwhile, 7th Company/I.R. GD 1, which had been standing by
on the west bank following its relief by 8th Company, began crossing
the river from the intact section of the road bridge, from where there
was an approximately 15-metre gap to the other bank. The company
occupied the foxholes it found there and set up a small all-round
defensive position. The enemy was quiet, with the exception of
increasingly heavy artillery fire, which was concentrated on the bridge
site behind the company. Stukas dropped their bombs on Podkletnoje, which lay approximately 3,000 metres beyond the bridgehead,
wreaking havoc in the village. At roughly 13.00, as the last bombs
were falling, the Stukas also dropped a message canister: "Village
virtually free of the enemy. Will support your attack!" No attack took
place, however, as the remaining elements of II Battalion/I.R. GD 1
were still crossing the river. A patrol from 8th Company which had
been sent to Podkletnoje failed to return.
Meanwhile, farther to the south, just north of the railroad bridge,
I and III Battalions of I.R. GD 2 were preparing for the crossing.
Their objective on the far side of the river had been fixed as the
Podkletnoje railroad station, which lay about 1,200 metres east of
the bridge. The companies moved up to the riverbank and the
crossing site in the evening twilight. Everything was ready: all items
of equipment that might rattle were left behind or taped, and no
rounds were carried in the chambers of the small arms in order to
prevent nervous soldiers from inadvertently firing on their own men
in the darkness. Orders were issued in whispers and all smoking was
strictly forbidden. There was complete quiet.
Overhead were the "Night Crows," those slow aircraft which made
their presence felt by dropping parachute flares, which were usually
followed by bombs. Some soldiers even joked that a man was busy
up there in the aircraft shovelling bombs out of a pit with a coal
shovel. Their primary value was as a nuisance, and now and then
354

they dropped a cluster of tiny bombs, startling the men on the ground
from their sleep.
At approximately 21.15 the Pioniers of the heavy company
brought up the inflatable boats. The soldiers quietly climbed in and
the first boats set off with light paddle strokes towards the other side.
2nd Company/1 Battalion/I.R. GD 2 and the battalion headquarters
were the first across and they immediately secured a small bridgehead
at the crossing site. Next the Pioniers took across the 5th (Hvy.) and
3rd (Rifle) Companies, which extended the position. Machine gun
platoons of the 4th Company followed. The enemy was quiet,
nothing stirred. It almost seemed as if the Soviets hadn't noticed.
This assumption was strengthened by the fact that the Soviets had
placed their positions farther to the east because of the higher west
bank, which provided the attackers with a good view of the other
side. Increasing resistance was expected at the heights southeast of
Podkletnoje. The crossing manoeuvre took most of the night and as
dawn broke on 6 July both battalions of I.R. GD 2 were assembled
on the east bank for the attack to the East.
At the road bridge the 6th and 8th Companies of I.R. 1 began
their attack just before dawn. Return fire from Podkletnoje, which
the battalion was to attack from the west-northwest while I Battalion/I.R. GD 1 attacked from the southeast, was initially weak. Just
outside the village itself, however, the advance was hampered by a
wide band of swamp. Elements of 6th Company were able to cross
over a small bridge but were forced to take cover on the other side
by well-aimed sniper fire. Elements of 7th Company, which had been
held in reserve, were now brought up and succeeded in advancing
some distance toward the first houses. However, a completely
flooded anti-tank ditch once again brought the advance to a halt.
Snipers forced the Grenadiers to take cover. Several men had already
been wounded and no one dared move. The ROA, Uffz. Groswindhager of the Art.Rgt. GD, was hit and fatally wounded.
In the meantime the road bridge over the Don had been repaired
by the Pioniers and was again passable. Assault guns were the first
vehicles to cross, followed by the battalions' heavy weapons and
anti-tank guns of the Panzerjger Battalion GD. The assault guns
joined up with the infantry outside Podkletnoje at roughly 09.00.
The village was taken from both sides late that morning, with
elements of I Battalion driving into Podkletnoje from the southeast.
The companies lost over seven men killed in the battle against
determined Soviet forces which defended desperately from bunkers
and foxholes. Completely worn out, the men were unable to go on.
They fell to the ground and lay there exhausted in the burning heat.
It required a great deal of effort to get some of the units moving again
to clear the Soviets from the wooded terrain to the east. Here the
Grenadiers found many bunkers and a great deal of equipment and

355

weapons; apparently the area had been a Soviet troop training

grounds. A large number of prisoners was taken there.
Following the capture of Podkletnoje, two rifle companies of I
Battalion/I.R. GD 1 climbed aboard the assault guns and carried out
a reconnaissance in force towards Voronezh. They succeeded in
pushing into the city as far as the railroad station. The force was
soon pulled back again, however; but it could lay claim to being the
first into the city.
The attack by I.R. GD 2 from its bridgehead at the railroad bridge,
with two battalions in the front line, made good progress. The first
determined enemy resistance was met at the buildings of the Podkletnoje railroad station, but this was soon broken through the use of
hand grenades. Ill Battalion/I.R. GD 2, which was advancing on the
left, ran into minefields as it pushed across the lines of hills northwest
of Voronezh and was forced to halt. The battalion also came under
flanking machine gun fire, forcing it to ground. All attempts to resume
the advance failed until Podkletnoje was taken. Late in the afternoon
the battalion established contact with I Battalion/I.R. GD 1, which
was farther to the north, and then took up positions for the night.
Here, too, the tremendous heat had sapped the strength of the men
and they fell to the ground and lay there, exhausted. Only 2nd
Company, riding on assault guns, made an attempt to enter
Voronezh, but it was recalled soon after it set out.
As darkness fell on 6 July 1942, both regiments of the Infantry
Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND were established on the east
bank and had won a large bridgehead. Farther to the right was the
24th Panzer Division, which had also crossed the river and had
likewise sent forces into the city of Voronezh. Contact between it
and the I.D. GD was established during the night. Once it was dark,
columns of vehicles and men began to stream across the Don.
Batteries and heavy weapons moved across, supply trucks rolled everything flowing towards the east. Crossing with them was the 3rd
Infantry Division, which was to expand the bridgehead to the
northeast the next day. The first Hungarian units also came.
The enemy had disappeared, at least in the immediate vicinityOnly in the city were small groups still holding out, and their fighting
capabilities could not be rated very highly. Initially the division
command had no idea what preparations the Soviets had made to
hem in this bridgehead in their rear area. It seemed certain, however,
that they would not stand idly by when faced with this penetration
of their defensive line along the Don.
In only five days XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, with its two panzer and
one motorised infantry divisions, had succeeded in winning the Don
near Voronezh, a success which led to the capture of the city on 7
July 1942. This was a success as great as any by the other units of
the Fourth Panzer Army, whose spearheads reached the Don

356

between Kalitwa and Ostrogoshsk at approximately the same time

(10 July). With this advance the German forces had broken through
the entire Russian Front between Kursk and Izyum on a width of
more than 300 kilometres. For the Soviets the main thing now was
to save what could be saved and build a new front along the Don.
Marshall Timoshenko had already issued new orders at the beginning
of July 1942, which directed that Soviet forces were to inflict
maximum losses on the enemy while avoiding encirclements themselves. The orders stressed that preserving a coherent front was more
important than defending every foot of ground.
The numbers of prisoners and the amount of booty captured by
the Germans shows the limited success of Timoshenko's order. In
the period from 28 June 1942, 88,689 prisoners were brought in
and 1,007 enemy tanks and 1,688 guns were destroyed or captured.
Impressive as these numbers were, they were still markedly lower
than the success figures for the previous year. The Soviets were
learning how to escape the pincers of the German envelopment
operations.
The German advance towards the east resulted in a great lengthening of their flanks, so that the danger of overextension steadily
increased due to the limited forces available. Hitler decided that the
next objective was to be the oil fields of the Caucasus and ordered
the necessary operations to begin. As a result of this decision, orders
were issued from the Fhrer Hauptquartier to strengthen the forces
operating against the Caucasus by withdrawing units from other
fronts. Especially effected was the Fourth Panzer Army. O n e of the
first units it was forced to release, on a direct order from Hitler, was
the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. Its destination: the
lower course of the Don roughly east of Rostov.
Details of the I.R. GD's change of direction reached the division's
commander during the night of 6 / 7 July 1942. The division's units
in the northern sector of the bridgehead would be relieved by
elements of the 3rd Infantry Division and those in the southern sector
by units of the 24th Panzer Division. The Assault Gun Battalion GD
was to be left behind in the bridgehead for twenty-four hours to
support the 3rd Infantry Division, but, in general, all relieved units
were to begin the march south as soon as possible. The relief of the
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND units proceeded without delay as the
units of the 3rd Infantry Division arrived in the bridgehead. I.R. GD
1 and I.R. GD 2 crossed the Don by companies on foot and
assembled near their vehicles. As departure was not scheduled until
8 July some minor reorganisation was carried out and the troops
rested, while the nearby Wieduga (I.R. 2) and Dewiza (I.R. 1) rivers
provided the men with an opportunity to bathe.
The 3rd Battery of the Assault Gun Battalion GD remained in
action in the bridgehead with the other batteries. Carrying a mounted
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company of the 29th Infantry Regiment/3rd Infantry Division, the

battery pushed once again into the city of Voronezh in an attempt
to become the first German unit to take the city.
Meanwhile, under the command of Major von Usedom, the
Reconnaissance Battalion GD, reinforced by the Pz.Jg. Battalion
GD, a Pionier company of the Sturmpionier Battalion GD and a
battery of heavy 8.8 cm Flak, undertook a reconnaissance in force
to the north through Janowischtsche-GubarewoGwosdewski
towards Werilowka. The force reached its objective without meeting
any resistance. The battalion was recalled early in the afternoon,
however, and immediately began retracing its steps. At 08.45 on 8
July the spearhead of the first march group, I.R. GD 1, crossed the
line of departure, beginning the march to the south, followed by the
Reconnaissance Battalion GD. Behind them came the main body of
the division I.R. GD 2, the artillery, the anti-tank guns, elements
of the Signals Battalion GD, the Flak artillery which was distributed
among the entire march group and the tanks. The division's first
objective was Oljchowatka. Its assignment: cut off the line of retreat
of the withdrawing units of Army Group Timoshenko and destroy
them.
That first day the division's vehicles covered 108 kilometres in the
burning heat. Shrouded in great clouds of dust, they passed through
Dewiza, Michnewka and Repjewka where the division command
post was set up for the night to Krasan where a destroyed bridge
forced a temporary halt. Countless other columns were also under
way, including horse-drawn Hungarian units which were on their way
to the Don to take over the defence of the river. The following days
and nights until 14 July passed the same way march, rest, dust,
heat, thirst and fuel shortages. Scraping together all fuel reserves,
supplemented by air drops by JU-52 transports and recovery of fuel
from abandoned vehicles, and leaving behind individual tanks and
other heavy consumers of fuel at some cost to the unit's fighting
strength the units kept up their rapid southwards pace, passing
through Nikolajewka (Div. CP, 10. 7.), Luzenkowo and Oljchowatka
(Div. CP, 11. 7.).
A marching order of II Battalion, I.R. GD 1 may provide further
insight into the events of 13 July:

358

II Btl./Inf.Rgt. GD 1

Btl. CP, 12 July 1942

M a r c h i n g Orders for 1 3 J u l y 1 9 4 2
(on 1 : 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 m a p )
1. The enemy is in retreat towards and across the Don. Straggling
enemy units and air attacks are to be expected in the area of the
advance.
2. I.D. GD will continue the advance on 13 July 1942 and reach the
Djogtewo-Meschkow road between Sssetrakowskij and Lasowskij
and there prevent a withdrawal by the enemy to the north.
3. II Battalion, advancing as the first march group of I.R. 1, will leave
the departure point Kolchos, southeast of Babyschef, at 02.45 in
the following order, which will also be the order of march:
6th Company
Staff
10th Company
8th Company
9th Company
7th Company
4. March Route: Marked by I.R. GD 1 road signs.
Oljchowatkaroad fork 9 km east JeremenkowPjakodonoff
Kosinkaroad fork east KosinkaMichailowkaSsmaglejewka
KolessnikowkaAnnowoRebrikowoSherebzowskijSchapil
off.
5. Departure Officer: a Feldwebel from 6th Company.
Trail Officer: Lt. von Carlowitz, 8th Company. It is his responsibility to see to it that no vehicle or column passes the march
group during the entire march. In addition, I make the company
commanders responsible to see to it that no vehicle passes, joins
up with or drives alongside their march column. Companies are
to appoint trail officers for this purpose. Vehicles which are left
behind are to drive along at the rear of the battalion and rejoin
their companies at the first rest stop.
6. On 13 July 1942 the I.D. GD has the right of way over all infantry
divisions and Hungarian units. The only vehicles with the right of
way over the division's units are all operational as well as courier
vehicles and echelons of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps and its units the
23rd and 24th Panzer Divisions.
7. Air Attack Protection greater enemy air activity is to be expected
in the area southeast of the present cantonment area. Companies
are to take all measures necessary for immediate defence against
air attack. (Machine guns clear!!)
8. Medical Collecting Station: during the march, Oljchowatka.
9. Hptm. Peiler is designated departure officer for I.R. GD 1.
F. d. R.
von Mitzlaff

Signed in draft:
von Courbire
Lt. and Adjutant
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The Reconnaissance Battalion GD, reinforced by a battery of light

field howitzers and a Pionier company, now became the division's
advance guard and was the first to begin the march towards the
south. Rain and fuel shortages constantly hampered the advance,
but there was nothing to be seen of the enemy. Nevertheless,
increased attentiveness was the order of the day; the troops had now
reached an area where, unlike the territory farther to the north,
German troops had not set foot before. Armoured patrols were
stepped up and the division maintained a higher degree of combat
readiness. Bogunoff was the battalion's first objective on 14 July. In
the past few days more than 420 kilometres had been covered with
no fighting. The first enemy troops were spotted by the advance
guard on a slope on the far side of Bogunoff following the capture
of the town. A horse-drawn Russian column was passing there and
this was soon taken care of. The prisoners and booty were the first
taken since 7 July. Straight away orders came in by radio from
division for the von Usedom advance detachment:
14 July, approximately 19.00 "Reach the east-west road in the
Kopani-Dederawski area, about 10 km west of Kaschari, today and
barricade it."
It was approximately 20.00; scarcely had the reinforced 2nd (SPW)
Squadron moved off when new orders came in:
"For 15 July: advance through Kaschari, push on to hills near Mirgorodskij and secure there."
If this were not enough, more orders were radioed in to the
battalion during the night, instructing it to carry out a reconnaissance
on 15 July as far as the line Millerowo- GruzynoffSkassyrskajathe
Morosowskaja road-north of Sstachoff and determine where neighbouring units and the enemy were located.
The armoured patrols of 1st (Armoured Car) Squadron, Reconnaissance Battalion GD were on the go day and night in order to
obtain the desired information. These operations, in which the few
men were completely on their own in totally unfamiliar territory,
proved very eventful. Gefr. Karl Bauer of 1st Squadron described a
night patrol in the area between "Don and Don":
"It was night again. The battalion received orders to take up a
hedgehog position. The armoured patrols and their drivers breathed
a sigh of relief finally, a little rest. The vehicles were quickly
refuelled and then sleep. I was just about to crawl under the
armoured car when a messenger came up with the order:
Wachtmeister Weichert's patrol get ready! Patrol leader and radio

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operator to the commander! So much for sleep. We quickly packed

up our few things again. Then Wachtmeister Weichert came back
and the familiar 'patrol assemble!' rang out. By way of the m a p we
now learned of our assignment: ahead of us about 4 km away lay a
village by a large stream. We were to establish a bridgehead there
and hold it until the advance detachment arrived early the next
morning. As a precaution, we were to identify ourselves with a
flashing signal from a green pocket lamp in the event of an early or
individual return.
As driver of the third four-wheeled car, it fell to me to post the GD
road sign in a prominent place at every crossroads for the Reconnaissance Battalion which was to follow later.
It was just past 23.00 when we started out. Our previous journey
had left our vehicles heavily smeared with mud and almost unrecognisable and the Balkan Crosses were no longer visible. This was to
prove lucky for us in the coming events.
After two kilometres we ran into a Russian supply column which
was heading east. The Russians were using tractors and panje
wagons to move their fuel and ammunition back. Our vehicles drove
past the unsuspecting Russians. No one recognised us, but we
scarcely dared breathe.
Finally, at the entrance to the village, we came to a crossroads
which had to be marked. I stopped my vehicle while the other two
eight-wheeled cars slowly drove on.
I climbed out quickly to nail the sign onto a tree. But then I saw
the Russians scarcely twenty metres from the crossroads stood a
Russian anti-tank gun and 15-20 men. They looked at me calmly. I
raced to my car and jumped in, certain that the Russians would open
fire at any minute.
I started up the engine and drove after the other two cars. As we
drove through the village we noticed vehicle after vehicle parked in
front of the houses, the place was full of Russians and supply train
vehicles. My only wish was to get out of the village.
But I couldn't find the exit again. In the darkness I had failed to
notice and missed the first street, which veered to the left, down
which the other cars had driven. As our car came round a curve
roughly in the middle of the village we found ourselves facing two
Russian tanks driving straight for us. I just couldn't get by them, but
then one of the tank commanders instructed his driver to move the
tank out of the way. My hair was standing on end; I was amazed that
our car's commander, Gefr. Grau, didn't lose his nerve completely.
Meanwhile, I saw another road which veered to the left. Without
hesitation I stepped on the gas and drove down the road. And here
I saw a sight that I will not forget: to the north, about 50 metres from
the road, was an entire mounted Cossack squadron! A real sight
truly unique!
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But all of this was hard on my kidneys! At first we remained quietly

where we were, then we moved back and continued to look for our
other two cars. Finally we were able to find them. They, too, had
had similar experiences. In view of the situation we were unable to
carry out our assignment of establishing a bridgehead.
After sending an appropriate radio message we drove back. When
we returned to the battalion and looked at our watches we saw that
it was 23.30 scarcely a half-hour had passed since our departure!"
The division was once again in enemy territory; enemy columns
appeared everywhere, some retreating in front of the German armies
advancing from the west, but others putting up a fight. The I.D. GD's
task was to advance along behind the enemy lines, which were
located farther to the west, and begin the creation of a pocket north
of Rostov. A shortage of fuel, caused by the long supply lines to the
north, hindered, and even endangered, the division's movements.
All attempts to overcome the problem failed initially, especially since
there was no contact with the attacking units to the west. Junkers
transport aircraft tried to alleviate the situation by delivering fuel by
air, but their capacity was too limited to completely solve the
problem. More vehicles and men were left behind and only the most
important units were kept moving by draining the fuel from other
vehicles. Some relief was provided when patrols discovered several
small Russian fuel dumps which were stormed and their contents put
to use. In this makeshift rather than planned fashion the units
continued slowly forwards.
On the evening of 15 July the von Usedom advance detachment
captured the small city of Bolschinka following a brief firefight with
retreating Soviet units. The city had suffered considerable damage
from Stuka attacks. Due to a shortage of fuel the advance detachment
was forced to remain in Bolschinka for the time being. The numerous
fruit trees there were most welcome. This pleasant diversion came
to an end on 16 July when a radio message came in from division
at 11.17, instructing the von Usedom group to take and secure the
crossing over the Byrstraja near Skassyrskaja on foot if necessary.
The "on foot" reference in the message enraged the Usedom-Hussars, as the reconnaissance troops were called, after their commander. Using mess gear the last of the fuel was collected and
distributed to several vehicles so that a small group from 2nd (SPW)
Squadron was able to move out. Additional fuel was soon delivered
by air, so that the entire battle group was again able to get under
way. The village of Skassyrskaja was taken by evening, but the bridge
there had already been destroyed. Pioniers worked through the night
to repair the bridge. There was no sign of the enemy; he seemed to
have disappeared.
A welcome radio message arrived from division; the advance
detachment was to be relieved and rested. I Battalion/I.R. GD 2 was
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to take over in the city of Bolschinka and a company from I.R. D 1

was to secure the village and crossings in Skassyrskaja.
The regimental commander, Oberst Khler, set out with 7th
Company in the direction of Tazinskaja to relieve the elements of
the Reconnaissance Battalion GD which were in Krassyrsnaja, about
130 kilometres away. Meanwhile, a patrol led by Obit. Greiner
discovered a fuel dump in the village of Tazinskaja which contained
enough fuel not only for the advance detachment, but for most of
the division as well. New orders came over the radio from division
while the vehicles were still being refuelled. High-ranking command
authorities were demanding a bridgehead across the Donets. What
could they do? At noon on 17 July, even before the relieving 7th
Company under Oberst Khler arrived, the advance battalion, reinforced by a battery of l.FH 18 light field howitzers and a Pionier
company, got under way again to carry out its new orders. The
advance detachment had scarcely set out when it was caught in a
heavy downpour. This cloudburst held up the force for some time.
When it finally arrived before the city of Konstantinowskaja late in
the afternoon, the detachment found that elements of II Battalion/I.R. GD 1, which had ridden in on tanks, were already there.
Without pausing to rest, the detachment veered right, to the west,
in the direction of the Donets. As they crossed the line of hills which
lay north of the town, the men were met by an impressive sight:
through the heavily-forested valley before them flowed the wide Don
river. On their side was the line of hills with its steep slopes falling
away to the river; on the far side were woods and bushes. From the
heights on their side of the river the men of the advance detachment
had an excellent view far into the country on the other side. There
were many tributaries and backwaters, while swamps and lakes
stretched along the edge of the river, a paradise for all sorts of
animals, but also an excellent hiding place for men seeking cover.
The city of Konstantinowskaja, which was built on the sloping bank
itself, was still held by the enemy. Closer inspection revealed at least
a regiment of enemy troops as well as tanks. These remained
generally quiet until German patrols especially from II Battalion/I.R. 1 appeared, but then the Soviet forces opened up with
quite heavy anti-tank and mortar fire.
All of this had little impact on the von Usedom advance detachment, however. Its path led it in the direction of the Donets, where
it was to secure a crossing. The following is an extract from the
Reconnaissance Battalion's war diary for that day:
"The battalion set out at dawn on 18 July 1942, objective: the
Donets and the creation of a bridgehead there.
A patrol led the way; close behind was the 2nd (SPW) Squadron
under Obit. Klemme. The wide road dropped gradually and we could
see the line of hills on the far side of the river.
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A platoon from 2nd (SPW) Squadron was sent ahead to scout to

the river. There was a hollow ahead of us and we still could not see
into the river valley. We waited nervously. The sound of sporadic
firing reached us from the valley; the weapons were checked once
more. Then the patrol returned and reported that the far bank of the
river was occupied by the enemy. It had come under fire from
machine guns and anti-tank guns and had also suffered some
casualties.
The armoured personnel carriers of 2nd (SPW) Squadron now
deployed and went to the attack. As they drove through the hollow
the squadron's vehicles were met by heavy anti-tank fire from the far
bank. There, on the left, was an enemy tank next to a birch tree; we
could see the muzzle-flashes as it fired. The armoured personnel
carriers, with the exception of the one with the 3.7 cm Pak, pulled
back into the hollow. Meanwhile, a 5 cm Pak of the 5th (Hvy.)
Squadron was driven into position and opened fire. Round after
round left the barrel of the anti-tank gun. There a giant spurt of
flame Jubilant, we shouted, 'a hit!'
Deploying again for the attack, the 2nd Squadron rolled down the
steep, thickly over-grown bank towards the Donets, while the 4th
Squadron followed on foot. Russian trucks were everywhere,
camouflaged in the bushes, and close by the river there were even
two anti-tank guns; however, there was no bridge to be seen. The
enemy fire abated, with only an occasional shot from the other side.
Suddenly, we saw a T-34 push its way slowly out of the bushes.
Under fire from all of our heavy weapons, it disappeared smoking
over the heights on the other side of the river.
In the meantime the first elements of 4th Squadron reached the
river. While the armoured personnel carriers which were
camouflaged in the bushes gave covering fire, Lt. Beckmann and
a soldier swam across the river to fetch a boat which was lying on
the other bank. We also saw that the pontoon bridge had been driven
onto the far bank.
Finally, Lt. Beckmann came paddling back with 'his' boat. The first
infantry section was sent across. Meanwhile 2nd (SPW) Squadron
dismounted and combed the bushes along the bank. Several more
prisoners were taken and these were immediately put to work
constructing a ferry.
Everywhere one looked NCOs and motor transport sergeants
could be seen crawling through the bushes. Each carried a stick of
chalk in his hand with which he marked the squadron number on
the side of the best Russian trucks in the hope that they would be
incorporated into the squadron's motor park as booty. The attached
Pionier company arrived and immediately set to work repairing the
two-track ferry. By late afternoon we were able to send the first
armoured personnel carriers across to the other side.
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It began to rain. The APCs climbed the serpentine riverbank road

and secured the left sector of the bridgehead near Bronitzkij.
Throughout the night two burning oil tanks on the bank cast a red
flickering light on the men and vehicles as they were brought across
the river."
I.R. GD 1 (less elements of II Btl.), which was following the advance
detachment, likewise turned off at Konstantinowskaja in preparation
for a crossing of the Donets.
While a heavy rain fell throughout 19 July the enemy forces in the
virtually surrounded city of Konstantinowskaja remained active, firing
from the city with anti-tank guns and artillery. A Russian patrol
(strength 1:25 with one panje wagon) which set out from the city in
the morning was completely destroyed by 7th Company and nearby
anti-aircraft guns. Unfortunately, machine gunner Merzmann was
killed and section leader Uffz. Boberg seriously wounded in this
action. Casualties to the persistent fire from the Soviet heavy
weapons increased. When Hptm. Pssel's tanks arrived late in the
afternoon, the city was attacked and quickly captured by elements
of I.R. GD 1. An entire Soviet regiment was taken prisoner.

Chapter Four
Pursuit to the Manych
On 20 July 1942 the first elements of the regiment crossed the
Donets near a village named Michailowskij, which was a very
common name in this area. At the same time the first elements of
the von Usedom advance detachment set out in the direction of
Mokri Log with the objective of capturing the small city of Kertschik.
This did not happen so quickly, however, since the enemy forces
which were being pushed from west to east by an attacking panzer
division now found themselves caught between two German forces
and were seeking escape in all directions. Once again the war diary
of the Reconnaissance Battalion:
" O n 20 July 1942 the battalion received orders from division to
set out for Kertschik. The vehicles were ready and the tents were
just being taken down when the air was filled with a howling noise.
With a crash, rockets from a Stalin Organ smashed into the
bridgehead security positions of 2nd and 4th Squadrons, resulting in
the first casualties of the day.
At approximately 08.00 the reinforced battalion set out from the
former bridgehead to begin the advance on Kertschik.

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In the burning heat the 3rd and 4th Squadrons advanced along
both sides of the road through fields and meadows and across hills
and valleys while the 2nd (SPW) Squadron covered the right flank.
The 1st (Armoured Car) Squadron, as well as the battery of light field
howitzers which was attached to the battalion and a battery of 8.8
cm Flak followed along the road. The Stalin Organs continued to
fire, and shrapnel from the exploding rockets tore gaps in the infantry
of both squadrons as they advanced widely dispersed. An 8.8 cm
gun was also heavily damaged. Individual tanks appeared to harass
the German advance, but most of these were put out of action. The
withdrawing enemy was difficult to pin down; he fired on the
spearhead as it moved into a valley, but by the time the flak was
moved forward into position he had long since disappeared over the
next hill.
All of this slowed the pace of the advance. The men were at the
limits of their strength; they were plagued by thirst and the heat had
brought them almost to the point of collapse under their heavy load
of equipment.
In the meantime the 2nd (SPW) Squadron under Obit. Klemme
and the 8.8 cm Flak were moved forwards as a special battle group
and now drove off after the withdrawing enemy direction
Kertschik. Near Mokri Log, however, the leading vehicles were met
by a hail of anti-tank shells. Here the road sloped gently towards the
village. To the left the terrain beside the road sloped steeply upwards,
while to the right of us a swamp hindered evasive manoeuvres or
withdrawal. As it had meanwhile become dark, and loud tank noises
could be heard from the village, the commander decided to dig in
here for the night. Strong security positions were set up in the
direction of the village and the Flak was moved forward."
Meanwhile, elements of II Battalion/I.R. GD 1, following on the
heels of the Reconnaissance Battalion, had succeeded in crossing
the river and had dug in on the other side. Under its protection, the
remainder of the regiment prepared for the crossing on the following
day.
I.R. GD 2, which had been held up for days farther to the rear
through lack of fuel, now advanced into the Tazinskaja- Skassyrskaja
area and followed slowly with the units of the division which had
been left behind.
The new objective for the Reconnaissance Battalion and for I.R.
GD 1 farther south was Kertschik and the industrial city of Schachty.
The Soviets had evacuated their positions in Mokri Log during the
night, and when the Stukas finally arrived their bombs struck only
houses and threshing machines. Meanwhile, giant columns of Soviet
tanks and vehicles moved across the next hill towards the northwest
in the direction of the attacking German panzer divisions. Individual
Soviet tanks still appeared, seeking a way out of the closing ring of
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German forces. Usually they created some initial confusion in the

German ranks, but were soon put of action. Soon, the advance was
moving quickly. The German forces had passed through several
villages with no sign of the enemy when the first houses of Schachty
appeared in the distance. The entry into the city was described in
the war diary of the Reconnaissance Battalion:
"To the left and right was equipment abandoned by the enemy and
a Stalin Organ as well. We drove through several more villages when,
suddenly, we spotted a giant dust cloud moving towards the south.
We thought it must be a fleeing enemy column until we learned
otherwise at a large crossroads: it was the 14th Panzer Division of
Gruppe von Kleist which, coming from Rostov, was advancing on
Novocherkassk.
We drove into gardens and behind houses to the left and right to
await further orders. Then the division adjutant, Hptm. Bethke,
appeared up front and reported that after completing its assignment
the division was to be transferred to France.
The advance on Schachty was resumed in high spirits. The city lay
directly before us. Far and wide there was no enemy. There was not
a shot fired as we roared through the streets of the suburbs and no
mines barred the way. The only Russians we saw were some of the
frightened inhabitants peering from their windows.
We drove through a small valley and over a bridge into the city.
The tracks of our armoured personnel carriers rattled on the pavement.
There ahead of us, a wall higher than a man with embrasures.
However, we rolled through the narrow opening without resistance.
Right and left of the road were huge craters and shattered houses;
the Stukas had done their work.
We crossed the railroad tracks and veered to the right. More bomb
craters on the tracks, twisted rails pointing into the air, telephone
lines hanging from partially broken down masts; the station buildings
were destroyed and the facility completely useless. Then the first
shots whistled over our heads. A single rifleman must be hiding
somewhere in a signal box. We drove off to the right. The battalion
had orders to secure the city. Company commanders and platoon
leaders scouted the billeting areas and sectors, while the men of the
battalion staff searched the nearby houses.
Several APCs engaged a fleeing Russian truck. It was stopped by
several well-aimed bursts of fire and several men were taken prisoner.
As our men approached the vehicle they suddenly heard shouts:
'Don't shoot, we're German!!' On closer inspection we found two
German soldiers, one of them with a head wound, bound and lying
on the bed of the truck.

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The companies had just moved into their security zones when an
order came in from division to evacuate the city of Schachty and
assemble in Kertschik for employment by the division."
The I.D. GD had received orders to turn off the highway to the
south, reach the lower Don near Melichowskaja and Rasdorskaja,
cross the river and advance southwards. Meanwhile, the 14th Panzer
Division, a part of III Panzer Corps, was to pursue the fleeing enemy
southwards through Koslik.
Gruppe Khler was formed from the following elements:
I.R. GD 1
Reconnaissance Battalion GD
1st and 2nd Batteries, Flak Artillery Battalion GD
a company of Anti-tank Battalion GD
It received orders to carry out the new plan, in which it was essential
to prevent the enemy forces from withdrawing and escaping across
the river.
In the course of the new action the division turned left while still
on the move and sent ahead three attack groups which reached the
bank of the Don during the night of 21/22 July.
Early on the morning of 22 July the infantry of II Battalion, I.R.
GD 1 moved into an assembly area outside Melichowskaja in
preparation for an attack on the village to be launched at 04.00.
Despite considerable enemy mortar fire the village was taken at
approximately 06.00. More than a thousand Russian soldiers were
flushed out of the bushes along the river and taken prisoner. There
was so much equipment stored and abandoned there that it was
difficult to accurately estimate its numbers or worth. The first soldiers
of the battalion immediately set about crossing the Don, which was
approximately 800 metres wide at this point, in inflatable boats in
order to establish a small bridgehead on the other side.
The action was described by Lt. Konopka, platoon leader in the
Regimental Pioniers:
"We had taken the village of Melichowskaja on the Don early in
the morning. A considerable amount of booty was taken on that side
of the river. The village had a ferry crossing, which interested me,
as responsible Pionier, the most. The ferry itself had been in use by
the enemy a short time before, but now it had disappeared, the rope
and cable cut and the approach partially destroyed.
The way I saw it, if there had once been ferry traffic here, then it
was highly probable that this was the crossing place sought by the
regiment. We immediately built ferries from inflatable boats and sent
across several reconnaissance vehicles. I myself went across with the
first. On the other side we caught a couple of riderless horses and
set off downstream to look for the ferry. We found it several hundred

368

metres farther down where it had been driven onto the bank by the
current. We went into the water and started to tow the thing
upstream with the horses. Then there was a sudden exchange of fire
with some Cossacks who appeared unexpectedly out of the willows.
We captured several, who were immediately put to work as oarsmen.
While the ferry traffic steadily increased, a Soviet seaplane landed
on the river about 200 metres away, apparently misled by the
Russian uniforms of the prisoners pressed into service as oarsmen.
The aircraft's crew was getting ready to make contact with them.
We grabbed our weapons, however, and were able to render the
crew harmless. Attempts to make the aircraft flyable for our own use
failed at first. Nevertheless, the aircraft was a considerable addition
to the strength of the Regimental Pionier Platoon/I.R. GD 1."
With the capture of Melichowskaja by II Battalion, the other
elements of I.R. GD 1, namely I and III Battalions supported by IV
Battalion, anti-tank units and heavy Flak, advanced along the ridge
towards Puchljakowskij and Rasdorskaja, where they became
embroiled in heavy fighting with Soviet units still holding out there.
In addition to preventing additional Soviet forces from escaping
across the river, it was also the regiment's task to find and capture
a suitable crossing over the Don.
After landing on the other side of the Don near Melichowskaja the
leading elements of II Battalion/I.R. GD 1 found that a wide band
of swampy, moor-like terrain ran along the river and was simply too
wide to bridge, especially for motor and armoured vehicles. Countless backwaters and tributaries led deep into the hinterland, posing
a virtually impenetrable obstruction.
In the stifling heat of the day each breath was an ordeal. The men
of II Battalion fought their way forwards against swarms of
mosquitoes and other pests in an attempt to reach a position where
they could see and shoot. Instead, however, they became more
entangled in the jungle of vegetation along the riverbank. Exhausted,
they sank to the ground and waited for what was to come.
Things were going much better for the reinforced Reconnaissance
Battalion GD and the I.R. GD 2 in the breadbasket of the Ukraine.
Positioned on the heights west of Kertschik, the Reconnaissance
Battalion's assignment was to guard the right flank and rear of I.R.
GD 1's battle group against enemy attack. This was all the more
important as surrounded Russians sought a way out of the pocket
which had closed around elements of several Soviet divisions to the
northeast. Patrols were sent out towards the KoslikNovocherkassk
road heavy fighting was still raging around the latter to
determine the enemy's movements. I.R. GD 2 was given similar
assignments; it secured to the north along the highway which ran
from east to west.

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Ill Battalion/I.R. GD 2, which was engaged in the same security

duties, did not see any sign of the enemy throughout the entire day.
It took advantage of the lull for its men to rest and recover at the
front. The battalion's roster on this day was as follows:
Commanding Officer III/I.R. 2
Adjutant
11th Company
12th Company
13th Company
14th Company
15th Company

Hptm. Bethge (formerly of I Btl.)

Obit. Hartz
Lt. Graf Bernsdorff
Hptm. John
Hptm. Schttler
Obit. Leyck
Lt. Denkhaus

During the night of 22/23 July 1942, the elements of I.R. GD 1

assembled behind a hill northwest of Rasdorskaja for an attack the
next morning against the village itself. There was no quiet during the
night; Soviet mortars and Stalin Organs (these apparently from the
other side of the river) kept up a steady fire. The village appeared to
be strongly defended as initially expected. On the other hand,
Rasdorskaja, even though it had to be approached over a rather
steep slope, was one of the few villages in this area from which a
crossing of the Don could be attempted. Pine and spruce could be
seen on the other side and white sand shimmered through, indicating
that relatively firm ground could be expected over there. The view
from the heights extended more than 15 kilometres into the
countryside beyond the river. The Soviets appeared to have dug in
there, with more heavy weapons than infantry.
The Soviet Air Force was active. During the day three or more
bombers and fighter-bombers would fly along the steep riverbank
and drop their "best wishes." However, when German fighters
appeared on the horizon they quickly disappeared.
The start of the attack by I Battalion/I.R. GD 1 was fixed for 05.00
on 23 July. Feldwebel Kraus, leader of 3rd Platoon/1st (SP) Company/Pz.Jg. Battalion GD, described the battle:
"For this attack the 3rd Platoon was attached to I Battalion/ I.R.
1. I received orders from my company commander to wait behind
the line of hills occupied by our infantry and follow along behind
them when the attack began. Meanwhile, the 2nd Platoon was to
take over the anti-tank defence on the right flank while 1st Platoon
was initially held in reserve.
At 05.00 the infantry of I Battalion moved forward in skirmishing
lines and reached the valley ahead of us without making any contact
with the enemy. I instructed my N C O observer to stay with the
platoon and watch over the infantry's advance while I followed the
actual attack in the motorcycle-sidecar.

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Our infantry took the next hill. On my signal the N C O observer

brought the platoon forward to the rear slope of the hill, while the
munitions tank and platoon leader's vehicle remained behind in the
valley.
On the hill I set up an observation post next to the infantry which
had gone into position there. The post was manned by our company
commander, myself and the N C O observer. 2,000 metres in front
of us were the Russians; we could see them clearly in their foxholes.
The deeply-eroded terrain provided the enemy with favourable
defensive positions and made it difficult for us to observe. A large
number of tractors and other types of farm machinery stood about
the terrain, providing good camouflage for enemy tanks. Suddenly,
one of these motionless machines came to life. The shape of a tank
appeared. Leaving its cover, it sought to drive to the rear in reverse
with its gun trained on us.
I jumped out of the observation position and waved my crew onto
the hill. A few seconds later I was sitting behind the gun in the
gunner's position. Range 1,500 metres. The first round left the
barrel. My company commander shouted, 'One target width left.'
The second and third shots found the target, and the enemy tank
was left burning in the valley.
The Russians then attempted to tow away a second heavy tank
with a tractor. It was standing still with its broadside towards me,
offering a good target. At a range of 1,400 metres the first shell tore
open the tank's hull and exploded its ammunition. I had the gun crew
pull back to the back slope, and continued to watch from the
observation post. The munitions tank had been summoned in the
meantime and it now replenished the gun's ammunition supply.
Mortars and heavy machine guns opened fire on the enemy
infantry which returned the fire, forcing us to take cover. Suddenly,
high-explosive shells exploded behind our hill. Was there another
enemy tank somewhere nearby? Then there were two flashes
followed closely by another. We spotted two dark objects, behind
which Russian soldiers were running to and fro. It was our most
dangerous foe: enemy anti-tank guns. For a second time the gun and
its crew moved onto the hill. 'Load high-explosive', I called to the
loader. I set the range indicator at 1,700 metres and targeted the left
gun. The first shell was long. My company commander corrected
the range, and seven rounds were sufficient to put both enemy guns
out of action.
Deprived of their last heavy weapon, the Russians pulled back,
leaving behind a large number of vehicles and much equipment. The
last hill before the village was in our hands. My platoon watched over
the continuation of the attack but saw no further action."
The village of Rasdorskaja was stormed and taken at noon on 23
July 1942. The soldiers of the I.R. GD 1 allowed themselves only a
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brief rest, however, and then it was on to the river. The Pionier
platoons of I and III Battalions' heavy companies dragged the first
inflatable boats up to the river while others searched the riverbank
for boats and any other means of getting across. It was midday and
extremely hot when the first inflatable boats began the crossing under
the protection of the heavy weapons. Heavy machine guns and
mortars laid down supporting fire to keep the enemy pinned down
on the other side.
The actual crossing was described by Hauptfeldwebel W. Kaufmann of 11th Company who, as senior NCO, was directly involved
in the preparations:
"The Ivans were sitting fast in the low pines on the far bank, feeling
rather secure because of the width of the river in front of them. And
with good reason, because it was impossible to reach the riverbank
undetected, much less cross the river. On our side was a steep bank;
behind stretched giant grain fields with a single machine station
consisting of only four buildings. From there we had a wide view into
the deep plain on the far side of the Don. There was brush and
scrawny pines growing along the edge of the river.
We the 11th Company were to be the first to cross and attack
the enemy in order to clear the way for the bridging of the river
planned for the following day. A discussion was held on the spot with
the company and section leaders concerning landmarks and stop
lines; at the same time boundaries for the automatic weapons fire
were laid down. As senior N C O and a former platoon leader, I was
to lead the crossing.
In the meantime the company cook, Feldw. Willi Becker, served
the sections a hot meal. Everyone was restless and there was a great
deal of tension.
The company's commanding officer, Obit. Kottkamp, and his
company headquarters personnel intended to cross in the first boats.
Just then a squadron of German aircraft passed overhead, returning
from a mission; at the same instant a mighty rain of fire crashed
down on a wide front precisely in our assembly area along the
riverbank. At first we suspected the aircraft above; but that could not
be, as we had clearly identified ourselves as German. It must therefore
have been a Stalin Organ. Two men were fatally injured; the medics
attended to the wounded.
But there was no time to lose and Obit. Kottkamp ordered the
crossing to begin at once. Kottkamp and his company headquarters
personnel jumped into the Pioniers' inflatable boat which had been
put into the water at the river's edge. At the same time our heavy
machine guns and other heavy weapons opened up a murderous
sustained fire on the other bank to keep the enemy's head down.
The first sections ran to the bank and into the boats. Soon there was
a brisk flow of traffic back and forth across the river with inflatable
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rafts and more and more men, including those from other companies, came up to the crossing site, some even with their vehicles.
Giant dust clouds hung over the steep riverbank.
In the meantime I assembled all of the company's drivers, as well
as Schirrmeister Hans Strbling, for another briefing. Then, suddenly, I saw a flash and at the same time recognised the firing position
of the feared Stalin Organ. Its rockets were soon whistling in. I
shouted, 'split up and take cover!' Other than the minor wounds
suffered by the Schirrmeister and the 2nd Field Cook, B. Kalkum,
there was no damage, although two vehicles of the 2nd and 10th
Companies went up in flames. Immediately afterwards all of the
vehicles hastily drove back across the open field to the machine
station.
Feldw. Willi Becker and the company tailor, Gefr. Fritz Dinnert,
remained there with the converted rations truck. My driver Ogefr.
Erhard Bhme, who was nicknamed Junior, also remained there. In
the meantime our pay sergeant, Uffz. Alfons Piitz, saw to it that the
fallen received a proper burial above, on the slope at the entrance
to the village.
Our Sturm-Pioniers had meanwhile constructed a raft to ship the
first guns and vehicles across. And that's how it was done."
It was the division's Pioniers who had to bear the brunt of the
action over the next few hours. Driven by the commanders, they
dragged their inflatable boats, ferries, pontoons and bridging equipment up to the bank in preparation for the bridging of the river.
Officers and NCOs surveyed the bridge site and staked it out, while
the equipment was laid out under cover farther to the rear. While a
portion of the Pioniers were busy with that, others were bringing
assault boats to the water to establish an orderly flow of traffic across
the river. Still others, assisted by the regimental and company
Pioniers, manned other assault boats in order to get the infantry
across to the south bank as quickly as possible. A small bridgehead,
approximately 200 x 400 metres, had been established there and
desperately needed reinforcement before the enemy could take
countermeasures.
It was mostly the riflemen of I and III Battalions, I.R. 1 who
streamed forwards and across the river. They streamed in the truest
sense of the word, because the men on the north bank were from
all companies and everyone was seeking a spot in the next boat.
Stripped to the waist, the Pioniers under Lt. Konopka piloted their
inflatable boats back and forth across the river. A number of Russian
prisoners, still in full uniform, were also put to work steering the
boats.
Meanwhile, on the south bank enemy resistance had begun to
stiffen. There was heavy fighting in the woods along the riverbank,
which resulted in casualties. Often the persistent Soviet counterat373

tacks, which were supported by mortars and anti tank guns, had to
be turned back in close-in fighting. The situation soon improved as
more companies arrived, gradually building up the German forces in
the bridgehead. Local attacks, mainly for reconnaissance purposes,
were carried out successfully.
Farther to the rear at the Rasdorskaja bridge site, the division's
Pioniers, together with recently-arrived army Pioniers, had begun the
job of throwing a bridge across the river. O n e hundred and ten
pontoons were brought in. The Pioniers stayed with their equipment
in the punishing heat of 25 July. They worked throughout the day
and night to complete the job. The bridge and crossing sites
repeatedly came under fire from Soviet heavy artillery, mortars,
Stalin Organs and even infantry weapons. The German flak artillery,
which had gone into position on the north bank and the steep slope,
had more than one opportunity to engage attacking Soviet bombers
and was able to shoot down several.
Without a doubt, the bridge-building operation under way near
Rasdorskaja was very uncomfortable for the Soviets. They made
numerous attempts to do away with it, but in vain. Further reinforcements were sent in by the division. II Battalion/I.R. GD 1 was
relieved in its bridgehead near Melichowskaja by 11th Company and
elements of the 15th Company/I.R. GD 2 and sent to Rasdorskaja.
Meanwhile, other elements of I.R. GD 2 (II Btl.) relieved the Reconnaissance Battalion near Bessergenewskaja. It was moved forward
to Kertschik-South in preparation for its next action deep in the
bridgehead. The battalion's commanding officer, Major von
Usedom, left the unit due to illness after first transferring command
to Rittmeister Wtjen, the former A O K 4.
The battalions of the Artillery Regiment GD went into position
north of and along the south bank in order to take over the fire
support role for the planned attack by I.R. GD 1 against Ssussatskij.
Approaching from the rear was the 16th Infantry Division under
Generalmajor Henrici, which was likewise to continue the advance
to the south from the bridgehead.
Reinforcement of the bridgehead near Rasdorskaja by the I.D. GD
continued, easing the battle of the men in the front lines. After the
village of Ssussatskij had been softened up by repeated Luftwaffe
bombing attacks and the enemy fire silenced, the Grenadiers of III
Battalion/I.R. GD 1, supported by the 2 cm Flak of the heavy
company under Obit. Walle, together with other elements of the
division, launched their attack across the completely open terrain. In
the face of increasing enemy resistance the village was not taken until
that evening. I Battalion was moved in immediately, with the first
tanks to cross the river right on its heels. Heavy weapons and
anti-tank guns were brought into position and the village prepared
for defence.
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That same night the Reconnaissance Battalion GD moved forward

and crossed the Don. Its task was to secure the area southeast of
the bridge site on the south bank. Further elements of I.R. GD 2,
which had been held up in the rear due to lack of fuel, now moved
up and crossed the river.
The bridge over the Don was completed on 26 July a great
accomplishment by the Pioniers. The heavy weapons, artillery, tanks
and assault guns rolled irresistibly across the bridge, followed by
vehicles of all kinds. At almost the same time the leading elements
of the 16th Infantry Division arrived in Rasdorskaja and began to
cross the river. Yellow dust clouds hung over the bluffs, drifting away
slowly to the west. Enemy bombers were constantly overhead,
attempting to drop their bombs on the bridge, but they were
effectively prevented from doing so by the efforts of the flak artillery.
The bridgehead near Melichowskaja was abandoned by the units
of III Btl./I.R. GD 2 after the Soviet forces pulled back following the
fall of Ssussatskij.
The Grenadiers of I.R. GD 1 continued to advance, capturing
Ashinoff on 26 July with only light casualties. The commander of II
Battalion, Hptm. von Courbire, was wounded and handed command of the battalion over to the former commander of 10th
Company, Hptm. Peiler. The I.R. GD 1's command post was located
in Ssussatskij. The division likewise moved its command post to the
south bank of the Don, selecting the village of Jalki. The Artillery
Regiment GD set up its command post in Voroshilov. Enemy
resistance lessened after the 16th Inf.Div. passed through the
bridgehead. The I.D. GD made some minor probing attacks, but
otherwise settled into positions in the bridgehead. There were no
new orders at hand for the division.
Elements of 7th Company/I.R. 1 drove forward toward the
Manych with orders to determine whether the bridge near Tuskuloff
was passable. The company established a temporary bridgehead at
this spot. It was determined that the bridge was not usable and the
bridgehead was evacuated three hours later. Meanwhile, heavy
fighting had broken out at other locations on the Manych as the 16th
Infantry Division attempted to force a crossing. Afterwards the I.D.
GD received orders to secure the rear area between the Don and
Manych rivers and clear the area between Rasdorskaja and Kalinin.
The necessary battle groups were assembled, while the remainder
of the division remained in its security zones and rested.
One of the battle groups was the reinforced I Battalion/I.R. 1,
which was to advance to the Manych. The operation failed primarily
because the Soviets blew the Manych dams, resulting in considerable
flooding. A large lake formed over the banks of the river. There were
no further combat operations.

375

Meanwhile, III Battalion/I.R. 2 was placed on alert and ordered to

advance deep into the Kalmuck steppe to cut off the avenue of retreat
of the withdrawing Soviet forces and destroy them in cooperation
with elements of the 23rd Panzer Division. The following is the entry
in the war diary of III Battalion/I.R. 2 for 31 July 1942:
"At approximately 04.00 the battalion marched off from Kudinoff.
Attached to the battalion were: one light and one heavy howitzer
battery, an anti-aircraft MG platoon from 16th Company, a heavy
infantry gun platoon from 17th Company and a radio section from
the GD Signals Battalion for communications with division. In
addition, two batteries of the Assault Gun Battalion GD came along
led by the unit's CO.
Crossing the treeless steppe in the oppressive heat, III Battalion
passed through W. Ssolonij and reached the village of Mitrofonowskij
shortly before noon. From there motorised patrols in platoon
strength reconnoitred to the southeast in the direction of Nemetzko
Nikolajewskij and to the northeast through Starij Limanskij towards
Nowij-Nikolajewski. While the southern patrol came upon a tributary
of the Manych after a few kilometres and could advance no farther,
the northern patrol reported Nowij Nikolajewskij occupied by the
enemy. Short-range reconnaissance aircraft which took off from an
airfield north of Mitrofonowskij reported that the main enemy force
had crossed the tributary of the Manych near Nowij-Nikolajewskij
and was retiring southwards in the direction of the river. The
remaining enemy forces in Nowij-Nikolajewskij must therefore be
rearguards.
There were two possible methods of pursuing the enemy forces:
a crossing in inflatable boats east of Mitrofonowskij and a pursuit on
foot, or a drive around the tributary of the Manych and an attack on
the enemy from the east. The first alternative was discarded as it was
unlikely that the withdrawing enemy forces could be caught on foot,
and the heavy weapons would have to be left behind. The battle
group's commander, Hptm. Bethge, therefore decided to go the
other route, even though fuel supplies were very low. A part of the
battle group was left behind and the fuel assigned to a few vehicles.
The pursuit began with 11th and 13th Companies, 1st Battery/A.R.
GD, 2nd Battery/Assault Gun Battalion GD, the anti-aircraft MG
platoon and the heavy infantry gun platoon. In the meantime the last
of the enemy units crossed the tributary of the Manych and afterwards destroyed all the boats and ferries.
Meeting no resistance, the battle group advanced in the darkness
as far as Zugaikin, where it camped for the night. 13th Company
was sent on ahead to Nowij Ssadkowskije from where, the next
morning, it was to send out a motorised patrol to establish contact
with the 126th Rifle Regiment of the 23rd Panzer Division, which

376

was supposed to be about twelve kilometres farther south in

Ssuchoj."
On the following day, 1 August 1942, the battle group encountered
enemy forces near Sherebkoff. The fighting there was occasionally
heavy, and the battle group was involved there, under changing
commands, until 12 August. The group came through the fighting
well, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy while suffering comparatively light casualties itself.
The fighting on the Manych was described by Gefreiter Canje of
13th Company/1.R. 2:
"Today we were only two platoons strong. We stalked through tall
fields of sunflowers, and in the distance we spotted this miserable
Russian village whose huts were built from cow dung with corn-stalk
roofs. The village appeared to be inhabited.
Employing every trick in the book we worked our way up to the
Russian positions. Unfortunately, we lost several men killed when
the enemy opened fire.
As darkness fell we were finally in the enemy's rear. We surprised
an Armenian sentry and took him prisoner. He was so frightened
that he simply couldn't close his mouth; all of his limbs were
trembling.
Then we came to the canal, a tributary of the Manych. We spotted
a harbour-like bulge in the river. We went over to it and considered
how to get across. Hans Klavun, Feldwebel and leader of our
platoon, explained to the Leutnant that we had to cross here. I then
said to Klavun, 'Look, there are footprints here that lead into the
water and come out on the other side. We should be able to get
across.' I slung my machine gun across my back and was soon up
to my stomach in mud and water. Then I waded the roughly 50-60
metres to the other bank. Soon the others were also across.
Everything was dark; we couldn't see a thing. A figure with a white
beard appeared suddenly from the darkness. I grabbed him and
shouted, 'Where are the Russkis?' 'Over there!' Using a match I lit
a pile of corn stalks which were soon burning brightly, illuminating
the immediate vicinity. Near a hut I saw a white blanket and eight
legs sticking out from underneath! I said to the man next to me, 'Fire
your rifle into the air!' He did so. Eight arms shot up into the air as
if on a string and four surprised faces appeared from under the
blanket. They were apparently manning an outpost and had been
snoring away here when we came upon them.
We took them into custody and searched them for weapons. Then
we went to the next huts and ferreted out some more Russians. More
and more turned up from stables, roadside ditches, peasant huts
and who knows where. They came from every corner. It seemed
that we had surprised a relatively large combat unit. My chum, Ogefr.
A. Kelle, scolded them like a fishwife, 'Come on out you
377

Waldheinis' And more came out from holes in the ground, from
cellars always more.
We took hundreds of Russians prisoner without loss to ourselves.
It was quite a day!"
Ill Battalion's battle group was not always so fortunate as to capture
an entire Russian regiment without loss. Another report on the battle
for the grain silo near Elista shows the other, more difficult side to
these battles:
"Our drive continued in the burning heat through the salt marshes
along the Manych canal. We had only one wish: water! But on the
parched steppe with temperatures in the sun of 45-50 degrees
centigrade it was impossible to obtain the precious liquid. We then
began a raid on the Elista grain silo. We first drove our vehicles quite
close to the objective and then dismounted. During the attack which
now began, we succeeded in destroying several enemy anti-tank gun
and artillery crews. Neither side employed tanks in the battle.
During this attack I was shot by an enemy sniper. He hit me right
in the corner of my left eye. The bullet passed through and out again
at my right eye. Suddenly I could no longer see because everything
was covered in blood. Five or six other men were also wounded,
some seriously. We wounded were assembled in a hollow. Also there
was my friend Ogefr. A. Kelle, whose leg had been almost shot off.
Our medic applied a dressing so that he wouldn't bleed to death. We
lay the whole night alone, waiting. Far and wide there was not a
living soul. Russian cavalry was all around us. It was not until
twenty-four hours later that we were picked up. Our August Kelle
kept trying to loosen his bandage, but we took turns watching him
to ensure nothing happened. When we were finally freed there was
a doctor on hand who immediately set to work to save August. But
it was already too late. We all stood around with tears in our eyes as
he lay dying from the great loss of blood."
On 1 August 1942, while the I.D. GD's battle groups namely
the reinforced III Btl./I.R. GD 2 and the reinforced Reconnaissance
Battalion GD were still in action, orders arrived to transfer
elements of the division back to the north across the Don. A new
mission was planned for the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Division; all
of its units were to be pulled out of the line. Sunday, the 2nd of
August 1942; GD journey day, as it was known in the jargon of the
common soldier, because most Sundays were travel days, and this
Sunday saw the first unit, II Btl./I.R. 1, set out across the Don to the
north. The regimental headquarters of I.R. 1 followed, moving
initially into Melichowskaja on the north bank of the river. I Battalion/I.R. 2 under Major Grosser passed through Rasdorskaja to
Schachty where it took up quarters. The Art.Rgt. GD and its
command post moved into the same city.

378

Rumours abounded: the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Division was

to be sent to France, the destination of everyone's dreams, to
recuperate. Other discontented and negative voices spoke of
employment on the central front. But these were only rumours; no
one not even the division itself knew where the unit was to go
next.
Those elements of the I.D. GD which had moved into the new
areas now rested, carried out maintenance on vehicles and weapons,
overhauled equipment needing attention after the wear and tear of
the past days of combat and began training.
By 3 August 1942 most of the division's units had been assembled
in the MelichowskajaSchachty area north of the Don and taken up
quarters there. The reinforced Reconnaissance Battalion GD
remained in action until 8 August clearing the territory between the
Sal and Manych and then moved into quarters in Krymskij, while III
Battalion/I.R. GD 2 was not pulled back from its area of operations
until 12 August.
Companies, batteries and detachments now rested. The men
began a splendid period of rest and recuperation with fine weather
and temperatures of over 40 degrees centigrade; the only interruptions were some light training and vehicle maintenance. The Don
and Donets rivers provided opportunities for swimming and fishing.
The surrounding countryside was truly God's country. Bountiful fields
of tomatoes, watermelon, grain, com and sunflowers stretched
across the gentle slopes to the horizon. The scale of these fields,
which measured in kilometres, was unimaginably large by European
standards. The only trees and bushes were to be found around the
isolated villages which lay along the streams or deeply-eroded river
valleys; otherwise the terrain was completely treeless. The whitepainted huts and cottages were very clean and all had a small garden
in front or behind. The Ukrainian inhabitants were very friendly and
accommodating. The villages were linked by dirt roads which in
summer were covered by a fine, dust-like layer of sand. Any vehicle
passing over one of these roads threw up a high cloud of dust which
was visible for miles. The men enjoyed themselves in the rivers, and
the fishermen among them found that there were plenty of fish to
be caught. Considerable numbers of crayfish were also caught,
bringing a welcome change to the daily menu. Well remembered is
the white castle on the Don, the quarters of I Btl./I.R. 1, which was
the site of several evening festivities and gatherings put on by Major
"Kiki" Gehrke.
The Division-Staff was located in Kertschik-South, another
pleasant village with plenty of shady trees. Parked in the gardens
were the buses of the members of the operations staff the Ia, O1
and O4 where work and preparations for the future went on, albeit
at a slower pace. The newly-assigned O1 (Lt. Winkler) with his O4
379

struggled to master the secrets of command and prepare himself for

his new duties. Winkler had come to the operations staff from the
Reconnaissance Battalion. The General, the old campaigner, wanted
the members of his staff to operate independently, as did the la,
Major i.G. von Hobe (who was in charge of the tactical aspects of
command). Von Hobe rarely had time to himself, even in quiet
periods.
The Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND h a d been
engaged in battles of attack and pursuit for nearly five weeks. Along
with the Panzer Divisions, it had formed the spearhead of Army
Group South. Its speed, tenacity and willingness for action had been
decisive. Numerically its greatest success had been in the destruction
of enemy tanks and guns, rather than the numbers of prisoners
brought in. This showed that, in contrast to 1941, the bulk of the
enemy forces had managed to escape encirclement. Major battles of
encirclement in the grand style, which alone could decisively weaken
the enemy, were missing. Instead, the German forces pursued the
withdrawing Russians deep into the hinterland for days and weeks.
The swing to the south in the direction of the Caucasus resulted in
a greatly-extended left flank.
The attacking German forces in the south were already in a
dangerous situation, which was all the more threatening because the
other fronts centre and north had not gone to the attack with
them. Germany's forces were no longer sufficient for an offensive
along the entire front. If the effort in the south did not result in the
destruction of the Russian southern wing and a decisive weakening
of Soviet potential, then the whole question of bringing the war in
Russia to a successful conclusion would be thrown in doubt.
Those who participated at decisive points in the operation were
entitled to criticise the fact that objectives were laid down for which
their forces were insufficient, and that a long, unprotected flank was
offered to an enemy which had not yet been destroyed. The result
was Stalingrad. Further, the front-line troops could also criticise the
lack of direct contact between the fighting soldiers and their supreme
commander. They should have been given the opportunity from time
to time to present their situation directly to him. However, the
opportunity was never given to the disadvantage of the entire
front.
The pleasant period of rest was brought to an abrupt end by an
order direct from the O K H to which the division was subordinated
from 3-18 August which instructed the division to prepare to
entrain for an as yet unknown destination. While the la and his O1
flew out of Stalino to the Fhrer Headquarters to receive more
detailed orders, the division's units moved individually into the area
around Stalino, where they were to entrain. The first elements of the
I.D. GD left the Melichowskaja billeting area on 11 August, marching
380

over the dusty Ukrainian roads towards their loading station. The
rumours that the unit's destination was France and that a longer
period of rest was to follow had become so persistent that everyone
was convinced that they were true.
Inf.Rgt. GD 1 II Btl.

Btl. CP, 13. 8. 1942

O r d e r for L o a d i n g a b o a r d R a i l Transport

1. Beginning on 15. 8. 1942 II Btl. will entrain at the following three

stations:
Stalino City
Rutschenkowo
Postyschewo
2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Approach roads to the entraining stations have been marked by

the regiment as follows:
to Stalino City with I.R. GD 1/A
to Rutschenkowo with I.R. GD 1/C
to Postyschewo with I.R. GD 1/D
Due to the strained transport situation the battalion must be loaded
mixed in order to fully utilise available transport space.
Transport Officers: Transport numbers (see entraining summary)
386013 Hptm Hones
386016 Obit. Blumenthal
386017 Hptm. Schmidt
386018 Hptm. Peiler
It is the responsibility of the transport officers to select loading
officers for the transport trains.
The tracked vehicles allocated to the transports as well as vehicles
from other units will establish contact with the loading units
themselves.
The companies will report by 18.45 on 13. 8. 1942: that all units
have been briefed on loading procedures and conduct on the rail
transports, and that communications and approach roads have
been mapped out and checked.
During one of the first movements by the reinforced I.R. 1 a unit
commander altered the train sequence on his own. The result was
a train delay of 45 minutes.
It is once again emphasised that any interference with rail traffic
is strictly forbidden.
Any remaining cargo space is definitely to be used.
Should there be insufficient space on a transport it is to be reported
immediately to the regiment's loading officer, Hptm. Scholten,
who will take the necessary steps.
The units are to be advised again that no article belonging to the
railway may be removed or damaged.

381

10. The entraining units are to establish contact with the loading
stations as early as possible. The trains are usually ready several
hours before the times given in the loading summary. It is therefore
possible that units which are to entrain by night might be able to
get aboard during daylight.
11. All orders for assembly, movement to the loading station, order of
loading and air defence during loading, en route and during
unloading are to be issued independently by the transport officers
for their trains.
12. The entraining units will find all further orders at the railheads.
13. Lt. Willert, 6th Company, has been designated commander of the
battalion's advance party. He will entrain with a car and crew one
day before the loading of the first battalion unit. Because it is
travelling by rail the advance party may become mixed in with the
regimental headquarters, which is entraining on 14. 8. 1942, and
an exchange of vehicles may be necessary.
The advance party will report to the regimental command post in
the unloading area.
Materials for posting the new billets and the route from the railhead
are to be received from battalion.
14. The regimental commander has once again pointed out the need
for iron discipline during loading, while on the trains and during
unloading. Violations against discipline and military obedience will
be severely punished. I am making the unit leaders responsible for
the carrying out of the regimental commander's order.
signed Hnes
This loading order, which was based on the complete divisional
order, was a masterpiece. The loading distribution itself was determined by the rail cars assigned, their specified size and capacity and
their mass and weight. The loading as such demanded a certain time
allotment, meaning that a unit had a specified period of time in which
to entrain. This received a fixed designation, for example, Tempo
24. This meant that a unit must be loaded aboard 24 trains in 24
hours. This meant that every hour a transport train was loaded and
ready to depart. This, however, was the maximum rate.
Even if the I.D. GD didn't have to entrain at such speed, it was
ostensibly bound for France, the promised land of peace, wine and
beautiful women. At many of the loading stations there was a certain
unconscious haste to get the units aboard the trains.

382

F H Q installation Eichenhain (Werewolf) near Vinnitsa, 1942.

383

Chapter Five
The Replacement Units
With the formation of the motorised Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, the resources of the former replacement unit in
Neuruppin were no longer sufficient for the division's many elements
and its special units. Therefore, on 9 April 1942, a discussion took
place between the Division's la and the BdE (Commander of the
Replacement and Training Army), Generaloberst Fromm and
General Olbricht, with the aim of increasing the size of the existing
replacement battalion. After much deliberation directions were issued as an interim measure for the formation of a replacement
regiment and later a replacement brigade. Neuruppin, the former
home of the replacement battalion, was too small to take the new
unit. Cottbus was suggested and accepted as a replacement. Cottbus
was a city east of Berlin on the GrlitzBerlin railway line. It
possessed a fully developed airport and several barracks which
housed infantry replacement units. These received orders to vacate
and hand over the barracks.
At that time Cottbus was a district town which, in addition to the
single track railway line, regional theatre and town hall, could boast
of pleasant surroundings which gradually gave way to the Spree
Forest. Large wooded areas surrounded the city, which possessed a
good reputation in Germany and abroad for the hats which were
made there. Otherwise it was like any other wartime city, where the
citizens went about their daily business and the cityscape was
dominated by the grey of uniforms. During the month of May 1942
Cottbus was to become home to the new replacement unit.
At about the same time the framework of the Grenadier Replacement Regiment (mot.) GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was created, from
which, in June 1942, the Replacement Brigade (mot.) GD was to
emerge. The unit's first commanding officer was Oberst von Wartenburg, who represented the unit's interests in dealings with the city
until about October 1942. Then, at the request of the division
commander, General Hoernlein, von Wartenburg was replaced by
Oberst Bandelow, a former battalion commander in the Infantry
Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.
The unit's initial composition more a formation cadre than a
complete unit was as follows:
Replacement

Regiment

(mot.)

384

GROSSDEUTSCHLAND

Quarters:

Schillerstrae (Garrison buildings)

Oberst von Wartenburg (died
1945)
Hptm. (Res.) Niehoff
Lt. (Res.) Graf Yorck von Wartenburg
Hptm. (Res.) Nebel
Obit. Beck
Waffenmeister Funk

Commanding Officer
Rgt. Adjutant
Executive Officer
Abt. Ib
Propaganda Section
Ordnance and Materiel

I Replacement and Training Battalion

(Sachsendorf Barracks)
1st Rifle Training Company
2nd Rifle Training Company
3rd Rifle Training Company
4th Rifle Training Company
OB Platoon
- Obit. Janke
Trained Replacement Company
Obit. Srensen
II Replacement and Training Battalion
(Alvensleben Barracks)
5th (Vehicle) Training Company
Hptm. Khl
6th (MG.) Training Company
7th (MG.) Training Company
8th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Training Company Obit. Sander
Rehabilitation Company II
Obit. Sander
Trained Replacement Company II
III Replacement and Training Battalion
Infantry Pionier Training Company
Assault Pionier Training Company Hptm. Warschnauer
Rehabilitation Company III
Lt. Lenz
Infantry Signals Training Company Obit. Bludau
Division Signals Training Company Hptm. Trinks
Trained Replacement Company III
The creation of the Replacement Regiment GD demanded the
importation of large numbers of officers, NCOs and recruits, all of
whom were still volunteers at this stage of the war. Increased
recruiting by the Hitler Youth, the Reich Labour Service, schools and
the Military District Headquarters produced a selection of young men
who now streamed into Cottbus. Everything took time, however,
and it was months before the new regiment became a unit. It was
while this period of expansion was still under way that orders arrived
to further enlarge the unit to become the:

385

Replacement

Brigade

GROSSDEUTSCHLAND

The composition of the brigade in July/August 1942 was as

follows:
Replacement Brigade

GROSSDEUTSCHU\ND

Brigade H . Q . a n d Garrison H . Q . Schillerstrae

Brigade Commander:

Oberst
von
Wartenburg
(Gen.Maj. as of 1. 10. 42)
Hptm. (Res.) Niehoff
Lt. (Res.) Graf Yorck Wartenburg
Hptm. (Res.) Nebel
Obit. Beck (from Oct. 1942 Hptm. Rssert)
Technical Inspector Funk

Brigade Adjutant:
Executive Officer:
Abt. Ib:
Propaganda Section:
Weapons and Equipment:

Obstlt./Oberst Bandelow
Oberst H. Schulte-Heuthaus
Oberst Langkeit
Oberst Schwarzrock
Oberst Glaesemer
Oberst Volker (until May 1945)

Later Brigade Commanders:

I Replacement and Training Battalion

(Sachsendorf Barracks)
Commanders:
Obstlt. Stirius
Hptm. Frhr. von Werthem
Hptm. Senger
Hptm. Wackemagel
Hptm. Buse
Hptm. Graf Nayhauss
Adjutant:
Obit. (Res.) Hoeck
Medical Officer:
Unterarzt Dr. Halbach
1st (Rifle) Training Company
Hptm. Wackemagel
Rittm. Kuehn
2nd (Rifle) Training Company
Obit. Derben
Hptm. Fabich
3rd (Rifle) Training Company
Obit. Blomberg
Obit. Heidemann
4th (MG.) Training Company
Hptm. Senger, Buse
Obit. Gnther
OB Platoon Obit. Janke
Rehabilitation Company I
Hptm. (Res.) Pankow
Cadre Company I
Lt. Herbig
Trained Replacement Company I

386

II Replacement and Training Battalion

(Alvensleben Barracks)
Commander:
Hptm. von Heinitz
Adjutant:
Lt. Wesselkoog
Staff Major:
Hptm. Beug
5th (Vehicle) Training Company Hptm. Khne
6th (MG.) Training Company
7th (MG.) Training Company
8th (Hvy.Inf.Gun) Training
Company
Obit. Lange
Rehabilitation Company II
Obit. Sander
Cadre Company II
Trained Replacement Company II
III Replacement and Training Battalion
(Sachsendorf Barracks)
Infantry Pionier Training Company
Assault Pionier Training Company
Infantry Signals Training Company Obit. Bludau
Division Signals Training Company Hptm. Trinks
Rehabilitation Company III
Trained Replacement Company III
from Oct./Nov. Artillery replacement and Training Battalion
(Guben)
1st Light/Heavy Field Howitzer Training Battery
2nd Light Flak Training Battery
3rd Heavy Flak Training Battery
4th Medic Training Company
5th Assault Gun Training Battery
(previously the 3rd Assault Gun Replacement Battery of 1st Company/3OOth Replacement Battalion Guben.)
In December 1942 the II Replacement and Training Battalion was
reorganised and renamed:
II (Mixed) (Motorised) Replacement Battalion GD
Panzer Troops Replacement and Training Battalion GD
(Hermann-Lns Barracks, Cottbus)
Commander:

Hptm. Schwarzrock
Major von Senft zu Pilsach

A large number of officers now joined the G D . They were

transferred from other Wehrmacht units. Some came against their
will, as they had no wish to leave the units they had led and in some
cases seen combat with. The core of the unit, however, remained

387

the men and officers of the old I.R. GD who kept returning to the
unit in spite of illness and wounds.

Chapter Six
In the Wolfsschanze
At the Wolfsschanze Installation, the Fhrer Headquarters near
Rastenburg in East Prussia, life in the command centre was running
smoothly. The Fhrer-Begleit Bataillon had taken over external
and internal security, while the personal protection of Hitler was the
responsibility of a small group of SS men under Obersturmbannfhrer Rattenhuber of the Sicherheitsdienst. The installation lay well
camouflaged in the forest and the activity that went on there was
scarcely noticeable to the uninitiated.
One of the installation's technical wonders was the communications centre of the FHQu, one of the most modern of its kind. It was
housed in a very large bunker and was manned by the best technicians, radio operators and switchboard operators available. These
men, whose duties were carried out beyond public scrutiny, were
former members of the post office, the marine radio service, well
known industrial operations, and so on. They were true specialists.
Their reputation was very high and their abilities were well known.
The Fhrer communications network extended like a spider's web
over all of Europe and beyond.
Responsible for the entire signals service was the FHQu's signals
company, which was under the direct command of the O K W and
led by Obit, (later Major) Lohse. Lohse was the Supreme
Commander's Wehrmacht Signals Officer. Teletype Central was
installed in the Kurhaus Warlimont. It carried on its teletype traffic
under the designator (V)WNOL, while the Fhrer Teletype Station
used W N O F . These agencies could always be reached using these
codes. Meanwhile, the telephone agencies used the call-signs
"Wolfsschanze Exchange" and "Warlimont Exchange". All of the
Fhrer lines were checked every night between 02.00 and 05.00 to
ensure serviceability and trouble-free operation.
One of the long distance telephone lines led to the city of Vinnitsa
in the Ukraine. It was near there that Hitler maintained a forward
headquarters at that time. An advance detachment of the FhrerBegleit-Bataillon went there in June 1942. Under the command of
Oberstabsarzt Dr. Walker, the detachment consisted of the 1st
Platoon of the 1st Company/FBB. It watched over the construction
and outfitting of blockhouses and two bunkers. The installation was

388

built by prisoners of war. Created under the cover name Eichenhain,

the Werewolf Installation accommodated Hitler's forward headquarters. When the summer offensive on the Eastern Front got under
way on 28 June 1942, further elements of the FBB moved into the
installation. These included the 1st and 5th Companies, the Signals
Company and elements of the 2nd and 3rd Companies. Werewolf
was located about 10 kilometres north of Vinnitsa on the River Bug.
Hitler himself arrived there in July 1942. The remaining elements of
the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon remained in the Wolfsschanze Installation.
The increasing responsibilities of the guard units demanded the
employment of more resources. The provision of security at the
Fhrer Headquarters and the command of the growing FhrerBegleit-Bataillon, both responsibilities of the Commander Headquarters, had become to great a task for one man. As a result, two
positions were created on 1 September 1942:
Commander Headquarters Oberst Streve,
Commander Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon Hptm. Pohlmann
The former commander of the FBB and Commander Headquarters, Oberst Thomas, was transferred to other duties. At the
same time there also took place a general reorganisation of the
Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon.
The 5th (Panzer) Company was the show-piece of the FBB. With
three platoons and sixteen PzKfw.38(t) tanks it formed the armoured
core of the defences within the installation. The men within the unit
were a special group.
Oberleutnant Karl-Ludwig Kegel and Leutnant Wilkens, the
African, were both killed in the East at the beginning of 1943. They
were killed by the same shell. On 2 January 1943 they were buried
in Chertkovo on the Don with five other members of the company.
Oberleutnant Karl-Theodor von Kronenfeldt, the company's
"youngster", was killed in Italy in September 1943 when his tank
drove into an ambush. He was buried by the Americans.
Leutnant Hans Rompel died of head wounds in December 1944
during an attack on a wood. He is buried in Germany. Oberleutnant
Wilhelm Geisberg was killed early on the morning of 22 April 1945
near Neu-Petershain in the area of Spremberg. Lt. Arnold was the
only officer to survive the war.

389

390

Part V
WITH

ARMY

18. 8. 42--25. 8. 42
26.
10.
9.
25.

8. 42-- 9. 9. 42
9. 42-- 8. 10. 42
10. 42--26. 10. 42
11. 42--10. 1. 43

GROUP

CENTRE

Army Group Reserve with Army Group

Centre.
Army Reserve AOK 9
Defensive battle in the Rzhev area.
OKH Reserve
Winter battle for the Ninth Army block.

Chapter One
The Defensive Battle for Rzhev
The winter offensive begun by the Soviets on 5 December 1941
had set the entire German front in motion, but had been unable to
bring about its collapse in the south. Extending from Rostov through
Orel Juchnow-Gshatsk to Rzhev, the southern section of the front
stood firm. The city of Rzhev held out against all attacks and, in the
period which followed, formed the corner stone of the German
defences which the Soviets were unable to pass. Farther north,
however, the Soviets penetrated deep into German-occupied territory, advancing as far as Bely (still in German hands) Demidow
Welish and Veliki Luki. In the forests of the central sector they
linked up with the partisan bands active in the area but were then
forced to halt operations temporarily by the onset of the spring
muddy period. The Germans meanwhile were able to establish a
makeshift, weakly-manned defensive line.
The projection deep into the Soviet lines held by the courageous
divisions of the Ninth Army under Generaloberst Model remained
the number one danger point. Following the failure of the German
attempt to close the gap in the front near Bely and establish a
cohesive line, the Ninth Army faced the threat of being cut off. The
objective of the approximately 10 Soviet divisions and 4 cavalry

391

divisions which had infiltrated the area remained Rzhev. Its capture
would mean the envelopment of the entire German Ninth Army as
well as parts of the Fourth Panzer Army.
When the focus of the German summer offensive was directed at
the southern sector of the front, the armies in the north and centre
were given the assignment of launching local attacks to tie down
large numbers of Soviet units and diversionary attacks with limited
objectives to improve their own defensive positions. In addition, the
Ninth Army was to withdraw strong forces from its otherwise quiet
front to first close the gap in the front near Bely and then eliminate
the threat from the groups of enemy forces in its rear by creating a
series of small pockets around them. Both plans succeeded. By the
end of July the Soviet Thirty Ninth Army and the Eleventh Cavalry
Corps were completely destroyed along with those elements of the
Twenty-Second and Forty-First Armies which had been unable to
escape.
In an effort to relieve the forces fighting in the Ninth Army's rear,
the Soviets launched an almost uninterrupted series of attacks against
Ninth Army's outer front, especially in the area of Rzhev. The Soviets
may have thought that the majority of the Ninth Army's units were
committed elsewhere and that their attacks there would bring relief
to their hard-pressed units in the south.
A major crisis developed near and south of Rzhev at the beginning
of August 1942 which held the threat of a Soviet breakthrough. The
first objective of the Soviet operation, which had grown into a major
offensive, appeared to be the city of Rzhev itself. The Soviets threw
two powerful shock armies into the attack: the Thirtieth Army from
the north against the city itself, and the Thirty-First Army from the
east against the SsytschewkaRzhev railway line, which constituted
the lifeline of the German forces fighting there. Between the two was
the somewhat weaker Russian Twenty-Ninth Army, which was also
assigned to the attack.
Under pressure from the attack by the massed Soviet armies, the
German defensive line was pulled back behind the Volga, and the
city of Subzow, which lay at the confluence of the Volga and the
Wasuga rivers, was abandoned. As the Germans withdrew under
heavy pressure from the numerically-superior enemy forces, the
Soviets were able to cross the Wasuga and Ossuga rivers southeast
of Rzhev and south of Subzow; there they established a bridgehead
which was fifteen kilometres wide and eight kilometres deep. The
Soviet forces were now dangerously close to the Ssytschewka- Rzhev
railway line. This as yet unchecked enemy assault caused the German
command to detain three panzer divisions and several infantry
divisions which had already been pulled out of the line for transfer
to the southern front, and send them by fast train to the central
sector. One of these units was the Infantry Division GROSS392

DEUTSCHLAND, another was the 1st Panzer Division; still others

were to follow. The task of these divisions was to halt the enemy
forces which had broken through south and southwest of Subzow,
eliminate the Soviet bridgehead and counterattack to restore the
former defensive line. The dreams of rest and relaxation in France
after the exertions of the southern campaign had been frustrated by
the Soviets. The trains turned off towards the north through Gomel
and Orsha, destination Smolensk station. The trains carrying the first
elements of the I.D. GD arrived in the city on 1 7 / 1 8 August. The
troops were billeted north and west of the city.
Orders from the highest levels of command forbade committing
the division in anything less than full strength. So, despite the
dangerous situation on Ninth Army's front, the troops assembled
and awaited the arrival of the trains carrying the rest of the division.
Their only tasks were reconnaissance and securing their billeting
areas on account of the partisan situation. The free time allowed for
individual training, vehicle maintenance and cleaning of weapons.
During this period the commander of the Division Supply Units GD
strove to once again form his columns into a unit. When the division
was shipped out he had been forced to hand over his column vehicles
to the Luftwaffe units employed in the south, who desperately needed
the cargo space for their purposes. All that was left to commander
Dinaf was a few columns and scratch elements from which he now
assembled a reduced-size supply column in Smolensk. The units
available consisted of three small and one large motor vehicle
column. The bulk of the supply troops remained in Smolensk without
vehicles, waiting for the replacements which would allow them to
reform the unit. For command reasons the four existing columns
were combined into the "Trahn Staffel" and placed under the senior
column commander, Obit. Trahn, who received his orders directly
from the Division lb.
Despite the most adverse road and weather conditions and the
limited cargo space available, the "Trahn Staffel" was able to carry
out its supply duties during the heavy fighting around Rzhev which
began at the beginning of October. Even if the close proximity of the
supply bases just behind the front helped ease the situation, the
efforts of the drivers and maintenance personnel, especially during
the weeks when the roads were little better than muddy tracks,
deserve special recognition.
The period of outward quiet for the division came to an end on 25
August 1942. That evening at 19.30 the division's wheeled elements
set off towards the northeast while the unit's tracked vehicles
followed by rail. On 26 August the march changed direction towards
the north. The troops encamped in forests and near villages.
The reinforced Infantry Regiment GD 1 resumed its march towards
the north on 28 August to prepare for the operations which were to
393

come. Approach roads, assembly areas and firing positions were

scouted to the north and east.
The first unit of the division to occupy positions was the
Panzerjger Battalion G D . The battalion was later relieved by an
assault gun battery. There was little activity by enemy infantry at the
front, and this was especially noticeable between 4 and 9 September.
The Soviet artillery was also quiet, in contrast to earlier when they
had massed an unprecedented concentration of firepower in the area
near the front. The Soviet Air Force was very active over the front
as well as the rear areas. The terrain in the area between Vyazma,
Ssytschewka, Rzhev and Olenin was dominated by large wooded
areas. It was flat and even and featured few fields or clearings; as a
result, fields of view and fire were extremely restricted. There was a
great deal of brush between the wooded areas, as well as marshy
meadows whose subsurface was quite impenetrable. The few roads
that passed through the area were passable only in fair weather. Long
stretches of log road had to be laid in order to keep the routes usable
at all.
The brush-covered and wooded terrain forced the German troops
to adopt a completely different style of fighting then that which they
had become so used to in the Ukraine. Here the battles were fought
over bushes and muddy holes, ditches and woods. Here the combatants were often only metres apart, within hand grenade range.
Here reigned the pistol, the spade, the quicker reaction; here
close-range weapons were the main tools of the combatants.
The weather worsened considerably between 4 and 9 September,
during which the front was conspicuously quiet. Reconnaissance by
the Luftwaffe soon provided the German commanders with a disquieting reason why: the Soviets were preparing for another attack,
which they hoped would result in a decisive breakthrough after so
many failed attempts. They were carting ammunition to their firing
positions and increasing the number of guns. The Soviets regrouped
and by weakening other sectors in the Uwarowo- WekschinoKostonossowo area they were able to assemble an assault force of
approximately six divisions in a very confined area in hopes of forcing
the desired breakthrough. Finally on 9 September 1942 the
tension and uncertainty felt by the front-line troops came to an end.
Following a barrage by all weapons, which evoked memories of the
massed fire of the First World War, the Soviets launched their attack
on a very narrow front from the Gostisha Ground near BoltinoSubarewo towards the northwest against the city of Rzhev. After heavy
fighting the Soviet forces succeeded in breaking through in the
direction of MichojewoSsuchtino and by evening were pressuring
the German positions near Tschermassowo.
As expected, the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was
alerted late in the afternoon of 9 September. Its assignment was to
394

halt the advancing enemy forces near Tschermassowo and, following

brief preparations, drive them back to their starting positions,
restoring the former main line of resistance. At approximately 20.00,
as darkness fell, the units began the move into the previously-selected
assembly areas from which they would launch the counterattack early
the following morning. With the onset of darkness the Soviet air force
became active, dropping parachute flares and attacking anything
they spotted moving on the ground. The Soviet aircraft dropped
large numbers of small bombs, inflicting not inconsiderable losses on
the advancing columns.
The move forward and the action that followed was described by
a Gefreiter of 9th Company/I.R. GD 1:
"More rations were issued and as darkness fell we drove off. The
moon shone brightly and we sat in the trucks with our blankets
wrapped around us. Russian bombers circled overhead, as always
dropping plenty of parachute flares and bombs. Under the eerie
illumination of the flares, the vehicles drove in long columns in the
direction of Rzhev, company after company, the battalion and finally
the entire regiment. We sat silently, each with his own thoughts: How
would it go this time? Would all of those driving out for the attack
return again? We knew that the Russians had a terrific number of
artillery pieces in a small area. The column halted. Get out with the
equipment! Everyone picked up his own things, the base plate, the
tube and the bipod, the ammunition bearers their two canisters. We
stood ready to march. The vehicles turned round and we marched
off. The way to the front led over terrible paths and log roads which
had been built by our soldiers. We passed through several destroyed
villages where soldiers from other units sat in bunkers and billets
among the ruins watching us approach. They called out to us,
'GROSSDEUTSCHLAND to the attack!' 'How far are you going
to advance?' 'Hopefully you'll make it!' We waved to them encouragingly and moved on into our assembly area.
We reached our positions as dawn was breaking and waited there
for the order to attack."
The attack order was given, an order that would decide life or death
for thousands, but one that would also decide whether the front held
or collapsed. The order was not given with a light heart. The
commanders knew only too well of the tremendous concentration
of Russian guns trained on the terrain over which the I.D. GD had
to advance. The confidence placed in the all volunteer division was
great. It was a point of honour for every member of the division to
justify this confidence.
The author, who was active in the Division Staff as O1, was an
eyewitness to the inner conflict raging within the division's commander and his la, and had been with them when they received their
first impression of this front. It was at daybreak and they had just
395

arrived with the first of the headquarters personnel and begun to dig
foxholes in a small area overgrown with bushes when a pair of
armoured Soviet IL-2 ground attack aircraft carried out an attack on
the position. Bombs fell all around the foxholes, a field policeman
was blown to bits, wounded screamed and the others trembled in
fear. It was a small foretaste of what was to come. It was in this
inferno that the soldiers were to halt the repeatedly attacking enemy,
throw him back to his starting positions and destroy him. It became
a battle of the unknown front-soldier against superior strength, a
confrontation between the individual and the machine, became a
sacrifice of the nameless German soldier in the hell of a war of
attrition. Only from this view can one fully appreciate the forty-eight
hour attack and the weeks-long defensive battle in the shell-torn earth
before and in Tschermassowo, at the church hill and the box-shaped
wood.
It was the 10th of September 1942. Early that day it may have
been 06.30 the two infantry regiments in the front line set out.
On the left was I.R. GD 1 under the command of Obstlt. Greim. In
the lead were III Battalion and the Assault Gun Battalion GD; to the
left and behind was II Battalion (less 7th Comp.), supported by the
heavy infantry weapons of IV Battalion. I Battalion was in reserve
and was approaching from the area south of Rzhev. The 1st
Regiment set out from the east edge of the wood north of
Tschuprowo in a skirmishing line as the shells from the batteries of
the Artillery Regiment GD whistled overhead on the way to their
targets to the east. To the right was I.R. GD 2, with II and III
Battalions in front and I Battalion, which had not yet arrived, in
reserve. Squadrons of Stukas roared overhead on their way to attack
targets in the enemy's rear. The Panzer Battalion GD stood to the
side in a narrow forest clearing awaiting orders to move out.
The advancing regiments were met at once by heavy artillery and
mortar fire, as well as repeated attacks by Soviet bombers and ground
attack aircraft on a scale not previously encountered. The attack
moved forwards, but only slowly and with heavy casualties. Repeated
Soviet counterattacks, preceded by heavy bombardments from Stalin
Organs and accompanied by tanks, had to be beaten off. The Russian
infantry forces were weak and of little significance, but the Soviets
possessed an abundance of heavy weapons which they employed
cleverly and to good effect. The Panzer Battalion GD was caught in
a surprise barrage and suffered heavy losses in men and equipment.
Mines inflicted further damage, while marshy ground forced the
panzers to bunch up, resulting in additional losses.
As a result of these difficulties, the Grenadiers of I.R. GD 1 failed
to penetrate the village of Tschermassowo on the first day of fighting.
That evening the battalions were forced to dig in on the hills west of
the village. Progress by I.R. GD 2 was also slow. Its objective lay
396

near Hill 197.1 and the village of Kostonossowo on the Gostisha

Brook. At noon, after concentrating all of the heavy weapons
including the Stukas, which provided outstanding cooperation during
this operation the focus of the attack was shifted to the left wing,
while the regiment's right wing was held back due to the open terrain
and the heavy artillery fire which was falling there.
At 16.00 I.R. GD 1 and III Battalion/I.R. GD 2, which was lined
up to the right, again went to the attack. After initial success the
attack had to be called off, because to continue the advance in the
face of the heavy enemy fire would have resulted in too many
casualties.
The regiments went over to the defensive for the night. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Commanding General
expressed their appreciation, as the attack by the I.D. GD had halted
the advance of a Soviet army and a tank corps and forced them onto
the defensive.
On the first day of the counterattack the Flak Battalion GD shot
down ten enemy aircraft, while the Signals Battalion GD accounted
for one with its light machine guns and I.R. GD 2 another three. The
Assault Gun Battalion GD reported the destruction of nineteen
Soviet tanks, thirteen anti-tank guns and two artillery pieces.
It must also be mentioned that during the attack II Battalion/I.R.
GD 2 was almost totally destroyed. Its commander, Hptm. von
Ltzau was killed. Ill Battalion/I.R. GD 1 also reported the death of
the commander of 11th Company, Obit. Kottkamp. Gefr. Backer
was fatally wounded at I.R. 1's command post, while many others
paid for the attack with their lives. Company strengths had been
reduced significantly. The evening report by 2nd Company/I.R. GD
2 was typical. In the morning one of its platoons set out with a
strength of 42 men; that evening it reported the loss of the platoon's
leader and 16 men.
The following description of the first day of the attack was made
by an unidentified member of a mortar platoon in I.R. GD 1:
"Our artillery blanketed the Bolshevik positions with effective fire;
their infantry was pinned down and we approached and broke into
and then through the first positions. In the roar of our artillery we
noticed little resistance from the Russian infantry. Now and then an
occasional shot whistled past. That was good; the Russians were
already on the run and we were pleased with our success.
Then all hell broke loose: the Russian artillery opened fire abruptly
and showered us with shells of every calibre. We were fortunate to
find the former Russian positions in the bushes deep foxholes,
trenches and machine gun positions. Everyone raced for cover in a
hole. Fortunately for us the Russian salvoes fell short!
Then came a second surprise: the Red Air Force appeared. Sixteen
to twenty Martin bombers approached from right to left. The heavy
397

Flak immediately opened fire; the Flak guns roared, our machine
guns hammered away. The black flak bursts appeared in the midst
of the bombers and the tracing rounds snaked upwards like a string
of pearls. Then our fighters appeared on the scene!
Expectantly, I followed the bombs, which hung in the air like an
iron chain and appeared to be falling directly toward us. They must
hit any second; I cowered against the cold earth wall of my hole and
noticed for the first time that there was a 15 cm layer of mud on the
ground. Now!! The earth shook, there was a crash and I was thrown
about my hole. It felt as if I was being lifted. Dirt flew down on me,
and I made myself yet smaller. With my head pressed close to the
earth I found myself looking into the staring eyes of a frog.
I was quite calm. I clung to the damp earth as if I wanted to hang
on and waited. Then it was over; our fighters had brought down one
of the bombers. Again we moved forward. Running in spurts, we
raced singly through the enemy mortar fire. Only too often the shells
exploded damned close, their fragments whizzing viciously through
the air.
We reached a hollow and breathed a little easier. Here at least we
were protected from direct fire. But the shells were soon roaring in
again and exploding on the far slope. Shells now started to strike
near us as well. I looked for a hole and took cover. The fire intensified.
Move to the other side! Pick up your gear and get across the hollow!
By chance my crew was running in a line, quite close together. I was
just about to shout for them to spread out when it happened. Five
metres ahead and to our right there was a flash and a crack. Struck
by the shock wave, I was spun around a full turn. Fragments whizzed
past me with a brief, sickening swish; I buckled over and fell biting
powder smoke burned my eyes and lungs. I had felt a short, hard
blow on my upper arm and my right knee burned terribly. After a
quick survey I realised that I had been hit by several shell fragments.
Holes had been torn in my service blouse and the knee of my pants
was shredded.
But what had become of my comrades who had been nearby? They
were all lying on the ground, some in cover. My gunner, a Berliner,
shouted, 'I'm wounded, get me out of here!' The mortar commander
cried out and the youngest ammunition bearer, a cheerful lad from
Vienna, lay with fragments in his back and face. I heard him say,
'I've been hit in both cheeks.' Of the six men in my crew, three lay
wounded on the ground.
We other three dragged them to nearby foxholes and shell holes.
I opened Fritz' uniform and noticed a shrapnel wound in his upper
thigh; he must have been in considerable pain, because he groaned
and swore, 'Damn it, why did I have to get it now?' Two infantrymen
were going back for ammunition. A brief handshake: 'Take care of

398

First Day of the Attack by I.D. GD, South of Rzhev

10 September 1942

Sketch from a Situation Report Illustrating the Position Southeast of Rzhev

yourself; be glad that you're out of the shit; and write from home!'
Then they carried him off, and the other two wounded men as well.
I squatted in the shell hole. I couldn't kneel, it hurt too much. My
arm was still burning. There were little holes all through my uniform.
Then there was another rush of shells. My section leader decided to
move ahead to a thicket which lay in front of us. As soon as we got
there we began digging foxholes, especially up front in a small
hollow, so we could keep our heads down. Shell after shell impacted
around and between us. An infantry gun drove up into our midst and
opened up a rapid fire. The Russians replied, but their fire was short
and fell on us.
Now and then I called, 'Akteris, Fritsch?' 'Yes, what's up?'
'Everything still OK?' 'Yes, everything's all right.' After another
barrage I saw Akteris running back during a pause in the shelling;
his hand was bandaged and blood-red. It had been ripped up by a
shell fragment and he had to go back to the main dressing station.
Now there was one more gone. It was different here than in the
south. Then the order came: Get ready, we're moving out! We stood
up and, bent low, moved forward in the cover of the bushes.
Someone was missing. Who then? Gerdes wasn't with us. Two men
went back and found him sitting in his foxhole, bent over with his
head on his knees. They called to him and shook him, but suddenly
they realised that he would wake no more Gerdes was dead. A
shell fragment had hit him as he sat in his hole and killed him. When
the two returned we stood silently for a moment. Then we moved
on.
Tank shells howled in direct fire straight over the bushes. Instinctively everyone stopped and ducked down. The shells crashed
through the branches and landed beyond us. Forwards! We hurried
through a thicket and suddenly ran directly into a swamp. We cursed,
but what was the good of it? The shells were now coming down as
thick as hail. I wasn't going to lie down here! My boots squeaked,
they were full of water. Once again, all that we could do was dig in.
Before beginning to dig we took a quick look around to see if there
were any holes close by. There was a Russian bomb crater as well
as a pair of foxholes. I jumped straight into one of the holes and fell
asleep.
I couldn't have slept long; the sun was already low on the horizon.
It was becoming cold and darkness was falling slowly. Tracers flitted
here and there; there were shots from both sides. The heavy artillery
fire slowly died away, and the infantry fire ebbed and then stopped.
We were able to stand up again and walk about freely. Now we could
see those comrades who had survived the day's fighting. New
positions were sought and the section leaders briefed. There was no
sense in digging a hole; after three spadefuls water was already
running in.
401

We were ready to move but our stomachs now made their presence
felt. During the day there had been no time to think of food.
Fortunately, they were now able to get some food up to us. It was
cold, but even cold noodles tasted good.
I heard the word being passed through 6th Company, which was
in position on our left: 'II Battalion prepare to change positions.'
That's always the way it happened; just when we were ready to get
some sleep they ordered a change of positions. Cursing softly we
gathered up our things and shuffled off. The company, which was
marching in file, was to move into new positions 300 metres ahead.
Suddenly, flares climbed high into the sky and hung motionless
above us. We froze; any movement could give away our position.
Then we moved on.
Quickly we were directed into our new positions. We had to be
cautious; above us buzzed a sewing machine, a slow, four-motor
bomber. From a great height it dropped one parachute flare after
another. If it recognised something on the ground it would immediately drop its bombs. It was always an awkward feeling when the
crate flew directly overhead. One always felt that it was staying right
there overhead. Then there was a brief crash, the earth shook and
there was an infernal flashing and cracking.
I wrapped myself in my tent-square and, deathly tired, fell fast
asleep."
At the same time all along the front line men fell into the nearest
hole, where they were overcome by exhaustion and fell into a
dreamless sleep. It was not yet time to rest for the panzers, the assault
guns, the artillery and the heavy infantry weapons, however; they
still had to take on fuel and ammunition, make guns and equipment
ready for action, load ammunition belts, and oil and grease the
equipment. First the machines, then the men; that was the first order
of business at the end of a day of fighting. That was the way it had
to be.
The night passed quietly, except for scattered harassing fire from
the enemy artillery. The Soviets had felt the effect of the thrust into
their attack; they, too, had suffered casualties and were forced to
regroup.
On the morning of 11 September, the second day of the attack,
the counterattack by the I.R. GD was to be resumed on both sides
of the Gostischka Valley towards Jurewo. However, as soon as dawn
broke the Soviets again opened up with heavy artillery, mortar and
multiple rocket launcher fire. On the division's left, in the 72nd
Infantry Division's sector, the Soviets, attacking from the bottomland
around the brook, succeeded in penetrating into the village of
Michojewo. While I Battalion/I.R. GD 1, which was in reserve, was
sent there at once to support the 72nd Division, II Battalion/I.R. GD
1 attempted to take the village of Tschermassowo and the graveyard
402

hill. In the face of repeated enemy counterattacks, supported by

tanks, the attack's progress was slow. The Assault Gun Battalion GD
sortied several times to help beat off the counterattacks and by day's
end had destroyed fifteen Russian tanks. The attackers got as far as
the TschermassowoMichojewo road and took possession of the
north south thoroughfare. That evening III Battalion/I.R. GD 1,
which was deployed to the right of II Battalion, pushed into the
western part of Tschermassowo and was able to gain a foothold
there. A heavy barrage seriously wounded the commander of III
Battalion, Major Heesemann, and the battalion adjutant.
The division's Panzer Battalion, which was committed between the
two regiments west of Ssuchtino, was able to reach and hold the hills
west of the village. This was accomplished in the face of extremely
heavy artillery and defensive fire and the panzers were only able to
hold onto the ground they had won with the greatest difficulty. Fire
from Soviet tanks and anti-tank guns prevented a further advance.
German tank losses were terrible: by evening only four were still
operational, all the others were either damaged or destroyed. The
commander of 3rd Company, Obit. Perner, was seriously wounded
when his tank was hit; Uffz. Hess was killed in the same vehicle.
I.R. GD 2 (less the bulk of II Battalion, which had been severely
mauled the previous day) launched an attack on Kostonossowo, with
Kampfgruppe Grosser III Battalion, reinforced by the heavy
weapons and those remnants of II Battalion which were still fit for
duty on the right, and I Battalion, which had assembled in the
Gostischka valley, on the left. In the afternoon the force was able to
approach Crossroads 197.1, which was defended by enemy snipers,
and take possession of it despite heavy casualties. It was here that
Lt. Brockhoff, I Battalion's adjutant, was killed by enemy artillery fire.
Between the two attacking spearheads the German front lagged
behind in the Gostischka Valley. The Soviet defenders had holed up
there and were resisting bitterly. Flanking sniper fire from the valley
was interfering with the advance. Since the beginning of the attack
the Soviet artillery there were 50-60 batteries covering the I.D.
GD's attack sector, with the light guns emplaced close to the front
had shifted further to the northwest. The Soviet artillery fire was
now concentrated on 197.1, Ssuchtino and Michojewo. This fact led
the German command to expect a resumption of the Soviet attack
against the left wing (I.R. GD 1) with constant screening fire to the
left.
In addition to the difficulties in directing the German artillery fire
caused by technical, problems with communications, the A R K O
(artillery commander) had not sufficiently concentrated his artillery
units. As a result, the Artillery Regiment GD had to request assistance
from and coordinate with its two neighbouring regiments on every

403

A R\ O

barrage. Despite this, both units provided outstanding support and

assistance.
The second day of the attack was also costly in lives lost and soldiers
wounded. Among the casualties were Schtze Buse and Uffz. Jud,
both of 7th Company/I.R. 1, killed, and Ogefr. Mller, missing.
The best descriptions of the day's events come from the men who
bore the brunt of the fighting. The following account of the attack
on Kostonossowo was made by a messenger from 2nd Company/I
Battalion/I.R. GD 2:
"Thick, gray fog rose from the hollows and valleys. A pink flare
rose into the sky near a line of hills. That must be where the Russian
positions are. All was still quiet as we moved forward over another
hill. Not a shot was fired; the usual morning quiet persisted until long
after we had dug in. And digging was not easy in the clay soil near
Rzhev.
To the left was a village. It appeared to be relatively intact. Not far
to the right were the heavy infantry guns of 17th Company, which
now began to bark. Several rounds flew overhead on their way to
the Ivans. The Russians were not long in responding and three times
as many shells came back.
From then on the quiet was over. A many-voiced orchestra began
the day's overture which controlled life and death on the battlefield
before Rzhev. After the pleasant campaign on the Don this was war
without pity. I was still a green novice, because until now I had not
learned what war was really about. I couldn't differentiate between
the sounds of the guns firing and the exploding shells. I lay huddled
in my almost completed hole with my knees paining terribly. Above
me the air buzzed like a beehive. It went on for hours. It was a
poisonous brew; humming and buzzing, crashing and bursting,
ahead of us, behind my hole, to the right and left. In my helplessness
I began to pray in my nervousness I rolled little balls of clay between
my fingers. I heard a cry, then whimpering and moaning. From
somewhere came the drawn-out and terrified cry: 'medic!' All of this
increased my fear of that which I could not change, my fear of the
unknown.
The sun was high in the sky and casting its rays into my hole when,
after an endlessly long time, I finally dared look outside. It was
midday. It also seemed to be quieter. Was it a midday pause or a
pause before an attack, the calm before the storm? With the
company commander, Lt. Hensel, we changed positions over to the
village of Ssuchtino.
I was the last in line. Ahead was Ofeldw. Schnknecht, the leader
of our company headquarters personnel. I had seen him a few
minutes earlier, sitting in his hole with another Feldwebel, laughing
and talking. There was a rumbling in the village behind us: tank
motors! Then an explosion out of the blue, just a few metres in front
404

of us. As if struck by lightning I leapt into cover in a hole somewhere.

Something had hit me on the head, probably just a lump of earth.
Thank God I had my helmet on. There was another fragment stuck
in my tunic.
I looked around. Hermann! He was holding both hands to his face;
blood was welling out between his fingers. I was gripped by icy fear.
'Hermann, what is it', I shouted, because the enemy artillery had
resumed its inferno. Ill Battalion was attacking near Ssuchtino with
tanks and assault guns and the Russians were firing and firing it
was a real witches cauldron!
Hermann took his bloody hands from his face; his steel helmet lay
at his knees. I stared into the bloody face. His nose had been
shattered and one eye socket was empty. The other eye was
bloodshot. I tore open a dressing packet with my teeth and bandaged
his head. I held him down under cover with my right hand and tried
to reassure him as he whimpered about his eyesight.
Gefr. Gerhard tting took Hermann by the hand and led him to
the rear to the medical bunker. I then ran across to the houses in
Ssuchtino."
The situation was no easier farther to the right. A member of II
Battalion/I.R. GD 1 described his experiences:
"I was wakened suddenly at 02.00. 'Rehfeldt, wake up!' I climbed
out of my hole, slung my rifle, took the glasses and stuck two hand
grenades in my belt. The half-moon hung in the sky, it was crystal
clear and cold. I stuck my hands in my pants pockets and shuffled
back and forth in front of the positions with an eye in the direction
of the enemy.
Now and then someone fired a flare; here and there a machine
gun rattled. The artillery was silent.
Then, suddenly, there was a call from ahead: 'Hello, where is the
9th Company's command post?' 'Here', I shouted. Two men came
in bringing a wounded man with them. I went with them to the medic
and asked who they were. One of them was from 4th Platoon and
in fact I recognised him. He was lying on a tent-square, groaning and
writhing in pain.
'Hein, man, where did you get it?'
'Here, through the thigh have you got anything to drink?'
The medic passed him his canteen and the exhausted man drank
greedily.
I asked him what had happened. He told me: 'I had brought some
wounded back to the aid station and was about to return. But I wasn't
sure where the company was so I went along with a messenger from
14th Company who was leaving for the battalion command post.
We lost our way in the dark and ran into a Russian patrol. We knew
there was only a few of them and decided to try and take them
prisoner. I shouted, 'Stoi, stoi rukki werch!` Then the Russians
405

opened fire. The man from 14th Company was killed instantly and
I got it in the thigh. The Russians beat it, and I had to lay there for
five hours in the cold; I couldn't move. After a while I called for help
and. . .' The wounded man had made his report in a halting voice,
but his strength now left him and he fell asleep.
The other two told me that they had heard moaning and, finally,
calls for help. They crawled forward and found him. The messenger
was already dead.
The wounded man was immediately evacuated to the rear in a half
track which had brought up some ammunition. All of the newly
delivered munitions rifle bullets, hand grenades, concentrated
charges, crates of mortar ammunition, boxes of anti-tank and
anti-aircraft rounds were concealed in holes in the ground to keep
them from being spotted from the air.
Otherwise, my two-hour watch passed uneventfully. I was glad to
be able to get a few hours of sleep in my hole. When I awoke I
couldn't believe my eyes, the sun was shining brightly. I asked for
the time: 'Nine o'clock, man, you slept well!'
We were to attack; orders arrived to get ready. Our machine gun
platoon broke down its weapons and moved into its jumping-off
position it must start soon. We were to advance 800 metres, as
that's where the Russian positions were thought to be. Events were
to prove quite different.
Our artillery opened fire with every gun; the hour of the attack had
arrived. We jumped from our holes; the heavy shells roared overhead. The 2l'ers exploded in the enemy positions. The rifle companies charged forwards we followed and reached the hill where
we were met by scattered rifle fire. With a shout of 'Hurray!' we
stormed ahead. Then a roaring and howling in the air. The sound
of heavy guns firing boomed over from the Russian lines. A black
curtain rose in front of us, a wall of exploding shells. We froze in our
tracks.
None of us had ever encountered such barrage fire before. The
earth rumbled and shook from the detonations of the bursting shells.
There was no way we could get through that! A few daredevils leapt
forward in an attempt to get through the wall of fire they soon lay
dead or wounded. It was useless.
We threw ourselves to the ground. Beside me lay body upon body.
One of them was my section leader, a young N C O of twenty-one
years. During the winter, while he was still a Gefreiter, he had been
with me in the same crew. We lay flat, as only one under such heavy
artillery fire could. The focus of the enemy fire lay in front of us
surely there could be nothing left alive there.
I looked into the face of my NCO; he was staring fixedly ahead,
then suddenly he fell backwards. I felt a pain in my leg. Clumps of
earth and shell fragments whizzed overhead and smacked into the
406

ground in front of us. Slowly I felt along my leg with my hand and
turned my head to look; no hole, nothing it had probably been
nothing more than a lump of earth.
Once again there was a roar and shells howled our way, crashing
into the earth just in front of us; again earth and dirt rained down on
us, bouncing off our helmets. The terrific noise left our ears ringing.
When we looked up during a pause in the firing smoke was drifting
overhead. My N C O said that it was impossible for us to stay here.
We had to get back to our holes and await the counterattack there.
Then we heard a familiar roar in the air; 'Stalin Organ', someone
shouted. Everyone knew what that meant: death, a multitude of
death, accompanied by an ear-splitting crashing and bursting. I
looked up and saw the rockets falling, apparently directly towards
us. We lay pressed tight against the earth, our fingers clutching the
grass and waited.
There was a whistle followed by a series of explosions again
fragments whizzed overhead. The explosions came faster. Forty-two
shells hammered down in rapid succession on an area no larger than
a soccer field. The rockets fell close together like barrage fire. Powder
smoke and dust mixed together, hanging before us like a black wall.
The wind drove the cloud toward us. It burned the eyes and irritated
the throat and lungs. Then, all at once, there was a whistling howl,
approaching unbelievably fast. Seconds later shells were exploding
in our midst. Fragments whizzed and whistled around us, mixed with
dirt and clumps of earth and grass. The next salvo was already on
its way. And now there began an almost uninterrupted howling,
crashing and bursting, a whizzing and whistling that seemed to have
no end. Spent shell fragments and clumps of earth showered down
harmlessly on us.
Speechless, I stared at a glowing fragment which had just missed
me and was sticking out of the ground barely 50 cm in front of my
face. Wouldn't the damned Russians ever stop?
Finally, the enemy fire shifted further to our rear, and we could
again raise our heads. The barrage had rolled over us like a
steamroller. Some of our men were already going back. Soon we,
too, would have to move back to our old positions. There was only
sporadic artillery fire; the main weight of the enemy's fire now lay to
our left.
The command came: 'Move out!' I picked up my ammunition
canisters, jumped up and raced down the slope towards my old
foxhole, pursued all the way by shells. I got to my hole and with a
leap I was in. I had made it!
Scattered rifle bullets were still whistling from behind me, hissing
past over my hole. I finally recovered my breath, stood up and
prepared myself for defence. I laid hand grenades at the rim of the

407

hole and released the safety on my rifle. Then I crouched in the safety
of my hole, watching for the Russians but they didn't come.
Observation revealed that the Russian infantry was pulling back;
our fire was probably too punishing for them. The Russian infantry
alone couldn't have stopped us if their artillery hadn't laid down
barrage fire. We moved forward again in pursuit of the retreating
enemy infantry. As dusk fell we occupied the hill and dug in deep.
It had certainly been a hot day!
The word came down from the right: '9th Company pick up
hot food and rations.' Each section was to send two men, one with
mess dishes and the other with a tent-square. I picked up my
tent-square and we set out. All we had to do was follow the deep
tracks left by the assault guns and soon we came to a ravine which
had been the scene of heavy fighting the day before.
The way to the battalion command post had been heavily-travelled.
All around lay equipment, empty ammunition canisters, wicker shell
baskets and shot-up trucks. Flares shot upwards every few moments.
The heavy shells from our long-range guns roared overhead; we
could scarcely hear the guns firing or the impact of the shells.
Darkness lay over the battlefield.
We reached the rations truck. Quickly and efficiently we were
issued food, coffee and cold rations. Soon we were ready and began
the trip back to our unit.
When we got back our boys were waiting expectantly in their
foxholes. The food was soon distributed and everyone spooned up
the cold barley soup. Their pleasure was increased further by the
cigarettes we had been able to buy."
Another day had come to an end, another advance at the cost of
much sweat and many casualties. On the left the former main line
of resistance was again in German hands; in the centre and on the
right it still remained to be recovered. There was not much farther
to go, only a few hundred metres. The corps to which the division
was attached issued orders calling off the attack in the division's
sector. The cost that had to be paid for every metre of ground was
too high. Although the Soviet infantry forces in this sector were weak,
they had amassed a tremendous artillery force. The day's objective,
to prevent an enemy breakthrough, had been achieved. The division
was to consolidate its positions and hold. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
was going over to the defensive.
Beginning at 02.00, the 16th of September saw the Soviets launch
one attack after another. Heavy artillery fire, backed up by fire from
Stalin Organs, fell on the German positions, forcing the defenders
deeper underground. It was clear that the enemy wanted to break
through north of the Gostischka by any means necessary. But on
this day the German artillery in the sector, under the direction of the
Artillery Regiment GD's C O , concentrated its fire so quickly and
408

accurately on the enemy assembly areas and attack operations that

by midday the enemy's strength was exhausted. As well, the Stukas
now began to attack in waves and, when the Soviets resumed their
attacks at approximately 16.00, these were smashed before they
could reach the German lines. The Artillery Regiment GD alone fired
3,750 rounds on this one day. It was fortunate that deliveries of
ammunition by rail were now proceeding relatively smoothly, otherwise this defensive battle could not have been fought.
Following this defensive success, on 13 September the pocket
before Kudrjawzewo in the Gostischka Valley and to the south was
to be cleared. The inner wings of both regiments set out following a
pre-attack artillery bombardment, but made little headway in the face
of extremely heavy Russian fire and bogged down in front of the
strongly-fortified enemy positions. Ill Battalion/I.R. GD 1 did, however, succeed in capturing and clearing the ravine west of Tschermassowo. At the same time, the Soviets tried three more times to
break through between Michojewo and Tschermassowo and failed
in each case. The Soviet artillery fire remained heavy, so that a
repetition of the German attack would be doomed to failure. For the
Germans the only hope of gaining ground lay in patrol-type operations. On the other hand, the German artillery was slowly gaining
the upper hand in concentration and rate of fire. Soviet batteries
were spotted by the 116th Armoured Observation Battery and then
silenced.
Since morning the ARKO 122 had assumed command of the
129th, 172nd and GD Artillery regiments. On 14 September both
sides remained in their positions. The Soviets instead turned their
attention to Rzhev's northern front, launching an attack preceded by
heavy artillery fire and bombing attacks. What was the reason for
the change in tactics? Perhaps the Soviets thought that the defenders
had been sufficiently weakened to allow them to launch concentric
attacks against the city, the bulwark of the German defence. Perhaps
they were only trying to take the pressure off the local sector in order
to allow their forces there to regroup and gather their strength.
According to statements by prisoners the Soviets were moving in
new, powerful tank forces.
In fact, the first enemy tank appeared at 07.00 on 15 September
in an assault on Michojewo and the terrain northwest of the cemetery
hill. Others followed. Several accurate salvoes from the guns of the
Artillery Regiment GD knocked out six of the Soviet tanks. Only a
few got as far as Michojewo, where they were destroyed by II
Battalion/I.R. 1, the assault guns and anti-tank guns. Hptm. Hnes,
the battalion commander, and his adjutant, Lt. von Mitlaff, were killed
by a direct hit on the battalion command post as was everyone else
inside with the exception of the battalion medical officer, who

409

escaped unhurt. Also killed there was Lt. Schlenga, platoon leader
in 14th Company/I.R. 1.
It was lucky for the defenders that the Soviet tanks attacked in
waves of only about thirty instead of massing them for one, concentrated assault. As a result of the Soviet tactics, the defenders had
time to knock out the tanks before they penetrated the infantry's
positions. On 15 September the Soviets lost a total of 102 tanks.
On that day the Artillery Regiment GD was able to raise the number
of enemy tanks destroyed by its guns since 28 June 1942 from 298
to 304.
The days between 15 and 21 September 1942 were marked by
repeated Soviet attacks and probes, all of which were beaten off.
The period between the 17th and 21st was a little quieter because
of poor weather, which brought steady rain. The resulting mud
severely hampered movement on both sides of the front.
One loss worthy of note was the death on 19 September of
Obermusikmeister Grosch, who was serving as executive officer with
the I.R. GD 1. He was killed by a direct hit. Grosch had formerly
been the second band leader with the Wach Regiment in Berlin.
Even the days of relative quiet were full of danger. Positional
warfare demanded daily sacrifices through artillery fire, mines and
snipers. The following is a description of the defensive battles
somewhere near Tschermassowo:
"Russian bombers approaching! Two machines flew directly over
our positions at low level. They sprayed out a grey-green liquid, which
settled to earth in dense clouds. Gas? If it was, then it was adieu. We
had no gas masks at the front. We had never needed them before.
Soon a thick wall of smoke stood between the fronts; now the
Russians must come any minute.
Then there was a roar behind us. The air above was filled with a
howling and whistling as our artillery laid down a barrage. Over there
mushroom clouds shot up into the air the fire was on target! The
Bolsheviks didn't even leave their holes. The attack which they had
likely been planning never took place. The day ended with heavy
artillery fire from both sides.
The call went out: four volunteers to the platoon leader! I buckled
up and ran to the command post. The platoon leader showed us
there were four soldiers including me two dead from our company
about 30 metres in front of our lines. Moving individually, we ran
forward and laid the first soldier on a tent-square. He still had an iron
grip on his rifle and we had to carry him back together with his
weapon.
Ready, go! and we ran back. We took a breather in a trench,
then hauled our sad cargo to the battalion command post. That
evening there were six to eight dead from the day's fighting laid out
there. They lay in a row, silent and cold. We laid our burden next to
410

Operation Max and Moritz.

411

the others and looked silently into the faces of the dead, recognising
many good friends with whom we had exchanged friendly words only
the day before.
There was always the uncertainty: would the next shot be meant
for me? or would it pass harmlessly by? We had long ago grown
sick of this damned, punishing war in the swamps and bushes, wild
forests and wide, seemingly endless plains of this damned Russia!
But every man knew that we had to fight on to the end until we had
achieved the complete destruction of bolshevism. Otherwise there
would never be any peace!" 21 September passed much like any
other day in the last few weeks without anything special taking place
at least as far as the senior command authorities were concerned.
Lt. von Carlowitz, a platoon leader in 9th Company/I.R. GD 1, was
killed on this day.
Things were livelier farther north near Rzhev. There, perhaps as
a diversion, or a change in the focus of their attack following their
lack of success at the Gostischka Valley, the bolsheviks charged the
positions of the German 6th Infantry Division. They achieved several
local penetrations and began to wear down the few defenders in the
positions at the edge of the city with their heavy fire. How long could
the defenders hold out? Was the city in direct danger? Was the
bastion of the German defences to fall after all? Once again it was
the I.D. GD which was called in to help save the city of Rzhev. The
Reconnaissance Battalion GD, under the command of Rittmeister
Wtjen, which until now had been standing idly by as corps reserve,
was alerted by the Chief of-Staff of XXVII Army Corps and instructed
to find a way to Rzhev-South and establish contact with the 6th
Infantry Division fighting there. Combat was to be expected. It was
learned from Generalmajor Gromann, the division's commander,
that the Russians had attacked on both sides of the railway line with
powerful tank and infantry forces and had pushed in the German
main line of resistance.
While it was still dark, the battalion less the armoured car
squadron set out in the direction of Rzhev for employment by VI
Army Corps which was in overall command there. The commander
of the 6th Infantry Division was considering three possible uses for
the Reconnaissance Battalion GD:
1. Participation in a counterattack to restore the old main line of
resistance;
2. Occupy the position at the northern edge of Rzhev;
3. Occupy the south bank of the Volga.
The Reconnaissance Battalion GD moved into the southern part
of Rzhev, the so-called lower section, and prepared for its next action.
The unit was kept on alert, but its only activity on 22 September was

412

the construction of positions on the south bank of the Volga. Late

that evening, however, the situation in the front lines demanded
reinforcement. At approximately 23.15 the 2nd and 4th Squadrons,
reinforced by elements of 5th Squadron, moved into the defensive
positions in northern Rzhev. The 3rd Squadron was placed under
the command of the neighbouring 473rd Infantry Regiment which
was manning the sector west of the railway/road sector. Throughout
the night Soviet aircraft known to the Germans as 'Klara Zetkin" or
the 'sewing machine" dropped bombs on every recognisable target.
And there were plenty of targets as the squadrons moved in columns
through the moonlit city past the "blue houses" of the White Square
and took up their positions. Lt Parusel, the battalion's executive
officer, was so severely wounded by fragments that he died a short
while later.
The 22nd of September was also the day on which a daring
operation was carried out by the Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD.
Following painstaking preparations, and supported by the artillery
and infantry, the attack was directed against the enemy bunkers on
the so-called cemetery hill due east of the town of Tschermassowo,
from which the Soviets had made repeated breakouts and where
their artillery observers were undoubtedly located. The enemy had
an excellent view of the German positions from the hill. If the German
forces could capture it, then they would be able to see far to the east
into the enemy's rear, making possible effective countermeasures
against the Soviet artillery positions.
The Artillery Regiment GD organised the fire direction for the
operation in an exemplary fashion. Not only did the regiment assign
its own observers to the operation, which had been code named
"Max and Moritz", but it ensured that the guns opened fire at the
exact minute, that the fire was lifted when necessary, directed fire
for effect, and so on. The fire support was vital for the attacking 2nd
and 3rd Companies of the Sturm-Pionier Battalion under their
company commanders Warschnauer and Hckel, as well as 7th
Company which was to break out from the I.R. GD 1's left wing.
Satchel charges, hand grenades, flamethrowers, spades, knives
these were the weapons of the Sturmpioniere. In the days leading
up to the attack they carefully reconnoitred the terrain, their objective
and their point of departure. The attack had been tested and
practised on mock objectives time and again; every manual operation
and the position of every man was laid down, everyone was prepared
to carry out his role in the attack.
At the same time, the entire front along the inner wings of both of
the positional regiments was to be pushed forward in order to achieve
a shortened and significantly better defensive position. Therefore, as
the attack began, the infantry stood ready to take advantage of the
surprise and confusion caused by the Pioniers' attack. It was 16.30
413

 Stuka support had been requested and the entire artillery force
stood ready to fire. The description of the attack begins with a factual
report by the I.R. GD 1 and is followed by an account of the
experiences of a Gefreiter Sturmpionier.
The following is the daily report by the I.R. GD 1, from whose
positions the operation began:
"Through Operation 'Max and Moritz' the southeast part of
Tschermassowo, the cemetery hill and the Gostischka valley were to
be taken from the enemy and incorporated into our own main
defensive position. Ill Battalion moved into its assembly area at
15.45. At 17.00 followed a sudden Stuka attack on the cemetery
hill and the Gostischka valley, as well as a barrage by all of our
artillery. Surprisingly, enemy resistance was comparatively weak.
The 2nd and 3rd Companies of the Stu.Pi.Btl. GD, which had moved
up into III Battalion's sector, were able to cross the enemy's barrage
fire zone very quickly and began clearing out the bunkers in the
Gostischka valley and at the southern edge of the small wood with
satchel charges and flamethrowers. Support by the attached Assault
Gun Battalion GD was very good, and by 17.00 our troops had
already taken the cemetery hill. The hill was cleared as was the gully
to the south.
7th Company cleared the ravine east of the cemetery hill which
had been named 'Prittwitz hollow'. The attack was carried forward
so forcefully that the enemy gave up 'panzer hill' (a neighbouring hill
on which there were several knocked-out tanks) and fled. At approximately 17.30 it was reported free of the enemy and the
neighbouring unit on the left should have occupied it. Unfortunately,
this was not done, and during the course of the evening the enemy
once again took possession of the hill.
By 18.00 it could be reported that the attack's objectives had been
reached. Ill Battalion/I.R. GD 1 set out to relieve the two Pionier
companies which had carried out the assault and, at 18.45, took
over the positions at the eastern edge of Tschermassowo and on the
cemetery hill. The situation that evening was as follows:
In the bottom land 150 metres south of the cemetery hill, the right
wing of III/I.R. 1 had contact on the right with units of I.R. GD 2. The
bulk of I.R. GD 2 was still lagging behind. The cemetery hill itself was
firmly in our hands. Contact existed there between the inner wing of
II and III Battalions/I.R. GD 1 and their neighbour on the left, III
Battalion/lO5th Inf.Rgt. When darkness fell the units regrouped for
defence and consolidated their new positions.
The Pionier company under Lt. Hckel set out against the small
wood which it reached in twelve minutes after storming eighty
bunkers. The company under Lt. Warschnauer was even more

414

Positions at the Edge of Rzhev

successful: it took the sections of Tschermassowo which remained

in enemy hands and from there stormed forward against the
cemetery hill. In the first assault the company took more than 120
heavily-defended enemy bunkers within eighteen minutes. The
momentum of the company's assault was so great that it advanced
far past its objective and continued on in pursuit of the enemy. Obit.
Warschnauer earned the Knight's Cross, which was presented to
him later for this outstanding action."
Gefreiter Hans Bittner of 3rd Company, Sturm Pionier Battalion
GD took part in this operation and provided the following account:
"Finally the sun came up; the night had been quite cool. We had
been in our foxholes since the previous evening. We already knew
the terrain. In front of us was a knocked-out T-34 which the Russians
were using as an observation post; behind and to the right on the
horizon was a small wood range, about 600 metres.
We had already been here twice before and had dug the foxholes
in which we now squatted the first time around. In front of us all was
quiet. Behind me to the right sat a Berliner. He crawled towards the
man next to him; then. . . a crack and my chum cried out. A shot
from a sniper had grazed his buttocks. Our first casualty and we had
only just arrived! Later, during the attack, he played coat-check girl
and stayed with our greatcoats.
The day passed slowly. The air smelled of freshly-dug earth, and
only now and then was a shot heard.
A call came in on the field telephone. The attack was to begin in
half an hour. It was 16.30. We were to get up and out of our holes
during the third Stuka attack, objective: the small wood to our right.
Attack as far as the cemetery wall, no farther!
It was time to get ready; coats off, belts buckled, hand grenades
and satchel charges stowed, rifle in hand and wait.
Finally the familiar drone: the Stukas were coming. Flares were
fired to let the bombers know the position of our front line. Then the
dance began. The first Stuka peeled off into its dive, then the second
and then another. The air was filled with such a howling and roaring
that one could think it couldn't possibly get any louder. Then came
the crashing and detonation of the bombs. One mushroom cloud
after another shot up into the air until there was a solid wall of smoke
and dust in front of us. Then the Stukas flew away overhead, the
roar of their motors adding to the horrible concert.
Get ready! The Stukas returned and once again dived on their
targets. Now. . . go! We climbed from our holes, almost as if we were
on the training field. Obit. Hckel raised his arm, pointing in the
direction where we were to attack. We leapt forward; a hundred
metres, two-hundred, then. . . watch out! Mines! Yes, there they
were, lying in the open, small green wooden boxes. An N C O stepped
on one and had a foot blown off. The rest of us were through quickly.

416

In long rows we passed through the gap. We were a third of the way
to our objective and not a shot had been fired. The nerve-racking
howling of the Stukas and our artillery seemed to have confused the
Russians somewhat.
Then, we spotted movement ahead. A commissar was chasing his
people around and the earth-brown figures were running about in
confusion. Then the whistling and buzzing began. So now it was
becoming serious. But we were already too close. Hand grenades
out, throw, take cover and up again. Soon we were in among the
Russian foxholes. The bolsheviks that hadn't run away raised their
hands. We stormed on into the wood, or better between the shattered
tree trunks. Ahead of us was the wall, but our momentum was so
great that we wanted to keep going. But the order came: Halt
advance no farther!
But why? Why now? But orders were orders. The word came
through to assemble. The whole thing had taken scarcely half an
hour. Then infantry came and occupied the position.
From this hill with its small wood we had a terrific view. We could
look down into three valleys, and to the northeast we could see the
Russians still running.
Then the first shells came in; the Russian artillery was making its
presence felt again. The word came down: Pioniers pull back. We
were to move back to our jumping-off positions.
Groups of three, assemble the wounded! We worked our way back
and soon we were again at the mine-belt. An N C O came towards
us with two Russian prisoners. We called to him, 'Watch out, mines!',
but one of the Russians stepped on one of the green boxes and the
second man right behind him. There was a loud crash and I couldn't
see anything for the smoke and dust. I couldn't hear a thing for at
least an hour.
We moved back to the old infantry position and for us it was time
to rest."
The infantry battalions quickly set about consolidating the newlywon positions and preparing them for defence. It was certain that it
wouldn't be long before the Russians tried to win back their former
main line of resistance. The important thing now was to hold on to
the vital hill with its excellent view into the enemy's rear.
On the following day, 23 September 1942, the enemy began his
desperate effort to regain the lost territory. If that were not enough,
a period of bad weather now set in. The continuous rain made it
difficult to walk along the trenches. The water stood 30 to 50
centimetres deep in the foxholes in which the men had to hold out
day and night under heavy artillery and mortar fire.

417

Meanwhile, the elements of the Reconnaissance Battalion GD

which had been deployed in positions at the edge of Rzhev had been
involved in heavy fighting since early morning. Soviet forces succeeded in breaking through 4th Squadron to the city limits, where
they were halted by the last reserves. Lt. Kaupa, the battalion's
executive officer, described the action:
"The racket began as dawn broke at approximately 04.30 on 23
September 1942. Listening in on the phone, Obit. Schubert, commander of 4th Squadron, learned that about 100 enemy soldiers had
broken through the main line of resistance manned by the infantry
in front of 4th Squadron. Then the following events took place: 4th
Squadron may have been in its foxholes for about an hour when the
noise of battle in front of our sector increased noticeably. It sounded
as if the firing was coming nearer. It was slowly becoming light.
Suddenly, several exhausted, excited soldiers of the 18th Infantry
Regiment, which was deployed up ahead, came running back
shouting, 'the Russians have broken through!'
The men prepared the machine guns and other weapons calmly
and with cool confidence. With that type of firepower and the new
rapid firing machine gun (MG 42) we were ready for anything. The
elements of the 18th Regiment that had pulled back concentrated
themselves on our left wing.
The enemy attack collapsed under the concentrated fire of our
weapons. Individual Russians tried to escape. At that moment I sent
2nd Platoon and a section from the neighbouring 3rd Platoon on
the left to the counterattack. Elements of the 18th Regiment followed
on the left flank, while the reserve squadron attacked from the right
flank.
Shooting from the hip, the men stormed enthusiastically towards
the enemy. Several bolsheviks who were holding out near the houses
were eliminated with hand grenades. Gefreiter Possel ripped the rifle
from the hands of an enemy soldier who was about to take aim at
him and knocked him to the ground with the butt end of his rifle.
When the leader of a machine gun team was wounded, the number
two man jumped in to take his place; finally the section leaders
themselves were manning the guns. The force of our attack put the
Russians to flight.
The 4th Platoon even pushed on past the line which was our
objective. Not until we were well forward lying in trenches, did a few
men mention that they had wounds which needed attention. 1st
Platoon was now placed under the tactical command of Hauptmann
Kalkreuth of I Btl./I8th Inf.Rgt., and was employed to plug up the
gaps which had appeared in the main line of resistance. The bulk of
the squadrons were pulled back to the positions at the edge of the
city. The attack had cost us about twenty casualties.

418

The energetic counterattack had quickly and clearly decided the

critical situation. The Russians had been overrun and destroyed. Lt.
Pukowski was wounded seriously in the arm during the battle.
The commander of 2nd Squadron, Lt. Otto, entered the command
post completely covered in muck and made his report on the day's
fighting.
At approximately 08.00 we were suddenly shaken from our sleep
by an ear-shattering crash. Walls collapsed, shells howled, there were
explosions and the air was filled with limestone dust as the entire
bunker shook.
We all grabbed our helmets and sat bewildered for a few moments
until we realised that it was just the Ivans sending us their morning
greetings. Artillery fire such as none of us had ever experienced
hailed down on us for the next four hours. Our observation post, a
gap between the cellar roof and the rubble to which led a path from
our bunker, was almost completely covered up. The exploding shells
opened new entrances to our cellar, while sealing up the old one.
Balconies the last which still hung from the crumbling ruins of the
houses crashed to the ground. Two or three times Ivan placed his
shells proper 15 cm ones directly on our cellar position, and
only the several metre-thick protective layer of rubble prevented the
worst. All hell had broken loose. The hours dragged by endlessly.
Messenger traffic was impossible as the position was on the exposed
forward slope and the Russians fired on any movement with machine
guns and mortars from the edge of the wood.
Finally, the fire abated somewhat, and we dared risk a look from
our observation post. Not two metres from me lay an unexploded
shell. Outside was a scene of desolation: the immediate area was
pockmarked by shell hole upon shell hole; collapsed houses and
shattered tree trunks stood out against the already darkening sky.
The first wounded were brought in, two men from 1st Platoon.
They were patched up and sent back to the main dressing station.
The platoon leaders came in to report. One dead and two wounded
those were the day's losses. It seemed a miracle that such heavy
artillery fire had not inflicted heavier casualties.
Food arrived, mess dishes rattled, food canisters were passed back
and forth, bread was passed out the bunker was still in operation."
All of the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND's units were
employed for the first time in the history of the division in trench
warfare, in the defence, in a war of attrition. This style of fighting,
which the German Eastern Front soldier had not experienced in the
previous campaigns, was something new and unusual for them. Until
now they had known only the quick, motorised advance, the sharp
but brief battles, the pursuit: now they were forced to persevere, to
dig in, to defend. The men who had endured the just-finished battle
proved that they were becoming masters of this new style of fighting
419

too. Of course, they needed time to adjust; it demanded nerves of

steel to face the numerical superiority of the enemy and, to be sure,
it meant a radical change in their style of fighting. At first, the
youngsters who still made up the bulk of the division were aghast at
the mass of materiel the enemy threw at them. It took them longer
to get used to it than the old hands. As a result, in the early going
casualties among them were far higher than in earlier actions.
In the division's sector the days that followed saw the Soviets
launch large- and small-scale attacks, but they failed to regain any of
their lost positions. A crisis appeared out of a blue sky on 27
September when, at dawn, the Russians succeeded in recapturing
the wood they had lost a few days before. The German infantry pulled
back, abandoning their foxholes in the face of the apparent Soviet
superiority in numbers and under the pressure of the surprise attack.
The men of 3rd Company/I.R. GD 1, which was now just a remnant
of the once proud company, and which had bitterly fought off every
enemy attack against the wood, were now overtired and physically
drained, their will to resist exhausted.
Ill Battalion/I.R. GD 1 was immediately sent to the counterattack
but, in the face of a determined enemy defence, was only able to get
as far as the southwest corner of the wood. There it was stopped.
During the night the well-rested Pioniers under Obit. Hckel,
together with III Battalion/I.R. GD 1 resumed the attack and
recovered the entire wood.
30 September 1942 was the last day on which the Infantry Division
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND and its neighbour, the 72nd Infantry
Division, carried out offensive operations, albeit with limited objectives. Scheduled several times, the attack had been put off before
because of inclement weather. Now it was to be go ahead. The
objective was to achieve a better defensive line, meaning one which
could be held for a longer period of time. The attacking units only
had to cover 400 to 600 metres depending on the terrain in their
sectors. Their objectives were precisely laid down. The entire operation, which had been well prepared, was code-named Herbstwind
(Autumn Wind). The code-word was issued at 13.00. But before
describing the attack, a few words on the planning and conduct of
this limited offensive.
The attack plan may have arisen under the pressure of conditions
prevailing at that time; in any event, it originated from the "green
tables" of the senior and most senior levels of command. Despite
the regular flow of reports accurately describing the division's situation, despite its losses, especially in men, of the past few weeks, and
despite the efforts of the division to impress upon its leaders the
difficulty of the attack and the associated risks, it seemed to be of
great importance to those "above" to win a new, more favourable

420

line, perhaps only to be able to report a success in this sector of the

front.
The burdening of the physically battered units, with their extraordinarily low combat strengths and low morale, with this assignment
was opposed and even resisted by the division command from the
beginning. The CO of I.R. GD 2, Oberst Garski, left no stone
unturned in his efforts to present his unit's point of view to the
responsible authorities. Several times he expressed his opinion to
the division's commander, Generalmajor Hoernlein, that the attack
served no purpose and was extremely risky. It was his opinion that
they would probably be able to reach the new line, but, because of
the terrain conditions and expected further heavy casualties, it was
unlikely that it could be held against the immediate Soviet counterattacks which were likely to follow. In addition, he stated emphatically
that the most that could be expected of the exhausted troops was to
hold on to their present lines.
The division command agreed with the arguments of its regimental
commander and passed them on to corps which, in turn, made a
like-minded presentation to the Ninth Army. Generaloberst Model
rejected these concerns, commenting that the Fhrer had ordered
the attack and that he expected the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND to do its duty.
So the order for the attack remained in effect, despite the serious
remonstrations of those officers who, because of their ongoing
familiarity with the enemy's and their own personnel situation and
the terrain difficulties, were capable of forming a precise assessment
of the attack's chances of success. No one can accuse them of not
attempting to pass this knowledge along to higher levels of command.
Assigned to Operation Herbstwind were I and II Battalions/I.R.
GD 1, reinforced by 2nd and 3rd Companies of Stu.Pi.Btl. GD and
elements of the Assault Gun Battalion GD. On the right was
'Kampfgruppe Grosser' I and III Battalions of I.R. GD 2
supported by the Panzer Battalion G D , while units of II Battalion
provided flanking cover. The artillery stood ready to fire and Stuka
support was expected.
The troops moved into their assembly areas at 14.00 in spite of
heavy enemy defensive fire. The men squatted in their holes and
waited for the attack order. At 14.15 the entire artillery force opened
fire at the same time as the Stuka attacks began. The infantry moved
forward as the artillery opened fire. Despite heavy defensive fire from
the other side the attack made good progress. Within fifteen minutes
the Assault Gun Battalion GD had captured 'Panzer Hill'; II Battalion/I.R. GD 1 crossed the hill a few minutes later.
Advancing rapidly, the left wing of "Kampfgruppe Grosser I.R. 2"
likewise reached its first objective. At 16.15, however, the Soviets
421

launched a counterattack south of the Gostischka Valley in reinforced

company strength, supported by two tanks, which threw back the
left wing of 'Kampfgruppe Grosser'.
Finally, at approximately 17.00, I and II Battalions/I.R. GD 1
reached their objectives, but had suffered terrible losses. Obit.
Cabanis, commander of 1st Company, Obit. Grundmann, commander of 2nd Company, and Obit. Vogel, commander of 8th
Company, were all killed on the battlefield.
As always, the commanding officer of I.R. GD 2, Oberst Garski,
led his regiment's attack from the front, his bravery providing an
example to his soldiers. In order to ensure secure radio communications with division, he had himself assigned a Panzer II command
tank which was fitted with a dummy cannon. When the attack began,
Garski accompanied 13th Company/I.R. 2, which was supported
by Obit. Heimke's Panzer company, in the command tank. Not
satisfied to follow the leading elements of the infantry company, he
joined the other tanks and pushed on right up to the Soviet positions,
where he operated the tank's machine gun, easing the infantry's
advance.
It was there that the command tank, which was commanded by
Ogefr. Fredi Lehmann, was hit by artillery fire and disabled. Oberst
Garski, wounded in the throat probably by fragments from the
periscope bailed out with the crew, taking the tank's machine gun
with him. As the leading elements of 13th Company had not quite
got that far yet, Garski himself opened fire on the Russians with his
pistol. On his orders 13th Company then rolled up the enemy trench.
For the first time in the war Oberst Garski led with a pistol; his men
were accustomed to seeing him in the front lines armed only with
his walking stick, standing, or at best kneeling, urging his men on or
cautioning them to be careful and take cover. After the enemy
position had been taken, Oberst Garski walked over to a Panzer IV
which was standing about 100 metres to the side. Using its radio,
he issued orders to the Heimke Panzer Company to continue the
attack. In spite of the heavy enemy fire he stood upright behind the
tank's turret, directing the infantry's attack.
Apparently a Russian sniper spotted the German officer in his
exposed position on the tank. Shot through the neck, Oberst Garski
fell to the ground. In the heat of battle the event went unnoticed.
The Panzer IV was forced to pull back when a Soviet anti-tank gun
opened fire, its crew still unaware that Garski had been hit.
At the regiment's command post there had been no reports on the
commander since the message that the attack was making rapid
progress. The Panzer II no longer answered and all enquiries of the
battalions were negative. Not until darkness fell were the regiment's
worst fears confirmed: some men of the Panzer company brought
in his body and reported on his death.
422

As night fell, officers of the Regimental Headquarters were able to

determine the position of the new main line of resistance and during
the course of the battle plugged up gaps which appeared in the line.
The attack which had been ordered from the 'green tables' had not
only resulted in heavy casualties, but had cost the life of a proven,
courageous regimental commander who, even though he had serious
doubts about the attack, did his utmost to ensure its success. Oberst
Garski's exemplary conduct was honoured by a posthumous promotion to Generalmajor.
Ogefr. Fredi Lehmann described the death of the commander of
I.R. GD 2 in his diary:
"I and my panzer were detached from the Staff Company of the
Pz.Btl. GD to the 2nd Regiment for use by its commander, Oberst
Garski.
The day began with the threat of a vehicle parade. Then came the
news that the attack was to begin at 15.00. That was south of
Ssuchtino. The bombers attacked at approximately 15.30; five
minutes later we drove off.
The attack by 2nd Regiment made good progress. Oberst Garski
reported this by radio. Meanwhile we had worked our way up to
within 10-15 metres of the Russian trenches. Then, suddenly, there
was a terrific blow; the tank stopped. The transmission had been hit.
There was nothing else to do but get out. I had been hit in the thigh.
Oberst Garski was bleeding from the neck. My radio operator, Gefr.
Alschnaede, was not wounded. Oberst Garski waved to another tank
but it failed to notice. Then the Oberst made his way over to a tank
which was standing some distance away. He climbed up to the turret
and bent over the hatch. All of a sudden, he doubled over and fell
down from the tank. My radio operator immediately ran over to the
Oberst. When he came back, all that he said was: The Oberst is
dead!"
An unidentified participant in the battle from 2nd Company/I.R.
2 described the difficulty of the fighting, especially for Kampfgruppe
Grosser:
"The artillery began the prelude to the concert, and at once the
other heavy weapons joined in. Then came the Stukas, howling
down on their victims.
The mortars began to spit: 1, 2, 3 rounds. . . 4, I counted along
with them, 5, 6 rifle ready, spade packed, I looked at my watch:
14.15. . . 7, 8. . . out of the trench and run, run, run! attack!!!
The metres across no-man's-land were the most dangerous. The
enemy still hadn't seen us coming. 50 metres 80 metres 100
metres! Running ahead of me was tting, to the right Kotelka. 120
metres keep going. Here and there a Russian jumped up and
skedaddled. Soviet commissars pointed their pistols from their holes

423

and fired blindly. They were swept away by our machine guns which
we fired on the run.
Then the first rounds from a Russian mortar landed in our ranks.
150 metres lungs burning, we headed straight for the Russian
trench line. Just as I was about to leap into the trench, I fell and found
myself looking into the asiatic face of a Russian sniper who was lying
there. Amid the roar of battle I shouted at him: Rukki wjerch\
hands up! But he didn't want to. I summoned my courage and poked
him with my bayonet. Then he left the trench and crawled to the
rear into captivity.
As a precaution I threw a hand grenade into the section of trench
to my left. Following the explosion I continued along the trench.
Other men from my company hastened along beside and behind me.
Suddenly, stop! We had advanced 250 metres when the trench was
interrupted by a barricade. Out! There was no way forward here.
Hand grenades flew to and fro; the bolsheviks were behind the
barricade, only 5-8 metres away and determined to resist. Then a
machine gun appeared among the Ivans. Machine gun forward! In
a flash our machine gun was in position. It was all or nothing now
us or them. It was a matter of seconds, one of us, the Russian or
the German, would be too slow in this life or death duel. Then our
machine gun spit out its deadly burst of fire, a tenth of a second
faster. On the Russian side an abandoned and shot-up machine gun
swayed in the air. Around us all hell broke loose; the Russians were
laying down barrage fire. Shell bursts danced around us. We pressed
into the trench. The hell of Ssuchtino raged. Death thundered down
from the cemetery hill, where the grenadiers were fighting, to the
hills before Ssuchtino. We could see the shells from a Stalin Organ
exploding over where the Grenadiers were.
Our tanks had not arrived. We were facing 144 Soviet batteries,
that was 432 guns. If things continued like that, we would never
reach the bank of the Volga which we could see shimmering on the
horizon. Behind me a man stood up, lifted his rifle and fired. . . and
collapsed, covered in blood. He had been shot through the head by
a sniper. I took the ammunition from his bullet pouch as our supply
was almost exhausted. Every bullet was precious. What would have
happened if the Russians had counterattacked? To make matters
worse, there was a 200 metre gap in the front. Lt. Leo Graf von
Schwerin, leader of 2nd Platoon, ordered Kotelka to reestablish
contact with our neighbouring platoon. Under constant fire, I crawled
from the trench and helped our medic tend to the severely wounded.
Five men were left standing in the trench no one had given up
yet.
The fighting slowly ebbed, and the day slowly came to an end.
Ignaz Kotelka had not returned. As darkness fell I crawled to the rear.
Through rolls of barbed wire, past dead and wounded, through shell
424

holes and trenches; then I ran to the battalion command post with
the report.
I stepped into the bunker. Light surrounded me. Major Grosser sat
before me. Thank God, a report from 2nd Company! Here, have
a smoke; what's new up front?' I made my report and sucked the
smoke deep into my lungs. The cigarette made me forget all the
excitement of the day. I learned that Gefr. Willy Bhme, our battalion
messenger, had been wounded then I ran back.
I ran into Uffz. Hoffmann, former driver for our company commander, his head almost completely swathed in bandages. I shook
his hand, a gesture that said more than a thousand words. When I
reported back, tting said to me, 'Kotelka is not here, he's missing!
Jupp Greifenstein has been killed.' I heard many other names.
The seriously wounded man was still lying in the trench, moaning
in pain. tting and I ran back to the old German trench in the
blackness and fetched a stretcher. As we carried it forward we met
some regimental Pioniers who were to plug the gap between our
platoons. No one knew the exact way to the front; in the Egyptian
blackness we had lost our way. One of the Pioniers suggested that
we just keep going.
We stumbled on, how many metres and for how long I no longer
know. Suddenly there was a call from ahead: '2nd Company
Grodeutschland??' I listened we heard Russian voices and then
a command in Russian, shots were fired.
We dropped the empty stretcher it would only slow us down
and ran back in the direction from which we had come. I stumbled
and fell right into a water-filled hole. I was soaking wet and my
boots were full of water.
When we finally reached Lt. von Schwerin's platoon, Lt. Hensel,
our company commander, was also there. Our severely wounded
comrade no longer needed the stretcher; while we were gone he had
died from loss of blood."
The losses suffered on this one day were such that individual units
had to be merged within the battalions. The fighting strength of the
division had fallen to that of a weak regiment. Nevertheless, the
attack had been a considerable success. For Uffz. Klemm of 2nd
Company/I.R. GD 1, 30 September 1942 was a day of glory. After
his company commander and all of the unit's senior NCOs were
knocked out of action he took command of 2nd Company and,
risking his own life, not only reached the assigned objective but, on
his own initiative, led the attack far beyond it. For this outstanding
action the Supreme Commander awarded Klemm the Knight's
Cross.
The award recommendation submitted by the regiment described
the action this way:

425

" O n 30 September 1942, 2nd Company found itself on the left

wing of the I Btl./I.R. 1 GROSSDEUTSCHLAND in the attack
against the bitterly-defended ravines of the Gostischka bottom land
southeast of Tschermassowo.
Within minutes of the beginning of the attack the company
commander and his deputy were killed by heavy enemy rifle fire.
When the company commander and second-in-command of the
company on the right were killed within minutes of each other, the
attack by the two now leaderless companies threatened to bog down
short of its objective.
In this extremely serious situation the enemy launched a counterattack from Boltino supported by two tanks in an attempt to throw I
Battalion back to its starting position.
At that point Uffz. Klemm took command of both companies, got
the attack moving and reached the objective. There he realised that
the regiment on the right (I.R. 2), which was supposed to advance
past I Battalion towards Boltino, was making no progress. On his
own initiative, Klemm decided to follow up behind the failed Russian
counterattack through the well-fortified enemy positions with the
limited forces available to him and take the high ground south of
Belogurowo, 500 metres west of Boltino, and there go over to the
defensive.
As a result of this daring decision the division was able to reach
the assigned objective even though the regiment on the right (I.R. 2)
was held up.
This act, which demonstrated Uffz. Klemm's personal bravery and
decisiveness in difficult situations, brought the division the success it
was seeking."
The Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was able to
report the following results on 30 September: 288 prisoners, 525
enemy dead, destruction or capture of 1 infantry gun, 8 heavy
machine guns, 27 light machine guns, 19 anti-tank guns, 19 mortars,
5 anti-tank rifles, 389 rifles, 21 submachine guns, 14 tanks and 7
artillery pieces; the division's accomplishments received the full
recognition of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ninth Army,
Generaloberst Model. After 1 October the fighting in the division's
sector faded away; patrol operations and construction of new
positions continued.
On an order from the Supreme Commander, the O K H decreed
that:
Infantry Regiment 1 be renamed Grenadier Regiment and,
Infantry Regiment 2 be renamed Fusilier Regiment.
Great joy now filled the trenches and foxholes on the Rzhev front:
I.D. GD was to be relieved in the next few days. A sigh of relief went

426

through the ranks; the morale of the men, who had endured this
battle for three weeks, improved greatly. Even though the enemy
resumed his sudden, surprise barrages, the repeated enemy assaults
collapsed under the fire of the Grenadiers and Fusiliers the
positions remained firmly in German hands.
The increasing numbers of orders of the day which were reaching
the troops in the front lines were a sign that relief was at hand. They
provided a brief review of the past period of fighting and were the
official thanks from the commanders for the sacrifices and accomplishments of the troops.
Special recognition for the division's accomplishments came in an
order of the day from XXVII Corps:
The Commanding General
XXVII Corps

Corps HQ, 7. 10. 42

Order of the Day

On 9. 10. 1942 the Inf.Div. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND will leave

the units of XXVII Army Corps.
Through its attack, the division prevented the destruction of the
troops of XXVII Corps, which were involved in the heaviest defensive
fighting, at the last moment and barred the enemy's way to Rzhev.
In the period 11. 9. 29. 9. 42 the division not only beat off
attack after attack by a far superior enemy in comradely cooperation
with its neighbouring divisions, but smashed the attacking enemy
forces and, in doing so, created the conditions for the great defensive
success of 30. 9. 42.
As the division leaves the units of XXVII Corps it can do so with
the proud feeling that its actions and the blood it shed in the Battle
of Rzhev made a decisive contribution to the success of the defensive
battle.
To the division command and all its officers, NCOs and men I
express my thanks and full appreciation. I respectfully think of the
commanders, officers, non-commissioned officers and men who
gave their lives in true fulfilment of their duty and wish the wounded
a speedy recovery.
New tasks await the division. I know that you will fulfil them and
my best wishes go with you!
Long live the Fhrer!
signed Wei

427

The order of the day from the division's commanding officer, to

whom the troops were closest, dwelled heavily on the death of his
regimental commander.
Inf.Div. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND

Div. Command Post, 2. 10. 42

Order of the Day

The division has been involved in heavy defensive fighting since

10 September 1942.
You have prevented the Russians from gaining any more territory
at the expense of our front. Through your actions you have contributed to the frustration of the enemy's plan to capture the city of
Rzhev, which is so vital to him.
In repeated attacks you have proved yourself superior to the
Russians and have smashed them.
I will be able to report that the division has done its duty at Rzhev.
At the head of his regiment, fighting in the very front lines, the
commanding officer of Inf.Rgt. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND 2
O b e r s t Garski

died a hero's death during the attack on Kostonossowo.

Awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross in June 1940, he
was one of our bravest.
Fulfilment of duty, bravery, comradeship these virtues determined his life.
The division remembers this exemplary officer and good comrade
with sorrowful pride.
The division has just received the following order from the Fhrer.
Effective immediately:
I.R. GD 1 is renamed Grenadier Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND,
I.R. GD 2 is renamed Fusilier Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
A new obligation for us!
signed Hoernlein
At that moment it may have been only a minor consolation to the
men of the division to hear the carefully-selected words of their
superiors describing their heroism of the past weeks. But the
division's reputation had been further enhanced, increasing the
fighting spirit of its men. They were aware of how highly the unit
was valued and they governed their conduct accordingly.

428

They also knew, however, that it had cost great sacrifices in action
to earn their reputation. Again and again the thoughts of the men
turned to the machine gunner or tank driver, the forward observer
or motorcyclist, who had given his life on some battlefield.
At the conclusion of the battle the I.R. GD 1 reported the following
casualties:
10 officers, 157 NCOs and men killed,
1,230 officers, NCOs and men wounded
The Reconnaissance Battalion GD alone suffered 141 casualties,
including 36 dead, during its action in the positions at the edge of
Rzhev in the period 23. 9. - 3. 10. 1942:
The 2nd Company/I.R. GD 1 went into battle on 10 September
with 141 men and returned on 5 October with only 47. The
company's commander, Obit. Grundmann, was killed on 30 September and with him Feldwebel Gratz and an Oberfeldwebel who
had just been transferred in from 17th Company. Among the NCOs
wounded were Ofeldw. Stadler, the first member of the division to
be awarded the German Cross in Gold (Feb. 1942), Feldw. Gehr and
Feldw. Arndt. The only Feldwebel who was unscathed was Ofeldw.
Wiesjahn who, by chance, was on a course in Germany at this time.
With the company train at that time were Hptfeldw. Pflug, Feldw.
Flsser and Feldw. Pabich.
The Artillery Regiment GD, which had fired more than 30,000
shells in the period 10. 9. - 1. 10. 1942, buried 6 officers and 29
NCOs and men in the military cemetery at Botscharewo. Another
13 officers and 102 NCOs and men were recovering from wounds
in military hospitals.
Between 6 and 9 October the individual units were relieved in their
positions near Tschermassowo and Ssuchtino by the 95th Infantry
Division and pulled out of the line. The men did not have long to
forget the inferno of the battle, however. The individual sections and
companies moved back across a landscape torn by the war of
attrition, while the prime movers drove to the rear through the
protective ravines, towing the anti-tank guns and heavy infantry
guns. They assembled behind stands of trees and clumps of bushes
and waited. The trucks arrived, were loaded with soldiers and drove
away to the northwest towards the main road. The units were
transferred into the division's rest area in the area north and
northeast of Olenin. The troops were quartered in villages and
peasant cottages, the vehicles were dispersed and camouflaged and
the unit stood down. Quiet lay over the villages as the men recovered
from the trials of the past few weeks. The following days saw them
engaged in servicing vehicles and weapons and improving their
quarters as they prepared for a longer period of rest. The hastily set

429

The Positions of the I.D. GD, South of Rzhev

10 October 1942

up orderly office registered the casualties and the losses in weapons

and equipment and put together long requirements reports for the
requisition of replacements. The signals personnel laid their
telephone lines, which provided communications between the companies and the division command. The company commanders were
kept busy writing to the families of the men killed, their painful letters
describing the circumstances of their deaths.
In preparation for the approaching winter, on 28 October a Ski
Battalion was formed from elements of the Grenadier Regiment, the
Fusilier Regiment and the Reconnaissance Battalion under the
command of Obit. Obermeier. Its composition was as follows:
Staff/Ski Btl. GD with Pionier Platoon and Light Infantry Gun
Platoon
1st Company formed by Recon. Btl. GD
2nd Company formed by 4th Company/Fusilier Rgt. GD
3rd Company formed by 13th Company/Grenadier Rgt. GD
Towards the end of October 1942 there were threatening signs
that the Soviets were about to renew their attempts to liquidate the
exposed positions of the German Ninth Army. The focus of their
attack was again expected to be the city of Rzhev and due southwest
of Bely, where especially heavy concentrations of troops had been
discovered. It seemed likely that the date of the attack would be 7
November 1942 the 25th anniversary of the Russian Revolution.
In order to assure the rapid reinforcement of the threatened front
near Bely, the A.O.K.9 ordered the I.D. GD to send a battle group
to the south. Included in the force was:
Fusilier Rgt. GD under Oberst Kassnitz (new Rgt. CO)
Assault Gun Btl. GD
Recon. Btl. GD
3rd Battery/ Army Flak Abt. GD
2nd Company/Pz.Jg.Abt. GD
I Btl./Art.Rgt. GD
2nd Medical Company
III Ambulance Platoon
Kampfgruppe Kassnitz, as the battle group was dubbed, left its
quarters and moved by vehicle into the Bely area, where it was to
be held as a mobile reserve. A large number of vehicles which were
of little use in the muddy period and the winter were assembled and
parked in the area northwest of Vyazma.
The division headquarters and remaining units remained in
Mjassniza. The units prepared for the coming winter war, practising
bivouacs in the open, training in the cold and snow and doing
everything possible to retain their mobility in winter conditions. The
division's members were issued winter clothing; especially welcome
431

were the padded snow-suits and felt-lined boots. Horses and sleighs
were also supplied.
A training demonstration by the Sturm-Pionier Battalion took place
in the presence of the commander-in-chief, likewise an exercise by
the Fusiliers of the reinforced II Battalion. Map exercises were also
included in the agenda. The units took all measures necessary to
defend against a Soviet winter offensive.
The Soviet Position:
"At the beginning of the winter the Russians resumed their attack
at the same points on which they had been focusing for months. It
was their intention to tie down German forces on all fronts, prevent
movement of reinforcements to threatened sectors and improve
conditions at tactically favourable positions for later operations. Their
greatest efforts were directed at the front between Rzhev and Velikiye
Luki where, during the summer months, the Germans had only been
able to close the gaps in a makeshift fashion. The bulge at Rzhev,
which jutted deep into Soviet-held territory, offered an especially
favourable starting point for an envelopment followed by a thrust
deep into the German front, especially as the Russian forces near
Toropets were already threatening the salient's deep northern flank.
German air reconnaissance had spotted a Soviet build-up between
Toropets and Kalinin in mid-October. Although air attacks could
probably delay and harass the Soviet build-up, they could not prevent
it in the long run."
R a d i o Message:

6. 11. 42 - Red Orchestra

Director to D o r a = Check through Taylor and all others and
report as soon as possible:
1. Who is commanding 18th Army; Lindemann or Schmidt?
2. Does a IX Army Corps exist within the northern group and which
divisions does it include?
3. Is the Model Group already formed? Its composition, combat
sector and headquarters!
4. Has the Kleist Group already been reorganised? and in what
composition is it fighting?
5. Is the headquarters of 3rd Panzer Army located in Vyazma? Its
composition; who is in command?
G e r m a n Situation:
"The entire salient held by Ninth Army under Gen.Obst. Model,
whose corners were SytschewkaRzhev(north) OleninBjeloy,
was defended by infantry divisions which had been in position since

432

the previous winter. Only a few panzer divisions, such as the 5th
Pz.Div. near Rzhev and the I.D. GD near Olenin, were available as
a mobile reserve. For the numerous points of effort expected in the
coming Soviet attack it was far too few.
In detail:
In the I.D. GD's area of operations were
(from north to south):
the 253rd Inf.Div., the 206th Inf.Div. and
the 110th Inf.Div. (XXIII Army Corps).
near Bely:
the 246th Inf.Div. and the 2nd Luftwaffe
Field Division (XXXXI Panzer Corps).
The strengths of these infantry divisions gave rise to fears that they
would not be able to prevent a breakthrough by the enemy in the
event of major attacks by the enemy."
In the first half of November the main body of the Infantry Division
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was still widely spread out across the area
east and northeast of Olenin. The division headquarters was in
Mjassniza.
The reinforced Kampfgruppe Kassnitz, which was in readiness
northeast of Bely, about 35 km south of Olenin, was expecting to
see action with XXXXI Panzer Corps (General Harpe), under whose
direct command it was. Reconnaissance in the northwest corner of
Ninth Army's combat zone indicated that further units of the I.D. GD
would most likely have to be sent there. It was already obvious that
the danger existed of the division being frittered away in small groups.
As far as weapons and personnel were concerned the division had
recovered relatively well despite the brief time it had been given to
recuperate, even though combat strengths had not yet reached their
former levels. The men were rested; exchanges and transfers had
closed the most important gaps in the ranks of the commanders.
Oberst Kassnitz had taken command of the Fusilier Regiment; Major
Grosser, former commander of I Battalion/Fusilier Regiment, had
been transferred and replaced by Hptm. Bethge. Major Kohlhaas,
who had been wounded at the Tim bridge, returned and took
command of the Fusilier Regiment's III Battalion. On 24 November
1942 Kohlhaas received the Knight's Cross which had been awarded
him by the Supreme Commander.
The Grenadier Regiment remained under the command of Oberst
Khler; his battalion commanders were Major Heesemann, Major
Gehrke and Hauptmann Petereit. Further officers arrived from
Germany to fill the open company and platoon commander positions
within the companies.
The 11th Armoured Observation Battery of the Artillery Regiment
GD was probably the first of the division's units to see action. From
17 November, on orders from XXIII Army Corps, it began monitor-

433

ing both sides of the Beresa River near Artemenki in the 110th
Infantry Division's sector using a sound-ranging system in preparation for the occupation of the area several days later. The 11th
Battery's Meteorological Section was sent into Demidow with the
ARKO 122 to take weather observations for the entire corps sector.
A flash-ranging system was subsequently set up in the same sector,
as it was determined that the Soviets had reinforced their artillery
forces in a sector opposite the 86th Infantry Division in the Luchesa
Valley.
The German High Command calculated that the Soviet offensive
would begin on 25 or 26 November 1942. All of the division's units
therefore found themselves at a high state of readiness. As reported
in the Wehrmacht communique, the Russians launched their attack
on the central sector on a wide front between Kalinin and Toropets,
preceded by heavy artillery fire. At the same time there began the
process of splitting up the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND into various battle groups which reached its peak on 30
November when elements of the division were scattered over 110
kilometres of front.
The A s s i g n m e n t o f t h e I . D . G D t o Sectors o f O t h e r
Divisions between O l e n i n a n d Bely
Grenadier Rgt. GD
I Btl.
II Btl.
III Btl.
IV Btl.

to
to
to
to

Fusilier Rgt. GD
entire regiment

to XXXXI Pz.Corps - Bely area

Reconnaissance Btl. GD
entire battalion

to XXXXI Pz.Corps -Bely area

Panzer Battalion GD
1st Company
2nd Company
3rd Company

disbanded
to 206th Inf.Div.
to 14th (mot) Inf.Div.

Assault Gun Btl. GD

entire battalion

to XXXXI Pz.Corps - Bely area

Artillery Rgt. GD
I Battalion
II Battalion
III Battalion
Armoured Observation

to
to
to
to
434

GD
GD
253rd Inf.Div.
GD

XXXXI Pz.Corps - Bely area

206th Inf.Div.
GD
253rd Inf.Div.

Battery
Army Flak Battalion GD
1st Battery
2nd Battery
3rd Battery
4th Battery
5th Battery

to
to
to
to
to

Pz.Jg. Battalion GD
1st Company
2nd Company
3rd Company

disbanded
to XXXXI Pz.Corps - Bely area
to GD

Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD
1st Company
2nd Company
3rd Company
Bridging Column
Signals Battalion GD

GD
206th Inf.Div.
XXIII Army Corps
GD
GD

to GD
to GD
to 14th (mot) Inf.Div.
Vyazma dispersal area
to GD

Supply Service GD
4th, 6th, 12th, 13th, 9th, 10th, 17th Columns to 592nd
Supply Battalion
Administrative and Supply Services GD
Bakery Company, Butchery Company in Vyazma dispersal
area.
Medical Services GD
1st Medical Company
2nd Medical Company

to GD
to XXXXI Pz.Corps - Bely area

Field Hospital
1st Ambulance Platoon
2nd Ambulance Platoon
3rd Ambulance Platoon

Vyazma dispersal area

to GD
to GD
to XXXXI Pz.Corps - Bely area

Military Police Service GD

to GD

Army Post Office

Kosino

Replacement and Training Btl. GD

Smolensk

Put another way, the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND

was left only with the following units:

435

Division Headquarters GD, Signals Battalion GD, Grenadier Regiment GD (I, II and IV Battalions), Panzerjger Battalion GD (3rd
Company), III Battalion/Artillery Regiment GD, Flak Battalion GD
(1st, 4th and 5th Batteries), Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD (Battalion
Staff, 1st and 2nd Companies).
At the same time, the following units were placed under the
command of the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND:
from the 86th Inf.Div. - 216th Grenadier Rgt. (I and reinf. Ill
Battalions); 3rd Company/I86th Pionier Battalion; 12th Battery/
186th Artillery Rgt. (Czech cannons); 2nd Company/I86th Pionier
Battalion.
from the 110th Inf.Div. reinf. 7th Company/252nd Grenadier
Rgt.; II Battalion/120th Artillery Regiment; Kampfgruppe Hptm.
Schmittborn (two rifle companies).
These were the units available to the division when action began.

Chapter Two
With the Ninth Army in the Winter Battle 1942-43
The Russian offensive began on 24 November 1942 as expected,
without immediately revealing its points of main effort, however.
Instead, the Soviets applied pressure all along the Ninth Army's front,
hoping to find the weakest spots in the German main line of
resistance. These were revealed in the afternoon, when alarming
reports of significant breakthroughs came in from the area south of
Bely, in the Luchesa valley, north of Cholmez (253rd Inf.Div.) and
near Wanino Motorino (boundary of the 253rd and 206th Inf.Div.).
The situation at these locations was unclear, and the commanding
corps XXIII Army Corps in Tatewo - had only a partial picture of
what was going on as the telephone lines and other forms of
communication had been partially severed. To make matters worse,
a severe winter storm was raging.
The result of the large number of reports coming in from all sectors
of XXIII Army Corps was the hasty alerting of the I.D. GD and an
order to send individual battle groups to the threatened points. They
were assigned to throw back the enemy forces through local
counterattacks and return the infantry which had fallen back in
the face of the Soviet attack to its former positions.
This order was a mistake, as the German command was soon to
find out, because a counterattack launched without knowledge of the
enemy's strength and with limited forces usually results in failure. An
even greater mistake was the splitting up into small groups of a
436

division which could have fought much more effectively as a united

body. All of this took place in spite of the objections by the division
command, and was ordered by Generaloberst Model, commanderin-chief of the Ninth Army. Perhaps he was forced to make the
decision by the imminent danger of numerous enemy penetrations
everywhere in his area of command, as well as by the shortage of
reserves and naturally, and above all, by the numerous threatened
areas in his army's area. The 'Modelei' as it was quickly dubbed
in soldier's jargon began. One after another the units of the I.D.
GD were set in motion on the afternoon of 24 November. The first
unit to leave was the Reconnaissance Battalion, which set out at
06.30 on 25 November, passing through Bobrowka into the
Gontscharowo area, where it initially made contact with the Artillery
Regiment GD which was in position there. The move was delayed
considerably by snow storms and heavy drifting. The la of the 253rd
Infantry Division was notified of the battalion's arrival by teletype.
From him the unit received orders to carry out reconnaissance in
preparation for the following assignments:
1. the occupation and holding of the high ground near Cholmez;
2. the occupation and holding of the high ground near Makarowo
and Tisslino.
When the patrols returned, orders from the 253rd Inf.Div. for the
action were already there. 3rd Squadron left at once for Cholmez
while it was still light, while 4th squadron set out for Makarowo. The
units were both in position in the specified villages by 18.00.
On the same day I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment drove to
Kiukino, where the Russians were said to have broken through,
leaving its train behind. Scarcely had the battalion arrived in this area
when it was sent to the attack towards Knyschnikowa and Scharki
in the 206th Infantry Division's sector. In spite of the deep snow,
2nd and 3rd Companies were able to reach the village of
Knyschnikowa before dark. The enemy defended desperately, and
the fighting went on far into the night; the village had to be taken
house by house. Wounded in the fighting were the commander of
2nd Company, Lt. Goeldel and that of 4th Company, Hptm.
Kraussold. 1st Company got to within 1,000 metres of Scharki but
then had to call off its attack in the face of heavy enemy fire. Obit.
Heidemann was wounded. Ill Battalion/Grenadier Regiment and III
Battalion/Artillery Regiment GD were sent in to reinforce and
continue the attack on the two villages where the Soviets had dug
in.
Additional battle groups from the I.D. GD such as the Sturm
Pionier Battalion, the Ski Battalion and parts of the Panzer Battalion
were moved into position in various sectors of the front. The
437

situation in the area defended by the 206th Infantry Division and the
253rd Infantry Division the right wing appeared especially
threatening. Increasing cold and persistent snow storms forced the
motorised units to take extraordinary measures. The tanks had to be
fired up every twenty minutes to prevent their engines from freezing.
Lack of, or insufficient supplies of camouflage paint made operations
by the tanks very difficult.
Meanwhile, heavy fighting was raging to the south (in the DubrowkaJemeljanowaDemechi area) where the Soviets had attacked
with two tank corps and had completely overrun the south wing of
the 246th Infantry Division and the entire 2nd Luftwaffe Field
Division. A dangerous breakthrough of the Ninth Army's front was
at hand. The Fusilier Regiment, which was still to the northeast, was
alerted and readied for action south of Bely. It was to depart early
on 26 November, without III Battalion, however, which had a special
assignment and would follow the regiment two days later.
The Soviets had also gone to the attack in the Luchesa valley in
the 86th Infantry Division's sector and had likewise achieved local
penetrations. As a result of pressure from the division command of
the 206th Infantry Division, the last available combat unit of the I.D.
GD, II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment, was also sent into action. The
battalion was placed on alert on the evening of 25 November.
The Soviets had made numerous local penetrations in Ninth
Army's main line of resistance on the northern and western fronts,
each of which had the potential to become a full-fledged
breakthrough. The last reserves, namely the units of the I.D. GD,
had been committed. The High Command advised its superiors of
this dangerous situation and requested further units. Two battle
groups from the 1st Panzer Division were despatched to danger area
number one: the area south of Bely. Kampfgruppe von Wietersheim
was on a forced march in the area due south of Bely, while
Kampfgruppe von der Meden was hurrying towards the Natscha,
southeast of Bely, in order to halt the advancing enemy at that section
of the river. But these measures were still under way, while the enemy
forces continued to march eastward through the snow. Moving
towards them from the other side of the pocket was a powerful Soviet
battle group with tanks which, by the evening of 25 November, had
reached the SsytschewkaRzhev railway line, severing the supply
route to the German divisions fighting to the north.
For the I.D. GD this brought about another weakening of its
fighting strength, because the Division Supply Units, which had just
arrived in Vyazma, were forced to release seven of their columns for
the supply of other units. With the limited number of supply columns
left to it, the division was only able to supply its widely-separated
units in a makeshift fashion and then only with great difficulty. This
placed a tremendous burden on the men of the supply services.
438

Darkness fell over the battlefield on this first night of the winter
battle on the central sector of the Russian Front, but there was no
quiet. The Soviets took advantage of their initial success and attempted to continue their eastward advance by moonlight. The
defenders clung to their individual strongpoints, regrouped and
occupied new positions. They were exhausted. Guns failed to fire in
the freezing cold and deliveries of ammunition by the overloaded
supply system were slow and inadequate. Another factor was their
own weakness compared to the numerical strength of the enemy,
which had been exacerbated by the considerable numbers of casualties, weakening their fighting strength. At the division headquarters
of the I.D. GD still in Mjassniza a certain desperation was
apparent. As it had scarcely any of its own units left under its
command, all the division command could do was register the reports
from the individual units; it had no influence over events. The
battalions, and even individual companies, were spread out from
right to left among the 206th Inf.Div., the 253rd Inf.Div., the 86th
Inf.Div., the 246th Inf.Div. and the XXXXI Pz.Corps. The division
command sought the return of its units, reminding its superiors of
the old lesson that the secondment of units to foreign commands
meant only disadvantages, exploitation and improper utilisation
but in vain.
Thus passed the night of 25/26 November. Reinforced by tanks
of the Panzer Battalion GD (1st and 3rd Companies), I and III
Battalions of the Grenadier Regiment, supported by III Battalion/
Artillery Regiment GD, resumed their attacks against Scharki (I Btl.)
and Wanino Motorino (III Btl.) in the face of heavy enemy fire.
Scharki was taken at the cost of heavy casualties; Motorino also fell
into German hands, but had to be given up again in the afternoon
when a shortage of ammunition forced a withdrawal in the face of a
Soviet counterattack.
Obit. Ringe, commander of one of the tank companies, was killed
as he attempted to recover a wounded grenadier. Also killed were
Obit. Henke, commander of 14th Company/Grenadier Regiment
and Lt. Dck, commander of 8th Company. Many NCOs and men
were also killed.
Exhausted, the men of III Battalion dug into the snow outside
Motorino, while the Grenadiers of I Battalion clung to the ruins of
Scharki, determined to hold on to the village.
Farther west the squadrons of the Reconnaissance Battalion GD
were in positions outside Cholmez and Makarowo as the reserve for
the 473rd Infantry Regiment of the 253rd Infantry Division. So far
the infantry had been able to hold onto its positions.
Farther south, the Soviet penetration south of Bely was threatening
to become a catastrophe. Finding no opposition, the Soviet armoured groups were pushing eastward, seeking to expand their
439

penetration to the north and south. The confusion on the German

side was great: there was no longer a coherent front; a hopeless flight
towards the east before the advancing waves of tanks began.
The following is a report by the commander of I Battalion/ Fusilier
Regiment GD on the events of 26 November south of Bely:
"Early in the morning the reinforced Fusilier regiment marched off
from its quarters in the following sequence: II Btl., I Btl., Ill Btl. About
5 km east of Bely the units climbed aboard trucks at the road which
led in from the east.
The situation at the front was uncertain. Apparently, a bolshevik
tank corps had broken through the positions of the 246th Infantry
Division and the 2nd Luftwaffe Field Division. All that was known of
the 246th Division was that its battalions were still holding in the
area of Budino with their front facing south, while the rest of the
division's positions had been overrun. The heavy artillery fire in this
area continued with undiminished intensity.
The terrain on both sides of the road east of Bely lay under enemy
harassing fire. From time to time enemy aircraft attacked vehicle
concentrations with guns and bombs.
I and II Battalions were given the assignment of advancing through
Wasnewo and Baturino towards Turowo and establishing contact
with the remains of the 246th Infantry Division near Budino. In order
to accomplish this, the battalions first had to cross the bridge over
Natscha brook and the swampy areas on both sides. West of the
bridge they would swing west towards Wasnewo.
The land itself was covered by a deep blanket of snow. Exploding
shells had turned the snow a dirty grey. Wasnewo was crammed full
of supply trains and horses belonging to the division next to the 246th
which was still holding its positions. Until now the only enemy activity
it had seen was patrols and feint attacks.
Orientation during the advance was difficult. Villages which were
indicated on the maps simply no longer existed. During the summer
they had been torn down and the wood from the peasant huts had
been used to build positions and improve command posts. In this
manner the villages of Borissowka, Baturino, Nossowo, Morosowo
and Turowo disappeared from the face of the earth.
Advancing along Wishenka brook, along whose east bank ran a
tank trap, the battalions reached the area of Turowo early in the
afternoon. The enemy apparently had a good view of the terrain as
the advancing battalions were blanketed with artillery fire, resulting
in the first casualties.
The command post of one of the regiments of the 246th Infantry
Division was located where the village of Budino was indicated on
the maps. One of the division's battalions was in position there. The
battalion commander briefed Oberst Kassnitz and the commanders
of I and II Battalions.
440

West of Bely the main line of resistance, which ran towards the
southwest, was firmly in the hands of the defending divisions as far
as Popowo. From Popowo the blocking position, which was occupied by the remnants of the 246th Infantry Division, bent back
towards Budino and ended with its left wing on Wishenka brook.
The positions of the 246th Infantry Division and the 2nd Luftwaffe
Field Division which extended from Popowo to the southwest around
Ssimonowka and Klemjatin had, as already mentioned, been overrun
by the Russian tank units. Most of the soldiers of both divisions had
been scattered or taken prisoner.
Hastily thrown together alert units and newly brought in reserves
tried desperately to dam up the breakthrough. On the German side
no one knew for sure exactly how far the Russians had penetrated.
The reinforced Kampfgruppe Kassnitz was placed under the
command of the 1st Panzer Division. On the afternoon of 26
November both rifle battalions were to attack southwest from Budino
towards Ssimonowka and Klemjatin, occupy both villages and win
back the former main line of resistance.
The bulk of the Soviet artillery was spotted in positions in the forest
about 5,000 metres west of Ssimonowka and Klemjatin. Their
observation posts were located in and on both sides of the two
villages. From there they must have had an excellent view of the
terrain over which Kampfgruppe Kassnitz was to launch its attack.
If the attack had gone ahead across this open terrain, it would
certainly have been smashed by Soviet artillery fire, especially since
the German artillery was still moving into position in the bottom land
on both sides of Borissowka and was temporarily unable to fire. As
a result of the objections raised by Oberst Kassnitz, the attack was
postponed until the following day at 10.00.
While the Oberst and his commanders were brought up to date by
the commander of the battalion from the 246th Infantry Division on
the present situation and the locations of the earlier positions, enemy
infantry suddenly attacked the blocking position due west of Budino.
Elements of I Battalion joined the action and threw back the enemy
forces which had managed to penetrate the German lines at one
point.The remnants of the 246th Division which were employed
there were rather battered and no longer stable.
The high ground on which the village of Budino once stood was
studded with massive bunkers which had been quite comfortably
fitted out. The regimental headquarters which had been quartered
there until the attack could probably have spent the winter there quite
nicely if the Russians hadn't been so unfriendly as to attack at that
exact spot. Also still standing were the bunkers in the bottom land
near Turowo, in which the division's supply train and horses had
apparently spent the winter.

441

I Battalion/Fusilier Regiment was able to find shelter for the night

in these and other bunkers, while II Battalion remained in the
anti-tank ditch at the foot of the slope, which offered a certain degree
of protection against the frequent bouts of Soviet artillery fire. The
5th Company's light infantry gun platoon and a heavy infantry gun
platoon from 17th Company/Fusilier Regiment had gone into
position in the bottom land between Budino and Turowo.
At approximately 21.00 the enemy launched a surprise attack with
about a dozen tanks and mounted infantry southwest of Budino along
the Wishenka valley. Apparently the Soviets were trying to break
through to Baturino. However, the anti-tank ditch across the valley
between Turowo and Morosowo brought the advance to a quick end.
Nevertheless, the tanks drove right up to the anti tank ditch and
opened fire with cannon and machine guns on the elements of
II Battalion which were in positions in the ditch, resulting in more
German casualties. The infantry guns of 17th and 5th Companies
were also hit. The commander of 2nd Company, Lt. Kster, whose
company was in the bunkers between Budino and Turowo, was killed
when his bunker took a direct hit.
The enemy withdrew before the assault guns, which were standing
by in a hollow east of Turowo, could arrive on the scene."
For the medical units of the I.D. GD, which were with all of the
division's units, the splitting apart of the division marked the beginning of a period of extremely hard work. Providing the division with
a uniform level of medical services was initially not possible. However, since the divisions which had been in position there had
established sufficient numbers of permanent facilities, the division's
medical service dispensed with setting up its own installations in the
Olenin area. Only the 2nd Medical Company GD, which had been
attached to Kampfgruppe Kassnitz, was in action, with a medical
clearing station in Koweltschina where it treated numerous casualties
from the fighting south of Bely. Within twenty-four hours the situation
became so acute that, after transporting out all of the wounded who
could not be treated at the site, the medical company had to be
pressed into service in the defence of Koweltschina.
The next day, 27 November, saw no easing of the situation,
although there was now a certain clarity over the focal points of the
Soviet attack: in addition to the one recognised earlier near and south
of Bjeloy, there was obviously another in the Luchesa Valley, where
the enemy had penetrated more than 5 kilometres into the German
main defensive area. The II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD which
was fighting there desperately and alone was unable to hold the
enemy. The Grenadiers fought with the courage of desperation
against an enemy force superior in tanks whose objective was the
BelyOlenin road. Desperate radio calls for reinforcements echoed
through the aether and were picked up at the division headquarters
442

and passed on to the higher authorities. But help with what? There
were no more German units available. The supply trains were
combed for men and scratch units sent to the front. Every available
fighting man was to be sent immediately to the threatened position
in the Luchesa Valley. Time was of the essence!
At about 07.30 on 27 November, following a thorough pre-attack
bombardment by the German artillery, I and III Battalions/ Grenadier
Regiment GD once again went to the attack against Wanino and
Motorino. Deep snow, drifts and cold hampered the attack, which
was so important to the recovery of the former main line of
resistance. The attack failed. After hours of bitter fighting the
Grenadiers could go no farther; it could simply not be done with the
available forces. The accompanying tanks suffered heavy losses; four
were knocked out during the battle.
Pleas by the commanders of the attacking battalions led XXIII
Army Corps to call off the attack in the 206th Division's sector and
issue orders to hold the line which had been reached as the new main
line of resistance. This freed forces which were immediately
employed elsewhere along the front. Ill Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD remained in the new front line, reinforcing the infantry
units there, while I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD, III Battalion/Artillery Regiment GD, the 2nd Pionier Company, a Flak
battery and the rest of Panzerjger Battalion GD were thrown
together as Kampfgruppe Khler. The units assembled during the
night in their old billeting area in preparation for a move early the
next morning into the Luchesa Valley, where it was to bring much
needed relief for II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment which was
engaged in hard fighting there.
The Reconnaissance Battalion GD was still in its positions near
Cholmez and Samoschje. It could see enemy troop concentrations
but nothing out of the ordinary took place and the battalion continued
extending and improving its positions.
Meanwhile, south of Bely where the Russians had broken through,
all hell had broken loose. Russian columns streamed endlessly
through the gap in the front and, together with the tanks, poured
eastward. Repeated attempts by the Russians to enlarge the
breakthrough to the north in the direction of Bely failed in the face
of the resistance put up by Kampfgruppe Kassnitz, which was itself
preparing for an attack from the north in the direction of Ssimonowka intended to take the enemy in his flank. The following is another
account by Hauptmann Bethge, commander of I Battalion/Fusilier
Regiment GD:
"It had meanwhile turned out that the enemy had occupied the
heights south and southwest of Morosowo and Nossowo after the
makeshift unit employed there abandoned its positions the night
before without any contact with the enemy. The result was a gap in
443

the front through which the enemy could have pushed northward
toward Bely. In order to remove this threat, III Battalion/Fusilier
Regiment GD under Oberstleutnant Kohlhaas, which had arrived
early on 27 November, was sent to take the heights south of
Morosowo.
Thick fog and blowing snow reduced visibility, but also prevented
the battalion from being spotted too soon by the enemy artillery and
fired upon.
The battle southwest of Morosowo raged back and forth for hours.
The enemy repeatedly sent in tanks and attempted to throw the
attacking III Battalion back down the hill. The Panzerjger of 18th
Company destroyed several T-34s.
Through gaps in the fog the men could see the enemy tanks clearly
as they drove around on the hills between Ogibalowo and Morosowo.
Eventually, however, III Battalion was able to gain a foothold at the
edge of a horseshoe-shaped gully southwest of Morosowo and held
this position against all enemy attacks.
During the afternoon enemy activity in front of the positions held
by Kampfgruppe Kassnitz died down. The planned attack by the
battle group was put off until the following day."
The breakthrough at this position had brought the enemy's spearheads to Skerino, about 12 kilometres southeast of Bely, or almost
20 kilometres past the former German defensive line. Meeting little
resistance, the Soviets prepared to cross the Natscha. But
Kampfgruppe von der Meden of the 1st Panzer Division arrived after
a forced march and occupied the east bank of the river between
Koweltschina and Komary in order to prevent the crossing. However, the battle group simply did not have the forces necessary to do
so, especially as the marshy areas along the river had frozen over
and were no longer an obstacle to tanks. A catastrophe now seemed
unavoidable and the destruction of the Ninth Army and with it the
Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND seemed certain.
On the other side, the Soviet elite units committed at the crucial
points, motorised and mechanised units with many tanks and rocket
launchers, fought especially well. The strength of the Soviet forces
in the Luchesa Valley alone was estimated at more than 21,000 men.
The German defenders were proven positional infantry divisions.
They had spent the previous winter of 1941/42 quietly in their
well-equipped bunkers, but had lost some of their defensive strength
in the months of inactivity. All of their preparations for the Soviet
attack they knew must come were smashed and destroyed by the
Soviet artillery barrage and following attack on the night of 24 and
25 November 1942.
In the face of the enemy assault the units of the I.D. GD were
employed as "fire brigades" at hot spots along the front. Dispersed
along the entire northern and western front of the Ninth Army, they
444

sought to bring the enemy advance to a standstill. Elements of the

Panzer Battalion GD fought with success almost directly in front of
the headquarters of the 206th Infantry Division, but at great cost in
men and tanks. The 3rd Company/Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD,
which fought alongside the Panzer Battalion, lost almost two-thirds
of its strength in the battle, but halted the enemy.
The Reconnaissance Battalion GD, until now in quiet positions
near Cholmez where the enemy had confined his efforts to feints and
diversionary attacks, was withdrawn during the evening. It was to
shift as quickly as possible into the area northeast of Bely, where the
enemy had cut the important BelyOlenin supply road near Jegorje.
That same evening elements of the battalion fought their way
southward through the deep snow, leaving many broken-down
vehicles along the side of the road.
The first elements of Kampfgruppe Khler arrived in the Luchesa
Valley. The situation when they arrived was as follows:
In the north, Kampfgruppe Lindemann (composed of elements of
the 110th Inf.Div.) was in the area of Griwa, beside it units of the
110th Division and the reinforced II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment
GD in positions which extended, strongpoint-style, from Wetka
through Griwa to Trawino; the still recognisable defensive line then
ran to Staruchi, where there were also elements of II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment, and on to approximately the edge of the
forest (northern tip) near Nikolskoje.
Here there was a gap where there were no defenders, offering the
Soviets an opportunity to stream through to the east. The nearest
German strongpoints were in Karskaja and Malinowka, manned by
troops of the 86th Infantry Division. In between was a yawning
emptiness.
The first of the division's units to arrive at the scene of the fighting
was 1st Company of the Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD. It first reached
Bogorodizkoje and then launched a surprise attack to the southwest
in an effort to close the dangerous gap in the front with the few men
available. The plan succeeded. Under the brave leadership of Obit.
Frsterling, the company reached the line StaruchiLadyshino. The
company held the line against the first probing Soviet patrols, but
the first serious counterattack did not take place until midday. The
Soviet attack, with about twenty-five tanks, was beaten off by the
Pioniers with some help from Grenadiers of II Battalion in bloody
close-in fighting.
The assignment for the rest of the division's units was clear: the
Luchesa Valley had to be blocked, a Soviet breakthrough prevented
and contact reestablished with the 86th Infantry Division. This
assignment placed great demands on the limited resources available,
however. Two weakened rifle battalions of the Grenadier Regiment,
with the Pionier Battalion (less one company still with the 14th
445

Inf.Div.) and the remnants of the Panzerjger Battalion (one company was near Bely and one motorized company had been disbanded) had to first seize their positions and then hold them against
the tremendous numerical superiority of the Soviets. These units,
which were once more under the direct command of the division,
were outdoors day and night in the snow and cold with practically
no cover, had no effective anti-tank weapons which could operate
in the cold, and had to fight without tank or assault gun support.
Their only support came from a weakened battalion from a foreign
unit on their left wing. The combat strengths of the units were
extremely low, and there were no reserves available. Soviet tanks
repeatedly overran the German strongpoints and then fired on the
positions from behind.
As it became more apparent that the main Soviet effort was in the
Luchesa Valley, the medical services moved to be nearer the fighting:
1st Medical Company and the 1st Ambulance Platoon to the road
leading to Ssidorowo where they immediately set up the main
dressing station. The ambulances drove the wounded from the
battalion aid stations in Gussewo to the main dressing station.
Further south the reinforced Kampfgruppe Kassnitz stood ready
for the planned attack in the direction of Ssimonowka. It was about
midday when the attack began. The following description of the
attack is taken from the personal papers of the commander of I
Battalion/Fusilier Regiment GD:
'II Battalion had scarcely left its blocking positions and stepped into
the open when it was struck by a firestorm. Within twenty minutes
the battalion had been shattered by artillery fire whose intensity was
unlike anything we had imagined before. The very leading elements
of II Battalion did succeed in reaching the first bunkers in Ssimonowka, but they were met there by Soviet infantry and badly shot up.
Only a few of the men made it back to their starting position. The
commanding officer, adjutant and all of the company commanders
and company officers were killed or wounded. The battalion executive officer was the only officer to return unhurt. Losses in men and
NCOs were correspondingly high.
Things went better for I Battalion which attacked from farther back
on the right. It was able to take the first part of the old main line of
resistance fairly quickly, but the attack then bogged down as a result
of II Battalion's lack of progress and the extremely heavy Soviet
artillery fire. Moreover, the enemy infantry had settled into the
bunkers and trenches and were defending tenaciously. Meanwhile,
Oberst Kassnitz arrived and gave orders for I Battalion to return to
its former positions.
The battalion was subsequently inserted on the left wing of the
battalion from the 246th Infantry Division in the blocking position
southwest of Budino where it closed the gap to III Battalion near
446

Battle for the Luchessa Valley Positions

1-3 December 1942

Action by Kampfgruppe Kassnitz

(Fusilier Rgt. GD) South of Bely
26 Nov.-16 Dec. 1942

Morosowo. The remnants of II Battalion were placed under the

command of Hauptmann Bethge and sent to rest in the bunkers in
Budino to give them a chance to recover from the day's shock. The
battalion had to regroup and reorganise as it had lost all of its
officers."
The 2nd Medical Company had carried out the assignment given
it on 27 November and had defended what, until recently, had been
the site of its main dressing station. The company left there on 28
November and set up a new main dressing station in the school in
Kartschishinino where the doctors and surgeons immediately set to
work at the operating tables, trying to save what lives they could.
However, help came too late for many of the wounded who had
been exposed too long to the extreme cold.
The night leading up to 29 November the first day of Advent brought no rest for the defenders outside in the snow and storm.
The enemy kept up the pressure, probing the German strongpoint
positions looking for gaps in the defences. By summoning their last
reserves of strength the German defenders were able to find the
enemy forces that had broken through and slow them down, forcing
them to pay a high price for every metre of snow-covered ground.
The individual sections and weapons teams held on in their holes in
the snow, only giving them up when further resistance became
useless. Then they ran a few metres back through the snow, threw
themselves down, brought their rifles or machine guns into firing
position and opened fire again. Only in this manner were the
defenders able to hold on at all.
Only limited assistance could be sent to the hard-fighting men of
II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment and 1st Company/Sturm-Pionier
Battalion under Obit. Frsterling. Kampfgruppe Khler, which contained artillery, an anti-tank company, Flak artillery and the recently-added 2nd Sturm-Pionier Company GD under Obit. Warschnauer,
was probably the first to arrive in the Luchesa Valley, but its combat
strength was very low. It had driven to Lapkowo that morning over
roads scouted the night before, then continued on foot through the
snowdrifts towards the Luchesa bridge. Of the enemy himself
nothing was known for certain. The battle group sought to make
contact with II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment which was already
fighting in the valley north of Staruchi. The Kampfgruppe arrived
just in time, as a Soviet tank attack was taking place. Quick action
by the limited number of 5 cm anti-tank guns and I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment lessened the danger.
Intercepted radio messages revealed that further Soviet armoured
forces were assembling near Anossowo. Individual tanks were able
to break through the thinly-manned line and attack the German
positions from behind. The 5 cm anti-tank guns were next to useless
against the Soviet T-34 and KV-I tanks. One gun after another was
449

overrun. There was nothing left but for the Grenadiers to jump onto
the steel monsters and destroy them with concentrated charges.
Fifteen of the Soviet tanks were put out of action by these means or
by direct fire from the 8.8 cm Flak, artillery or anti-tank guns.
At midday, however, the situation threatened to become even
more critical: the Karskaja strongpoint, which was being held by the
86th Infantry Division, was overrun by Soviet tanks. Finding no more
opposition, the tanks roared towards the east and north to attack
the other strongpoints from the side or rear, trailing sprays of snow
in their wakes. The only solution for the strongpoints was to form
hedgehog positions and hold on at any cost.
Soviet pressure also increased again near Staruchi. The German
infantry was in retreat towards Bogorodizkoje, the southern flank
had been ripped open. Then Kampfgruppe Warschnauer, which
consisted of 1st and 2nd Companies of Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD,
threw itself against the far superior enemy force which included at
least 40 tanks in an effort to prevent the Soviets from achieving a
breakthrough. Obit. Frsterling was killed and his NCOs fell one after
another, but the Pioniers held on in spite of the loss of their section
and platoon leaders and continued to fight. The attack was brought
to a halt, but only a small number of defenders survived those hellish
hours.
The elements of II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment deployed at the
Luchesa bridge north of Staruchi were also involved in bitter, close-in
fighting. The few men committed there fought with unparalleled
courage. The 7th Company and its commander Obit. Rupp were
likewise engaged in a battle man against men and tanks. That evening
7th Companyformerly the famous 'Sixth'counted a combat
strength of five men. Obit. Rupp, Ofeldw. Sonnenburg (leader of the
company headquarters personnel) and many others were listed as
missing in action. Every man held his ground and fought on against
the Soviet tide to his last breath. During the night II Battalion's
fighting strength was that of a reinforced platoon: that was all that
was left after the frightful 29 November 1942.
Alongside the infantry were the forward observers and radio
operators of the artillery. They took part in the battles in the front
lines, directing the fire of their batteries which provided fire support
for the Grenadiers. They were also the eyes of the division command.
Their continuous radio reports from every sector gave the artillery
and division commanders an accurate picture of their own and the
enemy's situation.
Lt. Busch of 7th Battery/III Battalion/Artillery Regiment GD,
which was supporting Kampfgruppe Khler, described his experiences that day as a forward observer near Staruchi:
"We occupied an observation post at 03.00; reported to Major
Lorenz, commander of a battle group. . . nothing to be seen, only
450

the uncomfortable sound of tank tracks rumbling through the impenetrable snowstorm. At about 09.00 the first crossed our lines,
rammed our Paks; one rolled straight over our trenches. Unfortunately, we had no hand grenades or demolition charges at hand.
When it cleared for a moment we could see our infantry crawling
about and heard the 'hurray' of the bolsheviks. I tried every means
to range in the guns, but when I actually did see an impact, by the
time the next shot was fired there was such a thick wall of snow in
front of us that we could see nothing more.
Suddenly, at about 10.00, ten more T-34s appeared in front of us
and rolled over our holes. A hundred paces behind them followed
the Russian infantry. We wondered why our Grenadiers weren't firing
and then saw them pulling back in a group behind us. What to do?
If we pulled back too the Russians would soon be on our hill and
would simply shoot us down as we climbed down into the gully. So
we decided to try to hold.
We collected all the machine guns and submachine guns.
Hauptmann Fromm, who had come forward a short time before,
took command of the last defendersabout 45 menincluding two
Pak crews, several Grenadiers and our radio operator.
We allowed the bolsheviks to approach to about 80 metres and
then we opened fire with our limited supply of ammunition. But there
always seemed to be more, charging at us with horrible cries of
'Urrah!'. There was nothing else to do we would have to make a
run for it. Hptm. Fromm ordered an orderly withdrawal along the
road, but there wasn't much chance of that.
I was able to take a brief, sad look at my forward observer car. It
was stuck in the ditch. It wouldn't be long until the Russians poured
over it. Nevertheless, we remained in cover behind it until we
suddenly came under fire from the side. The Russians had outflanked
us on the right.
The last hope for escape lay in flight across the snow-covered field
to the left. One man after another toppled over into the snow, fatally
hit. Hptm. Fromm was hit in the groin, but was able to keep going
with my help. Then there was a cry behind me; Wachtmeister
Budecke had been hit in the head.
I was able to drag myself slowly through the snow. I had already
lost my boots; I was able to get along much better without them.
There were splashes in the snow all around me; I don't remember
anything else, except that once, when I turned around, I saw a
number of dark forms standing behind me shooting at me.
The snow became deeper and deeper. I wasn't going to get much
farther; I was all in. Forty metres ahead of me was a small bush and
I trudged off towards it. A deep snowdrift lay before me; I couldn't
get through standing up. I tried to crawl through on all fours, tried
to roll over my strength was simply at an end.
451

I had to leave Hptm. Fromm. He had apparently been hit again;

the only sign of life from him was a soft moan.
Was I now to fall into the hands of the bolsheviks stuck in the snow?
For the first time in my life I called for help. I saw another form close
by. It was a Leutnant of the Pak coming to my aid. Summoning the
last of my strength I grasped at this straw and stood up. Now I was
in cover and at least the bolsheviks could no longer see me. The
Pak-Leutnant and I were the only survivors. Farther back to the
opposite slope. The infantry had reassembled there. Two 8.8 cm
Flak guns had driven up and finally halted the Russians, driving the
tanks away and destroying several.
It was a miracle that I escaped that witches' cauldron."
During the night the elements of I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment
which had been hastily committed the day before were withdrawn.
The relieving force, Kampfgruppe Warschnauer, which had been
reinforced by the addition of alert units, now took over the positions
east of Staruchi. The Soviet penetration south of Staruchi and near
Nikolskoje forced the units along the Luchesa to lengthen their flank.
It was imperative for the defenders to establish another blocking
position farther east and prevent a breakthrough by the Soviets to
the vital BelyOlenin road at all cost. Once it had been relieved, I
Battalion, with elements of IV (Heavy) Battalion, set out through
Merkuschi to Ssmolkowo where it was to occupy new defensive
positions. The following day (30 November 1942) was to see the
units of the I.D. GD in the Luchesa Valley face the most extreme
trials.
During the night there were frequent barrages from Soviet artillery
and Stalin Organs, as well as attacks near Trawino and Bogorodizkoje. The Grenadier Regiment GD, less II Battalion, had taken over
the defence of the SsmolkowoOssinowka sector with the reinforced I Battalion, the Military Police Company and alert units drawn
from the supply units and artillery.
The Soviet attacks began at dawn and continued throughout the
day. They managed to push their way into the northern section of
Bogorodizkoje, supported by a large number of tanks. A counterattack by 2nd Company/Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD led by Obit.
Warschnauer recaptured the village. Further northwest at the boundary with II Battalion, the Soviets launched repeated attacks against
Trawino (Kampfgruppe Lindemann) and were also making preparations for an attack west of Griwa.
Meanwhile, the stream of situation reports submitted by the
division command had finally convinced Corps and the Ninth Army
that the Soviet effort in the Luchesa Valley was another major thrust.
As a result infantry, artillery and tank units from the 110th and 253rd
Infantry Divisions were dispatched to reinforce the defences in the

452

valley. However, on 30 November these measures had still not come

into effect.
Early in the morning the Soviets launched an attack northward
from Ossinowka with seven heavy tanks and infantry. As the
defenders had no heavy anti-tank weapons, the Soviet tanks were
able to drive unopposed into the villages of Ssmolkowo North and
South. I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD was surrounded but was
able to fight its way out towards Gorowatka at the last minute after
repeated counterattacks. The attached III Battalion/216th Grenadier
Regiment disengaged following the loss of its last two officers and
all of its NCOs and made its way to the positions of I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD. This resulted in another dangerous
situation. The Soviets had smashed open a gap between Ossinowka
and Ssmolkowo and there were now no German defenders in their
path as they drove eastward.
On the division's right wing Kampfgruppe Lindemann also had to
face repeated enemy assaults against Griwa and Trawino in the
afternoon. These were beaten off with heavy losses to both sides.
The attacks near Bogorodizkoje lasted until late in the night. For
the most part, however, the defenders were able to hold off the
attacking Soviets.
The division's repeated requests to have its own units returned to
its command finally met with success. On the evening of 30
November the Panzer Battalion GD and the Ski Battalion GD were
released by the 14th Infantry Division and the 206th Infantry
Division, respectively, and sent on their way back to the division. In
the period 26-30 November the Panzer Battalion GD had destroyed
twenty-two T-34s, a KV-I and two T-26s. The 14th Infantry Division
gladly passed along its appreciation to the division command for the
battalion's efforts. The Ski Battalion GD, under the command of
Rittmeister Bartram, had fought off the heaviest attacks day after
day, losing more than half of its strength in the process.
Care and evacuation of the wounded in the combat zone were
extremely difficult. The ambulances of the ambulance platoons drove
day and night, often through snowdrifts which appeared impenetrable, and it happened only too often that an ambulance had
to be abandoned after being hit by artillery or tank fire. 1st Medical
Company's main dressing station in Ssidorowo was kept busy
tending to the wounded, many of whom were in serious condition.
The wounded were evacuated to medical facilities farther to the rear
aboard makeshift hospital trains. The transfer point was located at
Olenin Station.
The main body of the Reconnaissance Battalion GD, which had
been withdrawn from the front and was now on the move in the Bely
area, arrived in Jegorje, where it received orders from the 246th
Infantry Division to reopen the road to Olenin. The 2nd and 3rd
453

Squadrons and the Pionier Platoon of 5th Squadron were sent

against Podwoiskoje, north of the Obscha, while 4th Squadron was
to attack south of the river toward the southwest. The objectives
north of the river were reached in the face of light resistance, but 4th
Squadron ran into heavier resistance south of the Obscha and made
little progress. 2nd (SPW) Squadron was sent to help. Together the
two squadrons advanced rapidly, driving the enemy out of Lormaniki
and Schanino, although they were unable to take Gorki on account
of heavy fire from Soviet tanks and artillery.
Farther south at the other crisis point on Ninth Army's western
front the breakthrough point south of Bely the fury of the Soviet
attacks against the German south flank had abated. Instead the
Soviets now tried to build on their success in the east and concentrated the 35th Tank Brigade near Shiguny for an attack across
the Natscha. On the east bank of the river the 1st Panzer Division
attempted to prevent the crossing with the limited forces available.
However, individual Soviet battle groups appeared to have already
penetrated the wooded country east of the Natscha. Heavy fighting
was raging in the forests and at the river.
The reinforced Kampfgruppe Kassnitz, with I Battalion in the
Budino bunkers and II Battalion in the ravine between Morosowo
and Nossowo and in positions near Chirewo, initially called off the
resumption of its attack against Ssimonowka and Klemjatin. In
general the enemy was relatively quiet.
During the previous night III Battalion/Fusilier Regiment had
occupied new positions between Morosowo and Nossowo. The
villages no longer existed and the men lay in holes in the snow which
offered little protection. The commander of III Battalion, Oberstleutnant Kohlhaas, wearer of the Knight's Cross, had set up his
command post in a ravine and built snow bunkers along the ravine's
edge. Since III Battalion's position ran along a slope which climbed
away to the south, the enemy had a good view of it from the west.
That evening the Soviets fired on the position with Stalin Organs
and scored a direct hit on Kohlhaas' snow bunker. The commander
of III Battalion was killed instantly. The division had lost yet another
popular and courageous commander. Hauptmann Walle was ordered to take command of III Battalion.
That same day, 30 November 1942, the Soviets kept up the
pressure in an attempt to force a breakthrough. They attacked
without pause employing every means available to reach their
objective regardless of losses. Again and again they threw fresh forces
into the attack and concentrated them in narrow spearheads to
increase the weight of the attack. Next to the area south of Bely, the
Soviets most wanted to expand on the success they had achieved
the previous day between Ssmolkowo and Ossinowka and finally
break open the way to the east.
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On the German side the commanders saw their forces growing

ever weaker. The creation of additional strongpoints was no longer
possible; there were no reserves available and the men were completely exhausted and worn out. A few men formed the backbone
of the defences. They sacrificed themselves, urging their exhausted
comrades to carry on, preventing the enemy from breaking through.
During the night so-called "alert units" were formed in the division's
rear areas from supply trains, staff units, supply units, bakers,
butchers, drivers and military police. These were an expedient
thought up General Zeitzler, at that time Chief of the General Staff.
Well aware of the disproportion between fighting and non-fighting
personnel, he ordered all non-essential soldiers removed from the
supply trains and supply units, formed into alert units and sent to the
front. However, besides their physical shortcomings, these soldiers
had received limited combat training. They had been trained to
defend themselves for a short time and little more. The units were
under-armed, their fighting spirit was limited and they lacked field
kitchens. For the division they were more of a burden than a relief.
Despite several examples of inspiring heroism, the alert units were
usually soon scattered and suffered relatively heavy losses. Nevertheless, they had to be used for better or worse as there was no other
way to plug the gaps in the front. So, on the night of 30 November/1
December the alert units of the I.D. GD moved forward to reinforce
the front-line units.
1 December 1942 was the heaviest day of fighting for the
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Division in the Luchesa Valley. Three
Soviet divisions began attacking at dawn. Following very thorough
artillery preparation the tanks and infantry began their advance
against the strongpoints near the Bogorodizkoje bridge and between
Ssmolkowo-North and Korenewka. I Battalion/252nd Grenadier
Regiment was sent in. It occupied the edge of the wood east of
Korenewka, the east edge of Galitschkina and Bol. Borjatino.
At about 07.00 the Soviets attacked from the north across Point
261.8 towards Bol. Borjatino. Under the pressure of this attack the
weakened German units were forced to withdraw towards Now.
Bojartschtschina. Another attack followed at 08.30 between the
Bogorodizkoje mill and Merkuschi. By committing the last of their
forces, and aided by the accurate shooting of the artillery, the
defenders were able to hold.
To the southeast further attacks in battalion strength followed at
about 08.30 against Gorowatka and Shernossekowo. Despite bitter
resistance from the Grenadiers the Soviets gained ground. Under fire
from enemy tanks the German anti-tank weapons were knocked out
one by one. The situation was becoming critical.
At about 10.00 the Soviets finally penetrated the German positions
near the Bogorodizkoje mill across a bridge which had apparently
455

Major Battle for the Luchessa Valley by the

GD Grenadier Regiment and Attached Units
27-30 November 1942

Bottom: A map illustrating the death of Oberst Khler,

commander Grenadier Regiment GD, on 1 December 1942
near Gorowatka.

457

been repaired during the night. Numerous tanks, some with mounted
infantry, streamed into the woods north of Merkuschi. Kampfgruppe
Lorenz (elements of I Battalion /Grenadier Regiment GD and the
Sturm-Pioniers) which was positioned there held out in the northern
part of the narrow wood. For the German troops it was a battle for
survival.
The way to the main road, the lifeline not only of the division, but
of the entire Ninth Army, again appeared to be open before the
enemy. The elements of II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD and
2nd Company/Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD which were still holding
at the bridge near Bogorodizkoje were in constant danger of being
surrounded, as the Soviets had pushed farther to the north in the
direction of Bojewka. Snowstorms and drifting snow restricted the
view for the remaining anti-tank weapons as well as the Stukas which
had been called in. Losses among the personnel of Kampfgruppe
Lorenz (Major Lorenz, CO Sturm-Pionier Battalion) were considerable. The division attempted to fill the gaps with alert units. The
Soviets, too, suffered enormous losses, but they could always send
in fresh troops.
XXIII Army Corps sent in some new forces. II Battalion/473rd
Grenadier Regiment arrived with a total strength of 5 officers and
127 NCOs and men exactly company strength. Also arriving was
the 10th Battery of the 4th Flak Regiment with several guns. Farther
south the Soviets continued their heavy attacks. Their points of main
effort there were near Gorowatka and Now. Bojarschtschina, where
they employed greater numbers of tanks in an effort to force a
success.
At about 15.00 the attackers threw new forces into the battle near
the Bogorodizkoje bridge (at least 20 tanks and 1,100 men) and
forced II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment back into a prepared position in the rear near Lapkowo, due east of Bojewka. Assault gun
support was urgently requested. Help was promised and the Assault
Gun Battalion GD set out from the area of Bely. Hptm. Adam,
commander of the battalion, drove ahead to scout the area. However, several Soviet tanks which had broken through were on the
road to Olenin north of Bely and these opened fire on the
Hauptmann's Kbel from a range of 2,000 metres. The first shell
shattered the car, killing Hptm. Adam and his driver. Adam's deputy,
Hptm. Lemme, took command of the battalion.
Meanwhile, the Soviet pressure north and northeast of Bogorodizkoje had become so great that II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment was
forced to pull back its left wing and dig in again along a line
BogorodizkojeBojewka, with its front facing east and southeast.
The remaining elements of Kampfgruppe Lorenz (parts of I
Btl./Gren.Rgt. and the Sturm-Pioniers) were able to hold on in the
woods south of Lapkowo. As darkness fell the Soviet pressure
458

decreased; the principal danger had been averted for the next few
hours.
The division, which had its headquarters in Tatewo, followed the
movements of the enemy, the disposition and strength of its own
units as well as the manoeuvres of its forces with mounting anxiety.
The division headquarters maintained a steady flow of factual situation reports to XXIII Army Corps in an effort to convince it of the
seriousness of the situation. The corps did not share the division's
concern; in several cases it even tried to play down the threat. A
growing controversy resulted from the discrepancies in the assessment of the situation. This could be attributed to the false optimism
of the Ninth Army which, in order to give a positive picture of the
situation to those above, made unrealistic demands which failed to
take into account the actual condition of the fighting units.
Where the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was concerned, the picture was further complicated by the fact that Hitler
himself was following its progress in great detail, unaware that the
division had been committed at the focal point of the battle with only
the smallest part of its own units. Out of this grew an increasing
alienation between the I.D. GD and XXIII Army Corps as well as
Ninth Army. It was thanks to the Division la, General Staff Major
von Hobe, that no word of the numerous reproaches from superior
command authorities reached the ears of the troops.
The battle being fought by the Grenadier Regiment GD (less II
Battalion) in the SsmolkowoGorowatkaSnernossekowo area was
kept under close scrutiny by the division command. It was in constant
direct telephone communication with the regimental command
posts, resulting in a factual picture of the division's overall situation
on its situation maps.
During the afternoon hours of 1 December the commander of the
Grenadier Regiment GD was again on the phone, describing the
precarious situation of his troops. The commander, whose
weakened battle group possessed virtually no anti-tank weapons,
was speaking from a bunker on the south slope northwest of
Gorowatka. He described the numerous local penetrations by the
Soviets and the breakthroughs by individual enemy tanks, some with
mounted infantry. He described the bravery of his few men holding
out in holes dug in the snow and the high losses among his officers
and NCOs. He gave a pitiless description of the situation in his sector
which now consisted solely of a few strongpoints and machine gun
nests. Major von Hobe tried to cheer him up, but this seemed poor
consolation as he could hear the noise of rattling tank tracks and
bursts of machine gun fire over the line.
At that moment several T-34s with escorting infantry attacked the
village and the high ground to the northwest from the wood
southwest of Gorowatka. The defenders made out 10 enemy tanks.
459

A single 8.8-cm Flak tried to hold them off, but it was hit and put
out of action after destroying one of the T-34s. The gun's crew fled.
The Soviets pushed into the village and the T-34s fired point-blank
into cellars and bunkers in an effort to destroy the few Grenadiers
still desperately holding on. The scene was a terrible one and few
escaped the bloodbath.
Several of the tanks then turned toward the bunker on the side of
the hill in which were located Oberst Khler, some members of the
regiment's Pionier Platoon and a few signals men. Over the phone
the Oberst described the details of the enemy attack forcefully and
accurately. "I can now see the first T-34 driving over the slope; a
regimental Pionier trying to get close enough to use a demolition
charge has been hit and has gone down. The first Russians are
approaching, firing their submachine guns from the hip. The surviving Pioniers that are still able are firing back at them. There are only
a few men holding out with me: Uffz. Krger, my loyal la Clerk, a
Feldwebel from the Pioniers and a few men, no more. My executive
officer is outside trying to scrape together enough men for a
counterattack to win us some breathing space." A pause. Major von
Hobe listened; the sound of tank tracks was now clearer and louder
and between bursts of submachine gun fire he could hear the hacking
sound of an MG 42 and then the crash of tank cannon. Was Oberst
Khler about to leave the bunker and abandon the position? No, he
continued to speak, quite calmly, but also somewhat sadly. Did he
recognise the inescapable situation he and his men were in? Did he
suspect what was coming?
"Look at GD, Hobe, our old regiment and now our young division
it was a great time. And the Grenadier Regiment to which I feel
so closely bound. . . Now here we a r e , - - m y men are fighting like
lions. But soon it will be all over. We're ready. Please stay on the
line, I'd like to keep t a l k i n g , - - t a n k s are coming now. . ." Then
the connection was broken.
Major von Hobe hung his head in his hands. He wept. Deep quiet
reigned in the la room in Tatewo. The 01 still held the receiver in
his hand, but the set was silent. A few minutes passed. Then the la
suddenly raised his head. He called the leader of the signals service
and ordered: "Troubleshooter out at once! Communications with the
Grenadiers have been cut; restore them at once!" He rummaged
aimlessly through the maps and seemed to be looking for something.
Survivors later described what had happened after the line was cut:
Behind the village of Gorowatka lay a small hill on which were the
timber-reinforced foxholes and bunkers of the Regimental Pionier
Platoon under the command of Feldwebel Sperling. From there the
Pioniers pinned down the infantry escorting the Soviet tanks. It was
there that the Oberst and a few, mostly wounded, men went after
the village was abandoned in an effort to reorganise the defence and
460

hold the position. But the Soviets pressed towards the hill as well.
Nevertheless, the Oberst never thought of retreating despite the
hopelessness of his situation. Not until there was no other choice left
to him did he order the evacuation of the bunker hill. The last Pioniers
tried to leave the position under mutual covering fire. Finally, the
Oberst, too, left his bunker. When he was about twenty metres away
he and Feldwebel Sperling were killed by a mortar round. With him
fell some of the members of the Pionier Platoon which had held out
with him: Gefreiten Jger, Schulz, Kuschela, Meermann and Kubitz.
Others died heroically: Uffz. Krger, the regiment's Ia Clerk, and
Feldwebel Wrede of the Regimental Signals Platoon. Only a few men,
most of them wounded, succeeded in escaping this witches' cauldron
at the last minute. They survived to describe the death of their Oberst
and Regimental Commander.
But back to the division headquarters. About an hour after the last
conversation was cut off the door suddenly burst open; a white,
blood-smeared figure staggered inside. His left arm hung limply at
his side, tied up below the shoulder with a length of red telephone
wire. A Russian fur cap sat lop-sided on his head. It was Oberst Palm!
He threw himself down on the nearest bench and groaned. The
medical officer, Dr. Pflugmacher, came in, examined the arm and
tried to loosen the wire.
Almost shouting, Oberst Palm blurted out: "It's all over! The
Russians are through! Oberst Khler is dead! The men are retreating,
we can't hold any longer!!"
Then there was silence again. Major von Hobe stared at the Oberst.
Although he was dying to ask him many questions he refrained from
doing so. Minutes passed while the doctor and the leader of the
signals section tended to the wounded officer and arranged for his
evacuation to a hospital.
Major von Hobe regained his composure. He tried to contact the
artillery in order to ascertain the Grenadiers' situation through their
forward observer. He learned that, as a result of a lack of anti-tank
weapons, I Battalion and the remaining elements of III Battalion had
withdrawn towards Waskowo. There were now no more German
soldiers in the Luchesa Valley other than the Meurer Battalion which
was somewhat farther to the south, and the Soviets had a clear path
to the vital road. The situation in the area east of KorenewkaShernossekowo was initially unclear.
That evening the supply trains were again combed for men. The
resulting alert units were sent to reinforce I Battalion. The battalion
received orders to move from the Waskowo area and use all means
at its disposal to immediately create a new blocking position near
Kusowlewo. The new position was to be reinforced with mines.
Major Lorenz, former commander of the Sturm-Pionier Battalion
GD, was given command of the Grenadier Regiment GD. As a result
461

of his exemplary readiness for action, clarity of purpose, circumspection and above all calm, he soon became the soul of the defence in
the Luchesa Valley. He quickly succeeded in rousing the exhausted
and depressed Grenadiers, who had lost two regimental commanders in the past few days, from their lethargy and reinstilled their
will to resist. The first four assault guns under Obit. Frantz arrived
during the night, providing the Grenadiers with the support they
needed to face the heavy fighting expected on the following day.
The situation for the German defenders on the evening of 1
December 1942 was very bad; the front had been torn open in many
places. The units had been so scattered that the defences now
consisted only of isolated strongpoints; there was no longer a
coherent front. The division therefore shortened its front which now
ran as follows:
Wetka (to 110th Inf.Div.)-Point 234.7-Griwa (Gruppe Lindemann) -north of Woronino (II Btl./Gren.Rgt.)Bojewka (II
Btl./Gren.Rgt.)Missjulkino cheese dairy (I Btl./Gren.Rgt.)Chudulicha (Kgr. Lorenz)Now. Bojarschtschina (I Btl./252nd
Rgt.)Bogdaschkino (I Btl./252nd Rgt.)-to 86th Inf.Div.-reinforcements promised by XXIII Army Corps.
The fighting on this day, which again cost the division heavy
casualties, was very significant for the defence of the Ninth Army's
western front. As a result of the delaying tactics and the heroic
defence by the Grenadiers, the Soviets did not succeed in completing
their breakthrough to the east. Suffering enormous losses, they were
able to win ground but were never able to break through. Considerable Soviet forces were tied down by the division, gaining time which
allowed other forces to be moved into the Luchesa Valley from
quieter sections of the front. It is likely that a complete defensive
success would have been achieved if the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Division had been committed as a homogenous unit. It had been
learned long before that a man performed much better when he was
with his comrades as part of a coherent unit than when he was alone
among strangers.
The morning of 2 December dawned misty grey over the battlefield
in the Luchesa Valley. The Grenadiers, Pioniers, artillerymen and
members of the alert units stared from their dirty-white holes in the
snow and once again made ready their weapons. At 07.00 the
Soviets resumed their attack, sending tanks from the area of Bojewka
in the direction of Belikowo. The main burden of the fighting was
borne by the few Grenadiers of II Battalion.
Farther south the Soviets launched an attack with tank support
from the woods north of Merkuschi on both sides of the road to the
northeast and towards Wereista. The German forces in the path of
the attack (the Pioniers of the Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD and the
right wing of I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment G D , part of
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Kampfgruppe Lorenz) defended their positions against the attacking

tanks under heavy artillery fire. Some Soviet tanks with mounted
infantry succeeded in breaking through the weak line of strongpoints.
Still farther south, south of the Luchesa, the Soviets renewed their
efforts to break through to the east in the direction of Now.
Bojarschtschina. Powerful Soviet infantry and armoured forces went
to the attack at 09.00. They penetrated into the positions of I
Battalion/252nd Inf.Rgt. and then entered the village itself. After
some heavy fighting, much of it at close quarters, the defenders
withdrew towards Chudulicha, where they dug in. Only about 2,000
metres separated the enemy from the division's main supply road.
Tank shells and even isolated mortar rounds were already bursting
on the road which was so vital to the continuation of the battle and
to the flow of supplies and communications from the south. There
was a very real danger that the road would be cut.
In spite of the desperate defence, the Soviets gained ground against
Kampfgruppe Lorenz. They managed to push into the valley north
of Wereista and established themselves there. I Battalion/Grenadier
Regiment, which was fighting on the western edge of the valley, was
surrounded in Kusowlewo for a time. The battalion defended itself
bitterly in the village. That evening a counterattack ordered by Major
Lorenz recaptured the valley north of Weresita and freed the battalion.
II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD, which was under great
pressure near Bojewka, was pushed out of the village and had to
withdraw toward Belikowo. Heavy snowstorms, low unit strengths
and the complete exhaustion of the few defenders led to the village
being abandoned. It was there that Wachtmeister Kurt Kasiske of
the Assault Gun Battalion GD was killed. A patrol sent out by the
Grenadier Regiment GD towards Gorowatka managed to find and
recover the bodies of the regiment's commanding officer and the
Grenadiers who had fallen with him. All valuables had been stripped
from the bodies: rings removed, boots taken, even parts of their
uniforms. The dead were brought back for proper burial in the rear.
In recognition of his outstanding leadership and selfless actions,
which were examples to the exhausted defenders, Major Lorenz was
recommended for the Knight's Cross. He received the decoration
on 20 December 1942. On the occasion the division's commanding
officer released the following order of the day:
Infantry Division
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND

Div. H.Q., 20. 12. 1942

O r d e r of the D a y

463

The Fhrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht has

awarded the commander of the Pionier Battalion GROSSDEUTSCHLAND,
M a j o r Lorenz,

the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.

On 2. 12. 1942, after days of the heaviest defensive fighting with
completely exhausted troops, most of whom were drawn from train
units, Major Lorenz, despite being wounded himself, held the main
line of resistance against overwhelming numbers of fresh enemy units
and, on his own initiative, carried out a successful counterattack with
three recently arrived assault guns. This attack significantly improved
our main line of resistance and averted a very serious threat to our
supply road.
This decoration does honour to the exemplary personal action and
the outstanding bravery of this outstanding officer.
I know that others will follow the five soldiers who have won this
high decoration since the commitment of the Infantry Division
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND by doing their best.
signed Hoemlein
But what had become of the Reconnaissance Battalion GD which
had been deployed northeast of Bely under its commander Rittmeister Wtjen? The road to Olenin which ran north of the
Obscha was free of the enemy, but the Soviets had dug in south of
the Obscha near Schanino and Gorki. Undoubtedly these forces were
the armoured spearhead from the breakthrough south of Bely which
had advanced deeper into German territory. The Reconnaissance
Battalion shifted the focal point of its attack to the south bank of the
Obscha. Early on the morning of 2 December it sent 3rd Squadron
into Schanino, taking the village by surprise. The squadron captured
three enemy machine guns and took a large number of prisoners.
By taking Schanino the battalion had won a favourable starting
position for an attack on Gorki where there were strong enemy
infantry and tank forces. However, the battalion had no anti-tank
weapons, as they had all been put out of action. All that was sent by
XXXXI Panzer Corps were some 2 cm anti-aircraft guns. The
battalion's attack was to develop in the afternoon, but before this
could get under way the Soviets counterattacked and their tanks
pushed into Schanino once more. Despite bitter resistance, 3rd
Squadron was unable to halt the enemy's armour and, after destroying two T-34s with close-range weapons, was forced to give up the
village. The squadron suffered not inconsiderable losses. Afterward

464

the battalion assembled in Lomanki and prepared to defend the

village. Around midday the battalion learned from Major Schlesinger
of XXXXI Panzer Corps that it was to be pulled out of the line and
sent back to the division. After relief by 3rd Company/218th
Construction Battalion it was to transfer to the north into the area
south of Olenin by the fastest possible route. The battalion was told
to expect contact with enemy forces along the road, an assumption
which fortunately proved false. The promised reinforcements were
on their way and an easing of the situation in the Luchesa Valley was
on the horizon. The Reconnaissance Battalion was approaching the
valley, Pioniers and detached tanks of the Panzer Battalion GD were
on their way back to the division and III Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD, which was still attached to the 20th Infantry Division, had
orders to transfer into the division's combat zone once it was relieved.
II Battalion/Artillery Regiment GD was preparing to move its batteries into the Luchesa Valley. The men there could finally breathe
a little easier and it was about time!
For Kampfgruppe Lindemann in the northwest sector of the
division's combat zone the fighting went on with undiminished
ferocity. The Soviets launched heavy attacks throughout 3 December. They made numerous local penetrations, resulting in a totally
confused situation. Enemy pressure, especially by tanks, had so
increased by midday that the left wing of Kampfgruppe Lindemann
had to be pulled back. The soldiers holding Niwje and Griwa fought
their way back to a line KornilowkaMai. Iwanowka-Point 249.1
where their left wing reestablished contact with II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD which was in positions in Pysino and
Lonow. Enemy aircraft were active over the whole area, bombing
and strafing ground targets. The Soviets launched their first attacks
against Kampfgruppe Lorenz at 07.00. Supported by tanks, the
attackers managed to force their way into the village of Wereista after
heavy fighting. In the battles which developed in front of Kusowlevo
Soviet tanks against the Grenadiers of I Battalion thirteen of
the fourteen attacking tanks were destroyed by anti-tank guns,
close-range weapons and the few assault guns which were there.
Uffz. Hermann Nagel and Gefr. Joh Bsing of the Assault Gun
Battalion GD were killed in the fighting after knocking out several
enemy tanks.
The commanding officer of I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD,
Obstlt. (since 1. 4. 1942) Gehrkewas recommended for the Knight's
Cross for his conduct in and near Kusolewo where he and his men
prevented a Soviet breakthrough.
An enemy thrust against Chudulicha, where I Battalion/252nd
Infantry Regiment was holding out bravely, was successfully beaten
off. Once again an attempt by the Soviets to reach the main road
had been turned back. The heavy fighting of the past few days in the
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severe cold and blowing snow had weakened the troops considerably. It was only the self-sacrificial conduct of individual officers and
NCOs that enabled the positions to be held.
The medical units remained in action as before. The ambulance
drivers were active day and night without relief, bringing the wounded
back to the main dressing stations over the snow-covered roads. In
two days 2 and 3 December 1942 the 1st Medical Company's
overloaded main dressing station cared for 448 wounded. The
surgeons were exhausted, but they carried on, often kept going only
by coffee and stimulants. From time to time the field hospitals were
bombed and strafed by Soviet aircraft which spotted the traffic and
the inevitable concentrations of vehicles nearby.
Slowly, very slowly, the situation in the Luchesa Valley began to
stabilise. Assisting the Grenadiers in their defensive battles were the
Stukas, which bombed enemy assembly areas with considerable
success. Contributing to the accuracy of the bombing was the
outstanding work of the Close-Range Reconnaissance Platoon of the
A.O.K.9 which interpreted Soviet radio traffic, which was transmitted uncoded, and passed the intercepts on to the division command. During the course of the defensive battles in the Luchesa
Valley the Ic of the Division GD, Obit, of the Reserve Otto Ritter,
specialised in such activities, employing all available means to
determine the enemy's intentions. It was thanks to his initiative that,
following the first attempts at intelligence gathering using the
Armoured Observation Battery GD, forward observers and individual
listening posts set up in front of the lines the A.O.K.9's highlyspecialised Close Range Reconnaissance Platoon was employed in
the Division GD's sector. The platoon soon met with success. During
combat the Russians transmitted in the clear, even though they did
use code names. German intelligence soon discovered the meanings
of the code names.
Additional units were now sent to the defensive front in the Luchesa
Valley, which had stabilised on 4 and 5 December. The Kautz
Artillery Battalion of the 110th Infantry Division (GD's neighbour on
the right) was incorporated into the division's artillery system and
achieved great success as a result of excellent cooperation. The
Pioniers, who were fighting a courageous delaying action on the
LapkowoWaskowo road, were reinforced by elements of the Huch
Regiment of the 110th Infantry Division, the GD Military Police and
further alert units from Division Headquarters. Killed in the fighting
were Feldw. Germann and Ogefr. Richter, the executive officer of
Major von Hobe of the Division Staff.
5 December began with heavy fire from Soviet artillery and Stalin
Organs but, contrary to expectations, the rest of the day passed
quietly. Small-scale attacks were beaten back easily and the defenders

466

even managed to improve their own positions through local

counterattacks.
The defenders appeared to have done it; the weight of the enemy
attacks had diminished. The Soviets had suffered bloody losses and
the heroic steadfastness of the Grenadiers had brought about the
failure of every breakthrough attempt. Of a total of 200 Soviet tanks
employed in this sector l 2 O were knocked out, either by German
tanks or anti-tank guns or by the Grenadiers with their close-range
weapons. Several Soviet mechanised rifle brigades and rifle regiments had been wiped out. At some locations along the front the
appearance of an assault gun or tank was enough to induce Soviet
units and tanks to retreat, as in one incident near Martinowo.
The constantly active Close-Range Reconnaissance Platoon of the
A.O.K.9 was soon able to determine the reason for the surprising
quiet in the division's sector. An intercepted radio message revealed
that a commission was en route from Moscow to call to account
those responsible for the lack of elan in the attacks in the Luchesa
Valley.
On the German side the defenders were doing everything possible
to get ready for future attacks. The 129th Infantry Division under
Generalmajor Praun was inserted south of the Luchesa. It took over
command of the sector held by I Battalion/252nd Infantry Regiment
which ran from Martinowo to Chudulicha then to the southwest. This
allowed the I.D. GD to shorten its own defensive line and condense
its forces. Some alert units were withdrawn from the front lines and
replaced by GD units arriving from other sectors. The Reconnaissance Battalion GD moved into the forest about 1,000 metres
northeast of Waskowo and remained there as the division's mobile
reserve.
On 7 December 1942 every one of the weak Soviet attacks, some
with tanks, especially north of Lapkowo and near Wereista, was
beaten off with bloody losses to the attackers. These were correctly
assessed as the last gasps of the Soviet offensive. Several local
advances confirmed the observations of the past few days that the
Soviets were regrouping for defence and were undertaking only
minor local attacks and patrol operations. The number of wounded
at the division's field hospitals was still considerable, however, as
more and more cases of frostbite arrived for treatment. In the period
from 4 to 6 December, the main dressing station at Ssidorowo (1st
Medical Company) treated a total of 370 sick and wounded.
When no more attacks followed in the next few days, plans were
drawn up at headquarters to clear up the situation in the Luchesa
Valley, which probably originated from a radio message from the
Fhrer Headquarters. The following Fhrer Befehl reached the
Chief of the General Staff of the Ninth Army:

467

T h e Fhrer expects t h a t t h e fully e q u i p p e d D i v i s i o n G D

will clear u p t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e L u c h e s a Valley.
Without a doubt the message contained a certain reproach from
the supreme command. It is therefore not surprising that the division
command reacted in its own defence. In any case, as a result of the
arguments that followed, which brought XXIII Army Corps and Ninth
Army several not-undeserved reproaches from above, a scapegoat
had to be found. Major von Hobe was informed by the Commanding
General that he had been relieved and his successor named. Major
von Hobe wrote:
"I have too little experience in Panzer units and must first become
Corps la for a while. That is the rationale for relieving me of my
position. I suspected that my relations with Corps would have
consequences, but nevertheless this notification hits me hard. The
message has been at division for several days, but the General kept
it from me and the Adjutant (Hptm. Bethge) was sent to Fhrer
Headquarters in an effort to have the order rescinded.
All of the officers, especially the unit commanders, were very
concerned and consoled me with words of encouragement. That is
my greatest thanks! It's certain that I was lacking many of the qualities
needed for this difficult position, and it may be true that to those
above I showed too much concern for the men and too little
coldheartedness."
Oberstleutnant von Natzmer was named as von Hobe's successor.
As former acting Chief of Staff of a Panzer Division, he possessed
considerable experience. With the sudden visit to division headquarters by Oberst Schmundt, the relief of von Hobe could be delayed
no longer. However, this did not prevent Schmundt from receiving
an accurate description of what had taken place in the division's area
of operations, the splitting up of the division over 110 kilometres of
front and the extraordinary bravery of the units in the Luchesa Valley.
The facts were presented in every detail in the Fhrer Headquarters. Thus at least the men of the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Division were given their due.
On 7 December the division reported the destruction of its 500th
enemy tank; 120 of these had been accounted for in the Luchesa
Valley.
The cessation of offensive operations in this sector by the Soviets
was confirmed by air reconnaissance which observed the withdrawal
of their motorised units. On the German side this led to the
accelerated construction of further defensive positions, bunkers and
machine gun nests. Particular emphasis was placed on the building
of combat bunkers and underground living quarters in order to
provide adequate accommodation for the Grenadiers who had been
outside for weeks in the snow and cold.

468

The defensive front was significantly strengthened through the

reorganisation and reassignment of sectors. Oberst Reinke, former
CO of the division's artillery regiment, left the division and was
replaced by Obstlt. Albrecht. Major Gehrke, who had meanwhile
been awarded the Knight's Cross, was transferred to the Wach
Bataillon GD in Berlin. His successor was Hptm. Remer, who took
over command of I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment G D . Replacements arrived from Cottbus and filled the gaps in the various units.
The numbers of wounded were still considerable, even though they
were decreasing as a result of the situation at the front. From 7 . 1 2 .
to 9. 12. 1942 a total of 227 wounded were cared for at the
Ssidorowo main dressing station, including a large percentage suffering from frostbite. The incidence of frostbite had been on the rise
for the past few days following a thaw. The wounded were evacuated
from Olenin in improvised ambulance trains, which consisted of
freight cars temporarily converted for the passenger carrying role.
These makeshift hospital trains drove up close to the front, easing
the strain on other means of transportation for the wounded.
During those days there was little out of the ordinary to report from
the Luchesa Valley other than Soviet patrols and artillery fire. At the
same time, in the south Kampfgruppe Kassnitz (reinf. Fusilier Regiment GD) was making initial preparations to close the pocket
forming around two Soviet tank corps south of Bely. The
Kampfgruppe was instructed to advance from its previous positions
south of the city towards Dubrowka and establish contact with the
19th Panzer Division which was attacking from the south. To the
southeast the attack was supported along the Natscha by the 12th
Panzer Division, which had been hastily thrown into this sector from
the Orel area, and the SS-Cavalry Brigade Fegelein. The
Kampfgruppe was to close off the Soviet point of penetration south
of Bely and restore the former main line of resistance. This would
cut off the two Soviet tank corps, whose main force was suspected
to be in the forests southeast of Dubrovka, and complete their
encirclement.
The main effort of the attack by Kampfgruppe Kassnitz was to be
carried out by I Battalion under Hptm. Bethge. II Battalion was to
follow to the right and behind, at the same time screening the
regiment's right flank. IV Battalion with its heavy weapons was to
follow immediately behind I Battalion, which was to attack with the
tanks of Kampfgruppe von Wietersheim of the 1st Panzer Division
and the assault guns of the Assault Gun Battalion G D .
It was a cold, foggy morning. The Soviets were obviously not
expecting an attack as they were slow to react to the German move.
Not until German forces were crossing the high ground northeast of
Dubrovka did the Soviet artillery go into action. At that time the
objective itself was under heavy fire. The 19th Panzer Division had
469

penetrated into the town but soon afterwards turned about and went
over to the defensive in a line Novaya ZizinaPloskaya with fronts
facing east and west.
I Battalion soon entered Dubrovka and cleared the area of the
enemy before pushing on to the western edge of the town. As soon
as the fog lifted heavy artillery fire began to fall on the town. This
inflicted little damage on the battalion, however, as the bunkers on
the western edge of Dubrovka offered adequate protection. The area
had apparently once been used by the supply train of the 246th
Infantry Division. I Battalion located its command post at the western
edge of the town where there was an excellent view of the country
to the west. About 200 metres west of Dubrovka ran a ravine in
which the 246th Infantry Division had placed a heavy field howitzer
position. The guns were still there, but they now faced east. Apparently the Soviets had tried to put them to use against their former
owners. Along the ravine ran another line of bunkers which were
occupied immediately by the rifle companies. The main line of
resistance therefore ran along the reverse slope, but because of the
heavy enemy artillery fire this was advantageous.
The enemy was sitting in bunkers about 400 metres from the MLR
on the heights on both sides of Point 236. The 1st Company under
Obit. Wei was sent to the attack against the position and was able
to reach the high ground. Losses were so high in the bitter fighting
for the individual bunkers that the company had to be pulled back.
The company commander and five men were all of 1st Company
that made it back from the operation.
While I Battalion prepared for defence forward of the western edge
of Dubrovka, II Battalion launched an attack with assault gun support
in the direction of a wood in which enemy forces were sitting in the
bunkers of the former command post of the 246th Infantry Division's
artillery regiment. The operation was a success and resulted in
contact being established with III Battalion which was near Budino.
The encirclement of the two enemy tank corps was complete.
A security battalion made up of older men was placed under the
command of I Battalion and employed at the southern edge of
Dubrovka where it was to maintain contact with 19th Panzer
Division.
The 12th Panzer Division made good progress towards the
northwest along the Natscha and was able to significantly reinforce
the defensive front held by Kampfgruppe von der Meden. The enemy
was showing strong tendencies to withdraw westwards. In the next
few days pressure against the western side of the German ring
between Dubrovka and Ploskaje was to increase considerably. Heavy
fighting was expected there with Soviet battle groups attempting to
break out.

470

Thanks to the perseverance of the battle groups and the arrival of

new forces the initial crisis at the break-in point near Bely gradually
turned into a German victory. Kampfgruppe Kassnitz played a not
inconsiderable part in this success. There was still some heavy
fighting during the following few days, especially near Dubrovka and
further south with 19th Panzer Division where elements of the Soviet
tank corps tried desperately to break through the German ring. For
the most part, however, the defenders were able to hold on. Even if
some elements of the Soviet forces managed to break out near
Ploskaya, the bulk remained in the pocket where they were wiped
out over the course of the next few weeks.
By 17 December the fighting had died down sufficiently to allow
Kampfgruppe von Kassnitz to be withdrawn and sent back to the
division in the Luchesa Valley. In the valley itself there was little
activity beyond enemy probing attacks and patrols. On 14 December
Oberst Moehring, former commanding officer of the 82nd Infantry
Regiment, was named commander of the Grenadier Regiment GD.
This was not exactly what the division had had in mind. Major Lorenz
once again took command of the Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD.
At that time the situation at the front was such that individual
companies could be withdrawn in rotation for a rest in the rear.
After suffering terrible losses in the frightful battles of the past
weeks, on 16 December 1942 the Ski Battalion GD, which was
being employed in the front lines with the 14th (Motorised) Infantry
Division, had a strength of 4 officers and 35 NCOs and men.
Preparations were underway to relieve the battalion as it was soon
to return to the I.D. GD.
After the leading elements of the 12th Panzer Division coming
from the area east of Bely reached the Luchesa Valley, they were
committed to a limited offensive south of the valley. The former
Kampfgruppe Kassnitz, once again broken down into its constituent
units, had meanwhile moved into its former quarters in the Olenin
area. There the units prepared to take part in the attack planned for
21 December 1942. The Fusilier regiment GD was to supply most
of the forces for the attack.
The Fusilier Regiment GD prepared for the attack during the night
of 20/21 December in and around Kletischtsche. The attack would
begin at dawn following artillery preparation and would proceed in
the direction of Pysino and Lomow. Taking part on the left wing was
a company from the right wing of the Grenadier Regiment GD (II
Battalion) under Obit. Knzel. Formerly the Division O1, Knzel had
only recently taken over command of the company.
The Reconnaissance Battalion GD, which was in positions on both
sides of the main road, was given the task of confusing the Soviets
as to the real location of the main attack. They were to try to screen
the focal point of the attack which was under way farther north by
471

stepping up patrol activity and creating diversions with plenty of

firing.
The attack by the Fusilier Regiment GD made slow, but steady
progress. The advance was slowed by snowdrifts and fog which
reduced visibility to barely 50 metres. Resistance at first did not
appear to be overly strong. The attackers even gained the impression
that the Soviets had been deceived into believing that the main
German thrust was along the main road. There a patrol from the
Reconnaissance Battalion GD under Obit. Knzel together with two
tanks had succeeded in penetrating into the northern tip of the
narrow wood south of Lapkovo and destroyed several bunkers and
their crews.
Nervous Soviet harassing fire felt out the entire main line of
resistance. After the initial weak resistance, heavy fighting later broke
out in the woods north of Lapkovo and east of Pysino against nests
of resistance and bunker complexes. Only after hours of man-to-man
fighting were Lomow and the forest east of Pysino cleared of enemy
forces.
The "Meurer Battalion", which was advancing simultaneously from
the north out of the Tischtschenki area southwards in the direction
of Pysino, made slow progress as the single forest road had been
fortified by the enemy with gun positions and bunkers. All efforts
were directed towards establishing contact between the right wing
of the Fusilier Regiment and the "Meurer Battalion". This was finally
achieved at about midnight. In addition to this linking-up the main
task of the night was to fortify the line which had been won for
defence by blasting foxholes from the frozen earth.
The accompanying Grenadier company on the Fusilier Regiment's
left wing lost its company commander, Obit. Knzel, right at the
beginning of the attack. Knzel received severe spinal injuries and
suffered for weeks before succumbing to his wounds. The numbers
of wounded on this day were of course much greater than in previous
days. The ambulance loading station in Gussevo was beefed up by
the addition of several vehicles, some of which were moved forward
to Kletischtsche. Sleighs were used to evacuate wounded over the
terrain the vehicles could not cross. The small Akjas, a type of
Finnish transport sleigh, were a great success in transporting
wounded from the front lines. On this day the 1st Medical Company
GD's main dressing station in Ssidorowo treated more than 120
wounded.
The expected Soviet counterattacks began on the morning of 22
December but were for the most part beaten off. Straggling Soviet
soldiers were tracked down in the hinterland and captured. The
division decided to call off its attack for the time being and fortify the
line it had won. Contacts with the "Meurer Battalion" to the
northwest were made closer and strengthened.
472

Fire Plan for the 17th Company

Bunkers were laid down in the new positions with great haste, most
of the construction work being done at night. In the forest Pioniers
felled trees which the Grenadiers moved forward into their positions.
The fortunate ones were those whose positions were located at the
edge of the forest as were those of 2nd Company/I Battalion/Fusilier
Regiment GD.
The once again whole division was now situated north of the
Luchesa Valley in fortified positions. There it awaited the approaching Christmas season. All possible preparations were made for the
holiday without reducing vigilance at the front. On Christmas Eve
the division's commanding officer sent officers from his staff to all
the units, conveying his greetings and best wishes. General Hoernlein
himself could not be prevented from visiting the most forward
outposts and handing out some of his own cigars.
A general barrage from all of the division's heavy weapons was
planned for 24.00 in order to spoil any plans the Russians might
have made to interrupt the holiday. It was a time for reflection for
the men in the bunkers and holes in the snow, in the unit trains and
the main dressing stations. The following poem by Gefreiter Hans
Roger was probably written at that time:
The icy east wind sweeps through the house
around Russian farmers' cottages.
A lonely sentry stands outside,
watching over his comrades' rest.
Snowflakes swirl, night falls;
we sit in the circle together.
Someone lights the candles
our thoughts are elsewhere.
We see home beneath the lit tree,
we see our parents, our loved ones;
But alas it is only a beautiful dream,
from which only homesickness remains.
Then rings out the song of the "Holy Night",
at home in every room,
in the East we stand on guard for you,
we, your men and boys.
The soft notes of the harmonica
wake us from our dreams;
and with you at home together with you,
we sing the songs of Christmas.
Outside the sentry makes his rounds,
he doesn't hear the melancholy singing.
He hears the East wind howl and whine,
and the raucous voices of the snow geese!
Christmas Day passed without interruption by the enemy. The
front was completely still, scarcely ever interrupted by the whistle
474

and impact of a shell. The last days of the waning year passed much
the same way. Harassing artillery fire by both sides and occasional
patrols were the only events of those days. Not until 29 December
were orders issued by division for a limited attack on 30 December
north of the Luchesa. Oberstleutnant i.G. von Natzmer had become
the new Division la on Christmas Eve. Farther south the 12th Panzer
Division was to launch an attack from its sector to improve its main
line of resistance. The Grenadier Regiment GD under its commander
Oberst Moehring was to take part in these movements. Once again
the Reconnaissance Battalion GD was to simulate an attack from its
positions on both sides of the main road west of Waskowo and at
the same time carry out a reconnaissance in force toward the narrow
wood. The artillery was directed to support the attack.
The Grenadiers of I Battalion went to the attack at 06.30 under
the command of Obit. Zybon. Enemy resistance was stubborn but
the Grenadiers pushed into Missjulkino after intense close quarters
fighting. However, the battle group was pinned down by heavy fire
in front of the Missjulkino cheese dairy. The heaviest fire seemed to
be coming from the southern tip of the narrow wood. It was thanks
to the efforts of the Pionier platoon, which was able to roll up the
enemy positions from the left, that the attackers were able to capture
the objectives of Mai. and Bol (north of Gorowatka).
Despite heavy enemy fire and a counterattack from the southern
tip of the narrow wood, the German forces were able to hang onto
the territory they had won. Early on 31 December they resumed their
attack, shifting the focal point of the assault further north. Following
thorough artillery preparation and supported by tanks and assault
guns, II and III Battalions of the Grenadier Regiment GD and
elements of the Reconnaissance Battalion GD launched an attack
aimed at capturing the narrow wood. This resulted in heavy, close
quarters fighting against a determined enemy which was not brought
to a successful conclusion until evening. Several more hours passed
before the wood was cleared of stragglers. Contact was then established with the elements of the 12th Panzer Division attacking south
of the Luchesa. A defensive position was immediately set up at the
western edge of the wood and a new main line of resistance
established. With this a cohesive line had been achieved which could
be held in the future. Activity slowly died down along the front which,
at the end of the year, ran as follows in the division's sector:
Forest east of PysinoLomow in the hands of the Fusilier Regiment GD the fir wood and Lapkovo as well as the northern tip of
the narrow wood held by the Recon. Battalion. In the narrow wood
elements of II and III Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD, to the south
I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment near Merkuschi and Mai. to the
Luchesa. Contact there with the 12th Panzer Division.

475

It was in these positions that the men of the I.D. GD awaited the
new year, the fourth of the Second World War. As 31 December
1942 came to an end, when the clocks showed 24.00, every heavy
gun in the division's sector opened fire as if by a ghost hand. The
howitzers lobbed their shells toward the enemy, the cannon of the
9th Battery crashed and the light flak fired their pearls of tracing
ammunition into the sky as if trying to shoot down a horde of unseen
enemy aircraft. The flak searchlights probed the snow-veiled sky with
their milky-white fingers, joining their beams to form a dome of light
over the division's sector. The men got up out of their holes. In the
bunkers and foxholes the Grenadiers, the artillerymen, the stretcher
bearers and the members of the supply train raised their canteens
and wished one another luck and health for the coming year. In many
bunkers there was stillness when someone or other brought up
names such as Khler, Richter, Henke, Kster and others. Contrary
to expectations, the bolsheviks remained quiet that New Year's Eve,
although from time to time the sound of the drunken Soviets drifted
over from the other side.
During the late morning of 1 January the Bartsch Company of I
Btl./Grenadier Rgt., reinforced by several assault guns, cleared the
southwestern tip of the narrow wood of the enemy forces which had
been holding out there since the day before. The operation was a
success. There was tough, close quarters fighting, and once the forest
had been cleared the company captured the village of Merkuschi.
The village had to be taken as it was to form the bulwark of the future
main line of resistance. Immediate Soviet counterattacks were beaten
off with bloody losses to the enemy.
The capture of Merkuschi was the last major offensive operation
in this sector by a unit of the I.D. GD. The fortification of the line
which had been was pushed ahead rapidly, especially by the
Grenadier Regiment. The division now received more details of its
withdrawal from this sector which was to lead to a longer period of
rest.
New Year's greetings arrived from Fhrer Headquarters on 2
January which were received with much satisfaction all round. The
division commander, Gen.Lt. Hoernlein, marked his fiftieth birthday
on the same day, which was celebrated in an appropriate fashion.
The artillery had played a major role in the defensive success in
the Luchesa Valley thanks to the outstanding leadership of Oberst
Reinke and his adjutant, Hptm. Kuhlmann as well as his executive
officer, Obit. Wollenhaupt.
While the situation at the front continued to stabilise, the period
of quiet provided an opportunity to assign replacements to the
companies in an effort to raise their combat strengths. There were
also adjustments within the command ranks made necessary by the
overexertion of some individuals. In rare cases replacement was
476

necessary because of poor performance. In addition, there were

personnel moves made to ensure that experienced people were
available to train fresh recruits. As a result the former commander
of the Grenadier Regiment G D , Oberst Moehring, was replaced by
Obstlt. Lorenz, the command of III Btl./Grenadier Rgt. was placed
in the hands of Obit. Zybon, and Hptm. Chrapkowski was given
command of the Sturm-Pionier Battalion G D .
The following are typical company strengths before the division
was relieved:
2nd Comp./I Btl./Fusilier Rgt. GD = 1 officer, 2 NCOs, 8 men.
13th Comp./III Btl./Grenadier Rgt. GD = 1 officer, 1 NCO, 16 men.
The relief of the forward units of the I.D. GD finally took place on
8 January 1943. At 15.00 on 9 January the Division la was able to
report the complete relief of the division to his superiors. The division
was to travel by road, staying in interim quarters in Vyazma and
Jarzewo, into the Smolensk area where its embarkation was planned
destination unknown.
Orders for embarkation were issued to the division's units on 11
January 1943. Following a brief rest the units moved to the ramps
of the Smolensk station following a well-thought-out system in
preparation for boarding.
The division was leaving the central sector of the Eastern Front,
never to return.
Losses o f t h e G r e n . R g t . G D f r o m 6 . 8 . 1 9 4 2 - 1 0 . 1 . 1 9 4 3

22 officers and 522 NCOs and men killed.

2,130 officers, NCOs and men wounded or missing.
There must have been extraordinary reasons why not only this
regiment, but all other units of the division as well, without exception,
suffered such heavy losses in the brief span of time from mid-September 1942 to the first days of January 1943, or within barely
three-and-a-half months. At that time there was talk in command
circles that the unit had gone through its complete establishment of
personnel; meaning that losses which included killed and wounded
as well as missing, sick, detachments and transfers had reached
the scale of an entire division, or 18,000 men. Even if this perhaps
seems somewhat exaggerated, it does illustrate the extraordinary
harshness of those autumn and winter months.
At the time of its formation there was pressure from above to
employ the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, which was
comprised mostly of volunteers of all ranks, at the front as soon as

477

possible. The newly created division was never given the opportunity
to conduct division-level exercises on the training grounds. Even the
sub-unit exercises were limited to march movements and so-called
"command post exercises" once again because of time constraints.
The homogeneity, the interaction of command and units, familiarity
with the weapons of other units - all of this was missing completely.
The continual comings and goings of personnel right up until the
division's departure made it almost impossible for company commanders to learn the names of the men under their command. Even
the frequent company social evenings were of no help.
During the advance in July 1942 the actions at Schtschigry,
Voronezh and at the Manych saw only a few days of heavy fighting;
at no time did they approach the severity of the later battles near
Rzhev or in the Luchesa Valley. The feeling of being victors and
masters of the battlefield which had been fostered by the successes
in the Ukraine was lost on that morning in September when the bulk
of the division drove into the front lines south of Rzhev. The
thunderclap of the incoming artillery salvoes brought a painful
awakening. The course of events during the first days of the attack
near Rzhev led to a disillusionment which in many cases very soon
threatened to become desperation.
A deep depression gained the upper hand for a time. This
condition, which reigned after the first attack on 10 September 1942
and which reached its deepest point as a result of the enormous
losses of those few hours, could only be overcome, and had to be
overcome, by the strength of individuals, and these were not limited
to the officer corps. These few succeeded in holding the unit
together, even though a high price in blood was exacted.
Contributing to the unit's survival in purely military terms were the
absolutely vital changes in the methods of command and the battle
tactics of individuals. There was no comparison between the attack
and advance on the one hand and defensive fighting in foxholes and
bunkers on the other.
The change from joint action to individual fighting, from striving
forward to digging into the ground, from superior attack to fighting
for one's own life in addition to mastering this new style of fighting,
very high morale and unequalled staying power.
At first the troops were ill-prepared for a defensive struggle. They
had to make up for their lack of training in defence, which had been
neglected during the years preceding the war, on their own, in the
midst of a terrible battle of attrition.
Only a few survived the fighting south of Rzhev in early 1942.
Those that did survive, however, were first-rate fighters, the foundation of the later units and their will to resist.
The battles which took place in the Luchesa Valley and farther
south near Italy in November/December 1942 cost further heavy
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sacrifices, because senior levels of command ignored the fact that

spreading the division over more than 100 kilometres of front with
several unfamiliar units was absurd and nearly destroyed the morale
of a previously homogeneous unit.
But and this must be emphasised here the extent of the
sacrifices was largely due to the extraordinary bravery of the
division's soldiers, who held onto their sectors with exemplary
steadfastness. It can be said without exaggeration that it was on the
actions in the Luchesa Valley, which received praise from the highest
level, that the I.D. GD's reputation as an elite unit an Eastern Front
fire-brigade was built. Its core hardened during the days near
Rzhev and in the Luchesa Valley remained until the end of the
war.
Before the I.D. GD left his area of command, the commander of
the Ninth Army, Generaloberst Model, showed his appreciation for
the division's efforts when he offered the division headquarters an
officer, an N C O and a man from each of the divisions under his
command to help bring the unit back up to strength.
The men who in the ranks of the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Infantry Division were brave, highly-decorated soldiers. With few
exceptions they had accepted the responsibility of carrying on for
the fallen and had lived up to the challenge.

479