Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 751
Jack Greenberg, New York City (Lincoln C. Jenkins, Jr., Columbia, S. C.,
and Thurgood Marshall, New York City, on brief), for appellant.
Thomas A. Wofford, Greenville, S. C. (W. H. Arnold, Robert F. Plaxco,
Jr., Love, Thornton & Arnold, and Theodore A. Snyder, Jr., Greenville, S.
C., on brief), for appellees.
Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, and SOPER and HAYNSWORTH,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an action to enjoin the exclusion of the plaintiff and other Negroes,
similarly situated, from the general waiting room in the passenger terminal at
the Greenville (South Carolina) Municipal Airport. It was dismissed by the
District Court upon the grounds that the court was without jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the action and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.1 The District Court was of the opinion that the
complaint did not clearly allege that the plaintiff was segregated from other
passengers, at least, not from those who desired his company, or that any other
Negro had been subjected to similar treatment or was similarly situated. It also
concluded that whatever was done was not state action for no law required the
Henry brought this action, on behalf of himself and all other Negroes similarly
situated, against the members of the Greenville Airport Commission and the
manager of the Airport to restrain defendants from making any distinction on
the basis of race in regard to service at the Airport. He alleged that the
Commission is a governmental body of the state, and attached as an exhibit a
copy of the act which created it.
Clearly, whatever was done under the direction, or with the sanction of the
Commission was state action.
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Here the Commission was the creature of the state, operating a municipal
airport with the support of municipal funds. The General Assembly had
expressly delegated to it authority to promulgate rules and regulations
governing use of the airport. In every sense, it was an agency of the state, and
its exercise of its delegated powers was state action.
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The judgment of the District Court will be reversed and the cause remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, including a prompt
hearing upon the motion for a preliminary injunction if that motion should be
renewed.
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Notes:
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Acts and Joint Resolutions of General Assembly of the State of South Carolina,
No. 919, 1928
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873;
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 76 S.Ct. 141, 100 L.Ed. 776; Dawson
v. Mayor and City Council of City of Baltimore, 4 Cir., 220 F.2d 386, affirmed
350 U.S. 877, 76 S.Ct. 133, 100 L.Ed. 774; City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 4
Cir., 246 F. 2d 425; Department of Conservation & Development, etc. v. Tate, 4
Cir., 231 F. 2d 615; Derrington v. Plummer, 5 Cir., 240 F.2d 922; City of St.
Petersburg v. Alsup, 5 Cir., 238 F.2d 830; Coke v. City of Atlanta,
D.C.N.D.Ga., 184 F.Supp. 579
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873
Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of City of Baltimore, 4 Cir., 220 F.2d 386,
affirmed 350 U.S. 877, 76 S.Ct. 133, 100 L.Ed. 774; Department of
Conservation & Development, etc. v. Tate, 4 Cir., 231 F.2d 615
City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 4 Cir., 246 F.2d 425; Holmes v. City of Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879, 76 S.Ct. 141, 100 L.Ed. 776
City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 5 Cir., 238 F.2d 830; Tonkins v. City of
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