Immoral Atty Disbarred

1
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous

one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
Facts: In the complaint of Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr.

Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez
(Gomez) having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central
Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic
wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a
divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and
that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been
decreed. Consequently, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce
decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty.
Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid
and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State
of Virginia in the United States of America (USA).
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig
is a nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained from the
Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by
Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter
allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he
obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the
laws of the Philippines.
On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity
of
his
marriage
to
Gomez.
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their
son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Makati City where Atty.
Baydo was frequently seen.
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SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA
Dr. Perez also alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the
mail informing her of Atty. Catindigs scandalous affair with Atty.
Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter written
and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo. In the said letter, Atty.
Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her
once
his
impediment
is
removed.
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on
May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after the
wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying
with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems;
and that while their union was blessed with four children, their
relationship
simply
deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable
facto separation in 1984.
differences
led
to
their de
Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce with Gomez by mutual

consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12,
1984.
Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution
of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23,
1984.blesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew the fact that the divorce
decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in
the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of
Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that
Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July
1984
in
the
USA.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not
valid
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty.
Catindig.
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
After due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP-CBD which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig
for gross immorality
The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindigs
act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his
previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly
immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty
of disbarment.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge
against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence
The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Issue: W/N the respondents committed gross immorality, which would
warrant their disbarment.
Held: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession
and
support
the
activities
of
the
Integrated
Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In Arnobit
v.
Atty.
Arnobit,33 the
Court
held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater

import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it
must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing
in that exclusive and honored fraternity.
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In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that
a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter
alia,
for
grossly
immoral
conduct.
Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on
what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing

any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct
is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the communitys sense of decency. The Court makes these
distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one
amounts
to
a
grossly
immoral
conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and,
ironically, from Atty. Catindigs own admission, indeed establish
a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt
and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree
he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was not
recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino
citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to

Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be
properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would
be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing
circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindigs sense of social propriety
and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws
on
marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig
married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew
that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that
he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of
avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent
marriage
outside
Philippine
jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindigs claim is true, it
matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The
fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to
render a faade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr.
Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar
to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage. In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains
an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a
child.
Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission,
Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage,
taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.
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WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court

resolves to ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is
found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyers Oath and
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and
is
hereby DISBARRED
from
the
practice
of
law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A.
Catindig in the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from
the
Roll
of
Attorneys.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
Complainants withdrawal from the case

Rule 1.01
Rule 10.01
SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO and AIDA AMATORIO,
complainants, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP and ATTY.
WHELMA F. SITON-YAP, Respondents.
A.C. No. 5914 March 11, 2015
Reyes, J.
Facts: In Civil Case No. 2000-319, respondents sued the
complainants to compel them to pay their indebtedness of 18,000.00,
which was evidenced by a promissory note. After they filed their
answer to the complaint, however, the respondents filed a motion to
strike out the same and to declare them in default on the ground that
the said pleading was prepared by a lawyer suspended from the
practice of law and lacked proper verification. The motion was
however denied.
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 2000-321, the respondents
sued the complainants to collect the amount of 94,173.44. The
answer filed by Atty. Paras was however stricken off the record for
the reason that he was suspended from the practice of law at the
time of its filing.
Unable to find a lawyer to replace Atty. Paras, the complainants

decided to seek an out-of-court settlement. The parties agreed on
the terms of payment and, on that same day, Aida tendered her first
payment of 20,000.00, which was received and duly acknowledged
by Francisco in a written document with the letterhead of Yap Law
Office. When Aida asked the respondents if they should still attend
the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 2001 and June 18,
2001 in the civil cases filed against them, the latter told them they
need not attend anymore as they will be moving for the dismissal of
the cases. Relying on the respondents assurance, the complainants
did not attend the scheduled hearings. Subsequently, they were
surprised to receive copies of the decisions of the trial court in the
two civil cases filed by the respondents, declaring them in default for
non-appearance in the pre-trial conference and ordering them to pay
the amount of their indebtedness and damages. The decision
however did not mention the out-of-court settlement between the
parties. Nonetheless, the complainants continued tendering
installment payments to the respondents upon the latters assurance
that they will disregard the decision of the trial court since they
already had an out of court settlement before the rendition of said
judgment. They were surprised to learn, however, that the
respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in
Civil Case No. 2000-319 and were in fact issued said writ. Thus, the
instant disbarment case.
The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline recommended that Francisco Yap should be suspended
from the practice of law for 6 months and Whelma Yap should be
exonerated in the absence of any evidence of her participation.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation with
modification as to the penalty and ordered that Francicso Yap be
suspended for 3 months.
On August 9, 2007, the complainants filed a Manifestation,
terminating the services of Atty. Paras and/or Paras-Enojo and
3G AY 2015-2016
Associates as their counsel for the reason that they can no longer
afford the services of a private counsel.
Surprisingly, on the same day, the complainants executed a Judicial
Affidavit, disclaiming knowledge and participation in the preparation
of the complaint and the pleadings filed on their behalf by Atty. Paras
in connection with the disbarment case against the respondents.
They claimed that they merely signed the pleadings but the contents
thereof were not explained to them in a dialect which they
understood. They likewise expressed lack of intention to file a
disbarment case against the respondents and that, on the contrary,
they were very much willing to settle and pay their indebtedness to
them. Further, they asserted that it was not the respondents, but
Atty. Paras who instructed them not to attend the pre-trial conference
of the cases which eventually resulted to a judgment by default
against them. They claimed that Atty. Paras told them that he will be
the one to attend the pre-trial conference to settle matters with the
respondents and the court but he did not show up on the scheduled
date. They also asseverated that most of the statements contained in
the complaint for disbarment were false and that they wished to
withdraw the said complaint.
Issue: Whether the statements of the complainants, specifically
contesting the truthfulness of the allegations hurled against the
respondents in their own complaint for disbarment necessarily
results to Franciscos absolution.
Held: No. A case for suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the
facts proven so warrant.23 It follows that the withdrawal of the
complainant from the case, or even the filing of an affidavit of
desistance, does not conclude the administrative case against an
erring lawyer. This is so because the misconduct of a lawyer is
deemed a violation of his oath to keep sacred the integrity of the
profession for which he must be disciplined. The power to discipline
lawyers who are officers of the court may not be cut short by
compromise and withdrawal of the charges. This is as it should be,
especially when we consider that the law profession and its exercise
is one impressed with public interest. Proceedings to discipline erring
members of the bar are not instituted to protect and promote the
public good only but also to maintain the dignity of the profession by
the weeding out of those who have proven themselves unworthy
thereof.
The complainants forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case
does not ipso facto obliterate the misconduct committed by
Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the
complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering that they
had already presented and supported their claims with convincing
and credible evidence, and the IBP has promulgated a resolution on
the basis thereof. To be clear, [i]n administrative cases for
disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof
required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant.25 In the present case, it was clearly
established that Francisco received P20,000.00 as initial payment
from the complainants in compliance with the terms of their out-ofcourt settlement for the payment of the latters outstanding
obligations. The amount was duly received and acknowledged by
Francisco, who drafted the same in a paper with the letterhead of his
own law office, a fact he did not deny. While the respondents deny
that they told the complainants not to attend the pre-trial of the case
anymore and that they will be the one to inform the trial court of the
settlement, they did not bring the said agreement to the attention of
the court. Thus, the trial court, oblivious of the settlement of the
parties, rendered a judgment by default against the complainants.
The respondents even filed a motion for execution of the decision but
still did not inform the trial court of the out-of-court settlement
between them and the complainants. They deliberately failed to
mention this supervening event to the trial court, hence, violating the
standards of honesty provided for in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
WHEREFORE, for deliberately misleading the Court, Atty. Francisco
Dy Yap is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) months effective upon receipt of this Resolution, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with severely.
For lack of evidence of her participation in the misconduct, Atty.
Whelma F. Siton-Yap is hereby EXONERATED of the charges
against her.
DISMISSAL OF BASELESS DISBARMENT COMPLAINTS

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C.
TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR.,
ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR.,
AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C.
TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR.,
AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 8725
BERSAMIN, J.:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of

the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
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FACTS:
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T.
Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of the
following respondents:
1. Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., (counsel of defendant Ramon and
Josefina Ricafort)
2. Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., (counsel of complainants)
3. Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, (Acting Registrar)
4. Atty. Elbert T. Quilalav (Chief Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City)
5. Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. (Deputy Register of Deeds)
for allegedly falsifying a court order that became the basis for the
cancellation of their annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the
notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon
City.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the
RTC of the order dated May 16, 2008, they could no longer locate or
contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and
visits to his office. They found out upon verification at the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City that their previous annotations were cancelled
based on a letter request filed by Atty. Tolentino as well as the RTCs
order granting the Motion to Withdraw Complaint.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an
appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful cancellation
of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens. The
LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing and directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. However, the records do not
disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or
remained pending at the LRA.
In their sworn complaint for disbarment, the complainants narrated

that they inherited from their parents a residential lot located at No.
251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered
under TCT No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. They discovered that said TCT had been unlawfully
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and Josefina
Ricafort. This led them to file a case for annulment of TCT No. N290546 and they immediately caused the annotation of their affidavit
of adverse claim and notice of lis pendes on TCT No. N-290546.
Atty. Victorio was the counsel of complainants while Atty. Tolentino
was the counsel of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr.

despite their having paid him for his professional services, the
complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case. They
submitted that the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and
their notice of lis pendens without a court order specifically allowing
such cancellation resulted from the connivance and conspiracy
between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the
taking advantage of their positions as officials in the Registry of
Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty.
Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the new annotations.
Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced.
In order to end the dispute, the parties entered into an amicable

settlement during the pendency of Civil Case. The complainants
agreed to sell the property and the proceeds thereof would be
equally divided between the parties, and the complaint and
counterclaim would be withdrawn by the parties. Pursuant to the
terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint which the RTC granted in its order dated May
16, 2008.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted the following:

That complainant Robert Torres had been actively involved
in the proceedings in the Civil Case, which included the
mediation process
That the complainants, after having aggressively
participated in the drafting of the amicable settlement, could
not now claim that they had been deceived into entering the
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agreement and could not feign ignorance of the conditions

contained therein
That he did not commit any abandonment as alleged, but
had performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for the
complainants in the Civil Case
That he should not be held responsible for their
representation in other proceedings, such as that before the
LRA, which required a separate engagement; and that the
only payment he had received from the complainants were
those for his appearance fees of P1,000.00 for every
hearing in the RTC.
Atty. Tolentino, in his comment:

Refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing that he was not
acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio,
Jr. whom he had met during the hearings in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598;
That although he had notarized the letter-request dated June
30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had
no knowledge about how said letter-request had been
disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and
That the present complaint was the second disbarment case
filed by the complainants against him with no other motive
except to harass and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment:
That it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another Deputy Register of
Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the
annotations that resulted in the cancellation of the
annotations
That the cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in
the regular course of official duty and in the exercise of the
ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds;
That no irregularity occurred or was performed in the
cancellation of the annotations.
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Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.

As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his Comment in A.C. No.
8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya, Jr.'s signature that appeared
below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed another sworn
disbarment complaint alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the
signature of Atty. Cunanan. Such This disbarment complaint was
later on consolidated with the first disbarment cases filed because
the complaints involved the same parties and rested on similar
allegations against the respondents.
Atty. Quilala belied the allegation of forgery and reiterated his
previous arguments. On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he
adopted Atty. Quilala's Comment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent officers in the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City unlawfully cancelled the annotations to the prejudice of
the complainants
2. Whether or not Atty. Victorio and Atty. Tolentino conspired to
guarantee that the parties enter into an amicable settlememt
3. Whether or not Atty. Victorios acts constitute abandonment of the
case
RULING:
1. NO. Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) provides that it shall be the duty of the Register
of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies
with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said
instrument bears the proper documentary science stamps and that
the same are properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable,
he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter
of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and

advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with
Section 117 of this Decree. Such duty of the Register of Deeds is
ministerial in nature. Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or
intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide,
but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see
whether the documents sought to be registered conform with the
formal and legal requirements for such documents.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated
ahd participated in the settlement of the case, there was nothing
wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as lawyers to
do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that
a lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. In fine, the
presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement stands.
In this case, there was no abuse of authority or irregularity committed

by Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to
the cancellation of the annotations. Whether or not the RTC order
dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had
been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine
inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented for
registration was limited only to what appears on the face of the
documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the
RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and to be in
conformity with existing requirements, it became obligatory for them
to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.
3. NO. With respect to the charge of abandonment against Atty.

Victorio, Jr., the Court said that with his assistance, the complainants
obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds
of the sale of the property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds
accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The complainants did not
competently and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the part of
Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was
concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for abandonment.
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents' performance of duty,

complainants were not bereft of any remedy because they could
challenge the performance of duty by bringing the matter by way
ofconsulta with the LRA, as provided by Property Registration
Decree. But, as enunciated in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of
Rizal, it was ultimately within the province of a court of competent
jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the validity or invalidity of a
document registered by the Register of Deeds.
2. NO. With respect to the allegation of conspiracy, the Court said
that the complainants failed to establish conspiracy based on clear
and convincing evidence. On the contrary, the records showed their
own active participation in the amicable settlement. Hence, they
could not now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they
had themselves entered into.
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Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to
any other matters subsequent to the termination of the Civil Case.
Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between them at any time
during the engagement, the complainants had no right to assume
that Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s legal representation was indefinite as to
extend to his representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession
did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite
service to the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services
depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client. Atty.
Victorio, Jr.'s alleged failure to respond to the complainants' calls or
visits, or to provide them with his whereabouts to enable them to
have access to him despite the termination of his engagement in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without
the credible showing that he continued to come under the
professional obligation towards them after the termination of the Civil
Case.
The Court DISMISSED the baseless disbarment complaints against
respondents.
Doctrine: When a lawyer receives money from the client for a

particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to
the client showing that the money was spent for the intended
purpose. Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the
same must be immediately returned to the client.
A.C. No. 10672, March 18, 2015
EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE v. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR.
Facts: Complainant, as President of Samahan ng mga Maralitang

Taga Ma. Corazon III, Incorporated (Samahan), alleged that he
engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing a case
in order to determine the true owner of the land being occupied by
the members of Samahan. In connection therewith, he gave
respondent the aggregate amount of P48,000.00 intended to cover
the filing fees for the action to be instituted, as evidenced by a written
acknowledgment executed by respondent himself. Despite the
payment, respondent failed to file an action in court. When
confronted, respondent explained that the money given to him was
not enough to fully pay for the filing fees in court. Thus, complainant
asked for the return of the money, but respondent claimed to have
spent the same and even demanded more money.
Complainant further alleged that when he persisted in seeking
restitution of the aforesaid sum, respondent told him to shut up
because it was not his money in the first place. Hence, complainant
filed this administrative complaint seeking the return of the full
amount he h
ad paid to respondent.
In his defense, respondent denied spending complainants money,
explaining that he had already prepared the initiatory pleading and
was poised to file the same, when he discovered through the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City that the filing fee
was quite costly. This prompted him to immediately relay such
information to complainant who undertook to raise
3G AY 2015-2016
the amount needed. While waiting, however, the instant

administrative case was filed against him.
In a Report and Recommendation, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and Recommendation.
Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration which was,
however, denied.
Issue: W/N respondent should be held administratively liable for the
acts complained of.
Held: YES. The Court concurs with the findings of the IBP.
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to
attend to such clients cause with diligence, care, and devotion,
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyers neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for
which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03,
Canon 18of the CPR, which reads:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him
liable.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that complainant engaged the
services of respondent for the purpose of filing a case in court, and in
connection therewith, gave the amount of P48,000.00 to answer for
the filing fees. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply
with his undertaking and offered the flimsy excuse that the money he
10
received from complainant was not enough to fully pay the filing fees.
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03,
Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount of
P48,000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated demands,
viz.:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand. x x x.
Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the same
must be immediately returned to the client. A lawyers failure to
return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a
violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of
integrity, as in this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence
as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in
such matters of professional employment, and hence, must be
disciplined accordingly.
Having established respondents administrative liability, the Court
now determines the proper penalty to be imposed.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers
neglected their clients affairs and, at the same time, failed to return
the latters money and/or property despite demand, the Court meted
3G AY 2015-2016
out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. The Court
finds it appropriate that respondent be meted with the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Finally, the Court sustains the directive for respondent to account for
or return the amount of P48,000.00 to complainant. It is well to note
that while the Court has previously held that disciplinary
proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the
respondent-lawyers administrative and not his civil liability, it must
be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities
which are purely civil in nature for instance, when the claim
involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to
his professional engagement. Since the aforesaid amount was
intended to answer for filing fees which is intimately related to the
lawyer-client relationship between complainant and respondent, the
Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
NOTARIAL COMMISSION IS A LICENSE HELD PERSONALLY

BY THE NOTARY PUBLIC
CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO VS. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY
SUELLO
A.M. NO. 10695. MARCH 18, 2015
LEONEN, J.
FACTS: A motorcycle, purchased from EMCOR, Inc., was registered
in Pitogos name based on 3 documents notarized by respondent
Atty. Joselito Troy Suello. The documents indicate that they are
registered in Suellos notarial register. Pitogo obtained a copy of the
3 documents from the Land Transportation Office. He requested
Suello to certify the authenticity and veracity of the said documents
he obtained from LTO. He wanted to determine if the documents
were duly notarized by Suello or were merely fabricated. Pitogo did
not receive a reply from Suello.
11
Pitogo alleges that there were discrepancies between the 3

documents notarized by Suello and Suellos entries in his notarial
register such as the discrepancies between the Book Numbers and
the Names of parties appearing therein. Suello denies having
notarized the said documents. He denies the allegation that he
disowned the documents. He admits that he certified the documents
as true copies. Suello explains that it was his secretary who certified
Pitogos documents.
GROSS MISCONDUCT IN PRIVATE CAPACITY IS A GROUND

FOR SUSPENSION/DISBARMENT
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for his

negligence in keeping and maintaining his notarial register.
FACTS:
HELD: YES. Respondent is liable for his negligence as a notarial

register. When respondent negligently failed to enter the details of
the 3 documents on his notarial register, he cast doubt on the
authenticity of complainants documents. He also cast doubt on the
credibility of the notarial register and the notarial process. He
violated not only the Notarial Rules but also the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires lawyers to promote respect for law
and legal process.
Respondents secretary cannot be blamed for the erroneous entries
in the notarial register. The notarial commission is a license held
personally by the notary public. It cannot be further delegated. It is
the notary public alone who is personally responsible for the
correctness of the entries in his or her notarial register.
Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for 3 months and
disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for 1 year.
ANTONINA S. SOSA, Complainant, v. ATTY. MANUEL V.

MENDOZA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 8776, March 22, 2015
BRION, J.:
Ms. Sosa alleged that she extended a loan to Atty. Mendoza. Atty.
Mendoza signed a promissory note and issued a postdated check for
P500,000.00. Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on
due date.
The check was subsequently returned or dishonored as it was
Drawn against Insufficient Funds. Ms. Sosa then obtained the
services of Atty. Cabrera to legally address Atty. Mendozas failure to
pay. Atty. Cabrera sent a letter to Atty. Mendoza demanding
payment of the loan plus interest and collection charges. Atty.
Mendoza ignored the demand letter despite receipt and did not, in
any manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain why he failed to pay.
Ms. Sosa filed the complaint for disbarment or suspension, charging
Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. This Rule states that [a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Mendoza liable not only
administratively but also civilly.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted with modification the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner as to the finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that [the respondent] is
guilty of misconduct for his failure to pay a just and valid debt, Atty.
3G AY 2015-2016
12
Manuel V. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law

for 6 months and Ordered to Return the amount of P500,000.00 to
the complainant with legal interest.
Although he initially denied getting this amount and claimed that he

only received P100,000.00, he did not present any evidence to prove
his claim. He later also admitted the validity of his loan without
qualification as to the amount.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Mendoza should be suspended for gross
misconduct, by reason of his non-payment despite the fact that
several demands were made.
HELD:
YES. This Court has held that any gross misconduct of a lawyer in
his professional or in his private capacity is a ground for the
imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good
character is an essential qualification for the admission to and
continued practice of law. Any wrongdoing, whether professional or
non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies
disciplinary action.
Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment."
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: [a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper
or wrong conduct, as found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to pay the
loan was willful in character and implied a wrongful intent and not a
mere error in judgment.
We find it undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained a loan in the
amount of P500,000.00. He signed the promissory note and
acknowledgement receipt showing he received P500,000.00.
3G AY 2015-2016
Also, Ms. Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon maturity but
Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing
the postdated check upon Atty. Mendozas request, and based on
his promises that he would pay. Despite all these, he still failed to
comply with his obligation. Worse, the check when finally
deposited was dishonored, a fact that Atty. Mendoza did not
dispute.
Atty. Mendoza further claimed he had P600,000.00 on hand during
the hearing with the IBP Investigating Officer. He allegedly failed to
deliver the amount to Ms. Sosa or her counsel because he arrived
late. We find Atty. Mendozas excuse to be flimsy. It could have been
very easy for him to deliver the P600,000.00 to Ms. Sosa if he had
the real intention to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa wrote, through her
counsel, Atty. Mendoza asking him to settle his obligation because of
his manifestation that he already had the money. It is unclear to us
why Atty. Mendoza ignored Ms. Sosas request for settlement after
claiming that he already had the needed funds. He was either lying
he had the money, or had no intention of paying in the first place.
Atty. Mendoza was also not candid with the IBP Investigating Officer
when he claimed he had P600,000.00 and that he was ready to pay
his obligation. What is clear is that his obligation remains
outstanding after all these years.
Other than his claim that he was disposing of real properties in order
to settle his obligation, Atty. Mendoza failed to explain why he failed
to pay despite his admission of a just and valid loan. Whatever his
reasons or excuses may be, dire financial condition does not justify
non-payment of debt, as we have held in Yuhico.
[A] lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
13
clients. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important

than truthfulness and candor. To this end nothing should be done by
any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the profession.
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between
respondent and complainant, it is well-settled that an attorney may
be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, showing him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the
law confer upon him.
The facts and evidence in this case clearly establish Atty. Mendozas
failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer as dictated by the lawyer's
oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, thereby degrading not only his personal integrity
but his profession as well.
To reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest
and deceitful conduct. This dishonest conduct was compounded by
Atty. Mendozas act of interjecting flimsy excuses that only
strengthened the conclusion that he refused to pay a valid and just
debt.
While we agree with the punishment meted out by the IBP, we differ
with its recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay the amount
of the loan plus legal interest.
We take exception to the IBPs order to pay only because the case
before us is solely an administrative complaint for disbarment and is
not a civil action for collection of a sum of money. The quantum of
evidence in these two types of cases alone deters us from agreeing
with the IBPs order to pay; the administrative complaint before us
only requires substantial evidence to justify a finding of liability, while
3G AY 2015-2016
a civil action requires greater evidentiary standard of preponderance

of evidence.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare.
The purpose of disbarment is mainly to determine the fitness of a
lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant
in the dispensation of justice. The purpose of disbarment is to protect
the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the
court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.
However, in the recent case of Heenan v. Atty. Espejo, this Court
sitting en banc did not agree with the IBPs recommendation to order
the erring lawyer to return the money he borrowed from the
complainant:
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of
respondents administrative liability. Our findings have no material
bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by
the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for
determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this
Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should
be returned to the complainant.
14
Because the matter before us is not a civil action for the collection
money, we cannot order Atty. Mendoza to pay his outstanding loan.
We can only clarify that our ruling in this case is without prejudice to
any future civil or criminal action that Ms. Sosa, if she so decides,
may file against Atty. Mendoza in the future. Our action likewise is
without prejudice to any action we may take that is not based on the
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. MANUEL V.
MENDOZA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility with a STERN WARNING that commission of the
same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a
more severe penalty.
KEEPING MULTIPLE NOTARIAL REGISTERS; DUTY TO ACT
WITH COURTESY; DOUBLE DEALING WITH CLIENTS
A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015
false and irregular entries in his notarial registers. Gimeno further

submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the
services of his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices
(ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved her husband and
her parents-in-law. Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship,
Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the complaint for estafa and
violation of RA 3019 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed
against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing
against a former client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against
the representation of conflicting clients' interests. Lastly, Gimeno
contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the
same administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her. In
another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno observed that
Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone suffering
from "serious mental incompetence" in one of his
pleadings. According to Gimeno, these statements constitute
intemperate, offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is
proscribed from using in his dealings.
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a

complaint with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging
Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2)
falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language;
and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.
In his answer dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued

that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial
partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this document, his
notarial stamp and falsified signature were superimposed over the
typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually
notarized this document. Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified
his signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his
admission to the Bar. On the alleged falsification of his notarial
entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously use
several notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to
better cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate their
growing number. This explains the irregular and non-sequential
entries in his notarial registers.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty.

Zaide's admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission,
he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute
sale on March 29, 2002. She also accused Atty. Zaide of making
Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client
since she did not personally hire him as her counsel. Gimeno
engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an
associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in their
JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS

ZAIDE, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
3G AY 2015-2016
15
annulment of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of

ZMZ's partners. On this basis, the respondent should not be held
liable for representing conflicting clients' interests. Finally, he denied
that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his
pleadings.
Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo)
found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial
Practice Rules (keeping irregular entries in notarial register),
representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and insulting
language in his pleadings. The IBP Board of Governors (Board)
opined that the evidence on record fully supports the findings of the
investigating commissioner. However, the Board modified the
recommended penalty and imposed instead the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being
commissioned as a notary public. Atty. Zaide sought for the
reconsideration of the Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but this
was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether the IBP boards decision was proper
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings
and recommended penalty, and accordingly confirms them. As the
investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any
concrete evidence to show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29,
2002 partial extrajudicial partition prior to his admission to the Bar
and receipt of his notarial commission. It appears that this document
originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, as notary
public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his
name, roll number,, PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration
date of his notarial commission, were merely superimposed over
Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.
3G AY 2015-2016
Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the

document are his true information. However, he denied that he
personally stamped and signed the document. He contended that
Gimeno falsified his signature and used his notarial stamp to make it
appear that he was the one who notarized it. This Court notes that at
the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's
details as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet
existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he
could not have obtained and used the exact figures pertaining
to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the expiration
date of his notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly
on March 29, 2002. This circumstance, coupled with the absence of
any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such as a witness to the
alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty.
Zaide could not have notarized the document before his Bar
admission and receipt of his notarial commission. We find that
Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining
different notarial registers in several offices. Section l(a), Rule VI
of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall
keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided
in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of
notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with
numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary
public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given
time." On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping
several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1,
Rule VI.
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to
maintain only one active notarial register and ensure that the entries
in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register"
rule is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several
notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who
perform notarial services on his behalf. Since a notarial commission
is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally
administer the notarial acts that the law authorizes him to execute.
This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other
16
person, other than the notary public, should perform it. On the other
hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological
sequence in order to address and prevent the rampant practice of
leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating of
notarizations.
This Court stresses that a notary public should not
trivialize his functions as his powers and duties are impressed
with public interest. A notary public's office is not merely an
income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who
has been privileged to receive a notarial commission must faithfully
and conscientiously perform. The investigating commissioner
properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for
representing conflicting clients' interests.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
In Aninon v. Sabitsana, the Court laid down the tests to determine if
a lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting interests between and
among his clients. One of these tests is whether the acceptance of
a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. Another test is whether a lawyer would
be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client
any confidential information acquired through their connection
or previous employment.
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide
appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm's client. The lawyerclient relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when
Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged
ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any
3G AY 2015-2016
way connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno

with the Ombudsman. The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and
where Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained to the annulment
of a land title. Somontan was never a party to this case since this
only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case where
Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's
Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling
of the funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's
alleged corruption as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan
City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman
case are totally unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because
at the time Somontan engaged his services, he had already left
ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the record shows that Atty.
Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential information which
he acquired while he was still their counsel in the annulment of
title case.Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held
liable for violating the prohibition against the representation of
conflicting interests.
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive
language in a lawyer's professional dealings, whether with the
courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on the following
canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
17
menacing language or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis

supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the
Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist." And in
another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following
demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment
against his opposing counsel.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to
be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and
illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar
to abstain from any offensive personality and to refrain from any act
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's
language even in his pleadings, must be dignified.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is foundGUILTY of
violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for using
intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule
8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is
also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Burden of proof rests upon the complainant in a disbarment

complaint
ATTY. ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR.,Complainant, v. ATTYS. E.
HANS A. SANTOS AND AGNES H. MARANAN,Respondents.
A.C. No. 9868 [formerly CBD Case No. 05-1617], April 22, 2015
FACTS:
The complainant related that the respondents initiated Civil Case No.
70251 for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City (RTC Pasig) and used a deceptive ploy to prevent the payment
of the proper docket fees.
The respondents allegedly disguised the complaint as an action for
specific performance and injunction (where the amount involved is
incapable of pecuniary estimation) and deliberately omitted to specify
the damages prayed for amounting to P68,000,000.00 in the prayer
of the complaint in order to avoid paying the proper docket fees.
According to the complainant, this intentional omission to specify the
amount of damages was specifically declared by the Court
inManchester Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals as
grossly unethical, and thus constitutes a valid ground for disbarment.
The respondents denied the allegation, claiming that at the time the
complaint in Civil Case No. 70251 was filed on January 13, 2005,
twelve (12) out of fifteen (15) checks were not yet due and
demandable, clearly indicating that the complaint was really an
action for specific performance and injunction, rather than an action
for sum of money or damages.
IBP Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes found that the respondents
did not commit any violation of the code of professional ethics.
According to him, there is no showing that the Clerk of Court had
been deceived when she assessed the filing fees due on the
complaint in Civil Case No. 70251.
Moreover, there is no showing that the Clerk of Court had made any
mistake in the assessment of the docket fees since the court never
issued an order for reassessment or payment of higher docket fees.
3G AY 2015-2016
18
Hence, Commissioner Reyes recommended that the disbarment

case be dismissed for lack of merit.
intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the

correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment
of the filing fee."
The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve

the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after
finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record, and by the
applicable laws and rules. The complainant then filed a petition for
review assailing the IBP's findings.
ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether the respondents' omission of the
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer of the complaint
is unethical, and thereby violative of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RULING:
No. The respondents' omission of the specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer of the complaint is unethical, and thereby
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The complainant argued that the Investigating Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation is contrary to the Court's
pronouncement in Manchester Development Corporation, et
v. Court of Appeals. The material portions of the Manchester
doctrine provide:
al.
"The Court cannot close this case without making the observation
that it frowns at the practice of counsel v/ho filed the original
complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer although the amount of over Seventy-Eight
Million Pesos (P78,000,000.00) is alleged in the body of the
complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to
evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the
docket clerk in theassessmentof the filing fee."
In that case, the Court observed that the lawyer's act of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer of the
complaint, although the amount was alleged in its body, "was clearly
3G AY 2015-2016
After a careful study of the import of the Manchester doctrine and the
arguments of the parties, the court find as the Investigating
Commissioner did -that the respondents did not commit any violation
of the Code of Professional Conduct.
We stress that the main issue in disbarment cases is whether or not
a lawyer has committed serious professional misconduct sufficient to
cause disbarment. The test is whether the lawyer's conduct shows
him or her to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor; or whether it renders him or her unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.The burden of proof rests upon the
complainant; and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if
the complainant establishes the complaint with clearly preponderant
evidence.
Contrary to the complainant's allegation that the respondents had
defrauded the court, the element of "deceitful conduct" or "deceit"
was not present in this case.
First, the prayer in the complaint clearly showed that there was a
clear and express reference to paragraph 2.27 of the complaint,
which listed and described in detail the date of the checks, the check
numbers, and their corresponding amounts.
Second, there was also an express mention in the prayer of the

amount of P9.5 Million representing the value of the checks that had
already become due. Thus, we find unmeritorious the complainant's
claim that the respondents intentionally and deceptively omitted to
specify the amount of damages in the prayer.
Third, despite the complainant's move for the dismissal of Case No.
70251 on the ground that the proper docket fees were not paid, the
RTC Pasig Clerk of Court neither reassessed the filing fees, nor
required the plaintiff in that case to pay additional filing fees.
19
Fourth, even as of this date, the Court in Civil Case No. 70251 has
not issued an order requiring the reassessment, recomputation,
and/or payment of additional docket fees, signifying that the RTC
Pasig Clerk of Court did not make any mistake in the assessment of
the docket fees.
Fifth, an examination of the allegations of the complaint and the

prayer in Civil Case No. 70251 shows that the case is really an
action for specific performance and injunction. The complaint sought
to judicially require the complainant to deliver the actual and physical
checks enumerated in paragraph 2.27 of the complaint; to compel
him to account for the checks that he may have had already
encashed; and to restrain him from negotiating, transacting, and
encashing the checks in his possession. Clearly, the complaint was
an action for specific performance, rather than for a sum of money.
Even assuming that the respondents' mere reference to paragraph
2.27 of the complaint does not fully comply with the Manchester
doctrine, this Court still finds that it is not a sufficient ground for
disbarment. There is no clear showing that the respondents
defrauded or misled the RTC Pasig Clerk of Court. Neither was there
any proof that the respondents have maliciously disguised their
complaint as an action for specific performance and injunction so as
to evade the payment of the proper docket fees. Clearly, the
complainant's allegation is merely anchored on speculation and
conjecture, and hence insufficient to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty of disbarment.
We are likewise not convinced that the respondents violated Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The record of the case
do not show that the respondents had committed misconduct,
dishonesty, falsehood, or had misused the rules of procedure. In the
absence of such proof, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer
remains and the complaint against him must be dismissed.Viewed in
these lights, the disbarment complaint against the respondents Attys.
E. Hans A. Santos and Agnes H. Maranan should be dismissed for
lack of merit.
3G AY 2015-2016
GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY

Roberto P. Nonato v. Atty. Eutiqio M. Fudolin, Jr.
A.C. No. 10138 June 16, 2015
Sereno, CJ
Facts: In a verified complaint, the complainant alleged that his father,
the late Restituto Nonato, was the duly registered owner of a real
property Negros Occidental. The property became the subject of
ejectment proceedings filed by Restituto against Anselmo
Tubongbanua. When the complaint was filed, Restituto was
represented by Atty. Felino Garcia. However, at the pre-trial stage,
Atty. Garcia was replaced by Atty. Fudolin, the respondent in the
present case.
The complainant asserted that during the pendency of the ejectment
proceedings, the respondent failed to fully inform his father Restituto
of the status and developments in the case. Restituto could not
contact the respondent despite his continued efforts. The respondent
also failed to furnish Restituto copies of the pleadings, motions and
other documents filed with the court. Thus, Restituto and the
complainant were completely left in the dark regarding the status of
their case.
After an exchange of initial pleadings in the ejectment proceedings,
the MTC ordered the parties to submit their respective position
papers. Since neither party complied with the courts directive, the
MTC dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim on May
26, 2005.
The complainant alleges that he and his father Restituto did not
know of the ejectment suits dismissal as the respondent had failed
to furnish them a copy of the MTCs dismissal order. The
complainant also asserts that the respondent did not inform them
about the filing of the motion for reconsideration or of its denial by
the MTC. The complainant claims that he only found out that the
20
case had been dismissed when he personally went to the Office of

the MTC Clerk of Court and was informed of the dismissal.
In his Answer, the respondent asserted that at the time he received
the MTCs directive to submit a position paper, he was already
suffering from Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Atrial
Fibrillation, Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II.; that he had
an undetected stroke and arterial obstruction during the previous
months. His health condition led to his loss of concentration in his
cases and the loss of some of the case folders, among them the
records of the ejectment case. The respondent also claimed that he
focused on his health for self-preservation, and underwent vascular
laboratory examinations; thus, he failed to communicate with the late
Restituto and the complainant.
Lastly, the respondent alleged that after the ejectment suits
dismissal, he exerted all efforts, to the point of risking his poor
health, by filing successive pleadings to convince the court to
reconsider its dismissal order. Because the dismissal was purely
based on a technical ground, he maintained that his failure to file the
position paper did not amount to the abandonment of his clients
case.
The Investigating Commissioner found that the respondents failure
to file the position paper in the ejectment proceedings and to apprise
the client of the status of the case demonstrated his negligence and
lack of prudence in dealing with his clients; and that he failed to
promptly inform his clients, including the complainant, of his medical
condition deprived them of the opportunity to seek the services of
other lawyers.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the respondents
suspension for one (1) month from the practice of law.
Issue: W/N the respondent is guilty of negligence in the
performance of duty, and thus, should be held administratively
liable?
3G AY 2015-2016
Held: Yes. Except for the recommended penalty, we adopt the

findings of the IBP.
A lawyer is bound to protect his clients interests to the best of his
ability and with utmost diligence. He should serve his client in a
conscientious, diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the quality
of service at least equal to that which he, himself, would expect from
a competent lawyer in a similar situation. By consenting to be his
clients counsel, a lawyer impliedly represents that he will exercise
ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill
demanded by his profession, and his client may reasonably expect
him to perform his obligations diligently. The failure to meet these
standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
The record clearly shows that the respondent has been remiss in the
performance of his duties as Restitutos counsel. He failed to file his
position paper despite notice. In addition, the respondent failed to
inform Restituto and the complainant of the status of the case. His
failure to file the position paper, and to inform his client of the status
of the case, not only constituted inexcusable negligence; but it also
amounted to evasion of duty. All these acts violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility warranting the courts imposition of
disciplinary action.
Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.
Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
21
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the

status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the clients request for information.
We also find the respondents excuse that he had an undetected
stroke and was suffering from other illnesses unsatisfactory and
merely an afterthought. Even assuming that he was then suffering
from numerous health problems, his medical condition cannot serve
as a valid reason to excuse the omission to file the necessary court
pleadings. The respondent could have requested an extension of
time to file the required position paper, or at the very least, informed
his client of his medical condition; all these, the respondent failed to
do.
We, however, find the IBPs recommended penalty (one (1) month
suspension from the practice of law) to be a mere slap on the wrist
considering the gravity of the infractions committed. Thus, we deem
it appropriate to impose the penalty of two (2) years suspension,
taking into account the respondent's acts and omissions, as well as
the consequence of his negligence.
Being a lawyer is a privilege with attached duties and

obligations. One of which is to ensure that the clients interest
is met and protected with utmost diligence. Another is to accord
proper respect to the Courts procedures.
TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO B.
LAVADIA, JR., Respondent.
A.C. NO. 5686 16 June 2015
FACTS:
Teodulo Enriquez filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Edilberto B. Lavadia Jr for gross negligence and inefficiency in the
performance of his duties as a lawyer. This complaint stems from
3G AY 2015-2016
actions of Lavadia as the assigned attorney to a forcible entry

complaint against Enriquez before the MCTC of Talibon, Bohol.
During the handling of the forcible entry case, Lavadia has
repeatedly failed to submit on time the position papers and affidavits
within the 30 days from the receipt of the pre-trial order. This led to
defendants being declared in default and Atty. Lavadia filing for a
notice of appeal with sufficient bond. However, such appeal was
dismissed due to the failure of Lavadia to submit the appeal
memorandum despite being granted a total of no more than 71 days
or a total of 4 motions of extensions to file the memorandum.
Relatively, great damage and prejudice against Enriquez happened
as such the complaint for disbarment.
During the Courts and IBPs investigation, Lavadia has exhibited the
same cavalier attitude shown in handling Enriquez case. The Court
has granted every opportunity for Lavadia to file his comment to the
compliant. However, after a lapse of 8 years, a total of 155 days
extension to file his comment and no less than 8 resolutions ordering
Atty. Lavadia to comment: 2 of which ordered him to pay fines of
P1,000.00 and P2,000.00 and requiring him to show cause for his
failure to file and comply with the Courts resolution, Lavadia still did
not file any comment. Lavadia made excuses ranging from heavy
case load, to sickness of his wife and close relative to even having
dark beings in his home causing him misfortunes. Thus, IBP found
Lavadia unfit to dispense his duties and responsibilities as an
attorney and recommends for his disbarment.
ISSUE: WON Lavadia may be held administratively liable.
HELD: YES. We cannot stress enough that being a lawyer is a
privilege with attached duties and obligations. Lawyers bear the
responsibility to meet the professions exacting standards. A lawyer
is expected to live by the lawyers oath, the rules of the profession
and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The duties of a
lawyer may be classified into four general categories namely duties
he owes to the court, to the public, to the bar and to his client. A
22
lawyer who transgresses any of his duties is administratively liable

and subject to the Courts disciplinary authority.
In the present case, the duties transgressed by Atty. Lavadia fall
under those duties to his client and to the court. This Court notes
Atty. Lavadias propensity for filing motions for extension of time to
file pleadings but failing to file the same, in violation of Rule 12.03 of
the CPR.
Here, Enriquez paid a total of P29,750.00 as acceptance fee and
other fees relating to the preparation of pleadings for the case
including the appeal. Atty. Lavadia however failed to discharge his
duties. He failed to file his clients position paper rendering his client
in default. While he filed a notice of appeal and several motions for
extension of time to file the appeal memorandum, all of which were
granted by the lower court, he ultimately neglected to file the appeal
memorandum. Thus, following our pronouncement in Solidon, Atty.
Lavadia has clearly transgressed Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the
CPR thereby making him administratively liable.
As in Mariveles, Atty. Lavadia requested and was granted extensions
of time to file the appeal memorandum after he filed the notice of
appeal with sufficient bond. The lower court granted him four
extensions totaling 71 days after which time he still failed to file the
appeal memorandum. His failure adversely affected the cause of
Enriquez, his client. In repeatedly asking for extensions of time
without actually filing the appeal memorandum, Atty. Lavadia is liable
under Rule 12.03 of the CPR.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and
respondents deference is underscored by the fact that willful
disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the
integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.
(Citations omitted).
3G AY 2015-2016
The present complaint was filed January 2002. We granted Atty.

Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment to the complaint. We
issued no less than eight resolutions ordering Atty. Lavadia to
comment: two of which ordered him to pay fines of P1,000.00 and
P2,000.00 and requiring him to show cause for his failure to file and
to comply with the Courts resolutions. In fine, we have granted him a
total of 155 days extension to file his comment, in response to his
repeated pleas contained in his numerous ex parte motions. After a
lapse of eight years, this Court referred the case to the IBP where
Atty. Lavadia once again filed a motion for extension to file his
position paper but nevertheless failed to file the same.
While this Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia,
we cannot countenance his act of repeatedly pleading for extensions
of time and yet not submitting anything to the Court. This reflects his
willful disregard for Court orders putting in question his suitability to
discharge his duties and functions as a lawyer. As we stated in
Vaflor-Fabroa the Courts Resolution is not a mere request. A
lawyers blatant disregard or refusal to comply with the Courts
orders underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which
is only too deserving of reproof. Here, this disbarment case has
dragged on for years while we gave Atty. Lavadia every opportunity
to file his comment. Despite the extended time granted him, he
continued to fail to do so. Such obstinate disobedience to the Courts
orders merits disciplinary action.
We said in Figueras v. Atty. Jimenez that the determination of
whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a
period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. This Court
has imposed the penalties ranging from reprimand, warning with fine,
suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment for a lawyers failure to
file a brief or other pleading.
In the present case, we note that this is Atty. Lavadias first
infraction. However, given his proven propensity for filing motions for
extension of time and not filing the required pleading, this Court finds
that it should impose the severe sanction lest some other unknowing
23
clients engage his services only to lose their case due to Atty.
Lavadia's nonchalant attitude. Considering the gravity of Atty.
Lavadia's cavalier actions both to his client and his impertinent
attitude towards the Court, we find the penalty of DISBARMENT as
recommended by the IBP appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. is
hereby DISBARRED for violating Canons 11 and 18 and Rules
10.03, 12.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from
the Roll of Attorneys.
GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY

Olvida vs. Atty. Arnel Gonzales
A.C. No. 5732, June 16, 2015
FACTS: The complainant engaged the services of the respondent in
the filing and handling of a case for Termination of Tenancy
Relationship against tenant Alfonso Lumanta who was no longer
religiously paying the rentals for a coconut farm in Davao City,
owned by his wife and under his administration.
The complainant paid the respondent his acceptance fee of
P15,000.00 and P700.00 as advance appearance fee. The
respondent asked the complainant to provide him with copies of all
pertinent documents and affidavits of his witnesses. The case was
filed on January 22, 2001. DARAB exerted efforts to resolve the case
amicably, but the parties failed to come to an agreement, prompting
the Board to require the parties to submit their position papers within
40 days from the date of the hearing.
The complainant provided the respondent all pieces of documentary
evidence, including his own affidavit, for the preparation of the
position paper. Thereafter, the complainant repeatedly called the
respondent's office for information about the position paper. He did
this until April 25, 2001, the last day of its submission, but failed to
3G AY 2015-2016
contact the respondent. The complainant finally contacted the

respondent's secretary, Marivic Romero, about the position paper
and Romero told him that the position paper had already been filed.
Nine months after the expiration of the period for the filing of the
position paper a copy of the decision of Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator Sinsona dismissing the case for lack of merit. When he
read the text of the decision, he discovered that the respondent did
not file the position paper in the case. The decision stated that the
respondent failed to submit a position paper despite ample time to do
so.He learned that the respondent already had a copy of the decision
even before he received his own, and had not informed him about it.
The complainant terminated the respondent's services.
After more than seven years after he was first required by the Court
to do so, the respondent filed his comment and prayed for a
dismissal of the complaint.The respondent pointed out that the
complainant lost the case because there was a difference of opinion
between them; the complainant wanted to impose upon him his own
view and opinion and would dictate to him what he wanted to be
done in the course of the proceedings, while refusing all his advice
on how to pursue the case. The complainant in fact failed to submit
to him all the pieces of documentary evidence he needed.
Commissioner Cachapero found the respondent negligent in
discharging his duties as a lawyer in the handling of complainant's
case against his former tenant Lumanta. He disagreed with the
respondent's assertion that the Position Paper is unimportant and
that his client had failed to submit the necessary papers or
documents to support his cause of action. Commissioner Cachapero
recommended respondent's SUSPENSION from the practice of law
for a period of four (4) months.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was negligent in his duty as
counsel of the complainant in failing to file the position paper?
24
HELD: YES. The respondent, Atty. Arnel C. Gonzales, is liable as

charged. He grossly violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO
THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
The respondent gave the complainant the run-around for an
unreasonably long period of time; the latter had to repeatedly inquire
about and follow up the filing of the position paper in the DARAB
case. On the matter alone of keeping complainant posted on the
status of the case, the respondent failed to comply with his duty
under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 states that "a lawyer shall keep the
client informed of the status of the case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for
information."||Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires that "A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Accordingly, Rule 18.02
mandates that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable. The respondent kept to himself his receipt
of a copy of the DARAB's adverse decision which he received even
before the complainant received his own. This failure to
communicate was downright dishonest and unethical and cannot but
aggravate the respondent's inexcusable neglect in not filing a
position paper in the case. It also showed the respondent's gross
lack of professionalism in dealing with his client; worse than this, his
office, through his secretary, had even made the complainant believe
that the position paper had already been filed.
We are appalled at the respondent's boldness in saying that his
failure to file the position paper in the tenancy case was due to the
complainant's fault. He lost sight of the fact that he was engaged by
the complainant to plead his case in the tenancy dispute in the way
he (respondent) believed the case should be handled, not in any
other way. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
"shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling
the case. The respondent should have acted as a lawyer in the
3G AY 2015-2016
case, not as a mere agent waiting for the complainant's instructions.

He should not have wasted several months doing nothing about the
position paper he knew had to be filed as required by the DARAB
Adjudicator. He should not have lied to the complainant making him
believe that he was doing his work as his lawyer and that he had
already filed the position paper. Before the time for filing lapsed, he
should have been candid enough to tell the complainant that he
could not file the required position paper and that it was time for him
to engage another lawyer.
The IBP Board of Governors imposed a four-month suspension from
the practice of law on the respondent for his negligence in filing the
required position paper. The established facts, however, show that
the respondent was not only grossly negligent in the performance of
his duties as the complainant's lawyer; he was also downright
dishonest and unethical in his dealings with the complainant, an
aspect of the case glossed over during the IBP investigation. In this
light, we deem a three-year suspension from the practice of law an
appropriate penalty for the respondent's gross negligence and
dishonesty in his handling of the complainant's tenancy case.
GRAVE MISCONDUCT; ENGAGING IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW

WHILE UNDER SUSPENSION; DISBARMENT
Llunar vs Ricafort
AC 6484, June 16, 2015
Per Curiam
In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Severina
Banez, hired the respondent to file a case against father and son
Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for the recovery of a parcel of land
allegedly owned by the Banez family but was fraudulently registered
under the name of Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard.
The property, which Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank of
25
Malilipot, Albay, was the subject of foreclosure proceedings at the

time the respondent was hired. The respondent received from the
complainant the following amounts: (a) P70,000.00 as partial
payment of the redemption price of the property; (b) P19,000.00 to
cover the filing fees; and (c) P6,500.00 as attorney's fees.
Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving the
subject property was ever filed by the respondent with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Legaspi City. Thus, the complainant demanded
that the respondent return to her the amount of P95,000.00.
The respondent refused to return the whole amount of P95,000.00 to
the complainant. He argued that a complaint for annulment of title
against Ard Cervantes had actually been filed in court, though not by
him, but by another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he was
willing to return only what was left of the P95,000.00 after deducting
therefrom the P50,000.00 that he paid to Atty. Abitria as acceptance
fee for handling the case.
The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for annulment of
title filed by Atty. Abitria and claimed that she had no knowledge of
Atty. Abitria's engagement as counsel. Besides, the complaint was
filed three (3) years late and the property could no longer be
redeemed from the bank. Also, the complainant discovered that the
respondent had been suspended indefinitely from the practice of law
since May 29, 2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in
Administrative Case No. 5054,3 which the complainant suspected
was the reason another lawyer, and not the respondent, filed the
complaint for annulment of title in court.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended penalty from indefinite
suspension to disbarment. It also ordered the respondent to return to
the complainant the amount of P95,000.00 within thirty (30) days
from notice. The respondent moved for reconsideration.
In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent argued that his
referral of the complainant's case to Atty. Abitria was actually with
3G AY 2015-2016
the complainant's knowledge and consent; and that he paid Atty.

Abitria P50,000.00 for accepting the case. These facts were
confirmed by Atty. Abitria in an affidavit dated November 17, 2004,
but were alleged to have been overlooked by Commissioner
Villanueva in his report. The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution
No. XX-2013-710 dated June 21, 2013, denied the respondent's
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Was the respondent guilty of grave misconduct in his
dealings with his client and in engaging in the practice of law while
under indefinite suspension?
Held: YES.
The Court finds the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his
dealings with his client and in engaging in the practice of law while
under indefinite suspension, and thus impose upon him the ultimate
penalty of DISBARMENT.
The respondent in this case committed several infractions making
him liable for grave misconduct. First, the respondent did not exert
due diligence in handling the complainant's case. He failed to act
promptly in redeeming the complainant's property within the period of
redemption. What is worse is the delay of three years before a
complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. The
respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant's case and wasted
precious time and opportunity that were then readily available to
recover the complainant's property. Under these facts, the
respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."
Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts
given to him by the complainant for handling the latter's case. On
three separate occasions, the respondent received from the
complainant the amounts of P19,000.00, P70,000.00, and P6,500.00
26
for purposes of redeeming the mortgaged property from the bank

and filing the necessary civil case/s against Ard Cervantes. The
complainant approached the respondent several times thereafter to
follow up on the case/s to be filed supposedly by the respondent
who, in turn, reassured her that actions on her case had been taken.
After the complainant discovered three years later that the
respondent had not filed any case in court, she demanded that the
respondent return the amount of P95,000.00, but her demand was
left unheeded. The respondent later promised to pay her, but until
now, no payment of any amount has been made. These facts
confirm that the respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which
mandates every lawyer to "hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client that may come into his possession" and to "account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client." In
addition, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or
property he holds for his client gives rise to the presumption that he
has appropriated these funds or property for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
chanrobleslaw
Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright
with the complainant that he was under indefinite suspension from
the practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed this fact at
the time he was approached by the complainant for his services.
Canon 15 of the CPR states that "a lawyer shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
clients." The respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a
member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant's case despite
knowing that he could not and should not practice law.
Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite
the indefinite suspension imposed on him. This infraction infinitely
aggravates the offenses he committed. Based on the above facts
alone, the penalty of suspension for five (5) years from the practice
of law would have been justified, but the respondent is not an
ordinary violator of the profession's ethical rules; he is a repeat
3G AY 2015-2016
violator of these rules. In Nuez v. Atty. Ricafort, we had adjudged

the respondent liable for grave misconduct in failing to turn over the
proceeds of the sale of a property owned by his client and in issuing
bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution issued by the
court in the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 filed
against him by his client. We then suspended him indefinitely from
the practice of law - a penalty short of disbarment. Under his current
liability - which is no different in character from his previous offense we have no other way but to proceed to decree his disbarment. He
has become completely unworthy of membership in our honorable
profession.
The hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have been necessary had the
respondent been honest and diligent in handling the complainant's
case from the start. The complainant should not be burdened with
the expense of hiring another lawyer to perform the services that the
respondent was hired to do, especially in this case where there was
an inexcusable non-delivery of such services.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name REMOVED from the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately
upon his receipt of this Decision. Also, he
is ORDERED to RETURN the amount of P95,000.00 to complainant
Adelita B. Llunar, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.
Lawyers negligence in handling the legal matter entrusted to him
A.C. No. 9603, June 16, 2015

DOMINIC PAUL D. LAZARETO, Complainant, v. ATTY. DENNIS N.
ACORDA, Respondent.
FACTS: In January 2004, Lazareto and his family engaged the

respondents services to handle the extrajudicial settlement of the
27
estate of Lazaretos father who died intestate. Lazareto gave the

respondent the original duplicate copies of TCTs together with the
amount of P120,000.00. Since then, Lazareto had followed up the
developments with the respondent by phone, but he could not be
contacted until he received a fax message from him asking for an
additional P88,000.00, which Lazareto gave in installments of
P66,000.00 and P20,000. May 2004 passed without the papers for
extrajudicial settlement being filed. Lazareto had not heard from the
respondent all this time, although the lawyer sent a certain Manny
Pacheco, allegedly the liaison officer to get the second installment.
Lazareto gave additional funds to respondent consisting of
P150,000.00 ; P15,000.00; and another P10,330.00. Since then,
Lazareto had not heard from the respondent, until he wrote the
family saying that Pacheco had not given an accounting of the
monies the family had given him. Meantime, Lazareto and his family
entered into negotiations to sell Lot B. The buyers asked the
respondent to prepare the deed of sale for the transaction; however,
even if the respondent promised to give the matter priority, he failed
to attend to it. On August 15, 2005, the family wrote him a letter
reminding him of his promise, as well as of his failure to act on the
filing of the extrajudicial settlement action which had expired a year
ago. Follow ups had been made for the return pf the TCTs but to no
avail until the respondent admitted that he had lost one of the TCTs.
With this, Lazareto requested for an affidavit of loss but this was
unsigned by the respondent. Exasperated with the difficulties he was
having with the respondents nonchalant and negligent attitude and
his refusal to provide his family a signed affidavit of loss, Lazareto
filed the present complaint.
Thereafter, Atty. Policarpio, the respondents lawyer, proposed an
amicable settlement with Lazareto. Lazareto agreed to the proposal
and submitted a manifestation on the matter to the IBP Investigating
Commissioner. Once again, Lazareto was greatly disappointed. The
respondent failed to deliver on his commitments. With this
development, Lazareto had no choice but to agree to just accept
an affidavit of loss for the receipts and to rely on the word of
respondents counsel that he was assured by his client that he
3G AY 2015-2016
(respondent) had filed the extrajudicial settlement papers with

the Register of Deeds of Manila. However, they discovered that no
Extrajudicial Settlement was filed. Alarmed and shocked at his
discovery, Lazareto moved for the admission of newly discovered
evidence, but the motion was denied by Comm. Rico, as well as his
subsequent motion for reconsideration. His affidavit of desistance
and respondents apology notwithstanding, Lazareto expressed
grave concern over respondents misrepresentations in performing
his tasks as the family lawyer in the settlement of his fathers estate.
Nonetheless, he left it to Comm. Rico to resolve the case in the light
of his affidavit of desistance and the circumstances of the case.
The Case for the Respondent
In his position paper, the respondent alleged that upon his
engagement as counsel, he advised them that he could not
determine the exact date of completion or termination of his assigned
task. He denied Lazaretos submission that he had been negligent in
the performance of his duties as lawyer for the settlement of the
estate of Lazaretos deceased father. Additionally, the respondent
alleged that Pacheco stole a substantial amount of money from the
firm, as well as several original documents, and that Pacheco could
not be found despite efforts to locate him. He stressed that despite
the losses he suffered, he was able to finalize all documents and
transactions and to deliver the certificate of title."
ISSUES:
1) whether respondent was negligent in handling the legal matter
entrusted to him
2) whether respondent acted in bad faith in dealing with complainant
Lazareto and his family.
28
HELD: After an objective examination of the facts and the

evidence, we find the dismissal of the case unacceptable,
notwithstanding Lazaretos affidavit of desistance and his
silence with respect to said dismissal. The IBP Board of
Governors misappreciated the gravity and the scope of the
respondents breach of his contractual obligation with Lazareto and
his family. He had been negligent in carrying out the task entrusted
to him by Lazareto and his family as found by Comm. Inocencio, a
clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He had
been grossly dishonest with respect to certain actions he claimed he
had taken in relation to his task.
We disagree with and cannot accept Commissioner Ricos
conclusion and reason. The filing of the fake deed of sale and the
bogus publication of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Lazaretos deceased father were very much relevant to the
proceedings before Comm. Rico. They were inextricably linked to the
charge of negligence against respondent in his handling of the
extrajudicial settlement matter entrusted to him by Lazareto and his
family.
After the family gave him his acceptance fee and provided him with
the necessary funds for the undertaking, respondent became
inaccessible and unheard of with respect to his task until the agreed
deadline for the filing of the extrajudicial settlement papers expired.
For some time, he could not even produce the title to one of the lots
and when pressed to produce it, he admitted he could not find it.
While the respondent might have manifested, in good faith, his

intention to complete the task referred to him at the earliest possible
time, the results proved otherwise. He did not complete the legal
matter referred to him.
Necessarily also, the respondent committed a violation of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, cited in Lazaretos
complaint. Rule 1.01, in particular, requires that [a] lawyer shall not
3G AY 2015-2016
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP

Board of Governors completely disregarded this particular aspect of
the complaint against the respondent which, to our mind, should
have been given proper consideration, if only to remind the members
of the Bar to always keep faith with the tenets of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and as importantly, with their oath.
Further, the ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoins every lawyer
to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play, and nobility
in the course of his practice of law. Stated differently, any member of
the legal fraternity should do nothing that would lessen in any degree
the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of
the legal profession.
Considering the foregoing, we find the dismissal of the administrative
case improvident. What to us comes out in bold relief in reading
through the records of this case is a web of deceit and negligence
perpetrated by the respondent against the complainant and his
family, to their prejudice and to the prejudice of the profession that
now has been brought to disrepute by the respondents sharp
practices. How the respondent was able to extricate himself for what
he did is reprehensible and casts doubt on the integrity of the IBP
and its Commissioners. Thus, the respondent should be made to
answer for his dishonest dealings with Lazareto and his family, as
well as for his negligence in the handling of the task Lazareto had
entrusted to him. We say this notwithstanding the layman Lazaretos
desistance, as the respondents action was a transgression not only
of what is due Lazareto as a client but also of the profession and the
nation that expect its lawyers to live up to the highest standards of
performance in this noble profession.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2012-196,
dated June 9, 2012, of the IBP Board of Governors is SET ASIDE.
Respondent Atty. Dennis N. Acorda is ORDERED suspended from
the practice of law for three (3) years from and after notice of this
Decision. We also WARN him that the commission of the same or
similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.
29
A lawyer who thrice moved for extension of time to file appellants

brief
FRANCISCO CAOILE v. ATTY. MARCELINO MACARAEG
A.C. No. 720, June 17, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS: Francisco, and four others, engaged the services of Atty.
Macaraeg to represent them in Civil Case No. 11119, an action for
recovery of ownership filed before the CFI of Lingayen, Pangasinan.
After the CFI rendered judgment against them, Francisco and his codefendants decided to appeal their case before the CA. Accordingly,
Atty. Macaraeg filed a notice of appeal. Thrice he moved for
extension of time to file appellants' brief. In his last motion for
extension, he alleged that he was already in the process of doing the
finishing touches on the brief and just needed to have it printed. Yet,
the extended period expired without Atty. Macaraeg filing any brief.
Hence, upon motion of the opposing party, the CA dismissed the
appeal. The dismissal became final and executory on December 13,
1963.
Francisco averred that they were unaware of the dismissal of their
appeal until they were served with the CFI's writ of execution and a
notice of sale at public auction of their property in 1965. After
confirming with the CA that they indeed lost the case, Francisco
confronted Atty. Macaraeg who informed him that they lost the case
because they failed to pay him in full.
Hence, this administrative complaint against Atty. Macaraeg for
neglect and dereliction of duty.
In his Answer, Atty. Macaraeg averred that Francisco and his codefendants did not pay in full for his services in filing the appeal.
Anent the pacto de retro sale which Francisco and his wife executed
in his favor supposedly to cover the balance of his professional fees,
Atty. Macaraeg claimed that it was Francisco who insisted on its
execution, and that, contrary to Francisco's claim, it was intended as
3G AY 2015-2016
payment for his services while representing Francisco before the

CFI, and not as payment for his services in filing the appeal. Atty.
Macaraeg also claimed that, in any case, Francisco did not honor the
said pacto de retro sale as the possession of the lot was never
turned over to him.Atty. Macaraeg denied Francisco's accusation
that he neglected their case. He pointed out that to push through with
the appeal he even advanced some of the appeal expenses. While
he admitted that he failed to submit an appellants' brief, he averred
that the same was actually the fault of his clients who failed to
provide the necessary funds to file said brief.
On September 22, 1966, this Court referred the Complaint to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. From
March to November 1967, the Solicitor General conducted several
hearings.
In November 1972, the Office of the Solicitor General again
summoned the parties to appear before it. Notably, the return of the
subpoena served upon Atty. Macaraeg contained a notation that
Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg is now deceased.
Subsequently, this case was transferred to the IBP.
On October 19, 2011, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP came up with a Report and
Recommendation. The commissioner noted the long period of time
that the Complaint has been pending. Anent the merits of the
Complaint, Commissioner Cachapero ruled that Atty. Macaraeg
neglected the cause of his clients when he thrice moved for
extension of time within which to file his brief. However, he did not
file any, reasoning out that the non-filing was due to his clients'
failure to give him the necessary funds.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility for failing to file the appellants brief on behalf of his
client.
30
RULING: YES. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
A considerable length of time had elapsed from the time Atty.
Macaraeg' filed the notice of appeal on August 30, 1962 up to the
time he filed the third motion for extension of time to file brief on
October 5, 1963. Despite the passage of such time, however, Atty.
Macaraeg still failed to file the brief, which resulted in the dismissal of
his clients' appeal. Suffice it to state that a motion for extension to file
an appellant's brief carries with it the presumption that the applicantlawyer will file the pleading within the requested extended period.
Failure to dojo without any reasonable excuse violates the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
While Atty. Macaraeg attributed the non-filing of the brief to his
clients' failure to give the amount necessary for filing the same, he
should have, as aptly stated by Commissioner Cachapero, shown a
more mindful and caring attitude towards the cause of his clients by
advancing the payment. Besides, the facts of this case show that his
clients were making partial payments in their efforts to comply with
their obligation to him and were not deliberately refusing to pay him.
In fact, as claimed by Atty. Macaraeg himself, Francisco even
insisted that they enter into a pacto de retro sale in order for them to
fully pay him for the services he rendered in connection with their
civil case in the CFI. In fact, if Atty. Macaraeg truly believed that the
necessary funds from his clients were not forthcoming, he could
have excused himself from the case. The Code of Professional
Responsibility allows a counsel to withdraw his services for a good
cause, including the client's failure to comply with the retainer
agreement. Indeed, Atty. Macaraeg violated Rule 12.03.
Nevertheless, while the actuation of Atty. Macaraeg warrants the
imposition of a penalty, supervening circumstances call for the
dismissal of this administrative case. Records reveal that he was
already 60 years old when the hearings in this disbarment case were
held in 1967. Hence, he would have been 108 years old by this time.
3G AY 2015-2016
It is also noteworthy that the subpoena issued by the Solicitor

General in 1972 contains a handwritten note that Atty. Macaraeg had
already died. Thereafter, nothing more was heard from either party
despite notice. Under these circumstances, it is safe to assume that
the complainant had already lost interest in pursuing this disbarment
case against Atty. Macaraeg and that there is truth in the handwritten
notation in the return of the subpoena that Atty. Macaraeg had
already passed away.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Complaint for Disbarment
against Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg is hereby DISMISSED.
Attorneys fees need not be returned after counsels dismissal

due to loss of trust and confidence.
Dalupan v. Gacott | June 29, 2015
A.C. No. 5067 | Villarama, Jr., J.
Facts: The complainant engaged the legal service of respondent
where the latter charged an acceptance fee of P10,000. She paid the
respondent P5,000 as initial payment for his acceptance fee. During
the course of the retainer agreement, complainant asked respondent
to draft a Motion to Reduce Bail Bond but the latter refused as it was
beyond the scope of his retainer services.
The complainant paid the remaining balance of the acceptance fee
but the respondent refused to issue a receipt. It was alleged by
complainant that respondent neglected his duties as counsel and
failed to attend any of the hearings before the MTC prompting Judge
Dilig to issue an Order appointing a counsel de oficio to represent
her. Aggrieved, the complainant filed a complaint for disbarment
against respondent. The respondent denied all the allegations of the
complaint.
The Investigating Commissioner opined that respondent cannot be
held liable for abandonment or neglect of duty because it was the
complainant who discharged the respondent for loss of trust and
31
confidence. This was confirmed by the act of the complainant in

withdrawing all her records from the law office of the respondent.
Furthermore, the Investigating Commissioner said that absent
evidence showing that the respondent committed abandonment or
neglect of duty, the presumption of regularity should prevail in favor
of the respondent.
Although there was no evidence to support the claim of the
complainant that she paid the respondent the remaining balance of
P5,000 as acceptance fee and an appearance fee of P500, the
Investigating Commissioner gave credence to an Official Receipt
dated August 20, 1996 which proved that the complainant indeed
paid the respondent an amount of P5,000. However, the
Investigating Commissioner found that the respondent did not
perform any substantial legal work on behalf of the complainant. For
this reason, and in the interest of justice, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that the respondent return the amount
of P5,000 to the complainant. The said report and recommendation
was adopted in toto by the IBP Board of Governors.
The respondent filed this present petition which raises the sole issue
of whether he should return the payment of the attorneys fee to the
complainant in the amount of P5,000.
Issue: WoN the order to return the attorneys fee is proper.
Held: NO. A simple reading of the Official Receipt, the parties clearly
intended the payment of P5,000 to serve as acceptance fee of the
respondent, and not attorney's fee. Moreover, both parties expressly
claimed that they intended such payment as the acceptance fee of
the respondent. Absent any other evidence showing a contrary
intention of the parties, we find that the Investigating Commissioner
gravely erred in referring to the amount to be returned by the
respondent as attorney's fee.
3G AY 2015-2016
Firstly, the Investigating Commissioner seriously erred in referring to

the amount to be returned by the respondent as attorney's fee.
Relevantly, we agree with the respondent that there is a distinction
between attorney's fee and acceptance fee.
It is well-settled that attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary
and extraordinary concept. In its ordinary sense, attorney's fee
refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his
client for legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary
concept, attorney's fee is awarded by the court to the successful
litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages.
In this case, the Investigating Commissioner referred to the
attorney's fee in its ordinary concept.
On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed
by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because
once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from
handling cases of the opposing party based on the prohibition on
conflict of interest. Thus, he incurs an opportunity cost by merely
accepting the case of the client which is therefore indemnified by the
payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to
compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by
the nature and extent of the legal services rendered.
Since the Investigating Commissioner made an erroneous reference
to attorney's fee, he therefore mistakenly concluded that the
respondent should return the same as he did not perform any
substantial legal work on behalf of the complainant. The payment of
acceptance fee does not depend on the nature and extent of the
legal services rendered.
Secondly, the respondent did not commit any fault or negligence
which would entail the return of the acceptance fee. The retainer
agreement was willfully terminated by the complainant on the ground
of loss of trust and confidence. As held by the Investigating
Commissioner, the evidence on record shows that the respondent is
not liable for abandonment or neglect of duty. The.
32
Once a lawyer receives the acceptance fee for his legal services, he
is expected to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his
client's cause with diligence, care and devotion. In this case, the
complainant alleged that she requested the respondent to draft a
Motion to Reduce Bail Bond which was denied by the latter. She also
claimed that the respondent failed to attend any of the hearings
before the MTC. Thus, the complainant filed the present complaint
for disbarment on the ground of abandonment or neglect of duty. On
the other hand, the respondent denied the allegation that he failed to
draft the Motion to Reduce Bail Bond and submitted a copy of the
MTC Order granting the motion to reduce bail. He also justified his
failure to attend the hearings before the MTC to the failure of the
process server to provide him with a Notice of Hearing. Other than
her bare allegations, the complainant failed to present any evidence
to support her claim that the respondent committed abandonment or
neglect of duty. Absent any fault or negligence on the part of the
respondent, we see no legal basis for the order of the Investigating
Commissioner to return the attorney's fee (acceptance fee) of
P5,000.
Undue delay in court proceedings; misleading the court as to

the identity of his client.
VICTOR D. DE LOS SANTOS II, Complainant, v. ATTY. NESTOR

C. BARBOSA, Respondents.
A.C. No. 6681, June 17, 2015
FACTS: A complaint for Falsification of Public Document was filed by

Melba D. De Los Santos Rodis (Rodis) against her father, Ricardo D.
De Los Santos, Sr. (De Los Santos, Sr.) and Rosie P. Canaco
(Canaco). Rodis alleged that Canaco made untruthful statements in
the certificate of live birth of her son, Victor Canaco De Los Santos.
Canaco indicated in her son's certificate of live birth that she was
3G AY 2015-2016
married to De Los Santos, Sr. on September 1, 1974 in San

Fernando, Camarines Sur when no such marriage took place.
Respondent was the counsel de parte of Canaco.
On February 22, 2005, the complainant, Victor de los Santos II filed

a Petition for Disbarment with the Court, charging the respondent
with multiple gross violations of his oath as a lawyer and Canons of
Professional Ethics for unlawfully obstructing and delaying the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 111152 against Canaco.
The complainant alleged that the respondent's act of sending out the
letters dated May 24, 2004 to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, the National Census and Statistics Office, and St.
Lukes Hospita was criminally and maliciously done to delay,
impeded, obstruct, or otherwise frustrate the prosecution of Canaco,
who is the respondent's client and were made to suppress and
conceal the subject birth record to impair its availability, authenticity,
verity, or admissibility as evidence in Criminal Case No. 111152
before the MeTC. Compalinant further alleged that the acts of
respondent constituted multiple gross violations of his oath as a
lawyer, of the Canons of Professional Ethics, and of his duties as an
attorney under the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, the respondent argued that the complainant is a
disgruntled litigant whose series of cases, filed together with his
group, had all been dismissed and the respondent was the opposing
counsel in these dismissals. The respondent further asserted that
this case is a violation of the rule on forum shopping since it is the
tenth case pending on the same set of facts.
The Investigating Commissioner found the defendant guilty of gross

violation of his oath as a lawyer and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the said
33
findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the IBP

Commissioner's recommended penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year to six (6) months. Atty.
Barbosa moved to reconsider the BOG resolution. In a Resolution
dated December 11, 2008, the BOG denied the motion but modified
the respondent's suspension from the practice of law to a period of
only three months.
committed willful disobedience to a lawful order of the court intended

to avoid any further delay of the proceedings in the criminal case.
Misleading the Court as to the Identity of his Client
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is guilt of unduly delaying

the proceedings?
Under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers

owe candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. Particularly, Rule
10.01 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."
COURTS RULING:
A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. A lawyer's first
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice.
Unduly Delaying the Proceedings

Yes. Under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
lawyers should uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land,
and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is part of the machinery in the
administration of justice.A lawyer should not only help attain the
speedy, efficient, impartial, correct, and inexpensive adjudication of
cases and prompt satisfaction of final judgments, but should likewise
avoid any unethical or improper practices that may impede, obstruct,
or prevent the realization of a speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
In the present case, in disregard of the METC's intent to expedite the
proceedings through its Order of October 19, 2004, the respondent
sent letters to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the
National Census and Statistics Office, and St. Luke's Hospital to
prevent the prosecution from obtaining a certified true copy of the
birth certificate of Victor Canaco Delos Santos. The preliminary
conference of May 24, 2004 was precisely postponed to allow the
prosecution to secure this certified true copy. Thus, the respondent
3G AY 2015-2016
In this case, the respondent deliberately misled the MeTC, the

Commission and this Court into believing that Victor Canaco De Los
Santos (Canaco's son whose birth certificate is at issue in the
criminal case) and Victor P. De Los Santos (named in the
Information) are different persons.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Commissioner that the
difference in the middle initial is a mere typographical error on the
part of the City Prosecutor. The criminal case involved one and the
same Victor Canaco de los Santos whose birth certificate has been
at issue.
Members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission, that might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent
Atty. Nestor C. Barbosa GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.03 of
Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law,
34
effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY

WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
MCLE compliance requirement; Insulting and offensive

language against a fellow lawyer
A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O.
AILES, Respondent.
get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of

money from [you], x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong
polpol."
Furthermore, records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to
Terminate Services of Counsel in the complaint for damages, which
stated that Maximino "x x x has never done anything to protect the
interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his
representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from
charging enormous amount of professional fees and questionable
expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far only in
preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as
a Compromise Agreement, both of which he sent to Marcelo for his
signature.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: In the complaint for damages filed by Orlando against his

brother Marcelo (represented by Maximino) and several defendants,
Orlando provided data regarding his IBP dues payment and MCLE
Compliance. Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the
said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have already
reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not
2009, and that he should have finished his third Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the
second. This is one of the bases of this administrative complaint
against Orlando for being in violation of Bar Matter 1922.
On the other hand, upon receipt of a copy of the complaint for grave
threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando, Maximino
discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been
maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as
counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged
exorbitant fees, saying, among others: "x x x Better dismiss [your] hitrack lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable
[professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never
appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x
3G AY 2015-2016
The above is the other basis for this administrative complaint for
being in violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Respondents contention: Orlando denied the charges against him
and claimed that his late submission of the third MCLE compliance is
not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate
Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made
upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in default
in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the
allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo
was used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered
in good faith.
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by
Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded to unjust vexation, which
Orlando voluntarily pleaded guilty consisting in his act of vexing or
annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading
words to drop his lawyer over a case x x x.
IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case, which
was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.
35
ISSUE/s:
(1) W/N the transgression to the MCLE compliance requirement is a
ground for disbarment.
(2) W/N the insulting and offensive private messages of Orlando are
violative of the CPR.
HELD:
(1) NO. The failure to disclose the required information for MCLE
compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed against his
brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation
shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the
expunction thereof from the records.
(2) YES. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who

meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Consequently,
a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a
manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow
lawyers.
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR

provides:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
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Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use

language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon
the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the
right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.
The IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother
Marcelo as casual communications considering that they were
conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the
messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly
intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of
the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that
Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates
Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation of the
above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to
the crime of unjust vexation was an admission that he spoke ill,
insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial
decorum which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and

uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public
or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct
falls short of the standards imposed upon them. Thus, in this case, it
is inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to
Orlando's brother in private.
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial

proceedings, as in this case, constitutes unprofessional conduct
which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. While a lawyer is
entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
36
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O.

Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the entire
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his
professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
Failure of lawyer to deliver to his client the settlement proceeds

he received after entering into a Compromise Agreement
entered into without the latters consent
Jun B. Luna vs Atty, Dwight M. Galarrita
AC 10662, July 07, 2015
Leonen, J.
Facts: Luna filed an Affidavit-Complaint against his lawyer, Atty.
Galarrita before the IBP. He alleged that he retained Atty. Galarritas
legal services in filing a foreclosure complaint against Jose Calvario
who allegedly owed him P100,000 secured by a Real Estate
Mortage. After his formal offer of evidence, Atty. Galarrita opted to
enter into a settlement with the other party without informing him and
without delivering to him the settlement proceeds.
When Luna learned of the settlement, he wrote to the respondent
stating that the settlement is beyond what they discussed. Atty.
Galarrita replied that he entered into the settlement because he was
certain that it was better than winning the case and asked for
understanding since he had not received any appearance fee for
numerous hearings. Luna mentioned that delay in retainers fee
payments was due to Atty. Galarritas negligence in handling the
case. The respondent explained that the reason why the case was
archived was because he could not attend several hearings for lack
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of meal and transportation allowance going to Gumaca, Quezon, but

such fact is moot because the case was not dismissed by the court.
Luna received a letter from one of the heirs of Jose Calvario, Emma
Tayag, and again from Lutchiare Calvario, regarding the delivery of
title since they paid the P100,000 settlement amount.
In his answer, Atty. Glarrita prays for the dismissal of the disbarment
case, claiming that he entered into the Compromise Agreement by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney. Also, he added that under their
General Retainership Agreement, Luna shall pay him P4,000
monthly and after 4 years, the client owes him an unpaid balance of
P208,000. He argues for an application of the rule on retaining lien.
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Galarrita guilty of
violation Rule 16.03 of the CPR and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for 1 year. The IBP board of Governors
modified the recommendation, recommending the respondents
suspension from the practice of law for 6 months and ordered to
return the amount of P100,000.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for
entering into a Compromise Agreement without his clients consent,
then refusing to turn over the settlement proceeds received.
Held: Yes. Complainant Luna entrusted Atty. Galarrita with handling

the civil case involving a mortgaged land in Quezon Province,
however, without his consent, the latter settled the case with the
other party. There are compelling reasons to believe that Luna had
not given any authority to enter into a Compromise Agreement:
firstly, Luna was not a party to the Compromise Agreement despite
the fact that he was not abroad when the agreement was executed;
secondly, there was no indication that he had agreed to the amount
37
of P100,000; thirdly, he was not seasonable informed of the

execution of the Compromise Agreement.
Even if such authority was given, the SPA still cannot justify the
Compromise Agreement on February 14, 2006. The SPA was
executed on September 16, 2002 before the filing of the complaint.
The conclusion seems to be that the authority given was to enter into
a possible settlement during the preliminary conference or pre-trial.
Rule 16.03 under Canon 6 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility: A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over
the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client.
The respondent entered into the Compromise Agreement without the

clients consent and continued to act in bad fait by refusing to turn
over the P100,000 settlement amount received. It is not amiss to
state that he entered into the said agreement with the motivation to
hold on to it and pave the way for the payment of his attorneys fees.
In doing so, he violated the trust reposed in him by his client and
violated Rule 16.03.
The CPR allows the lawyer to apply the money retained to satisfy his
lawful fees. However. This provision assumes that the client agrees
with the lawyer as to the amount of the attorneys fees and as to the
application of the clients fund to pay his lawful fees and
disbursements.
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Atty. Galarrita is suspended from the practice of law for 2 years, with
a stern warning. He is ordered to return to the complainant Luna the
amount of P100,000 with legal interest of 6% per annum from
February 2006 until fully paid, without prejudice to the filing of a
collection case for retainers fee against complainant Luna.
Violations of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR which prohibits a
lawyer from representing conflicting interests and which enjoins a
lawyer to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with clients.
MABINI COLLEGES v. ATTY PAJARILLO
A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS: Mabini Colleges, Inc. had a Board of Trustees which was

divided into two opposing factions - the Adeva Group and the Lukban
Group(complainant) while the complainant appointed the respondent
as its corporate secretary.
On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an unnumbered Board

Resolution to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP),
Daet Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of the complainant. Lukban
Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application because the
Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were
allegedly not registered as stockholders in the Stock and Transfer
Book of the complainant, as members of the Board of Trustees. The
Lukban Group also alleged that the complainant was having financial
difficulties. In reply, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter
of complainant's financial capacity to pay the loan. RBP granted the
loan application in the amount of P200,000 (later on raised to
P400,000) which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the
properties of the complainant.
On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage.
Complainant then filed a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage with a
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent entered
his appearance as counsel for RBP.
38
On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present complaint for

disbarment against the respondent for allegedly representing
conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness, and
loyalty.
Respondents 3 defenses:
1. That complainants cannot represent the complainant in this
disbarment case because they were not duly authorized by the Board
of Directors to file the complaint.
2. That he is not covered by the prohibition on conflict of interest
because he merely served as the corporate secretary of complainant
and did not serve as its legal counsel.
3. That there was no conflict of interest when he represented RBP in
the case for annulment of mortgage because all the documents and
information related to the loan transaction between RBP and the
complainant were public records. Thus, respondent claimed that he
could not have taken advantage of his position as the mere corporate
secretary of the complainant.
Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation
finding respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for at least one year. The Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed such
findings.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests when he entered his appearance as counsel for RBP in the
case for annulment of mortgage filed by complainant against RBP.
HELD: Yes.
1. The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent was
compensated by complainant for his retained legal services is
supported by the evidence on record, the cash vouchers from 1994 to
2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent's former client. And
respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by his former
client against RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests since respondent failed to show any written
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consent of all concerned (particularly the complainant) given after a

full disclosure of the facts representing conflicting interests.
We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's interest
on the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant when he
sent a letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to assure the latter of the
financial capacity of the complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel
for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted
against the interest of the complainant, his former client.
Based on the principles of public policy and good taste, this prohibition
on representing conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to
represent a client from thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's
opponent applies equally even though during the continuance of the
employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the
attorney by the client. This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has
been held that an attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot
thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no
knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the
subsequent adverse employment. Thus, the nature and extent of the
information received by the lawyer from his client is irrelevant in
determining the existence of conflict of interest.
2. A complaint for disbarment is imbued with public interest which
allows for a liberal rule on legal standing. The complainants can
institute the complaint for disbarment even without authority from the
Board of Directors of the complainant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolutions of the IBP
Board of Governors imposing a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one year against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo
are hereby AFFIRMED.
39
A LAWYER SHOULD ALWAYS PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF HIS

CLIENTS
CELINA ANDRADA VS ATTY RODRIGO CERA
AC 10187, JULY 22, 2015 || BRION, J.
FACTS: Celina hired the services of Atty. Rodrigo Cera to represent
her in an annulment of marriage pending before the RTC of Baguio
City. She gave P3,000.00 to respondent for the processing and
issuance of her childrens birth certificates which were not registered
because her husband failed to accomplish the certificates. These
documents were needed in her case for annulment of marriage. She
also gave the amount of P10,000.00 as advance payment for the
hiring of a psychologist. When she asked from the NSO the release
of her childrens birth certificates, she was requested to provide the
receipt for the request. Knowing it was with respondent, she called
him up but she failed to get even the receipt number; respondent
assured her that the payment for the request had been made. When
she failed to get the receipt or receipt number, she requested
confirmation of payment with the NSO; thereat, she found out that
respondent never paid nor filed the applications for birth
certificates. Through her father Freddie J. Farres, she requested
surrender of the NSO receipt and return of the P10,000.00 she gave
to respondent; despite receipt, respondent failed to heed the demand
letter. Celina then filed an administrative case against Atty. Cera,
alleging deceitful, irresponsible and unprofessional conduct on the
part of the latter, resulting in the unwarranted delay of her case and
forcing her to file anew an annulment case against her
husband. Respondent did not appear in the mandatory conference
nor filed his answer to the complaint. In April, 2012, respondent
returned the amount of P17,000.00 to the complainant pursuant to a
compromise agreement in exchange for the dismissal of the case for
estafa she filed against respondent. He also promised to secure the
birth certificates of her children, an undertaking he has yet to fulfil.
In its report and recommendation, the IBP Commissioner
recommended the imposition of three years suspension from the
practice of law of respondent, upon a finding that he engaged in
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unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct against his

clients interest in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR, as well as
misappropriation of funds entrusted to him and failing to account and
return his clients money upon demand. The IBP Board of
Governors modified the recommended penalty to one year
suspension.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of the administrative
charge against him.
Ruling: YES. When a lawyer takes a case, he covenants that he will
exercise due diligence in protecting his clients rights. Failure to
exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed by
his client, and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to
the legal profession, the courts, and society.
It is apparent that the respondent did not exert any effort on his
clients case and completely reneged on the obligations due his
client. The respondent lied to the complainant that he had made the
necessary application and payment with the NSO for the issuance of
the birth certificates of the complainants children. Despite the
complainants repeated requests, the respondent failed to comply
with their agreement to provide a psychologist to administer the
necessary psychological tests, thus causing further delay in the
proceedings of the complainants annulment case.
Clearly, these actions show the respondents negligence and lack of
zeal in handling the complainants case, for which he should be
made administratively liable. He violated not only Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 of the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, but also Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18 of the same Code, which provides that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Moreover, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer
when he unlawfully withheld the complainants money. The money
given to the respondent was never used for its intended purposes, as
40
could be gleaned from the NSOs non-issuance of birth certificates of

the complainants children, and by the non-administration of
psychological tests on the complainant and her children. These
omissions confirm the presumption that the respondent
misappropriated the funds of his client, in violation of Canon 16 of
the CPR that holds a lawyer in trust of all moneys and properties of
his client that may come into his possession. The respondent,
likewise, violated Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 (which provides that a
lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand) when he failed to return the complainants money
upon demand. We note that it was only after a year that the
respondent, under threat of a criminal case filed against him,
returned the complainants money. The respondents restitution
cannot serve to mitigate his administrative liability as he returned the
complainants money not voluntarily but for fear of possible criminal
liability.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rodrigo Cera is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
ABUSE OF COURT PROCESSES IN VIOLATIONS OF CANON 10

AND 12 OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
PATROCINIA H. SALABAO v. ATTY. ANDRES C. VILLARUEL,

JR.
A.C. No. 8084 August 24, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS: Complainant narrates that in 1995 she filed a case against
Elmer Lumberio for his deceitful or fraudulent conduct of taking her
precious real property situated in Taguig City. After hearing, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162, Pasig City issued its
resolution in her favor in 2002.
3G AY 2015-2016
Respondent then entered the picture as counsel for Lumberio. From

then on, Complainant complained that Respondent had made her
suffer because of his abuse of processes and disregard for her rights
as a litigant.In 2002, the Regional Trial Court Pasig City which tried
Civil Case No. 65147 issued its resolution in her favor. In order to
delay the case, Respondent brought the case on appeal to the Court
of Appeals under CA-GR CV No. 76360. The Court of Appeals
decided in her favor on January 13, 2004 but Respondent again filed
an appeal before the Supreme Court under GR No. 167413.
Lumberio lost and the case became final and executory.
Undeterred, respondent tried to defer the execution of the decision of
the RTC, by bringing to the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment under CA-GR SP No. 97564. When
rebuffed, he again appealed to the Supreme Court under GR No.
181243 sans a clear or new arguments other than what he had
presented before the Court of Appeals.Still, Respondent filed a
Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the 29 November 2007 Order
of the RTC before the Court of Appeals under CA-GR SP No.
101992 which was however dismissed. From hereon, there was not
stopping the Respondent. Once again he filed a new complaint
before the RTC of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64 under Civil Case No.
08-0666-M. Apart from this, Respondent filed several Motion,
Inhibition and Contempt that were meant to delay the resolution of
the case. He likewise filed an administrative case against Judge
Briccio Ygaa of RTC Branch 153, Taguig City.
Complainant then complained that Respondent had done more than

enough to suppress her rights as a winning litigant and filed this case
for abuse of processes pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of
Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).Respondent, for his part, denied the accusation
and clarified that the several pleadings he had filed had centered on
the legality of the court's decision ordering the cancellation of the title
41
of Lumberio in such ordinary proceeding for cancellation of the title.

To his mind, the said ordinary proceeding for cancellation of title
before the RTC Branch 153, Taguig City was void because the law
vests upon the government through the Solicitor General the power
to initiate a reversion case if there is such a ground to cancel the title
issued by the Land Management Bureau in favor of Lumberio.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner
found at respondent "relentlessly filed petitions and appeals in order
to exhaust all possible remedies to obtain relief for his client"5 which
he considered as tantamount to "abusive and a spiteful effort to
delay the execution of Judgment." He thus recommended that
respondent be meted out the penalty of suspension for four
months.In its Resolution the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Issue: Should respondent be held administratively liable?
Ruling: YES. While it is true that lawyers owe "entire devotion" to
the cause of their clients, it cannot be emphasized enough that their
first and primary duty is "not to the client but to the administration of
justice." Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that "A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice." Thus, in
the use of Court processes, the lawyer's zeal to win must be
tempered by the paramount consideration that justice be done to all
parties involved, and the lawyer for the losing party should not stand
in the way of the execution of a valid judgment. This is a fundamental
principle in legal ethics and professional responsibility that has
iterations in various forms:
Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court:
Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney: xxxx
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as
3G AY 2015-2016
appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to

be honestly debatable under the law;
xxxx
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance
of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any
corrupt motive or interest; (Emphasis supplied)
Code of Professional Responsibility:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall
not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the
same cause.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes. (Emphasis
supplied)
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in
the administration of justice, any act of a lawyer that obstructs,
perverts, or impedes the administration of justice constitutes
misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.
In this case, the judgment in favor of complainant had become final
and executory by July 27, 2005. Respondent however proceeded to
file no less than twelve (12) motions and cases in various courts
subsequent to the Entry of Judgment.From the nature and sheer
number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that respondent's
intention was to delay the execution of the final judgment.In epitome,
to sustain petitioner's insinuation of extrinsic fraud is to make a
42
mockery of Our judicial system. We take exception to the unjustified

delay in the enforcement of the RTC Decision dated 31 July 2002
which has long become final and executory. This is obviously a
spiteful ploy to deprive respondent of the fruits of her victory.It is
quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial
process by abusing Court processes, employing dilatory tactics to
frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning ignorance of
Ms duties as an officer of the court. He has breached his sworn duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and
violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g) of the
Rules of Court. In so doing, he is administratively liable for his
actions.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Andres C.
Villaruel, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer's
Oath and Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a
period of eighteen (18) months.
GROSS MISCONDUCT RESULTING TO INEXCUSABLE DELAY
OF CLIENTS CAUSE
Mary Ann T. Flores, Complainant, vs. Atty. Jovencio LL. Mayor, Jr.,
Respondent
A.C. NO. 7314, August 25, 2015
Per Curiam
FACTS: Jose Roberto Flores, herein complainants husband, filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against JMJB International Services,
Inc. before the NLRC. Flores case was raffled to respondent Labor
Arbiter Mayor Jr. Respondent ruled that there was no illegal
dismissal as Flores voluntarily resigned from employment. Flores
appealed the case to the NLRC, but the appeal was dismissed for
having filed out of time. Flores thereafter elevated the case to the CA
3G AY 2015-2016
and the latter reversed the ruling of the NLRC finding that the appeal
was timely filed. The CA declared the NLRC ruling null and void and
granted monetary award to Flores. Consequently, counsel of Flores
then filed a motion for execution of the CAs decision. Counsel of
Flores received from the CA a Notice of Transmittal of Records of
Case addressed to the Clerk of Court of the NLRC. As respondent
was not acting on the Motion for Execution, the counsel of Flores
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation praying that the motion be
resolved with dispatch. Flores counsel subsequently learned that the
records of the case were still being requested from the Records
Section of the NLRC. The Records Officer of the NLRC likewise
disclosed that case records had been sent for archiving and were
difficult to retrieve. Two years after this reception of information,
respondent Mayor, Jr. finally issued a Writ of Execution against
JMJB International Services, Inc. By that time, the corporation had
not yet been dissolved, but had already amended its name to F.O.
Maidin International Services, Inc. This amendment prompted the
counsel of Flores to file a Motion to Amend Writ of Execution.
Respondent, however, refused to act on the motion, reasoning that
F.O. Maidin International Services, Inc. was not a party to the case.
Accordingly, complainant filed an administrative case against
respondent, citing that the latter's act of archiving the records of the
labor case and refusal to amend the Writ of Execution constituted a
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and other ethical standards. IBP Commisioner
recommended that respondent be disbarred. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and affirmed IBP Commisioners
recommendation but modified the penalty of disbarment to
suspension for 3 years. Respondent moved to reconsider, but the
IBP Board of Governors denied the same and instead reinstated the
penalty of disbarment.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and other
ethical standards.
HELD: YES. Respondent was clearly neglectful of duty and
ignorant of the law in failing to immediately act on the Motion
43
for Execution, as well as his refusal to amend the Writ of

Execution despite having been informed of the amendment of
the name - but not the dissolution of the corporation against
which the writ was issued.
severe penalty. In light of respondent's previous suspension from the

practice of law in an earlier administrative case as above-mentioned,
the recommendation of the IBP Board to disbar respondent is only
proper.
Respondents justification cannot be countenanced, as it was

through his fault that the records of the case were lost. That he
archived the case records at the NLRC Records Section, not on the
basis of official or sanctioned guidelines but only because it was the
common practice in his office, reflects his lack of due diligence and
care in the custody of official documents.
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE

MCLE
While delay in the processing of documents normally occurs, it was

inexcusable and out of the ordinary for respondent to allow a period
of more than two years to lapse before acting on the motion. This
omission amounts to gross misconduct as the unnecessary delay
has caused prejudice to complainant. Respondent also erroneously
interprets jurisprudence when he insists that the writ could not have
been issued against F.O. Maidin International Services, Inc.,
because it was not a party to the case. His argument contravenes
the pronouncement of the Court in Republic Planters Bank v. Court
of Appeals, in which it said that "a change in the corporate name
does not make a new corporation, and whether effected by special
act or under general law, has no effect on the identity of the
corporation, or on its property, rights, or liabilities."
FACTS: This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A.

Adaza for his failure to comply with the requirements of the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No.
850.
As a Labor Arbiter, respondent is a public officer who must at all

times be accountable to the people, whom he must serve with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The unjustified
delay in his actions and his failure to act according to law constituted
a breach of his accountability not only to complainant, but also to the
public in general. With respect to the imposable penalty, herein
respondent was already suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months in another case, Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr., in
which he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of
the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. For
that offense, he was warned that the commission of the same or a
similar offense in the future would result in the imposition of a more
3G AY 2015-2016
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A.

ADAZA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
CARPIO, J.
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado called the

attention of this Court to the practice of respondent of indicating
"MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings
filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for
Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes,
Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the
Court the rollo of the case together with the MCLE Governing
Board's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation. In its Evaluation,
Report and Recommendation, the MCLE Governing Board, through
retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, MCLE
Chairman, informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption
for the First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001
to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively, on
the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter
No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14
44
January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted
that respondent neither applied for exemption nor complied with the
Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
In his Compliance and Comment, respondent alleged that he did not
receive a copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated
that he was wondering why his application for exemption could not
be granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a formal denial
of his application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and
that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of
complainant who belonged to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the
law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family.
Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin
and had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the province.
He further alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in
Camiguin except for himself. Respondent further claimed that he had
written five books. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice
for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from MCLE
compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law
while complying with the MCLE requirements.
The Office of the Bar Confidant reported that respondent failed to
meet the requirements necessary for the exemption. The OBC found
that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer.
The OBC stated that respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the
pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records and
considered invalid. The OBC recommended that respondent be
declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of noncompliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further
recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for
six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC
also recommended that respondent be directed to comply with the
requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing Board.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for his

failure to comply with the MCLE requirements.
HELD: YES. Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to
undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that throughout their
career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the
ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of
law."
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to
comply with the four compliance periods. The records also showed
that respondent filed an application for exemption only on 5 January
2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board, respondent's
application for exemption covered the First and Second Compliance
Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third
Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied
respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the
ground that the application did not meet the requirements of
expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing
to comply with Bar Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for
the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the
compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his
application for exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter
dated 7 February 2012 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on
his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to
send it to the MCLE Office. He did not comply with the Fourth
Compliance Period.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE
Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies for the
First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third,
and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished
proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards
Complying with the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed
3G AY 2015-2016
45
that his application for exemption, filed after the compliance periods,
would be granted. He purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up
the status of his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to
send the letter.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on
respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009, it took
the office three years to inform respondent of the denial of his
application. However, after he had been informed of the denial of his
application for exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a
motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still asking, his time to
satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent
indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a
pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the
MCLE Office.
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and
disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office warrant his declaration
as a delinquent member of the IBP.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to
promptly act on matters that require its immediate attention, such as
but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to communicate its
action to the interested parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted
from MCLE compliance as the matter had already been denied with
finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and SUSPEND him from the
practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with
the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the
required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
3G AY 2015-2016
Violation of the Notarial Rules and the Code of Professional

Responsibility
Sappayani vs. Gasmen
AC No. 7073, September 1, 2015
FACTS: In his Complaint-Affidavit, Sappayani alleged that Atty.
Gasmen notarized documents which he purportedly executed,
particularly, a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one
Newtrade Goodwill Corporation (NGC) through Romeo N. Maravillas
(Maravillas) and an Application for Loan and Promissory Note (loan
application) with Air Materiel Wing Savings and Loan Association,
Inc. (AMWSLAI). The SPA, which was notarized by Atty. Gasmen on
March 29, 2000, authorized NGC through Maravillas to complete the
loan application with AMWSLAI and thereafter, receive its proceeds.
Thus, by virtue of said notarized documents, AMWSLAI released to
Maravillas, as representative of NGC, a loan amounting to
P157,301.43.
However, Sappayani denied executing said documents, claiming that

his signature found on the SPA was forged as he did not know
Maravillas. Neither did he authorize Maravillas to enter into any
transaction on his behalf. Sappayani added that it was physically
impossible for him to personally appear before Atty. Gasmen and
execute the documents at the AMWSLAI office in Quezon City, as he
was then training as a new recruit at the Bureau of Fire Protection at
General Santos City.
After more than two (2) years, Atty. Gasmen filed his Comment
dated May 26, 2008 and claimed, among others, that the notarization
of the SPA and loan application was done only after the release of
the proceeds of the loan to Maravillas, who then released the same
to one Zenaida C. Razo (Razo), the marketing representative of
NGC for Region V. According to Atty. Gasmen, Razo was also the
one responsible for taking the purported loan of Sappayani, the
proceeds of which the latter never received. Moreover, he asserted
46
that prior to notarization, Sappayani's signature on the SPA was

compared with his signature specimen cards with AMWSLAI, of
which he was an honorary member. Finally, he claimed that by
practice, notarization of loan applications at AMWSLAI was done "on
a ministerial basis" albeit with "proper safeguards," and that
documents were notarized only after the loan is released and the
AMWSLAI President has approved the same. As such, notarization
was merely a way of completing the loan documentation
requirements of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP correctly found Atty. Gasmen liable
for violation of the Notarial Rules and the CPR.
HELD: The Court notes that both the SPA and the loan application
subject of this case were notarized in 2000, during which Act No.
2711 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Title IV, Chapter
11, otherwise known as the "Notarial Law," in addition to Act No.
2103, governed the rules on notaries public.
Section 1 (a) of Act No. 2103 provides:
Section 1. x x x
(a) The acknowledgement shall be made before a notary public or an

officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place where
the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgement shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free
act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if
3G AY 2015-2016
he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so

state.
One of the obligations of a notary public is to authenticate

documents acknowledged before him, certifying the truth thereof
under his seal of office. When acknowledging a document, it is
required that the person who signed or executed the same, appears
in person before the notary public and represents to the latter that
the signature on the document was voluntarily affixed by him for the
purposes stated in the document, declaring the same as his free and
voluntary act and deed. Thereafter, the notary public affixes his
notarial seal on the instrument which certifies the due execution of
the document, and resultantly, converts a private document into a
public document which on its face, is entitled to full faith and
credit.clawrednad
In the discharge of his powers and duties, the notary public's

certification is one impressed with public interest, accuracy and
fidelity such that he owes it to the public to notarize only when the
person who signs the document is the same person who executed it
and personally appeared before him to attest to his knowledge of the
contents stated therein. Thus, the Court has repeatedly emphasized
the necessity of an affiant's personal appearance and makes the
failure to observe such rule punishable. In fact, such necessity has
been further stressed in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on
Notarial Practice of 2004, which provides:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
47
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of

the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
In this case, Atty. Gasmen claimed that before the SPA and loan
application were notarized, the proceeds were already released to
NGC by AMWSLAI, thus, dispensing with the need for notarization.
Moreover, he insisted that the notarization of said documents was
merely done on a ministerial basis, with proper safeguards, and that
it cannot be expected of him to require the personal appearance of
every loan applicant considering the hundreds of loan applications
brought to him for signing.
subject documents, he engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or

deceitful conduct which makes him liable as well for violation of the
pertinent rules of the CPR, particularly Rule 1.01, Canon 1 which
provides:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, or routinary act. It is

impressed with substantial public interest, and only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as such. It is not a purposeless
ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by parties who
are willing to pay fees for notarization.23 Moreover, notarization of a
private document, such as an SPA in this case, converts the
document into a public one which, on its face, is given full faith and
credit. Thus, the failure of Atty. Gasmen to observe the utmost care
in the performance of his duties caused not only damage to those
directly affected by the notarized document, but also undermined the
integrity of a notary public and tainted the function of notarization.
As to the proper penalty, the Court finds the need to modify the
penalty recommended by the IBP. The Court has ruled that a notary
public who fails to discharge his duties as such is meted out the
following penalties: (7) revocation of notarial commission; (2)
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public; and (3)
suspension from the practice of law - the terms of which vary based
on the circumstances of each case. In this case, while the IBP
Commissioner found the absence of bad faith and considered Atty.
Gasmen as a first time offender, the Court finds that the penalties of
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for a
period of two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year are proper.26 On this score, the Court observes that
Atty. Gasmen did not deny notarizing the documents without the
presence of Sappayani and indirectly admitted doing the same with
other similar documents and affiants. Thus, such practice, he
evidently countenanced fraud.
Further, as a lawyer, Atty. Gasmen is expected at all times to uphold

the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any
act or omission which might erode the trust and confidence reposed
by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. By notarizing the
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Renato G. Gasmen

GUILTY of violation of the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from
the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his incumbent
commission as a notary public; and PROHIBITS him from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective
The Court is not persuaded.
3G AY 2015-2016
48
immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or

similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
DECEITFUL CONDUCT AND VIOLATING THE LAWYERS OATH

Intestate Estate of Jose Uy, and Administrator Wilson Uy v. Atty.
Pacifico Maghari III
A.C. NO. 10525, September 01, 2015
LEONEN, J.:
Facts: On February 18, 1997, Lilia Hofilea (Hofilea) filed a Petition
before the Bacolod City Regional Trial Court praying that she be
designated administratrix of the estate of her common-law partner,
the deceased Jose Uy, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-241.
Hofilea was initially designated administratrix. However, a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order designating Hofilea as
administratix was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy's children, on
behalf of Jose Uy's spouse and other children. In its Order dated
June 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court designated Wilson Uy as
administrator of Jose Uy's estate.
Subsequently, Hofilea's claims in the settlement of Jose Uy's estate
were granted. Hence, she filed a Motion for Execution dated
September 14, 2007.
In Spec. Proc No. 97-241 and in other proceedings arising from the
conflicting claims to Jose Uy's estate, Hofilea was represented by
her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-El (Atty. Natu-el).
There appears to have been conflicts between Wilson Uy and the
other heirs of Jose Uy. In the course of the proceedings, Wilson Uy
prayed that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy
as she was alleged to have been the treasurer of several businesses
owned by Jose Uy. In its Order dated April 20, 2010, the Regional
Trial Court granted Wilson Uy's Motion that a Subpoena ad
Testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy.
3G AY 2015-2016
Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel, filed a

Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with Alternative Motion
to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H. Uy.
In signing the motion, Atty. Maghari indicated the same professional
details, aside from his name, as those found in Atty. Natu-els motion
for a Subpoena ad Testificandum; the IBP O.R. number, PTR
Number, Roll Number, and MCLE Compliance Number were all
copied with slight additions.
On November 9, 2010, Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena
Uy's Motion to Quash.
Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply to Wilson Uy's
Opposition. Maghari then indicated a different set of IBP O.R., PTR
and MCLE numbers, whilst keeping the same Bar Roll Number
previously used.
The Regional Trial Court subsequently denied Magdalena Uy's
Motion to Quash. Thereafter, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 15, 2011. In signing this
Motion, Maghari indicated a wholly different set of IBP O.R., PTR,
Roll, and MCLE numbers in the professional details.
As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, Maghari filed for
Magdalena Uy a Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum dated
March 8, 2012. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated once again,
a completely different set of professional details as before.
At this point, Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that based on the details
indicated in the March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari appeared to have
only recently passed the bar examinations. This prompted Wilson Uy
to check the records of Spec. Proc No. 97-241. Upon doing so, he
learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the
professional details indicated in the pleadings he has signed and has
been copying the professional details of Atty. Natu-El.
Wilson Uy then filed a Motion to declare Magdalena Uy in indirect
contempt (as by then she had still not complied with the Subpoena
ad Testificandum) and to require Maghari to explain why he had
49
been usurping the professional details of another lawyer. The

Regional Trial Court declined from citing Magdalena Uy in contempt
as no verified petition asking that she be so cited had been filed.
Wilson Uy filed before this court the present Complaint for
disbarment. Pointing to Maghari's act of repeatedly a changing and
using another lawyer's professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that
Maghari violated the Lawyer's Oath and acted in a deceitful manner.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Maghari engaged in unethical conduct.
Ruling: Yes. Atty. Maghari III engaged in deceitful conduct violating

not only the lawyers oath, but every single chapter of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides for deceit as a
ground for disbarment. The Lawyer's Oath entails commitment to,
among others, obeying laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood,
conducting one's self as a lawyer to the best of one's capacity, and
acting with fidelity to both court and client.
Respondent does not deny the existence of the errant entries
indicated by complainant. However, he insists that he did not incur
disciplinary liability. He claims that these entries were mere
overlooked errors. He attempts to diminish the significance of the
dubious entries and instead ascribes ill motive to complainant. He
faults complainant for "nitpicking" and calls him a "sore loser" and a
"disgruntled litigant" who is merely "making a mountain out of a
molehill" and is predisposed to "fault-finding. He even provides his
supposedly correct professional details for the satisfaction of the
complainant.
Respondent's avowals, protestations, and ad hominem attacks on
complainant fail to impress.
The duplicitous entries speak for themselves. The errors are

manifest and respondent admits their existence. No amount of
feigned ignorance and ad hominem attacks on complainant can
negate the gravity of respondent's actions. His insolent and mocking
violation of statutory and regulatory requirements is a violation of his
duties to society and to courts. His swiping of another lawyer's
information is a violation of his duties to the legal profession. The
unnecessary risks that he foiled on his client as a possible result of
deficiently signed pleadings violate his duties to his client. Thus,
respondent did not only act in a deceitful manner and violate the
solemn oath he took to be admitted into the legal profession; he also
violated every single chapter of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
LAWYERS SIGNATURE; PURPOSE:
As per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, A counsel's signature
on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a mere means
for identification. Through his or her signature, a party's counsel
makes a positive declaration. In certifying through his or her
signature that he or she has read the pleading, that there is ground
to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts
his or her competence, credibility, and ethics. Signing a pleading is
such a solemn component of legal practice that this court has taken
occasion to decry the delegation of this task to non-lawyers as a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, under Canon
9.01: A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading that
failure to comply with this requirement reduces a pleading to a mere
scrap of paper totally bereft of legal effect. Thus, faithful compliance
with this requirement is not only a matter of satisfying a duty to a
court but is as much a matter of fidelity to one's client. A deficiency in
this respect can be fatal to a client's cause.
IBP O.R. NUMBER, PROFESSIONAL TAX RECEIPT NUMBER,
AND BAR ROLL NUMBER; PURPOSE:
3G AY 2015-2016
50
The inclusion of a counsel's Roll of Attorneys number, professional

tax receipt number, and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
receipt (or lifetime membership) number is intended to preserve and
protect the integrity of legal practice. They seek to ensure that only
those who have satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to
engage in it. With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can readily
verify if a person purporting to be a lawyer has, in fact, been
admitted to the Philippine bar. With the professional tax receipt
number, they can verify if the same person is qualified to engage in a
profession in the place where he or she principally discharges his or
her functions. With the IBP receipt number, they can ascertain if the
same person remains in good standing as a lawyer. These pieces of
information, in the words of Galicto v. Aquino III, "protect the public
from bogus lawyers." Paying professional taxes (and the receipt that
proves this payment) is likewise compliance with a revenue
mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to local government
units.
MCLE NUMBER; PURPOSE:
The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption
from) Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to
ensure that legal practice is reserved only for those who have
complied with the recognized mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast with
law and jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of the profession[,]
and enhancing] the standards of the practice of law."
ADDRESS AND CONTACT DETAILS; PURPOSE:
Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact details is
designed to facilitate the dispensation of justice. These pieces of
information aid in the service of court processes, enhance
compliance with the requisites of due process, and facilitate better
representation of a client's cause. There have been in the past when,
because of failure to inform the court of the change of address,
litigations were delayed. And this, not to speak of inconvenience
caused the other parties and the court. Worse still, litigants have lost
their cases in court because of such negligence on the part of their
counsel. It is painful enough for a litigant to surfer a setback in a
3G AY 2015-2016
legal battle. It is doubly painful if defeat is occasioned by his

attorney's failure to receive notice because the latter has changed
the place of his law office without giving the proper notice therefor.
These requirements are not mere frivolities. They are not mere
markings on a piece of paper. To willfully disregard them is, thus, to
willfully disregard mechanisms put in place to facilitate integrity,
competence, and credibility in legal practice; it is to betray apathy for
the ideals of the legal profession and demonstrates how one is
wanting of the standards for admission to and continuing inclusion in
the bar. Worse, to not only willfully disregard them but to feign
compliance only, in truth, to make a mockery of them reveals a dire,
wretched, and utter lack of respect for the profession that one
brandishes.
Facts proving Intent to Deceive:
Respondent acted deliberately. It is impossible that the erroneous
details he indicated on his pleadings are products of mere
inadvertence.
To begin with, details were copied from a pleading submitted by
another lawyer. These details somehow found their way into
respondent's own pleadings. Certainly, these details could not have
written themselves, let alone transfer themselves from a pleading
prepared by one lawyer to those prepared by another. Someone
must have actually performed the act of copying and transferring;
that is, someone must have intended to copy and transfer them.
Moreover, the person responsible for this could have only been
respondent or someone acting under his instructions; the pleadings
on which they were transferred are, after all, respondent's pleadings.
Second, these details were not merely copied, they were modified.
"B.C." was added to the IBP official receipt and professional tax
receipt numbers copied from Atty. Natu-el. The facts of modification
and addition show active human intervention to make something
more out of markings that could otherwise have simply been
reproduced.
51
Third, in subsequent pleadings, some details copied from Atty. Natuel were discarded while some were retained. The December 8, 2010
Reply still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number and MCLE
compliance number, but no longer his IBP official receipt number and
professional tax receipt number. The July 15, 2011 Motion for
Reconsideration only bore Atty. Natu-el's MCLE compliance number.
This gradual act of segregating informationdiscarding some while
retaining others, and retaining less over timereveals that the
author of these markings must have engaged in a willful exercise
that filtered those that were to be discarded from those that were to
be retained.
Respondent is rightly considered the author of these acts. Any claim
that the error was committed by a secretary is inconsequential.
In his Comment, respondent provided what are supposedly his
correct professional details. We emphasize, however, that he failed
to attach to his Comment copies of the pertinent official receipts,
certifications, and other supporting documents. All that he relies on is
a self-serving recital of numbers and dates. None but respondent,
himself, was in a better position to produce the documents that could
prove his claims. His failure to do so is, at the very least, suspicious.
It can very well mean that they do not exist, or that he willfully
desisted from producing them. The latter would be more damaging to
respondent, as it calls into operation the basic presumption "[t]hat
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced."
In any case, even assuming that the details provided by respondent
in his Comment are correct, it still remains that he (1) used a false
IBP official receipt number, professional tax receipt number, Roll of
Attorneys number, and MCLE compliance number a total of seven
(7) times; and (2) used another lawyer's details seven (7) times.
It is unsettling that respondent engaged in the mockery and ridicule
that he did of the very same badgeshis place in the Roll of
Attorneys, his membership in the Integrated Bar, his recognition as a
practicing professional, his continuing training and competencethat
are emblematic of his being a lawyer. Seeing as how he manifested
such contempt for these badges, we find that there is every reason
3G AY 2015-2016
for preventing him, at least temporarily, from engaging in the

profession these badges signify.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III, having
clearly violated his Lawyer's Oath and the Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years.
DISBARMENT; MOCKERY OUT OF THE INSTITUTION OF

MARRIAGE
Atty. Roy Ecraela vs Atty. Ian Raymond Pangalanan
A.C No. 10676, September 8, 2015
FACTS: Complainant and respondent were best friends and both

graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law
in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with
several of their classmates. Respondent was formerly married to
Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children.
Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a
series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried
women between the years 1990 to 2007. Aside from the illicit
relations, rrespondent as a lawyer of Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel, represented the interest of Manila International
Airport Authority against Kendrick Devt Corporation. However,
despite being a public officer and a government counsel, respondent
conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and
assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAAs case, and, in
effect, that of the Philippine Government. In return for his earnest
efforts in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was allege dly
rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL by Atty. Espejo. In connection
with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that
respondent was summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning rampant
52
faking of land titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation

of the alleged spurious land titles of KDC. It appears from the
documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution finding probable cause against respondent, and an
Information was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation
of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019. Complainant also
claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator where
respondent induced his male students to engage in nocturnal
preoccupations and entertained the romantic gestures of his female
students in exchange for passing grades.
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence

the grounds by which respondent has been found committing gross
immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs.
In his undated Answer, respondent opted not to present any counterstatement of facts in support of his defense. Instead, respondent
simply argued that the petition suffers from procedural and
substantive infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to substantiate
the allegations or charges against him.
In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on

several adulterous and illicitrelations with both married and
unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007,including
complainants own wife. Through documentary evidences in the
form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of
the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish
respondents illicit relations with DDD and CCC by preponderant
evidence.
The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution disbarring

respondent and striking off his name in the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE: Whether respondent committed gross immoral conduct

which would warrant his disbarment
HELD: Yes. Good moral character is not only required for admission
to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain ones good
standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. The Court has
consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings
against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence,
and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the
evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine
mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.
3G AY 2015-2016
This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of

lawyers who were proven to havenot only failed to retain good moral
character in their professional and personal lives, but have also
made a mockery of the institution of marriage by maintaining illicit
affairs.
Aside from respondents illicit relations, We agree with

Commissioner Villadolids findings that respondent violated Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making
a mockery out of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of
his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and
refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he
lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the
bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.
53
ALLEGED DECEITFUL ACTS AGAINST CLIENT; NEGLIGENCE IN

HANDLING THE CASE
Felicisima Mendoza Vda de Robosa vs. Atty Juan Mendoza and

Atty. Eusebio Navarro
AC No. 6056, September 9, 2015
Villarama, J.
FACTS: Eladio Mendoza applied for original registration of two
parcels of land situated in Calamba, Laguna before the CENRO and
LMB. While his application was pending, Eladio died, leaving all his
children as heirs to his estate. The children pursued the application
and executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of herein
complainant. Their relative (cousin of complainant), Atty. Mendoza,
prepared and notarized the said SPA. They also engaged the latters
services as their counsel in the proceedings before the CENRO and
LMB.
On February 20, 1993, upon the behest of Atty. Mendoza, Felicisima
signed a Contract for Service, wherein it was stipulated that should a
favorable judgment be rendered by the CENRO or LMB, Felicisima
shall convey to Atty. Mendoza 1/5 of the lands subject of the
application or 1/5 of the proceeds should the same property be sold.
The CENRO and the LMB proceedings resulted in the dismissal of
the application for Lot No. 2489 and a partial grant for Lot No 3771.
One-third of the latter parcel of land was registered in the name of
the Mendoza heirs and was later on sold to Greenfield Corporation
for P7, 120,800.00.
Subsequently, Atty. Mendoza filed a Complaint (Civil Case No. T1080) before the RTC against Felicisima and her siblings, claiming
that except for the amount of P40, 000.00, the latter refused to pay
his attorneys fees equivalent to 1/5 of the proceeds of the sale of the
land as stipulated in the Contract for Service. In their Answer with
Counterclaim, Felicisima and her siblings vehemently denied the
existence and authenticity of the Contract of Service, adding that it
3G AY 2015-2016
did not reflect the true intention of the parties. They also asserted
that based on quantum meruit, Atty. Mendoza is not entitled to the
claimed attorneys fees because they lost in one case and he failed
to accomplish the titling of the land awarded to them, which would
have enhanced the property. In this Civil Case, Felicisima and her
siblings engaged the services of Atty. Navarro as their counsel.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Atty. Mendoza, stating that
Felicisima failed to substantiate her claim that she did not enter into
a contingency contract for legal services with Atty. Mendoza. They
were ordered to pay Atty. Mendoza P1, 258,000.00, representing
attorneys fees, as well as cost of suit. Atty. Navarro then filed a
Notice of Appeal on behalf of Felicisima. However, Atty. Mendoza
moved for an execution pending appeal with the RTC and since no
opposition was filed, the RTC granted the said motion and issued a
writ of execution, resulting in the levy and eventual transfer of
Felicisimas properties in favor of Atty. Mendoza as the highest
bidder in an execution sale. The CA ordered Felicisima to file an
appellants brief but Atty. Navarro failed to file the same within the
reglementary period, consequently leading to its dismissal for noncompliance with Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
On June 3, 2003, Felicisima filed a complaint-affidavit for disbarment
before the Supreme Court against Atty. Mendoza for allegedly
deceiving her into signing a Contract for Service by taking advantage
of her illiteracy and against Atty. Navarro for dereliction of duty in
handling her case before the CA, causing her properties to be levied
and sold at public auction.
In his Comment, Atty. Mendoza avers that he has been a lawyer
since 1954 and retired sometime in 1983 due to partial disability. He
went back to practicing his profession in 1996 on a selective basis
due to his disability but completely stopped a year after. Being 82
years of age at the time of filing his comment, Atty. Mendoza admits
that he is now totally disabled, cannot walk on his own, cannot even
write and sign his name, and can only move about with the help of
his family for he has been suffering from a severe case of "acute
gouty arthritic attack" which causes extreme difficulty in moving
54
virtually all his joints. He points out that he had previously handled
pro bono a concubinage case filed by Felicisima against her
husband, having yielded to her repeated pleas as she was then
financially hard-up and psychologically distraught. For the application
with the CENRO and LMB, he agreed to be paid for his legal
services on a contingent basis, which contract was subsequently
found by the RTC to be valid. When it was time to collect his
attorney's fees, Felicisima and her siblings refused to pay him
without any justifiable reason and even threatened to shoot him if he
continued to press for his compensation. This left Atty. Mendoza with
no other recourse but to avail of the judicial process to enforce his
claim.
On his part, Atty. Navarro asserts that he did his best to win
Felicisima's case although he was unsuccessful. He explains that
even before handling Felicisima's case, he had been saddled by
many cases involving politicians and sympathizers, having previously
served as councilor in the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Batangas for
two consecutive terms. He thus emphasized to Felicisima that in
order to "keep the case alive", he could file the Notice of Appeal in
her behalf, and instructed her to look for another lawyer who has the
time to attend to her case and that she would return to him only
when she failed to get one. However, Atty. Navarro admits that since
he was too preoccupied with so many cases in the local courts, he
had altogether forgotten about Felicisima's case, not having seen her
again as per their agreement.
The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) submitted her Report and Recommendation finding
Atty. Mendoza guilty of taking advantage of Felicisima's ignorance
just to have the Contract for Service signed. She held that Atty.
Mendoza violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on
him, as well as Rule 20.04, Canon 20 which exhorts lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning matters of compensation and to
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
As to Atty. Navarro, the Investigating Commissioner held that his
3G AY 2015-2016
participation in politics affected his law practice and caused him to

forget about Felicisima's case. Having failed to file the appellant's
brief as ordered by the CA, Atty. Navarro even filed a Motion to
Withdraw Appearance at a very late stage, leaving no time for
Felicisima to secure the services of another lawyer. His infraction
caused the eviction of Felicisima and her children from their
residence by virtue of the writ of execution and public auction of her
real properties. The Investigating Commissioner further said that
Atty. Navarro's acts showed lack of diligence in violation of Canon 18
of the CPR and his Lawyer's Oath.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that both Atty.
Mendoza and Atty. Navarro be suspended for two (2) years from the
practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors modified the
Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation,
lowering the period of suspension to six months.
ISSUE: Are Atty. Mendoza and Atty. Navarro administratively liable

for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING:
1. Atty. Mendoza is NOT guilty of allegedly deceiving his
client.
It appears that Felicisima raised the issue of voluntariness of her

signing the Contract for Service only during the hearing when she
supposedly testified that, having reached only Grade IV and trusting
completely her lawyer cousin, Atty. Mendoza who told her that the
document will protect her from the claims of her siblings, she actually
signed the Contract for Service. The RTC, however, found the
evidence adduced by Felicisima as insufficient to defeat Atty.
Mendoza's claim for attorney's fees. Said judgment had attained
finality and even pending appeal was already executed on motion by
55
Atty. Mendoza.
It bears to stress that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this
jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and binding but must
be laid down in an express contract. The validity of contingent fees
depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount
fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the case.
Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee
was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his
client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is
clearly excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved
party.
Apart from the allegations in her affidavit-complaint, Felicisima failed
to establish by clear and satisfactory proof of the deception allegedly
committed by Atty. Mendoza when she agreed in writing for the
latter's contingent fees. Fraud and irregularity in the execution of
their contingency fee contract cannot be deduced from the fact alone
that Atty. Mendoza filed suit to enforce their contract.
from the said premises. Worse, he failed to file an appellant's brief

despite receipt of the order from the CA directing him to do so within
the period specified therein, and to file a motion for reconsideration
when the appeal was dismissed due to non-filing of such brief. His
motion for extension of time to submit an appellant's brief was filed
93 days late and was thus denied by the CA. Barely a week after, he
filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance bearing the conformity of
his clients which was granted. It is evident from the foregoing that
Atty. Navarro failed to inform Felicisima of the status of the case so
that the latter was surprised upon being served the eviction order of
the court and eventual dismissal by the CA of their appeal.
Canon 18 of the CPR mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further provides that a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Navarro is hereby suspended from the practice

of law for 6 months. The charges against Atty. Mendoza are
dismissed.
2. Atty. Navarro is guilty of dereliction of duty.
Lawyers engaged to represent a client in a case bear the

responsibility of protecting the latter's interest with warmth, zeal and
utmost diligence.36 They must constantly keep in mind that their
actions or omissions would be binding on the client.37
In this case, Atty. Navarro agreed to represent Felicisima and her
siblings in Civil Case No. T-1080 and as their counsel he filed the
Answer with Counterclaim. He likewise attended the hearings of the
case until the RTC rendered an adverse judgment. However, after
filing the Notice of Appeal, nothing was heard of again from him. He
did not file any opposition when Atty. Mendoza moved for execution
pending appeal, which resulted in the sale of Felicisima's properties
at public auction and eventual eviction of Felicisima and her children
3G AY 2015-2016
WILLFUL AND DELIBERATE FORUM SHOPPING HAS BEEN

MADE PUNISHABLE EITHER AS DIRECT OR INDIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT
DAVID WILLIAMS, Complainant, v. ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ,

Respondent.
A.C. No. 8319, September 16, 2015
Facts: Spouses Williams filed a Complaint-Affidavit7 for disbarment,
dated June 26, 2009, against Atty. Enriquez for 1] violation of the
56
rule on forum shopping; and 2] purposely filing a groundless, false

and unlawful suit.
Spouses Williams alleged that in December 2002, a complaint for
forcible entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 390,8 was filed against
them before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Valencia-Bacong,
Negros Oriental (MCTC), by Desiderio Briones Ventolero, Francisco
Briones Ventolero, Ramon Verar, Martin Umbac, and Lucia Briones
(plaintiffs), where Atty. Enriquez acted as their counsel. The case
involved a parcel of land, Lot No. 2920, situated in San Miguel,
Bacong, Negros Oriental. The MCTC resolved the case in favor of
the plaintiffs, and on appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 44, in Dumaguete City (RTC-Br.44) affirmed the
decision.9 While the case was under reconsideration, Judge
Candelario V. Gonzales of RTC-Br. 44 inhibited himself and the case
was re-raffled and assigned to RTC, Branch 32 (RTC-Br. 32),
presided by Judge Roderick A. Maxino (Judge Maxino). On
November 8, 2006, RTC-Br. 32 reversed and set aside the MCTC
decision and dismissed the complaint for forcible entry against
Spouses Williams.
Spouses Williams also alleged that during the pendency of Civil
Case No. 390, Atty. Enriquez instructed Paciano Ventolero Umbac
(Paciano) to use death threats to chase off their caretaker and then
to illegally invade Lot 2920 and destroy an old house owned by their
predecessor/vendor, Orlando Verar Rian, Jr. (Orlando); that as a
result, Marisa Williams (Marisa) and Orlando filed Civil Case No.
502-B for forcible entry against Paciano where a decision was
rendered in their favor and a writ of execution was issued ordering
Paciano to vacate the property. According to Spouses Williams, Atty.
Enriquez, who was representing himself as the counsel of the
plaintiffs, was nothing more than the leader of a group of usurpers,
squatters and would be extortionists who were trying to punish them
because they refused an earlier demand for a cash payoff.
Spouses Williams further claimed that Atty. Enriquez subsequently
drafted a new complaint for forcible entry, falsely alleging that Marisa
and Orlando together with two hired goons forcibly entered Lot 2920
3G AY 2015-2016
and ejected Paciano by throwing rocks at him and hitting various

parts of his body; that the two goons wrecked the old house; and that
Paciano was the owner of Lot 2920 by way of successional rights
from his grandparents, Aurea and Ceriaco Ventolero. Spouses
Williams added that Atty. Enriquez, in order to prevent another
administrative case, instructed Paciano to file the case for forcible
entry on his own and he would thereafter take over as counsel of
record; and that Paciano, under the direction of Atty. Enriquez, filed
the complaint for forcible entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 521-B.
On May 27, 2008, the MCTC dismissed the subsequent suit on the
ground of litis pendentia. It found that in Civil Case No. 390 and Civil
Case No. 521-B, there was an "almost word-for-word similarity" in
the two complaints; that both involved the same subject matter; that
the plaintiffs in the two suits shared the same cause of action as both
claimed prior physical possession; and that the parties in the two
cases shared a community of interest.
Spouses Williams asserted that although Atty. Enriquez did not sign
the complaint in Civil Case No. 521-B, there was proof that he
drafted it and participated in the filing of the case considering that (1)
Paciano was illiterate, spoke no English, and could not possibly draft
the complaint without the help of Atty. Einriquez; (2) the complaints
in Civil Case No. 390 and Civil Case No. 521-B were identical, (3)
the person who marked the annexes in Civil Case No. 390 and Civil
Case No. 521-B had identical handwriting with that of Atty. Enriquez;
and (4) the Answer to Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 521-B was
prepared, verified and filed by Atty. Enriquez.
Lastly, Spouses Williams informed the Court that they previously
filed an administrative case, docketed as A.C. No. 7329, against
Atty. Enriquez for knowingly making untruthM statements in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 390 and that the IBP suspended him for
a period of one (1) year. The Court, however, in its Resolution, dated
November 27, 2013, set aside the IBP Resolution and dismissed the
administrative case.
57
In his Comment, Atty. Enriquez countered that he was merely

representing the heirs of Aurea Briones Ventolero who were
defending their title over Lot 2920.
In its Report and Recommendation, dated August 4, 2011, the IBPCBD found that Atty. Enriquez failed to squarely refute the charge of
forum shopping and recommended that he be suspended from the
practice of law and as a member of the Bar for six (6) months.
In its Resolution, dated February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of

Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
the IBP-CBD finding Atty. Enriquez liable for violation of the rule on
forum-shopping.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Enriquez is guilty of forum shopping.
Ruling: YES. As correctly observed by the IBP, Atty. Enriquez did

not deny the allegation that he engaged in forum-shopping. Atty.
Enriquez knew that in Civil Case No. 390, the MCTC decision was
reversed and set aside on appeal and the complaint for forcible entry
was dismissed against Spouses Williams. He, nonetheless, drafted
another complaint for forcible entry involving Lot 2920 and prodded
Paciano, also an alleged heir of Aurea and Ceriaco Ventolero, to file
Civil Case No. 521-B, against Spouses Williams. Even if Atty.
Enriquez did not sign the complaint in Civil Case No. 521, he could
still be held administratively liable because he obviously wrote the
complaint as could be gleaned from the similarity of the words and
phrases used in the complaint in Civil Case No. 390. Atty. Enriquez
likewise prepared and verified the answer to the counterclaim in Civil
Case No. 521-B, another proof that he knew and actively participated
in the litigation of Civil Case 521-B. Doubtless, this undesirable
practice violated his oath as a member of the Bar and transgressed
the known virtues and values which the legal profession demands
from its members.
3G AY 2015-2016
As a retired judge, Atty. Enriquez should know that a lawyer's

primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice.
Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes this obligation.19 In engaging in
such malpractice, Atty. Enriquez violated Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of
the land and to promote respect for the law and the legal processes.
He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice,20 and the prohibition against unduly
delaying a case by misusing court processes.21 For all his
reprehensible actions, the Court deems it appropriate to suspend
Atty. Enriquez for six (6) months from the practice of law.
A notary public must observe the highest degree of care in

complying with the basic requirements in the performance of
his duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in
the integrity of the notarial system.
Bartolome vs Basilio
AC No. 10783 | October 14, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe. J.:
Facts: Bartolome alleged that Basilio, a notary public in Tarlac City,
notarized a document entitled "Joint Affidavit of Non-Tenancy and
Aggregate Landholdings purportedly subscribed and sworn to
before him by Tanedo and Lim despite the fact that Taedo had
already passed away three years before the signing.
In his Answer, Basilio admitted having notarized the Joint Affidavit
but claimed that, prior to the notarization, he verified the identities of
the persons who appeared before him through their respective Social
Security System (SSS) identification cards and driver's licenses. He
further denied any knowledge that the one who appeared before him
58
misrepresented himself as Taedo and that the latter was already

dead.
personally known to the notary public or has not identified himself

through competent evidence of identity.
During the clarificatory hearing, Basilio, who undisputedly notarized

the Joint Affidavit, admitted his failure to: (a) record the subject
document in his notarial book; (b) submit a copy of the same to the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City (RTC); and (c) have the
notarization revoked or recalled.
The Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one
(1) year; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a notary public, if
any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary
public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
IBP found Basilio to have manifested gross negligence and a

complete disregard of Notarial Rules. And recommended that
Basilio's notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked; he be
disqualified from obtaining a notarial commission for a period of one
(1) year and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Issue: whether or not the IBP correctly found Basilio liable for
violation of the Notarial Rules.
Held: YES. As the records bear out, Basilio affixed his official
signature and seal on the notarial certificate of the Joint Affidavit
without properly identifying the person/s who signed the same. His
claim that he verified the identities of the affiants through their
respective SSS identification cards and driver's licenses cannot be
given any credence considering the ostensible lack of their details on
the face of the certificate. Neither was he able to provide the fact of
identification in any way. On the other hand, it has been established
that one of the named signatories to the Joint Affidavit was already
dead when he notarized the aforesaid document. Hence, it is
sufficiently clear that Basilio had indeed affixed his official signature
and seal on an incomplete, if not false, notarial certificate.
Moreover, by the same account, Basilio the Notarial Rules that
prohibits the notarization of a document if the person involved is not
3G AY 2015-2016
GROSS IMMORAL CONDUCT (ILLICIT RELATIONS) AS GROUND

FOR DISBARMENT
NELSON P. VALDEZ v. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON, JR.

AC NO. 7353 November 16, 2015
SERENO, C.J.
FACTS: Complainant Nelson charged respondent Atty. Dabon, a
Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals (CA), with gross
immorality for allegedly carrying on an adulterous relationship with
his wife, Sonia Romero Valdez (Sonia), which was made possible by
sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intimidation.
Nelson averred, among others, that his wife, Sonia was employed as
Court Stenographer of the CA from 1992 until her resignation on May
15, 2006; and that she admitted to have had an adulterous and
immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon, from 2000 to 2006. He came
to know of the relationship after receiving an anonymous text
message hinting/stating about the existence of an illicit affair
between the two and that initially, Sonia denied the affair but
eventually broke down and admitted her sexual liaison with Atty.
Dabon when confronted with a text message he received from Atty.
Jocelyn Dabon (Atty. Joy), the wife of the respondent. Nelson also
asserted that Sonia confessed her infidelity and described her
extramarital affair with Atty. Dabon to have been attended by sexual
59
assaults and maintained through intimidation and threats of

exposure, humiliation and embarrassment.
Sonia narrated that her illicit relationship with Atty. Dabon started
sometime in November 2000 and ended in March 2006 when she,
bothered by her conscience, decided to break it off; that Atty. Dabon
relentlessly pursued her for years and even admitted that he fell in
love with her the first time he laid eyes on her; that on November 13,
2000, Atty. Dabon lured her to what appeared to be a mere friendly
lunch date, managed to put sleep-inducing drug into her food or drink
causing her to feel drowsy and weak and, thereafter, brought her to
Victoria Court Motel where he sexually molested her while she was
asleep; that she opted to keep silent about the incident for fear of its
adverse repercussions of shame and embarrassment to her and her
family; that she pleaded with Atty. Dabon to leave her and forget
what had happened, but the respondent instead taunted her by
laughing at her misery; that since then, Atty. Dabon succeeded in
having repeated carnal knowledge of her once or twice a week
through intimidation and threats; that Atty. Dabon threatened her that
he would tell everyone that she had been playing around with him, if
she would not yield to his lascivious cravings; and that she suffered
in silence for years and submitted herself to the bestial desires of
Atty. Dabon, until she even thought that she was in love with him.
Sonia further claimed that after years of living in deception and
infidelity, she decided to call it quits with Atty. Dabon sometime in
March 2006 but he could not let go of their relationship; that Atty.
Dabon started pestering and threatening her through phone calls and
handwritten messages in vile attempts to persuade her to continue
their illicit affair; that despite their break-up, Atty. Dabon still pursued
his lustful quest by bringing her to Anito Motel, along Quirino Avenue
on March 10, 2006, but she foiled his plan when she went ballistic
prompting the respondent to drive her back to the CA; that on March
13, 2006, Atty. Dabon forcibly boarded her car and pleaded for
forgiveness and reconciliation but she remained firm in her resolve to
end the affair; that she had to seek the assistance of her officemates,
just to convince Atty. Dabon to alight from her car as the said
3G AY 2015-2016
incident had already drawn the attention of several employees within

the vicinity of the CA parking lot; that Atty. Dabon used the members
of his staff to relay his messages and deliver his handwritten letters
to her; that Atty. Dabon, angered by her repeated rejection, went
berserk and sent her a letter which stated, among others, that he
could no longer stand her constant avoidance of him and that he
would divulge their illicit relationship to her husband; that it numbed
her with fright, so she called Atty. Joy, without disclosing her identity,
and told her that Atty. Dabon was harassing an employee at the CA;
that Atty. Dabon sent a text message to Nelson telling him of the
extramarital affair; that Atty. Joy called up Nelson and informed him
that her husband, Atty. Dabon, had confessed to her the illicit
relationship; and that when she was asked by Nelson, she initially
denied the affair for fear of reprisal but, afterwards, admitted the truth
and explained to him that she was merely a victim of Atty. Dabon's
threat and intimidation which led to their illicit relationship. Nelson
further stated that Atty. Dabon' s willful, flagrant and shameless
conduct was in gross defiance of the customs, values and sense of
morality of the community. He prayed for the disbarment of Atty.
Dabon whose immoral acts showed his lack of moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor and, hence, unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.
Respondent Atty. Dabon strongly refuted the accusation against him

claiming that the same was baseless and unfounded and that the
complaint for disbarment was merely calculated to harass, annoy
and besmirch his reputation. Atty. Dabon denied the charges of
grossly immoral and unlawful acts through sexual assaults, abuses,
threats and intimidation. He posited that the allegations of spouses
Nelson and Sonia in their respective affidavits were nothing but pure
fabrication solely intended to malign his name and honor. . He
contended that it was highly improbable for him, a married lawyer at
that, to suddenly turn crazy and abandon all cares just to satisfy his
purported lustful hungerness by sexually assaulting Sonia, "an
ordinary plain-looking 43-year old woman with two (2) teen aged
children. The filing of the complaint for disbarment was motivated by
60
vengeance against him as Nelson was consummed by his suspicion

that he had seduced Sonia which led to the deterioration of their
marriage. He was a victim caught in the crossfire between the
troubled couple, Nelson and Sonia. There was no truth to Sonia's
allegation that he was attracted to her from the first time he saw her
much less pursued her relentlessly. He and Sonia were just close
friends. He was Sonia's confidante. She would usually confide in him
her personal woes and problems especially those concerning her
husband, Nelson. It was Sonia who aggressively sought his
companionship and frequented his office, bringing food, fruits and
other goodies. His friendship with Sonia turned sour when she
learned of his plan to settle for good in the Unites States with his
family. Sonia began to avoid him. He exerted efforts to make her
understand his decision, but to no avail. He presented cards
expressing Sonia's affection towards him as well as the expensive
gifts she gave him which belied her claim that she was sexually
assaulted and that she resisted his alleged sexual advances.
Further, he denied sending Nelson the alleged text messages and
that all were part of an elaborate scheme to force him to immediately
resign as Division Clerk of Court from the CA. Lastly, it was not true
that he harassed Sonia through text messages and phone calls. It
was he who was the victim of harassment from Nelson, who
orchestrated a series of events that compelled him to leave the
country earlier than scheduled for fear that an untoward incident
might happen to him.
IBP Commissioner: Found Atty. Dabon guilty of gross immoral

conduct and, accordingly, be disbarred and dropped from the Roll of
Attorneys.
IBP Board of Governors: ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. (MR,
denied)
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dabon is guilty of violating the CPR.
3G AY 2015-2016
HELD: YES. After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the
findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Lawyers have been
repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral
character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement
to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe
the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's
integrity, and the legal profession exacts from its members nothing
less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar,
free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.
Consequently, any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or

private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
suspension or disbarment. In the case at bench, the Court
subscribes to the IBP's opinion that there was substantial evidence
showing that Atty. Dabon did have an illicit relationship with Nelson's
legal wife. Atty. Dabon interposed a blanket denial of the romantic
involvement but at the same time, he seemed to have tacitly
admitted the illicit affair only that it was not attended by sexual
assaults, threats and intimidations. The Court also observed that he
devoted considerable effort to demonstrate that the affair did not
amount to gross immoral conduct and that no sexual abuse, threat or
intimidation was exerted upon the person of Sonia, but not once did
he squarely deny the affair itself. In other words, the respondent's
denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the admission of
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely
denied. It is clear from Atty. Dabon's Comment that his denial only
pertained as to the existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a
categorical denial thereof, he is deemed to have admitted his
consensual affair with Sonia. More telling of the existence of a
romantic relationship are the notes and cards that Sonia sent to Atty.
61
Dabon containing personal and intimate messages in her own

handwriting. The messages conveyed Sonia's affection towards him
as she even referred to him as "hon" or "honey." There were also
gifts she gave him on special occasions such as signature shoes,
watch and shirts. It also appeared that Sonia frequently visited him in
his office either to bring him food, fruits and other goodies or to invite
him to lunch which apparently displayed her emotional attachment to
him. Curiously, the foregoing was never refuted by Sonia. Such "egoboosting admissions" of Atty. Dabon indeed proved that a
consensual relationship between him and Sonia existed. It has not
escaped the Court's attention either that Atty. Dabon really tried hard
to win back Sonia because he could not let go of their relationship,
even to the point of pestering her with his persistent pleas for
reconciliation.
Incidentally, vis-a-vis Nelson's overwhelming evidence of said

harassments, he offered only denials which was self-serving and
weak under the law on evidence. In light of the above disquisition,
the Court finds Sonia's allegation that the illicit relationship was made
possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat and
intimidations, to be untrue. Certainly, a sexually abused woman
could not be expected to lavish her oppressor with expensive gifts or
pay him affectionate compliments or words of endearment. The
natural reaction of a victim of a sexual molestation would be to avoid
her ravisher. In this case, however, it appeared that Sonia continually
remained in the company of Atty. Dabon for more than five years,
even inviting him for lunch-outs and frequenting his office to bring
food whenever the latter was preoccupied with his workload and
could not go out with her to eat. Verily, Sonia's actuations towards
Atty. Dabon are in stark contrast to the expected demeanor of one
who had been repeatedly sexually abused.
Further, the Court cannot fathom why Sonia never reported the
alleged sexual abuse to the police, if such was the truth. She could
have placed the respondent behind bars and put an end to her
3G AY 2015-2016
claimed misery. The Court is left with the most logical conclusion that
Sonia freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral
relationship with Atty. Dabon sans any threat and intimidation.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
It has been repeatedly held that to justify suspension or disbarment,

the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.
A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. It is
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community.
In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's intimate relationship with a
woman other than his wife showed his moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. It
manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage
and for his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral
depravity and low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession.
Indeed, he has fallen below the moral bar. Such detestable behavior
warrants a disciplinary sanction. Even if not all forms of extramarital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside of
62
marriage are considered disgraceful and immoral as they manifest

deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's misconduct and unrepentant
demeanor clearly showed a serious flaw in his character, his moral
indifference to the sanctity of marriage and marital vows, and his
outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put
the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril. Accordingly, the Court finds the
need for the imposition of the extreme administrative penalty of
disbarment.
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty. Antolin Allyson M.

Dabon, Jr. GUILTY of Gross Immorality, the Court hereby DISBARS
him from the practice of law. Let respondent's name be stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all court throughout the country
with copies of this Decision. SO ORDERED
3G AY 2015-2016

Immoral Atty Disbarred

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Immoral Atty Disbarred

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1

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous

Facts: In the complaint of Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr.

Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce with Gomez by mutual

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ

citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court

Complainants withdrawal from the case

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Unable to find a lawyer to replace Atty. Paras, the complainants

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

DISMISSAL OF BASELESS DISBARMENT COMPLAINTS

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ

In their sworn complaint for disbarment, the complainants narrated

Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr.

In order to end the dispute, the parties entered into an amicable

Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted the following:

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ

agreement and could not feign ignorance of the conditions

Atty. Tolentino, in his comment:

Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ

of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and

In this case, there was no abuse of authority or irregularity committed

3. NO. With respect to the charge of abandonment against Atty.

Should they be aggrieved by said respondents' performance of duty,

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Doctrine: When a lawyer receives money from the client for a

Facts: Complainant, as President of Samahan ng mga Maralitang

the amount needed. While waiting, however, the instant

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ

NOTARIAL COMMISSION IS A LICENSE HELD PERSONALLY

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Pitogo alleges that there were discrepancies between the 3

GROSS MISCONDUCT IN PRIVATE CAPACITY IS A GROUND

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for his

HELD: YES. Respondent is liable for his negligence as a notarial

ANTONINA S. SOSA, Complainant, v. ATTY. MANUEL V.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Manuel V. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law

Although he initially denied getting this amount and claimed that he

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ

clients. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important

a civil action requires greater evidentiary standard of preponderance

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. J.F. DE CHAVEZ