Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 14-4932
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg.
Michael F. Urbanski,
District Judge. (5:14-cr-00014-MFU-1)
Argued:
Decided:
district
court
suppress
evidence
flowing
vehicle.
granted
from
Dmytro
a
Patiutkas
warrantless
motion
search
of
to
his
We affirm.
I.
On April 27, 2013, Virginia State Trooper G.S. Cox, while
patrolling Interstate 81, observed an SUV with tinted windows
and a tinted license plate cover, which potentially violated
Virginia law.
asked
birth
Patiutka
for
his
name
and
date
of
and
later
Although Trooper
Trooper
through
Cox
police
ran
the
databases
information
and,
after
supplied
by
receiving
no
Rather, the
officers
participated
in
the
search,
As many as five
including
Trooper
Trooper Moore
found
in
hatchback
bag
containing
area
and
opened
credit
one
of
card
reader
several
large
the
SUVs
suitcases,
Meanwhile,
Patiutka asked Trooper Cox why the officers were searching his
car.
Trooper
but
then
announced
investigative detention.
handcuffed
Patiutka
and
that
he
was
placing
Patiutka
in
him
back
to
the
patrol
car.
vehicle and the credit card reader and Trooper Coxs conduct
(the
stop
and
request
to
search),
Trooper
Moore
believed
At the conclusion
station
and,
during
the
trip,
read
him
his
Miranda
plate
tint.
cover,
Eight
failure
months
to
maintain
later,
on
lane,
January
improper
and
13,
illegal
2014,
the
moved
to
suppress
the
physical
evidence
seized
from his car as well as all statements and evidence that flowed
from
the
warrantless
search.
At
the
suppression
hearing,
if
we
hadnt
of
[sic]
found
anything
in
the
vehicle,
the
district
court,
the
Government
claimed
that
review
district
courts
legal
determinations
[t]he
be
right
of
the
people
to
secure
in
their
persons,
seizures.
II.
First, the Government argues that the search was incident
to Patiutkas arrest.
Police officers may search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupants arrest when the arrestee is within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is
reasonable
to
believe
offense of arrest.
the
vehicle
contains
evidence
of
the
United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir. 1991).
However,
police
must
beginning a search.
(4th Cir. 1996).
warrantless
have
probable
cause
to
arrest
prior
to
search
will
not
serve
as
justification
for
the
arrest.
(1968).
We note at the outset that the Government does not contend
that the police conducted a search incident to Patiutkas arrest
for
access
device
fraud
and
aggravated
identity
theft,
even
probable
cause
to
arrest
Patiutka
for
the
state
offense
of
Assuming
that the record permits such an argument, and that the offense
justifying a search incident to arrest can be different from the
offense for which a defendant was arrested, the argument still
fails. 1
The
district
courts
factual
findings
forestall
the
testimony
as
to
the
factual
basis
of
his
asserted
Rather, the
We can
Moreover,
we must view the facts in the record in the light most favorable
to
Patiutka
because
he
prevailed
before
the
district
court.
United States v. Green, 740 F.3d 275, 277 (4th Cir. 2014).
We
Government did not meet its burden, the district court relied on
the video of the stop.
called
off
the
search
when
Patiutka
objected,
suggesting that the only basis for the search was consent.
the
video
did
not
substantiate
the
existence
of
the
And
primary
have
probable
cause.
That
evidence
was
the
troopers
traffic
noise,
barking
police
dog,
and
Patiutkas
pronounced foreign accent, the video did not reveal exactly what
Patiutka said was his birthdate.
date.
Even
Patiutka
argues
only
that
the
trooper
was
entitled
to
do
on
these
that
the
Government
had
Johnson v.
III.
Next, the Government argues that the warrantless search was
valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
A.
Police
officers
do
not
need
warrant
to
search
an
search for evidence of any crime, not just of the offense that
provided the basis for the arrest.
of
the
following
facts:
(1)
for
reasons
unknown
to
(2)
there
were
three
suitcases
in
the
back
of
11
The
court
concluded
that
these
facts
did
not
provide
an
reader and iPads that Trooper Moore had uncovered at that point.
While
the
trooper
found
their
combination
and
placement
utilize
attached
iPads
with
credit
card
readers
in
lieu
of
the
district
court,
we
acknowledge
that
the
facts
well
meet
suspicion.
for
the
the
standard
for
reasonable
troopers
to
question
Patiutka
out
articulable
of
this
conversation
about
the
contents
Additional information
could
potentially
have
to
speak
with
Patiutka
the
police
before
placing
him
in
handcuffs
and
have
probable
cause
(not
just
reasonable
Government
contends
that
an
additional
piece
of
probable
cause
to
search.
Invoking
the
collective-
collective-knowledge
here
because
the
officers
district court that the doctrine does not save this search, but
for the alternative reason that, as we explained above, Trooper
Cox had no probable cause to communicate to a fellow officer.
The collective-knowledge doctrine simply directs [a court]
to
substitute
the
knowledge
of
the
instructing
officer
or
In Massenburg, we rejected a
Id.
Id. at 495-96.
that
arrest
precludes
exception
knowledge
application
also
argument.
thwarts
Here
the
of
the
the
search
Governments
district
court
incident
to
collective-
found
that
the
Patiutka
search
proceeded
When
Patiutka
when
he
solely
revoked
initiated
on
his
the
the
basis
consent,
search.
of
Rather,
Patiutkas
Trooper
Cox
the
consent.
halted
the
Moore
officer,
had
understood
halted
the
Trooper
search.
Cox,
the
Nonetheless,
instructing
Trooper
Moore
Here,
Cox,
the
instructing
determination.
officer,
Instead,
Trooper
Trooper
Cox
made
instructed
no
his
such
fellow
IV.
For
proposed
the
foregoing
exceptions
reasons,
to
the
neither
of
the
Governments
Fourth
Amendments
warrant
15