PAST IMPERFECT

Updates from and about UMAM D&R

Issue 1, August 2016

2016

Syrian and Lebanese anecdotes on the margins of the Aleppo Battle

Reminiscences and Candies

) (/

he approach taken by UMAM D&R since its

inceptionthat of dealing with Lebanon's pasthas
been adjusted constantly according to concerns about
the present and how they will affect the future. In
advancing those multifaceted efforts, UMAM D&R has
always stressed that while Lebanons experience has
certainly yielded some lessons that can be applied to
war and peace, some of those lessons focus (sometimes
uncomfortably) on questioning the country's model
for peace. Thus, as part of its continuing exploration of
critical issues, UMAM D&R is pleased to introduce this
series of newsletters. This and subsequent editions of
PAST IMPERFECT will enable us to share systematic
updates about the work being done by our organization.

...

2016

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Predictions and differing opinions about

the eventual rematch in Aleppo are
logical responses to the politico-military
landscape that emerged in the aftermath
of the latest developments in that area.
As a reminder, the Assad regime endured
a significant defeat in the eastern area of
the city in summer 2012. Since then, the
situation shifted constantly and included
advances by one side and then the other,
a war of attrition waged to accelerate
success by the regime and its allies, and a
series of engagements between February
and August 2016, which culminated in
a full-blown siege of the eastern area of
the city and involved attacks intended
to sever the rebel supply lines. Given that
background, combined with recent news
from the area, it is worthwhile to review
some of the information germane to
the breakout of the siege by the rebels,
especially since the significance of that
information makes it all but impossible
to view it simply as an amalgamation of
details.
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On August 4, 2016, the Islamist coalition

known as Jaysh al-Fath (Army of
Conquest) announced the launch of
its third operational phase, which was
intended to break the siege being
pressed on Aleppo's eastern districts
by the Assad regime and its allies. In
parallel with the start of that operation
(and doubtlessly as an attempt at
psychological warfare), a Jaysh alFath spokesman announced that the
offensive would be called the Ibrahim
al-Youssef Assault. Interestingly, the title
given that operation would not have
been of particular importance had its
namesake been some illustrious field
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commander killed in a recent battle, or

even a noted militant who died while
incarcerated in one of Assads prisons.
The startling reality, however, is that he is
neither. Instead, the al-Youssef in whose
"honor" the assault was named became
iconic due to his involvement in the
mass murder of dozens of Alawi cadets
at the Aleppo Artillery School on June
16, 1979. That incident is considered
the tipping point in the confrontation
between the Syrian regime and the
Muslim Brotherhood, as well as other
groups referred to nowadays as Islamist
inspired.1 According to author Raphal
Lefvre,
[At] the Aleppo Artillery School []
a Sunni Baathist staff member,
Captain Ibrahim Yusuf, assembled
the cadet officers of Alawi faith
in the dining-hall before letting
in jihadist gunmen affiliated with
the 'Fighting Vanguard' who then
slaughtered eighty-three of them,
wounding many others.2

Details of the death of Ibrahim al-Youssef published

on the front page of Lebanon's daily an-Nahar on
June 4, 1980. The heading reads, "Aleppo: death
of Ibrahim al-Youssef, [suspected of involvement
in] the Artillery School [massacre].
Beneath the images: Two pictures of Captain
al-Youssef distributed by SANA [the official Syrian
news agency] showing him alive and dead.

Assad regime and its allies, most antiAssadistswhether anonymous tweeters

or politico-military experts associated
with anti-Assad media outletschose
to ignore that little "detail." Similarly,
they elected to overlook the political
affiliation of the rebels fighting to break
the siege of Aleppo. Ultimately, Jaysh
al-Fath contented itself with the results
it achieved on the battlefield. Amid
the raucous celebrations that followed
that victory, Spain-based Louay Hussein
(among the very few Alawi-Syrian
opposition figures) characterized
al-Youssef as murderous, and
described those who led the operation
named in his behalf as Sunni crap.3
Similarly, Hussein criticized the opposition
leaders and intellectuals who whispered
that while the decision made by
Jaysh al-Fath was wrong, al-Youssef
ultimately fit the profile of a rebel.4

Less than a year afterward, al-Youssef

was killed by Syrian security personnel.
Legend has it that his corpse was
placed on display at the Artillery School,
where cadets were invited to spit on it!
Not coincidentally, Jaysh al-Fath
decided to capitalize on al-Youssef's
brutal notoriety by implying that its
operation was affiliated with the actions
taken by al-Youssef and his acolytes
in 1979. Moreover, Jaysh al-Fath never
sought to minimize the debate
prompted by its decision. Indeed, after
being caught up in the fervor that
followed the losses inflicted upon the
Raphal Lefvre, Ashes of Hama The Muslim
Brotherhood in Syria, Oxford University Press,
2013, p. 73.
2
Ibid.
3
For a quick profile of Louay Hussein, see:
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/49490
4
Louay Hussein's comments are available at:
http://all4syria.info/Archive/333689
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WE ARE HIS grandsons!

In these great and blessed days, Aleppo
is about to experience a great expedition
(ghazwa). At this pointGod willingwe will
move to conquer the Artillery School. We will call
our attack on the school the Ibrahim al-Youssef
Assault. [Al-Youssef] was a hero: a great man
and an innovator during the 1980s, and was a
follower of Adnan Oklamay God rest his soul.
[Al-Youssef] gathered the Alawi and Nusayri at
the Artillery School [and after he made sure to]
exclude the Sunni, he liquidated all of them. After
executing 80 of them and wounding another 80,
he left the [scene] safe and sound and continued to
attack the Nusayri for another year before he was
killed as martyrmay God forgive him.(*)
God says [in The Quran]: [If you suffer hardship,
the enemy also suffers the same hardship.] We
alternate the days of victory and defeat among
the people. [Al-Emran: 140] Today, we carry
on what Ibrahim al-Youssef started. We will be,
God willing, his grandsons. We will conquer
[the school] and place it under the boots of the
mujahedeen. We will kill the Alawi just as they were
killed that day [in 1979]. And as they dragged and
placed on public display [the body of] al-Youssef
[and his Sunni brethren], we warn them
that we will do the same with their bodies.

Above: Lebanese Forces MP Antoine Zahra

poses in the middle of a group of armed al-Qaa
residents. Below: Women participate in the selfdefense initiative!

Another recipient was Lebanese

editorialist Hazem al-Ameen, who writes
for Saudi-funded, pan-Arab al-Hayat
and is known both for the positions he
takes against the Assad regime and
Hezbollah, and for his unconditional
support for change in Syria. But when alAmeen dared to question the dilemma
presented by having to choose
between the Assad regime and the
Islamists, he too was soundly rebuked
and reminded of his Shia ancestry.5

* Alawi are sometimes referred to as "Nusayris," a term

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that has a particularly derogatory connotation!

UMAM D&Rs translation into English of the

announcement released by Jaysh al-Fateh about
its "Ibrahim Al-Youssef Assault." Of note, the
original Arabic version is available on YouTube
at : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LqEw_6_
Dzpo&feature=youtu.be

Considering the numerous political,

diplomatic and military developments
that have occurred, these verbal
clashes will probably not only
go unnoticed, but may also be
overshadowed soon enough by other,
more "theatrical" developments. Yet, it
would be a shame not to review some
of the lessons this situation teachesfree
of chargeto anyone who believes
that the war in Syria must someday
end. The first such lesson to be drawn
is that the Syrian conflict is deeply

Unsurprisingly, Hussein's comments

angered a great many people who
rationalized that while he is indeed an
outspoken opponent of the regime,
he remains an Alawi who cannot
be trusted. Unsurprisingly also, that
mainstream, sectarian anger was
not directed solely at Louay Hussein.
5

Hazem al-Ameen's "offensive" editorial is available at:

http://www.alhayat.com/Opinion/HazemAlAmin/16787634

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rooted in history and has exceedingly

complex narratives, all of which bear
more weight than do the repeated calls
for the bloodletting to end, or at least
decrease.

Compared to circumstances in and

about Syria, the seemingly minute
developments that affect Lebanon
are easily missed. Apparently, it does
not matter that the country has come
to an absolute standstill. For instance,
Lebanon has not had a president for
more than two years, its legislature is
completely paralyzed, the government
is all but entirely ineffective, corruption
is rampant and State-run services are
dysfunctional, the sum of which is
significant when one considers that
among other challenges the country is
facing, it must contend with a millionplus Syrian refugees! But rather than
actually address these deficiencies, the
imperative in Lebanon is to maintain the
impression that things are under control!
Clearly, it is not politically correct to
question the price being paid to keep
this impression and to keep things under
control, especially when that control is
characterized by (1) an overreliance on
the State's military/security organizations
to police the country and its residents
(Palestinian and Syrian refugees
included) and (2) de facto acceptance
of cooperation between those State
organizations and Hezbollah. At this
point, let's consider some of the "clues"
that deserve attention:

A new Lebanese Shia martyrologue is steadily

emerging as Hezbollahs involvement in Syria
swells to major-league proportions. Of course, the
number of Shia boys (and others) who have
fallen in Syria (which, according to the most reliable
sources is approaching some 2,000) will not be the
only legacy of this war. As with any other conflict,
this one is generating its own narratives, culture
and sites of memory. Pictured here, a portion of
the Shakra cemetery, (South Lebanon), dedicated
to the war in Syria (taken April 2016).

of a more existential nature (such

as the future of Christians in Lebanon)
and those that are more practical
(such as the country's failing economy
and corruption). In fact, the accuracy
of those statistics was demonstrated
several weeks ago (June 27, 2016) when
a series of alleged suicide bombings
rocked the Christian village of al-Qaa
in northeast Lebanon (adjacent to the
Lebanese-Syrian border). Regardless
of the whole truth about what
happened that day (that eight suicide
bombers actually blew themselves up),
the political response to the carnage
was the deployment of groups of armed
civilians seeking to ensure self-defense
(notably, one of the volunteers was a
Lebanese Forces MP who was an eager
participant in Lebanon's long civil war).
That deployment was touted as having
been coordinated with, and supported
by the Lebanese army. Whatever the
case, it illustrates that the culture of
partnering with the Staterather than
being under its protectionis maturing

- UMAM D&R recently noted the

results of a poll taken by a traditional
Lebanese Christian party to gauge
the concerns held today by Lebanese
Christians. The responses indicated
that Hezbollah weaponry, long a
flashpoint topic in the country (and
beyond) is no longer a priority. Instead,
that worry has been surpassed by issues
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Lebanon) is proceeding nicely, and

that its happiness is being shared
within Lebanon's Shia and Christian
communities. But it should be obvious
as well, by now, that the ongoing war
in Syria is looking increasingly like an
integrated and functional subset of
Lebanons own legacy of conflict.
Similar to the situation surrounding the
el-Youssef case (whose status as "hero"
vs. "murderer" suddenly reemerged
more than three decades after he
garnered that notoriety), we need to
accept that the sanguinary theme of
hero versus murderer is present in
the framework of Lebanon's Sunni-Shia
tensioneven if it is not always (or even
often) particularly evident.

A noted Salafi Sunni

cleric based in Tripoli
(brown Djellaba)
assisted by followers
offers candies and
sweets in the streets
of Tripoli. Interestingly,
some news reports
indicated that
thecandy operation
was concentrated
on the two Tripoli
mosques that were car-bombed in May 2013
(Al-Liwaa newspaper, August 11, 2016).
Aside from having been particularly deadly,
Lebanon's judiciary accused the head of
the pro-Syrian Alawi Arab Democratic party
of involvement in those attacks. Beyond
demonstrating solidarity with the Aleppo rebels,
this initiative also signified that the defeat of the
Syrian regime and its allies in Aleppo was an act
of revenge for those killed in 2013.

- For example, on August 6, 2016, shortly

after the rebels announced that they
had taken the Artillery School and
broken the siege of eastern Aleppo, a
wave of celebration occurred in some
quarters of Tripoli. Mosque loudspeakers
broadcast thanks to God, fireworks
exploded in the skies above and
candies were offered in the streets
below (of note, some of those "candy
checkpoints" were manned by clerics).
But one man's joy is often another man's
sorrow, and the happiness expressed
by Tripolis most outspoken Sunnis
certainly conflicted with the anguish
their Alawi neighbors experienced.
After all, the two groups battled each
other in 20 rounds of violence between
2008 and 2014, to say nothing of the
"miscellaneous" reciprocal bombings
and assassinations that took place. And,
of course, there is no law against people
distributing candy to express their joy!
In short, the scene says volumes about
both the temperature of sectarian
relationsespecially in Tripoliand
the kind of stability that necessitates
the army's deployment to ensure that
neither the joy nor the sorrow being
trumpeted erupts into civil unrest.6

even within Lebanon's Christian

community.
- Hezbollah should be happy that
not only has it achieved something
approaching full "civil-military
partnership" with the Lebanese State
(certainly at the expense of the
State), but also that its weaponry is
politically secure (and demonstrably
more capable than its State-owned
counterpart), that the war it is fighting
in Syria (purportedly to neutralize
the takfiri threat and protect
6

According to a story posted online, on August 7, 2016,

by al-Nashra news, The LAF is taking exceptional
measures in the streets of Bab et-Tabbaneh and
Jabal Mohsen [both predominantly Sunni areas] to
prevent any provocation from [either] side against
the backdrop of the celebration organized by the
[residents of] Bab et-Tabbaneh following the news
about the breaking of the siege in Aleppo.

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1979 1980

2016

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_https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LqEw_6
Dzpo&feature=youtu.be

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http://all4syria.info/Archive/333689

( )3 11 .2016
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