Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 11-4293
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:10cr-00297-RWT-1)
Argued:
Decided:
February 8, 2013
wrote
the
ARGUED:
Meghan Suzanne Skelton, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Adam Kenneth Ake,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
He now challenges
agreement
pretrial
in
conduct
telling
qualified
the
for
district
an
court
that
obstruction
of
Taylors
justice
I
On December 29, 2009, Gregory Taylor entered a SunTrust
bank in Upper Marlboro, Maryland, and handed the teller a demand
note stating, I want all 100s and 50s NOW!
Taylor $1,235, and Taylor fled.
Office
was
appointed
for
him,
Taylor
refused
to
Sylvester
Taylor
J,
Authorized
Representative
d/b/a
settlement
and
closure
in
the
transaction.
Taylors
which
included
consideration
of
Taylors
wish
to
At the
hearing, when addressing the court, Taylor continued to use UCClaced terminology, telling the court, I dont consent to this
conversation. . . .
The court told Taylor that it was very familiar with the
various
movements
that
assert
these
various
positions
that
youre taking and noted that Taylor had filed 14 civil suits
in this court, all of which have been found to be frivolous and
dismissed.
guilty and the time comes for sentencing, I want you to know
that under our sentencing guidelines, if I conclude that youve
taken steps to obstruct justice, that that could enhance the
amount
of
sentence
guidelines.
you
might
be
recommended
for
under
those
questions.
When the court resumed asking Taylor whether he wanted to
proceed without counsel, Taylor told the court at least four
times that he wished to proceed on his own.
He then said, Im
Im only here to
the
seriousness
of
the
charges
that
Taylor
was
The
court
replied
that
this
was
legally
nonsensical
and
its
subsequent
written
order,
the
court
granted
the
The
court
also
appointed
standby
counsel,
over
Taylors objection.
Shortly after the hearing, Taylor requested counsel and the
court
then
reappointed
counsel
from
the
Public
Defenders
Office.
Even after having counsel reappointed, Taylor continued to
send the court various pro se motions using UCC terminology,
asking, for example, that the case be dismissed because he had
accepted all charges of the DEBTOR/DEFENDANT . . . and have
returned them to the above courts for offset and for a chance
to tender an offer to discharge all old case bonds, bails, or
other obligations with an exchange of my exemption.
At the hearing on Taylors pretrial motions, on December
13,
2010,
change
his
Taylors
plea,
counsel
but
would
told
the
first
court
like
to
that
hear
Taylor
the
might
courts
Taylor that the types of suits and motions he filed have been
classic examples of what . . . [is] referred to at various times
5
as
the
flesh
defense.
and
blood
defense
or
the
sovereign
man
attempts
computers
to
do
with
everything
nonsensical
it
can
pleadings
to
jam
the
and
had
now
told
Taylor
that
he
was
treat[ing]
these
The
nonsensical
Taylors counsel
told the court that Mr. Taylor . . . has been adamant that I
tell the Court . . . that by filing the motions . . . his
intention was merely to avail himself of what he thought were
means by which to obtain information, discovery, and . . . other
relief.
him that the defense is one that has absolutely no merit and
was designed to gum up the machinery of the court.
thanked
the
court,
and
the
court
then
proceeded
Taylor
with
the
rearraignment.
Taylor pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement
with
the
stipulated
government.
that
the
base
Under
the
offense
6
agreement,
level
was
7,
the
parties
pursuant
to
to
because
the
thefts
were
from
that
the
government
d[id]
not
the
person
of
2-level
offense
characteristics,
potential
departures
or
sentencing
adjustments
[N]o other
guidelines
set
forth
in
factors,
the
United
Taylors
court,
sentencing
after
hearing
discussing
on
the
March
volume
3,
of
2011,
the
Taylors
frivolous motions and suits and the efforts they required of the
U.S. Attorneys Office and the court, asked the parties whether
Taylors motions and suits warranted an upward adjustment for
obstruction of justice.
and then had the following exchange with the Assistant United
States Attorney (AUSA).
THE COURT:
I understand the government has an
agreement and is bound by it.
But Im asking you as
an officer of the court whether you believe what Ive
described does or does not constitute obstruction of
justice for an enhancement of an offense level.
*
*
7
court
then
requested
argument
on
what
the
appropriate
Consistent
with
the
plea
of
10
months,
agreement,
the
government
arguing
that
the
Guidelines
already
frivolous.
didnt
know,
again,
that
these
things
were.
In imposing sentence, the court explained that it had very
carefully considered the Guidelines range of 8 to 14 months,
but found it to be hopelessly, woefully inadequate.
pointed
out
holdups
over
that
a
Taylor
had
relatively
committed
short
period
four
of
The court
different
time
bank
running
from
that
Taylor
had
earlier
received
The court
sentence
of
63
months
in
that
supervised release.
case
for
violating
the
conditions
of
Taylor had not been deterred from pursuing his criminal conduct.
which
Taylor
received
relatively
trivial
slap
on
the
court
next
considered
Taylors
mental
health,
I believe that
It then
government,
in
giving
its
opinion
on
the
obstruction
of
10
II
Taylor contends first that the government breached its plea
agreement not to raise or place in dispute any Guidelines
factors
by
arguing
that
Taylors
conduct
constituted
Alternatively, it
would
nonetheless
have
been
justified
because
Taylor
United States
v. Lewis, 633 F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting United
States v. Dawson, 587 F.3d 640, 645 (4th Cir. 2009)).
It is
Guidelines
Stipulation
by
which
Taylor
and
the
parties
also
agreed
that
11
[n]o
other
offense
characteristics,
departures
or
sentencing
adjustments
guidelines
set
forth
factors,
in
the
potential
United
States
(Emphasis added).
government breached this agreement when the AUSA told the court,
in
response
qualified
to
for
the
the
courts
question,
obstruction
of
that
justice
Taylors
conduct
enhancement.
The
was standing in for the assigned AUSA and was not familiar with
the documents he was discussing, the court responded:
THE COURT:
Ive directed him as an officer of the
Court to give me a legal opinion answer, and hes
clearly indicated that he is standing by the plea
agreement.
He is not in violation of the plea
agreement.
Hes an officer of the court.
Hes
obligated to answer me when I ask him a question.
12
But the
an
enhancement,
nor
place
one
in
dispute.
The
approval
of
or
agreement
with
the
imposition
of
an
that
it
was
not
requesting
the
enhancement.
This
In
Keller,
the
court
concluded
that
the
In
contrast, the AUSA here did not advocate for the enhancement,
nor did he even comment . . . on the strength of the evidence
for one.
request
an
opinion,
quickly
13
noting
that
it
was
not
also
argues
that
the
governments
insistence
on
obstruction
agreement.
of
justice
was
(Emphasis added).
also
breach
of
Again, we disagree.
the
plea
On appeal,
the government did nothing more than defend the district courts
sentence, as it was permitted to do.
and
legally
free
to
impose
the
obstruction
of
at
270
(stating
that
district
court
has
the
filings
were
breach
of
agreement.
14
his
obligations
under
the
III
Taylor
next
contends
that
the
district
court
erred
in
any
event
Taylors
conduct
did
not
rise
to
the
level
government
Taylors
conduct
contends
was
that
obstructive
the
was
courts
not
finding
clearly
that
erroneous
considering
the
district
the
appropriate
court
increased
sentence
Taylors
under
Guidelines
attempted
justice
with
to
obstruct
respect
to
or
the
impede,
the
investigation,
administration
prosecution,
of
or
(Emphasis
added).
633
(alteration
F.3d
312,
320
(4th
Cir.
2011)
in
original)
(quoting United States v. Romulus, 949 F.2d 713, 717 (4th Cir.
1991)).
Taylor
argues
that
we
cannot
be
confident
that
the
culpable
state
of
mind
and
suggests
that
the
court
argument.
The court concluded multiple times that Taylor himself had
acted with the requisite intent.
hearing,
the
court
described
deliberateness
of
Taylors
with
[this
case].
The
court
then
described
the
the
justice.
court
system
and
the
proper
administration
of
it is creating for the justice system, the court did not impute
to Taylor a state of mind derived from those other cases.
After
making its observation about the rise of the flesh and blood
defense generally, the court turned to the facts of this case
and concluded that this is clearly a case with the requisite
intent.
(Emphasis added).
Taylor also contends that the record does not show that he
willfully obstructed or impeded the administration of justice.
He
argues
that,
to
the
contrary,
the
record
shows
that
he
believed that the flesh and blood defense was a valid legal
defense or even that his action was the product of a mental
disease or defect.
court
Taylor
found
that
deliberately
used
the
The
defense
to
of
defense
is
not
the
kind
of
conduct
that
merits
in
that
the
the
Commentary
examples
to
given
3C1.1,
are
the
Commentary
non-exhaustive
makes
list.
17
United States
this
case,
the
district
court
warned
Taylor
in
open
when
youre
and
presumed
if
to
youre
be
found
innocent,
guilty,
that
if
that
that
could
happens,
affect
and
your
sentence potentially.
Despite these warnings, Taylor continued to file groundless
motions.
18
disruptive
conduct,
resulting
in
the
expenditure
of
to
warrant
Accordingly,
we
reject
application
of
procedurally
the
the
enhancement
under
3C1.1.
the
courts
Taylors
argument
that
enhancement
rendered
Taylors
unreasonable.
We
therefore
do
not
sentence
reach
the
IV
Finally,
Taylor
unreasonable,
challenges
arguing
that
his
the
sentence
court
gave
as
substantively
more
weight
to
an
individualized
assessment
based
on
the
facts
of
the
present case.
Taylor pleaded guilty to four counts of bank larceny, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and convictions under that
statute
are
punishable
by
maximum
sentence
of
20
years
for
these
2B1.1(a)(1).
level
to
offenses
of
7,
pursuant
to
U.S.S.G.
with
application
of
the
obstruction
of
justice
19
months
imprisonment,
the
court
observed
that
sentence
within that range for four bank heists was hopelessly, woefully
inadequate to provide punishment that is sufficient to take into
account all of the factors in Section 3553.
and
determined
that
it
was
necessary
to
impose
amount
included
of
bank
time;
(2)
robbery
Taylors
in
criminal
Virginia
that
history,
had
which
striking
bank
public;
conviction;
(5)
need
to
avoid
Taylor
had
been
and
disparities
robbery,
robbery
the
because
for
virtually
the
(4)
same
the
need
to
protect
unwarranted
prosecuted,
offense
in
20
sentencing
albeit
the
the
for
Eastern
We review every sentence under a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard, regardless of whether the sentence imposed
is
inside,
just
outside,
or
significantly
outside
the
that:
assessment
the
because
court
it
did
imposed
not
make
sentence
an
equal
individualized
to
his
prior
connection
between
the
sentence
imposed
and
the
556,
(alteration
564
added)
(4th
(quoting
Cir.
2007)
United
States
v.
21
in
Booker,
original)
(emphasis
543
220,
U.S.
246
(2005)).
inadequate sentence for four bank heists, the court pointed to,
among
other
things,
the
63-month
sentence
that
the
district
court had given Taylor for virtually the same offense conduct.
This is not a case like United States v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1244,
1260 (10th Cir. 2007), where the court sentenced the defendant
for
an
entirely
different,
and
far
more
serious,
crime.
when
considering
the
nature
and
circumstances
of
the
second
point
is
that
the
court
emphasized
criminal
history
influenced
3553(a)
it.
as
factors
one
Taylor
and
among
also
properly
considered
many
those
argues
of
on
this
Taylors
factors
point
that
that
the
While
variance
sentence.
We
therefore
conclude
that
the
district
and
carefully
diagnosis.
considered
Taylors
psychosocial
disorder
impermissibly
considered
rehabilitation,
in
violation
of
the
treatment
rehabilitation.
(2011).
shows
program
or
otherwise
to
the
promote
court
did
not
determine
the
The record
length
of
an
To the
mental
health
needs.
It
simply
and
permissibly
23
AFFIRMED
24